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

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ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS:

FORTY-EIGHT VOLUMES.

—(14.)—

EAST INDIA—*continued.*

LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
NATIVE JURISDICTION OVER BRITISH SUBJECTS.

Session
15 *February* —— 25 *August* 1883.

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ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS:

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FOURTEENTH VOLUME.

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India Office,
2nd March 1883.

J. K. CROSS,
Under Secretary of State.

PART I.

(*Mr. Stanhope.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
15 *March* 1883.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

(Financial, No. 51.)

SIR, India Office, London, October 13, 1881.

Para. 1. Your Excellency is doubtless aware of the general principles upon which the various Local Governments in India are permitted to have the management of certain revenues, and the responsibility for certain expenditure. While the special circumstances of one Province may have afforded to it exceptional advantages, I believe there is no doubt that, taken on the whole, the system has been productive of very great advantage to both the supreme and the local authorities, and that, through the greater freedom which the latter derive therefrom, a great many minor causes of friction have been removed.

2. I am not aware of the reasons which prevented the acceptance in 1877–78 by Madras, as by other Local Governments, of the extension of their provincial system of finance, which still remains on the footing on which it was first introduced by Lord Mayo's Government, but I think it is so desirable that those enlargements of the powers and responsibilities of the Local Government should be adopted there which have been introduced in other parts of India, that I request that the subject may receive early attention from your Excellency, and that you will endeavour to make an arrangement with the Government of India which shall be mutually satisfactory.

3. I have addressed a similar communication to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
HARTINGTON.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

(Financial, No. 291.)

MY LORD MARQUIS, Simla, November 12, 1881.

WE HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's Despatch No. 51, dated the 13th of October, on the subject of the extension of the provincial system of finance to the Madras Presidency.

2. In reply we beg to forward copies of the communications specified in the margin, from which it will be observed that the subject had already engaged our attention, and that the Government of Madras have been invited to join in the new arrangements which we have in contemplation.

Resolution No. 3353, dated September 30, 1881.
Letter to Madras No. 3515, dated October 10, 1881.
Circular No. 4070, dated November 9, 1881.

3. When these arrangements have been completed, they will be fully reported to your Lordship in accordance with established custom.

We have, &c.
W. STOKES.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.

RESOLUTION by the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce dated September 30, 1881, No. 3353.

RESOLUTION.—These proceedings* contain the record of the existing agreements with the several Local Governments for the administration of the provincial services.

2. These agreements are the outcome of what is popularly known as Lord Mayo's decentralisation scheme of 1870. The principles of that scheme could in 1870 only be applied in a limited and tentative manner. Certain heads of expenditure were handed over to the more unfettered control of Local Governments, together with the means of providing for them, consisting partly of the receipts under the same heads, and partly of a fixed consolidated allotment from the Imperial revenue. The Governments were to use as they pleased any surplus, but to make good any deficit, resulting from their administration.

3. In 1877 an important advance was made by handing over to certain Governments heads of revenue, but also introducing the principle of Provincial responsibility for works constructed for mere Local and Provincial purposes. At the same time were issued (Resolution, Financial Department, No. 1709 of 22nd March 1877) new "rules and conditions," which are still the standard, for the administration by the Governments of all revenues and services handed over to them. All the Governments except that of Madras, which remains under the arrangements of 1870, readily accepted the more independent position offered to them; and in 1877, or subsequently, have entered into revised agreements of more or less extended scope, the latest (for Assam and British Burma) affecting almost all heads of revenue and expenditure. These agreements were in some cases for short terms, and all either have expired already, or will expire with the current year, except the two last specified, which extend to 1882–3. These two it is proposed, with the consent of the Local Governments concerned, to terminate on the 31st March next, in order to secure an early establishment of the decentralisation system in all the Provinces on a uniform and extended basis.

4. In the first place, it is now proposed to apply to the whole of India the principle upon which the most recent settlement, namely, that with Burma in 1879, was framed. That principle is that, instead of giving Local Governments a fixed sum of money to make good any excess of provincialised expenditure over provincialised receipts, a certain proportion of the Imperial revenue of each Province should be devoted to this object. Certain heads, as few in number as possible, are wholly or with minute local exceptions only, reserved as Imperial; others are divided, in proportions for the most part equal, between Imperial and Provincial; the rest are wholly or with minute local exceptions only, made Provincial. The balance of transfers being against the Local Governments, is rectified for each Province by a fixed percentage on its Land Revenue (otherwise reserved as Imperial), except in Burma where the percentage is extended to the Imperial rice export duty and salt revenue also. The advantage of this system over that which now generally prevails is, that the Provincial Governments will be given a direct interest, not only in the provincialised revenue, but also in the most important item of Imperial revenue raised within their own Province.

5. Another important change which is contemplated requires somewhat fuller explanation. In the resolution No. 3334, dated 14th December 1870, the Imperial Government, speaking broadly, announced a policy of divesting itself of both responsibility and control within certain limits, but a reservation was made (paragraph 17) of power to modify the resources granted, in the event of "some fiscal misfortune "such as heavy loss in the opium revenue, or national disaster, such as war or severe "famine." On two occasions already within a decade this reservation has been acted on. On the occasion of the great famine of 1876–77 in Western and Southern India, the Supreme Government necessarily came to the rescue of the Local Governments in meeting the enormous outlay involved; but it directed that all Provincial and Local resources must be exhausted before Imperial aid could be supplied. This decision was unexceptionable in the sense in which it was meant; but it may have led to developments which were not altogether intended. The second occasion on which the

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* Various Accounts and Finance Proceedings from January 1871 to June 1879.

reservation has been acted on is that of the Afgan war. The Local Governments were called upon during the years 1879-80 and 1880-81 to contribute £670,000 from the resources made their own by the decentralisation policy, and in the Financial Statement of 1880–81 (paragraph 170) the hope was expressed that they had been able "to afford this timely help to the general finances with little apparent difficulty." The circumstances of the time were, without doubt, peculiar, and the strain upon the finances was undoubtedly severe. But the sudden suspension of improvements in progress, the starvation of public works, and the discouragement of care and economy by requiring a surrender of their results could not, in themselves, be otherwise than prejudicial.

6. In modification, therefore, of the reservation hitherto in force, it is proposed to declare, on the one hand, that the Local Governments must look for no special aid from the Imperial Government except in the case of severe famine (and then only within limits to which allusion will presently be made); and on the other, that the Imperial Government will make no demand on them except in the case of disaster so abnormal as to exhaust the Imperial reserves and resources, and to necessitate a suspension of the entire machinery of public improvement throughout the Empire.

7. The question of relief to be afforded on the occasion of severe famine presents considerable difficulties. It has been suggested that each Local Government should be held responsible for a fixed share of any expenditure incurred on famine relief, and that exceptional cases may be left for exceptional treatment at the time. To this course the objections are that any fixed share of the expenditure will always be either too much or too little, and that a time of actual famine is a bad time for driving bargains and defining responsibilities. It is obvious that the Provincial Government ought to have a direct interest in keeping down relief expenditure, and equally so that a Provincial Government, emerging from a great famine, after exhausting all its resources, cannot be saddled with a further liability for interest on Imperial famine expenditure, and will even be crippled in its ordinary administration for many years to come. The real question seems to be, how far should Provincial resources be depleted before Imperial aid steps in.

8. Assuming that Provincial responsibility ought to be enforced within reasonable limits, His Excellency in Council considers that those limits must bear relation to the Provincial resources, not to the relief expenditure. Provincial resources consist of (1) current income during the period of distress; (2) accumulated savings of past years, in excess of the ordinary "working balance"; and (3) the margin of provincialised income over expenditure in normal years, which is the Provincial Government's "profit on the contract" available for public improvements. Upon these, provincial responsibility will be enforced in proportion to their nature. The first should be entirely exhausted, every avoidable expense in every department being retrenched, and the Public Works grants being applied to famine works to the very utmost possible. The second should be drawn upon up to two-thirds only of their total amount. The third will, in the first place, be made liable to whatever extent may be necessary in addition to the ordinary Public Works grants, for the completion of works begun as relief works under the pressure of famine. In cases where no such need for completion remains after a famine, this third resource will be chargeable up to one-fourth, at most, for payment of interest of Imperial loans (if any) which have been raised to meet the excess cost of that famine in the Province.

9. In connexion with this subject, His Excellency in Council is pleased to declare that, though unable to give any absolute pledge at this early period, it is his intention, in the event of a sufficient surplus accruing at the close of the current financial year, to restore to the Provincial Governments the contributions, as per margin, which they made to the Imperial Government in the years 1879–80 and 1880–81, on receipt of satisfactory assurances that these amounts will be devoted to Productive Public Works.

Provinces.	1879-80.	1880-81.	Totals in lakhs.
Bengal	10	10	20
North-Western Provinces	7½	7½	15
Bombay	4	4	8
Punjab	3	3	6
Burma	3	3	6
Central Provinces	2½	2½	5
Madras	2	2	4
Assam	1½	1½	3
Totals	33½	33½	67

10. There is, however, another very important question which is intimately connected with the general scheme for the decentralisation of finance, namely, the development of self-government. Allusion was prominently made to this point in the 23rd paragraph of the Resolution of December 14th, 1870, in the following terms :—

"But beyond all this there is a greater and wider object in view. Local interest, supervision, and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical charity, and local public works. The operation of this Resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal institutions, and for the association of Natives and Europeans to a greater extent than heretofore in the administration of affairs.

In pursuance of the policy thus laid down, considerable progress has been made since 1870. The bulk of the local rates and cesses now existing has been imposed since that date; in some Provinces a portion of these have been entrusted to the management of Committees; in others, such as Bombay, the Committees previously existing have made great advances in resources and in efficiency. Municipalities, also, have increased in number and usefulness. At the same time, it must be admitted that there has been greater inequality in the progress in the direction of self-government attained in the various Provinces than their respective circumstances can be altogether held to justify. There undoubtedly exists very great variety in the weight of the burdens borne by different localities, and very great diversity in the objects for which the latter are called on to provide. The inequality sometimes produces a sense of injustice; the objects are often those the advantage or local obligation of which the people are least able to understand. Matters such as primary education and minor public works, which have in some provinces been for many years under local management with acknowledged advantage, are in others reserved to the Provincial Government, while heavy contributions are levied from municipalities for Police, in the administration of which they necessarily can take no part.

11. His Excellency the Governor General in Council is, therefore, of opinion that the time has now arrived when further practical development may be afforded to the intentions of Lord Mayo's government, and that the Provincipal agreements should no longer exclude from all consideration the mass of taxation under Local and Municipal management, together with the similar resources still retained in Provincial control, and ignore the question of local self-government. The Provincial Governments, while being now largely endowed from Imperial sources, may well, in their turn, hand over to local self-government considerable revenues, at present kept in their own hands, but similar in kind to many which have long been "locally" managed with success by Committees, partly composed of non-official members, and subject only to a general remedial control reserved to the State by the legislature. At the same time, such items should be generally made Local as the people are most likely to be able to understand the use of and to administer well. His Excellency would, therefore, invite the Local Governments to undertake a careful scrutiny of Provincial, Local, and Municipal accounts, with the view of ascertaining (1) what items of receipt and charge can be transferred from "Provincial" to "Local" heads, for administration by Committees comprising non-official, and, wherever possible, elected members, and what items already "Local" but not so administered, might suitably be so; (2) what redistribution of items is desirable in order to lay on Local and Municipal bodies those which are best understood and appreciated by the people; (3) what measures, legislative or otherwise, are necessary to ensure more local self-government. Incidentally to the scrutiny they will probably notice, and might carefully consider (4) ways of equalising local and municipal taxation throughout the Empire, checking severe or unsuitable imposts, and favouring forms most in accordance with popular opinion or sentiment. The Government of India have already made some preliminary inquiries in the same direction, the results of which will shortly be communicated to the several Local Governments for consideration in conjunction with their own.

12. Appended to this Resolution are a schedule showing the heads under which it is proposed to make assignments for Provincial services, and a figured statment of its actual operation, if applied to the estimates of 1881–82, in the case of each Government. Both are subject to any modifications in the direction of "de-provincialisation," or transfer of funds to local and municipal bodies, which may result from the inquiries instituted in accordance with the preceding paragraph. The following remarks are offered in explanation of the schedule.

13. It is deemed expedient that the Imperial and Provincial Governments should have joint and equal interests in the net revenue from Forests, Excise, Assessed

Taxes, Stamps, and Registration, including Record Room Fees. Such a joint interest in the more important of these revenues already practically exists in most Provinces, although in a somewhat complex form. Regarding Registration, however, it may be observed that the present policy of the Government of India is not to look upon it as a source of revenue.

14. The Imperial Government will, henceforth, claim no share in the revenue from Provincial Rates, which will be appropriated wholly by the Local Governments.

15. The Medical Establishments have not hitherto been included in the provincial services, except in the case of Bombay and British Burma, because their cost is not immediately within the control of the Local Governments. But experience shows that these items are subject to little fluctuation; and it seems simpler and better now to include them in the provincial allotments. The Ecclesiastical Establishments are, to some extent, in a similar position, but it appears desirable, for various reasons, that they should, for the present, be provincially administered outside the new arrangements, on the fixed allotment system.

16. With respect to Pensions some of the Local Governments have hitherto objected to become responsible for them, because the pensioners of one Government may draw their pensions from treasuries under another Government. But, as it is evidently desirable that the Government which grants a pension or gratuity should be responsible for its cost, the Governor General in Council has lately, in order to obviate that objection, allowed the inter-provincial adjustment of expenditure on pensions.

In the same way, it is proposed to allow the inter-provincial adjustment of revenue collected by one Local Government for another (such for example, as the excise on spirit distilled, or on fermented liquors and drugs produced in India, when carried by land or sea, and under bond or otherwise, into some other Province).

None of these adjustments will appear in the Finance and Revenue Accounts; they will be effected outside these accounts by clearing or cancelling arrangements under the supervision of the Comptroller General, who will record all claims established, after mutual correspondence, by one Local Government against another or against the Imperial Government, and adjust them by periodical transfers from the balances of the debtor Governments to those of the creditor Governments.

17. Railways, Irrigation and Navigation, and other Public Works.—The extent to which these works have up to the present time been provincialised is shown in the margin. Under the arrangements now in force, each Local Government bears, as a provincial charge, interest on the whole imperial part of the capital cost of every such work in its jurisdiction, of which capital and revenue accounts are kept, whether such cost has been recorded under 38 Productive Public Works or under some other ordinary head, and is entirely responsible for its construction and administration. The connexion of the Government of India with such works is confined to the enforcement of the rules and tests prescribed by itself or the Secretary of State, and to the provision of the funds required from the Imperial Treasury under the head of Productive Public Works. The Local Governments do not, of course, pay interest upon any part of the capital cost of such works which has been provided from Provincial Revenues, or by means of Local Debenture Loans the interest on which is a Provincial charge.

* In thousands of rupees.	Railways. Miles.	Irrigation Works, gross including indirect Revenue.
Now provincialised - - - -	1,181	60,83
Now imperial - - - -	2,463	2,35,48
Total -	3,644	2,96,31

18. Since the time, however, when the arrangements just described were matured, Public Works Policy and prospects have altered most materially. The "Famine Relief and Insurance" annual allotment has been permanently fixed, the invocation of private interprise is producing a response the limits and effects of which no one can now foresee, and the resources of the Empire for public works will require manipulation, as a whole, from new standpoints, and for the attainment of hitherto uncontemplated ends. Under these circumstances, it seems to be unwise, and might prove to be improvident, to stereotype, much more to alter hastily the *status quo*. Irrigation works will, probably, still be constructed almost entirely by the State, in which case

provincialisation may still be freely pursued; but as regards railways, the future is altogether uncertain. The Governor General in Council desires to make the administration of all these services as far as possible Provincial, but is unable, for the reasons explained, to give more than a general declaration of intention to provincialise hereafter every work which, on mature consideration, proves suitable for such treatment. Existing provincialisations will not be now interfered with, but should be considered to be provisional only.

19. The financial result shown in the figured statement may be summarised as under; the percentage of land revenue to be assigned to produce equilibrium is added :—

Provinces.	Revenues.*			Expenditure.*			Percentage of land revenue to be assigned to cover differences.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	
Bengal - -	6,76,58,8	4,06,26,2	10,82,85,0	48,81,5	4,06,26,2	4,55,07,7	38·4864
Madras - -	6,03,75,3	2,11,72,9	8,15,48,2	77,74,1	2,11,72,9	2,89,47,0	26·8838
Bombay - - -	4,33,01,3	3,38,51,0	7,71,52,3	71,38,5	3,38,51,0	4,09,89,5	58·5554
N. W. P. and Oudh -	5,18,50,0	2,79,46,0	7,97,96,0	32,51,6	2,79,46,0	3,11,97,6	22·3955
Punjab - -	1,47,05,0	1,43,57,0	2,90,62,0	27,73,7	1,43,57,0	1,71,30,7	43·2934
Central Provinces -	53,89,1	65,72,9	1,19,62,0	14,25,7	65,72,9	79,98,6	48·4626
Assam - - -	33,39,3	39,52,7	72,92,0	7,19,1	39,52,7	46,71,8	49·8224
British Burma -	1,31,66,9	1,05,60,1	2,37,27,0	22,75,9	1,05,60,1	1,28,36,0	33·6150
Total -	25,97,85,7	15,90,38,8	41,88,24,5	3,02,40,1	15,90,38,8	18,92,78,9	—

* In hundreds of rupees.

The above figures thus fall into the Budget Estimate of 1880–81, upon which the statement is based :—

	Revenues.*	Expenditure.
Amount comprised in the Provincial arrangement as above - - -	41,88,24,5	18,92,78,9
„ excluded as entirely Local - - - - - -	2,75,16,0	3,06,13,0
„ reserved as exclusively Imperial - - - - -	25,78,26,5	47,57,25,1
Total - -	70,41,67,0	69,56,17,0

* In hundreds of rupees.

Nearly three-fifths of the revenues, and above one-fourth of the expenditure of British India, would thus be "provincialised"; that is to say, the Provincial Governments would have to a greater or less extent, according to the circumstances of each head, an interest in, and responsibility for, their administration.

20. While thus inviting the Local Governments to assume new obligations, the Government of India has assigned to them, simultaneously, the means of discharging these obligations. The prospects of the revenues which it is proposed to divide between the Central and Local Governments, as well as of those which will be exclusively provincial, are good, and the details of the administration will be so completely in the hands of the Local Governments, that they will be able effectually to promote economy as well as to develop the revenues. Their share of the increased resources thus

obtained will be at their free disposal, subject always to standing rules to be made from time to time. After such modifications as may be made upon a consideration of the criticisms of the Local Governments, it is intended that this scheme should supersede all the existing contracts, with effect from the beginning of the financial year 1882–83.

21. The views of the Local Governments on this Resolution should reach the Government of India as early as possible. The object being simplicity and uniformity combined with a complete development of the policy that it is expedient that a Local Government should possess a substantial independent interest in the improvement of the revenues which it collects, and the restriction of the expenditure which it incurs, the Governor General in Council anticipates the cordial co-operation of the Local Governments in this measure, and is confident that objections thereto will not be made inconsiderately.

ORDERED, that this Resolution be communicated to the Home, Foreign, Military, and Public Works Departments, as also to the Comptroller General and Accountants General, for information, and to the several Local Governments for immediate consideration, and that it be published in the *Gazette of India*.

T. C. HOPE,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Revised Scheme of Provincial Assignments for Provincial Services.

(It is to be understood that these proposals refer, generally, only to items recorded in the Accounts of the several Provinces, whether Civil or Public Works, and do not refer to items recorded in the Accounts of the Central Government only, such, for example, as the Mint, and Imperial Post Office and Telegraph Revenues, the Revenues of Ajmere and Coorg, the Guaranteed Railways or the East Indian, Frontier, Rajputana or Central India State Railways.)

REVENUES.			EXPENDITURE.		
	Imperial.	Provincial.		Imperial.	Provincial.
I.—Land Revenue	The whole except as entered in the Provincial column.	In *Burma*, Fisheries; in the *North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, collections from the Terai, Bhabar and Dudhi estates, Rents of Water Mills and Stone Quarries; and, in *Bombay*, Rents of Resumed Service Lands and Service Commutations. In all Provinces, a fixed per-centage on the Imperial Land Revenue to cover the difference between the Provincial Revenue and the Provincial Expenditure.	1.—Interest	The whole except as entered in the Provincial column.	Interest on Local Debenture Loans. 4½ per cent. on the capital cost to the commencement of the year, and 2½ per cent. on the capital cost during the year, of all Public Works, whether classified as *Productive Public Works* or not, of which capital and revenue accounts are kept; excepting, always, any portion of their cost supplied from Provincial Revenues or by Local Debenture Loans. The rate of interest on the cost of *Protective Public Works* will be the subject of special agreement.
II.—Tributes	The whole	Nil.	2.—Interest on Service Funds and other accounts.	Interest on Service Funds and deposits in Savings Banks.	The remainder.
III.—Forest	Half	Half.	3.—Refunds and Drawbacks.	Of the Imperial share of the revenues.	Of the Provincial share of the revenues.
IV.—Excise	Ditto	Ditto.	4.—Land Revenue	The same per-centage on charges for collection of Land Revenue and on the cost of Surveys (including expenditure hitherto charged in the Accounts of the Central Government) and Settlements, elsewhere than in *Bombay* and *Madras*, as is retained of Land Revenue.	The remainder.
V.—Assessed Taxes.	Ditto	Ditto.			
VI.—Provincial Rates.	Nil	The whole.			
VII.—Customs	All except as entered in the Provincial column.	All items other than Customs Duties; and, in *Burma* only, the same per-centage on the Export Duties as on the Land Revenue.	5.—Forest	Half	Half.
			6.—Excise	Ditto	Ditto.
			7.—Assessed Taxes	Ditto	Ditto.
			8.—Provincial Rates	Nil	The whole.
			9.—Customs	Ditto	Ditto.
VIII.—Salt	Ditto	All items other than Duty on Salt and Sale of Salt; and, in *Burma* only, the same per-centage on the Salt Revenue as on the Land Revenue.	10.—Salt	In *Madras* the whole. Elsewhere the purchase and manufacture of salt; and, in *Bengal*, the cost of preventive lines and operations; in *Bombay* charges connected with the administration of Salt Revenue in Portuguese India.	The remainder.
IX.—Opium	The whole	Nil.	11.—Opium	The whole	Nil.
X.—Stamps	Half	Half.	12.—Stamps	Half	Half.
			13.—Registration	Ditto	Ditto.
XI.—Registration.	Ditto	Ditto.	15.—Post Office	Nil	The whole.
XIII.—Post Office	Nil	The whole.	16.—Telegraph	Ditto	Ditto.
XIV.—Minor Departments.	Ditto	Ditto.	17.—Administration	Account and Currency Offices and Allowances to Presidency Banks.	The remainder.
XVI.—Law and Justice.	Ditto	Ditto.			
XVII.—Police	Ditto	Ditto.			
XVIII.—Marine	As at present	As at present.	18.—Minor Departments.	Archæological and Meteorological Departments, Censuses, Gazetteers, and Statistical Memoirs.	Ditto.
XIX.—Education	Nil	The whole.			
XX.—Medical	Ditto	Ditto.	19.—Law and Justice	Nil	The whole.
XXI.—Stationery and Printing.	Ditto	Ditto.	20.—Police	Frontier Police and Police employed on Imperial State Railways and on Salt preventive duties.	The remainder.
			21.—Marine	Whatever is now Imperial	What is now Provincial in each Province.
			22.—Education	Ditto	The whole.
			23.—Ecclesiastical	The whole	Nil.
XXII.—Interest	All except as entered in Provincial column.	Interest on Government Securities (Provincial).	24.—Medical	Nil	The whole.
			25.—Stationery and Printing.	Stationery purchased for Central Stores.	The remainder, including cost of stationery obtained from the Central Stores.
XXIII.—Pensions	Book transfers from the Military and Medical Funds and subscriptions to these Funds.	The remainder.	26.—Political	The whole	Nil.
			27.—Allowances and Assignments.	The whole except as in the Provincial column.	In *Bombay*, items now Provincial.
			28.—Civil Furlough and Absentee Allowances.	The whole	Nil.
XXIV.—Miscellaneous.	Gain by Exchange on Imperial Transactions, Premia on Bills and Unclaimed Bills of Exchange.	Ditto.	29.—Superannuations.	Items not provided for in the Provincial column.	All pensions and gratuities, except pensions payable from the Military and Medical funds, brought to account in India; each Government being responsible for the pensions and gratuities which it now pays, or, hereafter grants or recommends, however earned and wherever paid.
XXV.—Railway	As at present	Whatever is now Provincial in each Province.			
XXVI.—Irrigation and Navigation.	Ditto	Ditto.	30.—Miscellaneous	Remittance of treasure, and discount on Supply Bills.	The remainder.
			31.—Famine Relief	See paragraph 7 of Resolution.	See paragraph 7 of Resolution.
XXVII.—Other Public Works.	Receipts from Military Works.	The remainder.	32.—Railways	As at present	Whatever is now Provincial.
			33.—Irrigation	Ditto	Ditto.
			34.—Other Public Works.	Military Public Works, and, except in *British Burma*, Offices of the Supreme Government; Works in the Salt, Opium, Post Office, Imperial Telegraph and Ecclesiastical Departments, and on Mints and Currency Offices; and the Bengal Surveyor General's Offices.	The remainder.
XXXI.—Gain by Exchange on Transactions with London.	The whole	Nil.	38.—Loss by Exchange.	The whole	Nil.

PART I.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE.

Part I.

Revenue.	Central Provinces.			British Burma.			Assam.			Bengal.		
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	(Omit-Rs.
I.—Land Revenue	31,28,3	29,41,7	60,70,0	66,61,7	45,38,3	1,12,00,0	19,41,9	19,28,1	38,70,0	2,30,25,8	1,44,06,2	3,74,32,0
III.—Forests	5,80,5	5,80,5	11,61,0	7,10,0	7,10,0	14,20,0	90,0	90,0	1,80,0	2,93,0	2,93,0	5,86,0
IV.—Excise	9,14,0	9,14,0	18,28,0	8,88,5	8,88,5	17,77,0	9,60,0	9,60,0	19,20,0	42,05,0	42,05,0	*84,10,0
V.—Assessed Taxes	1,35,0	1,35,0	2,70,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	8,00,5	8,00,5	16,01,0
VI.—Provincial Rates	—	2,92,0	2,92,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	3,35,0	3,35,0	—	35,62,0	35,62,0
VII.—Customs	Nil	Nil	Nil	43,27,3	14,22,7	57,50,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	84,26,0	74,0	85,00,0
VIII.—Salt	Nil	Nil	Nil	1,49,4	75,6	2,25,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	2,38,27,0	1,23,0	2,39,50,0
X.—Stamps	5,84,0	5,84,0	11,68,0	3,94,5	3,94,5	7,89,0	3,16,5	3,16,5	6,33,0	58,00,0	58,00,0	1,16,00,0
XI.—Registration	29,0	29,0	58,0	12,5	12,5	25,0	18,5	18,5	37,0	5,37,5	5,37,5	10,75,0
XII.—Post Office	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
XV.—Minor Departments	—	3,0	3,0	—	2,0	2,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	1,65,0	1,65,0
XVI.—Law and Justice	—	5,60,0	5,60,0	—	4,93,0	4,93,0	—	1,64,0	1,64,0	—	18,20,0	18,20,0
XVII.—Police	—	53,0	53,0	—	1,62,0	1,62,0	—	66,0	66,0	—	4,77,0	4,77,0
XVIII.—Marine	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	2,00,0	2,00,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	11,75,0	11,75,0
XIX.—Education	—	82,0	82,0	—	35,0	35,0	—	22,0	22,0	—	4,97,0	4,97,0
XX.—Medical	—	3,0	3,0	—	9,0	9,0	—	1,0	1,0	—	1,65,0	1,65,0
XXI.—Stationery and Printing	—	19,0	19,0	—	5,0	5,0	—	1,0	1,0	—	1,05,0	1,05,0
XXII.—Interest	15,0	—	15,0	12,0	Nil	12,0	11,0	1,0	12,0	7,27,0	15,0	7,42,0
XXIII.—Superannuation	—	2,0	2,0	—	5,0	5,0	—	1,0	1,0	—	76,0	76,0
XXIV.—Miscellaneous	1,0	10,0	11,0	5,0	22,0	27,0	—	30,0	30,0	12,0	6,65,0	6,77,0
XXV.—Railways	—	3,00,0	3,00,0	—	14,50,0	14,50,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	31,10,0	31,10,0
XXVI.—Irrigation and Navigation.	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	36,0	36,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	18,73,0	18,73,0
XXVII.—Other Public Works	2,3	64,7	67,0	6,0	99,0	1,05,0	1,4	18,6	20,0	5,0	6,82,0	6,87,0
Total	53,89,1	65,72,9	1,19,62,0	1,31,66,9	1,05,60,1	2,37,27,0	33,39,3	39,52,7	72,92,0	6,76,58,8	4,06,26,2	10,82,85,0

* The following adjustments have been made on account of Shahjehanpur Rum, the duty on which will be credited to the Government of the Province in which the rum is consumed:—

Added to Bengal	1,10,0	Deducted, from North-Western Provinces 2,20,0.
„ Punjab	1,00,0	
„ Bombay	10,0	
	2,20,0	

Part I.

North-Western Provinces and Oudh.			Punjab.			Madras.			Bombay.			Total.		
Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.
ting 00.) Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
4,56,37,7	1,34,52,3	5,90,90,0	1,16,17,5	88,69,5	2,04,87,0	3,42,98,8	1,26,11,2	4,69,10,0	1,29,10,0	2,49,94,0	3,79,04,0	13,92,21,7	8,37,41,3	22,29,63,0
5,90,0	5,90,0	11,80,0	3,75,0	3,75,0	7,50,0	2,10,0	2,10,0	4,20,0	8,25,0	8,25,0	16,50,0	36,73,5	36,73,5	73,47,0
17,40,0	17,40,0	*34,80,0	5,75,0	5,75,0	*11,50,0	30,50,0	30,50,0	61,00,0	27,05,0	27,05,0	*54,10,0	1,50,37,5	1,50,37,5	3,00,75,0
6,24,5	6,24,5	12,69,0	2,40,0	2,4 0,0	4,80,0	2,40,0	2,40,0	4,80,0	7,00,0	7,00,0	14,00,0	27,50,0	27,50,0	55,00,0
—	11,37,0	11,37,0	—	4,94,0	4,94,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	58,20,0	58,20,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	23,78,0	42,0	24,20,0	69,24,	76,0	70,00,0	2,20,55,3	16,14,7	2,36,70,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1,58,52,0	48,0	1,59,00,0	1,47,64,0	36,0	1,48,00,0	5,45,92,4	2,82,6	5,48,75,0
27,50,0	27,50,0	55,00,0	16,25,0	16,25,0	32,50,0	27,13,5	27 13,5	54,27,0	21,40,0	21,40,0	42,80,0	1,63,23,5	1,63,23,5	3,26,47,0
3,00,0	3,00,0	6,00,0	1,17,5	1,17,5	2,35,0	2,85,0	2,85,0	5,70,0	1,43,0	1,43,0	2,86,0	14,43,0	14,43,0	28,86,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	—	27,0	27,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	27,0	27,0
—	70,0	70,0	—	39,0	39,0	—	1,01,0	1,01,0	—	26,0	26,0	—	4,06,0	4,06,0
—	10,41,0	10,41,0	—	8,00,0	8,00,0	—	7,50,0	7,50,0	—	7,00,0	7,00,0	—	63,28,0	63,28,0
—	3,80,0	3,80,0	—	1,30,0	1,30,0	—	4,44,0	4,44,0	—	2,38,0	2,38,0	—	19,50,0	19,50,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	5,0	14,0	19,0	—	50,0	50,0	50	14,39,0	14,44,0
—	87,0	87,0	—	76,0	76,0	—	1,65,0	1,65,0	—	1,86,0	1,86,0	—	11,50,0	11,50,0
—	11,0	11,0	—	17,0	17,0	—	49,0	49,0	—	89,0	89,0	—	3,44,0	3,44,0
—	1,07,0	1,07,0	—	1,84,0	1,84,0	15,0	36,0	51,0	15,0	35,0	50,0	30,0	4,92,0	5,22,0
1,89,0	12,0	2,01,0	1,34,0	33,0	1,67,0	7,83,0	2,0	7,85,0	17,64,0	59,0	18,23,0	36,35,0	1,22,0	37,57,0
—	20,0	20,0	—	37,0	37,0	5,20,0	20,0	5,40,0	2,93,0	1,22,0	4,15,0	8,13,0	2,83,0	10,96,0
7,0	2,18,0	2,25,0	9,0	1,13,0	1,22,0	4,0	95,0	99,0	29,0	1,25,0	1,54,0	67,0	12,78,0	13,45,0
—	4,40,0	4,40,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	Nil	—	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	53,00,0	53,00,0
—	40,60,0	40,60,0	—	23,0	23,0	—	1,15,0	1,15,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	61,07,0	61,07,0
1,8	8,96,2	8,98,0	12,0	5,82,0	5,94,0	21,0	1,82,2	2,03,2	89,3	6,02,0	6,91,3	1,38,8	31,26,7	32,65,5
5,18,50,0	2,79,46,0	7,97,96,0	1,47,05,0	1,43,57,0	2,90,62,0	6,03,75,3	2,11,72,9	8,15,48,2	4,33,01,3	3,38,51,0	7,71,52,3	25,97,85,7	15,90,38,8	41,88,24,5

Part I.

EXPENDITURE.	Central Provinces.			British Burma.			Assam.			Bengal.		
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	(Omit-Rs.
1. Interest on Debt	—	2,89,0	2,89,0	—	6,49,0	6,49,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	37,69,0	37,69,0
2. Interest, Other Accounts	14,0	—	14,0	9,0	—	9,0	9,0	—	9,0	1,60,0	2,0	1,62,0
3. Refunds and Drawbacks	15,6	43,4	59,0	66,4	1,02,6	1,69,0	12,5	37,5	50,0	5,51,5	6,88,5	12,40,0
4. Land Revenue	—	6,48,0	6,48,0	10,36,2	10,94,8	21,31,0	2,10,8	6,72,2	8,83,0	1,57,2	29,65,8	31,23,0
5. Forest	3,50,5	3,50,5	7,01,0	5,05,0	5,05,0	10,10,0	80,0	80,0	1,60,0	1,88,0	1,88,0	3,76,0
6. Excise	29,0	29,0	58,0	7,5	7,5	15,0	5,0	5,0	10,0	1,35,0	1,35,0	2,70,0
7. Assessed Taxes	5	5	1,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	50,0	50,0	1,00,0
8. Provincial Rates	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	6,0	6,0	Nil	Nil	Nil
9. Customs	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	2,76,0	2,76,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	7,00,0	7,00,0
10. Salt	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	3,0	3,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	31,0	22,0	53,0
12. Stamps	18,0	18,0	36,0	14,0	14,0	28,0	11,0	11,0	22,0	2,17,0	2,17,0	4,34,0
13. Registration	14,5	14,5	29,0	10,0	10,0	20,0	14,0	14,0	28,0	3,24,0	3,24,0	6,48,0
15. Post Office	—	42,0	42,0	—	12,0	12,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
17. Administration	61,0	3,53,0	4,14,0	72,0	3,81,0	4,53,0	44,0	2,33,0	2,77,0	2,70,0	14,78,0	17,48,0
18. Minor Departments	38,5	27,5	66,0	59,0	81,0	1,40,0	18,0	8,0	26,0	2,13,0	2,86,0	4,99,0
19. Law and Justice	—	12,52,0	12,52,0	—	15,50,0	15,50,0	—	5,68,0	5,68,0	—	93,44,0	93,44,0
20. Police	—	11,69,0	11,69,0	—	16,96,0	16,96,0	62,0	7,68,0	8,30,0	—	41,00,0	41,00,0
21. Marine	1,0	—	1,0	—	5,07,0	5,07,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	12,17,0	12,17,0
22. Education	—	5,53,0	5,53,0	—	3,04,0	3,04,0	—	2,00,0	2,00,0	—	26,90,0	26,90,0
24. Medical	—	2,84,0	2,84,0	—	2,19,0	2,19,0	—	1,11,0	1,11,0	—	15,23,0	15,23,0
25. Stationery and Printing	—	1,14,0	1,14,0	—	1,70,0	1,70,0	—	54,0	54,0	13,00,0	9,48,0	22,48,0
27. Allowances	5,07,0	—	5,07,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	69,0	—	69,0	11,81,0	—	11,81,0
29. Superannuation	—	1,54,0	1,54,0	—	1,26,0	1,26,0	—	55,0	55,0	—	9,74,0	9,74,0
30. Miscellaneous	4,0	22,0	26,0	15,0	20,0	35,0	11,0	55,0	66,0	41,0	3,02,0	3,43,0
32. Railways	—	2,60,0	2,60,0	—	8,90,0	8,90,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	30,90,0	30,90,0
33. Irrigation and Navigation	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	4,27,0	4,27,0	—	1,59,0	1,59,0	—	40,00,0	40,00,0
34. Other Public Works	3,72,1	8,24,5	11,96,6	4,81,8	32,91,2	37,73,0	1,72,8	12,51,0	14,23,8	62,8	53,63,9	54,26,7
Total	14,25,7	64,47,9	78,73,6	22,75,9	1,23,36,1	1,46,12,0	7,19,1	42,87,7	50,06,8	48,81,5	4,43,77,2	4,92,58,7
Provincial Surplus (+)	—	+1,25,0	+1,25,0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Provincial Deficit (−)	—	—	—	—	−17,76,0	−17,76,0	—	−3,35,0	−3,35,0	—	−37,51,0	−37,51,0
Total	14,25,7	65,72,9	79,98,6	22,75,9	1,05,60,1	1,28,36,0	7,19,1	39,52,7	46,71,8	48,81,5	4,06,26,2	4,55,07,7

Part I.

North-Western Provinces and Oudh.			Punjab.			Madras.			Bombay.			Total.		
Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Total.
ting 00.) Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
—	29,48,0	29,48,0	—	70,0	70,0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	77,25,0	77,25,0
47,0	11,0	58,0	18,0	1,0	19,0	6,36,8	2,2	6,39,0	7,95,0	73,0	8,68,0	16,88,8	89,2	17,78,0
1,56,2	1,48,8	3,05,0	32,9	76,1	1,09,0	1,38,4	1,49,6	2,88,0	6,15,1	2,64,9	8,80,0	15,88,6	15,11,4	31,00,0
5,84,4	39,02,6	44,87,0	3,77,1	19,07,9	22,85,0	—	42,26,0	42,26,0	—	66,50,0	66,50,0	23,65,7	2,20,67,3	2,44,33,0
4,27,5	4,27,5	8,55,0	3,00,0	3,00,0	6,00,0	2,07,5	2,07,5	4,15,0	6,00,0	6,00,0	12,00,0	26,58,5	26,58,5	53,17,0
75,5	75,5	1,51,0	29,5	29,5	59,0	1,10,0	1,10,0	2,20,0	96,0	96,0	1,92,0	4,87,5	4,87,5	9,75,0
3,0	3,0	6,0	2,0	2,0	4,0	6,0	6,0	12,0	13,5	13,5	27,0	75,0	75,0	1,50,0
—	4,0	4,0	—	39,0	39,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	49,0	49,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	2,40,0	2,40,0	—	8,44,0	8,44,0	—	20,60,0	20,60,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	14,25,0	—	14,25,0	6,88,0	5,68,0	12,56,0	21,44,0	5,93,0	27,37,0
53,5	53,5	1,07,0	68,5	68,5	1,37,0	71,5	71,5	1,43,0	1,03,5	1,03,5	2,07,0	5,57,0	5,57,0	11,14,0
1,42,5	1,42,5	2,85,0	68,0	68,0	1,36,0	2,09,5	2,09,5	4,19,0	1,45,0	1,45,0	2,90,0	9,27,5	9,27,5	18,55,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	—	83,0	83,0	—	1,07,0	1,07,0	—	90,0	90,0	—	3,34,0	3,34,0
2,24,0	12,39,0	14,63,0	1,58,0	10,66,0	12,24,0	2,99,1	9,54,9	12,54,0	4,31,0	12,09,0	16,40,0	15,59,1	69,13,9	84,73,0
1,75,0	1,59,0	3,34,0	71,0	77,0	1,48,0	1,67,4	3,44,6	5,12,0	99,0	1,54,0	2,53,0	8,40,9	11,37,1	19,78,0
—	54,00,0	54,00,0	—	33,00,0	33,00,0	—	49,40,0	49,40,0	—	53,00,0	53,00,0	—	3,16,54,0	3,16,54,0
—	38,36,0	38,36,0	1,32,0	26,68,0	28,00,0	3,00,0	38,30,0	41,30,0	47,0	39,96,0	40,43,0	5,41,0	2,20,63,0	2,26,04,0
Nil	Nil	Nil	9,0	—	9,0	78,0	12,0	90,0	—	44,0	44,0	88,0	17,80,0	18,68,0
—	8,92,0	8,92,0	—	6,57,0	6,57,0	—	10,58,0	10,58,0	—	10,28,0	10,28,0	—	73,82,0	73,82,0
—	9,38,0	9,38,0	—	5,44,0	5,44,0	—	10,62,0	10,62,0	—	11,36,0	11,36,0	—	58,17,0	58,17,0
—	5,29,0	5,29,0	—	4,24,0	4,24,0	1,15,5	6,73,5	7,89,0	1,50,0	5,12,0	6,62,0	15,65,5	34,24,5	49,90,0
12,00,0	—	12,00,0	7,10,0	—	7,10,0	22,48,0	—	22,48,0	13,56,0	68,60,0	82,16,0	72,71,0	68,60,0	1,41,31,0
—	10,78,0	10,78,0	—	4,67,0	4,67,0	9,12,2	7,85,8	16,98,0	4,44,0	10,54,0	14,98,0	13,56,2	46,93,8	60,50,0
31,0	1,70,0	2,01,0	65,0	1,51,0	2,16,0	45,0	2,35,0	2,80,0	1,30,0	2,00,0	3,30,0	3,42,0	11,55,0	14,97,0
—	3,87,0	3,87,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	46,27,0	46,27,0
—	18,82,0	18,82,0	—	17,0	17,0	—	3,28,0	3,28,0	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	68,13,0	68,13,0
1,32,0	28,73,6	30,05,6	7,32,7	24,00,0	31,32,7	8,04,2	15,37,8	23,42,0	14,25,4	27,14,1	41,39,5	41,83,8	2,02,56,1	2,44,39,9
32,51,6	2,71,00,0	3,03,51,6	27,73,7	1,44,16,0	1,71,89,7	77,74,1	2,10,90,9	2,88,65,0	71,38,5	3,36,55,0	4,07,93,5	3,02,40,1	16,37,10,8	19,39,50,9
—	+8,46,0	+8,46,0	—	—	—	—	+32,0	+32,0	—	+1,96,0	+1,96,0	—	−46,72,0	−46,72,0
—	—	—	—	−59,0	−59,0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
32,51,6	2,79,46,0	3,11,97,6	27,73,7	1,43,57,0	1,71,30,7	77,74,1	2,11,72,9	2,89,47,0	71,38,5	3,38,51,0	4,09,89,5	3,02,40,1	15,90,38,8	18,92,78,9

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

(Financial, No. 3515).

SIR, Simla, October 10, 1881.

I AM directed to submit, for the consideration of his Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks, in continuation of paragraph 11 of the Resolution of the Government of India in this Department, No. 3353, dated the 30th ultimo,* on the subject of the further extension of local self-government.

2. The Provincial expenditure which may at the present time be transferred with greatest advantage to local control appears in the accounts under the heads of Medical, Education, and Public Works; but the Government of India is anxious that no artificial restriction should be imposed on such transfers; and if, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, there should be other items of expenditure under minor Departments, miscellaneous, or any other head of the accounts which can without loss of efficiency be transferred to Local Bodies, the Governor General in Council will be glad to consider favourably any recommendation to that effect which his Excellency may wish to make.

3. His Excellency in Council specially desires that the case of each minor head of Provincial expenditure under Education or Medical Services should be separately considered, and that the reasons for or against transferring it to local management should be distinctly stated. The various heads under minor Departments and miscellaneous need not be considered in detail, but the Governor General in Council will be glad to be favoured with an expression of the views of his Excellency the Governor in Council as regards any items under these heads which it might *primâ facie* seem practicable to transfer to local management and control, even though it may not be deemed expedient to make the transfer at present. All expenditure now charged as local, but not locally administered, should also be considered in detail, and the reasons stated which render it inexpedient, if the case be so, to transfer it to local control. It should also be considered whether any, and what, further expenditure on sanitation, drainage, water supply, and public works might now be made local.

4. His Excellency in Council observes that at present the total annual amount spent on Police by municipalities in British India amounts to about 27½ lakhs of rupees. The only function which the municipalities discharge in regard to police is the provision of funds for the purpose of meeting the whole or a portion of the cost of the Municipal Police Force. They practically exercise no control over the Police, and cannot therefore be expected to take any special interest in the efficiency of the force, or to look with sympathy on a provision of the law which treats them as a machinery for raising taxes to be spent on a department over which they have no control, and in the efficient and economical expenditure of which they have but little direct interest and no immediate responsibility. The Governor General in Council would therefore be glad to see municipal bodies relieved altogether of the charge for police, an equal amount of expenditure on education, medical charity, and, if possible, public works of local interest, being transferred to them with as full control as may be practically expedient over the details of such expenditure.

5. It is not the intention of the Government of India that the proposed transfer of the control of expenditure of a specially local character to local bodies should involve any addition to existing local burdens, and it will therefore be necessary to arrange for the simultaneous transfer of receipts sufficient to meet any net balance of additional expenditure which in any instance may arise. The nature of the receipts to be transferred requires careful consideration. They should, where possible, be of such a character as to afford a reasonable prospect that by careful administration, with all the advantages due to local sympathy, experience, and watchfulness, they will so increase as to afford the means of meeting any additional expenditure which may be rendered necessary by the growing wants of each locality. In cases where a larger augmentation may be needed than is yielded by receipts of a specially local character it may perhaps

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* *See* page 8.

be found possible to assign to local bodies the receipts from pounds or a share of assessed taxes collected within the area of their jurisdiction. All receipts connected with any head of expenditure transferred to local control would, of course, be also transferred at the same time. For instance, all fees paid in schools under local control would be treated as local receipts. The Governor General in Council is anxious, however, in this matter as in all other questions connected with the proposed system of local self-government which must to a great extent be decided on considerations of local expediency, to meet, as far as may be possible, the wishes of the local authorities.

6. The practicability of the transfer of items of Provincial expenditure to local management and control cannot be profitably considered apart from the question of the local bodies to whom such transfers should be made.

The existing local bodies of greatest importance are the municipalities and district committees, and the Governor General in Council will be glad if, in any proposals which his Excellency the Governor in Council makes, advantage be taken as far as possible of the existence of these bodies, their powers being, where necessary, extended by means of legislation.

7. In the case of municipalities all provinces in British India are now provided with legislative enactments sufficient for their constitution and working. But these enactments are, in some, of a much more elementary and incomplete character than in others, and it may be advantageous, while providing for any changes necessarily entailed by the transfers of receipts and charges now contemplated, for each Province to review all contemporary Indian legislation on the subject, and consider what improvements of a general nature are desirable.

8. With reference to District Committees I am desired to state that his Excellency in Council is disposed *primâ facie* to consider the most desirable and effective policy to be that of concentrating all the local administration, other than that embraced by municipalities, in the hands of one committee for each district, having ancillary subordinate sub-committees for each tahsil or subdivision (as the case may be), of the former the magistrate and collector would be president, of the latter the assistant or deputy in charge of the subdivision would be chairman, and in each case the local body should comprise persons not in the service of Government, and elected or nominated, as may seem best, in a proportion not less than from one-half to two-thirds. In districts where more than one committee now exists for different objects, the possibility of their amalgamation should be considered; where no such committees have yet been formed, their constitution is evidently desirable.

9. In view of one or other of the purposes which have been alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, it appears probable that in most Provinces, though perhaps not in all, legislation will be necessary; and I am therefore to request that, should this be so in the case of Madras, the general outline of the nature of the legislation by which it is proposed to effect the necessary changes may be stated in your reply. Special attention will be required in settling the relations between the various local bodies and the officers of the general administration, and in provining for a certain measure of control and inspection on the part of the Government. It would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government if local bodies were subject to check and interference in matters of detail; and the respective powers of Government and of the various local bodies should be clearly and distinctly defined by statute, so that there may be as little risk of friction and misunderstanding as possible. Within the limits to be laid down in each case, however, the Governor General in Council is anxious that the fullest possible liberty of action should be given to local bodies.

10. The preceding remarks are more or less of general application. In the case of Madras in particular, the distinctive features would appear to be as follows:—

(*a.*) That the mofussil municipal organisation appears to be fairly complete, and that the charge on municipalities for police, though it amounted to less than one lakh of rupees in 1879–80, may be greatly increased at the discretion of the Government of Madras. That the municipal expenditure on Education and Sanitary and Charitable Establishments during the same year amounted to only three lakhs of rupees.

(*b.*) That Local Fund Boards already exist for the administration of all funds comprised under the Madras Local Fund Act of 1871.

(*c.*) That a considerable portion of the expenditure on Education is already met from local funds, and is locally administered, but that this amount appears to be capable of considerable augmentation, and that the same remarks apply to medical expenditure.

In particular, there appears to be no reason why a large proportion of the total provincial expenditure on hospitals and dispensaries should not now be deprovincialised.

(*d.*) That the estimate on provincial and local expenditure on Public Works is Rs. 15,34,000 and Rs. 38,76,000, and that the bulk of the latter, but no portion of the former, is in charge of district committees.

11. His Excellency the Governor of Madras will no doubt take into consideration the question of entrusting a still larger proportion of the expenditure on education, medical services, &c. to the management of the Local Fund Boards, subject to such provincial supervision as may be deemed necessary, and the Governor General in Council would be glad if municipalities could be relieved altogether of the cost of municipal police, some more appropriated educational, sanitary, or other burden being substituted.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that his Excellency the Governor of Madras fully appreciates the importance of the extension of local self-government; that the proposals now put forward will receive the most careful consideration from the Government of Madras, and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a considerable burden on the Local Government and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay, that can possibly be avoided, to occur in their introduction, that he trusts his Excellency the Governor of Madras will find himself in a position to favour the Government of India with an expression of his opinion on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.
STEPHEN JACOB,
Officiating Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, No. 4070. CIRCULATED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, &c.

Simla, the 9th November 1881.

Read again:—

Financial Resolution, No. 3353, dated the 30th September 1881, regarding the further extension of the scheme of Provincial Services.

Resolution:—The Governor General in Council observes that in the statements referred to, in paragraph 12 of the above-mentioned Resolution, the contributions made

from Provincial to Local Funds, and *vice versâ*, have not been taken into account. The amounts thus omitted are as follows:—

(In rupees, omitting 00.)

—	Contributions from Provincial to Local.	Contributions from Local to Provincial.	Net from Provincial to Local.
Assam - - - -	3,47,0	—	3,47,0
Bengal - - - -	1,50,0	2,0	1,48,0
North-West Provinces and Oudh -	6,04,0	5,68,0	36,0
Punjab - - - -	—	2,89,0	—2,89,0
Madras - - - -	1,94,0	98,0	96,0
Bombay - - - -	4,00,0	24,0	3,76,0

2. Thus the effect of the omission has been to under estimate the expenditure of the Provinces named, except Punjab, by the extent of the net amounts shown in the last column.

3. The percentage of Land Revenue, which it is proposed in the Resolution to assign to the Local Governments, will be adjusted accordingly when the new scheme is finally settled.

Ordered that this Resolution be communicated to the Governments of Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, Punjab, Madras, and Bombay, and to the Chief Commissioner of Assam; and also to the Accountants General of those Provinces.

J. E. O'CONOR,
Assistant Secretary to the
Government of India.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(Financial, No. 48.)

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, February 9, 1882.

Para. 1. I have considered in Council your Excellency's Letter, dated the 1st of July 1881, No. 169, in which, with reference to the appointment of an Engineer for the town and district of Akyab, one half of whose pay is to be met by the municipality, and the other by the Incorporated Local Funds of the district, you discuss the question whether appointments under Municipal and Local Fund Boards, and similar local bodies, are, or should be, subject to the restrictions imposed in the case of appointments to the ordinary Government service, including the necessity of reference to Her Majesty's Government when the salary attached to those appointments exceeds a certain amount.

2. In view of the importance of developing local self-government, and the generally successful administration of Local Funds by Local Boards, as well as of the difficulty, even if it were desirable to attempt it, of remodelling the local and municipal fund legislation of India, you propose to issue instructions that Local Bodies, to whom the administration of Local Funds has been committed, are competent, subject to the general restrictions imposed by the Legislature, to create, as well as to abolish, without reference to higher authority, all appointments, the pay of which is chargeable to Local Funds. The power would evidently include that of increasing the salary of an appointment.

3. I agree in the opinions held by your Excellency as to the inexpediency of taking any steps which might have the effect of checking the development of self-government through the action of Municipalities and Local Boards, and I authorise you to issue the proposed instructions.

4. It is important, however, that provision should be made to guard against the imposition of any charge on the general revenues, through the action of the furlough or pension rules, on account of service rendered to Local Boards. In a general way, the question has not been overlooked in the regulations of the Civil Code; but it appears to me that, in a case of mixed service, the Local Body might, by increasing the pay of the officer without the concurrence of the Government, impose on the public revenues a greater charge for furlough allowance or pension than was contemplated by the Government when lending his services to the Local Body; and I request your Excellency to reconsider the rules in this point of view.

I have, &c.
HARTINGTON.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(Financial, No. 51.)

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, February 16, 1882.

Para. 1. With your Letter,* dated the 12th of November, No. 291, I have received a copy of the Resolution issued by order of your Excellency on the 30th of September, regarding the scheme which you propose to introduce with effect from the 1st of April 1882, in order to extend the Provincial system of finance.

2. One of the principles which you are now desirous of applying generally is that of giving to the Local Governments, in order to make good any excess of their expenditure over their receipts, not a fixed sum of money, but a certain proportion of the Imperial revenue of the Province.

3. Another point with which you are dealing is the aid to be given to a Local Government in the case of severe famine, and that which the Local Governments should be called upon to render to the Central Government in the case of anabnormal strain on its resources.

4. As regards the latter, your Excellency proposes to declare that such assistance will not be required unless the Imperial reserves are exhausted, and a suspension of the entire machinery of public improvement throughout the empire is rendered necessary. It appears to me undesirable to pledge your Government to place itself in the position of proving that such a state of matters exists before it could require assistance from the Local Governments; and I think it would be sufficient to state that they would not be called upon to surrender any portion of their revenues, unless your Government saw no alternative between such a course and the imposition of taxation which it was not deemed expedient to undertake.

5. With regard to the aid to be given to a Provincial Government in the case of famine, you propose to declare that, before such help is rendered, the Provincial Government will be required entirely to exhaust its current income, to reduce its expenditure as much as possible, and to apply the Public Works grants to famine works to the very utmost that may be practicable; it will also be called upon to draw on its accumulated savings, in excess of the ordinary working balance, to the extent of two-thirds of the total amount; and, as regards its surplus in years succeeding the famine, to apply it to the completion of the famine relief works, if needed, in addition to the ordinary Public Works grants, and, if that is not necessary, to devote a sum not exceeding one-fourth of the surplus to the payment of interest of any Imperial loans raised to meet the cost of famine in that Province.

6. It is with much pleasure that I observe the expression by your Excellency of a hope that you may be able, out of the surplus of the current year, to restore to the Provincial Governments, on condition that the sums will be devoted to Productive Works, the amount of their contributions to the Central Government in 1879–80 and 1880–81, during the pressure arising from war.

7. You have further invited the Local Governments to consider whether a redistribution of local and municipal receipts and expenditure may not with advantage be effected, the object being to develop the system of self-government, and to entrust to the Municipal Committees such funds and such responsibilities as can be most properly delegated to them.

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* *See* page 7.

8. In a table given in para. 19 of the Resolution, the financial result of your proposals is shown as applied to the Budget Estimate of 1881–82, from which it appears that, out of a total revenue of Rs. 70,41,67,000, only Rs. 25,78,26,500 would be reserved as exclusively Imperial, and Rs. 2,75,16,000 as exclusively Local; in the remainder, amounting to Rs. 41,88,24,500, or nearly three-fifths of the entire revenues, the Provincial Governments would have a more or less direct interest and responsibility. The portion of the total expenditure of Rs. 69,56,17,000 similarly entrusted to the Provincial Governments would be Rs. 18,92,78,900, or upwards of one-fourth of the whole amount.

9. The statement shows the percentage of land revenue of each Province to be assigned to cover the excess of its provincial expenditure over its provincial receipts. This percentage should not be fixed for any definite period, and should be liable to adjustment from time to time as needed. The circumstances of a Province may at any time render it desirable to increase or reduce provincial taxation, in which case it would be requisite to reduce or increase the assignment of land revenue needed to effect an equilibrium between the provincial revenue and expenditure.

10. With these observations, it only remains for me to express a cordial approval of the endeavours which your Excellency is making, towards a completion of the system begun in 1870, and continued in 1877 and 1879, with such excellent effect in affording the Local Governments a real interest in the careful collection of the revenue, the economy of their finances, and the good administration of the territory committed to their charge.

I have, &c.
HARTINGTON.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

(Public No. 35.)

My Lord Marquis, Simla, May 23, 1882.

With reference to our Financial Despatch No. 291, dated 12th November 1881, we have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, copy of a Resolution which we have issued in continuation and explanation of our previous Resolution * on the important question of developing local self-government throughout British India outside the Presidency Towns.

We have, &c.
RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
J. GIBBS.
T. F. WILSON.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.

Resolution of the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, dated 18th May 1882. No. $\frac{17}{745-759}$.

The Governor General in Council in the Resolution* of the Financial Department, dated the 30th September 1881, set out, for the informaton of the Local Governments, the principles upon which it was proposed to revise the agreements then in force for the administration of the Provincial Services, and to establish the decentralised system of finance on a uniform and extended basis. It was explained that intimately connected with this general scheme for the decentralisation of finance was the very important question of developing local self-government. Considerable progress in this direction

* Finance and Commerce No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881. *See* page 8.

had, it was admitted, been made since 1870. A large income from local rates and cesses had been secured, and in some Provinces the management of this income had been freely entrusted to local bodies. Municipalities had also increased in number and usefulness. But there was still, it was remarked, a greater inequality of progress in different parts of the country than varying local circumstances seemed to warrant. In many places services admirably adapted for local management were reserved in the hands of the central administration, while everywhere heavy charges were levied on Municipalities in connexion with the police, over which they had necessarily no executive control.

Paragraph 11 of the Resolution went on to say:—

"His Excellency the Governor General in Council is therefore of opinion that the time has now arrived when further practical development may be afforded to the intentions of Lord Mayo's Government, and that the Provincial agreements should no longer exclude from all consideration the mass of taxation under Local and Municipal management, together with the similar resources still retained in Provincial control, and ignore the question of local self-government. The Provincial Governments, while being now largely endowed from Imperial sources, may well, in their turn, hand over to local self-government considerable revenues, at present kept in their own hands, but similar in kind to many which have long been 'locally' managed with success by Committees, partly composed of non-official members, and subject only to a general remedial control reserved to the State by the Legislature. At the same time, such items should be generally made local as the people are most likely to be able to understand the use of and to administer well. His Excellency would therefore invite the Local Governments to undertake a careful scrutiny of Provincial, Local, and Municipal accounts, with the view of ascertaining (1) what items of receipt and charge can be transferred from 'Provincial' to 'Local' heads, for administration by Committees comprising non-official and, wherever possible, elected members, and what items, already 'Local,' but not so administered, might suitably be so; (2) what redistribution of items is desirable, in order to lay on Local and Municipal bodies those which are best understood and appreciated by the people; (3) what measures, legislative or otherwise, are necessary to ensure more local self-government. Incidentally to the scrutiny they will probably notice, and might carefully consider, (4) ways of equalising local and municipal taxation throughout the Empire, checking severe or unsuitable imposts, and favouring forms most in accordance with popular opinion or sentiment. The Government of India have already made some preliminary inquiries in the same direction, the results of which will shortly be communicated to the several Local Governments for consideration in conjunction with their own."

2. Accordingly, on the 10th October 1881 letters were addressed to the various Local Governments indicating those branches of expenditure which appeared to the Government of India most suited for local control, and inviting each Government to examine any other heads of account which might seem to cover items capable of transfer to such control. It was pointed out that it was not the intention of the Government of India that the proposed transfer of the control of expenditure of a specially local character to local bodies should involve any additions to existing local burdens; and it was therefore shown to be necessary to arrange for the simultaneous transfer of receipts sufficient to meet any net balance of additional expenditure which in any instance might arise. The receipts to be thus transferred should, it was suggested, be such as to afford a prospect that, by careful administration, with all the advantages due to local sympathy, experience and watchfulness, they would be susceptible of reasonable increase. In cases where larger assignments of funds were required, the receipts from pounds, or a share of the assessed taxes collected within the jurisdiction of a local body, were indicated as suitable sources of revenue to be made over. But on this, as on other points, a wide discretion was left to the Local Governments.

3. As regards the character of the local bodies to whom those powers of control and administration were to be entrusted, it was remarked that already in most parts of British India there were in existence Municipal Committees, whose powers might in many cases be advantageously extended, and District Committees for various purposes, which might very well be consolidated into single homogeneous working bodies, with ancillary subordinate committees for each tahsil or sub-division of the district. It was suggested that the Magistrate and Collector should be President of the District Committee, and the Assistant or Deputy Magistrate in charge of the sub-division, President of the subordinate committees; but in each case the local bodies should, it was said,

comprise persons not in the service of Government, and elected or nominated, as might seem best, in a proportion of not less than from one-half to two-thirds of the whole number of members. For the satisfactory development of this plan, it was admitted that legislation would probably be necessary in most provinces, and the Local Governments were invited in their replies to explain the general outlines which such legislation should follow. In regard to this it was said—

"Special attention will be required in settling the relations between the various local bodies and the officers of the general administration, and in providing for a certain measure of control and inspection on the part of Government. It would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government if the local bodies were subject to check and interference in matters of detail; and the respective powers of Government and of the various local bodies should be clearly and distinctly defined by statute, so that there may be as little risk of friction and misunderstanding as possible. Within the limits to be laid down in each case, however, the Governor General in Council is anxious that the fullest possible liberty of action should be given to local bodies."

4. The policy thus enunciated by the Government of India has, on the whole, been loyally, and in some cases cordially, accepted by the Local Governments, several of which have already drawn up schemes for giving effect to it, and have submitted these for the information of the Government of India. The Governor General in Council desires to acknowledge the care and thought with which some of these schemes have been worked out. Upon each the Government of India will communicate hereafter its views in detail to the Local Government concerned. Meantime, however, it will be convenient that the Governor General in Council should explain somewhat more fully than he has hitherto done the general mode in which he would wish to see effect given to the principle of local self-government throughout British India outside the Presidency Towns. This is the more necessary, as further consideration of the subject and examination of the schemes prepared for the different Provinces have suggested the propriety of certain modifications of the plan sketched out in the Circular letters of the 10th October last.

5. At the outset, the Governor General in Council must explain that, in advocating the extension of local self-government, and the adoption of this principle in the management of many branches of local affairs, he does not suppose that the work will be in the first instance better done than if it remained in the sole hands of the Government district officers. It is not, primarily, with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education. His Excellency in Council has himself no doubt that, in course of time, as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely upon local administration, improved efficiency will in fact follow. But at starting there will doubtless be many failures, calculated to discourage exaggerated hopes, and even in some cases to cast apparent discredit upon the practice of self-government itself. If, however, the officers of Government only set themselves, as the Governor General in Council believes they will, to foster sedulously the small beginnings of independent political life; if they accept loyally and as their own the policy of the Government; and if they come to realise that the system really opens to them a fairer field for the exercise of administrative tact and directive energy than the more autocratic system which it supersedes, then it may be hoped that the period of failures will be short, and that real and substantial progress will very soon become manifest.

6. It is not uncommonly asserted that the people of this country are themselves entirely indifferent to the principle of self-government; that they take but little interest in public matters; and that they prefer to have such affairs managed for them by Government officers. The Governor General in Council does not attach much value to this theory. It represents no doubt the point of view which commends itself to many active and well-intentioned district officers; and the people of India are, there can be equally no doubt, remarkably tolerant of existing facts. But as education advances, there is rapidly growing up all over the country an intelligent class of public spirited men, whom it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power, to fail to utilise. The task of administration is yearly becoming more onerous as the country progresses in civilisation and material prosperity. The annual reports of every Government tell of an ever-increasing burden laid upon the shoulders of the local officers. The cry is everywhere for increased establishment. The universal

complaint in all departments is that of overwork. Under these circumstances it becomes imperatively necessary to look around for some means of relief; and the Governor General in Council has no hesitation in stating his conviction, that the only reasonable plan open to the Government is to induce the people themselves to undertake, as far as may be, the management of their own affairs; and to develop, or create if need be, a capacity for self-help in respect of all matters that have not, for Imperial reasons, to be retained in the hands of the representatives of Government.

7. If it be said that the experiments hitherto made in this direction have not been encouraging, the Governor General in Council must avow his belief that the principle has not as yet been, in any general or satisfactory fashion, fully and fairly tried. There is reason to fear that previous attempts at local self-government have been too often overridden and practically crushed by direct, though well-meant, official interference. In the few cases where real responsibility has been thrown upon local bodies and real power entrusted to them, the results have been very gratifying. There is even now a vast amount of assistance rendered to the administration by Honorary Magistrates, members of Municipal Corporations and other Committees; and there is no antecedent improbability in the theory that if non-official auxiliary agency were more thoroughly organised and more fully trusted, there would be a speedy and marked improvement, not only in its amount, but in its efficiency.

8. Holding, therefore, that it is the duty and interest of the ruling power to take care that the further advance which it is now proposed to make in the direction of local self-government shall be, though cautious, yet at the same time real and substantial, the Governor General in Council will proceed to indicate, for the guidance of the Provincial Administrations, the general principles upon which, in the judgment of the Government of India, these measures should be shaped. The subject may for the purposes of this Resolution be divided into two parts—the first, relating to the mode in which local boards, whether municipal or district, should generally be constituted; and the second, to the degree of control which the Government should retain over such bodies, and the manner in which that control should be exercised.

9. In regard to the first of these points, the Governor General in Council would observe that he is quite aware of the absurdiiy of attempting to lay down any hard-and-fast rules which shall be of universal application in a country so vast, and in its local circumstances so varied, as British India. It would be unreasonable to expect that any uniform system of local government could be applied with equal success in provinces differing as the Punjab, for instance, differs from Madras, or Bengal from Burma. A large latitude of application must, therefore, in every case be left to the local authorities. Indeed, we are really as yet so much in the infancy of self-government, and have perhaps so little knowledge of the directions in which it would naturally develop itself among the people, that there is a distinct advantage in having different schemes tried in different places, in order to test by practical experience what arrangements are best suited to the ways of thinking, habits, and other idiosyncracies of the heterogenous populations of the Empire. But there are, nevertheless, fundamental principles which, after every allowance has been made for local peculiarities, must be universally followed and frankly adopted, if the system is to have anywhere a fair trial.

10. The Government of India desires, then, that, while maintaining and extending, as far as practicable, the plan of municipal government in the cities and towns of each Province, the Local Governments will also maintain and extend throughout the country, in every district where intelligent non-official agency can be found, a network of local boards, to be charged with definite duties and entrusted with definite funds. The Governor General in Council considers it very important that the area of jurisdiction allotted to each board should in no case be too large. If the plan is to succeed at all, it will be necessary to secure among the members both local interest and local knowledge. Experience proves that District Committees are, as a rule, very badly attended by members not actually residing in the vicinity of the head-quarters' station. Those who do attend have frequently no intimate acquaintance with the wants of outlying parts of the district. The consequence is, either that undue attention is given to the requirements of the immediate neighbourhood of the central station, or that the business falls entirely into the hands of the district officer the Committee contenting itself with formally endorsing his proposals. Modifying therefore, to some extent the suggestions made in paragraph 8 of the Circular Letter

of the 10th October last, the Governor General in Council desires that the smallest administrative unit—the sub-division, the taluka, or the tahsil—shall ordinarily form the maximum area to be placed under a local board. He would not indeed object to even smaller jurisdictions where these were deemed suitable. In some provinces it may be found possible to leave these sub-divisional boards to their own independent working, arranging for a periodical District Council, to which delegates from each local board might be sent, to settle such common matters as the rate of land cess to be levied during the year, the allotment to be made of district funds, and other questions of general interest. In other provinces, again, it may be thought best to have a District Board with controlling power over the smaller local boards. But whatever system is followed, the cardinal principle, which is essential to the success of self-government in any shape, is this, that the jurisdiction of the primary boards must be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members.

11. The Municipal Committees will, of course, remain the local boards for areas included within town limits. The relations between such municipal boards and the sub-divisional or district boards within whose jurisdiction the towns lie must be carefully settled in each case. In some instances the town boards will be left entirely independent and apart. In others it may be found desirable to give the rural boards a certain share in the settlement of questions of common interest. In others, again, the town boards would be required to send delegates to the District Board or Council.

12. The local boards, both urban and rural, must everywhere have a large preponderance of non-official members. In no case ought the official members to be more than one-third of the whole, unless in places in which the elective system is followed, when there would be no ground for objecting to an elected member merely on the ground that he was in the service of Government. The Governor General in Council is disposed to think that the non-official members of the boards should hold office for at least two years after election or appointment; but probably the best plan to follow would be that of the compulsory retirement by rotation of a fixed proportion of members, those retiring being eligible to sit again. A detail of this description may, however, fitly be left to the Local Governments.

13. Members of boards should be chosen by election wherever it may, in the opinion of the Local Governments, be practicable to adopt that system of choice. The Governor General in Council does not require the adoption of the system of election in all cases, though that is the system which he hopes will ultimately prevail throughout the country, and which he wishes to establish now as widely as local circumstances will permit. Election in some form or other should be generally introduced in towns of any considerable size, but may be extended more cautiously and gradually to the smaller municipalities and to backward rural tracts. Even as regards these last, however, the Governor General in Council is disposed to think that if the Government officers cordially accept the principle, and set themselves to make it successful, a great advance might made with comparatively little difficulty. Thus when the Local Governments had determined the nature of the qualifications suited to such a district (and these might ordinarily at first be fairly high), each sub-divisional officer might be instructed to prepare a list or register of candidates qualified to sit upon the local board, and might invite all those residing in any particular area, such as a police (thana) jurisdiction, to meet him on a day fixed at some convenient spot near their homes. He might then explain to them the objects of Government, and the nature of the duties they were invited to undertake, and call upon them to elect then or on a future day the number of representatives that had been fixed for the area in question. In the course of a few years, when the members of the board find that they have real powers and responsibilities entrusted to them, any Government interference will become unnecessary. The electors may safely then be left to conduct their own elections under such rules as may be from time to time laid down.

14. As to the system of election to be followed, the Governor General in Council would here also leave a large discretion to the Local Governments. Experience is wanting to determine the most suitable general system for each province; and it is desirable that a variety of plans should be tried in order to a future comparison of results. The simple vote, the cumulative vote, election by wards, election by the whole town or tract, suffrage of more or less extended qualification, election by castes or occupations—these and other methods might all be tried. New methods, unthought

of in Europe, may be found suitable to India; and after a time it will probably be possible to say what forms suit best the local peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the different populations. The Provincial Governments should, through their district officers, consult the leading Natives of each locality, not only as to the possibility of introducing the elective system, but as to the arrangements most likely to meet their local circumstances; and should use every effort to make the schemes adopted as consonant as possible to the feelings and habits of the people.

15. Doubtless the first consequence of this mode of proceeding will be that the electoral system, viewed as a whole, will present for a time a very diversified appearance, and in some places arrangements made will turn out badly and call for change; but the Governor General in Council is not disposed to attach undue importance to this. The problem before the Government is one of no slight difficulty; being that of discovering in what manner the people of the towns and districts of British India can be best trained to manage their own local affairs intelligently and successfully. The attempts hitherto made with this object have met with but little success. The best men in many cases do not at present present themselves as candidates for municipal office. The number of voters is generally insignificant compared with the number on the registers. And yet there can be no doubt that among the more intelligent classes of the community there is a real and growing interest being taken in administrative matters. It may be suspected, therefore, that the cause of comparative failure in the efforts hitherto made is to be found rather in the character of those efforts than in the nature of the object pursued. They have been, it seems to the Governor General in Council, wanting to a great degree in earnestness and in real endeavours to adapt the system adopted to the feelings of the people by whom it has to be worked. If this is so, the remedy must lie in ascertaining by patient and practical experiment how best to call forth and render effective that desire and capacity for self-government which all intelligent and fairly educated men may safely be assumed to possess.

16. With a view to stimulating the candidature of men of respectable standing in Native society, and to mark the importance of the functions of these local boards in the eyes of Government, the Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that the courtesy titles of "Rai (or Rao) Bahadur" or "Khan Bahadur" shall in all official correspondence be applicable to Native members of all local boards during their term of office.

17. Turning now to the second division of the subject—the degree of control to be retained by the Government over the local boards, and the manner in which that control should be exercised, the Governor General in Council observes that the true principle to be followed in this matter is, that the control should be exercised from without rather than from within. The Government should revise and check the acts of the local bodies, but not dictate them. The executive authorities should have two powers of control. In the first place, their sanction should be required in order to give validity to certain acts, such as the raising of loans, the imposition of taxes in other than duly authorised forms, the alienation of municipal property, interference with any matters involving religious questions or affecting the public peace, and the like. (The cases in which such sanction should be insisted upon would have to be carefully considered by each Government, and they would at the outset be probably somewhat numerous, but, as the boards gained in experience, might be reduced in number.) In the second place, the Local Government should have power to interfere either to set aside altogether the proceedings of the board in particular cases, or, in the event of gross and continued neglect of any important duty, to suspend the board temporarily, by the appointment of persons to execute the office of the board until the neglected duty had been satisfactorily performed. That being done, the regular system would be re-established, a fresh board being elected or appointed. This power of absolute supersession would require in every case the consent of the Supreme Government. A similar power is reserved to the Executive Government under several English statutes; and if required in England, where local self-government is long established and effective, it is not probable that it could be altogether dispensed with in India. It should be the general function of the executive officers of Government to watch, especially at the outset, the proceedings of the local boards; to point out to them matters calling for their consideration, to draw their attention to any neglect of duty on their part, and to check by official remonstrance any attempt to exceed their proper functions, or to act illegally or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

18. It does not appear necessary, for the exercise of these powers, that the chief executive officers of towns, sub-divisions or districts should be Chairmen or even members of the local boards. There is indeed much reason to believe that it would be more convenient that they should supervise and control the acts of those bodies, without taking actual part in their proceedings. The Governor General in Council is aware that many high authorities hold that the district officer should always be *ex-officio* Chairman of all the local boards within the district, and should directly guide and regulate their proceedings. This was indeed the view taken by the Government of India itself in the Circular letters of the 10th October last, so far as the constitution of district boards was concerned. But even then the Governor General in Council did not see his way to accepting the principle in the case of Municipal Boards; and further consideration has led him to the belief that, on the whole, it is better to lay down no such general rule in the case of any class of local boards. There appears to him to be great force in the argument that so long as the chief executive officers are, as a matter of course, Chairmen of the Municipal and District Committees, there is little chance of these Committees affording any effective training to their members in the management of local affairs, or of the non-official members taking any real interest in local business. The non-official members must be led to feel that real power is placed in their hands, and that they have real responsibilities to discharge. It is doubtful whether they have under present arrangements any sufficient inducement to give up their time and attention to the transaction of public business. There is this further objection to the district officer acting as Chairman, that if the non-official members are independent and energetic, risk may arise of unseemly collision between the Chairman and the board. The former would be in a far more dignified and influential position if he supervised and controlled the proceedings of the Board from outside, acting as arbiter between all parties, and not as leader of any.

19. The Governor General in Council therefore would wish to see non-official persons acting, wherever practicable, as Chairmen of the local boards. There may, however, be places where it would be impossible to get any suitable non-official Chairman, and there may be districts where the chief executive officer must for the present retain these duties in his own hands. But his Excellency in Council trusts that the Local Governments will have recourse sparingly to the appointment of executive officers as Chairmen of local boards; and he is of opinion that it should be a general rule that when such an officer is chairman of any local board, he shall not in that capacity have a vote in its proceedings. This arrangement will, to some extent, tend to strengthen the independence of the non-official members, and keep the official Chairman, where there must be such, apart from the possible contentions of opposing parties.

The appointments of Chairmen should always be subject to the approval of the Local Government, but need not be always made by it. The Governor General in Council would be glad to see the boards allowed, in as many cases as possible, to elect their own Chairman. But this matter is one which must be left to the discretion of Local Governments.

20. These, then, are the principles upon which the Governor General in Council desires to see the experiment of local self-government introduced throughout the several provinces of India; and he would ask the Local Governments to revise their several schemes and shape any proposed legislation in general accordance with these principles. On such of the local schemes as have already come before the Government of India separate orders will, as already intimated, be passed in accordance with the foregoing exposition of policy. There are, however, one or two points to which attention has been drawn by a perusal of the orders of the Local Governments, which, though matters of detail, are still of sufficient importance to warrant their being noticed in this Resolution.

21. In the orders of the 10th October last the Government of India laid special stress on the importance of entrusting to the local boards, not merely the expenditure of fixed allotments of funds, but the management of certain local sources of revenue. Sufficient regard does not as yet appear to have been paid to this part of the scheme. Not only should every local board have the entire control over the proceeds of all local rates and cesses levied within its jurisdiction for its own special purposes, but along with the charge of any expenditure that is at present Provincial should be transferred, where possible, the management of equivalent revenue. The License Tax assessments and collections, for example, might very well be made over to the local boards, municipal and rural, in many parts of the country, subject to the control provided by the

existing law. Pounds and ferry receipts have been already indicated as suited for transfer. The allotment of lump grants from Provincial Revenues should be reserved as much as possible to balance the receipts and expenditure of the local boards. The Governor General in Council hopes that this part of the scheme will receive very careful consideration from all Local Governments, with a view to giving full effect to the policy which the Government of India has laid down on this point.

22. Another point deserving of notice is the control that should be exercised over the execution of local works. It will not always be possible for a local board to entertain a competent engineer of its own; and in any case, when Government buildings and important works of other kinds are made over for maintenance, there must be some effective guarantee for thoroughness of execution. It will probably be most convenient that, while all subordinate establishments are entirely under the control of the boards, Government should supply the district engineer and furnish professional supervision, the boards defraying in such manner as may be determined by the Local Governments with reference to the amount of work done for each board the payments to be made to Government on this account. Care must, however, be taken that the boards are left unfettered in the initiation and direction of operations, and that the engineer is placed in the position of their servant and not of their master. The power of check vested in the district officer will suffice to remedy any carelessness or improper working on the part of the boards. If this arrangement is carried out, it will probably be found possible to make over to the charge of the boards most of the public buildings in the districts, and other works of various kinds which would otherwise have to be kept in the hands of the Government officers. Double establishments will thus be avoided, and public money saved.

ORDER.—Ordered, that a copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to the Local Governments and Administrations and to the Departments of the Government of India noted on the margin for information; and that it be published in the Supplement to the "Gazette of India."

Madras.
Bombay.
Bengal.
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.
Punjab.
Central Provinces.
British Burma.
Coorg.
Assam.
Hyderabad.
The Department of Finance and Commerce.
The Public Works Department.

A. MACKENZIE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 107.)

MY LORD MARQUIS, India Office, London, October 5, 1882.

PARA. 1. I have considered in Council the Letter of your Excellency in Council, No. 35, dated the 23rd of May 1882, forwarding for my information copy of a Resolution of your Government on the question of developing local self-government throughout British India outside the Presidency towns.

2. I have to assure your Excellency that I share your desire to give further extension to the self-government of which the germs are found in the ancient institutions of a great part of India, and which has already received sanction in principle from Parliament through the introduction of Native members into the Legislative Councils, and from your Excellency's predecessors in the enactments constituting and regulating the now numerous Indian municipalities.

3. Your Excellency has already published your resolution in India; but I observe that in the 15th paragraph you intimate that it will be brought into operation tentatively, and that generally the problem "of discovering the manner in which the "people of the towns and districts of British India can be best trained to manage "their own local affairs intelligently and successfully" has yet to be solved. Opportunities will, therefore, present themselves hereafter to me of commenting on portions of your scheme, and for the purpose of enabling me to avail myself of them,

I request your Excellency in Council to forward to me the correspondence referred to in the Resolution, and all subsequent correspondence and orders on this subject issued by your Excellency's Government or any of the Local Governments. Any legislative proposals which may be needed will, doubtless, be communicated to me under the orders contained in the Secretary of State Despatch of the 31st March 1874.

4. I gather from all parts of your Excellency's Resolution that you are sensible of the difficulties which this scheme will have to encounter from the great varieties in the social condition of different parts of British India, and of the necessity of using much caution in carrying it into effect.

5. I trust that this important experiment, conducted with care and circumspection by your own and the various Local Governments, will be attended with the satisfactory results which it has been the object of your Government to secure in the several provinces of India.

I have, &c.
HARTINGTON.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Public, No. 52.)

My Lord Marquis, Simla, October 10, 1882.

In continuation of our Despatch No. 35, dated 23 May 1882, we have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, copies of the papers cited in the annexed list, on the subject of the extension of the system of local self-government in the Bombay Presidency and in the Provinces of Lower Bengal, the Punjab and British Burma.

We have, &c.
RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

List of Enclosures.

1. From Government of Bombay, No. 1094, dated 25th March 1882 and enclosure.
2. To Government of Bombay, No. 831, dated 31st May 1882.
3. From Government of Bombay, No. 3584, dated 19th September 1882, and enclosures.
4. To Government of Bombay, No. 1521, dated 4th October 1882.
5. From Government of Bengal, No. 921½, dated 8th April 1882.
6. To Government of Bengal, No. 832, dated 31st May 1882.
7. From Government of Bengal, No. 420, dated 19th July 1882, and enclosure.
8. To Government of Bengal, No. 1258, dated 22nd August 1882.
9. From Government of the Punjab, No. 1777A., dated 7th September 1882, and enclosure.
10. To Government of the Punjab, No. 1477, dated 19th September 1882.
11. From Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 159—4A., dated 4th May 1882, and enclosures.
12. To Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 954, dated 23rd June 1882.
13. From Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 345—14G.M., dated 12th June 1882, and enclosure.
14. To Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 87, dated 3rd July 1882.
15. From Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 989—16G.M., dated 31st July 1882.
16. To Chief Commissioner, British Burma, No. 1465, dated 16th September 1882.

From THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

No. 1094,

SIR, 25th March 1882.

WITH reference to paragraph 9 of this Government letter No. 4161, dated 8th November 1881, I am directed to forward, for submission to the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a Resolution No. 1093, dated 25th March 1882, passed by this Government on the subject of the development of local self-government discussed in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Resolution of the Government of India in the Department of Finance and Commerce, No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881, and more fully in their subsequent letter No. 3516, dated 10th October last.

RESOLUTION No. 1093, dated 25th March 1882.

RESOLUTION.—The question of the further extension of the system of local self-government in the Bombay Presidency is one of considerable difficulty. District and Taluka Local Fund Committees and Municipalities in this Presidency have already large funds at their disposal over the expenditure of which they possess discretionary power, and it is doubtful whether those bodies as at present constituted can advantageously be charged with the administration of other heads of expenditure.

2. An examination seriatim of the various heads of Provincial expenditure and revenue shows how difficult it would be to entrust to local bodies the administration of the majority of the funds of which the management is now controlled by Government and its officers. Of the various items comprised under the general heading "Minor Departments" the Accountant General can only suggest that the grants under two heads should be administered by local bodies. Of these one is Provincial Museums, for which the grant is but Rs. 3,300. This is now under the control of the Director of Public Instruction, and it seems questionable whether it is expedient to create a special committee to superintend the outlay of this petty grant. The other item is "Bull and Stallion Charges." Government, however, is of opinion that for the present at least it is desirable that the funds provided from Provincial revenues for this purpose should continue to be managed by the new department specially established to superintend horse-breeding operations, rather than that they should be divided between that department and a number of Local Fund Committees. Uniformity of system and control vested in a single authority are essential to the success of the undertaking, and this it would be difficult to attain if the administration of the grant was placed in the hands of local committees, possibly holding widely varying views on the subject of the utility of expenditure for such purposes.

3. Under the head "Education" the expenditure from Provincial funds is very large, and in respect of it an extension of the principle of local self-government in certain places and with certain modifications of the existing constitution of local committees may probably be found to be both politic and advantageous in its results. Local Fund Committees already enjoy large powers in administering the portion of the proceeds of the local cess which is devoted to educational purposes, but it is for consideration in the Educational Department whether the creation of special school boards and committees to regulate the management financial and otherwise of schools which are now not under the control of Local Fund Committees might not prove of benefit in meeting local wants and encouraging local efforts in respect of education. The Commissioner, Northern Division, and others of the officers consulted are of opinion that too large a share of the Government educational grant is expended on higher education, that "the "recipients of higher education might be made to contribute more towards the expenditure," and that a larger proportion of the sum given from Provincial revenues for educational purposes should be devoted to the establishment and maintenance of village schools. Mr. Sheppard also advocates increased grants for agricultural and technical classes, and considers that if more village schools as compared with higher class schools were maintained, and if the special classes he recommends were more liberally supported, "efficient local committees may perhaps be found to control the management." These points and suggestions can most appropriately be considered by Government in the Educational Department. Government in the Financial Department will be happy to sanction any proposals tending to give effect to the wishes of the Government of India and to promote a healthy interest in local education on the part of local bodies, and would only request that it should be borne in mind

that Provincial funds are not yet in a position to admit of larger aggregate grants for educational objects than those which they at present provide.

4. Under the head "Medical" the only portion of the grant now contributed and administered by Government, which can in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor in Council be with advantage entrusted to the control of local bodies, is that assigned for the maintenance of dispensaries. On this subject separate orders will hereafter be issued. The grants for Civil Hospitals should, Government considers, remain as now under the management of the Medical Department. As regards Vaccination and Sanitation the expediency of any change in the existing system appears also questionable. The Provincial grant for Vaccination and Sanitation is chiefly devoted to inspection. It amounts in the current year to Rs. 1,48,000, and of this sum Rs. 1,39,800 represent the salaries of the Commissioner, his deputies, the Superintendents of Vaccination, the Inspectors and Assistant Superintendents and their office establishments, whilst the balance is the amount of their travelling expenses and other contingent charges. It is clearly not desirable that Government should resign the duty of supervising and enforcing the measures adopted for the preservation of health, and His Excellency in Council considers that the Sanitary Commissioner is justified in deprecating such a change. With his report on this subject the Sanitary Commissioner has submitted at considerable length proposals for an increase of the number and the pay of the subordinates of the department, involving an additional annual cost to Provincial revenues of Rs. 46,000. The objects which Mr. Lumsdaine desires to attain are doubtless desirable, but His Excellency in Council regrets that it is not possible at present to sanction a scheme necessitating so considerable an increase of expenditure. Such an increase, moreover, would be a step rather of a retrogade character, inasmuch as while Government should retain the task of inspection, the practical work should to a great extent be carried on by local Governing bodies.

5. Government in the Financial Department concurs with the Secretary in the Public Works Department in the opinion that for the reasons stated in the memorandum in the latter Department, No. A.—13, dated 5th January 1882, it is not desirable and would not be an economical policy to entrust to local bodies a larger discretion in the outlay of Provincial funds on Public Works than that which they at present possess.

6. Under the head "Miscellaneous" the Accountant-General suggests that the control and expenditure of the following grants might be made over to local bodies :—

(1.) Petty Provincial Establishments;
(2.) Miscellaneous and unforeseen charges;
(3.) Donations for charitable purposes;
(4.) Costs of books and publications;
(5.) Rewards for destruction of wild animals.

Government is unable to concur in this proposal. As regards No. 1 the grant is Rs. 20,000. Of this sum Rs. 1,200 represent the pay of the Superintendent of Pánchgani, a gazetted officer appointed by Government, and Rs. 18,400 or $\frac{23}{25}$ of the total amount represent the cost of the establishments of Travellers' Bungalows in Native States. The Accountant-General has not explained to what local bodies he would recommend that the control of this particular grant should be assigned, and the proposal appears to His Excellency the Governor in Council hardly feasible. As regards No. 2 for which the grant is Rs. 24,000, it may be observed that the charges have to be borne by Government for Government objects and small items for which no specific provision has been made in the Budget. With reference to No. 3, to meet which a sum of Rs. 21,000 is inserted in the Budget, it would seem injudicious to confer on local committees authority to spend Provincial funds on any object they may deem deserving of compassion. Government is alone able to consider the relative urgency, and to weigh the comparative claims, of applications from all parts of the Presidency, and to decide in what cases pecuniary aid is most needed and would be most serviceable. As regards No. 4, for which a grant of Rs. 6,000 is provided, it would be inconsistent with sound policy to provide local committees with public money for such a purpose, unless by way of contribution or supplement to a fund locally raised. Until, therefore, such funds and agencies are established, it would seem preferable to adhere to the system now in force under which Government determines what books and publications should be bought, is able by purchasing them in considerable numbers to obtain them at reduced rates, and arranges for the distribution of the copies procured. With respect to No. 5, for which the grant amounts to Rs. 10,000, the reward given for the destruction of the various descriptions of noxious

beasts and reptiles, is fixed by Government and is paid by Government officers. No advantage is in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor in Council to be derived from entrusting local committees with the management of this grant.

7. It may be the case that, under the present constitution of local committees, whether Municipal or Local funds, as much local control over Provincial contributions to local expenditure exists as is practicable or consistent with economy in the administration of public funds, but His Excellency the Governor in Council is of opinion that the time has now arrived when it may properly be considered whether some change in the constitution of those committees may not with advantage be introduced, and whether extended powers in respect of the expenditure of public money derived from local taxation and Provincial subsidies may not with benefit to all concerned be conferred upon local governing bodies formed under a new system. It appears to Government that the present is a fitting opportunity to decide whether in the case of the largest and most important Municipalities an extension of the principle of representative self-government cannot advantageously be effected, and whether when the representative element has thus been introduced, augmented powers of local expenditure aided from Provincial funds may not be granted to the municipal governing bodies to the benefit alike of Government and of the people.

8. His Excellency the Governor in Council proposes at present only to avail himself of the powers conferred on Government under the Bombay District Municipal Act. Special difficulties exist in the way of the election by the inhabitants of country districts of members of the Local Fund Committees for such districts. The Bombay District Municipal Act, however, contains a provision authorising the election of non-official Commissioners of City Municipalities. In their case no practical difficulties are to be found. The question is one merely of expediency, and His Excellency the Governor in Council perceives no reason why the intelligent population of the chief towns in the Presidency should not be allowed to have a direct voice in their local self-government. The measure must necessarily be to some extent of the nature of an experiment, but it has been tried with success in the City of Bombay, and Government would express its decided opinion that the character and capacity of the elected members of the Bombay Corporation, and the tone of their discussions contrast favourably with those of elected municipal bodies in the United Kingdom. His Excellency the Governor in Council trusts that it will be found that the inhabitants of the large towns in the mofussil will display the same amount of public spirit and intelligence as has been shown by the citizens of Bombay. He further hopes that the success of the experiment may ere long justify the passing of a legislative enactment to amend the existing law by introducing also into Town Municipalities the election of a portion of the Municipal Commissioners.

9. Under clause 2 of section 7 of Bombay Act VI. of 1873, the Governor in Council may, if he think fit, direct that in any City Municipality the whole or any portion of the non-official Commissioners (whose number shall always be not less than double that of the ex-officio Commissioners) shall be appointed by election and may fix the time and manner of the election and the qualification of the electors. City Municipalities have been established at Poona, Sholapur, Ahmednagar, Ahmedabad, Broach, Surat, Karachi, Hyderabad, Shikarpur, and Sukkur. In these ten cities the principle of representative municipal government may in the opinion of Government be with advantage introduced. His Excellency the Governor in Council would propose that in each of these City Municipalities one-half of the total number of Commissioners should be elected, each town being divided into wards, each of which should return one member. The qualification for a vote for the election of the representative Commissioners should be the payment of any direct tax, whether Government, Local Fund, or Municipal. All persons accordingly resident within the municipal limits and paying Government land assessment, licence tax, local fund cess or any direct municipal tax would be entitled to a vote.

10. His Excellency the Governor in Council is not in possession of any data to enable him to form an opinion as to the number of persons who under this scheme would be qualified as voters. In some Municipalities, notably in Hyderabad, Shikarpur and Sukkur, where there is apparently little, if any, direct municipal taxation, the number of persons entitled to vote under the pecuniary qualification would presumably be but small. It is not, however, essential that the franchise should be strictly limited to those persons who pay direct rates or taxes, Government or Muni-

cipal. The desire of Government is that as far as possible all persons of respectability, character, and means, should possess a voice in the election of representative Commissioners. The franchise might, therefore, be not only pecuniary but also educational and professional, and the privilege of a vote might be granted as well to graduates of any university or medical college and to vakils and pleaders, as to persons contributing directly to Government or municipal revenues.

11. The Commissioners, Northern Division, Central Division, and in Sind should be requested to report at their early convenience the approximate number of persons who would be entitled to a vote in each of the City Municipalities situated within their respective divisions, if the franchise is made pecuniary only, and if it is educational and professional as well as pecuniary. They should also be asked to state the total number at present of Commissioners, ex-officio and non-official, in each City Municipality, and when the period in each instance for which the non-official Commissioners now serving have been appointed will expire. His Excellency the Governor in Council will be obliged if the Commissioners, when submitting the reports now called for, will favour Government with any further suggestions or remarks they may desire to offer.

12. On the receipt and consideration of the reports from the Commissioners, detailed orders and instructions in view of the carrying into execution of the scheme now set forth will be issued, and the requisite rules will have to be prepared under clause 2 of section 7 of Bombay Act VI. of 1873.

13. The creation of representative bodies on the principle now proposed will enable Government to obtain more accurate knowledge than it at present possesses of the wishes of the people, specially in regard to education, medical expenditure, local taxation, and will tend to facilitate the final consideration of the question as to the increased powers in respect of control over the outlay of public money which may most beneficially be conferred upon local bodies.

14. This Resolution should be published in the "Bombay Government Gazette," and a copy of it placed on the Editors' Table. It should also be communicated to the Government of India.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY.

Home Department.
Public, No. 831.

SIR, Simla, May 31, 1882.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to the Government of India in the Financial Department, No. 1094 of the 25th March last, submitting a Resolution of His Excellency the Governor in Council on the question of the extension of local self-government in the Presidency of Bombay.

2. The Government of Bombay remarks that the District and Taluka Local Fund Committees of that Presidency have already large funds at their disposal, and considers it doubtful whether these bodies, as at present constituted, can advantageously be charged with the administration of other heads of expenditure. Similar conclusions are arrived at in respect of Municipal Committees, who are said to have as much control over Provincial contributions to local expenditure as is practicable or consistent with economy in the administration of public funds. His Excellency the Governor in Council is, however, of opinion that in the case of a few of the largest and most important municipalities, an extension of the principle of representative self-government might advantageously be effected; and it is indicated as possible, that to local governing bodies, formed under the new system, extended powers in respect of public money derived from local taxation and provincial subsidies, might eventually be conceded. Reports have accordingly been called for from Commissioners as to the introduction of the elective system in the ten City Municipalities of the Bombay Presidency. But

the question of increasing the local powers of control, even in these large towns, is postponed until experience has been had of the working of the elective system. No proposals for amending or altering the constitution and powers of the Local Fund Committees are anywhere made. But it is stated generally that the Local Government will be prepared to consider favourably suggestions for the creation of special school boards and committees to regulate the management—financial and other—of schools which are not at present under the control of the Local Fund Committees.

3. The Governor General in Council welcomes the steps taken for the introduction of the elective principal in the largest and most important towns of Western India; but he trusts that, on a reconsideration of the whole subject, in the light of the instructions, contained in the Resolution of this Department, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}759}$ of the 18th instant, His Excellency the Governor in Council may find it possible to go still further in the direction of developing the system of local self-government than is apparently at present contemplated.

4. I am to suggest for the consideration of the Bombay Government that the very complete and admirable system of taluka committees existent in Bombay might with advantage be developed, in the manner indicated in paragraph 10 of the Resolution above referred to, into a system of sub-divisional boards supplemented by a District Council. The advantages to be derived from limiting the area of each local jurisdiction are so manifest that the Government of India would be glad to see the position of the taluka committees strengthened as much as possible, their constitution being at the same time popularised in the way proposed by the Governor General in Council. A District Council, composed of delegates from these rural boards and from the municipalities of the district, would be able to deal satisfactorily with matters of general interest.

5. No official information has yet come before the Government of India as to the manner in which the Bombay Government intends to give effect to the suggestions of the Supreme Government in respect of the transfer to local management of educational matters; but the Governor General in Council is aware, from the Resolution of the Local Government, No. 414 of the 23rd March, published in the Bombay newspapers, that it is at present only contemplated to give very limited effect to this principle in the three leading municipalities of the Presidency. His Excellency in Council trusts that the Bombay Government will now see its way to following a more extended policy in this respect. It would not probably be either possible or desirable to transfer to local control such institutions as colleges, attached collegiate schools, schools for European and Eurasians, normal schools with attached model schools, medical schools, surveying schools, or other schools of technical instruction. But with these exceptions, the Governor General in Council can see no reason for limiting the transference of educational institutions to the management of the local boards. The Department of Public Instruction would still maintain its general control over the system of instruction. The Government rules for grants-in-aid would still hold good. The local officers of the department would work, according to their rank, either as the advisers or as the agents of the boards. In this way there would be no violent change of system, while local effort would be elicited, and the relations of the Educational Department and the local bodies be drawn closer together to their mutual advantage. Arrangements would have to be made regarding the appointment of teachers in the higher schools, in order to secure the selection of suitable men; and many other points of detail would have to be considered and arranged; but there appears to be no insuperable difficulty in so settling matters as to meet the requirements of the Government system, while stimulating the interest of these local bodies in the cause of popular education.

6. No steps appear as yet to have been taken to relieve Municipalities of police charges as suggested in the letter from the Financial Department, No. 3516 of the 10th October last. The Governor General in Council would be glad to hear that this is actually in contemplation, and to know that, with a complete system of local boards, revised as regards constitution in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India, a comprehensive scheme for the transfer to these bodies of many branches of local administration has been elaborated by the Bombay Government. Any legislation necessary to give effect to these proposals would of course be introduced in the local Council. It will be seen from paragraphs 17–19 of the Resolution of the 18th May, that ample power for the correction of abuses and the general direction of the working of the local boards is intended to be reserved to Government and its officers,

and there need, therefore, be no hesitation in making the further advance now proposed in the direction of local self-government, as is indicated in the Resolution, "real" and "substantial." The particular attention of His Excellency the Governor in Council is also invited to the remarks in paragraph 21 of the Resolution on the importance of making over to the local boards the management of revenues as well as of expenditure.

7. With reference to the remarks in paragraph 5 of the Resolution of the Governor in Council, No. 1093 of the 25th March (on the inadvisability of entrusting to local bodies a larger discretion in the outlay of Provincial Funds on public works than they at present possess), and to the general system upon which local fund works are at present carried out in Bombay, I am to request that the Local Fund Committees may be invited to state their opinions upon the working of the system now in force, and to submit any suggestion on the subject which they may deem useful. Their replies, with the remarks of the Local Government thereupon, should be forwarded for the information of the Government of India.

I have, &c.

A. MACKENZIE,

Secretary to the Government of India.

From the ACTING SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 3584.) September 19, 1882.

I AM directed to forward herewith, with reference to previous correspondence on the subject, a copy of the Resolution of the Government of Bombay, No. 3583 of this day's date regarding the extension of local self-government in this Presidency, and to state that His Excellency the Governor in Council trusts that the views expressed and the instructions given in the Resolution will meet with the approval of the Government of India.

2. I am to invite attention particularly to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Resolution, and to request that, for the reasons stated therein, you will be good enough to move the Government of India to reconsider the instructions conveyed in paragraphs 16 and 17 of their Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}59}$ of the 18th May last, to the effect that the courtesy titles of Ráo Badáhur or Khán Bahádur should in all official correspondence be applicable to native members of all local boards during their term of office, and that the Local Government should not possess the requisite authority to direct the absolute supersession of such boards in cases in which it is necessary to do so. The reasons which have induced His Excellency the Governor in Council to solicit a reconsideration of these points are so fully stated in the Resolution that it is unnecessary for me to repeat them here.

3. I am also to enclose copies of two printed collections* of important papers on the subject of the extension of local self-government in this Presidency, in which will be found, among other papers, the reports of the District Officers referred to in paragraph 1 of the Resolution forwarded herewith.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 3583, dated September 19, 1882.

THE Government of India in its Resolution† dated the 18th May last communicated to the various Local Governments at considerable length and in full details its views and orders on the subject of the extension of local self-government, and indicated the principles upon which in its opinion measures should be adopted to render the further advance in the direction of such government real and substantial. On the receipt of this Resolution reports were called for by this Government from the Commissioners

* *See* Appendix, pages 1 to 109. † *See* page 25.

and Collectors on the various points touched upon by the Government of India. Those reports have now been received and have been considered by His Excellency the Governor in Council with the care and attention due to the deliberate opinions of officers who from their general ability, their long experience, their acquaintance with the views, modes of thought, and habits of all classes of the population, and their official intercourse with all sections of the community are peculiarly qualified to give valuable and sound advice on so important and difficult a subject.

2. The population of this Presidency both urban and rural has for many years enjoyed a large share of local self-government secured to it by the provisions of the Bombay Local Funds Act, 1869, and the Bombay District Municipal Act. The constitution of the Municipal and Local Funds Committees was popular; the non-official element predominated; and the large and influential class of Inámdars elected its own representatives on the Táluka and District Local Fund Committees. The District Municipal Act contained provisions authorising Government to grant the elective franchise to city municipalities, and Government possessed the power of elevating town municipalities to the status of city municipalities whenever the inhabitants displayed sufficient. intelligence and public spirit to justify such a measure. The improvements which have been effected, and the progress in all that constitutes civilisation are hardly credible to those who can remember the state of this Presidency even 20 years ago. Education has advanced, water supply and sanitation have been provided for, and even the most remote and rugged districts have been opened up by excellent roads. It may well be feared that the newly constituted and less experienced Boards could ill spare the guiding influence of the Collector which has hitherto enabled the Committees to overcome caste enmities and the conflicting influence of local factions. Political education is a tender plant of very slow growth, and it cannot wisely be forced into a premature development. Before subverting a system which has been found in practice to work so well this Government would have preferred to proceed more cautiously, to create and educate a public spirit, and to ascertain the fitness of the Municipal and Local Fund Committees to exercise more exteded powers. Such powers are often abused even in countries where the people have been accustomed to free institutions, the growth of centuries, and His Excellency the Governor in Council cannot but regard with uncertainty and anxiety the bestowal by one step of unlimited powers on communities so new to their exercise. In its recent orders, however, the Government of India insists on the introduction without delay of very radical measures of self-government, and having placed on record his opinion that measures so extensive are somewhat premature it will now be the duty of His Excellency the Governor in Council to carry out those measures to the utmost extent which he considers compatible with safety.

3. The main features of the Government of India scheme are an increase of the powers of local boards, urban and rural, a more full emancipation of those boards from the control of local officials, the grant of a wider discretion to the boards in all matters of expenditure, the placing of larger funds at the disposal of those boards, the resuscitation of táluka boards from their present state of suspended animation, and the introduction of a system under which the members of the board would in the main be elected, and would be the representatives chosen by the mass of the ratepayers.

4. The chief points for consideration and orders would accordingly appear to be—

1st, the constitution of the various boards, Municipal and Local Funds,
2nd, the mode of appointment of the members of such boards,
3rd, the powers to be conferred upon and exercised by such boards,
4th, the funds to be placed under the management of such boards and the functions to be discharged by them,
5th, the nature and extent of the power to be reserved to Government in connexion with the administration of the boards.

5. One of the first points to be determined is what are the powers which a Collector of a District is to be allowed to continue to exercise. He now is President of all City and Town Municipalities in his District and also of the District Local Fund Committee. As President of a City Municipality he presides at meetings of the Commissioners, watches over the financial and executive administration, submits questions of importance for the decision of the Commissioners, has a casting vote, and can suspend, pending the receipt of the orders of Government, the operation of any Resolution carried against a minority of not less than $\frac{2}{5}$ of the members voting. As President of a Town Municipality he is vested with "the power and responsibility for carrying out the

" purposes of the Act " or in other words he is, subject to appeal to the Commissioner and to Government, invested with plenary powers. As President of the District Local Fund Committee he decides any disputed questions between that Committee and the Táluka Committees, he presides and has a casting vote at meetings of the former Committee, he places the Budget and other business before the Committee, and he possesses the power of veto. The Collector in his turn is subject to the control and orders of the Commissioner of the Division, and under the system now in force the latter is in many respects practically the principal authority in Local Fund matters.

6. It is in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor in Council essential to the success and the safe working of the new scheme that the Collector should, for the present at least, continue to be the President of the Municipalities and the District Local Fund Committee of his Collectorate. It may not be necessary that the Collector should retain all the powers which he now possesses and exercise the control in minor matters and questions of detail which he now holds, and it is desirable that his interference in the management of the affairs entrusted to local and municipal boards should be minimised as far as possible, but it is requisite that he should still enjoy a voice in the administration of those affairs, and that the power of directing the deliberations of the urban and rural committees of his district, should for at all events some years to come be vested in him. After experience has been, gained, and when in the course of a few years the more intelligent portion of the population has attained to a degree of political education which it as yet has not reached, it may be found practicable in the more advanced towns and collectorates to appoint non-officials to be Presidents of Municipal and Local Fund Boards, and even now instances may be found of private persons fitted to undertake such functions of whose services His Excellency the Governor in Council would be glad to avail himself, but such a step as a general measure would at present in the opinion of His Excellency be both premature and calculated to ensure the failure of the experiment now to be introduced. To entrust at once with full administrative functions persons who however estimable and public spirited they may be have never before exercised such powers or had any previous training, and to deprive them at the same time of the counsel and guidance of the officers who have hitherto devised and carried out all reforms and superintended the operations of the various local committees, would be a hazardous step and a measure which Government is not prepared to adopt. It is the desire of His Excellency the Governor in Council that Municipal and Local Fund Committees should be self-governing to the fullest possible extent compatible with efficient, impartial, and judicious administration. It appears to him, however, to be absolutely necessary that for the present at least the Presidents of the various boards should be the district officials, and that a general power of supervision should continue to be vested in those officers. The power may be used sparingly and discreetly, but it should exist, and this Government cannot therefore consent to a step which it is convinced must frustrate the object in view and ensure the utter failure of the experiment.

7. In accordance with the views above expressed the Collector will in the case of City Municipalities continue for the present to be President, and to direct the deliberations of the Committees, save in the few possible exceptional cases where private persons qualified to perform the duties of a President may be available. He will as now watch over the financial and executive administration, but he will no longer possess the power of suspending the operation of a resolution passed by the majority of the Commissioners and will abstain from all interference with the action of the Commissioners. It will merely be his duty to report to Government through the Commissioner of the Division the adoption by the Municipal Board of any course which he deems prejudicial to the public health, safety or interests generally, and Government will in future as now have authority to disallow any order passed by the Municipal Commissioners. Under ordinary circumstances the Collector when presiding at a meeting whether of a Municipal or a Local Fund Committee will not vote. His vote will be purely a casting vote and only given when on a division the number of members voting on each side is equal.

8. In the case of Town Municipalities the powers of a Collector will in future be limited to those which he now enjoys in respect of City Municipalities. The powers of the Assistant or Deputy Collector as Vice-President will be similarly curtailed and neither he nor the President will in future have the power of overruling the opinion of a majority of the Commissioners. It will suffice if the President possesses authority to refer to Government for orders any resolution of the Commissioners from which he

dissents and of which the operation would in his opinion be prejudicial to the public health, safety or other interests. The Committees of both City and Town Municipalities will be required to forward at once to the Collector for his information copies of all resolutions passed at meetings of the Committees.

9. To consider now the question of the constitution of the various boards and to take municipal boards first, it may be observed that under the present law a City Municipality Committee consists of from 4 to 10 (generally 9) ex-officio members including the Collector, and twice as many non-official as there are ex-officio members. It is in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor in Council expedient to diminish the number of official members, and the City Inspector or Chief Constable, the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Educational Inspector and the Executive Engineer may be removed from the list of official members. The ex-officio members would then be,—

1. The Collector,—President.
2. The Assistant or Deputy Collector in charge of the Táluka.
3. The Civil Surgeon, } when resident in or near the place and not
4. The Huzúr Deputy Collector, } otherwise.
5. The Mámlatdár of the Táluka.

Whilst however it seems unnecessary to retain the Executive Engineer and the Deputy Educational Inspector as ex-officio members it appears desirable that they should be authorised but not necessarily required to attend the meetings and act as professional advisers of the committee, and to take a part in the discussion of questions within their respective provinces although not entitled to a vote. The number of non-official members may be fixed at not more than 19 and not less than 13, the number varying according to the population of the Municipality. Of the total number of members, which consequently would range from 18 to 24, one-half should be elected. The remainder would consist of the ex-officio members and of persons resident in or near the place nominated by the Governor in Council or any officer duly authorised by him. The Chairman should whenever possible be a non-official member, but the choice of a Chairman may well be left to the body of the Commissioners, subject to the approval of Government.

10. A Town Municipality Committee now is composed of—

1. The Collector,—President,
2. The Assistant or Deputy Collector,
3. The Mámlatdár,
4. The Chief Constable,

and of non-official persons not exceeding 12 in number appointed by Government (*i.e.*, by the Commissioner under the powers delegated to him).

Of the total number of 16 members not more than one-half may be persons holding salaried offices in the service of Government.

It appears to His Excellency the Governor in Council unnecessary that the Chief Constable should be an ex-officio member. The number of ex-officio members may consequently be reduced to three, and the total number of members of the committee of a Town Municipality may be fixed at not more than 18 and not less than 12, of whom one-half should be elected, the other half being composed of the ex-officio members and of persons resident in or near the place nominated by Government or any officer duly authorised on its behalf.

11. It has been urged not only by some of the officers consulted by Government but also by some of the exponents of native opinion that the system of elective representation should not be introduced in the majority of the Town Municipalities, and it has been contended that the populations of the minor towns are as yet unfitted for the exercise of the franchise. In this view however His Excellency the Governor in Council is unable to concur. It is the expressed desire of the Government of India that the elective system should be introduced generally as far as may be found practicable, and in order to comply with this wish it is expedient that, as a general rule, save in exceptional cases where special reasons exist against the adoption of such a course, the system of election of representatives should be carried out in Town as well as in City Municipalities. There would seem *primâ facie* little ground for supposing that if the experiment proves successful in one class of Municipalities it will result in failure in the other class. Whether it will succeed at all is a matter of opinion. His Excellency in Council trusts and believes that eventually if not

immediately it will, but in any case the attempt has to be made, and considering that the bulk of the populations of Indian towns in this Presidency differs rather in numbers than in degrees of culture and intelligence it is difficult to perceive why the same system should not produce similar results in various towns. It is customary to speak of Poona as the most advanced Mofussil Municipality and the city in which the principle of election can with the best chances of success be introduced, but after all the Poona merchant, shop-keeper, or artisan is in all respects very much the same as his *confrère* in a táluka town, and the general educational status of the mass of the citizens is probably not materially higher in Poona than it is in Kaira or Vengurla, Bársi or Bhusával, Bhiwndi, Hubli or Karád.

12. A Táluka Local Fund Committee now consists of—

(1.) The Assistant or Deputy Collector,—President.
(2.) The Mámlatdár.
(3.) A Public Works Department officer, *or* in educational matters the Deputy Educational Inspector.
(4.) An Inámdár elected by the other Inámdárs.
(5, 6, 7.) Three landholders (or if there is no Inámdár member, four landholders), nominated by the Collector.

Here too a reduction may with advantage be effected in the number of ex-officio members, and henceforth the Assistant or Deputy Collector and the Mámlatdár should be the only members of this class. The Public Works Department and Educational officers should be entitled to be present at the meetings of the Committee and to advise the members, but should not be members or have any vote. The Committee should have the power to require the attendance also of the Head Master of the Anglo-Vernacular School of the Táluka should it consider it desirable to obtain his advice on any educational question coming before it for decision. In future as now the holders of Inám villages in the táluka may be represented by a member elected from amongst themselves. If there is a municipality containing a population of over 5,000 souls situated in the táluka it should return a member to the Committee, such member being elected by the body of the Municipal Commissioners. It seems unnecessary to confer such a privilege on smaller municipalities, whose wealth, population and stake in the material interests of the táluka would bear but a very slight proportion to those of the aggregate mass of villages in the táluka. In addition there should be a certain number of members being holders or proprietors of land in the Táluka of whom some would be elected and some nominated by the Collector. This number would vary according as there was or was not in the táluka a municipality returning a member to the Táluka Committee. Where such a municipality existed the number of members so elected and nominated would be 8, of whom 4 would be elected and 4 nominated. Where no such municipality was found the number would be 9, of whom 5 would be elected and 4 nominated. In either case then each Táluka Committee would consist of 12 members, of whom 2 would be Government officials and members by virtue of their office, 4 would be nominated by the Collector and 6 would be elected. The power of nominating members to both Municipal and Local Fund Boards thus given to Government will prevent the undue exclusion of representatives of any particular class, creed, caste or interest, and will meet the objection to a scheme of election raised by some of the Collectors, whilst the limited number of ex-officio members and the great preponderence in number of the non-official members will preclude the possibility of allegations that the interests, wishes, and aspirations of the non-official element in the Committees are overidden by official votes and defeated by official influence.

13. A District Local Funds Committee is now constituted as follows:—

(1.) The Collector,—President,
(2.) The Assistant and Deputy Collectors (generally 3) in charge of tálukas,
(3.) The Executive Engineer, *or* in educational matters the Educational Inspector,
(4.) The Huzúr Deputy Collector,
(5.) An Inámdar elected by the other Inámdárs of the District,
(6.) Six landowners or proprietors appointed by the Commissioner,

or in all 13 members, of whom 6 are ex-officio.

Following the policy adopted in other cases of diminishing the number of ex-officio members His Excellency the Governor in Council would remove from the list of ex-officio members the Huzúr Deputy Collector (who has no territorial charge) and the Educational Inspector and Executive Engineer. As in the case of the Táluka so in

the case of the District Local Fund Committee the two latter officers should cease to be members and should become merely professional advisers of the Board. The number of ex-officio members would accordingly be reduced to four, taking the average number per district of officers in charge of talukás. The Inámdár member should continue as now. Each táluka should be represented on the District Committee by a member of its Local Fund Committee, to be elected by the members of the Táluka Committee (the Mámlatdár not being eligible for election). In districts in which a City Municipality has been created such municipality will be allowed to return to the District Local Fund Committee a member, who will be elected by the Commissioners from amongst their own body. In addition to the ex-officio and elected members each District Local Fund Committee will also contain a certain number of members to be nominated by the Collector subject to the approval and confirmation of the Commissioner. The number of members so to be nominated will be so regulated that the number of ex-officio and nominated members combined shall exactly equal the number of elected members.

14. His Excellency the Governor in Council does not consider that the claim put forward in the memorials of the Poona Sárvajanik Sabha that the educated and professional classes should be allowed direct and separate representation on the various boards can be entertained. There would appear to be no more valid cause why graduates and pleaders and the other members of these classes should be permitted to return their own special representatives than there is for adopting a like course in the case of money-lenders, shopkeepers, or persons of any other class or occupation. A vakíl has no more, and often not as much, interest in the administration of a municipality than has a seller of ghee or a dealer in cloth, and a graduate has no greater claim to a share in the management of the roads, schools, wells, and rest-houses in his native táluka than has the farmer of 20 acres of land or the cultivator who grows grain and breeds horses and bullocks. The educated classes and the professional men will if qualified to vote enjoy their share of the power of electing representatives, but there appears no sufficient reason why they should be granted an exceptional and special representation for which no precedent exists in India or in England. It seems improbable that the alterations now to be effected in the mode of appointment of members to the various boards will lead to much change in the present *personnel* of those boards. The native gentlemen now nominated by the Commissioners are as a rule selected as being the most intelligent men and the fittest representatives of the native community in their respective towns and districts. Under the new system they will stand the best chance of being returned as members of the urban and rural boards by the different constituencies who it may be trusted will choose men of known merit and local influence to give expression to their views and wishes. It may therefore safely be assumed that the classes for whom the Sárvajanik Sabha solicits direct and special representation will furnish many, if not the majority, of the elected members and will have no cause for complaint that they are swamped by the mass of voters of lesser intelligence and lower social position and have no means left of giving utterance to their views and assuming their share of local self-government. Although the educated and professional classes may be numerically in a minority their superior education, social status, and personal influence must in the long run effectually secure them from being in any way effaced.

15. The next point is the question what should constitute a qualification for the franchise. In the case of Municipal Boards His Excellency the Governor in Council can perceive no advantage in requiring varying qualifications for electors and for candidates. He is of opinion that any person qualified to vote should also be qualified to be voted for. He also considers that the same standard of qualification should be prescribed for City and Town Municipalities alike. It is desirable that the constituencies should not be so large as to be unwieldy, and that the franchise should be extended only to those persons who are by position and education qualified to exercise it judiciously, and to persons whose contributions towards the municipal revenues are sufficiently large to justify their having a voice in the administration of those funds. On the other hand it is expedient that the qualifications for a vote should not be too restricted or too high, as in such a case the number persons entitled to a vote would be inconveniently limited and the mass of the inhabitants would possess no more direct concern in the management of the municipal affairs than they at present enjoy. Bearing these considerations in mind His Excellency the Governor in Council has decided that the following persons should be entitled to a vote at the election of

Municipal Commissioners for the Municipality, whether Town or City, of the town in which they are residents :—

(1.) All graduates of any university, Indian or European,
(2.) All Pleaders holding sanads granted by the High Court,
(3.) All Licentiates of Medicine, Surgery, and Civil Engineering,
(4.) All Jurors, Assessors, and Conciliators,
(5.) All Government pensioners in receipt of a pension of not less than Rs. 20 monthly,
(6.) All persons in Government service in receipt of a monthly salary of not less than Rs. 30,
(7.) All persons paying Imperial license tax of Rs. 20 per annum and upwards,
(8.) All persons paying Rs. 5 per annum direct municipal taxes (in Sind the pecuniary qualification should be a payment of Rs. 3 house tax, or Rs. 5 direct municipal taxes).

The possession of any one of the qualifications entitling to a vote will entitle its possessor to stand as a candidate. Females should not be disqualified to vote merely on account of their sex if qualified to vote as coming within classes 5, 6, 7, or 8, but will not be qualified to sit as Municipal Commissioners. No person should be entitled to vote or be eligible for election who

(1) is under 21 years of age,
(2) has been dismissed for misconduct from Government employ,
(3) has been sentenced to imprisonment by any Criminal Court, such sentence having been upheld on appeal,

and no person shall be qualified to be elected or appointed to be a Municipal Commissioner who

(1) is an uncertificated bankrupt or insolvent,
(2) is a Municipal Executive officer or a clerk or servant of the Municipality,
(3) has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any contract or employment with, by, or on behalf of the Municipality.

Also any Municipal Commissioner who during the term for which he has been elected or appointed

(1) becomes disqualified for any of the above reasons,
(2) is absent for more than 4 consecutive months from the Municipal limits,
(3) is sentenced to imprisonment,

shall cease to be a Municipal Commissioner.

16. In municipal towns the voting should as a general rule be by wards, though in special cases and when exceptional circumstances render the adoption of such a course advisable, the different sections of the community, as for instance, the Christians, the Mussalmans, the Pársis, and the Hindus, may be permitted to return their own representatives. In those places where the voting is by wards the town should be divided into a number of wards corresponding with the number of elected representatives, and the wards should be so mapped out that each will contain as far as possible the same number of voters. Each ward should then elect its own representative who may be a resident in that or any other ward. Where this scheme would be difficult of execution owing to arrangement of existing wards or recognised sub-divisions of the town the number of representatives of each ward should as far as may be practicable be regulated in accordance with the number of persons qualified to vote residing in that ward. No person should have more than one vote, *e.g.*, a person should not be entitled to two votes because he is a graduate and also pays Rs. 5 direct municipal taxes, or because he is an assessor and also pays Rs. 20 Imperial license tax. The Collector should prepare annually lists of the persons qualified to vote, and copies of such lists should be fixed up and be open to inspection in the Mámlatdár's kacheri, the Municipal Office, and any other large public building in the town. Due notice should be publicly given at least 15 days prior to the date fixed for the elections of the day on which the elections will be held. The votes should be given personally by the voters at the municipal office, or at such other places as may be appointed, in the presence of the municipal secretary or other municipal officers nominated for the purpose. The names of the successful candidates and the number of votes recorded for each candidate should then be reported to the Collector who will cause the names of the candidates elected to be notified in the "Government Gazette." The names of the persons nomi-

nated by the Governor in Council or any officer duly authorised on his behalf would at the same time be notified.

17. Next for decision comes the question as to whom should be entrusted the power of electing members of the Táluka Local Fund Committees. On full consideration of the various opinions and representations received it appears to His Excellency the Governor in Council that the following persons should be entitled to a vote :—

(1.) All persons holding or occupying land paying an annual Government assessment of not less than Rs. 48,

(2.) All officiating Revenue or Police Patels.

Here again it has been urged by the Poona Sárvajanik Sabha that jurors, assessors, pleaders, and graduates should be granted a voice in the selection of the members, but Government cannot admit that such persons have any valid claim merely on the ground that they possess a general or special education to control the expenditure of funds to which possibly they contribute nothing. A vakíl *per se* has certainly no greater, probably not so much, direct interest in the construction and maintenance of roads and tanks in his táluka than has the fairly well-to-do cultivator who uses the roads for the conveyance to markets of his produce and needs the tanks for the supply of water to his cattle. Nor should the education of his children and those of his neighbours be a matter of greater concern to him than it is to the average ryot, who is moreover more nearly affected by the establishment of the primary schools which are supported from Local Funds than is the pleader or graduate who resides at the táluka town and sends his sons to the more pretentious and advanced Anglo-Vernacular School. Pleaders, graduates, &c., who hold Government land or pay the requisite sum on account of the assessment will in their capacity as holders or occupants be entitled to a vote, but that they should be allowed a vote simply because they have received a special or University education and have passed examinations in law, medicine, mathematics or languages appears to the Governor in Council undesirable and unnecessary. The Commissioner, C. D., has recommended that a payment of Rs. 10 on account of Local Fund cess should be the qualification for the vote. The proposed limit seems however to be far too high. It implies the payment of a sum of Rs. 160 yearly as Government land assessment, and this involves the restriction of the franchise to a comparatively small number of men in most districts and an exceedingly small number in some. If the franchise is to be given at all it should be granted generously, and unfettered by conditions which render it beyond the reach of the vast mass of respectable ratepayers. It may be said that the great bulk of the *contribuens plebs*, the majority of the smaller landholders, will not care for a vote and would not exercise intelligently any power conferred upon them. This may be the case, but in any event it is necessary to give the experiment the fairest and fullest trial, and to furnish no opportunity or occasion for allegations that in determining the pecuniary qualification for the franchise it has been fixed at so high a figure as to render the concession valueless and to restrict the enjoyment of the privilege to an unduly limited number of individuals.

18. The qualification for candidature for membership of a Táluka Local Fund Board should be the possession of unencumbered real property in the táluka of the value of not less than Rs. 1,000, or of other property of not lower value than Rs. 15,000. A like qualification should be required in the case of members appointed by the Collector. The disqualifications alike for voters and members should be the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as in the case of municipal voters and Commissioners.

19. For election purposes each táluka should be divided into groups of villages corresponding in number with the number of members to be elected to the Local Fund Committee of the particular táluka, and each group should return its own member to the Táluka Committee. The distribution of villages should be so arranged that the amount of land assessment and Local Fund cess paid by each of the various groups should be approximately the same. The grouping of villages should be carried out by the Collector. Only persons resident in the táluka should be eligible for election as members, but it is not essential that the member for a group of villages should be an inhabitant of any of the villages composing the group. A list of the persons in the táluka qualified to vote and to serve as members should be prepared annually by the Collector and copies of the list should be posted in the Mámlatdár's kacheri and be open to public inspection. A list of all the cess-payers qualified to serve as members, and of the persons entitled to vote in the town

or village, should be sent to each town or village and posted up in the chávdi or other public building. A central place should be selected in each group of villages at which the votes of the voters resident in that group should be taken, and one month before the date fixed for the election the Mámlatdár should send to each voter a notice informing him of the day on which the election will be held and the place at which votes will be received. The votes of the voters then appearing in person should be recorded by the Mámlatdár or other officer appointed for the purpose by the Assistant or Deputy Collector in charge of the táluka, and as soon as the results of the election have been ascertained the latter will report to the Collector the names of the successful candidates. The names of the persons elected and of those nominated by the Collector should then be notified in the "Government Gazette."

20. The procedure in the case of the election of members of the District Local Fund Committee will be simple. Each Táluka Committee will send a representative selected by his brother members. The election will take place at a special meeting of the Committee held for the purpose, and the result will be communicated to the Collector by the President—the Assistant or Deputy Collector in charge of the Táluka. In case of an equality of votes the choice can be determined by lot.

21. All Boards, Local Fund and Municipal, should consist of two committees, a general and a managing. The number of members on the managing committee should in no case exceed one-third of the total number of members of the Board. The chairmen of both committees should be elected, the appointment being subject to the confirmation of Government, and should as a rule and when possible be non-official members. The preparation of rules for the guidance of committees, the distribution of their duties, regulation of their meetings, &c. may be entrusted to the Commissioners who should submit for approval the rules they would propose for adoption. The head-quarters of Local Fund Boards should be the Huzúr stations or táluka towns. As regards remuneration it appears unnecessary to grant any fees or salaries to the members or chairmen of Municipal Boards who at present receive no money payment. In the case of members and chairmen of Local Fund Boards any actual travelling expenses incurred by them should be allowed and they may further be granted an honorarium of Rs. 3 each for each meeting at which they attend, care being taken to limit the number of meetings for attendance at which they should be entitled to fees. The labourer is worthy of his hire, and it cannot be expected that men of the means and status of the ordinary Local Fund Committee member will be willing to attend frequent meetings and to devote their time and attention to the work unless they receive some direct and tangible recompense.

22. The Government of India have in paragraph 16 of their Resolution dated May 18th last directed that "the courtesy titles of Ráo Bahádur or Khán Bahádur "shall in all official correspondence be applicable to native members of all local "boards during their term of office." There is an almost unanimous consensus of opinion on the part of the officers consulted by this Government against this measure, and the Government of India should be requested to reconsider this point and in place of directing that titles which have hitherto been highly valued, rarely bestowed, and only earned after years of assiduous and successful labour in the service of Government, should be scattered broadcast over the land, to order that such temporary marks of distinction should only be conferred on the chairmen of general and managing committees of Local and Municipal Boards. It should further be pointed out that as all Mámlatdárs and all Subordinate Judges save those of the highest class now only possess the honorary title of Ráo Sáheb or Khán Sáheb it seems undesirable and invidious to grant the higher title of Ráo Bahádur or Khán Bahádur to even the chairmen of Town Municipalities or Táluka Boards who would as a rule be men of lower social status, inferior education, less ability, and smaller means, than the average Mámlatdár or Subordinate Judge. As regards the members, other than the chairmen, of the various Boards it would seem sufficient to confer on them the honorary title of A'zam formerly allowed to Mamlatdárs.

23. To give effect to the views expressed in the foregoing paragraphs it will be necessary to amend the existing laws relating to district Municipalities and Local Funds. There are, however, many portions of the Presidency, as for instance Thar and Párkar, the Upper Sind Frontier District and parts of the Khándesh, Násik, Thána, Kolába, Ratnágiri, Kánara and Panch Maháls Districts, which probably are not yet fitted for a system involving election of representatives and a far greater independent

local non-official power and action than any they have yet enjoyed. It will be expedient therefore in any legislative measure which may be introduced to reserve to Government the power of deferring the introduction of these advanced forms of local self-government in any district or local area in which owing to local circumstances, the backward condition of the people, or the sparseness of the population, the carrying out of the new system would meet with insuperable difficulties. A failure in any particular case would tend to throw discredit on the entire scheme, and this it is most desirable to avoid. The Commissioners should report at their early convenience what portions of their respective Divisions they consider to be as yet unsuited for the introduction in its entirety of the new system in so far as it relates to the election of members of Local Fund Committees. His Excellency the Governor in Council is of opinion that it is desirable that Government should possess the power to suspend the operation of the new system and to direct a reversion to the old order of things in cases where experience has proved that the novel arrangements are in practice unworkable and have as a matter of fact broken down and brought the local administration to a deadlock. It appears however questionable, to judge from paragraph 17 of the Resolution of the Government of India dated the 18th May last, whether that Government would sanction such a course. In that paragraph it is ruled that the "power of " absolute supersession" of any Board "would require in every case the consent of " the Supreme Government." On this point also the Government of India may be invited to reconsider its order. It should be observed that in the opinion of the Governor in Council a Government exercising in other respects the wide and varied powers possessed by the Administration of a Presidency may well be entrusted with the authority to suspend a Táluka or Municipal Committee and to appoint other men to do the work which the Committee has neglected or refused to do. To prohibit a local Government from adopting such a measure, when deemed by it to be requisite, without the previous sanction of the Supreme Government is virtually to declare that the local Government is unfit to discharge a function which properly pertains to it, unless indeed the power of local self-government is to be granted alone to Local Fund and Municipal Boards and is to be refused to the Government to which those Boards are subordinate.

24. The period for which members of Municipal and Local Fund Boards, whether elected or appointed, should serve, may be fixed at three years, but they should be eligible for re-election or re-appointment on the expiration of the term of three years. In the case of the resignation, disqualification, or death of a member before the expiration of the period for which he was appointed, a successor should be nominated or elected according as the member resigning, dying, or becoming disqualified was nominated or elected, and should serve as a member for the residue of the term of the member whom he succeeds. Chairmen of Committees, General or Managing, should be elected for one year only, but should be eligible for re-election.

25. As regards the question of the powers to be conferred upon and exercised by Boards it appears to the Governor in Council that no very extensive change is required in the case of Municipal Committees. Those Committees should enjoy the powers they now possess, freed however as already proposed in paragraphs 7 and 8 from the local official restraint which now checks their action. Subject to the limited control specified in paragraph 17 of the Resolution of the Government of India, dated the 18th May last, each Municipal Board should have the entire and unfettered administration of the affairs of the Municipality and the disposal of its funds in accordance with the provisions of the Act. To meet the popular wishes, to satisfy the requirements of the Government of India, and to render local self-government a reality and not merely a name, it is essential that the Boards should have full powers, and be liable only to the general control and supervision of Government. In minor matters and questions of details there should be no interference from above. In like manner in the case of Local Fund Boards the allotment and expenditure of the moneys placed at the disposal of each Board should, subject to the provisions of a new law as to the purposes on which Local Funds must and may be expended, and to a general power of supervision to be reserved to Government, be left entirely in the hands of the Boards.

26. It is now necessary to consider not only the question of the continuance in future of the seven years' budget system for Local Funds works, but also whether the budgets recently framed under that system and now regulating Local Fund operations should not be cancelled. If those budgets are to be allowed to stand the new representative Boards to be brought into existence within a few months will for years to

come find their hands tied, their post a sinecure, and their power of deciding upon expenditure a fiction. The works to be carried on have been mapped out for years in advance: to execute those works the Local Fund revenues for years are pledged: and if the Budgets are to hold good the new Boards will for the most part have nothing to do but to look on and see the money spent on projects which were decided upon before they were created. On careful consideration of the question, and of the various opinions expressed, His Excellency the Governor in Council is pleased to decide that it must be left to the discretion of the new Boards to accept or to modify as they may deem fit the seven years' budget schemes which they may find in operation when they assume office. When deciding on the subject they will have to be guided by their knowledge of the most pressing wants of the district, by engineering considerations, and by the amounts already expended on the various works. If a road or bridge, for instance, is half completed it would be folly to stop operations on it, and thus virtually throw away the money already expended on the undertaking. Ordinary prudence will dictate the finishing of the work and the postponement of other works not yet commenced until it is completed. In granting therefore to the new Boards power to review and revise the seven years' budgets already sanctioned it must be understood that this power is conferred subject to the condition that waste of money is not caused by stoppage of works in progress. Hereafter the budgets to be framed by the new Boards should be co-extensive with the tenure of office of the Boards and should therefore embrace only a three years' scheme.

27. As concerns funds the Municipal and Local Boards will in the first place have at their disposal the various funds they now have. The Municipal Boards will have the Municipal revenues derived from Municipal taxation and any other miscellaneous receipts which are now made over to them. In Municipalities where Dispensaries are established the Government grants for such Dispensaries should be handed over to the Municipal Boards in whom the management of the Dispensaries should vest, who should have entire control over the subordinate Dispensary establishment, and without whose assent the medical officer in charge should not be removed or transferred except on promotion. It has been proposed by Messrs. Crawford and Jervoise that Local Committees should be allowed complete discretion to indent for medicines and instruments and that their indents should be accepted without alteration. The Governor in Council however does not consider that this suggestion can be adopted. Such Committees can as a rule know absolutely nothing concerning what medicines are needed and how large a quantity of each drug is required. They can only be guided by the assertions of the medical officer,—often merely a junior man in a low grade—and experience has shown that the Dispensary officials frequently ask for medicines concerning the use of which they know nothing, and demand supplies greatly in excess of the real requirements. Moreover as the medicines are supplied by Government it is but proper that in determining what and what quantities should be given Government through its responsible and experienced officers at the head of the Department should have some voice. It is true that in grants-in-aid Dispensaries the cost of the medicines supplied is paid for from the Dispensary Funds, but even in these cases a portion of the cost of the drugs, &c., provided is in reality paid by Goverment. In the case of Dispensaries located in towns in which no Municipality has been created the management of the Dispensaries and the expenditure of the Government grants should rest with the Táluka Local Fund Committees which should possess is respect of such Dispensaries the same powers as those enjoyed in regard to Municipal Dispensaries by Municipal Committees.

28. It has been decided that the management of Civil Hospitals should remain with Government.

29. On the subject of vaccination there is little material divergence of opinion. The Sanitary Commissioner is strongly opposed to the grant to Local Boards of any control over the expenditure from Local Funds on this very important object, fearing that the grant of a discretionary power of expenditure and of authority in the administration of the Department might lead to results prejudicial to the success and even the existence of the Department in some districts. Government in their Resolution No. 1093, of March 25th last, expressed an opinion that "as regards vaccination and "sanitation the expediency of any change in the existing system appears questionable," and no sufficient cause has since been shown to lead the Governor in Council to change his views on this point and to direct that the control over vaccination and sanitation should be entrusted to Municipal and Local Boards. The Commissioner, Southern

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Division, suggests that Dispensary Committees should "control vaccination in all the "villages around the Dispensary," but on the whole it seems expedient that the present arrangements should not be disturbed. It may however be decided that no increased expenditure on account of vaccination should be thrown on any Board without the assent of that Board, and at the same time it appears necessary to rule distinctly that the vaccination and sanitation establishments are to be maintained as heretofore and that no decrease in the expenditure now incurred on them can be permitted, as otherwise an obstructive or ignorant Board might suddenly refuse to make any provision for vaccination. In considering this branch of the subject it is essential to bear in mind the strength and deep-rooted tenacity of native social and religious prejudices, and also, as regards sanitation and the cleanliness of towns and villages, that the views of the uninformed masses of the native community differ widely from those entertained by educated Europeans. It is not improbable that if native communities and their representatives were allowed absolutely unrestricted discretion vaccination and sanitation would in some districts ere many years become completely things of the past and be utterly disregarded.

30. Government having directed that a moiety of the charges for the maintenance of Government stallions in a district should be defrayed from Local Funds with effect from April 1st last. This order may continue in force for the present. It seems unlikely that in any district in which Government stallions are now stationed the District Local Fund Committee would refuse to make any provision for this charge on account of a popular and useful object. There may in some cases be some demur about the amount of the charge, and then each case would have to be considered on its merits and in view of the particular circumstances. In Ahmednagar, for instance, the District Local Fund Committee have recently expressed an opinion that the number of stallions posted in the Collectorate is in excess of the requirements of the District. In such a case Government could either reduce the number, or if no reduction was held by it to be desirable, would have to keep some of the horses entirely at its own cost. The management of the stallions must be left as a whole to the Superintendent of Horse Breeding Operations, but he should act as far as possible in consultation with the District Committees. It seems inadvisable to place the control of the stallions which are the property of Government in any way under Táluka Committees, whose members as a rule possess no knowledge concerning the breeding and management of valuable horses.

31. The income of the Local Fund Committee of a District is at present derived from the following sources:—

(1.) The one anna cess, of which $\frac{2}{3}$ are devoted to roads, communications, dharmshálás, water-supply, and other useful public objects, and $\frac{1}{3}$ is expended on education.
(2.) The Ferry Fund, including the proceeds of ferries whether farmed or managed departmentally and of fines inflicted under the Ferries Act.
(3.) The Toll Fund.
(4.) The Cattle Pound Fund.
(5.) The Sand and Quarry Fee Fund.
(6.) License Fees for the sale of poisons.
(7.) Contributions towards works of public utility given by ryots.
(8.) Grants given for specific purposes from Provincial Revenues.

It is *in limine* desirable to decide what part or share of the Local Fund revenue should be at the exclusive disposal of the District Committee and what portion should be made over for control and expenditure to the Táluka Committees. The latter at present, it may be said, have hardly any power to spend money for they have virtually no money to spend. The District Committee is the chief spending body: the great bulk of the Local Fund income is expended by it; but it too in many respects possesses but a merely nominal authority and discretion. Its members may have and may express an opinion as to the way in which the funds available can be laid out most advantageously for the benefit of the district, but in practice the decision, more especially of late years, has rested with the Commissioner of the Division and Government, and it may be taken for granted that in many instances the orders passed and the works undertaken are not those which the native members would have sanctioned had the power of determining the question been vested in them. The seven years' Budget system means the triumph of the big works and the long roads policy: it signifies a few large and important works, and a still fewer very small works. The system has

undoubtedly possessed certain advantages. It has resulted in the construction of works which though costly are of great value and importance. It has prevented the expenditure of money on little works of questionable utility and has checked the frittering away of funds on trivial objects and under inefficient supervision. But it also has had its drawbacks and these have been of a serious nature. When nearly all the money is required for trunk roads and costly projects little remains for the humbler, but to the villagers most useful and valuable, works, such as wells, local roads, rest-houses and the like. The principle that taking the táluka as the unit local contributions to the Fund should be locally expended has been of late years if not altogether lost sight of at least departed from to a great extent. Hence have arisen dissatisfaction on the part of many officers, much discontent on the part of committees and cess-payers, and the idea, for which there has only been too much ground, that the Táluka Committees were powerless and therefore useless. A return—partial at least if not entire—to the original scheme seems to the Governor in Council to be now desirable and necessary. The amount of money annually at the disposal of Táluka Committees should be materially increased and the sums expended on minor works in each táluka should more nearly approximate to the amount of the proceeds of the cess and miscellaneous receipts in the táluka.

32. His Excellency the Governor in Council is of opinion therefore that each Táluka Committee should have the disposal of the expenditure of one-half of the Public Works share of the one-anna cess proceeds of the táluka, and of the entire receipts from the Cattle Pound Fund and the Sand and Quarry Fee Fund together with the receipts on account of fees for licenses for the sale of poisons and any contributions which may be given by ryots in the táluka for public works in the táluka. It seems however desirable that in deciding on the expenditure of the funds at its disposal a Táluka Committee should where possible act on the grant-in-aid principle, giving in the case of local works of interest to one village only a grant equal to the amount locally subscribed. It also appears expedient to direct that the unexpended balances at the close of the year should lapse to the District Committee.

33. The funds available for public works which will be administered by the District Committee will accordingly be one-half of the public works share of the one-anna cess proceeds of the entire district, the Toll Fund and the Ferry Fund, any lapsed unexpended balances of Táluka Committee Funds, and any grants which might be given by Government from Provincial Revenues. It seems desirable that all the main Local Fund roads should be constructed by, and maintained at, the cost of the District Committee funds, and that the management of those roads and of the tolls levied on them should rest with the District Committee. This arrangement would obviate the possibility of any inter-táluka disputes concerning the location of toll bars and ferries and regarding the division of the receipts from roads and ferry tolls. The principle should be that all large works and important projects should be carried out by the District Committee, whilst all minor and purely local works would be executed by the Táluka Committees. The division as now directed of the receipts which go to form the Local Fund revenue appears just and reasonable. The chief source of income is the $\frac{2}{3}$ share of the one-anna cess proceeds. Of this one moiety would be allotted to the District Committee and the balance to the Táluka Committees. In consideration of its bearing all charges connected with the main Local Fund roads the District Committee would receive all revenue derived from tolls and ferries, whilst to the Táluka Committees would be credited the receipts obtained from the minor sources of revenue.

34. As regards the Local Funds Public Works establishment the Governor in Council is of opinion that the permanent establishment should be under the sole control of the District Local Fund Committee and should be paid by that Committee. Each District Committee should maintain its own staff of overseers and other subordinate officers. It will not require a separate Local Funds Engineer. The District Executive Engineer can perform also the duties of Local Fund Engineer. The question has been considered whether any and if so what proportion of the salary of the District Engineer should be paid by the District Committee, or whether a certain fixed sum should be charged annually for his services irrespective of the amount of his salary, which would of course constantly fluctuate accordingly to his grade and seniority, or whether no charge should be made at all, and after full deliberation His Excellency the Governor in Council has decided that no charge should be made on this account. Government is prepared and willing to place the services of its District Executive Engineers at the disposal of Local Fund Committees for works of so useful a nature without demanding

any payment, and this may be regarded as one, and not the least valuable, of the Government contributions to Local Funds. The charge of 15 per cent. for supervision should in any case be abolished. No ground for imposing it will exist when each District supports its own staff of overseers and the only aid furnished by the Public Works Department is that of the District Executive Engineer. This system will moreover enable reductions to be effected in the District staff paid for in the Public Works Department from Provincial Revenues as Public Works Department subordinates will no longer be employed upon or required for Local Fund works. The District Local Fund Committee will determine the strength and cost of the staff to be kept up by it, after consideration of its own requirements and those of the Táluka Committees. Any special purely temporary establishment which a Táluka Committee may need from time to time, as also the cost of labour on any work carried out by it will be paid by the Táluka Committee, but no separate and permanent establishment will be maintained by any Táluka Committee. The orders now issued will necessitate the transfer of the great bulk of the subordinate establishments from the Provincial to the Local Public Works Department at the outset of the new system, as it would obviously be inexpedient and unwise for the District Committees to entertain an untried and inexperienced staff to supervise their works.

35. It appears to the Governor in Council to be at present undesirable to make over to District Local Fund Committees the maintenance and repairs of public buildings now constructed and kept up at the cost of Provincial Revenues. There would however seem to be no valid reason why the maintenance of existing Provincial lines of roads should not be entrusted to District Local Fund Committees who would at the same time be given lump grants from Provincial Revenues to meet the cost of keeping those roads in repair, whilst the adoption of such a course would probably tend to economy and result in a reduction in the cost and strength of establishments. It will be the duty of the District Engineer to see that the roads are maintained in efficient condition, and to report to Government if the District Committee fails in the discharge of its duty in this respect. The Governor in Council trusts that such failure would rarely if ever occur, but in the event of a Committee omitting to devote sufficient funds to the maintenance of what now are Provincial roads to enable those roads to be kept in proper order Government would be compelled to reduce or to withhold the grant allotted to the Committee from Provincial Revenues. The assignment to be granted each year to each District Local Fund Committee will be determined by Government in the Public Works Department, bearing in mind the fact that the cost of the District Engineer and his office and of the construction and maintenance of public buildings will continue as now to be defrayed from Provincial Revenues.

36. The question of local self-government will now be considered in respect of educational matters in relation to (1) Municipalities and (2) District and Táluka Boards, but it should be noted that the question of female education is reserved for future and separate consideration.

37. It is necessary first to refer to Government Resolution No. 414 of 23rd March last, by which it was decided that the first experiment should be limited to three selected Municipalities, namely, Bombay, Poona, and Ahmedabad. The Director of Public Instruction was directed to offer to these Municipalities the management of primary schools, together with grants from the Provincial Treasury about equal in each place to the Provincial payments by which the school fees and other local receipts are at present supplemented, but on certain conditions, of which one was that the expenditure on the schools from sources other than the Provincial grant was to bear a ratio to that grant not yet determined.

38. The result of the negotiations between the Director of Public Instruction and the three Municipalities has not yet been reported to Government, and in the meantime the Government of India has expressed its wish that the experiment should be greatly enlarged. The Governor in Council has therefore decided (1) that the negotiations directed in Government Resolution No. 414 of 23rd March last, should be entered into with all the 10 existing City Municipalities in the Presidency, and with the other town municipalities shortly to be raised to the status of city municipalities, and (2) that the management of Anglo-Vernacular as well as Primary Schools should be included in the offer.

39. As regards High Schools the transfer of their management to the Municipal Boards is a step upon which the Governor in Council will not determine until it has

been considered specially with reference to the stipulations which are necessary to maintain the status and interests of these flourishing and promising institutions. For the present therefore no change will be made in their administration.

40. Referring to the condition, as yet undefined, of the ratio which the Provincial grant to Municipal (Primary Schools) should bear to the expenditure on such schools from other sources, it occurs to the Governor in Council to note that the whole question of the distribution of the present Provincial grant to Primary education requires reconsideration, before a commencement can properly be made in the transfer of schools from State to Municipal or other Local management. The present distribution is founded on the principle of regarding the whole Presidency as an educational unit, and whereas the varying circumstances and dispositions of different portions of the Presidency community have led to inequality in the funds locally forthcoming for primary education in different places, it has been left to the Educational Department to ensure an even progress by supplying deficiencies from the Provincial revenues. But a first consequence of breaking up the Presidency into a number of educational units for the purpose of local management will be a close examination of the fairness of the way in which the Provincial grant is distributed, as affecting the amounts that must be raised in different places whether for the maintenance or the extension of schools.

41. Excluding the sum expended in Bombay the Provincial grant amounts to Rs. 2,63,919, and of this sum Rs. 1,74,822 are expended on schools in Municipal towns, and Rs. 89,097 only on schools in non-Municipal towns and villages throughout the Presidency. The latter schools are mainly supported by the Local cess, but the inhabitants of Municipal Towns pay no educational rate analogous to the cess. Municipalities indeed make discretional assignments from their general incomes for education, but these assignments with a few exceptions are unequal in rate, and generally small, if not niggardly. Moreover these assignments are frequently not for primary education, but for English classes in primary schools. Many Municipalities make no assignments for education at all. If note be taken of the ratio which the Provincial grant bears to the funds raised locally, whether in the shape of cess and school fees in the case of the Districts, or of cess, school-fees, municipal grants, interest on endowments, and popular contributions in the case of municipal towns, it will be found that the Provincial grant amounts to barely $\frac{1}{1\frac{1}{2}}$ of the funds locally raised in the Districts, and to rather more than twice the funds locally raised in the Municipal towns.

42. It further appears that not only do schools in Municipal towns generally obtain so much more than their proper share of the Provincial grant, but actually in some places they obtain, besides a portion of the cess money raised in the Districts beyond their limits. Thus in Sind the whole allotment from Provincial revenues being an insufficient supplement to the local receipts to meet the expenses of schools in the Municipal towns, no less than Rs. 24,027 are taken besides from the District cess collections to make good the deficiency. And again in Broach the former Provincial grant having been reduced to provide for the wants of other Districts, Rs. 8,000 of district cess-money are taken to make both ends meet in paying for the schools in Municipal towns. Dhárwár has also been mentioned by the Director of Public Instruction as another District in which the same thing has been done, and the Dhárwár Municipality makes no contribution whatever to the cost of Dhárwár schools.

43. The Director of Public Instruction should therefore be requested to consider and report in what way the Provincial grant should be redistributed on equitable principles with a view to the clear understanding by each Municipality invited to take charge of its schools of the proportion of the Provincial grant available for its assistance, and of the remaining liability which it will have to meet through economy, or increase of taxation. In towns it will probably be found that a given sum of money can be made to go much further in providing education by the substitution of a system of municipal aid to privately managed schools, for the system of direct maintenance of schools. But whatever means may be adopted for the attainment of the desired end, the Governor in Council will be prepared to assist by spreading the reduction of the Provincial grant to its proper amount over a number of years, instead of insisting on such reduction being carried out at once.

44. In regard to the smaller Municipalities other than those mentioned above in paragraph 38, the Governor in Council trusts that in a short time it may be found expedient to entrust to several of them the same control of primary and Anglo-Vernacular education as in the case of the present City Municipalities. In the meantime all the present Town Municipalities should be vested *mutatis mutandis* with the control provided for Táluka Committees in the following paragraphs.

45. Referring lastly to the management of schools, Primary and Anglo-Vernacular, in the non-Municipal towns and villages throughout the Districts in this Presidency, note is first taken of the "cardinal principle" laid down by the Government of India "as essential to the success of self-government in any shape," namely, "that the "jurisdiction of the primary Boards must be so limited in area as to ensure both local "knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members."

46. It has been decided that the smallest area for local self-government is to be the táluka, and that the Táluka Cammittee is to be composed of the Assistant Collector and Mámlatdár (ex-officio), of landholders to be elected or nominated, a representative Inámdár, and a delegate, in some places, from the Municipality of the Táluka Town. And the Governor in Council can find little encouragement to believe that speaking generally the members of Táluka Committees will be found either competent or inclined to undertake the management of schools throughout a táluka. It would in fact be impossible to ensure local knowledge and local interest on the part of non-official members of rural Boards, unless a separate Board were established for every village.

47. In these circumstances two courses have been submitted for the consideration of Government—(1) that the management of non-Municipal schools throughout a whole District should be entrusted to the District Committee, or rather to a School Board in dependence on such Committee, the members of which School Board being specially chosen for interest in educational matters would not necessarily be also members of the Committee, (2) that the management of schools in each táluka should be divided between the Táluka Committee and the District Committee by rules distinguishing the matters which could most suitably be entrusted to each.

48. The plan first mentioned is founded on no principle of representation, or of local knowledge and interest. It amounts merely to the transfer of school administration from the State Educational Department to a School Board of native gentlemen who will have other occupations, and little or no opportunity of informing themselves personally of the condition and wants of the District in educational matters.

49. The second plan does not commend itself to the Governor in Council as convenient, and it would needlessly interfere with the principle of making the Táluka Committees as independent as possible.

50. It appears to the Governor in Council that for the present it will be the best plan to leave to the Educational Department the actual teaching, discipline, and management of schools, including the appointment and dismissal of masters, and the grants of leave of absence. It is not to be expected that matters involving such constant trouble will be properly looked after by the unpaid and often unwilling agency of a Táluka Committee, unless the work is left to the ex-officio members. But while spared this trouble it is possible to assign to these Committees a very real and large control of education in their Tálukas, easily exercised at occasional meetings in such matters as—

(1.) The determination of the places at which schools shall be established, including the transfer or abolition of existing schools.
(2.) The determination of the class of each school in point of cost, selection being from classes recognised by the Educational Department.
(3.) The determination of the standard of teaching in each school, the selection being from standards recognised by the Department.
(4.) The rate of fees to be charged to the pupils in each school whether children of cesspayers, or non-cesspayers.
(5.) The number of free scholars in each school.
(6.) The assignment of money to be expended through the Educational Department on grants-in-aid in places where it may be decided to rely on privately managed schools.

(7.) The assignment of sums necessary to provide accommodation for primary schools whether by building, purchase, or hire, and the determination of the way in which such accommodation shall be provided wherever wanted.

(8.) The assignment of provision for secondary education, but for this the sanction of the Director of Public Instruction should be necessary.

51. The Governor in Council is accordingly pleased to direct that on the revised constitution of the Táluka Committees being effected, rules should be put in force vesting in them the powers above detailed.

52. The question of the funds to be entrusted to Municipal and Local Boards has been considered already. The Governor in Council would merely here add that he is unable to agree with the Commissioner C. D. in the opinion that "all ground rent "now credited to Government the sale proceeds of lands sold for non-agricultural "purposes, and all fines and penalties for converting land to such purposes" should be credited to Municipal funds. As long as the land is the property of Government all the receipts on account of it should be paid to Government. There is no more reason why Government should give up the ground rent on its land to a Municipality than there is why a private landlord should do so. Fines and penalties for breaches of Municipal rules may however in all cases be credited, when recovered, to municipal funds.

53. The Government of India in paragraph 21 of their Resolution of May 18th last have suggested that "the License Tax assessments and collections might very well be "made over to the local boards, municipal and rural, in many parts of the country, "subject to the control provided by the existing law." The majority of the officers consulted are strongly opposed to the adoption of this proposal, and it is contended that if this course is followed it will be a matter of extreme difficulty to prevent favouritism and injustice, and the receipts from the tax will almost certainly be materially diminished. In deference however to the wishes of the Supreme Government the Governor in Council is prepared to entrust to Municipal and District Local Fund Boards the assessments and collections of this tax, subject to the condition that no reduction is allowed in the aggregate proceeds recovered in each Municipality or District as compared with the proceeds in 1882–83. Each Municipality will be responsible for the assessment and collection within its limits, and a like responsibility will devolve on each District Local Fund Committee for the assessment and collection in its district. One-half of the sums realised will be credited to Imperial Revenues: the balance will be credited to the revenues of the Municipal or District Committee by which the assessment and collections are made, a set-off being taken in the form of a deduction from the grants now or in future to be granted from Provincial revenues to the Municipal or Local Fund Board in question for public works, education, or other objects. For the purpose of deciding the precise amount of the deduction thus to be made the receipts on account of License Tax for the present financial year will be regarded as the basis of calculation.

54. The Commissioners C. D. and S. D. urge that the present Local Funds are insufficient for the purposes for which they are required and inadequate to meet the numerous demands made upon them. Mr. Crawford suggests that the District Committees might be allowed to impose special additional local taxation under restrictions necessary for the protection of Imperial interests. Mr. Robertson holds a like view, and would further impose the Local Fund cess on A'bkári contracts, and would give to Local Funds a larger proportion of the increase of land assessment derived from revised survey settlements. The adoption of the latter portion of the recommendations of the Commissioner C. D. must inevitably result in a loss of revenue to Government, for which no sufficient cause has been made out. The Commissioner contends that "the A'bkári revenue would not suffer by such an arrangement," and that "even if "it did the grant would be a fair and proper one to make." If by "the A'bkári "revenue" the Commissioner means the total A'bkári revenue (Government and Local Funds under his scheme) his statement may be well founded, but if he means the Government A'bkári revenue, then the assertion must obviously be incorrect. In the latter case Government would lose $\frac{1}{16}$ or $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of its A'bkári revenue derived from farms of spirituous liquors, as it seems perfectly clear that no farmer would give a single rupee more for his farm than he otherwise would pay simply because he knew that $\frac{1}{16}$ of any sum he might give would go to swell Local Fund revenues. It is altogether immaterial to him how the money paid by him for his farm is credited.

His sole object is to make as much profit as he can out of his contract, and the smaller the sum he pays for the farm the greater is the gain he will derive from his speculation. No reasons are assigned by the Commissioner in support of his statement that in any case "the grant would be a fair and proper one to make" and his Excellency the Governor in Council fails to see what valid arguments could be advanced in proof of the assertion. The A'bkári Revenue of a district is not affected by the Local Funds administration. The establishment of schools, the construction of roads, and even the provision of a water supply do not tend to increase the income obtained by Government from A'bkári, and unless it can be shown that the A'bkári Department and revenue are benefited by the action of Local Fund Committees any claim put forward on behalf of those Committees to a share in that revenue at the expense of Government can hardly be regarded as meriting favourable consideration. As concerns the proposal of the Commissioner C. D. that the Local Fund receipts on account of increased assessments imposed at revision settlements should be doubled, it may be pointed out that this would involve a loss to the State of $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the increase in the land assessment levied on revision of settlements. Where it now gets a rupee it would then only get 15 annas. The 16th anna would have to be paid by the State to Local Funds as it would be impossible to require the cultivator to pay a Local Fund cess of two annas on every rupee of increased assessment. Part of this loss would fall on the Provincial Government, under the new financial arrangements, and part on the Imperial Government, the Provincial Government being the heaviest sufferer. Neither Government however can afford this sacrifice of revenue, and the Commissioner's proposal must accordingly be regarded as impracticable.

55. It seems therefore to His Excellency the Governor in Council that if Municipal and Local Funds, even when supplemented by any Provincial grants which may be given for specific purposes, are unable to meet the wants of the districts and municipal towns, the only course open is the imposition either of additional taxation by Government *suo motu* or of such special local taxation as the Boards may consider requisite, always provided that no fresh taxes shall be levied without the previous sanction of Government. Whether the Committees, Local or Municipal, will ever voluntarily consent to devise and impose fresh taxes is a matter on which considerable doubt may be entertained. The simultaneous introduction of the scheme of local self-government and of additional taxes to provide larger funds for the operations of the representative Committees is not likely to render the new system highly popular. The mass of the ratepayers would prefer the old system without the new taxes, and it is not improbable that the majority of the non-official members of Local and Municipal Boards would decline to support any proposals for the levy of further taxation. If therefore the District and Municipal Committees refuse to recommend and levy fresh taxes, it is for consideration whether this power should not be exercised by Government. The Commissioner C. D. suggests that "an enactment should now be passed making a "house-tax a general tax," and that the proceeds of such a tax should in municipal towns be credited to Municipal Funds, and elsewhere presumably to the funds at the disposal of District Local Fund Committees. As regards this proposal it may be noted that whilst such a tax would undoubtedly bring in a very large sum, it would equally certainly be in the highest degree unpopular. In place of passing a law directing that every house should be taxed, it seems to His Excellency in Council that it will suffice to introduce a less sweeping legislative measure authorising Government to order the imposition of such a tax in any District or Municipality in which on the evidence adduced and after sufficient inquiry the Governor in Council is satisfied that the necessity for additional taxation to meet the local wants of the District or Municipality in respect of works of public utility has been established.

56. The last point for consideration is with reference to the nature and extent of the power and control to be reserved to and exercised by Government in connexion with the action and proceedings of Local and Municipal Boards. This point has already been touched upon incidentally in several of the preceding paragraphs of this Resolution and it seems unnecessary now further to refer to it at any very great length. Government clearly must possess the powers mentioned in paragraph 17 of the Resolution of the Government of India dated May 18th, 1882. It must have a general authority to modify or set aside altogether the orders and proceedings of Boards on subjects of importance when such orders and proceedings are obviously unjust, impolitic, improper, opposed to the public interest, injurious to the public health, safety or convenience, or prejudicial to the Government revenues. It should also have the power to supersede absolutely a Board for gross and continued neglect

of duty, and this power it should in the opinion of the Governor in Council, for the reasons already assigned in paragraph 23, be entitled to exercise without the previous sanction of the Government of India. In all minor matters the interference of Government should be minimised to the utmost possible extent. When conferring greatly increased powers on Municipal and Local Boards it is necessary to allow those powers subject to the conditions above specified and to the following stipulations—

1st, that no loan shall be raised without the previous sanction of Government,
2nd, that no new tax shall be imposed without such sanction,
3rd, that no existing tax shall be abolished or decreased without such sanction,
4th, that no Municipality shall be allowed to abolish itself without such sanction,
5th, that no property belonging to any Local Fund or Municipal Board shall be alienated without such sanction,
6th, that no Local Fund or Municipal employé in receipt of a salary of Rs. 100 or upwards shall be dismissed without the sanction of the Commissioner of the Division,
7th, that in the case of all pensionable servants an appeal shall lie to Government from an order of a Board directing dismissal, suspension, or degradation,
8th, that without the previous sanction of Government no interference by any Board in any matter involving a religious question or prejudices of caste or creed or affecting the public peace or the public food or water supply or the public health shall be permitted.

57. The Remembrancer of Legal Affairs should be requested to prepare at his early convenience for the consideration of the Governor in Council draft Bills for the amendment of the Bombay Local Funds Act, 1869, and the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1873, to give effect to the orders contained in this Resolution where such orders necessitate alteration of the existing law. It will be understood that it is not necessary to insert in the Bills themselves full and minute provisions on all the points referred to in this Resolution, as for instance the mode of elections, or the exact nature and proportion of the receipts to be placed at the disposal of Táluka Committees. Instructions on these subjects can most conveniently be contained in rules to be framed under the Acts, and it must be remembered that the measures and arrangements of which the adoption has now been directed must be of necessity experimental to a certain extent, and that experience may show that in some respects they are capable of improvement, and stand in need of modification. Should changes hereafter be found necessary it would be a simpler task to effect alterations in the rules than to resort to further legislation to amend the law.

58. Bearing in mind the delay which must attend important legislation of the character contemplated, and also the modification of financial arrangements which has to be effected, and the interval which must be allowed for the elaboration of minor details and the preparation for elections, it seems to His Excellency the Governor in Council to be impossible that the scheme now sanctioned should come into operation before April 1st, 1883.

59. Orders will hereafter be issued as to the conversion into City Municipalities of some of the most populous, advanced, and thriving of the present Town Municipalities.

60. Measures will be adopted for the relief from the charges on account of contributions towards the maintenance of the Police employed within their limits of the Mofussil Municipalities now paying a portion of the cost of the Police force, when the question of the adjustment of Provincial grants to Municipal and District Boards is being determined.

61. Copy of this Resolution which is issued with the full concurrence of Government in the Educational and Public Works Departments should be forwarded to the Government of India and placed on the Editors' Table. It should also be published in the "Bombay Government Gazette."

J. NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 3774, OCTOBER 12, 1881.

Resolution* of the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881—Communicating their observations as regards the future management of the Imperial and Provincial Revenues; and requesting to be favored with the views of this Government at an early date.

RESOLUTION.—His Excellency the Governor in Council desires to have the views of the Commissioner in Sind, the Commissioners of Divisions, and the Director of Public Instruction on the important subject discussed by the Government of India in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the above Resolution which has been published in the "Bombay Government Gazette" of the 6th instant, pages 581–589. They open up a wide field for suggestion, and the opinions of all officers who take an interest in Local and Municipal administration may be invited. It is desired, however, that any proposals which may be submitted may be restricted to what is immediately practicable as an extension of local self-government beyond its present limits.

J. MONTEATH,
Acting Under Secretary to Government.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY.

(No. 3516.)

SIR, Simla, October 10, 1881.

I AM directed to submit, for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks, in continuation of paragraph 11 of the Resolution of the Government of India in this Department, No. 3353, dated the 30th ultimo, on the subject of the further extension of Local Self-Government.

2. The Provincial expenditure which may at the present time be transferred with greatest advantage to local control appears in the accounts under the heads of Medical, Education, and Public Works, but the Government of India is anxious that no artificial restriction should be imposed on such transfers; and if, in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor in Council, there should be other items of expenditure under Minor Departments, Miscellaneous, or any other head of the accounts which can without loss of efficiency be transferred to Local Bodies, the Governor General in Council will be glad to consider favourably any recommendation to that effect which His Excellency may wish to make.

3. His Excellency in Council specially desires that the case of each minor head of Provincial expenditure under Education or Medical Services should be separately considered, and that the reasons for or against transferring it to local management should be distinctly stated. The various heads under Minor Departments and Miscellaneous need not be considered in detail; but the Governor General in Council will be glad to be favoured with an expression of the views of His Excellency the Governor in Council as regards any items under these heads which it might *primâ facie* seem practicable to transfer to local management and control, even though it may not be deemed expedient to make the transfer at present. All expenditure now charged as Local, but not locally administered, should also be considered in detail, and the reasons stated which render it inexpedient, if the case be so, to transfer it to local control. It should also be considered whether any, and what, further expenditure on sanitation, drainage, water-supply and Public Works might now be made Local.

4. His Excellency in Council observes that at present the total annual amount spent on Police by Municipalities in British India amounts to about 27½ lakhs of rupees. The only function which the Municipalities discharge in regard to Police is the provision of funds for the purpose of meeting the whole, or a portion, of the cost of the Municipal Police Force. They practically exercise no control over the Police, and cannot, therefore, be expected to take any special interest in the efficiency of the force, or to look with sympathy on a provision of the Law which treats them as a

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* *See* page 8.

machinery for raising taxes to be spent on a department over which they have no control, and in the efficient and economical expenditure of which they have but little direct interest and no immediate responsibility. The Governor General in Council would, therefore, be glad to see Municipal Bodies relieved altogether of the charge for Police, an equal amount of expenditure on Education, Medical Charity, and, if possible, Public Works of local interest, being transferred to them with as full control as may be practically expedient over the details of such expenditure.

5. It is not the intention of the Government of India that the proposed transfer of the control of expenditure of a specially local character to Local Bodies should involve any addition to existing local burdens, and it will therefore be necessary to arrange for the simultaneous transfer of receipts sufficient to meet any net balance of additional expenditure which in any instance may arise. The nature of the receipts to be transferred requires careful consideration. They should, where possible, be of such a character as to afford a reasonable prospect that by careful administration, with all the advantages due to local sympathy, experience and watchfulness, they will so increase as to afford the means of meeting any additional expenditure which may be rendered necessary by the growing wants of each locality. In cases where a larger augmentation may be needed than is yielded by receipts of a specially local character, it may perhaps be found possible to assign to Local Bodies the receipts from Pounds, or a share of Assessed Taxes collected within the area of their jurisdiction. All receipts connected with any head of expenditure transferred to local control would, of course, be also transferred at the same time. For instance, all fees paid in Schools under local control would be treated as local receipts. The Governor General in Council is anxious, however, in this matter, as in all other questions connected with the proposed system of Local Self-Government, which must to a great extent be decided on considerations of local expediency, to meet, as far as may be possible, the wishes of the Local authorities.

6. The practicability of the transfer of items of provincial expenditure to local management and control cannot be profitably considered apart from the question of the Local Bodies to whom such transfer should be made.

The existing Local Bodies of greatest importance are the Municipalities and District Committees, and the Governor General in Council will be glad if, in any proposals which His Excellency the Governor in Council makes, advantage be taken as far as possible of the existence of these bodies, their powers being, where necessary, extended by means of legislation.

7. In the case of Municipalities, all Provinces in British India are now provided with legislative enactments sufficient for their constitution and working. But these enactments are, in some, of a much more elementary and incomplete character than in others, and it may be advantageous, while providing for any changes necessarily entailed by the transfers of receipts and charges now contemplated, for each Province to review all contemporary Indian legislation on the subject, and consider what improvements of a general nature are desirable.

8. With reference to District Committees, I am desired to state that His Excellency in Council is disposed *primâ facie* to consider the most desirable and effective policy to be that of concentrating all the local administration, other than that embraced by Municipalities, in the hands of one Committee for each District, having ancillary subordinate Sub-Committees for each tahsil or subdivision (as the case may be). Of the former the Magistrate and Collector would be President, of the latter the Assistant or Deputy in charge of the subdivision would be Chairman, and in each case the Local Body should comprise persons not in the service of Government, and elected or nominated, as may seem best, in a proportion not less than from one-half to two-thirds. In districts where more than one Committee now exists for different objects the possibility of their amalgamation should be considered; where no such Committees have yet been formed their constitution is evidently desirable.

9. In view of one or other of the purposes which have been alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, it appears probable that in most provinces, though perhaps not in all, legislation will be necessary; and I am therefore to request that, should this be so in the case of Bengal, the general outline of the nature of the legislation by which it is proposed to effect the necessary changes may be stated in your reply. Special attention will be required in settling the relations between the various Local Bodies

and the officers of the general administration, and in providing for a certain measure of control and inspection on the part of the Government. It would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government, if Local Bodies were subject to check and interference in matters of detail; and the respective powers of Government and of the various Local Bodies should be clearly and distinctly defined by statute, so that there may be as little risk of friction and misunderstanding as possible. Within the limits to be laid down in each case, however, the Governor General in Council is anxious that the fullest possible liberty of action should be given to Local Bodies.

10. The preceding remarks are more or less of general application. In the case of Bombay the distinctive features would appear to be as follows :—

(*a.*) That the mofussil Municipal organisation is complete, and the Municipal law the best, perhaps, in India, but that Municipalities are saddled with more than five lakhs of rupees of Police charges, while their expenditure on Education and Sanitary Establishments does not much exceed 2½ lakhs of rupees.

(*b.*) That Local Fund Committees, with Táluka Sub-Committees, already exist in all districts for the administration of all the funds embraced under Bombay Acts VIII. of 1865 and VII. of 1869, and are in good working order.

(*c.*) That more than half the total expenditure on Education is now met from Local Funds, but that the Educational expenditure which is locally controlled may, perhaps, admit of still further increase.

(*d.*) That only a small portion of the total Medical expenditure is Local, and that it seems possible to transfer a large portion of the Provincial Medical expenditure, especially under the heads of Vaccination and Sanitation and Hospitals and Dispensaries, to local control and management.

(*e.*) That the estimate of Provincial and Local expenditure on Public Works in 1881–82 amounts to Rs. 25,80,000 and Rs. 21,20,000 respectively. Of the latter amount, however, nearly the whole is expended through the Public Works Department.

11. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay will no doubt take into consideration the question of entrusting to the control and management of the Local Fund Committees a larger portion of the present Provincial expenditure subject to such Provincial supervision as may be deemed necessary, and the Government of India would be glad if it were found possible to relieve Municipalities altogether from the charge which they now bear on account of Police, some more appropriate Educational, Sanitary, or other burdens, being substituted.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that His Excellency the Governor of Bombay fully appreciates the importance of the extension of Local Self-Government; that the proposals now put forward will receive the most careful consideration from the Government of Bombay; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a considerable burden on the Local Government and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay, that can possibly be avoided, to occur in their introduction, that he trusts His Excellency the Governor of Bombay will find himself in a position to favour the Government of India with an expression of his views on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.

STEPHEN JACOB,
Officiating Under-Secretary to the
Government of India.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 3950, OCTOBER 25, 1881.

LETTER from the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, No. 3516, dated 10th October 1881—Submitting for consideration their remarks, in continuation of paragraph 11 of their Resolution No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881, on the subject of the further extension of local Self-Government; and requesting to be favoured with an expression of the views of this Government on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

RESOLUTION. — Government have already in Resolution, Financial Department, No. 3774 of October 12th, 1881, called for the views of the Commissioners and the Director of Public Instruction on the 10th and 11th paragraphs of the Resolution of the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, No. 3353, dated September 30th, 1881. The letter of the Government of India, No. 3516 of October 10th in the same Department, conveys the views of His Excellency the Viceroy in Council on the same subject in detail.

2. The first nine paragraphs of the letter are of general application to all provinces, and apparently relate more particularly to provinces in which the machinery of local administration is less complete than it is in Bombay. Paragraphs 10 and 11 deal with the case of this Presidency.

3. In the earlier portion of the letter, the Provincial Major Heads of Medical Services, Education, Public Works, Minor Departments and Miscellaneous are indicated as those under which Provincial expenditure may be transferred with the greatest advantage to local control. His Excellency the Viceroy in Council desires that the case of each minor head under Education and Medical Services may be separately considered and that the reasons for or against transferring it to local management should be distinctly stated. It is also desired that suggestions may be made as to any minor heads under Miscellaneous and Minor Departments which it may appear to Government practicable to transfer to local management and control. Expenditure now charged as local, but not locally administered, is to be examined in detail, and the reasons which prevent its transfer to local control are to be given. And it is to be considered whether any further transfer to local control of expenditure on sanitation, drainage, water-supply and public works can be made.

4. On this general aspect of the subject His Excellency in Council desires to be favoured with the views of the Accountant General, who has recently been bestowing great attention to the subject of Provincial and Local Finance. It is probable that not much further extension of the principle of local administration is immediately feasible under some at least of the above heads, but Government will be glad to consider any suggestions which may be made to them, whether for present or future adoption.

5. The suggestions of the Government of India must also be considered in the Public Works Department with reference to the large sums of Provincial and Local revenue which are now expended by or under the supervision of that Department. The question for discussion is whether a part of that expenditure can be entrusted with advantage to Local Bodies, and if so in what way.

6. As observed by the Government of India the most important Local Bodies, viz., the Municipalities and the Local Fund Committees, have already in Bombay a complete organization under special laws. The District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI. of 1873) regulates the constitution of City and Town Municipalities and requires the appointment of a large proportion of non-official Commissioners. The same Act vests in the Municipality with other property, "moneys accruing by gifts or transfers from Government." The Local Funds Act (Bombay Act III. of 1869) provides for the creation of Local Fund Committees of Districts one-half of the members of which are to be non-official, and these Committees are to administer, besides the special cess, "such other funds as may from time to time be placed at their disposal under the "orders of Government." Bombay Act No. VIII. of 1865 makes somewhat similar provision for the administration of Local Funds in Sind. The agency for local administration does not therefore call for immediate attention in this Presidency, and the question is rather in what way a larger proportion of the present Provincial expenditure may be entrusted to the control and management of the District Local Fund Committees and Municipalities.

7. The principal suggestions made by the Government of India, and on which the opinions of the officers subordinate to this Government are now desired, are, first, that the Municipal Bodies should be relieved altogether of the charge they now bear for Police under Bombay Act VI. of 1873, Section 24, Clause 1 (1) and should undertake an equal amount of expenditure on Education, Medical Charity, and if possible, Public Works of local interest. If an increased expenditure is undertaken by the Local Body, local receipts, such as school fees, are to be made over to it, and even, if necessary, a portion of revenue now Provincial, such as assessed taxes collected within the local area. Secondly, that education might be locally controlled to a larger extent than it now is. The Director of Public Instruction has already been requested to report generally on the subject as it concerns his Department. The object would be to make over a fixed Provincial grant together with the school fees of a city, town, or area to a Local Body, who would extend education within the limits of their charge by aid of increased receipts, donations, and endowments. Thirdly, that Provincial Medical expenditure especially under the heads of Vaccination, Sanitation, Hospitals, and Dispensaries, may be transferred to local control and management. Government desire that this portion of the subject may have the careful consideration of the Surgeon-General and the Sanitary Commissioner. It will also be treated fully by the Commissioners of Divisions.

8. It will be apparent that if effect can be given to any considerable portion of the scheme now sketched by the Government of India, the Local Bodies will receive a greatly increased influence and importance and will undertake greatly enlarged responsibilities to the Government and their fellow countrymen. The means and agencies of extended local Government at present existing must therefore have most careful attention, and be weighed and valued in a wide and liberal spirit.

9. His Excellency in Council desires to remind the Heads of Departments and other officers who are to submit their opinions that while Government will be greatly influenced in its conclusions by the views which are submitted by them for consideration, the large number of reports expected will require some time to arrange and digest, and that as the Government of India have requested that the views of His Excellency in Council on the whole question may be placed before His Excellency the Viceroy in Council in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year, the subject must not be put aside to be taken up at a moment of leisure, but calls for immediate study.

J. MONTEATH,
For Secretary to Government.

SCHEME FOR THE EXTENSON OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN SIND.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 964, MARCH 16, 1882.

LETTER from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 783,* dated 25th February 1882—

No. 3774, dated 12th October 1881.
No. 3950, dated 25th October 1881.

Submitting his remarks with reference to Government Resolutions noted in the margin on the subject of the further extension of local self-government.

RESOLUTION.—His Excellency the Governor in Council has perused with interest the careful and well considered report submitted by the Commissioner in Sind. In many of the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner Government would express their general concurrence. Any measures that may be adopted for the further extension of local self-government in Sind must be framed more or less in conformity with the proposals made by Mr. Erskine. The questions for immediate decision are, to what extent and in what respects should increased facilities of self-government be afforded, to whom should the additional power of control over outlay on local objects be granted, and how should the financial burdens be adjusted so as to avoid the casting on Provincial Revenues of an expenditure materially in excess of that which now devolves upon them.

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* See page 11 of Appendix.

2. Whatever may be the decision of Government on other points it seems desirable that the administration of the expenditure connected with Civil Hospitals should not be removed from Government and vested in any local body, and that Thar and Párkar should not be included at present in any scheme for the extension of local self-government in Sind. No officer whose report has been received advocates any departure from the existing system in respect of Civil Hospitals, and as regards Thar and Párkar the Commissioner shows with sufficient clearness that that district has not yet reached so advanced a stage of civilisation as to render it expedient to delegate to local bodies within it a greater power over the purse and higher responsibilities and functions than they at present possess.

3. The statement therefore of which Government have to consider the financial and other aspects is Mr. Erskine's Statement B., which differs from his Statement A. in excluding from consideration Thar and Párkar and the expenditure on Civil Hospitals. Statement B. refers to Karáchi, Hyderabad, Shikárpur, and the Upper Sind Frontier District, and to the expenditure on Police in Municipalities, Vaccination and Sanitation, Dispensaries, and certain Educational heads in those four districts.

4. At present the net expenditure under these four main headings which, being now defrayed from Provincial Funds, the Commissioner proposes to cast on Municipal and Local Funds is as follows :—

	Rs.
Karáchi	22,554
Hyderabad	22,447
Shikárpur	10,347
Upper Sind Frontier	602
Total	55,950

This expenditure would be thrown as follows on the various Local and Municipal Funds :—

—	Municipal Funds.	Local Funds.
	Rs.	Rs.
Kárachi	16,254	6,300
Hyderabad	18,830	3,617
Shikárpur	7,869	2,478
Upper Sind Frontier	—	602
Total	42,953	12,997
	= 55,950	

As at present Local Funds do not bear any expenditure which can now *per contra* be thrown on Provincial Revenues, it would be necessary to give them a special grant of Rs. 12,997 from Provincial Funds to meet these new charges. This, however, would not in itself mean any additional expenditure to Government. It would simply be tantamount to Government spending the money through the agency of Local Fund Committees instead of through the agency of its own officers.

5. The Municipalities now bear in part the cost of the Police employed within their limits. The expenditure thus incurred by them should in future, the Commissioner proposes, be defrayed from Provincial Funds. The following table shows the payments for Police now made by the Municipalities from which it is proposed to relieve them, the new charges which under the scheme would be cast on them, and the net gain or loss to them :—

—	Now Pays.	Will in Future Pay.	Gains or Loses.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Karáchi	31,514	16,254	15,260 gains.
Hyderabad	13,721	18,830	5,109 loses.
Shikárpur	9,340	7,869	1,471 gains.
Upper Sind Frontier	4,096	—	4,096 gains.
Total	58,671	42,953	

It would be necessary to make from Provincial Funds a grant of Rs. 5,109 to the Hyderabad Municipality to compensate the Municipality for the increased charges thrown on it in excess of its present Police expenditure.

6. The additional cost to Provincial Revenues which this Scheme would necessitate would therefore be—

Rs. (58,671—42,953 =) 15,718 + 5,109, or Rs. 20,827,

or stated in another way, the calculation would be—

Charges to be incurred by Government.

	Rs.
Police charges - - - - -	58,671
Payment to Local Funds - - - -	12,997
Do. Hyderabad Municipal Funds - -	5,109
	76,777
Deduct—	
Charges now paid by Government and henceforth to be paid from Municipal and Local Funds - -	55,950
Net result increase - - - - -	20,827

7. The immediate gainers by the change would be the Municipalities. The scheme means to them a clear gain in Karáchi of Rs. 15,260, in Shikárpur of Rs. 1,471, and in the Upper Sind Frontier of Rs. 4,096,—a burden which has hitherto fallen on them would be taken off their shoulders by Government at the expense of the general body of tax payers. In return, the payment of Police charges from Municipal funds would cease. It is no doubt desirable for various reasons that the cost of the maintenance of the Police generally should be defrayed by the State, but it may also be observed that, as is pointed out by some of the officers consulted by the Commissioner, the system in Sind under which certain of the Municipalities bear a portion of the charges for Police is not without its special advantages. A scheme under which the Municipalities would pay part of the cost of the Police and would have a voice in the Police administration, whilst Government would retain the control over the Police, appoint the superior officers, and contribute a certain proportion of the cost of the Police on condition that the force was maintained in an efficient state, and that any other requirements which may be insisted upon are fulfilled, seems to His Excellency the Governor in Council to be one which would merit favourable consideration.

8. The main financial objection to the recommendations of the Commissioner is that they throw on Government an additional charge of Rs. 20,827, raising the expenditure from Provincial funds about 35 per cent. The proposals of the Government of India on the subject of decentralisation did not contemplate a net increase of cost of Government. Those proposals virtually were that Government instead of itself spending its own money on certain objects should make over to certain bodies sums equal to those which it now expends on those objects, and should leave to those bodies a discretionary power as to how the money could best be laid out. It was not contemplated that the adoption of the new system should involve large additional demands on Provincial Funds.

9. The opinion of Government in the Educational Department should be requested on the Commissioner's suggestions in so far as they relate to educational purposes and expenditure. The Surgeon-General with this Government should also be asked for his views on the proposals made by the Commissioner and the Deputy Surgeon-General regarding medical expenditure and accounts.

10. Government as at present advised consider that any attempt in the direction of an extension in Sind of local self-government should for the present at least be confined in the four city municipalities of Karáchi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, and Shikárpur. If successful there the experiment can be carried out on a larger scale throughout the Province. In order however to introduce the new system into even the four city municipalities fuller and more detailed information than is contained in Mr. Erskine's letter is required. The Commissioner should therefore be requested to furnish

Government at his early convenience with information giving full particulars of the payments on account of Police made in each of the above mentioned city municipalities, of the cost of the vaccination and sanitation service in each, and the mode in which that cost is now met, of any medical service expenditure in each which though now defrayed from Provincial Funds might henceforth be met from municipal revenues and placed under municipal administration, and of the nature and extent of the charges connected with education in each now borne by Government. The Commissioner should also be asked to supply a statement furnishing similar information concernig the larger town municipalities.

J. NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 414, MARCH 23, 1882.

RESOLUTION of Government in the Financial Department, No. 3950,* dated 25th October 1881—Communicating a letter from the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, on the subject of the further extension of local Self-Government; and calling upon the Heads of Departments and other officers to submit their views on the question, in time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year. Appending copy of that Department Government Resolution No. 3774 of 1881, in which the views of the Commissioners and the Director of Public Instructions were called for on the subject.

RESOLUTION.—His Excellency the Governor in Council having had under consideration how the principle of local Self-Government may be extended in the Department of Public Instruction, is of opinion that the best field for a tentative measure in this direction offers itself in the management of elementary instruction within Municipal limits.

2. His Excellency in Council prefers to proceed experimentally, and is not prepared at once to hand over grants from Provincial Revenues *en masse* to all Municipalities. On the other hand he desires to promote a genuine effort at popular Self-Government, and would not be content with a mere nominal transfer of administrative control to existing local bodies which, though very efficient for their own purposes, are largely composed of official members.

3. His Excellency in Council proposes in the first instance to limit the experiment below described to a few chosen Municipalities, which may be Bombay, Poona, and Ahmedabad. If the measure succeeds with these Municipalities they will be an example to others who may then be invited to follow in their steps.

4. The measure should take the form of an offer made to the Municipalities which they will accept or reject, according as their desire for Self-Government is strong and genuine or otherwise.

5. The offer will be made on conditions which Government will attach to the transfer to the Municipalities of money from Provincial Revenues.

6. Government will assure itself by these conditions that the money will be well spent for the public benefit, and will reserve the right to withdraw the grants if such assurance is at any time wanting.

7. As the Municipalities which accept the offer will on their part undertake both labour, expense, and responsibility, as much independence of action as possible should be left to them.

8. His Excellency in Council will, therefore, not propose, as suggested by the Director of Public Instruction, to place an officer of the Educational Department on the School Boards; nor would he dictate to the Municipalities minute rules for the working of the School Committees; nor would he reserve the appointment of teachers to the Educational Inspectors.

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* *See* page 61.

9. He would prefer to invite the Municipalities to frame their own rules for the constitution and working of their School Boards, with of course certain general conditions which may be somewhat as follows :—

10. Government proposes to transfer to the Municipality the control of Elementary Education within Municipal limits, together with a grant-in-aid from Provincial Revenues, beginning with a sum about equal to the present Provincial expenditure on the Elementary Schools in the said Municipal limits.

11. If the offer is accepted Government will attach the following conditions to the continued payment of the public grant.

12. The Municipal Elementary School Fund will consist, in addition to the Government grant, of school fees, assignments of Municipal Revenue, subscriptions, donations, and other receipts, which will be administered by a duly constituted School Board.

13. Government desires that the Municipalty will make proposals, in framing which the English Elementary Education Act and its schedules may be used, for the constitution and functions of such School Board, which should be a Sub-Committee of the Municipality. The scheme must be subject to the approval of Government. But Government do not desire to impose the details of the constitution of the School Board, or stipulate for the inclusion of official members, and will only expect that it shall fairly represent all the principal sections of the community.

14. Government will stipulate :—

(*a.*) That the Government principles and system of Elementary School management, rates of salary, and course of instruction shall be generally maintained in the Municipal schools.

(*b.*) That the expenditure on the schools from other sources shall be not less than * times the Government grant to the Municipality.

(*c.*) That the Municipal schools shall be open to inspection and examination at any time by the Government Inspecting Staff.

(*d.*) That the account of the Municipal School Fund shall be audited yearly by auditors, of whom one shall be a Government Officer, and shall be published for general information.

(*e.*) The Municipality shall agree not to resign the management of the Municipal schools without a clear year's notice. Government will give a clear year's notice of reduction or withdrawal of the Government grant.

(*f.*) Instead of a lump grant from Provincial Funds, the Municipality may claim a grant by results, in which case the Grant-in-aid Rules shall be held applicable to the Municipal Elementary Schools, and rule (*b*) above shall not apply. Government may after one year's notice require a Municipality to accept a grant by results in place of a lump grant.

(*g.*) If the Municipality employ any teacher of the Government Department who has done pensionable service, or for pensioning whom the Department has made provision, the Municipality must make provision for the continuance of his pension rights, according to the rules of Government from time to time in force.

(*h.*) The appointment and dismissal of employés in Municipal Elementary Schools, or under the School Board, shall rest with the School Board or Municipality as may be arranged, but no employé lent to the Municipality by the Department of Public Instruction shall be discharged or dismissed without the concurrence of the Educational Inspector, except after three months' notice, which should be communicated to the Educational Inspector.

(*i.*) Government will expect that the Municipality shall give full consideration to representations of the Department of Public Instruction, as to the number, size, and location of schools, their discipline, and all other departmental matters.

(*k.*) The Municipality shall employ teachers certificated by the Department of Public Instruction in preference to others, so far as they can be provided.

(*l.*) A statement of employés with their salaries and all other items of recurring expenditure shall be maintained by the School Board, and be at all times open to the infpection of the Government Educational Inspector.

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* Figure to be suggested by the Director of Public Instruction.

(*m.*) The payment of the Government grant must be held subject to financial exigencies.

(*n.*) Government will reduce or withdraw the grant, after notice, if abuses or transgressions of the declared educational policy of the State are persisted in by a School Board after time has been given for reforming them; or if the provision of schools of elementary instruction by the Municipality is manifestly inadequate.

(*o.*) All reports and returns required by Government must be furnished by the School Board.

15. While it appears judicious to proceed tentatively at first in a measure which may lead to important changes in the duties of the Government Department of Public Instruction, His Excellency in Council will have much satisfaction in extending it at no distant date to all the important Municipalities, if the proposals of Government are met with alacrity.

16. His Excellency in Council desires that the Director of Public Instruction will place himself in communication with the three selected Municipalities named above, will communicate to them the views of Government, will consult with them on questions of detail, and will receive and submit with his opinion the proposals which they are to frame as to the constitution and functions of their School Boards.

J. B. PEILE,
Acting Chief Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 1254, APRIL 3, 1882.

LETTER from the Commissioner, S. D., No. 736, dated 14th March 1882—Reporting that the Collectors and Presidents of District Local Funds and Municipalities of his Division may be said to be unanimously opposed to any present extension of the existing self-government in respect of Local Funds and Municipalities; appending remarks and suggestions of Mr. Todd, Assistant Collector of Kánara, which appear to be worthy of consideration; observing that he sees year by year a perceptible improvement in the status of Municipal Commissioners but that he is bound to admit that except perhaps in the two largest towns, Belgaum and Dhárwár, it would as yet be unsafe to entrust Municipalities with more than they have to superintend at present, that in Belgaum and Dhárwár the experiment might be tried of handing over to the Municipalities the funds now spent on education, on vaccination, and on dispensaries, and the system, if found successful, might be extended to smaller Municipalities, that the whole question of dispensaries is one that must soon be dealt with on a system very different from the present, that the soundest plan would be to open gradually the door to private practitioners by offering the use of dispensaries to picked gentlemen who have graduated in the Grant Medical College, that he thinks that both District and Local Fund Committees and Municipalities might be benefited and strengthened if every Municipality annually elected and sent a member from the non-official body of Commissioners to serve on the District and Táluka Local Fund Committee, and that such a nomination would be popular and enhance the importance of the whole body of the Municipal Commissioners; and adding that at present no more can safely be done in the direction suggested by the Government of India as we are already far in advance of most other parts of India.

RESOLUTION.—Government defer the consideration of the questions discussed in Mr. Crawford's report till June next, when a conference will be held at Poona to consider them.

2. Further orders on the subject of the conference will be issued hereafter.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 1343, APRIL 10, 1882.

LETTER from the Commissioner, N. D., No. 453, dated 27th March 1882—Stating, with reference to paragraph 11 of Government Resolution No. 1093,* dated 25th idem, that in the large cities of Gujarát the number of persons entitled to vote under the pecuniary qualifications will be very large in consequence of the Halálcore Cess being levied in the cities of Ahmedabad and Surat and the House Tax in the City of Broach; observing that it is to be presumed that the payment of the Halálcore Cess is not intended to qualify to vote as almost the whole population would thereby be included; suggesting that a somewhat less unmanageable method might be devised by dividing the cities and allowing a vote to the representative of each caste or sect in each ward, the said representative being chosen by the rest of the caste or sect; and adding that this would reduce the number of votes from thousands to hundreds and would as a commencement be found better than a more general admission to the franchise.

RESOLUTION.—The Commissioner, N. D., should be informed that Government, as at present advised, do not consider it expedient to modify or alter their previous orders, which are quite clear.

2. The Commissioner in Sind and the Commissioners, N. D. and C. D. when reporting as directed in paragraph 11 of Government Resolution No. 1093, dated 25th March 1882, on the approximate number of persons who would be entitled to vote in each of the City Municipalities in their respective Divisions, should also give the approximate number that will derive their right to the franchise from each description of direct rate or tax, Government or Municipal, as well as the number which will derive their right from an educational or professional franchise. Government will then be able to see how many people derive their right to vote from the Halálcore Cess and how many from the House Tax to which Mr. Sheppard refers.

J. MONTEATH,
Acting Under Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 550, APRIL 15, 1882.

TRANSFER from the Financial Department, No. 964, dated 16th March 1882—Of a Resolution of Government in that Department regarding the scheme for the extension of Local Self-Government in Sind, together with the Commissioner's report and minutes thereon.

Memorandum from the Secretary to Government in the Financial Department, No. 1266, dated 4th April 1882.

RESOLUTION.—Government in the Educational Department after considering the views of the Commissioner and Local Officers in Sind on the subject of the extension of Local Self-Government in the Department of Public Instruction are pleased to issue the following instructions.

2. Government have in Resolution No. 414 of March 23, authorised the Director of Public Instruction to treat with the Municipalities of Bombay, Poona, and Ahmedabad with a view to the transfer to these Municipalities of the control of elementary instruction, along with a Provincial grant, by the Agency of School Boards which are to be Sub-Committees of the Municipalities.

3. A copy of this Resolution should now be sent to the Commissioner in Sind, and he should be authorised to make similar arrangements with the Municipalities of Karáchi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, and Shikárpur.

4. His Excellency in Council desires in Sind as in the Presidency to limit the experiment at first to elementary education. Higher education is more backward in Sind than in the Presidency Divisions, and requires more careful fostering by the

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* *See* page 34.

Government Officers; and it would be premature to expect too much at once from the Municipalities. But both in Sind and the Presidency, His Excellency in Council would look forward to the transfer of the higher as well as the lower class schools to Municipal Administration if the present experiment succeeds.

5. With regard to the other important point discussed, viz., how a full equivalent charge is to be undertaken by the Municipalities if Government takes over the cost of the Police, it appears to Government in this Department that this consideration need not interfere with the execution of the proposed arrangement, by which Government will merely transfer a sum provided in the Provincial Budget to the administration of the Municipality without incurring any fresh charge. But if any of the four Municipalities now pays for Police as much as or more than the sum the Provincial Budget now bears for Elementary Schools, it will be very simple for Government to cease providing the latter and to stipulate that the Municipality shall provide it in future, Government at the same time undertaking an equivalent portion of the cost of Police heretofore paid by the Municipality. This will be a mere adjustment which the Commissioner can carry out. The Municipality will apply to Elementary Schools a sum which it has hitherto applied to Police. Government will cease to contribute from Provincial Funds to the cost of the Elementary Schools, but will pay an equal sum for the Police instead.

6. On this point the Commissioner may submit further proposals in the Financial Department, but the negotiation with the Municipalities need not be delayed for the completion of this exchange of charges, which may be separately arranged.

J. B. PEILE,
Acting Chief Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 1630, MAY 3, 1882.

LETTER from the Commissioner, C. D., No. R.–1513,* dated 17th April 1882—Forwarding, with reference to Government Resolution (Financial Department), No. 3774, dated 12th October 1881, his own views on the scheme for the future management of the Imperial and Provincial Revenues, together with a précis of opinions of the Collectors of his Division respecting the same; observing that the general opinion is that little or no further local powers can be given than those now held by the different local bodies, such as Local Fund Committees and Municipalities; and recommending (paragraph 8) for the reasons given that increase of powers be granted only to the Chief City Municipalities who should be allowed under certain restrictions the right to elect a certain number of Commissioners.

RESOLUTION.—The Commissioner, C. D., should be informed that it is the intention of Government that during the approaching rains a conference should assemble at Poona to consider fully and in detail the various questions connected with the proposed further extension of local self-government.

2. The attention of the Commissioner, C. D., should be drawn to the fact that the recommendation made by him in paragraph 8 of his letter No. 1513 of the 17th ultimo to the effect that the chief City Municipalities should be granted the right to elect a certain number of the Commissioners had already been anticipated by Government, who had in their Resolution No. 1093 of March 25th last, of which a copy was forwarded to the Commissioner, directed the adoption of the course now suggested by Mr. Robertson.

3. The Commissioner should be informed that Government trust that he will in furnishing the information called for in the above-mentioned Resolution use greater expedition than was shown in the submission of the report required by Resolution No. 3950, dated 25th October, 1881. From the dates of the various reports by the Collectors of the Central Division it appears that the last of them was sent to the Commissioner on January 9th last, but although in paragraph 9 of Resolution No. 3950 early report was called for, and the reasons which rendered it necessary that report should be furnished

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* *See* page 23 of Appendix.

before the close of the financial year were stated, the Commissioner's reply was not despatched until April 17th.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 2100, JUNE 7, 1882, on RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MAY 18, 1882, printed on page 25.

RESOLUTION.—The above Resolution of the Government of India should be published in the Bombay "Government Gazette" for general information, and copies thereof communicated to the Commissioner in Sind, the Commissioner, N. D., C. D., and S. D., the Commissioner of Customs, Opium and A'bkári, the Survey and Settlement Commissioner, and all Collectors including the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners in Sind, with a request that they will be so good as to submit, on or before the 1st July next, their views and opinions thereon for the consideration of Government.

2. With a view to save time, the reports of the Collectors should be submitted direct to Government.

J. MONTEATH,
Acting Under Secretary to Government.

From A. MACKENZIE, ESQ., SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY.

Home Department.
Public, No. 1521.

SIR, Simla, October 4, 1882.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 3584 of the 19th September 1882, forwarding a copy of a Resolution* of the Government of Bombay, No. 3583 of the same date, on the subject of the extension of local self-government in the Bombay Presidency; and in reply I am to communicate the following observations of His Excellency the Governor General in Council.

2. Accompanying your letter are copies of two printed collections of papers, being the reports of Commissioners, Collectors, and other officers of Government, bearing upon the subject. The Government of India, while recognising the full value of such opinions, was particularly desirous that those of leading Natives should also be invited upon the suggestions put forward in the Resolution of the Home Department of the 18th May last; but apart from the letters of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha printed in the second "collection," and which seem to have been volunteered by that Association, there is no record of any reference to Native or non-official opinion to be found in the papers; nor have the opinions of Local Fund Committees, which were specially called for in paragraph 7 of my letter No. 831 of the 31st May last, apparently as yet been received and considered by the Local Government.

3. In paragraph 2 of the Resolution it is represented that the population of the Bombay Presidency, both urban and rural, has for many years past enjoyed a large share of local self-government under the Bombay Local Funds Act, 1869, and the District Municipal Act, 1873. The constitution of the Committees under these Acts is stated to be already popular in character, with a predominating non-official element; while in respect of the large and influential class of inamdars, the elective principle of representation is said to be adopted both for Taluka and District Local Fund Committees. It is further remarked that the Bombay District Municipal Act already contains provisions authorising the Government to grant the elective franchise to city municipalities, and to elevate town municipalities to the status of city municipalities, whenever the inhabitants display sufficient intelligence and public spirit to justify such a measure. Under this system it is claimed that large advances in civilisation have been made and improvements effected, hardly credible to those who knew the Presidency twenty years ago. The Government of India is then represented as proposing to "subvert" this system, which has in practice answered well, by substi-

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* *See* page 39.

tuting for Committees working under the guiding influence of the Collector "newly "constituted and less experienced Boards," on which it is proposed to "bestow by one "step unlimited powers." The Governor General in Council is said to "insist on the "introduction without delay of very radical measures of self-government" which in the opinion of the Bombay Government, are "somewhat premature," and not, in their full application, "compatible with safety;" the system advocated by the Supreme Government being further described in paragraph 3 as one under which the members of the boards would in the main be "the representatives chosen by the mass of the ratepayers."

4. The Governor General in Council has perused with regret these remarks of the Government of Bombay. His Excellency in Council finds it difficult to understand how the Government of Bombay can have so seriously misapprehended the plain statement of the views and intentions of the Government of India, set forth in the Resolution of the 18th May last. In that Resolution, as in the previous Resolution in the Financial Department of the 30th September 1881, the Governor General in Council explained how the recent further extension of the principle of financial decentralisation made it at length both possible and desirable to give practical effect to one of the principal objects of Lord Mayo's Government, when inaugurating the system in 1870, —as described in paragraph 23 of their Resolution of the 11th February of that year, in which it was stated—

"But beyond all this there is a greater and wider object in view. Local interest, supervision, and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to Education, Sanitation, Medical Charity, and Local Public Works. The operation of this Resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal institutions, and for the association of Natives and Europeans, to a greater extent than heretofore, in the administration of affairs."

After meeting certain preliminary objections which have been occasionally urged against any decided advance in the direction of local self-government in India, the Governor General in Council in the Resolution of the 18th May proceeded to indicate, for the guidance of the Provincial Governments and Administrations, the general principles upon which measures of this tendency should be framed, intimating at the same time the necessity not only of making the advance real and substantial, but also of observing a due amount of caution in connexion therewith. In the 9th paragraph of the Resolution His Excellency in Council deprecated any attempt to lay down rules of universal application in a country like India, and left a "large latitude of application" in every case to the local authorities. In the matter of the appointment of members to boards it was left to the Local Governments to decide in what districts the system of election should be adopted, the Governor General in Council expressing his hope that this system would ultimately prevail generally, and meantime be as widely established as might be practicable. So far from proposing to make the elected members in all cases the representatives of the mass of the ratepayers, as stated in the Resolution of the Bombay Government, the determination of the qualifications for electors and of the modes of election was left entirely to the Local Governments, an opinion being, however, given that the qualifications "might ordinarily at first be "fairly high;" and reference being made to a great variety of methods of election in order more distinctly to mark the discretion which it was intended to leave to Local Governments in this matter. The desire of the Government of India therefore is not to force upon all parts of the country a uniform system of its own devising, but to secure the gradual training of the best, most intelligent, and most influential men in the community to take an interest and an active part in the management of their local affairs.

The Government of Bombay do not seem to attach much importance to the attainment of this object. The Government of India have distinctly explained that they consider the extension of local self-government to be chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education. The Governor of Bombay in Council would, it appears, have preferred "to create and educate a public spirit" before entrusting more extended powers to Municipalities and Local Fund Committees. It is not explained what are the measures which His Excellency in Council would have proposed to adopt for the purpose of creating and educating public spirit; and in the absence of any information on this subject, the Governor General in Council cannot but feel much doubt as to the power of any Government to create public spirit otherwise than by

affording to the public a practical opportunity for displaying and cultivating such a spirit in the management of some portion, however limited, of public affairs. It is far easier for an Executive Government, by its direct action, to check and hamper the development of public spirit than to create it.

5. The Governor General in Council is at a loss to conceive what can have led the Government of Bombay to suppose that the Government of India had any intention either of subverting altogether the existing system in Bombay, or of conferring unlimited powers upon municipalities and local boards. In the separate communication to the Government of Bombay noted on the margin stress is laid upon the advantages which the existence of a widely spread system of municipal and local fund boards gave to that Presidency in following out the principles advocated by the Supreme Government. Not subversion but adaptation and expansion of existing arrangements was what the Government of India desired. Furthermore, the powers which it is proposed to entrust to local boards are not in any sense unlimited, but are in fact most strictly limited. The local objects to be entrusted to their management are merely those which they already administer, and which are described in the Resolution of Lord Mayo's Government above quoted; and although it is contemplated that in the performance of their functions they should be less subject than at present to official direction, it is clearly laid down in the Resolution of the 18th May that in respect of several of those functions, such as the raising of loans, the imposition of new taxes, the alienation of property, interference with matters involving religious questions or affecting the public peace, &c.—the sanction of authority would be necessary, as heretofore, to give validity to their proceedings. Besides this general form of control, it was explained in the Resolution (paragraphs 17 and 18) that it was the intention of the Government of India that the district officer should supervise and control from without the proceedings of the local boards within his district, while the Government were to retain all necessary powers for dealing with any board that failed in its duty—powers extending from simple remonstrance up to an absolute, though temporary, supersession of the defaulting body and of course including such intermediate measures for the prevention of serious and persistent neglect of duty as might be determined upon in consultation with Local Governments.

From Home Department, No. 831, dated 31st May 1882.

6. The Governor General in Council is not surprised that if the Government of Bombay really imagined it to be in contemplation to bestow "unlimited powers" on local bodies, they should view the proposal with hesitation and distrust. His Excellency in Council cannot, however, but regret that before issuing a Resolution attributing to the Government of India any intention on the face of it so improbable, the Local Government took no steps whatever, official or unofficial, to ascertain what the policy of the Supreme Government really was. The uncertainty and anxiety felt by the Governor in Council as to the "safety" of the measures contemplated by the Government of India is doubtless due to this misconception. Those measures are, as has been shown, of strictly limited scope, and are only the natural development of the principles laid down by Lord Mayo's Government. Of their perfect safety when applied in the manner and with the restrictions contemplated by the Government of India, the Governor General in Council has no doubt whatever; but it may reasonably be questioned whether it would be much longer "compatible with safety" to continue to extend education, and especially that higher education to which the Government of India attaches so much importance, and which the public so warmly desires, without affording to those whom the State has thus educated some more extended means than they have hitherto enjoyed, of taking a share in the conduct of their own affairs. It is one of the inevitable drawbacks of a widespread system of State education that it encourages to an unhealthy extent a desire for employment in the public service, not only as a mode of livelihood, but as a means of obtaining influence and distinction. No more effectual remedy for this evil can be provided than by affording to persons of education and talent fair opportunities for devoting their energies to the public service in a non-official capacity.

7. The Governor General in Council is not prepared to accept unreservedly the further suggestion which underlies the argument in paragraph 2 of the Resolution under acknowledgment, that the existing system in the Bombay Presidency is either in itself or in the mode of its administration so perfect as to make any change undesirable. On the contrary, a reference to the debates which took place in the local Council in connexion with the passing of the Bombay Municipal Act of 1873 will

show that that measure was from the outset regarded by the intelligent members of the Native community as limiting unduly the powers which Municipal Commissioners enjoyed under Act XXVI. of 1850—the enactment that it superseded; there can be no doubt that the powers of control and veto vested by the Act in the President are such as it has not been found necessary to assert in any other province of India; and it is indeed sufficient to read the description of those powers which is given in paragraph 5 of the Bombay Government Resolution to see how inconsistent they are with anything like independent action on the part of the local bodies. The Bombay Government point, indeed, to the powers given them by the Act of granting the elective franchise to city municipalities, and of elevating towns to the status of city municipalities. They refer also to the great advance that the Presidency has made since the Act was introduced. But the fact is that the number of city municipalities is now but ten throughout the whole Presidency, only one town (Sukkur) having been raised to that rank since the Act came into operation,* while the elective franchise had not up to the date of the issue of the Resolution of the 18th May last been granted under the Act to any city or town, however flourishing or far advanced. Such a state of things cannot in the opinion of the Government of India be regarded with complacency in a Presidency which on account of its enlightenment and general advancement would seem to be capable of exercising with safety and advantage more extended powers of self-government than could be wisely conceded to many other parts of the country.

It is admitted frankly enough by some of the more experienced officers consulted by the Bombay Government that the system of control hitherto in force has been "(to some extent) too strict and elaborate to encourage much really independent "action."† One officer‡ declares that "as popular institutions the municipalities "and Local Fund Committees (in Sind) are (with the exception of some city municipalities) little better than shams." Another officer§ notes "a tendency somewhat "increasing to dictate to Municipal Committees in a manner which may secure uniformity of municipal administration at the cost of the spirit of independence, which "is the life and soul of municipal self-government." A third officer‖ writes: "If the "principles enunciated in our Municipal and Local Fund Acts had been fairly acted "up to, we should have had some years of experience to show us how the natives, "entrusted under these Acts with certain responsibilities, had exercised their power. "As it is, though several years have elapsed since the Local Fund Act has been "passed, the power reserved to the Native Committees has been gradually decreased "until they are now a set of dummies with nothing to do and no money to spend. "The District Committee is in but a little better plight, as all its funds but a "small margin are budgeted for under the orders of superior authority. Municipalities are somewhat better off, but even they have had pressure occasionally "applied to them, which has prevented them from exercising the powers entrusted to "them by the Legislature." Other evidence to the same effect might be adduced from the reports of the District Officers enclosed in your letter under reply. It also appears from the papers that under arrangements recently made by the Local Government the admirable system of taluka Local Fund Committees has practically become extinct.

8. It is essential to the success of the policy, laid down by Lord Mayo in 1870, and repeatedly enunciated since that time by the Government of India, that freer opportunities of developing a capacity for local self-government should be given to the people of this country; and there is ample evidence before the Government of India, coming from all parts of the country, that it is only by removing the pressure of direct official interference that the people can be brought to take sufficient interest in local matters, and to devote to them the same amount of care and attention that enables them successfully to manage their own private concerns. There is nothing specially difficult or recondite in the work that is ordinarily entrusted to local Boards. The control of funds to be expended on the repair of local roads, the cleansing of local drains, the maintenance of local Primary Schools, and such like operations, constitute by far the greater portion of their duties. So long as the district officer is in a position to see that the necessary work is done, and to remonstrate and intervene if it is not

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* The Administration Report of 1874–75 shows nine city municipalities as then constituted, three of them being in Sind; but the Act was not formally extended to Sind till 1879. No addition has been made to the number of city municipalities in Bombay proper.

† Mr. Sheppard, Commissioner, Northern Division. ‡ Mr. Erskine, Commissioner of Sind.

§ Mr. Lee Warner. ‖ Mr. Pratt, Collector of Satara.

done, the Governor General in Council can see no reason why he should be everywhere required to direct the whole of the deliberations of the Boards, and to relieve them of all real responsibility by his constant presence.

9. The Governor General in Council is therefore unable to regard the proposal of the Government of Bombay set out in paragraphs 5 to 8 of their Resolution under notice, that the Collector should continue as a rule to be President of the city and town municipalities and of the Local Fund Committees of his district, as anything but a temporary arrangement. His Excellency in Council trusts that the experiment which the Bombay Government declare themselves willing to make of appointing non-officials to be Presidents in the more advanced towns and collectorates will be tried in an ungrudging spirit; and he has no doubt that if the plan of outside control is only properly understood and fairly worked by District Officers, its advantages will very soon be appreciated, and that it will be more and more widely followed. In any case the new Act should provide for the adoption of this arrangement wherever the Local Government may from time to time think fit to resort to it. The system of elected Chairmen for both general and managing Committees, described in paragraph 21 of the Resolution, will, it may be hoped, enable the district officers in practice to leave much real authority to the Members of the Board; and the Governor General in Council does not doubt that the Bombay Government will advise its officers to confine as much as possible the range of their presidential functions, so as to bring them more into harmony with the policy of the Supreme Government on this important matter.

10. The Governor General in Council is glad to observe that, while not prepared generally to abandon the system of official Presidents, the Bombay Government is ready to give up the power of suspending resolutions passed by a majority of the Commissioners which is now held by the President of a city municipality, and also to limit the powers of the President in town municipalities. The President will also in future have, it is understood, in both cases only a casting vote. There is also an intention expressed in paragraph 59 of converting several of the larger town corporations into city municipalities.

11. The Government of India approve of the proposals of the Local Government (paragraphs 9 to 13) for reducing the number of *ex-officio* members on the various local Boards, and for introducing a system of election. It is expected that in the course of a short time a less restricted system will be adopted in many places. The new Act should be so framed as to enable the Government to adapt the details of the system of appointment and election to varying local circumstances.

12. As regards the qualifications for the franchise and for election to the local boards (paragraphs 14–18), and the manner in which elections are to be conducted, the Governor General in Council has already said he would be prepared to leave much to the Local Governments. He trusts that the working of the system now about to be adopted in Bombay will be closely watched, and that opportunity will be taken to improve or modify it as experience may dictate.

13. Referring to the objections taken in paragraph 22 of the Resolution to the grant of honorary titles to members of the boards, I am to explain that the titles of Rai or Rao Bahadur and Khan Bahadur are those given in other parts of India as a matter of course to all members of the Subordinate Judicial and Executive Service. If the practice in Bombay is different, there would be no objection to the Local Government adopting for members of local boards any complimentary mode of address that seems to them suitable.

14. The Governor General in Council accepts the statement made in paragraph 23 of the Resolution, that there are tracts in Bombay, as in other Presidencies, where it is not possible at present to introduce the more advanced forms of local self-government. It is left to the Governor of Bombay in Council to determine in what places the new system may be introduced with a fair prospect of success. The Governor General in Council, however, trusts that a narrow policy in this respect will not be followed by the Bombay Government.

15. The Governor General in Council is glad to find from the announcement made in paragraph 26 of the Resolution that the system of seven years' budgets for Local Fund works is to be given up, and to gather from other paragraphs that the Taluka Committees are again to be utilised and have funds placed at their disposal for petty

local works. The paragraphs of the Resolution (27–53) dealing with the question of the funds to be made over to local boards, and the powers to be entrusted to them in respect of local works, education, and other matters, have evidently been very carefully thought out by the Government of Bombay, and the Government of India are content to await their development in practice. It is, however, hoped that the Government of Bombay will be able to include both sanitation and vaccination among the matters for which the boards will be held responsible.

16. On the question of taxation, discussed in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Resolution, the Governor General in Council is of opinion that it is highly undesirable to resort to increased taxation at present. It is quite possible that under an efficient system of local self-government local bodies may hereafter desire to raise larger funds for the important objects which they will be called upon to administer; but nothing could be further from the intention of the Government of India than that the development of self-government, which they desire to promote, should be used as an engine for imposing additional burthens upon the people. On the contrary, taxation is one of those matters over which, especially in the interest of the poorer classes, the Government must retain a strict power of control; and this is provided for in Bombay by the reservation laid down in paragraph 56 of the Resolution under notice. The Government of India would approve of the substitution of a house tax for the present system of octroi, should that course commend itself to any of the city or town municipalities, but not otherwise.

I have, &c.
A. MACKENZIE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, BENGAL.

From COLMAN MACAULAY, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Department of Finance and Commerce.

(No. 921½.)

Sir, Calcutta, April 8, 1882.

I am now directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 3513, dated 10th October,* on the subject of the further extension of local self-government in Bengal. Sir Ashley Eden has given this question his most careful consideration, and he has had before him the opinions of the local officers of his administration as well as those of various public bodies in this province. The conclusions at which he has arrived are stated in the following paragraphs.

2. Sir Ashley Eden has no doubt of the soundness of the general policy of extending local self-government in Bengal, and he believes it to be at once the duty and the interest of Government to promote among the people a genuine and intelligent concern in the management of local affairs and the development of local institutions. But he is convinced that, if this policy is really to succeed, it must be introduced with the utmost caution, and that any attempt to force suddenly upon the country at large an elaborate system of administration based upon the practice of western nations and foreign to all the traditions and ideas of the people, must necessarily result in failure. The first question, therefore, which he has had to consider is whether the legislation which will be needed to confer the necessary powers on local bodies in advanced districts could contain provisions so graduated that some at least might be extended to all districts. After careful consideration he has come to the conclusion that this would not be possible, and in this opinion a number of experienced officers whom he has consulted unanimously concur. In a province like Bengal, which contains districts representing many different stages of development and education, no single system of local self-government could be administered with success. Pooree and Chumparun differ as much from Singbhoom and the Chittagong Hill Tracts on one side as they differ from Hooghly and the 24-Pergunnahs on the other. If the measure were uniform, it would fail by being either too elaborate for the backward districts or

* *See* page 155.

too simple for the more advanced. If it provided in itself for too many gradations, it would be unwieldy. In the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion we should provide for the gradual advance of backward districts by improving existing machinery and enlarging the powers of local bodies, as far as may be considered advisable, by executive order. For advanced districts one compresensive measure should be enacted providing for all the branches of local self-government.

3. It is unnecessary at this stage to specify the districts to be placed under the first category. They will probably be those comprised in the Chota Nagpore, Orissa, and Chittagong divisions, and some of those comprised in the Patna, Bhagulpore, Rajshahye, and Dacca divisions. The three districts to which the Cess Act does not apply—Singbhoom, the Sonthal Pergunnahs, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts—will of course not be affected. The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that, as time goes on, the number of districts admitted to the larger measure will gradually increase. Meanwhile he considers that the following policy should be adopted. The committees constituted under the Cess Act should be carefully revised and strengthened, inactive members being eliminated and members added who will consent to take a genuine interest in the administration of the district affairs. To these Committees should be entrusted provisionally the maintenance of all provincial roads, of staging bungalows, and of such other buildings as the Department of Public Works may find it possible, in consultation with the Committees, to place under their management. The existing District Education Committees should be abolished and their functions transferred to the Committees already entrusted with the administration of the Road Cess. These functions would be considerably enlarged. They would extend to some control over the grant for primary schools, and over the grant-in-aid allotment, and to the management of Government secondary schools and circle schools, and of Government high English schools. The Committee would also be vested with the management of all dispensaries outside municipal limits which now receive aid from Government. They would have the charge of all school and dispensary buildings in cases where the institution was under their charge. A fixed grant would be made representing the present expenditure on the services entrusted to the Committees, less the net proceeds of ferries and pounds in the district. The latter sources of income would be made over to them, but the administration of ferries and pounds could only be confided to bodies appointed under the new Act. It would be understood that ample powers of inspection would be reserved to Government, and that, in the event of the duty not being satisfactorily performed, the whole or a part of the grant or of the Committee's powers might be withdrawn. In some districts it might not be possible to give such large powers, but this is the general scheme that Sir Ashley Eden would wish to try in districts which are not yet sufficiently advanced for a more elaborate measure. As the new law cannot come into force for some months he would apply this executive measure at once to all districts, extending the new law afterwards to such districts as may be considered suitable for its application. Orders in this matter will not, however, be immediately issued, as Sir Ashley Eden does not consider that it would be proper for him, immediately before laying down the Government, to commit his successor to such a large measure of policy.

4. The law embodying the more elaborate measure of local self-government should be framed on the model of the General Municipal Act, with provisions under the various heads, which could be extended or withdrawn by executive order. One chapter would deal with public works, and would take the place of Chapters VIII. to XII. of the Cess Act, which chapters would, on the extension of the new Act to any district, cease to be in force in it. Another would deal with sanitation, a third with medical charity, and so forth. The Lieutenant-Governor now proceeds to explain the details of the legislative measure which he would propose.

(1.)—*Constitution of Boards.*

5. If any practical result is to be obtained from the extension of local self-government, it is essential that the unit of administration should be the Local or Subdivisional Board, and not the District Board. The District Board should have the general control of the scheme of district work; it should have the allotment of funds, and it should direct the policy of the district as a whole. But the details of local self-government can only be performed by working local bodies with limited areas of jurisdiction. Where these cannot be formed, as much use as possible must be made of District Committees; but it is only to districts in which they can be formed

that a detailed scheme such as is now under consideration can with any advantage be applied. It is quite impossible that the affairs of a district in many departments can be efficiently managed by a body of men meeting six or eight times in the year at the head-quarters station. The distances are too great, and the number of possible meetings would be too small, to admit of thorough control by the Board at large, and it would be hopeless to look for sustained interest on the part of the members in the details of business conducted on such a system. One of two evils would be inevitable,—either meetings would be held at long intervals, when the work could not be properly done,—or meetings would be held at short intervals, when members from outlying places would be practically excluded, and the work of the Board would fall into the hands of the members who reside at or near the head-quarters station. Some officers propose to have departmental sub-committees to conduct the executive business of the District Board in the different branches during the intervals between its meetings. This, however, would only stereotype the second evil just referred to. These sub-committees must meet frequently, and only members residing at or near the head-quarters station—certainly in the head-quarters sub-division—could attend meetings frequently. A few members, therefore, from the head-quarters station and its neighbourhood would do all the executive work of the District Board, merely reporting to, or taking orders from, the general body six or eight times a year. The members from the interior of the district would be deprived of all concern in the working of the business of local self-government. Yet it is this concern, and not the privilege of voting or debating at meetings held a few times in the year, that we wish to secure to them in order that they may learn to administer their own public affairs. What is required is a Local Board for each sub-division, inclusive of the head-quarters, each Local Board doing the work of its own sub-division under the general control of the District Board, and periodically referring to it questions of district importance and applying to it for the allotment of district funds. It is certain that sub-committees at the head-quarters and Local Boards at sub-divisions could not work together. If we have the one, we must abandon the other. If we have the former, we give local self-government to the head-quarters sub-division only, and we exclude the other sub-divisions indefinitely from it, If we have the latter, we give all the sub-divisions the same privilege. The Lieutenant-Governor has therefore made the Local or Sub-divisional Board the basis of his scheme.

Local Boards.

6. The non-official section of each Local Board should consist of two members from each thannah, if possible, or, if this cannot be secured, of a number of members calculated on that proportion. The Chairman should be, in the head-quarters sub-division, a Joint, Deputy, or Assistant Magistrate, nominated by the Magistrate of the district; in other sub-divisions the sub-divisional officer. The High Court have very properly objected to judicial officers holding posts involving so much executive responsibility as the vice-chairmanship of a Road Cess Committee. It is quite essential that the head of the Local Board should be an officer of Government accustomed to the transaction of public business. Without this, confusion and neglect would inevitably occur. The ample representation of non-official members on the Board would render it impossible for the Chairman to monopolize its powers. The only ex-officio member of the Local Board besides the Chairman would be the Deputy Inspector of Schools. Each Local Board should elect its own Vice-Chairman. The general proportion on Local Boards throughout the district should be not less than two non-official members to one official member. Endeavours should be made to secure this proportion on each Local Board; but there might be cases where this would be inconvenient, and it would be sufficient to ensure that in the aggregate of the members of Local Boards throughout the district the proportion of not less than two-thirds and one-third is observed.

Nomination

7. As a general rule appointment to Local Boards must be by nomination—by Government in the first instance, and by Government or the Board itself on the occasion of vacancies. Objections have recently been taken in one important municipality to an invitation to nominate members for the approval of Government. It might, however, be provided that in certain cases Local Boards might be authorized to nominate, for the approval of Government, members to fill vacancies, the votes being taken by ballot. The members first appointed should remain in office for three years. Afterwards members should retire in rotation, one-third every year, but retiring members should be eligible for re-appointment.

8. Though, however, as a general rule, appointment must be by nomination, Sir Ashley Eden considers it very desirable that some provision should be made for election. If this were omitted the measure would not be complete, and, with the safeguard of a property qualification for voters and candidates, the experiment might well be tried in one or two places. The qualification for voters might be the payment of Rs. 25 road cess or Rs. 20 license tax, or proof, to the satisfaction of the Magistrate of the district, of income from other sources than land amounting to not less than Rs. 1,000 per annum. For candidates Sir Ashley Eden would insist on the possession of landed or house property within the area to be represented of the value of not less than Rs. 1,000 per annum. It is important that representatives of rural areas elected under the Act should have a substantial stake in the locality which returns them. The experiment might be tried in one or two thannahs in the Hooghly, Howrah, or the 24-Pergunnahs Districts. If it failed, the provision might be withdrawn from the place in question, and no harm would have been done. To extend the system of election indiscriminately, however, would be to court failure. The people at large would take no interest in the elections, and there would be a serious danger of the work passing into the hands of men who would throw discredit on the system.

9. The District Board should consist of two delegates elected by each Local Board, where the jurisdiction of the latter extends over not more than three thannahs, of three where it extends over four thannahs, and of four where it extends over more than five. As the District Board will have control over education in municipalities and over provincial and district roads passing through them, municipalities should be duly represented, two delegates being sent by each first class municipality and one by each second class municipality with a population of 5,000 or more. The proportion of official to non-official members being observed in regard to the aggregate number of members of Local Boards and the delegates being elected by their own Boards, it is unnecessary to insist on any fixed proportion being observed on the District Board. It would be inconvenient to secure this, and to attempt it would be at once to invade the right accorded to the Local Boards of electing their own delegates. The Chairman of the District Board should be the Magistrate of the district. The Chairmen all Local Boards, the District Superintendent of Police, the Civil Surgeon, and the Deputy Inspector of Schools should be the only other ex-officio members. The sanitary Commissioner, the Inspector or Assistant or Joint Inspector of Schools, and the Divisional Superintendent of Works should be entitled to attend meetings of the District Board, but they should have no vote. An example of the application of these proposals is given in the margin. It will be seen that the District Board consists of 24 members, of whom only eight hold their appointment ex-officio.

BURDWAN DISTRICT.

Local Boards.		*District Board.*	
Head-quarters Sub-division—		Ex-officio.	
Chairman	1	Chairman	1
Members (2 each from 8 thannas)	16	Four Chairmen of Local Boards, District Superintendent of Police, Civil-Surgeon, and Deputy Inspector of Schools	7
	17	Delegates—	
Raneegunge—		Head-quarters (8 thannahs)	4
Chairman	1	Raneegunge (3 „)	2
Members (2 each from 3 thannahs)	6	Cutwa (3 „)	2
	7	Culna (3 „)	2
Cutwa—		Burdwan Municipality (1st class)	2
Chairman	1	Dainhat Municipality (2nd class)	1
Members (2 each from 3 thannahs)	6	Ranegunge Municipality (2nd class)	1
	7	Cutwa Municipality (2nd class)	1
Culna—		Culna Municipality (2nd class)	1
Chairman	1		
Members (2 each from 3 thannahs)	6		
	7	Total	24

10. The Lieutenant-Governor has said that the Chairman of the District Board should be the Magistrate of the district. This is an indispensable condition. The District Officer is the mainspring of the administration, and it is absolutely essential that his position should be upheld in its integrity. Experiments in local self-government will be very valuable as a means of educating the people in the conduct of affairs, but they must not be allowed to weaken the framework of Government. In the day of trouble Government must look to its District Officers, and not to District Boards, to uphold its authority and carry out its orders. There is no reasonable doubt, moreover, that the great mass of the people would have no confidence in any system of management from which the head of the district was excluded, or in which he held a subordinate place, and that they would attach no prestige to a Board constituted

under such a system. Any one who knows the country knows that the District Officers possess in a remarkable degree the confidence and respect of the people.

The District Boards should elect their own Vice-Chairmen, subject to the approval of Government.

(2.)—*Departments and Funds to be Administered by Boards.*

11. The next question is the funds to be made over to the Boards and the Departments of the Administration to be entrusted to their management.

Public Works.

12. Provincial Roads would be made over in all cases. These roads are very important lines of District, as well as Provincial, communication; in many cases they pass through the head-quarters of the district, and the people of the district are keenly interested in their maintenance in good order. Ample checks, it will be observed, are provided further on. As a rule Provincial Buildings could not be made over with any advantage, though in particular cases, where small works had to be carried out and there was no provincial establishment, it might be possible for the Public Works Department to enter into arrangements with the District Boards, paying them of course for the services of their staff. Under Act VI. (B. C.) of 1880 the Drainage Commissioners appointed to carry out any scheme must number not less than seven, of whom at least four must be holders of lands to be affected by the scheme or managers on behalf of such holders. As such schemes affect not only the productiveness of the lands drained, but also the salubrity of the surrounding country, it might be convenient to appoint the Local Board, or one of the subordinate Committees to be referred to further on, to be Commissioners under the Act. It is also proposed that in some districts the maintenance of Embankments and the control of Irrigation works should be entrusted to the Boards. As in the case of Provincial Buildings, however, no absolute rule could be laid down in these cases, and it will be sufficient to take a general power under the Act.

Ferries.

13. Ferries are obviously a branch which could well be transferred to local management. This would necessitate a change in the law for districts brought under the new Act. At present some municipalities enjoy a very large income from ferries. In the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, however, when a ferry is situated on a District Road, even if it lies within municipal limits, the proceeds should, as a rule, go to the District Board, which should be charged with the general control of district highways, contributing funds to Local and Municipal Boards for the maintenance of such portions of the roads as fall within their respective jurisdictions. Power, however, should be reserved to Government to direct a special distribution in special cases.

Pounds.

14. Except in districts where indigo quarrels might be embarrassing, Pounds are eminently a branch which could with advantage be entrusted to the control of Local Boards. There is no doubt that a vast amount of extortion is practised in the interior in regard to impounded cattle. The gomashta's cutcherry is largely used as a pound, and cattle trespass fines form not the least of his perquisites. If pounds were more numerous, and were made over to the management of local punchayets, large sums that are now appropriated by zemindari officials would be made available for sanitation and public purposes. The proceeds should be strictly spent on roads or other improvements within the area served by the pound, under the system referred to below. This, it is to be observed, would require an alteration of an Imperial Act.

Village sanitation.

15. One of the most important functions that the Local Boards could perform would be the gradual improvement of Village Drainage, Village Sanitation, and Village Water Supply. Simple provisions could be inserted in a special chapter, and the Local Board of any place to which the chapter might be extended could be authorised to frame byelaws and publish them after confirmation by Government. Mr. Beames, Commissioner of Burdwan, gives the following very interesting account of a system under which some punchayets raise subscriptions from the villagers and apply them to village sanitary improvements and roads:—

In some parts of the Serampore sub-division there are very large and populous villages, among the inhabitants of which are many gentlemen of high intelligence and business habits. Some are retired officers of Government, others are pleaders and merchants who go daily to their places of business in Calcutta. These gentlemen have undertaken the office of punchayet under the Village Chowkidari Act, and finding a very great demand and necessity for sanitary improvements in their villages, have availed themselves of the influence acquired by their appointment to induce the

villagers to subscribe for such purposes. They have built culverts, made roads, and drained dirty places, all with funds freely contributed by the villagers. No possibility of oppression exists, as the villagers, from daily contact with the outer world, are far too well aware of their rights to permit themselves to be oppressed.

Here and there a refractory villager refuses to subscribe, or cannot be induced to sacrifice some little corner of his holding for the purpose of making a drain, or refuses to put a stop to some nuisance which is offensive to his neighbours, on the ground that the punchayet has no legal authority. The sub-divisional officer, Mr. Carstairs, has in all cases supported these enterprising punchayets in every legal manner; but both he and they feel that some authority from Government is necessary to enable them to carry out the wishes of the majority. They do not wish to be made into municipalities or even unions, not being prepared to bear the burden or undergo the labour involved in maintaining municipal institutions. All that is necessary is that some addition should be made to the Village Chowkidari Act, or a chapter added to the Municipal Act.

This beginning, modest though it is, promises good results, and the chapter of the law relating to this subject might legalise the levy of subscriptions for these purposes up to a fixed maximum. The punchayets could then take the form of the subordinate committees, to which reference will be made in the next section. In order to help the funds raised for these village improvements, the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to make over, with the management of pounds the receipts from this source, without any corresponding reduction of the general district grant. The net revenue thus sacrificed, if this system were adopted throughout the Burdwan and Presidency Divisions, would be about Rs. 60,000. This would be a substantial contribution to village improvement, and the Lieutenant-Governor considers that it would be a judicious sacrifice of revenue.

Medical charity.

16. There is no head of medical receipts that could with any advantage be made over to the District Boards. The heads are "Medical College Fees," "Hospital Receipts" (Calcutta and Lunatic Asylums), "Lunatic Asylums" (sale proceeds of manufactures), "Medicines, &c., of Civil Surgeons," "Contributions," and "Miscellaneous." In regard to their own hospitals and dispensaries, however, District Boards might be empowered to fix a charge for paying patients, and they might have legal power, such as the English law gives (section 132), to recover from a patient who is not a pauper any expenses incurred in maintaining him in the hospital. The only part of medical expenditure that can be made over to them is the present expenditure of Government on hospitals and dispensaries outside municipalities. This should be made over to them as a fixed grant. They would still work through local Dispensary Committees. They would appoint their own medical officers from the Government list, subject to the approval of the Surgeon-General. They would be required to submit to the Surgeon-General through the Civil Surgeon, such returns as might be required by Government. The officer appointed might be the medical officer attached to a sub-division. In that case the Board could pay him such allowances as Government might direct.

Education.

17. Under Education the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to invest the District and Local Boards with extensive powers. Indeed, the only branches over which they would have no control would be colleges, attached collegiate schools, normal schools, with attached model schools, medical schools, surveying schools, madrasahs, and schools for Europeans and Eurasians. Normal schools, being concerned with the training of teachers, should remain within the control of the Department, and, indeed, they are specially reserved to the Department under the Education Despatch of 1854. Schools of medicine and surveying, and madrasahs, are of too special a kind to be transferred. The high schools attached to colleges and the model or practising schools attached to normal schools are usually held in the same building as those to which they are attached, and must therefore necessarily remain under the same management.

Primary schools.

It is proposed to transfer to the Local Board all the authority over primary schools now exercised by the District Magistrate, subject only to the general control of the District Board and of the Director. Consequently, no change of system in the administration of the primary grant would be made without the sanction of the District Board and of the Director. Subject to that condition, the functions of the Local Board would extend over the whole field of administration, under the system as sanctioned. The Board would have the Deputy Inspector as its adviser and the Sub-Inspector as its agent. It would undertake the inspection of primary schools, conduct all ordinary examinations, and, subject to the general control of the District

Board, determine all grants. Its action in all matters relating to the administration of the primary allotment would be determined by definite rules, to be drawn up by the District Board under the sanction of the Director. All bills payable from the primary allotment would be passed by the Local Board, after countersignature by the Deputy Inspector.

Aided schools.

A certain number of primary schools, chiefly under missionary management, receive grants-in-aid, and they may conveniently come under the same management as the aided secondary schools. The following rules, therefore, would refer generally to the administration of the grant-in-aid allotment. Every application for a grant, whether monthly or special, would be submitted to the Local Board, which, after such inquiry through the Deputy Inspector as might be deemed necessary, would forward it to the District Board. The District Board, on the report of the Local Board, would then deal with the application; and if it sees fit, would recommend a certain establishment, with a certain grant, to the Inspector. Should the Inspector accept the Board's recommendations, the Board would issue its sanction to the grant. Should they be unable to agree, the case would be referred to the Director for decision. The sanction to the grant would in every case be issued by the District Board. A statement should be drawn up by the District Board every year, showing for each school and each class of schools the grants in force or proposed for the ensuing year. A copy of this statement should be sent to the Inspector and the Director. For the purpose of this statement, the Deputy Inspector should lay before the Board an abstract of the results of the scholarship examinations of the three preceding years, so that the Board might know which schools were improving and which falling back, and regulate its grants accordingly. But each school should be dealt with separately, and no grant should be increased or reduced without the Inspector's (or in the last resort the Director's) sanction. The District and Local Boards would not generally interfere in the internal management of aided schools. The courses of study and standards of examination would be prescribed by the Department, and the managers of each school would be free to choose its own text-books out of the authorised list issued by the Central Text-Book Committee under the sanction of the Department. But the Local Board would always have authority to inquire into complaints of mismanagement, for example, complaints by teachers of delay in paying salaries; and the District Board, on the report of the Local Board, might suspend a grant pending inquiry. It might also suspend a grant on the Inspector's recommendation to that effect after visiting a school; but no grant should be cancelled without the agreement of the District Board and the Inspector. In case of disagreement the Director would decide. The appointment of every teacher in an aided school would be subject to the approval of the Inspector. The bills for grant-in-aid would be passed every month by the District Board after countersignature by the Deputy Inspector, and would be payable at the treasury.

Government Vernacular schools.

With Government vernacular schools may be included, firstly, the few Government primary schools established in backward places; and, secondly, those (so-called) Government middle English schools which are really vernacular schools, with an English class attached at the expense of the pupils. These schools would be transferred to the management of the Local Boards to be administered either directly or through a Committee. The theory of them is that they are the pioneers of education above the primary standard in backward places where the grant-in-aid system will not apply There is, therefore, in general, no certainty of a local Committee being formed. If in any place the materials of such a Committee exist, its formation should be encouraged; and in that case the management of the school should be made over to the local Committee under special rules. It would be provided that the course of instruction and standards of examination should be settled by the Department, and that no teacher could be appointed without the approval of the Inspector, who would see that the teachers trained in his normal school were properly provided for. When a school is either declared to be unsuccessful, or is judged to have fulfilled its purpose by paving the way for an aided school, it is removed, with its staff and grant, to another backward village. This removal the District Board would effect. Subject to the sanction of the District Board and of the Inspector, the Local Board would fix or modify the scale of establishment, within the limits of the net grant, appoint teachers, and permit the addition of an English class at the expense of the pupils. The balance in favour of each school would be placed to its credit for the following year, and the District Board might either spend it upon the particular school, or transfer it to another school of the same class in the district which might not have sufficient funds for its require-

ments. The monthly bills of each school would be passed by the Local Board after countersignature by the Deputy Inspector.

Circle schools.

The management of Circle schools would follow that of Government vernacular schools, it being provided that the circle grant should be strictly confined to its legitimate purpose, namely, the raising of private pathsalas to a higher standard by means of itinerant Government teachers. The grant should not in any case be merged in the primary allotment. But as in some divisions these teachers have a separate gradation system of their own, extending over several districts, it would be necessary to arrange for transfers of funds by the Director, on the report of the Inspector, so as to provide for promotions.

High English schools.

The chief administrative difficulty in the way of transferring High English or Zillah schools to the direct management of the Boards arises from the fact of the teachers being borne on the graded list. There can be no doubt, however, that the power of managing these schools would be specially appreciated by the Boards. The difficulty may, perhaps, be overcome by the following provisions. The inspecting staff should be separated from the teachers on the graded list. The Boards would be required to appoint to vacancies teachers from the graded list so long as candidates considered eligible by the Director were available. Promotions would be given from grade to grade successively, and the Director of Public Instruction would have a power of veto on all nominations by the Boards, whether from the graded list or not, for reasons to be stated by him. The Local Boards would have charge of all high English schools except those situated at the head-quarters of a district. These would be under the immediate management of the District Board, who might delegate its functions to a special sub-committee. The Boards would have authority to suspend reduce, or dismiss any teacher with the sanction of the Director. The standard of the final examination in zillah schools is fixed by the University, and the course of study throughout the classes is settled by the Inspector. These arrangements should continue. But the Board should be empowered to make recommendations and proposals affecting these excepted points.

At the same time these arrangements must be considered as provisional only. The Boards would not in any way correspond to the idea of "private effort assisted by grants-in-aid," which is foreshadowed in the Despatch of 1854 as the educational policy of the future. They would still be in a measure Government Boards, partly or wholly appointed by Government, disposing of Government funds, and dealing directly with the Government treasury in respect of the allotments made to them. What is ultimately required is private Committees constituted *ad hoc;* associations of private persons interested in the maintenance of the high school, and ready and able, if need be, to relieve Government of its direct management. Out of about 200 high schools for natives, only 48 are Government schools; and it is difficult to believe that private associations cannot, at the head-quarter stations of districts, undertake those duties of management and control which are discharged without difficulty in much smaller and less important towns. It would be provided therefore, that Government might, at any time, give notice that after a certain term of years it would withdraw from the direct management of the local school and transfer it to private control.

Education in municipalities.

The Lieutenant-Governor has considered the question whether the zillah school at head-quarters might not be made over to the management of the municipality. On the whole he considers it desirable that the District Board should have control over education generally throughout the district, and over this class of schools in particular. The zillah school, though generally situated within a municipality, cannot be regarded as a local school in the sense in which a pathsala or Government vernacular school within municipal limits is a local school. Unlike the latter class of schools, it draws its supply of pupils from the whole district. Indeed its name indicates that it is intended to be a district school, and not a merely local town school. Probably in any case a majority of the pupils are residents of the municipality; but it may be conjectured that the fact that the municipalities of Bengal contributed only Rs. 70 to the support of zillah schools in 1880–81 is attributable to the knowledge that the school exists for the benefit of the district and not of the town only.

But while the zillah school is really a school for the whole district, it is at the same time indisputable that the municipality benefits greatly from its establishment. At least one-half of the pupils of every zillah school are residents of the Municipality; and in some cases a larger proportion. The Lieutenant-Governor, in taking over the cost of the police of municipalities, declared that municipal funds would be required to contribute to the support of schools situated within municipal limits. The Director

will now be requested to fix the contribution to be made, calculated on the proportion of pupils resident in the municipality to the gross number of pupils in the school. The Government grant to the District Boards will be reduced by this amount. The exact amount to be contributed for each school should be annually revised on the same principle.

With regard to education of other kinds, middle and primary, it should be the duty of the District Board to inquire into the sufficiency of the provisions made in each municipality within the district, as well as into the sufficiency of the support rendered by the municipality to the existing schools. The Board should then state its views and recommendations to the municipality; and if the municipality declined to accept its recommendations, it would be open to the Board to make a representation on the subject to the Commissioner, with a view to the consideration of the subject with the Municipal Budget. Municipalities will also be required to undertake the whole expenditure now borne by Government for the support of Government vernacular schools within municipal limits.

Inspection.

The Sub-Inspectors of schools would be servants of the Boards, and the same rules would govern their appointment, promotion, removal, and the like, as have been suggested for teachers. The Deputy Inspector, who must continue to be the chief educational officer of the district, would have relations both with the Inspector, whose subordinate he would be, and with the Boards. On the one hand, he must be the agent or deputy of the Inspector, enabling the latter to maintain his necessary connexion with schools of every class throughout the district; on the other, he would be the chief adviser of the Boards in matters of education, though not subordinate to them. The Sub-Inspectors would not be formally subordinate to him; but his relations with the Inspector, to whom they would partly look for promotion, and to the Boards, whose servants they would be, would invest him with quite sufficient authority to enable him effectively to supervise their work. The correspondence of the District Board on educational matters should be carried on through the Inspector. In order to enable him to thoroughly supervise the educational work of his circle, it is necessary that he should possess complete information; and this could only be secured by making him the channel of communication with the Director, as he actually is under the present constitution of the District Committees. The Director similarly should correspond with the Board through the Inspector. The salary and travelling bills of Sub-Inspectors would be passed by the Local Board on the countersignature of the Deputy Inspector. The Deputy Inspector's bills would be passed by the Inspector.

Scholarships.

The lower primary scholarship examination, which is held independently for each district, should be conducted by the Deputy and Sub-Inspectors jointly, and the award of scholarships should be made by the Local Board on the recommendation of the Deputy Inspector. The scholarship bills should be drawn by the head master of the school in which they are held, and passed for payment by the Local Board. The examination for upper primary and for middle scholarships should be held by the Inspector for all the districts in his circle, the existing orders on the subject being maintained. These scholarships, of which each district has a special number assigned to it, should in general be awarded by the Inspector strictly on the results of the examination. It should, however, be open to the District Board to make a representation to the Inspector, before the award, in favour of particular schools or tracts which it may think deserving of special encouragement by reason of their less advanced state, and the Inspector should be authorised to consider such a recommendation in making his award. The stipends for these scholarships should be drawn under the existing rules.

At the close of the year the District Board should draw up an annual report of its operations, which should be sent through the Inspector to the Director.

A great part of these provisions would be embodied in rules framed under the Act, and would find no place in the law itself. The Lieutenant-Governor has, however, thought it well to enter into some detail in discussing the question of education, as there is perhaps no branch in which more interest will be taken by those to be entrusted with the management of local affairs.

Miscellaneous.

18. Under the head Miscellaneous, the only head of receipts and expenditure that could be made over with any advantage is "Staging Bungalows." Some officers have alluded to "Rewards for the destruction of wild animals." But this is purely a matter of routine. Government fixes the rates, and the Magistrate is the person who can most conveniently make the disbursements.

Minor departments.

19. Under Minor Departments the receipts are derived from emigration fees and receipts from Botanical Gardens and Cinchona Plantations. None of these could be made over. Of the expenditure heads "Public Exhibitions and Fairs" would appear to be a proper item for transfer. None of the grants, however, apply to districts likely to be brought under the Act. The same observation applies to "Grants to Public Gardens."

Trusts.

20. The Lieutenant-Governor considers that in most cases Trust Funds other than those relating to religious endowments could with advantage be made over to District Boards. In some cases, however, the terms of the Trust would bar this, and only a general power should be taken.

21. The grants to made over to local control would be based on the amount now expended by Government on the different services, reduced (except in the case of pound receipts above referred to) by the amount of receipts surrendered. Adjustments would also be made on account of contributions to educational funds to be made by municipalities. It would be necessary to provide that in cases where Government made a grant for such a work as a feeder road to a railway, it would add to the district grant a fixed percentage on the initial cost to provide for repairs. Finally, the Lieutenant-Governor trusts that Government would be able to make an annual grant of Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000 to each district brought under the Act, to enable the Board to pay for an efficient Secretary and to bear the charges for travelling allowances and the like.

(3.)—*Relations of District Boards to Municipal Committees and Local Boards, and of Government to District Boards.*

Municipalities.

22. Except in regard to Education and Provincial and District Roads, Municipal Committees should be entirely independent of the District Boards. Even if the details of Municipal Administration were such as could be efficiently supervised by a Board whose members would be drawn from all parts of a district, the fact that the municipality raises its own funds would be a sufficient bar to any such proposal. At the same time the District Board will undoubtedly gain by the presence among its members of men of experience and business habits deputed to represent the municipalities.

District and local boards.

23. The principle that should govern the distribution of powers between District and Local Boards is that all matters of purely local interest should be left as much as possible to the Local Boards, while all matters of district interest, in which would be included the preservation of uniformity of policy, should be decided by the District Board.

24. The Local Board would submit a general scheme of work with its application for funds for each year. This would be considered by the District Board in allotting funds, and its general scope would be adhered to during the year. Within the limits of this scheme, and subject to the rules governing the administration of each department, the Local Board would have power to settle all matters of purely local interest, to decide on the establishment of new pounds, the execution of small drainage works, the repair of local roads, and the like. The Lieutenant-Governor considers that it would be very useful to give Local Boards the power to delegate its powers or any of them in any department or departments to subordinate committees formed on the model of the Parochial Committees under the English Public Health Act. These Committees could be formed for any thannah, or outpost, or pergunnah, or cluster of villages, and they could administer the village-sanitation clauses of the Act, manage pounds, and superintend the construction and repair of village roads. The Committee might consist partly of members of the Local Board itself and partly of residents of the tract in question, selected by the Local Board. The Local Board would not thus be relieved of its own responsibility, and it would be able to alter the constitution of the subordinate Committee or to dissolve it at any time. Sir Ashley Eden believes that such a provision as this would be found extremely useful in developing local self-government, especially under such conditions as are described by the Commissioner of Burdwan.

Thannah or Pergunnah Committees.

25. The District Board would deal with repairs of all District, and of course of all Provincial, roads, with measures of drainage affecting more than one sub-division, with the grants to secondary schools, and so forth. It would allot funds to the different

Local Boards for expenditure on local objects, and it would decide the general policy to be adopted—in such matters, for instance, as the method of distributing the grant for primary education. The District Board would again be bound to conform to the policy laid down by Government in regard to questions of general administration.

Powers of control.

26. Should the Local Board fail to make proper provision for any necessary object, whether it be a road, a school, or a dispensary, the District Board would, on being informed by the report of any of its inspecting officers—its Secretary, District Engineer or other, or otherwise, make inquiry, and if satisfied that the work was necessary, and that funds were available for it, make an order limiting a time for the execution of the work by the Local Board. In the event of the work not being performed within the time fixed, the District Board would cause it to be executed and recover the cost from the Local Board. In the same way, the Commissioner of the Division, on the report of the Divisional Superintendent of Works, the Inspector of Schools, the District Officer, or otherwise, could call upon the District Board to do any work, or take certain order with any school or class of schools, or to provide medical aid, within a fixed period, and in default might cause the work to be done, or in extreme cases, report to Government in view to a withdrawal of the power of the Board in regard to education, medical charity, or the like. This would be following the lines of section 299 of the English Act and placing the Commissioner of the Division provisionally in the position of the Local Government Board. Section 318 of the Municipal Act gives the Lieutenant-Governor similar powers on the report of a Committee appointed by the Commissioner with Government sanction. But it does not appear to be necessary that everything should be in the first instance reported to Government, though it would always be open to any Board aggrieved by the action of the Commissioner to apply for relief to Government. Sir Ashley Eden does not apprehend that such applications would be numerous. The introduction of this measure will be attended by a great increase in work, and it is very desirable that we should not centralize too much, but should leave to the Commissioner of a Division a large discretion in the administration of the Act within his jurisdiction. This provision and the power of Government to withdraw any part of the Act or the whole of it from any district would be quite sufficient to protect the interests of the State.

District Board over Local Board.

Commissioner over District Board.

Powers of sanction to works.

27. The limit of cost within which District Boards should be permitted to undertake works without sanction must be settled by rule. The scale must be fixed with reference to the qualifications of the District Engineers. Commissioners should have the power of sanctioning works costing Rs. 50,000 or less. Though budgets should of course be prepared by the District Boards, the Lieutenant-Governor does not consider that it would be necessary to do more than require that copies should be supplied to the Commissioner. Each District Board should also furnish the Commissioner with a report of its operations every year, the financial year being adopted, and an account of its income and expenditure. This report and account should be published in the "Gazette." Some officers are of opinion that the provisions of the Cess Act regarding interference with the budget are useless and vexatious. Sir Ashley Eden considers that, in districts which are fit to come under the new Act, all display of interference should, as much as possible, be avoided. He entirely concurs in the view of the Government of India, that it would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government if District Boards were subject to check and interference in matter of detail. Powers of substantial interference are reserved for cases of necessity, and nothing more is really required.

Budget

Annual report.

(4.)—*Establishment.*

28. In regard to establishments, Sir Ashley Eden would follow the policy enunciated above. Some officers recommend that Government should have the power of making rules to regulate the employment of officers and establishments, so as to guard against the unnecessary multiplication of appointments. Sir Ashley Eden does not agree in this view. With two provisoes he would give the Boards free scope in regard to subordinate establishments. The first would be that the aggregate of salaries and absentee allowances of officers employed under the Public Works Department of the Board, including the proportion ratably charged against this head for the salary of the Secretary and for travelling allowances, should not exceed one-fourth of the income available for expenditure on public works during the year. The second would be that no new appointment on a salary of Rs. 200 per mensem, or more, should be created without the previous sanction of the Commissioner. As the power of Government

itself to create a new appointment is limited to Rs. 250, the Boards need not complain if they are limited to Rs. 200. In regard to the higher appointments, moreover, of Secretary and Engineer, where special qualifications are required, it will be quite essential that Government should have a power of veto. The Local Government Board in England has control in the case of appointments of medical and other officers any portion of whose salary is paid out of moneys voted by Parliament. It is at least as desirable that Government should have control over the appointments of Secretary and Engineer to a District Board as that it should have the power of vetoing the appointments of similar officers under the Calcutta Corporation.

(5.)—*General Provisions.*

Rules of business.

29. A schedule of rules to govern meetings and proceedings should be drawn up and appended to the Act as in the case of the English Act. These would require, amongst other things, timely circulation of a printed or written notice containing full information regarding the business to be transacted at the meeting. This is strongly insisted upon by more than one officer, and the Lieutenant-Governor considers it a matter of the first importance. All members should have full and timely opportunity of considering and taking advice on all questions to be brought up for discussion. The rules would also provide for special and general meetings, the maximum interval between general meetings, the number of members required to form a quorum, the legal validity of minutes, and the like.

Contracts.

30. The formalities to be observed in making contracts should be specified. Those laid down in section 174 of the English Act of 1875 seem suitable for adoption with the necessary alterations. These include calling for estimates, giving public notice limiting tenders, furnishing full specifications, and in the case of contracts of 50*l.* or more, reducing to writing and sealing. The Chairman, or any member of the Board to whom he delegates the power in writing for any special occasion, should have power to contract on behalf of the Board. Contracts for sums exceeding estimates already framed should only be entered into with the sanction of the Board accorded at a meeting.

Travelling allowances.

31. There is a general opinion that the expenses of members in attending meetings of the Board should be defrayed. This is very necessary. Travelling allowance at the rate of four annas a mile by road and one and a half anna a mile by rail should be allowed to all nominated or elected members for journeys of more than five miles. Ex-officio members would draw their travelling allowance from Government under the existing rules. The bills of ordinary members would be cashed on the countersignature of the Vice-Chairman of the District or Local Board, as the case might be.

Audit.

32. Finally, provision should be made for an audit sub-committee under each Board, and the strictest rules should be framed against incurring expenditure in anticipation of the sanction of the Board, except in cases of emergency to be generally described. The accounts would also be audited every year by the Examiner of Local Funds Accounts, and the result published in the "Gazette," a copy of the report being exhibited in the office of the District, and of each Local Board.

33. Such is the general scheme of legislation which Sir Ashley Eden would propose. He would gladly have initiated it himself, because he believes that if it is worked judiciously, and without too great an anxiety to force elaborate provisions on districts which may not be ready for them, it will be successful. Some persons are of opinion that apathy and indifference on the part of the people will prove an insuperable obstacle to any attempt to interest them in local self-government. Sir Ashley Eden does not share these apprehensions. In many districts in Bengal there are able and energetic men who are willing to take a share in the management of public affairs. Their readiness to assist only requires judicious management and direction. If these men are properly encouraged and are treated with reasonable confidence, their interest in the work will increase, and their example will be followed by others. Sir Ashley Eden trusts that this will be the policy of the officers of Government in administering this Act, and that, though there may be some disappointments at first, the ultimate result will be a large measure of relief to the public departments and of lasting benefit to the best interests of the people.

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL.

Home Department.
Public, No. 832.

Sir, Simla, May 31, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter to the Government of India in the Financial Department, No. 921½ of the 8th April, submitting the scheme proposed by Sir Ashley Eden for the further extension of local self-government in Bengal.

2. The Governor General in Council desires to acknowledge the loyal co-operation which the late Lieutenant-Governor was ready to accord to the Government of India in connexion with this matter, and the care and ability with which the scheme now under consideration has been elaborated by him. His Excellency in Council is glad to know that His Honour the present Lieutenant-Governor will be equally forward to aid in advancing this most important object.

3. The general mode in which the Government of India would wish to see effect given to the principle of local self-government throughout British India has now been fully explained in Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747\ -59}$ of the 18th instant, and I am to request that the Government of Bengal will carefully reconsider the proposals made in your letter under reply in the light of the instructions contained in that Resolution.

4. The Governor General in Council is quite prepared to admit, what is urged in the opening paragraphs of your letter, that among districts representing many different stages of development and education no absolutely uniform system of local self-government can be summarily introduced. But he believes that the fundamental principles laid down by the Government of India are capable of wide application in most parts of Bengal; and he observes that Sir Ashley Eden himself, when he proceeds to explain his scheme in detail, is content to divide the districts of Bengal into only two main categories. The Governor General in Council is not without hope that it may be found on further consideration possible to group the larger number of districts under the more advanced cate gory,though in working out locally the system of self-government large allowance may here and there have to be made for local peculiarities. The fact that so many municipalities, large and small, have already in Bengal done so much good work, and that under the Road Cess Act the plan of District Road Committees has been found to answer in nearly every part of the province, is an encouragement to the further development of the principle of local administration of local affairs.

5. In the less advanced districts Sir Ashley Eden proposes to revise and strengthen the composition of the committees under the Cess Act; to centre in them the functions now performed by district, educational, and dispensary committees; to make over to them provisionally the maintainance of all provincial roads, staging bungalows, and such other buildings as the Public Works Department may approve; to give them some control over the grant for primary schools and the grant-in-aid allotment, as well as over the management of Government secondary and circle schools, and high English schools; and to entrust them with the charge of school and dispensary buildings where the institution itself is under their management. A fixed grant would then be made to each committee, representing the present expenditure on the services transferred to it, less the net proceeds of the ferries and pounds in the district; but the Committee would not be entrusted with the actual administration of any ferries or pounds. This last reservation, the importance of which is not by any means clear, appears to constitute the only material distinction between the functions of the Committees in backward tracts and those in the more advanced districts which are afterwards discussed. Apart from this, the Governor General in Council can trace no radical difference of kind between the duties set out in paragraph 3 of your letter and those more elaborately detailed in paragraphs 11 to 18. This being so, it is matter for consideration whether the constitution of the Committees might not be more closely assimilated than is at present proposed. It does not therefore follow that precisely the same responsibilities should be made over in each district. But, generally speaking, the Governor General in Council is disposed to hold that, although in the metropolitan districts local self-government may appear to greater advantage, and may advance with more firm and confident steps, yet there

are few districts of Bengal in which it cannot be tried with fair hope of success on the lines laid down in the Resolution of this Government of the 18th instant. It does not seem a matter of insuperable difficulty to frame an Act which shall provide the outlines of a working system suited generally to all districts which are not actually savage or undeveloped tracts, while leaving it open to Government to vary within reasonable limits the mode of appointing the local Committees and the extent of their functions and powers. In any case, the Governor General in Council is inclined to think that the arrangements for both first and second class districts, if different arrangements are really required, should be clearly defined in the law.

6. Turning now to the explanation given in paragraphs 5 to 10 of your letter regarding the proposed constitution of the Boards or Committees in the more advanced tracts, I am to express the entire concurrence of the Governor General in Council in Sir Ashley Eden's view of the importance of making the sub-divisional Boards the groundwork of the system of self-government in rural tracts. The views of the Government of India upon the question of the local extent of a Board's jurisdiction are given in paragraph 10 of the Resolution already quoted. The system of administration best suited to Bengal, where sub-divisional arrangements are already almost complete, appears to be that of sub-divisional local Boards; working for the most part independently, but supplemented by a district Council for the purpose of fixing the rates of land cess, allotting funds for works common to two or more sub-divisions, and the like. In some districts the sub-divisions will easily afford material for more than one satisfactory Board; and where this is the case the area should be again sub-divided accordingly. Use might also perhaps be made, in subordination to the boards, of such small local Committees as already exist in connexion with village watch assessments, and educational institutions of various kinds.

7. It does not seem to be necessary to maintain the overruling power of the district Board for any of the purposes mentioned in your letter. Educational policy must be directed to a great extent by the general orders of Government and the Secretary of State. In the distribution of grants-in-aid the Boards must be guided by the standing rules. No changes of system in the administration of the primary grant could be permitted without departmental sanction. In settling such general questions as the lines of provincial, district or railway feeder roads, professional and departmental opinion must have a preponderating weight. This being so, it would seem that the sub-divisional Boards might very well be left free of the control of a district Board, arranging all matters of common interest by sending delegates to a district Council.

8. As regards the mode of appointing the members of the local Boards, and the questions of official membership and chairmanship, the views of the Government of India are sufficiently set forth in the Resolution of the 18th May; and the Governor General in Council will content himself here with expressing the hope that the Lieutenant-Governor will carefully reconsider this part of the scheme, and give the elective principle free scope for trial. It will not, moreover, be overlooked by the Government of Bengal that the suggestions made by the Government of India on the subject of election and non-official Chairmen have even more direct reference to Town or Municipal Boards than to the district and rural Boards which form the subject of discussion in the present communication.

9. The suggestions made in paragraphs 11 to 21 of your letter in respect of the departments and funds to be made over to the control of the Boards are generally satisfactory as far as they go; but the financial part of the question calls for a certain amount of reconsideration, with reference to the remarks made in paragraph 21 of the Resolution above referred to. It may also be remarked, with reference to the observations in your letter under the head of High English Schools, that if the constitution of the Boards is popularised in the manner suggested by the Government, the transfer to them of the higher class of schools would meet to a great extent the views of Government as to the enlistment of private effort in the maintenance of such institutions. I am further to point out generally that every duty allotted to the District Boards in your letter under reply in respect of the services which it is proposed to transfer to such Boards, could apparently be discharged with equal, if not greater, efficiency by the sub-divisional boards and a district Council.

10. The Governor General in Council desires me here to suggest for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, that it would perhaps be advisable in lieu of giving fixed grants to the Boards from Provincial Revenues, to make over a

certain proportion of the proceeds of the Provincial Cess raised within the jurisdiction of each Committee in order to square accounts, in the same manner as the Government of India makes over to the Local Government in the Provincial settlement a fixed proportion of the land revenue. The Governor General in Council would also be glad to have an expression of the views of the Lieutenant-Governor upon the question of transferring to local management such parts of the Excise revenues as depend upon local arrangement; as, for instance, fees for outstills and licenses to sell spirits and drugs.

11. With respect to the question of establishments discussed in paragraph 28 of your letter, I am to invite attention to what is said in paragraph 22 of the Resolution of the 18th May. The Government ought to have some guarantee that the public money entrusted to the Boards is usefully spent and made the most of, and that Government buildings and other works made over to them are properly maintained. In order to secure this, the Governor General in Council has said that, when a local board is unable to employ a competent Engineer of its own, the Government might provide an officer of the Public Works Department to act as Engineer to all or several of the local boards of a district, and this officer would be subject, as regards his professional work, to departmental and professional check. Government might indeed offer in all cases to supply competent Engineers for local boards, and should do all that it can to assist them in securing good professional assistance. It should also in all cases supply professional supervision, the exercise of which will be necessary to enable the district officer to see that the boards do their work satisfactorily. Each local Board should, of course, have its own subordinate staff of overseers and the like, and the appointment and removal of the members of this staff would necessarily be left to the board. When the district Engineer is appointed by Government and made over to the service of the district local Boards as their professional adviser and assistant in public works' matters, the boards should pay to Government in such proportions as may be determined his salary and allowances. No charge should in any case be made to the boards for professional supervision and control by the superior officers of the Public Works Department. The Local Government would see that in the rules defining the duties and position of Public Works officers thus made over to the service of local bodies, full freedom of initiation, direction, and control in respect of all matters, not being details of professional execution, was reserved to the local Boards. If these principles were followed, there would seem to be no reason why the cutcheries, jails, lunatic asylums, and other public buildings should not be entrusted to the care of the local Boards. There would probably be very few districts in which it would be necessary to keep up a separate provincial engineering establishment.

From COLMAN MACAULAY, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(No. 420.)

Sir, Calcutta, July 19, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the Resolution of the Government of India, No. 17—747–54,* dated 18th May, on the subject of local self-government generally, and of your letter No. 832, dated 31st May, regarding its further extension in Bengal. The Lieutenant-Governor has lost no time in laying the Resolution of the Government of India before the local officers with an expression of his own views on this important question, and he has called upon the Commissioners of divisions for early reports with reference to the special condition of the municipalities and rural tracts in their respective jurisdictions. A copy of the circular addressed to them is enclosed for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

2. There are some points in your letter of 31st May to which the Lieutenant-Governor may have occasion to advert in submitting the general scheme of legislation hereafter. Meanwhile he deems it necessary to lay one part of his scheme at once before the Government of India. It will be observed from paragraph 14 of the circular that the Lieutenant-Governor considers that the local Boards should, in as many cases as possible, be left free from internal control arising either from the interference

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* *See* page 25.

of official Chairmen, or from the preponderance of Government nominees among the members. Mr. Rivers Thompson ventures to think that the method contemplated in paragraph 17 of the Government of India's Resolution would not secure the kind of control which the case demands. Some procedure is required less severe than absolute supersession and more effective than mere remonstrance. Some supervising authority is also required which, while it absolves the Government from the necessity of direct interference, would at the same time be more easily put in motion than Government. In the Lieutenant-Governnor's opinion there should be a body with not less power than the Local Government Board in England, to which the executive officers could refer in the event of a local Board neglecting an important public duty, and which could cause such duty to be performed at the expense of the Board in the event of their continued default after due notice. Government has a somewhat similar power over municipalities under section 318 of Act V. (B.C.) of 1876, and this the Lieutenant-Governor would by law transfer to the central controlling body which he proposes to create. It is not desirable that any of the local officers should have such means of direct interference, and it is certain that any attempt to throw the duty upon Government would, apart from the incalculable burden of work thus imposed upon the State, be resented generally as hostile to the independent action of the Boards. As soon as the new measure is passed, there will be a great mass of work connected with bye-laws, rules of procedure, division of funds, settlement of questions between conterminous local boards, and general direction and guidance, that must be disposed of by some central authority, but which Government could certainly not undertake. As time goes on inspections will be frequently required, applications for the creation of local government districts or for the introduction of the elective system will have to be inquired into and submitted to Government, projects for improvements scrutinised, the raising of loans or levy of local sanitation rates sanctioned; and doubtless many other questions will arise in the progressive development of a great social reform.

3. Apart from the direction of local boards, a central board would also be able to relieve Government of a great deal of work that now devolves upon it in the supervision of municipal administration. There are now some 192 places at which municipalities or minicipal institutions of a kind are established in Bengal, and for all these the general lines of policy must of course be laid down by the State, and provision must be made for their financial control. But the matters referred to Government are increasing every day, and as the new policy is matured and the constitution and administration of municipal bodies are placed upon a popular basis, with larger funds at their disposal for municipal improvement, there will certainly be a still further increase of work.

4. While, therefore, it will be essential to the successful working of the system that a new controlling machinery should be created, it appears to the Lieutenant-Governor that an apportunity is thus afforded of actually extending the scheme in its main principle of self-government. He proposes that the Central or Local Government Board should consist of three persons, the Chairman being, for the present at any rate, an officer of the standing of a Commissioner with special experience in municipal administration, and the two members being natives of character and influence. The Lieutenant-Governor would endeavour to select members who would command the public confidence, and he hopes that hereafter it may be possible to find gentlemen who have specially qualified themselves for the post by good work on some of the local Committees. He would make the appointments tenable for five years, and in order to enhance their position and dignity, and to maintain a connexion between the legislature and the local bodies, he would nominate the members alternately to the Legislative Council. The salary of the Chairman should be that of a Commissioner, while each native member should draw Rs. 1,250 and actual travelling expenses. A Native Secretary would also be required on a salary of Rs. 500 a month. No regular inspectors would be needed. The local executive officers would practically take the place of inspectors in the first instance, and the Board could depute one of its members or its Secretary to make local inquiries in cases of necessity. The gross cost of the scheme, including establishment charges, would be about Rs. 85,000 a a year. The Lieutenant-Governor would gladly contribute half of this sum from Provincial revenues in consideration of the great importance of the Board to the success of the general scheme, and the relief that would be afforded to the general administration. The other half would be met by a contribution from the different Boards and Committees, proportioned to their income. As the details of the income and charges to be made over to them have not yet been settled, it is not possible to state

now exactly what the aggregate income of District Committees, Local Boards, and Municipalities will amount to; but it will be little, if at all, short of 90 lakhs per annum, and a contribution of less than ½ per cent. on this would provide for their share of the cost of the Local Government Board. The exact powers to be entrusted to the Board would be settled hereafter, but the Lieutenant-Governor would be disposed to assign to them much the same functions as are performed by the Local Government Board in London, reserving to Government only a general control in matters of policy, and the right to intervene where the public interests were manifestly menaced.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that His Excellency the Governor-General will approve the proposal now made, and recommend it for the sanction of the Secretary of State. He looks upon it not only as essential to the successful prosecution of the scheme of local self-government, but also as likely to form a very valuable instrument for the gradual development of representative institutions in Bengal.

From COLMAN MACAULAY, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to all COMMISSIONERS OF DIVISIONS.

Sir, Darjeeling, July 5, 1882.

I am directed to forward, for your early consideration, copies of the papers noted on the margin, with reference to the extension of Local Self-Government. Your opinion on the general question has already been submitted in reply to my Circular (Finance, No. 98–106T, dated 4th November). The letter of this Government to the Government of India, No. 921½, dated 8th April, and the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th May, have, however, raised points of much wider application than have been hitherto under discussion, and these should now receive the special and attentive consideration of all local officers, assisted by such native advisers as they may be able to consult. Mr. Rivers Thompson is anxious to give the fullest possible effect to the policy of the Government of India. It is quite clear, however, that, whether as affecting Municipalities or as affecting Local Boards, the extent of the applicability of the new proposals to either towns or tracts must depend very much upon the local information to be obtained regarding each one of them; and it is necessary, therefore, that the circumstances of each district should be carefully examined, in order that Government may be in a position to determine how far the full scope of the scheme can be extended, what modifications will be required in particular places, and how many grades must be constructed in the legislative measure in which the general scheme is to find its ultimate expression.

*Letter No. 921½, dated 8th April, 1882, to Government of India.

†Resolution of Government of India, dated 18th May 1882.

2. You will observe that the two main points on which the Government of India have modified the scheme submitted by this Government are the extent to which the constitution of the Local Boards is to be determined by election, and the extent to which they are to be controlled by official Chairmen. The Government of India lay down no rigid rule. They desire that the elective system may be introduced, and that non-officials may be Chairmen of the Local Boards, wherever these measures may be practicable. It will be incumbent upon this Government and its officers, with whom will rest the determination of this condition as regards individual localities, not to abuse the discretion allowed them, but without reference to preconceived ideas on general questions of policy, to give the fullest effect to the wishes of the Supreme Government that may be compatible with their duty to their own charges.

3. The suggestions of the Government of India on these two principal points have even more direct reference to Town or Municipal Boards than to District and Local Boards. Before, therefore, proceeding to discuss the scheme for the constitution and working of the last-named bodies, the Lieutenant-Governor desires me to invite your attention to the following considerations regarding Municipalities.

4. Apart from Calcutta, which is under a separate law, the elective system is now in force in three only out of the 26 first class Municipalities in Bengal. It is true that no very great success has attended the experiment in two at least out of these three. Nevertheless, it is reported that, though the electors do not as a body display much

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* *See* page 75. † *See* page 25.

interest in the exercise of the franchise, and though the elected Commissioners do not apply themselves with any special diligence to the conduct of municipal affairs, the *personnel* of the Corporation is much the same as it would have been had the system of nomination been maintained. Instances, however, are not unknown in more advanced communities where elected members of Local Boards are indifferent to the call of public duty. This much at least is clear that, while under the elective system there may be some hope of progress in regard to general interest in municipal affairs, there can hardly be any such prospect under a system of simple nomination, and all the experience of past efforts would seem to show that, if little good has so far been effected by election, certainly no harm has been done by it. It was in view of these circumstances, and in the hope that, with extended responsibilities and extended powers, greater interest in public affairs might be taken both by electors and by elected, that Sir Ashley Eden, in announcing the determination of Government to relieve Municipalities of the charges for Police, expressed his willingness to consider proposals for extending the elective system to first class Municipalities. A circular was issued inviting an expression of the wishes of the different bodies; but there has been no response to this invitation. The law requires that one-third of the ratepayers shall sign a petition, praying for the introduction of the elective system into a Municipality, before Government can take any action in this direction, and it may be that ignorance of this provision on the part of the people is the cause of their silence. In view, however, of the declared policy of Government, it is not desirable that its officers should maintain a passive attitude in this matter. It is entirely the wish of the Lieutenant-Governor that the partial failures of past limited experiments should not be accepted by District Officers as a sufficient reason for declining to extend the trial to other Municipalities. They should cause the requirements of the law to be generally understood, and they should make it known that the Lieutenant-Governor will be prepared, as a rule, to extend the elective system to all first class Municipalities, and large second class Municipalities, in which the requirements of section 16 of the General Municipal Act are fulfilled. In submitting proposals to this end, it will be convenient that you should communicate your views, and those of the local officers, regarding the method of election most suitable to the Municipality in question, and the rules by which it should be controlled. You should also make recommendations in regard to the qualifications to be prescribed for electors and candidates, and state the number of persons who, according to such tests, would be entitled to the franchise or to a seat at the Municipal Board. Copies of the rules now in force in the Calcutta, Burdwan, Kishnaghur, and Serampore Municipalities are herewith forwarded for your inspection.

5. It has also been declared to be the policy of the Government of India that non-official persons should be appointed to be Chairmen of Local Boards wherever this may be practicable, and that, where it is necessary to appoint an executive officer to be Chairman, he should not, as a general rule, have a vote in the proceedings of the Board. It is obvious that, if this policy can be carried out anywhere, it can be carried out in Municipalities. The law constituting and regulating Mofussil Municipalities has now been in operation for many years; the area over which such Municipalities exercise jurisdiction is limited and well defined; and the places at which such Municipalities have been established are generally centres of trade and population, where we may expect to find not only men of education and culture, but men who have gained practical experience of Municipal Administration under the system which has been in force during the last twenty years. In all this period the intelligence of the people of Bengal has not stood still; and more than in other provinces it may be claimed here that, with the proofs of rapid advance in popular education and of the growth of a healthier public opinion, the time has come when the demand of the more intelligent classes for a large freedom in the management of their own concerns must be recognised and allowed. The desire of the Lieutenant-Governor is that Municipal Commissioners shall have as much scope as possible in the independent management of the affairs of their own towns, and there can be no doubt that this scope may be seriously limited, in the interior at any rate, by the active intervention of the chief executive officer of the district or sub-division. In Calcutta, the Chairman is Commissioner of Police, but he has no other executive authority. Two-thirds of the Commissioners are elected, and the practical interest which as a body they now display in the administration of the affairs of the town is beginning to have excellent results. In the Suburban and Howrah Municipalities the Magistrate of the district is Chairman. Here, however, the conditions are essentially

different from those of mofussil towns. Official influence is of comparatively little moment; and the Commissioners evince much independence and public spirit in the discussion and direction of municipal affairs. The circumstances of these three Municipalities are, however, in other respects also quite special, and Imperial and Provincial interests are to a large extent involved. The question of their administration is receiving the separate consideration of the Lieutenant-Governor. In the mofussil, however, the presence of the chief executive officer at the head of the Board has very frequently the effect of discouraging the free expression of independent opinion; and, though this may be materially altered by the working of the elective system, still there can be little doubt that the object of encouraging Local Self-Government would be promoted by the removal of this overshadowing influence, sufficient power being retained to compel the Commissioners to discharge their duty to the public should they persist in neglecting it. Obviously, however, no fixed rule can be laid down for all Municipalities. In some the non-official members have hitherto so far held back from active interest in public affairs that no one may be found among them fitted for the post of Chairman. In a few, even if the Ward system were fully developed, the labours would be so heavy, and the responsibilities so great, that no one may be willing to accept the position without a special salary; and in some cases it may be found that the ratepayers and the Commissioners themselves would prefer to retain the gratuitous official agency now available to them, while the former enjoy the privileges of election. The case of each Municipality must be carefully considered with due regard to all its circumstances. On the whole Mr. Rivers Thompson would be willing to adopt the same test of the popular wishes in this matter as in that of election, and, in the absence of very special objection, to appoint a non-official Chairman or to appoint a nominee of the Commissioners themselves, in the event of one-third of the ratepayers signing a petition asking him to take this action. The existing law gives the Lieutenant-Governor authority to appoint any person to be Chairman of a Municipality. Indeed, the prominent success of a Municipality in the Hooghly district has recently led His Honour to confer this office upon one of the non-official Commissioners, who has hitherto conducted the duties of Vice-Chairman; and he will be ready to take similar measures elsewhere. It will be desirable to make the intention of Government in this respect generally known. Meanwhile you should report, regarding each Municipality, whether, in your opinion and in that of the local officers and their native advisers, the chief executive officer should remain Chairman or should be replaced by some other official, and whether either of these should be allowed to vote at the meetings of the Board; or whether Government should nominate a non-official Chairman, or, finally, should leave the Commissioners to nominate their own Chairman, subject to the Lieutenant-Governor's approval. It will of course be understood that the conduct of the inquiries which bear upon these questions should not be limited to official agency. The persons mainly concerned are the people themselves; and there should be no difficulty, by public meetings, or by personal communication with the residents in each Municipality, of ascertaining the wishes of those chiefly interested. Other questions connected with Municipalities, such as the amount to be contributed to district schools situated within their limits, and their relations with adjoining Local Boards in regard to education, highways, ferries, and the like, will be discussed further on.

6. When we approach the discussion of the constitution of Local Boards, the difficulties of the problem are manifestly greater; and these difficulties arise primarily from the fact that, in this direction at least, the experiment of Local Self-Government based upon election is entirely an innovation, foreign alike to the genius and instincts of the people and to the system of rule which has obtained since the British power was established in India. The Government on this side of India has no past experience to fall back upon for its guidance, nor probably could it find in any of the independent Native States in the country precedents of a kind to help it in such a novel undertaking. The Lieutenant-Governor is anxious, nevertheless, to give to the views expressed by His Excellency the Viceroy in Council the fullest and the fairest trial; and, though he has no fears as to the results of the measure and no doubts as to its ultimate success he is, bound from his position to give the warning that, if any solid and permanent results are to be achieved, it can only be by a tentative and patient procedure in the introduction of the new policy. We are dealing with untried men in an untried system. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore is glad to find that, in the work to be done and the manner of its accomplishment, a large discretion has been

accorded to him; and he avails himself of this liberty in recording now the view which he desires to bring under your notice.

7. As regards the general question of the machinery by which Local Self-Government is to be conducted, you will observe that the Government of India have accepted Sir Ashley Eden's recommendation that the unit of administration should be the Local or Sub-divisional, and not the District, Board. Even smaller jurisdictions would be admitted if it were found practicable to appoint Local Boards to control them. The Government of India are also disposed to restrict the functions of the District Boards or Councils to the decision of very general questions affecting the district, such as the rate of road cess, and the like, and the allotment of general district funds. Mr. Rivers Thompson thinks that there will be little difficulty in providing for the exercise of independent powers by Local Boards, and thus dispensing with District Councils altogether where such Boards exist. Wherever it may be necessary for two or more Boards to execute some work in common, or to contribute to the salary of a common officer, provision can be made for the union of Boards for any specific purpose, and the delegation of their powers for such purpose to a joint Board, as in the English Act. Sir Ashley Eden was of opinion that it would be best to legislate only for districts in which Local Boards could be formed, other districts being dealt with by executive order. The Government of India prefer that all should be included. There will be no difficulty in incorporating in the law the powers which are now held by Road, Education and Dispensary Committees, with such enlargement as may be found possible, and conferring them on single Committees.

8. There will therefore be, under the new law, (from which the districts of Singbhoom, Sonthal Pergunnahs, and Chittagong Hill Tracts will be excluded) three classes of districts: (1) Those which contain no sub-division in which a Local Board can be formed: these will remain under the charge of District Committees, and will correspond with the "rural districts," under the English Act, which are not fit for incorporation in a "Local Government district." (2) Those which contain some sub-divisions in which a Local Board can be formed, and some in which this is not possible: the latter class of sub-division will be placed in charge of such a Committee, corresponding to a Branch Committee under the existing Cess Act, as can be formed, the Chairman being the Sub-divisional Officer. (3) Those which contain sub-divisions in all of which Local Boards can be formed: these will correspond with "Local Government districts" in England. It will now be for you to report, after detailed inquiry, under which of three categories each district in your jurisdiction should be placed. It will of course be the desire of Government that as many sub-divisions as possible may gradually advance sufficiently to be created Local Government districts. In order that no obstacle may be thrown in the way, the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to insert a section in the law to enable a certain proportion of the persons of substance in a sub-division to petition Government to have a Local Board created, and to provide for full inquiry into such petitions.

9. You will next consider, as in the case of Municipalities, the questions of election of members and appointment of Chairmen. In which of the sub-divisions to be created Local Government districts can a part of the members of the Local Board be elected? In what cases should the Local Boards be allowed to nominate their own Chairman, in what should Government appoint a non-official Chairman, and in what would it be necessary to have an official Chairman?

10. Mr. Rivers Thompson is entirely in favour of introducing the elective system, wherever the condition of the people is such as to warrant him in doing so. In considering the applicability of this system to any tract, it will be necessary to recollect that in the promotion of Local Self-Government, the object chiefly aimed at is the political education of the people, and obviously political education should succeed, and not precede, education in the ordinary sense of the term. It must also be borne in mind that a high average of intelligence among representatives cannot be secured without a moderate average of intelligence and knowledge among those who elect them. But if in any Local Government district a reasonable proportion of the persons, who would be qualified to vote according to such standard as might be generally adopted, desire to have the power to elect their representatives, and show that the desire is real by subsequently exercising the franchise, the Lieutenant-Governor sees no reason why that power should be withheld from them. It will first be necessary to fix the qualification for voters. Mr. Rivers Thompson is distinctly of opinion that the

ownership or occupancy of some kind of property, or the direction of some trade or business, in the area to be represented, should be an essential condition of the franchise. In England the right of voting at the election of a Local Board is enjoyed only by owners of, and payers of poor rate in respect of, property situated in the district for which the election is held. Such a definition would rarely be suitable to India. Many men of wealth and intelligence not alone own or hold no land, but reside in houses of which the value bears no relation to their means and their stake in the country. The payment therefore of a certain rate of license-tax, and the ownership of a certain amount of personal property, should be held to qualify. But if the experiment is really to promote Local Self-Government, it is essential that both the voters and the candidates here, as in England, should have some stake in the locality. Mr. Rivers Thompson would propose, as the qualification for members, the payment of Rs. 25 road cess, or Rs. 20 license-tax, or proof of income from other sources than land, amounting to not less than Rs. 1,000 per annum. Residence within the Local Government District represented, or within five miles of its boundary, would be an essential condition of membership. For voters the qualification might be placed at Rs. 10 road cess, Rs. 10 license-tax, or Rs. 500 other income. It would also appear desirable, as in the English Law, to increase the number of votes, to be given by one individual, up to five or six, according to the extent of his property. It is only right that those who own a large amount of property within the jurisdiction of a Local Board should individually have a more substantial voice in its constitution than those who are only just qualified to vote. All this could be arranged by rules under the Act. I am to point out that the elective system need not necessarily be extended to the whole of a Local Government district. Each Local Government district would be divided, for the purposes of election, into wards corresponding with thannahs, or, in very thickly populated tracts, smaller areas. The number of members for each would be separately settled, and they would be taken in the proportion of two elected to one nominated. A Local Government district might be entirely divided into elective wards, or one part might be so divided, the members for the other part being nominated by Government in the proportion of not more than one official to two non-official members. I am to ask that no time may be lost in preparing rough lists of the persons who would be entitled to vote according to the scale above mentioned in each sub-division in which it is believed that a Local Board might be properly established. No inquisitorial proceedings should of course be held as regards ordinary income. The road cess and license-tax lists, however, can be easily prepared, and the list of owners of private property must be made approximately to the best of the local officer's judgment. In reporting upon this part of the subject, you should discuss any modes of voting that you may consider specially suitable to any of the local districts under your charge, bearing in mind the instruction already inculcated that the sentiments and wishes of all intelligent native residents should be freely consulted. If any system of election more consonant with native feeling should be suggested, it should receive your attention. Uniformity of procedure is neither necessary nor desirable; and as regards the natives of the country, the main object to be attained is not so much at present the representation of the masses, as the gradual training of the most capable and influential men in the community to a participation in the business of the part of the district in which their interest lies. Local knowledge of local affairs should be a primary qualification for office; and from this point of view it is the Lieutenant-Governor's hope that not a few European gentlemen, resident in the interior and concerned in the development and progress of the country, will be willing to come forward as candidates for seats on the local boards.

11. As regards the question of the appointment of the Chairmen of Local Boards, it is possible that in places difficulties may arise, such as have been alluded to in connexion with Municipalities. It must be noted, however, that, whereas the chief charge of a Municipality cannot be divided, the area of a Local Board need not be identical with that of the sub-division. If the work is exceptionally heavy, the sub-division will probably be very populous, and separate Local Boards may be appointed for one or more thannahs. At the same time, with the restricted area under each Local Board, it would seem unnecessary to grant travelling allowances for attending meetings. If the members are unwilling to travel a few miles at their own expense, it is not probable that any of them will agree to undertake the labours and responsibilities of the Chairmanship without remuneration. The Lieutenant-Governor is prepared to admit that if Local Boards were to be left to their own devices, and if provision were not made for effective interference in the event of their neglecting

their duty to the public, there would be some danger in leaving them without official direction; scandals and abuses and class jealousies might arise which would discredit the system of Local Self-Government and entirely defeat the object now in view. Some control therefore must be exercised either from within or from without; and, having regard, not alone to the desirability of fostering intelligent and independent interest in local affairs and of promoting the political education of the people, but also to the daily increasing burden of work on public officers, Mr. Rivers Thompson has no doubt that, where it is possible to provide effectively for the second kind of control, we should have recourse to it. There may be sub-divisions where it would be preferable to maintain the local executive officer as Chairman of the Local Board in order to avoid a certainty of failure; but as a rule this should not be necessary with the provision for control which will be referred to below. In the majority of cases, where a Local Board has been created at all, it should be possible to find a non-official member able and willing to direct its deliberations. The local executive officer will have ample means of supervising and controlling the proceedings of the Board by his own personal influence, or, in the last resort, by invoking the interference of superior authority. I am to ask you, therefore, bearing in mind these considerations and those referred to in the second paragraph of this letter, to report regarding each Local Board whether it is necessary that the Sub-divisional Officer should be Chairman, and if so, whether he should have a vote in the proceedings of the Board, or whether Government should appoint some other official or some non-official to be Chairman, or should accept the nomination of the Board itself.

12. Some of the powers to be entrusted to Local Boards have been enumerated in paragraphs 12 to 20 of my letter to the Government of India, No. 921½, dated 8th April.* For the purpose of providing the means of improving drainage, water-supply, and sanitation, and to supplement for general purposes the funds to be definitely surrendered to them by Government, it will be necessary to empower them to levy a local rate of which the proceeds will be credited, with their income from other sources, to the "Local District Fund." The Government of India suggest that, instead of making over to them fixed grants from the Provincial Revenues to supplement the receipts from pounds and ferries, and enable them to meet the charges transferred to them, the license-tax assessments and collections should be made over to them and to Municipalities. These collections, however, would in many places, particularly in Municipalities, largely exceed any charges that Government could transfer to them; and a share, to be fixed separately for each Board, is all that could be surrendered. Your opinion is invited upon this point, with any suggestions that you may have to offer in regard to the Public Works Cess or other source of revenue.

13. It is a part of the proposed scheme that Municipalities should be kept distinct from other Local Boards, as they are at present, and that there should be no general District Council. Any new provisions that may be required in regard to Municipalities will be considered in connexion with the amendment of the General Municipal Act. In view of the extensive powers to be entrusted to Local Boards, it appears very desirable to abolish many of the existing unions, especially in the Patna, Gya and Hooghly districts, and some perhaps of the smaller Municipalities. It will be also necessary to make some special provision for the control and support of the Zillah schools. The best arrangement would appear to be to appoint, in each case, a managing board, partly from the Municipal Committee and partly from the Local Board of the head-quarters sub-division. Where a Local Government district is not created, the school will of course remain, as at present, under the District Committee. The contribution to be made in the first case by the Municipality and each Local Board in the district, and in the second case by the Municipality only, will be fixed every year by the Director of Public Instruction. Other questions between Municipalities and adjoining Local Boards, such as those relating to ferries on the boundary, repairs of highways leading to such ferries, or to ferries just inside or just outside municipal boundaries, and the like, must be settled between the authorities concerned, a final reference lying to the controlling body to be described in the next paragraph.

14. The control which the Government of India propose to reserve to the executive authorities is of two kinds—(1) sanction to certain acts; (2) interference to set aside proceedings, and, in the event of continued neglect, absolute supersession with the sanction of the Supreme Government. Your opinion is requested on the first point.

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* *See* page 75.

One matter in regard to which a controlling power should certainly be reserved is a limit of expenditure on single works without special sanction. This is prescribed even in the Calcutta Municipality. As regards the second point, the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to address a further communication to the Government of India. It appears to him that some less severe and more manageable procedure than absolute supersession, after reference to the Supreme Government, is required for cases in which a Board neglects its duty in spite of official remonstrance. The English Statute empowers the Local Government Board to issue an order limiting a time for the performance of a duty neglected by a Local Authority, and, in the event of continued default, to cause the work to be done at the expense of the authority. It is not possible to vest the powers of the Local Government Board in the district officers. To do so would be to neutralise all the effects of the independence to be given under certain reservations to the Local Boards. Yet there must be some more ready and efficient means of compelling defaulting Boards to do their duty than can be secured by detailed references to Government in each case. The true solution of the difficulty appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to be the creation of a central directing body, appointed but not controlled, except in matters of general policy, by Government. This body would consist of specially selected representative members, adequately remunerated, with powers analogous to those of the Local Government Board in London. Similar powers are reserved to Government by section 318 of the Municipal Act, and these would be transferred to the Central Board of control. They would make inquiries on the reports of local officers, pass the necessary orders, dispose of all references from Municipalities and Local Boards or District Committees, sanction their byelaws, and generally fulfil the functions of the chief controlling authority. With this safeguard, which is necessary in England, and certainly cannot be dispensed with in India, there is no reason why most of the Local Boards should not be elected and elect their own Chairmen.

15. It seems to Mr. Rivers Thompson that, under the scheme which has just been sketched out, it should be possible to give a very practical effect to the policy of Local Self-Government. After the first arrangements had been concluded, Local Government district would only be created and Local Boards appointed, on the application of the people themselves, and after full inquiry to ascertain the presence of the two essential conditions of local interest and local knowledge. The elective system would only be introduced on the application of those entitled to vote, and no first election would be confirmed, unless a fair proportion of those qualified to vote actually voted. Local Boards would only be allowed to elect their own Chairmen if this was shown to be the public wish, and if it was considered otherwise desirable; while their own proceedings would be effectively supervised and controlled, though without undue interference, by the local executive officers and a representative Central Board. If wider liberties are possible in the future, they should be earned by the public spirit and loyal efforts of those whose co-operation the Government now invites in the inauguration and development of a great measure.

16. I am to ask that you will take immediate steps to consult the officers subordinate to you, and as many native gentlemen as you can, on the questions discussed in this letter, and its enclosures. Your general reply should be submitted not later than 15th September. The Lieutenant-Governor would be glad, however, if you could submit a special report on the points referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 before that date.

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL.

Home Department.
Public, No. 1258.

Sir, Simla, August 22, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 420* of the 19th July last, submitting a copy of a circular addressed on the 5th idem to the Commissioners of Divisions throughout Bengal, explaining to them the Lieutenant-Governor's views on the question of local self-government in municipalities and rural tracts, and consulting them as to the steps to be taken to give effect to the policy of the Government of India in this important matter.

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* *See* page 89.

2. The Governor-General in Council observes with much satisfaction that Mr. Rivers Thompson is anxious to give the fullest possible effect to that policy; and in view of the fact that the precise details of its application in Bengal will depend very much on the results of the reference that has been made to local officers, and of the inquiries which the Lieutenant-Governor is himself prosecuting in the course of his present tour, it does not appear to be either necessary or desirable to discuss at present the various suggestions embodied in the circular of the Local Government.

3. Your letter under reply raises, however, a special question, in connexion with the remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor in paragraph 14 of the circular, as to which the early orders of the Government of India are solicited. Mr. Rivers Thompson discusses in that paragraph the nature and extent of the control which the executive authorities should exercise over the proceedings of local Boards. He assumes it to be the intention of the Government of India that when a Board neglects its duty in spite of official remonstrance the only remedy will be the absolute supersession of the Board after reference to the Supreme Government. Holding that some less severe and more manageable procedure is required, the Lieutenant-Governor observes that in England the Local Government Board is empowered to issue an order limiting a time for the performance of a duty neglected by a Local Authority, and in the event of continued default to cause the work to be done at the expense of the Authority. This power the Lieutenant-Governor would not propose to entrust to district officers, but at the same time he thinks that there must be some more ready and efficient means of compelling defaulting Boards to do their duty than can be secured by detailed references to Government in each case. The true solution of the difficulty appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to be the creation of a central directing body, appointed but not controlled, except in matters of general policy, by Government. This body would, it is said, consist of specially selected representative members, adequately remunerated, with power analogous to those of the Local Government Board in London. It would make inquiries on the reports of local officers, pass the necessary orders, dispose of all references from Municipalities and Local Boards or District Committees, sanction their byelaws, and generally fulfil the functions of the chief controlling authority. In your letter under reply these proposals are reiterated, and it is urged not only that the work which the control of the Boards would throw upon the Local Government is more than it could properly undertake, but that for Government to reserve this control in its own hands would be regarded as detrimental to the independent action of the Boards.

4. In paragraph 4 of your letter the Lieutenant-Governor explains as follows the constitution of the proposed Central Board:—

The Central or Local Government Board should consist of three persons, the Chairman being, for the present at any rate, an officer of the standing of a Commissioner with special experience in municipal administration, and the two members being natives of character and influence. The Lieutenant-Governor would endeavour to select members who would command the public confidence, and he hopes that hereafter it may be possible to find gentlemen who have especially qualified themselves for the post by good work on some of the local Committees. He would make the appointments tenable for five years, and in order to enhance their position and dignity, and to maintain a connexion between the legislature and the local bodies, he would nominate the members alternately to the Legislative Council. The salary of the Chairman should be that of a Commissioner, while each native member should draw Rs. 1,250 and actual travelling expenses. A Native Secretary would also be required on a salary of Rs. 500 a month. No regular inspectors would be needed. The local executive officers would practically take the place of inspectors in the first instance, and the Board could depute one of its members or its Secretary to make local inquiries in cases of necessity. The gross cost of the scheme, including establishment charges, would be about Rs. 85,000 a year. The Lieutenant-Governor would gladly contribute half of this sum from Provincial revenues in consideration of the great importance of the Board to the success of the general scheme, and the relief that would be afforded to the general administration. The other half would be met by a contribution from the different Boards and Committees, proportioned to their income.

5. With reference to these proposals and the considerations upon which they are based, I am to observe in the first place that the exact nature of the control over the Boards which the Government of India intended the local executive authorities to exercise appears to have been somewhat misunderstood by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. In paragraph 18 of the Resolution of the 18th May last, it is indicated as

the wish of the Government that the Chief Executive Officers of towns, sub-divisions, or districts should "supervise and control" the acts of the local Boards, though without taking actual part in their proceedings. The reasons for this last restriction are stated in the paragraph, which concludes by pointing out that the District Officer is intended to occupy a "dignified and influential position" of supervision and control, acting as arbiter between all parties on his local Committees, while not mixing himself up directly in the debates or disputes that are incidental to the working of committees all the world over. The Resolution does not formulate the provisions of law which would be necessary to secure this; and it appears, therefore, to have been assumed from paragraph 17 of the Resolution (in which the powers of control reserved to the Government itself are set out) that there will be no authority short of the Local Government that can control the working of the local Boards. I am now to explain that it was the intention of the Governor-General in Council that in any law for giving effect to the policy of the Government of India, distinct provision should be made for the supervision by the District Officer of the proceedings of every local Board within his jurisdiction. He would have power to enter on and inspect their works, call for and inspect their records, and require them to furnish such statements, accounts, and reports as he may require. If he should be of opinion that any of their proceedings is open to criticism or doubt he would communicate with the Board either personally or by letter, intimating his views, calling for explanation, or suggesting modified action. Under certain serious and urgent circumstances he would even be vested with power to suspend the execution of any work or prohibit the doing of any Act, reporting his proceedings for the confirmation of the Commissioner of the Division or other superior authority. It is to be hoped that in the vast majority of cases the District Officer and the Board would be able to come to a determination and settlement satisfactory to both. If, however, the District Officer failed to convince the Board, or if he found that a Board had made such serious default of duty as to necessitate further action he would be empowered to represent the fact to the Commissioner or other superior authority indicated in the law; and that authority would have power, by an order in writing, to fix a period within which the Board shall perform the duty in question, or show cause to the contrary. If on expiration of the period of grace the order were made absolute, the Board still defaulting, there would be a power given to the Commissioner or other authority to order the work to be done at the cost and charges of the Board's fund. It would only be in cases of gross and persistent default that the power of suspending the Board, referred to in paragraph 17 of the Resolution, would come to be exercised by the Local Government.

6. While, therefore, the Governor General in Council agrees with the Lieutenant-Governor that the District Officer ought not to be empowered of his own motion to interfere directly with the proceedings of a local Board, save under very exceptional circumstances, and pending reference to higher authority, His Excellency in Council is clearly of opinion that a power of control must be provided for meeting ordinary difficulties, and removing ordinary shortcomings in the local administration without its being necessary to refer to Government or to any central authority. In Bengal the Commissioners of Divisions would appear to be the proper officers to be vested with those powers, and it would seem to be desirable to secure to them their natural place as the local representatives of the Provincial Government.

7. If then the Commissioners occupy such a position in connexion with the scheme of local self-government, the burden of work falling upon the Bengal Secretariat would not probably be more than that office, already so strongly manned, could easily undertake. It is for many reasons advisable that the working of an experiment so new and so important should be at the outset very closely watched and directed by the Government itself; and the Governor General in Council is not without apprehension lest the transfer of these duties to an independent Central Bureau might militate against the success of the experiment, by lessening that sense of responsibility in respect of it by which the Local Government ought itself to be especially actuated.

8. In paragraph 14 of the circular the Lieutenant-Governor describes the Central Board, which he proposes to form, as in some sense a representative body; it is to consist of "specially selected representative members." It appears, however, to the Governor General in Council very doubtful whether a Board constituted in the manner suggested in your letter under reply could be looked upon as really representative. The Chairman is to be an officer of the standing of Commissioner, and drawing a Commissioner's salary, while the two Native members are to give their

whole time to the work on salaries of Rs. 1,250 each. It is inevitable that the Native members should be either persons already in Government service, or persons whose ordinary avocations are such as to permit their abandoning them to hold the appointments in question for a term of five years. Natives holding really influential positions would not easily be found in this last catagory, and the Native community might very probably decline to look upon those who would come forward as in any degree representative men.

9. The Board would in fact, as it seems to the Governor General in Council, be in reality an official body, or at any rate would generally be looked upon as such. It would have no special local knowledge of a kind or extent superior to that possessed by the Government itself, and it would not command the same amount of support and assistance from the local authorities that the Government would always be able to secure.

10. The expense to be incurred is another serious drawback to the proposal. The charges on account of salaries, establishment, travelling allowances, office rent, and contingencies would probably be not less than one lakh of rupees per annum; and although the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to throw only half of the cost upon provincial funds, distributing the balance over funds of the different Boards in the interior, the scheme involves a material addition to the cost of the general administration which there appears to be no absolute necessity for incurring; while if sanctioned in Bengal it might be followed by similar proposals coming from other and poorer provinces which the Government would find it difficult to resist.

11. The foregoing is the view which the Governor General in Council is at present disposed to take of the proposals made in your letter under acknowledgment, and before communicating, as desired, with the Secretary of State, he would wish the Lieutenant-Governor to reconsider the scheme in the light of the explanations now given as to the intentions of the Government of India in the matter of official control over local Boards.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE PUNJAB.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Panjab, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(No. 1777A.)

September 7, 1882.

With reference to Government of India, Home Department Resolution No. 17—747–59,* dated 18th May last, I am desired to forward herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, a copy of Punjab Government Resolution No. 1777 of this day's date, on the subject of local self-government.

Resolution of THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, No. 1777, September 7, 1882.

Read—

Resolution of the Government of India, in the Home Department, No. $\frac{17}{747-59}$,* dated the 18th May 1882, explaining generally the manner in which the Governor General in Council desires the principle of local self-government to be applied throughout British India outside the Presidency Towns.

Resolution.—The Resolution read above is herewith circulated for the information and guidance of Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners, who are invited to submit proposals for the adoption, in the different Districts and Divisions, of administrative measures to be framed, in accordance with the remarks about to be made, for the purpose of giving effect, in the Punjab, to the policy and instructions of the Government of India.

Circulates Government of India Resolution of May.

2. The observations of the Governor General in Council recite the material points in the recent financial correspondence between the Local and Supreme Governments. It was intended that further developments of local responsibility and local administrative

Previous cause of the correspondence.

* *See* page 25.

control should follow, as a consequence, upon the introduction of the new schemes for extending the decentralization of finance which are now in operation in the various Provinces. In October last, Local Governments were therefore addressed in regard to the re-adjustments of liability and resources which might be considered or effected as between Provincial and Local Funds, and, incidentally, opinions were expressed by the Government of India touching the character and functions of the local bodies about to be entrusted with extended powers. Some of these opinions have now been modified in the direction of greater liberality after considering the schemes for promoting local self-government prepared in several Provinces. The Punjab Government did not draw up any such scheme; for although Sir Robert Egerton cordially accepted the general principles of the instructions of October, he desired, at the close of his term of office, to leave to his successor the initiation of measures which must necessarily involve considerable changes in the provincial administration.

Summary of Government of India orders.

3. Amongst the cardinal principles enunciated by the Government of India, it was laid down that, within appropriate limits, local bodies should be allowed much larger powers than they now enjoy, and that the respective powers of such bodies and of the Government should be distinctly defined. It is explained that the extension of local self-government has not, as its immediate object, improved administrative efficiency. It is chiefly desired "as an instrument of political and popular education." Some failures are to be expected; success is to be attained by patiently nurturing the growth of small political institutions. If it be said that the mass of the people is indifferent to public affairs, it is replied that intelligence and public spirit are spreading, and should be utilised. The officers of Government in all Departments complain of overwork; and the true remedy is to awaken or foster a capacity for self-help amongst the people. This principle has not yet had a fair trial; and the Government of India now wishes to make a substantial, though cautious, advance in this direction. Accordingly the Government of India has traced, in general outline, the measures to be taken towards this end by Local Governments, both as regards the constitution of municipal and district boards, and as to the degree and manner of control over them to be retained or exercised by Government.

The Lieutenant-Governor's views of the policy of the Resolution.

4. The whole policy expressed in the Resolution above summarised is frankly and cordially accepted by the Lieutenant-Governor. It is, in his judgment, conceived in a wise and liberal spirit; and he relies on the officers of the Punjab Commission to endeavour earnestly to carry it out wherever local circumstances are not prohibitory. No doubt the country is, in some places, riper for self-government than in others, and everywhere caution must be observed. But to suppose that local self-government can only be fitly and successfully developed where the country is already fully prepared for it, would be to ignore the history of local institutions in the Punjab under British rule, and to miss the most prominent and important aim which the Government now has in view. The object of the whole proceeding is, the Lieutenant-Governor repeats, to educate the people to manage their own affairs. At the outset it is admitted that, amongst the native community, the various capacities requisite in public life are as yet, for the most part, immature: it is precisely for this reason that a period of public and political training is necessary; and it is on this ground that the interposition and action of Government are justified. The great value of the policy prescribed by the Government of India seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to be its tendency to create and develop the capacity for self-help. Placed in new positions of responsibility, the representatives of the people on the local boards will, it is to be hoped, become, year by year, more intelligent, independent, and self-reliant. But these advantages can only be secured if the local bodies are trusted. Their power and their responsibilities must alike be real; in proportion as there is any pretence or illusion about either the one or the other, there is an obvious possibility that the whole undertaking may degenerate into an officious dislocation of existing arrangements. No such lamentable miscarriage of a singularly generous and enlightened policy must be suffered to occur in the Punjab. This risk escaped, the Government, anticipating, by wise reforms, those legitimate aspirations which always gain substance and strength with the progress of instruction and civilisation, and providing a career for the people, to open and expand with their growing intelligence and education, will unquestionably avoid many of the dangers inherent in foreign rule. This is, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, the great merit of the new policy. Briefly, he thinks that the scheme, in so far as it can be successfully worked, will tend to elevate the duties and enlarge the official character of Government officers; to educate the country in public life; to relieve the Government of the odium of petty interferences and small unpopular acts; to diminish any sense of antagonism between

the people and the Government; to promote better knowledge of the real aims of the governing body; to popularise taxation; to open useful, if not exalted, careers to the native gentry; and to interest leading men in the progress of undertakings and the stability of institutions in which they will now for the first time have a personal and prominent share. Thus the political education of the people will directly subserve some of the chief political purposes of the Government.

History of local self-government in the Punjab.

5. In considering what steps should now be taken to extend local self-government in the Punjab, it is of much consequence to bear in mind the present character and past growth of District and Municipal Committees in the Province. In 1849 the Board of Administration introduced the chaukidari police system in all towns and villages, the cost of the establishment being distributed into shares or cesses and levied from house proprietors. The task of assessment was entrusted to influential residents; but complaints of inequality arose, and it was found that exemptions were made on personal grounds or from sectarian motives, and the rich were generally spared at the expense of the lower classes. For this and other reasons the house-tax was very unpopular; and, in 1850, on the suggestion of the citizens, it was abandoned for the system of town duties, then introduced on trial in Lahore and Amritsar. This system was indigenous to the country; for it was founded on the chungi collections of the Sikhs so modified as to remove, almost entirely, all objectionable restrictions upon trade. It was shortly after extended to the Mooltan, Jhelum and Sutlej States Divisions. The surplus over and above the funds so raised for police was expended on municipal improvements. The income was vested in the Magistrate of the district as trustee, but the expenditure was regulated by the advice of a Committee elected by the townsmen. Such, under British rule in the Punjab, was the beginning of local self-government—a term which first appears in the literature of the Province in paragraph 389 of the first Punjab Administratien Report for the years 1849 to 1851. The development of this system during the first ten or twelve years of British administration had no connexion with the action taken in isolated cases under the Towns Improvements Act, XXVI. of 1850. During this period Simla and Bhiwani were the only places in which that Act was applied. In 1860, in reply to a request of the Government of India for information regarding the system of municipal government and its success, the Officiating Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Roberts, reported that the local funds were managed by a Committee of European officials and other members, European and Native. Practically, however, few natives, except Extra Assistant Commissioners, were appointed, though in some instances the town panches were associated with the Committees. But these bodies were not, properly speaking, municipal corporations, as they had no power of taxation, but simply originated and executed local improvements under the supervision of the Divisional Commissioner. The funds expended by them were usually collected by an octroi duty, and, in some cases, by a house-tax, though the latter impost was not popular. The entire local funds of the Province were under the administrative control of the Judicial Commissioner.

Proceedings of 1861–62. Opinion of Sir Donald McLeod.

6. In submitting this report to the Government of India the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Robert Montgomery, expressed the opinion that, so far as the system of municipal government had been tried, it had worked well. The Government of India then urged greater efforts for its more complete establishment, ascribing the apathy of the people to a general distrust of novelties and to misconceptions of the objects of Government and the ends of local taxation. Means were suggested by which these difficulties might be overcome; the formation of representative bodies in large towns was advised; and it was required both that personal influence should be used to create a desire for municipal administration, and that due attention should be paid to the ascertained wishes of local communities. On this Resolution Sir Donald McLeod, then Financial Commissioner, recorded a memorandum which appears to the Lieutenant-Governor to breathe the very spirit of the present instructions of the Government of India. Sir Donald McLeod observed—

"The genius of the natives is essentially suited for municipal organisation, and as rightly observed by the Supreme Government, municipal institutions are as well adapted to the natives of India as to those of England. This municipal organisation still exists in every trade, and did exist, previous to our rule, in every village. But their experiences have been of a microscopic character. In social matters the representative element was almost the only regulating principle. In the affairs of State none was ordinarily allowed to interfere. Hence municipal organisations among the natives have been limited to small sections of society having common interests.

"This should be borne in mind in all our endeavours to turn municipal organisation to account. We should commence with the atoms of which native society is composed and work upwards in such a manner as they may themselves suggest, or as may be found most congenial to them.

"To give the people a real interest in the arrangements contemplated, it is absolutely essential that they should be given a large discretion in the matter of expenditure. To work any practical use out of the people, they should not continue ever to be treated as children or imbeciles."

Sir Donald McLeod then proceeded to advise the following plan:

"First determine whether the organisation shall be the castes, muhullas, trades, or any other subdivisions of the people or locality. Then direct such sub-division to appoint its own managing Committee, and entrust to it the entire executive management of such duties as it may be determined to make over; and lastly, leave it entirely to these bodies to elect a general or central Committee of management, investing this body with real authority and discretion to manage and control all general questions and to exercise a supervision over the subordinate Committees. No Government official ought to be associated with them in their deliberations, or allowed to interfere in any way with their nomination, though each member, when elected, should be recognised, and, if necessary, invested by the local representatives of Government; and these should also have the power of declaring ineligible, or removing from the post any one of bad character, or convicted of any serious offences.

"In short, the municipal body should be, as regards essentials, really independent, so far as the interference of our officials goes.

"If, however, we begin as we have been wont to do, from the top instead of from the bottom,—*i.e.*, nominate a council of men of rank and consideration, and then descend to details as best we may,—the whole thing will become a sham and a delusion; and still more so if we associate our own officers with them in their proceedings, whether deliberative or executive."

Commissioners of Divisions were consulted; and the result was the issue of Sir Robert Montgomery's well known Resolution of 1862, directing the establishment of municipalities in towns near the head-quarters of districts. The Committees were to be composed of representatives of the townspeople elected annually by delegates or punchayats of trades and callings. They were to exercise a real control over conservancy, drainage, water-supply, the construction of local buildings, lighting, the regulation of bazaars, and the like. No new local taxes were to be imposed, nor were the rates to be increased, without their consent. The District Officer was to be their friend and adviser; he was to encourage them to act boldly and independently; and he was not to overrule their designs without previous reference to the Commissioner of the Division.

Operation of the orders of 1862.

7. The evidence as to the practical operation of these orders during the next five years is scanty and inconclusive; and it seems doubtful whether they were carried into full effect by local officers. In December 1862 the Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Cust, reported the results in 35 towns where Committees had been elected in various ways, by wards, by castes, by the suffrages of income-tax payers divided into trades, by householders, by delegates from different classes, by headmen of tribes, by an electoral body chosen by license-tax payers, by general consent, by sects, and by acclamation at an assembly of citizens. In one town out of the 35, viz., Bannu, the Committee was nominated by the District Officer, and consisted of the panch associated with chaudris; in another, Peshawar, some members were similarly nominated and others elected. Mr. Cust was sceptical of the success of these new municipalities, decrying their capacity for administrative undertakings, and evidently holding that, in many places, the measure had been incautious and premature. In the Administration Report of the year, however, it was stated that the members of the Committees had worked together harmoniously and had transacted business with zeal, spirit, and efficiency. "Hitherto," it was said, "the experiment of thus enfranchising a people full of energy "and good-feeling has been attended with nought but the happiest result, and properly "supervised and fostered, there is no reason to fear danger to the body politic from this "plan of leaving the people to manage their own affairs for themselves."

Municipal Committees from 1862 to 1872.

8. In 1863 a brief further report was submitted from the Amritsar Division which had been omitted from the previous returns. At Amritsar the Committee was elected by delegates from constituencies formed by circles of trades and tribes. The citizens were satisfied with the result of the polling, and the Committee was said to have

worked well. In 1864 there were Committees in 49 towns, the members in 28 towns being elected. In 1866 doubts were felt as to the legality of the octroi tax in several parts of the Province; and in 1867 an Act was passed to remove uncertainty as to the legal constitution of the existing Municipal Committees and to empower the Local Government to extend the system and to define the relations between the Government and the Municipalities. Immediately afterwards rules were issued largely importing the official element into the Committees. It was further laid down that the manner of appointment of members would vary according to the circumstances of each town. "Ordinarily," it was said, "a system of appointment by careful selection and nomination will be preferred to one of popular election; but whether the mode adopted for appointing non-official members of Municipal Committees be that of nomination or election, the object kept in view will be the same, viz., to secure a fair representation of the interests of the people in all parts of the town." It is very remarkable that these orders, entirely at variance though they were with the views expressed by Sir Donald McLeod when Financial Commissioner, five years earlier, were issued during his Lieutenant-Governorship. No record has been traced explaining the grounds for this change of policy, and some further observations will be made below on this part of the subject generally. As some of the provisions of the Act of 1867 were of a temporary character, it was so framed as to expire in five years. The rules remained in force till 1872 when they were revised under the orders of Sir Henry Davies, who considered that the proportion of officials upon the Committees was unduly large, the administrative officials such as the Commissioners and several Inspectors General being thereafter excluded from the municipal bodies.

Visit of Lord Mayo to Lahore.

9. Before this, at the close of Sir Donald McLeod's administration, the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, visited Lahore, and on a public occasion testified to the progress which had been made in municipal government in the Province during Sir Donald's tenure of office in the following words:—

"When he entered office only three or four towns in the Province were provided with written byelaws and regularly constituted Municipal Committees. I am, however, now told that there are upwards of 100 towns endowed in some shape or other with the means of self-government, and I do say that any man who has succeeded in establishing municipal institutions, which have always been in every country in the world the basis of civil government and the first germ of civilisation, is entitled to the highest praise."

Elective representation had by this time almost died out of the country; and this was the inevitable consequence of the rule laid down in 1867, prescribing that ordinarily a system of appointment by careful selection was to be preferred.

Municipal Committees from 1872 to the present time.

10. In 1872, Act XV. of 1867 was continued for a year; and in the next year the present law, Act IV. of 1873, was passed. The rules made under that enactment, and issued in Circular No. 31 of the 23rd May 1874, are in force at the present time. It was observed that the system of appointing members from amongst the leading citizens of towns or recognised representatives of class interests was generally in force, and it was said that this method of nomination would be found better suited to the circumstances of the towns of the Punjab, and more in accordance with the feelings and habits of the people, than a system of appointment by popular election. At the same time readiness was expressed to sanction a system of election wherever there might be a *bonâ fide* desire for it on the part of the people, and a reasonable prospect of the privilege of voting being intelligently and honestly exercised. The position of the Deputy Commissioner, and generally of the officers of Government, in relation to the Committees stood practically as defined by the successive orders of 1867 and 1872; and the distribution of municipalities into first, second, and third class bodies was continued. The annual reports show that municipalities have worked satisfactorily, and in the summary of the Report for 1880–81 the following observations occur:—

"The growth of the municipal system in the Punjab is one of the most interesting features in the development of the country. The Municipalities in existence during the year were 195 in number, and contained a population of two million inhabitants, or more than one-tenth of the whole population of the Province. Nothing has done so much to develop the capabilities of self-government in the people as the municipal system, and nowhere have public improvements been carried on so vigorously or with such good effect as in the towns where the system prevails."

This testimony affords a great encouragement in considering the prospects of the present scheme. It was further said that on the whole the funds entrusted to the Committees had been loyally and usefully administered, and that the authority delegated to the municipal bodies had had the best results, not only in promoting the welfare of the town population, but also in engendering cordiality and sympathy between the officers of the Government and the people. This consequence, in the Lieutenant-Governor's judgment, could hardly fail to ensue; and he believes that it will follow in a more marked degree upon an expansion of the system. In one respect it was noted that the results had been disappointing. The system of elective representation was pronounced to have proved a complete failure, partly, it was believed, from want of interest in the voters, and partly from the reluctance of candidates to enter the lists in a competition. In time it was thought interest would be awakened. Finally, Sir Robert Egerton recorded that "whatever drawbacks there might be to the "introduction of the elective system of representation in the important centres of the "Province, the Municipalities afford ample evidence of a growing capacity for "administration and of steadily increasing popularity."

History of District Committees.

11. The District Committees have had a shorter, a less varied, but an equally promising history. Act XX. of 1871 (The Punjab Local Rates Act) empowered the Lieutenant-Governor to appoint Committees in each district for the purpose of determining the manner in which the rates should be applied. In accordance with the rules framed under that enactment, Committees, consisting of official and non-official members, have been formed in all districts. The Deputy Commissioner is President, and, in his absence, the senior Assistant Commissioner presides. The non-official members are appointed by the nomination of the Deputy Commissioner, subject to the veto of the Commissioner and the sanction of the Local Government. The powers of the Committees which ordinarily meet at the head-quarters of districts are generally assimilated to those of the second-class Municipal Committees. Year after year the annual reports show that these Committees have proved most useful and popular institutions. As an illustration of the better understanding between Government and the people which the extension of local self-government may be expected to promote, it is interesting to observe a statement in the annual Report for 1873-74 to the effect that any dissatisfaction which might have existed at the time when local rates were first levied had died away, the people perceiving that the funds were expended for their benefit, and that they had a voice in determining works to which they were applied. Sir Henry Davies considered the establishment of these bodies to be essentially a wise and liberal measure; and in the Report for 1880–81 the interest taken by the District Committees in the administration of funds placed at their disposal for district purposes was noted as indicative of advance in intelligence and full of promise for the future.

The same continued.

12. Previously, in 1878, Act V. of that year had been passed for the purpose of enhancing the local rates in order to defray expenditure on famine relief and prevention; but this legislation effected no change in the functions and constitution of District Committees. In February 1879 it was decided that the budgets of these Committees should be regulated exclusively by the estimated income of the year, their balances being thus withdrawn from their control and held in reserve to deal with unforeseen contingencies of a more serious character than could be met out of the small sums set apart yearly for the purpose. However necessary this restriction may have been under the pressure of considerable financial embarrassment and in view of possible difficulty and distress, it must obviously have deprived the Committees of many incentives both to economy and enterprise. Against the recurrence of such a measure local boards should for the future be secured.

Character of local self-government by District and Municipal Committees as now constituted.

13. The District Committees have thus only been in existence for 11 years. Their present constitution necessitates a vast preponderance of official influence, and, no doubt, the system is capable of great extension on the lines now laid down by the Government of India. The measure, so far as it has been carried out, has been attended with success, but the advantage reaped has been that of counsel to District Officers rather than increase of self-reliance on the part of the people. It is, however, the latter, the creation of a spirit of self-help, at which the Government chiefly aims. Municipal Committees have, perhaps, evinced a greater independence. It is probable that they form a better school for individual character, and it is certain that they have done much useful work and accomplished many public improvements. The proportion of unofficial members in Municipal Committees is slightly greater than in District Committees, being two-fifths in the former case as against one-third in the

latter, or as six to five; but, unlike the District Committees, the Municipal Committees, subject to the sanction of Government, exercise powers of taxation, and can frame their own byelaws. If their authority has been less real and their initiative generally less original than is to be desired, the circumstance is probably due, not so much to any defect in the law as to the operation of the existing rules relating to their constitution. Officials, as a consequence of their position, carry weight in such Committees out of all proportion to their numbers. So long as the president is a high officer, or, indeed, any officer of Government, the acts of a Municipal Committee tend to be his rather than theirs.

Resolution of 18th May 1882.

14. The two most important points in the Government of India Resolution of the 18th May 1882 relate to—

(1.) The position of the officers of Government in relation to local bodies; and

(2.) The application of the principle of election in this country.

Bearing these points in mind, the Lieutenant-Governor will now proceed to explain in what manner he would propose to adapt to the Punjab the general observations of the Government of India in the 9th and following paragraphs of the Resolution of May.

Formation of local boards.

15. As regards the constitution of local bodies, one important novelty contemplated is the institution of local or sub-divisional boards as distinguished from the District Committees which are now appointed for districts at large and usually assemble, as already said, at district head-quarters. In the composition of the new local boards, no less than in the mode of appointing town and District Committees, uniformity of system is no more essential in the Punjab than it is in India generally. On the contrary, a diversity in the arrangements will be presumptive proof that the varying requirements of different localities have not been disregarded. No scheme of local self-government in the Punjab should overlook the fact that the population is made up of tribes, castes, and village communities. Representation should be the representation of existing organic groups of the people. How far the endeavours now to be made can proceed in the various districts seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to be, to a great extent, a question of *personnel*. Men must be found who are willing and at least fairly competent, under judicious guidance, to do the work of local self-government; and the operation of the scheme must be widened or contracted according as such men are numerous or the reverse. The limited amount of funds which will be at the disposal of local boards no doubt constitutes a difficulty. The largest amount provided in the District Fund Budget for 1881–82 for any district is less than Rs. 1,20,000 on either side of the account: and the smallest allotment, omitting that of the Simla district, does not exceed Rs. 12,000. If such sums are divided amongst the tahsils, the sub-divisional boards will have little scope for expenditure. But this objection is not conclusive. The same difficulty was felt on the first establishment of Municipal Committees, and as time goes on the resources placed at the disposal of local boards will increase. Moreover, funds will be largely localised under the financial orders issued in a separate Resolution of this date. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore thinks the local boards should be established throughout the Province, except where (1) there are not enough people fit to be members; (2) the funds at the disposal of the board would be so insignificant as to make its proceedings ineffectual; or (3) political circumstances exist which would render any such change in present arrangements really a matter of risk. In places where local boards are not proposed, local officers should clearly state how far all or any of these conditions obtain.

Jurisdiction of local boards.

16. Probably these local or rural boards will sometimes be nothing more or less than local sections of existing district boards formed by splitting up District Committees according to localities. But it will be preferable, wherever practicable, to constitute separate local boards with distinct functions. In determining the local limits of the jurisdiction of rural boards, it will ordinarily be most convenient to follow the several administrative sub-divisions of the district; but this need not be an invariable rule. The test should be not symmetry or uniformity, but the possibility of forming a useful board. The iláka, or circle of the rural board, might follow the limits occupied by a particular tribe or by several tribes which could act well together; or it might coincide with one or more old parganas not yet forgotten by the people; or it might even be based neither upon the ethnical distribution of the people nor upon traditions, but merely upon convenience, regard being had to the places of residence of the men who form the board, and the distance they would have to travel to a meeting. The obligatory principle is that stated in the Resolution of the Govern-

ment of India, viz., that the jurisdiction of such boards must be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members.

Size of local boards.

17. What should be the size of these new local bodies is a question of some consequence. The Municipal Act lays down that the Committee shall consist of not less than five members; and the smallest number permissible in the case of District Committees is six. The Lieutenant-Governor would take five as a minimum in all cases for local bodies of all descriptions. It is always easy to enlarge a Committee if good men are forthcoming for membership. On the other hand, small Committees are more amenable to reason, more easily replaced, and more keenly alive to their own responsibilities. The Lieutenant-Governor considers that the Committees, tahsil, district and municipal, should ordinarily be limited in number to what is necessary for the due representation of the chief classes of the community in each locality or town; but on this point also full consideration must be given to local circumstances, and there is no objection to the formation of large Committees if they give promise of efficient working.

Classification of local bodies.

18. The powers of the rural boards would necessarily vary. Some boards might have the full powers of a district board except as regards general questions and questions affecting more than one local body. Others, again, would require personal guidance for some time. But all, even with the most limited powers, would be useful to the Deputy Commissioner as a consultative body on questions both of local and of general interest. It would thus be expedient to make a classification of local boards; and the Lieutenant-Governor would here follow the principle of assimilating the law and rules for town, rural, and district boards. He would have first, second, and third class local bodies; and it seems to him probable that the same, or nearly the same, gradation of authority would do for all, whether municipal or rural. Municipalities and rural boards of the lower grades would be advanced to the higher from time to time as they showed themselves fit for it.

Relations of different local bodies and control of those of the lowest class.

19. Municipal Committees will, as observed by the Government of India, continue to be the local boards for municipal areas. The mutual relations of the various local bodies will require careful consideration and settlement. For localities where the whole scheme might be introduced in its full extent, the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the principle laid down in paragraph 10 of the Government of India Resolution, namely, that sub-divisional boards should work independently, and that common affairs should be determined by periodical District Committees at which delegates from time to time selected from the local boards should attend, is the right one. But in many places this state of things would be distant as yet, and more diversified arrangements must be adopted. Everywhere the present classification of Municipal Committees should be maintained. The Lieutenant-Governor would make second class local boards and municipalities tolerably independent, and he thinks that the control which it may be necessary to maintain over any boards or municipalities not yet prepared for the ordinary amount of independence would probably be better exercised by the Deputy Commissioner than by the District Committee. That Committee should deal with questions affecting (*a*) the district as a whole, or (*b*) more than one sub-division, or (*c*) arising where municipal or local interests may overlap or conflict. In respect to these matters the local boards and municipalities would, subject to the general control of the Local Government, be bound to obey the instructions and carry out the decisions of the District Committees. The district boards thus having to deal mainly with matters of common interest should be largely composed of delegates both from tahsil boards or municipalities or groups of municipalities. In some cases where the new Local Boards are merely sub-committees of existing District Boards, the latter might themselves define what powers the newly-formed bodies should exercise. On all these points, however, as well as in regard to the best system for controlling third class municipalities, the Lieutenant-Governor would be glad to be favoured with an expression of the opinions of Commissioners of Divisions.

Proportion of non-official members.

Term of office.

20. In regard to the rules proposed in the 12th paragraph of the Government of India Resolution, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that in Committees of all kinds, district, tahsil, and municipal, no less than two-thirds of the members should be private persons other than officers of Government, unless officers of Government be chosen by election. Non-official members and officials when elected should hold office for three years. They might be eligible to serve again after the expiry of that period; or perhaps better after the lapse of three years from the time of vacating office.

The principle of election. Its alleged failure.

21. Coming now to the question of election, and having regard to the alleged failure of the system in the Punjab, the Lieutenant-Governor finds no evidence to prove that the principle has ever been fairly tried in this Province for any sufficient length of time. Even supposing that the experiment was allowed a due chance of success between 1862 and 1867—and the probabilities of the case, vague as they are, seem to point the other way—five years are a mere span in the education of a people; while it is manifest that, since 1867, the idea of election has been officially discouraged by the provisions of the municipal rules. It is true that Government has often announced its readiness to grant an elective system to any municipality which might really desire it; but the rules have not been altered; and, looking to the necessary bent of official influence under their guidance, it is difficult to see how, under the circumstances, a wish for a system of election should be fostered or find free expression. It may be frankly admitted that even within the limits of the narrow experience gained, abuses have not been unknown. There are instances on record of the purchase of votes, and of at least one other form of corruption. On one occasion, in 1862, a rebel, whose property had been confiscated, and who had been dismissed from public employ, was returned as chairman of a municipality. Apathy has been exhibited in recording votes and in candidature. At a recent election in Amritsar only seventeen persons presented themselves to fill sixteen vacancies, and one of them had been convicted of a criminal offence. In the election of zaildars there have been absolute absurdities, numbers of village headmen either refusing to vote or manfully voting for themselves. But acknowledging all this, the Lieutenant-Governor is prepared to face some failures and occasional scandals rather than to assume that the people do not possess, and cannot acquire, the intelligence, honesty, and capacity to choose representatives for themselves. It has always been an avowed object in connexion with the local institutions of the Province to secure a fair representation of all classes. Sir Charles Aitchison thinks that by mere nomination this object cannot be attained. Individuals of different classes may no doubt by selection be brought together on a board. But there is no guarantee that such individuals really represent the feelings and interest of the classes concerned unless they are elected by them, not chosen for them by external authority. One weakness of a Government situated like the British Government in India is its want of detailed knowledge of class interests and class feelings. Enough is not known of these subjects to ensure a real representation, in the proper sense of the term, if the supposed representatives are simply appointed by the Government. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore deprecates any too hasty assumption that election, which in one form or another is not altogether unfamiliar to native ideas, will fail.

Its essential connection with the scheme.

It is not too much to say that the final and complete success of the whole project of local self-government depends in the main upon the introduction of the principle of election. In no other way can the power and responsibility of local undertakings be shifted from officials on to the people. So long as a majority of the members of the boards are nominated by Government they will be regarded in the light of servants of Government, and the distinction between the acts of the Government and the local authorities will not be generally recognised, or, in fact, very generally exist. The Lieutenant-Governor would therefore express his cordial approval of the policy of the Government of India in this matter, and he hopes that the officers of the Punjab Commission will endeavour earnestly to carry it out wherever practicable.

Conditions under which the principle of election to be tried.

22. But Sir Charles Aitchison would not attempt to introduce election where the people are decidedly opposed to it, for there he would not regard the measure as a practicable one. No doubt there are some parts of the country in which resort to election would be attended with greater difficulties than others. On the frontier, for example, where personal animosities are high, an election might be a signal for disturbance or outrage. But even there the constant references made by District Officers to tribal assemblies, or jirgas, show that it may be practicable to utilise the popular element. In backward parts, also, or in kasbas or small towns, election in any elaborate form could only be exceptionally introduced. This is fully recognised by the Government of India, who desire, however, that in these backward places and small towns election in some form that harmonises with native ideas should be encouraged, and that in one form or another it should be introduced in considerable towns. The Lieutenant-Governor believes that there is nothing to prevent this in the circumstances of the country or the genius of the people, whether Hindus, Sikhs, or Muhammadans, to all of whom, in connexion with their own social or religious affairs, election in some form or another is familiar. If the qualifications for voting and for holding office are carefully framed, and care is taken that good men, or traditional representatives of the

people, are not deterred from coming forward, he has no doubt that election will eventually succeed, provided always that Sir Donald McLeod's caution is observed, and the boards are vested with real power and responsibility, and are not overshadowed by a preponderance of official influence. The remarks in the Administration Report of 1862–63 show that at the outset the elective system was both successful and popular. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it could not but fail under the discouragement afterwards thrown upon it.

Election should be introduced where efficient constituencies can be formed.

23. Though popular opposition to the introduction of election would be a good reason for not attempting it, the existence, on the other hand, of a wish for it on the part of the people is not an essential consideration, however gratifying it may be as an augury of probable success. The question whether measures should be taken to introduce the elective system or not should depend upon the probability of forming efficient constituencies, and the marks which denote a proper constituency are, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, two, viz., (1) capacity for giving an honest and intelligent vote; and (2) a substantial interest in the proceedings of the local bodies based on payment of the rates or taxes which they administer. In the abstract, apart from political considerations and class antagonism, voting qualifications, His Honour believes, are merely rules for giving effect to these principles, and for regulating the weight to be given to capacities and interests of varying kinds and degrees. It is to be hoped that in course of time electors will come to entertain a due sense of the honour and responsibility of their functions. Everything should be done to bring this about by investing elections with some little ceremonial, by encouraging constituents to attend the meetings of the boards which should generally be public, and by holding annual assemblies at which the proceedings of the year should be published and made known and honours and rewards distributed.

Methods of election.

24. In a few large towns and advanced districts it may perhaps be practicable at once to fix upon a property or taxation qualification for voting and holding office, or to determine those qualifications in some other way by general definitions. In such places it is not unlikely that the election arrangements may more or less follow the English model. A high qualification for the electors will generally be needed at first in order to get the best men returned: and this is contemplated in the Government of India Resolution. The object is to get together a sufficient body of representative men who will act reasonably and fairly in the matter. Elsewhere and in backward parts of the country the arrangements must necessarily be much less elaborate both in respect to the manner of election and to qualifications. Different modes of election may be tried varying from show of hands or public acclamation, which although a loose method has from its publicity certain advantages in preventing corruption and abuses, up to formal registration of votes. For some places the old system, which was reported to have worked satisfactorily in Amritsar, might be suitable, whereby delegates or panchayats were selected in the first instance by the castes and trades, and the votes of the artificial constituencies, thus formed recorded. In others the Deputy Commissioner might consider the various castes, tribes, and trade guilds in the town or district, and decide how many electors each should be invited to appoint, accepting those who satisfied the conditions of capacity and interest. Or, if this would lead to the nomination of electors for the purpose of naming particular candidates, he might on exceptional occasions himself directly appoint the electors. Again, in other places, it might be best to nominate five or six candidates for each seat on the board, leaving the electors to choose the nominee most acceptable to them. In none of these cases would the successful candidates be mere Government nominees. Eventually in these places also the method of election may be systematised and the qualifications for voting and for holding office may be laid down in general definitions. But in the infancy of the system great latitude must be allowed throughout in devising measures for obtaining a really popular representation both in large towns and in parts of the country more or less advanced. The leading men of the various social groups should be freely consulted, and any preference expressed by any organic group for any particular principle to guide either the selection of electors or the return of candidates should be carefully considered and effect given to it as far as possible. Wherever the elective system in any form is adopted, it is essential that the district authorities should in no case show a preference for any one duly qualified candidate over another.

Control over local

25. It remains to consider what control the Government must continue to exercise over the local bodies. The Lieutenant-Governor is convinced that the ultimate aim

bodies to be exercised from without.

of the Government of India Resolution is the right one, and that we must endeavour gradually to effect a complete separation between the functions of the official body and those of the local and town boards. The principle to be kept in view is check not dictation. On this point paragraph 17 of the Resolution seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to be almost exhaustive. Doubtless the official members of all the boards not exceeding one-third in each, should be nominated by Government, and should ordinarily be the same for tahsil boards and minor Municipal Committees. Generally the Deputy Commissioner would not be on any board, unless the board was so weak and uninstructed as to be unable to move alone; and in the latter case it would be understood that the connexion would be severed so soon as the board showed capacity for independence. Any board in which an official might be President should be empowered to appoint by election a Vice-President who, in the absence of the President, would exercise his authority. Such Vice-President should ordinarily not be an official. As a general rule Tahsildars might be on District Committees, but the Lieutenant-Governor would prefer that they should not be members of rural or town boards. Like Deputy Commissioners they should be required, in respect to rural boards, to act from without. There may be difficulty, however, under these circumstances, in employing tahsil establishments in the execution of local works; and this is a point which will have to be carefully considered.

Official members.

District Officer to be the channel of communication.

26. All boards, rural, municipal and district, might communicate with each other direct; but the District Officer should be the channel of communication between all local, district, and town boards on the one hand, and all Departments of Government on the other.

Powers of District Staff.

27. The powers of District Officers and Tahsildars must be most carefully regulated. This part of the subject presents much difficulty, and will require very careful treatment. The detailed suggestions of Commissioners are invited, and the Lieutenant-Governor will merely here sketch in a tentative manner the proposals he would be disposed to make.

Powers of local bodies.

28. The powers of local bodies may be considered under the heads of (*a*) taxation (*b*) check by the Local Government or its officers; (*c*) expenditure on works; (*d*) expenditure on establishments; (*e*) miscellaneous. Each of these matters will be considered in order.

Taxation.

29. (*a.*) *Taxation.*—Under this head the Lieutenant-Governor sees no reason to suppose that the existing law and rules will not suffice as regards municipal bodies. It is true that considerable modification of the Municipal Act will probably be required, and that contemporary Indian legislation on the subject must be examined with the object of selecting all that is best for embodiment in a new Act for the Province. The same will be done in regard to the Local Rates Act; but so far as municipalities are concerned, this process will not affect taxation. The questions of equalising municipal taxation and of preventing its interference with trade will be dealt with separately; and on these points some amendment of the rules may be requisite. But this matter is distinct from the subject of the present orders.

The same.

30. In accordance with paragraph 21 of the Government of India Resolution, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that it will be right to confer on local and district boards powers of taxation analogous to those exercised by Municipal Committees. Such powers should be confined to district boards and first class rural boards. It is proposed to consolidate all the local rates, (namely, those under Act V. of 1878 and road, school, and dâk cesses) into one impost to be levied at a maximum percentage on the annual value of land, both the maximum and minimum of this percentage being fixed by law. District boards and first class rural boards might be empowered to declare the percentage which the consolidated local rate should bear to the annual value for a year or two years or a term of years as might be thought proper, subject to sanction, in each case, by the Local Government. As the dâk, road, and school cesses would have been fixed for a term of settlement, a sum equal to their proceeds should be set apart for expenditure on the objects for which they are levied during that period; and until its expiry the district board would have no authority to revise this arrangement.

Exercise of control.

31. (*b.*) *Check by the Local Government and its officers.*—In order to facilitate the separation of official and popular agency, Section 17 of the Municipal Act* should,

* Section 17. "The Local Government may, by order, suspend or limit all or any of the powers of any "Committee, and may also cancel any of their proceedings, rules or byelaws, and remit or reduce any tax "which they have imposed."

for the present at least, be retained; and the Lieutenant-Governor would also extend it so as to cover the case of all local bodies. Moreover, power should be taken (1) for the absolute supersession of rural or district boards and of Municipal Committees; and (2) without the suspension of the general functions of the local body, for the performance, under the special sanction of the Local Government, of particular duties at the cost of the board, but by officials, when the board, after remonstrance, had failed to discharge them. No board should be absolutely suspended without the sanction of the Government of India. The Lieutenant-Governor would make this proviso in order to foster a sense of self-reliance. It is to be hoped, however, that District Officers will at the outset be patient with such shortcomings of the boards as are naturally to be expected in the infancy of the movement, and may not be due to wilful neglect or misuse of power; and that they will exhaust the powers of advice and check which are vested in them before recommending severer measures which should not be had recourse to unless really demanded in the public interests. Whenever the Lieutenant-Governor is advised to resort to extreme measures, the recommendation should invariably be accompanied with an explanation from the board, which they should be allowed full opportunity of making.

Expenditure on works.

32. (*c.*) *Expenditure on works.*—Rules might be laid down similar to those now in force for first, second, and third class municipalities, and extended to first, second, and third class boards. The powers of first class local bodies would be raised. The quorum might perhaps be three for third class bodies, and five or more for first and second class bodies. The number should be larger for district bodies, and the point might perhaps be best settled by a byelaw to be approved by the Local Government. The requirement of the present rules that one or more of the quorum must be an ex-officio member should be omitted.

On establishments.

33. (*d.*) *Expenditure on establishments.*—The recent Financial Resolution, No. 2078, dated 30th June 1882, gives local bodies plenary authority in this matter, subject to legislative restrictions and special reservations made by the Government of India. For first and second class bodies some modification of the rules proposed in Bengal might be suitable, viz.:—

(i.) Department Public Works salaries and absentee allowances should not exceed 20 per cent. of the income available for the Department Public Works expenditure during the year.

(ii.) No new appointment on Rs. 200 a month or more should be created without the sanction of the Commissioner. On this head the Accountant-General and other authorities must be consulted.

Powers of third class bodies.

34. The proceedings of third class bodies should be fully reported to the Deputy Commissioner within three days of the meetings. The Deputy Commissioner would carefully supervise them and assist the boards with his advice, pointing out what might be wrong, and suggesting improvements; but he would not overrule or disallow the proceedings except for important reasons and in exceptional cases, to be duly reported to the Commissioner.

General principles of administration to be observed by local bodies.

35. The existing rule No. 29 for District Committees binding them to observe the general principles which Government has approved in the several Departments of the administration should be retained and applied to all local bodies; and probably all the illustrations to that rule, including illustration (*d*), which precludes a Committee from creating a new grade of officers or from increasing or diminishing the pay of officials in any existing grade without the sanction of Government, should continue in operation. These general principles should be explained in simple language in the vernacular, and the system of accounts and audit should also be made as simple as possible. On this subject the Accountant-General should advise.

Loans.

Alienations of property.

Interposition in certain cases.

Obligatory expenditure.

36. (*e.*) *Miscellaneous.*—Loans and, as already said, taxation should be subject to the sanction of Government. In the case of the alienation of movable property vested in local bodies the sanction of the Commissioner should be required where the value of the property exceeded a fixed amount. The sanction of the Local Government should be required for the alienation of immovable property or money invested in the public funds. Without suspending the ordinary powers of the local body in other respects the Deputy Commissioner should be authorised to interpose and regulate matters affecting the public peace. Some portions of the income of each local body should be classed as obligatory expenditure, and proposals are specially invited on this

point. Probably no general rule is possible. Subject to the final sanction of t Commissioner or the Local Government, each body should make its own scheme obligatory expenditure, which, when once sanctioned, should be binding till modifi

Prohibited reductions.

with the sanction of equal authority. It would be necessary to prohibit reductio of establishment in certain cases; and here the present rule No. 28 for Distr Committees appears suitable. Under this rule such committees have no power abolish any existing school, dispensary, or other institution without reference to t head of the Department concerned. The principle might be applied in the case all local bodies—town, rural or other, the reference being made of course through t Deputy Commissioner in each case, and not direct to the Department concerned.

Chairman to be elected as a rule.

37. Wherever possible each local body should elect its own Chairman. Ordinar the District Officers and Tahsildars, unless in the exceptional cases referred to paragraph 25, should be the guides of the local bodies, acting always as outs advisers and critics, and would still be responsible for their general efficiency. Th

Relations of local officers to local bodies.

officers should be regularly supplied with the recorded proceedings of the boar which in the case of rural boards of the lower grades at least would usually be in t vernacular; but, as often as possible, the proceedings should be in English as well in the vernacular; and whether in the vernacular, in English, or in both, they sho always be in such detail as to render scrutiny and check, which should be promp and thoroughly applied, effective guarantees for a satisfactory course of condu When a local body exceeded its powers or failed to perform its duties, the Deputy Co missioner of his own motion or on the report by the Tahsildar, as the case might should forthwith direct the attention of the board to the matter. If such remo strances should remain unheeded, the power which the Lieutenant-Governor propo to reserve would fully enable the authorities to deal with the case. The initiative projects should ordinarily come from the boards; but Deputy Commissioners wo more freely and frequently offer formal suggestions to third class bodies than others. In the case of first and second class bodies, the Deputy Commissioners wo usually, in conversation and by unofficial advice, induce members to bring forwa useful scheme of their own motion.

Measures to promote self-government in certain districts or parts of districts not prepared for the full scheme.

38. On examination it may perhaps appear that in some parts as well of t Province generally as of particular districts little can be done directly upon the li of the Government of India Resolution. In such cases there are still plans for co dération, which, if adopted, would fall in well with the general principles of the sche Thus, for example, where villages were too small for constitution as municipaliti they might, if the inhabitants were of the same tribe, and would work w together, here and there be combined into unions to which the municipal law mig be extended. Again, the Lieutenant-Governor would be glad if the Commission would consider and report whether anything can be done in the way of creating

Village unions.

reviving village councils or panchâyats. It may be that such councils have ceased

Village panchâyats.

exist, and have been superseded by the lambardari system which, from its heredit character, is necessarily not of a representive type. Still there might be advantage in giving some formal and legal recognition to the institution of the villa panchâyats where such could be formed with any benefit, and could be entrusted w any definite public functions. Such a measure would at least tend to train up men w would be capable of serving on the more important rural or town boards of t district. In districts where none or few members of the District Committees co be delegated from town or rural boards, it would be proper, nevertheless, to exam the question whether all or a certain proportion of the non-official members could be returned from one part of the district or another by election.

Possibly in some divisions of the Province the rural boards may be strong enou to divide among them nearly all the duties, other than questions of mutual intere which devolve upon the District Committees. In such cases there may be little nothing left for District Committees to do, and the expediency of substituting Divisional Committee in their place may be considered.

Form of reports now required.

39. The reports which District Officers should frame in compliance with t Resolution should take the form of a project for the introduction of the scheme each district. No project must be carried out until it has been sanctioned by Gove ment, and this rule must be strictly observed.

Classification of districts as regards local boards.

40. The results would show districts in the following categories:—

I.—Districts where nothing can be done in the way of forming rural boards. H the extension of the principle of local self-government would be affected

general rules raising the powers of District Committees and first class Municipal Committees; by general proceedings about to be taken for the purpose of further localising finance; by forming village unions of villages of the same caste, to be constituted as petty municipalities; and possibly also by reviving, in some way, the village council or punchâyat.

II.—Districts where it would be possible to form local sub-committees of the district board to work locally. The relations between the sub-committees and the general committee would be set out in the Deputy Commissioner' project in detail. This might usually be determined by the general committee.

III.—Districts where one or more rural boards could be formed, either for tahsils or for parganas; or tracts occupied by similar tribes or the like. If only one such board could be formed in some particular tahsil or tract, the Deputy Commissioner should not be deterred from proposing to form it by the resulting diversity in district arrangements.

IV.—Districts throughout which the scheme of rural boards could be introduced in its integrity, *i.e.*, every part of the district outside the municipal towns would be parcelled out so as to fall within the jurisdiction of one rural board or another.

Classification of districts as regards the principle of election.

41. So far the reports would deal only with the formation of the boards or other local bodies. The question of election should be treated separately, and the report should show—

I.—Districts where the system of election should be introduced or extended in one or more municipal towns.

II.—Districts where the system might be applied in the formation of one or more rural boards.

III.—Districts where some of the members of the District Committee might be elected.

IV.—Districts where nothing can be done in the matter of election.

Further particulars to be entered in the reports.

42. The reports should describe carefully the existing organisation of the District Committee. A list of members should be annexed showing their caste, tribe or occupation and religion, and specifying the quarter of the district in which each lives. It should be stated how far the present District Committee might be said to be representative of the ethnical elements of the population, *i.e.*, the chief castes and tribes of the different classes connected with agriculture and of the well-marked local divisions of the district. Any tendency of the work of the committee to fall into the hands of men living at or near the head-quarters of the district should be noted in the report.

Free expression of opinion invited.

43. The Lieutenant-Governor invites a full and free expression of the opinions of Commissioners upon all the details which will be necessary to give effect to the main outlines of the scheme. Commissioners should carefully consult leading natives on all the principal questions involved, and should endeavour to the utmost to get the Government policy carried out both fully and in a way most acceptable to the people. The task imposed by these orders on Deputy Commissioners is one demanding much administrative skill and intimate knowledge of their districts and of the people. The Lieutenant-Governor is confident that both Divisional and District Officers will ably respond to this request for their cordial help in this important matter, and that they will spare no pains to devise schemes likely to work in practice and to conduce to the real progress of the country.

If Commissioners have any suggestions to make on questions of principle, it is requested that they may be submitted not later than 30th November. Longer time will be needed for the preparation of the detailed district reports. The Lieutenant-Governor would be glad if the latter could reach him by 28th February 1883 at latest. Commissioners need not wait till all the reports from the districts of their divisions are received, but may send them up separately from time to time as they come in, with such remarks and recommendations as may seem necessary. Indeed, there will be a distinct advantage in this course.

ORDER.—Ordered, that copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to all Heads of Departments for information, and to all Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners for consideration and report with reference to paragraph 43.

Also, that it be published in the "Punjab Government Gazette."

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

(No. 1477.)

Simla, 19th September 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1777A., dated the 7th instant, forwarding copy of a Resolution recorded by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the subject of the extension of the system of local self-government in the Punjab.

2. In reply, I am requested to convey the thanks of the Government of India to Sir C. Aitchison for this excellent Resolution, which shows a thorough grasp of the policy of the Government on the question, and a cordial desire to give effect thereto. His Excellency the Governor General in Council will await with interest the result of the reference made by the Lieutenant-Governor to his local officers for the practical development of the scheme so ably sketched out by the Local Government.

EXTENSION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN MUNICIPAL AND OTHER TOWNS IN BRITISH BURMA.

From G. D. BURGESS, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 159—4A.)

Rangoon, May 4, 1882.

I am directed to solicit a reference to paragraph 11 of Finance and Commerce Department Resolution* No. 3353, dated the 30th September 1881, and to submit, for the information of the Government of India in the Home Department, a copy of a Resolution by the Chief Commissioner, No. 4A., dated the 28th April, on the subject of the extension of self-government in municipal and other towns.

2. I am to submit that the question of District Committees is still being considered.

Resolution of THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BRITISH BURMA, No. 4A., dated the 28th April 1882.

In their orders of September and October last the Government of India decided that effort should be made to extend local self-government in towns and in districts, and indicated the directions in which reform should begin. They requested that a more real and a wider discretion should be left to local bodies, and that the power of the Executive Government or its officers to control or interpose should be clearly and narrowly restricted. These injunctions were enforced by the words of exhortation and advice which the Viceroy addressed to local bodies and to the public on more than one occasion during his recent visit to British Burma. Copies of His Excellency's speeches have been circulated throughout the Province in English and Burmese, and the views of the Government of India on the importance of municipal freedom and the honourable nature of municipal functions have become generally known.

2. Opinions have been received from all municipal bodies regarding the best way of giving effect to the orders of the Government of India. The present Resolution will lay down plans for carrying out those orders in the municipal cities and in the towns of the province.

At present there are seven towns in Burma which have been constituted municipalities under the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874. There are also 24 towns in which town funds are raised and ought to be spent for the benefit of the townspeople; these towns are not under any Municipal or Town Act, and their funds are spent by the district officers with such advice as can be obtained from the "town elders." The committees or governing bodies of municipalities have hitherto been nominated by

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* *See* page 8.

the Government, the majority consisting of non-officials, European and Native. Recently it has been decided that three-fourths of the Municipal Committee of Rangoon shall be appointed by election by the ratepayers. If the plan of electing committeemen is successful in Rangoon the elective system will probably spread to other municipalities. Committees are responsible for and manage the roads, water-supply, conservancy, and hospitals within their limits; some municipalities pay for and manage their town schools.

3. The law under which Burma municipalities consist is, for the most part, sufficiently liberal. It provides not only for the election of committeemen, but also for the election of Presidents and Vice-Presidents. As yet no President of a municipal committee has been elected; and the Deputy Commissioner of the district has always been the President. A non-official member has occasionally been elected Vice-President. Hereafter, when elected municipal committees at the larger seaports come to take interest in and pay attention to civil business, it may be well that they should elect their own Presidents. The only provision in the present Municipal Act which might unduly restrict the discretion of municipal bodies is section 25, whereby it is enacted that "the Chief Commissioner may by order cancel, suspend, or limit any of the acts, "proceedings, or rules of any (municipal) committee." For some years past no instance can be recalled in which the Chief Commissioner has taken action under this section. But still the presence of such a provision on the statute-book is said to operate as a menace to a municipal committee, to fetter their discretion, and to weaken their responsibility. When the Burma Municipal Act comes under revision this section should be struck out. In its place should be enacted a provision that, if a municipal committee fails to carry out any of the purposes of the Act, the Chief Commissioner may, if he thinks fit, call upon the committee to take order for carrying out such purpose or purposes; and that, if they fail either to take the necessary steps, or to show cause to the contrary, the Chief Commissioner may at his discretion do, or cause to be done, what may be necessary for the purpose of the Act, and may make the cost of such operations a first charge on the revenues or funds of the committee.

4. A change in practice, or in the rules of the Finance Department, is necessary in order to give the committees more power and responsibility. At present they cannot, without the sanction of the Chief Commissioner, entertain any temporary or permanent establishment, change any establishment, make a transfer from one budget head to another, or undertake a work costing more than a very limited sum. The Chief Commissioner will ask the sanction of the Government of India to a rule empowering any municipality to make transfers from one budget head to another; to sanction permanent or temporary establishments, provided that the constitution of any new office carrying a salary of over Rs. 100 a month for a longer period than six months, must be subject to the sanction of the Chief Commissioner; and to sanction any work costing not more than Rs. 20,000 in the case of seaport municipalities, or Rs. 10,000 in the case of inland municipalities. No establishment and no work could be sanctioned unless the cost could be met from the grants or the savings of the year. If such rules were approved, then the Audit Department would accept a resolution of the committee sanctioning any establishment or work, and showing how the outlay could be met from the sanctioned budget as sufficient authority for passing the charge.

5. The question of paying fees to members of committees for their attendance has been already submitted for the orders of the Government of India. If the advice of Counsel at Rangoon be not accepted, and if it be held that the payment of such fees is not legal within the meaning of the Act, then it will perhaps be possible to legalise such fees when the Municipal Act comes under revision.

6. The people of lesser towns, where town funds are raised, have usually objected strenuously to any proposals that their towns should be constituted municipalities. They appear to fear that the establishment of a municipality would cause new and heavy taxes to be levied and would lead to restrictions on the freedom of the people. Still it is most desirable that town funds in these 24 towns should be expended for the good of those towns and with the advice of the chief townsfolk. This end will probably be best secured by creating such places second-class municipalities. If the townsfolk understand that no pressure will be put upon them to levy new taxes or to adopt harassing byelaws, and if they see that they are relieved from the duty of paying for their town police, most of these towns will probably consent to be

made second-class municipalities with somewhat narrower duties, powers, and responsibilities. Legal basis for second-class municipalities could perhaps be given by adding Part VII. to the British Burmah Municipal Act, 1874. Such "part" might provide—

(1) for the Chief Commissioner's constituting any town with a town fund income exceeding Rs. 3,000 a year, a second-class municipality;

(2) for the Chief Commissioner's extending to such town any of the following sections of the Act, namely, sections, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, clause (*g*), 20, 21, 27, 30, omitting words "and after providing out of such fund for a "police establishment in the manner herein-after mentioned," 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, or any parts of any of these sections;

(3) for the Chief Commissioner's extending additional sections to any town at the request of the committee, and after the procedure prescribed in sections 3 and 4 has been taken;

(4) for the acts and proceedings of every second-class municipality at a place other than the head-quarters of a district being periodically reported to the Deputy Commissioner, and being subject to his confirmation, with the proviso that he shall not overrule the committee, save in cases where they may have exceeded their powers or transgressed the law, without the previous sanction of the Commissioner of the Division;

(5) for permitting a municipality of either class to devote a portion of its funds to aiding any road, bridge, ferry, or steamer which serves the trade of its town.

Meanwhile, until these changes in the law are made, Commissioners of Divisions will be requested to constitute provisional committees in each of the 24 towns named in the appended list and to bring them into working order on the basis of the plan sketched in the present Resolution. The number of committeemen need not be more than five, besides the Chief Resident Magistrate of the town, who would usually be President. The Secretary might be a school-master or a selected pleader, but should under all circumstances be a Native of the Province and a resident of the town.

7. It remains to deal with so much of the Government of India orders as directs that municipalities shall be relieved of charges for police, and that additional responsibilities and powers shall be entrusted to them in respect of schools, hospitals, vaccination, and such like charges. The Burma Municipal Act lays down that the duty of paying the town police (sections 30 and 32) is one of the first duties of a municipal committee. Burma municipal and town funds, moreover, have for many years enjoyed certain excise revenues in consideration of their paying for their own town police. Further, municipal committees have, for some years past at any rate, been always consulted before changes have been made in the strength or cost of their town police. According to the estimates of the year 1882–83 the excise receipts and the municipal outlay on town police are as follows:—

	Total excise receipts.	Total outlay on police.
	Rs.	Rs.
Seven municipal towns - - - -	2,63,500	1,75,500
Twenty-four town funds - - -	58,450	51,900
Total - -	3,21,950	2,27,400

The municipal committees appear to be all agreed in deprecating the withdrawal of the excise revenues which they enjoy. From the 1st April 1882 the total cost of the municipal and town police, as above shown, will be transferred to the provincial budget, the municipal and town funds being proportionately relieved. And the Government of India will be asked to move the Legislature to alter sections 30 and 32 of the Municipal Act so far as concerns the obligation on municipalities to pay for their town police.

8. From the 1st April the cost of, responsibility for, and the management of, all Government schools within their limits, except "high schools," "normal and practising schools," "survey schools," and "technical schools," will be laid upon municipal committees and upon town funds; and so will also the responsibility for, and management of, the grant-in-aid fund in respect of all "aided schools" and "aided indigenous schools" within their limits. In order to do justice to these new duties the munici-

palities of larger towns will probably find it convenient to appoint standing sub-committees to deal with educational questions. Fees levied at Government schools thus made over will be credited to the municipal committees. A sum of from 15 to 20 per cent. on the grant for all Government and aided schools will be added to the provincial allotment for each municipality: this percentage will be available for expenditure on scholarships. Grants-in-aid of schools or grants to indigenous schools must be made by municipal committees in accordance with results under the rules and practice already in force and sanctioned by the Government of India. But any municipality will be at liberty to make additional grants at its discretion outside the rules. Any scheme for municipal scholarships should provide for the needs of aided as well as Government schools, and must be submitted for the approval of the Educational Syndicate before it is carried into effect. Until a new scholarship scheme for a town is sanctioned the municipality will carry on existing scholarships enjoyed by scholars within their borders, except University and technical scholarships. The Chief Commissioner hopes that most municipalities may be able, from their savings, to add considerably to the liberal scholarship grants now made. As scholarships are generally tenable for two or three years, the full scholarship expenditure will not be incurred during the first year; and municipalities of both classes will, for one or two years, have a considerable surplus from the scholarship fund, which they can devote to other educational objects.

In Government schools appointments to masterships on more than Rs. 100 per month will be subject to the confirmation of the Director of Public Instruction; and any change of charge or additional charge affecting an office on more than Rs. 100 per month will be subject to the approval of the Director and to the confirmation of the Chief Commissioner, as per paragraph 4 of the present Resolution.

The assignments of educational funds now made provide in part only for building grants to aided schools. The expenditure on such grants must of necessity fluctuate greatly. For the present it will suffice to say that when any municipality sees fit to make a building grant to an aided school, the Provincial Government will during the next five years make an equal grant. Thus only half the cost of building grants will fall upon the municipal funds, while the municipal committee will have the power of settling the amount of the whole grant.

9. Besides schools, the complete charges and responsibility for all hospitals, dispensaries, and vaccination establishments within their limits will be made over to municipalities. The only item of medical expenditure within municipalities which should remain "provincial" will be the Civil Surgeon's substantive salary. Most Civil Surgeons have duties outside municipal limits, and so their salaries will remain a provincial charge. In respect of hospitals, vaccination, and other medical establishments municipalities will have the same powers as are described at paragraph 4 of the present Resolution, except that they will not be able to alter the emoluments of Assistant Surgeons or Hospital Assistants (Native doctors) in the regular service of Government without the sanction of the Chief Commissioner.

10. Further, the maintenance and management of certain roads situated within the limits of or close to municipalities, which roads have hitherto been maintained by provincial funds, will be made over entirely to the several municipalities.

11. Funds to meet the cost of these new burdens, so far as they may exceed the amount of the town police charges, will be granted to each municipality from provincial funds. Statement A,* with the appended notes, shows in the case of each municipality what the new burdens are and what sum from provincial funds is allotted to meet them. The amount of these provincial allotments will remain unchanged for the five years ending on the 31st March 1887.

12. In the case of second-class municipalities, the Chief Commissioner does not propose to impose any additional burdens in place of the police charges of which they are now relieved. The Chief Commissioner hopes that the funds thus set free will enable towns like Thayetmyo, Pegu, and Kyiketo to do more than they now do for improving the schools within their borders, and for establishing scholarships for the benefit of boys and girls at such schools. The attention of municipalities of both classes is especially invited to the need for improved educational facilities for girls, and to the remarks of the Viceroy on this subject as reported at pages 9 and 10 of the "Gazette Extraordinary" containing a diary of his Excellency's visit. Girls ought to have their share of the scholarships. As they have for many years had and as they still have fewer opportunities for education than boys, they may find it difficult to

* *See* page 109 of Appendix.

compete on equal terms with boys for open scholarships. Second-class municipalities will have to undertake the cost and management of hospitals and schools, Government and aided, within their limits. In cases where town funds, after being relieved of police burdens, do not suffice to bear these charges, grants proportioned to these new burdens will be made from provincial funds. The amount of these grants for each town will be seen from Statement B appended to the present orders.

13. As a considerable number of schoolmasters and others who have served Government for shorter or longer periods will, under the present orders, be transferred to municipal service, the Government of India will be asked to allow the names of these persons to remain on the list of people who are earning pensions from the Provincial Government. For the future schoolmasters and others appointed by municipalities will come under the same rules as to pension or gratuity that govern the cases of other municipal servants. If schoolmasters who may be transferred from Government schools to municipal schools desire to continue on the Government pension lists, they will have to subscribe for their pensions under the rules in force.

14. The decisions and orders conveyed in the present Resolution may be summarised thus:—

To be carried out at once—

(1) budgets of municipalities for the present year will be altered so as to exclude all police charges, so as to include the additional educational, medical, and public works charges now indicated, and so as to include the provincial grants now made;

(2) municipalities will take charge of the schools, hospitals, and roads now made over to their care;

(3) budgets of the 24 town funds will be modified in accordance with the present orders, and Commissioners will take steps to call into being municipal Committees at these towns which shall go to work in anticipation of a change in the law, legalising second-class municipalities.

To be carried out if the Government of India and the Legislature approve—

(4) second-class municipalities with their Committees and their rules of business are to be gazetted;

(5) the powers of municipal Committees to sanction establishments, to undertake works, and generally to deal with municipal funds on their own responsibility will be greatly increased.

ORDER.—Ordered that a copy of this Resolution be forwarded for information and guidance to—

Each Commissioner,
The Sanitary Commissioner in charge of the Civil Medical Department,
The Director of Public Instruction,
The Inspector General of Police,
The President, Rangoon Municipal Committee,
Each President of a Municipal Committee,
Each Deputy Commissioner,
The Comptroller.

Ordered also that the Resolution be published in the "British Burma Gazette."

G. D. BURGESS,
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner
of British Burma.

From A. MACKENZIE, ESQ., SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, to the CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BRITISH BURMA.

Home Department.
Public, No. 954.

SIR, Simla, June 23, 1882.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 159–4A. of the 4th May, submitting a copy of your Resolution on the subject of the extension of local self-

government in municipal and other towns in British Burma. In reply, I am to refer you to the Resolution of this Government No. $\frac{17}{747-759}$ dated the 18th May, in which the views of the Governor General in Council on the matter are fully explained.

2. Your proposals are generally in accordance with the policy of the Government, but you may think some slight modifications necessary when you have reconsidered the whole question in the light of the recent orders. For instance, if you find it possible to establish generally a system of rural boards with reasonably limited jurisdictions, you may find it unnecessary to create urban boards for such small townships as some of those which you at present propose to turn into second-class municipalities. Again, the Governor General in Council would invite you to consider whether the elective principle might not at once be tried elsewhere than in Rangoon, and whether the larger municipalities might not be granted this privilege.

3. Turning now to the details of your Resolution, I am to say that the Governor General in Council agrees with you that section 25 of of the Burma Municipal Act ought not to be retained in its present form. Its provisions are far too general in terms, and go much beyond the necessities of the case. The nature and extent of the control which the Government should exercise over the proceedings of local boards is discussed in paragraph 17 of the Resolution of the 18th May. It is there explained that the law should specifically provide for the previous sanction of the Local Government being had to the raising of loans, the imposition of taxes in other than duly authorised forms, the alienation of municipal property and other matters of similar general importance, over which, in the interests of the public at large, the executive authorities must reserve some power of check. If sections 11 to 14 of the Act do not provide a sufficient control in the case of municipal taxation, or do not provide this in the manner you think desirable, you are requested to submit the amendments which you would propose to make; and at the same time you should consider in respect of what other proceedings of the municipal boards it is necessary to secure to the Executive Government this power of preliminary sanction. The precise limits of this control should be clearly laid down in the Act. In their regular working the boards will ordinarily be left free of all direct official control; but the district officer should be instructed to bring to their notice matters in which he may think that action is called for, or in which he may consider their proceedings ill-judged. In cases where no attention is paid to his representations, or when the board takes a different view from his, it is obvious that there must be some reference to superior authority; and the Governor General in Council leaves it to you to determine whether in British Burma this authority might in certain cases be the Commissioner of the Division, or should always be the Chief Commissioner himself. It may not perhaps be necessary that all cases of this kind should be referred to the Local Government. It may be possible to discriminate between the less and more important subjects of reference. Under any circumstances, the deciding authority, after such inquiry as may be proper, and after taking such professional advice as may seem suitable, ought certainly, as you remark, to have power, in the first place, to require the board to give effect to the decision arrived at, and then, failing compliance within a reasonable time, power to direct effect to be given to it by the district officer, at the cost and charges of the board's funds. The power of setting aside formally in certain cases the proceedings of the board must rest in the hands of the Local Government itself. So also the power of superseding a board for gross and continued neglect of duty must be exercised by no authority inferior to the Local Government, and by it only with the previous sanction of the Government of India. The law should provide as precisely as circumstances will admit for the manner in which these powers may be exercised, and I am to invite you to submit your views as to the shape which its provisions should take in the case of British Burma.

4. Your remarks in paragraph 4 regarding the checks imposed by the rules of the Financial Department upon municipal action are not clearly understood. The Governor General in Council is of opinion that the Financial Department, as such, should have nothing whatever to do with the management or keeping of municipal accounts, beyond furnishing an outside audit (where this is necessary) and obtaining the annual returns for incorporation in the statistics of the Empire. I am to request that you will submit the rules which you propose to pass, explaining at the same time more fully how the present system of check came to be imposed, and referring to the orders establishing it.

5. As regards the payment of fees to members of committees, I am to refer you to my letter No. 51 of the 15th May, reply to which is awaited.

6. The financial arrangements explained in the concluding paragraphs of your Resolution are liberal to the municipalities; and the Governor General in Council sees no reason for taking exception to them. It appears that certain excise revenues have long been enjoyed by the towns, and these need not be interfered with. It is however understood that the committees have nothing to say to excise administration. Whether they should eventually have any voice in this is a matter under consideration, but until it is decided on general grounds the control of the excise should remain with the district officers.

7. With reference to the educational transfers proposed in your paragraph 8, I am to remark that from the detailed schedule attached to your Resolution, it appears that the high schools at Moulmein and Akyab are to be transferred to local management, and, if this is so, the Governor General in Council does not clearly understand why the same course should not be followed at Rangoon. There ought apparently to be no difficulty in securing a committee there competent to manage such an institution. The question of pensions to teachers and other Government servants lent to local boards, raised in your 13th paragraph, is now under consideration in the Financial Department, and general orders on the subject will shortly issue.

8. Your proposals with reference to district or other rural boards are awaited; as also a complete statement of the amendments which you would wish to have made in the Burma Municipal Act.

From G. D. BURGESS, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 345—14G.M.)

Rangoon, June 12, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of Home Department Resolution No. 17–747—59, dated the 18th May, on the subject of the development of local self-government, and also of your letter No. 51, dated the 15th May, in which the Chief Commissioner is asked whether he would wish to propose the amendment of the British Burma Municipal Act for the purpose of legalising the payment of fees to members for their attendance at municipal meetings, and if so, whether in his opinion the Act requires amendment in any other particulars.

2. In paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of the Chief Commissioner's Resolution No. 4A., dated the 28th April last (copy of which was submitted with this office letter No. 159–4A., dated the 4th May), certain points were indicated in regard to which amendment of the Municipal Act appeared desirable. Certain further amendments are required in order to give effect to the policy laid down in the Home Department Resolution already quoted.

3. A draft Bill for the amendment of the British Burma Municipal Act has accordingly been prepared, and is herewith submitted for the orders of the Government of India. The object of the various amendments proposed is believed to be so clear as to render any detailed explanation unnecessary. I am to solicit that the Bill may be thrown into such language as may seem suitable to the Legislative Department, and that it may then be passed into law at an early date. Until this has been done the Chief Commissioner will not be in a position to give full effect to the wishes of the Government of India in regard to the development of local self-government in this province.

Draft Bill to Amend the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874.

Preamble. Whereas it is expedient to amend the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874, and also to extend the operation thereof by providing for the appointment of Municipal Committees in towns in British Burma to which it is not desirable to apply at once all the provisions of the said Act; It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. This Act may be called "The British Burma Municipal Extension Act, 1882": and it shall come into force on the passing thereof. Short title.

2. "Section" means a section of the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874. Interpretation clause.

3. The following portions of the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874, are hereby repealed, that is to say— Repeal of portions of the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874.

the words in section 30, "and after providing out of such fund for a Police "establishment in the manner herein-after mentioned";

section 32;

and the first sentence of section 33.

4. In section 2, before the word "may" the following shall be inserted, that is to say, "in whole or in part." Addition to section 2.

5. In section 3, after the word "Act," the following shall be inserted, that is to say, "or any portion thereof"; and in the same section, after the word "Burma," the following shall be inserted, that is to say, "and in the case of a town to which the "whole Act has not been extended may from time to time, by like notification, "declare his intention to extend any further portion of this Act to any such town." Addition to section 3.

6. In section 5, after the word "Act" where it first occurs, the following shall be inserted, that is to say, "or any portion thereof." Addition to section 5.

7. In section 7, for the words "two-fifths of the members of a Committee" "two-"thirds of the members of a Committee not being elected members," shall be substituted. Amendment of section 7.

8. To section 10, clause (*i*), the following shall be added, that is to say, "provided "that in any case in which the Chairman is not appointed by election, the Chief "Commissioner may, if he see fit, direct that such Chairman shall not have a vote at "meetings of the Committee." Addition to clause (*i.*), section 10.

9. For the first part of section 25 the following shall be substituted, that is to say, "If at any time the Chief Commissioner shall be satisfied that any of the purposes of "this Act have not been, and are not likely to be, properly accomplished by any "Committee, he may, by notice in writing, require such Committee, within a reason-"able time, to take measures to his satisfaction for properly accomplishing such "purpose or to show cause to the contrary; and, unless such measures are taken or "such cause is shown to his satisfaction, may cause such purpose to be accomplished "at the cost of the Committee." Amendment of section 25.

To the same section the following shall be added, that is to say,—

"All acts and proceedings of the Committee of any town to which the whole of this Act has not been extended shall be subject to the confirmation of the Deputy Commissioner of the district in which such town is situate, and the Deputy Commissioner may cancel, suspend, or modify any such acts or proceedings. Provided that, unless such acts or proceedings are contrary to law or are beyond the powers of the Committee, the Deputy Commissioner shall not cancel or modify the same without the previous sanction of the Commissioner of the division."

10. In section 27, after the word "Act" where it first occurs, the following shall be inserted, that is to say, "or any portion thereof." Addition to section 27.

To the same section shall be added the following, that is to say,—

"The Committee may allow to each member thereof for attendance at meetings of the Committee or of Sub-Committees fees to such amount and subject to such conditions as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time approve."

11. To section 30 the following shall be added, that is to say,— Addition to section 30.

"*Explanation.*—The work or object on which expenditure of municipal funds may be made under this section need not necessarily lie within the limits of the municipality, provided that such expenditure is for the general benefit of the municipality."

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BRITISH BURMA.

(No. 87.)

Simla, July 3, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 345—14G.M., dated 12th ultimo, forwarding a draft Bill for the amendment of the British Burma Municipal Act.

2. In reply, I am to invite your attention to Home Department letter No. 959, dated the 23rd ultimo, and, with reference to the suggestions and observations contained therein, to say that the Government of India will await your further report before passing orders on your present communication.

From G. D. BURGESS, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner British Burma, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(Gen. Dept., No. 989–16 G.M.)

Rangoon, July 31, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 959, dated the 23rd June, conveying remarks on the Chief Commissioner's Resolution on the subject of local self-government in municipal and other towns in British Burma.

2. With reference to paragraphs 2 and 8 of your letter, I am to submit that, if permitted, the Chief Commissioner would prefer to let the several new and old municipalities be started on the revised footing before embarking on the business of establishing rural boards. The Chief Commissioner does not think that the rural boards and the municipalities will interfere with each other. The starting of these new institutions must depend in a great measure on the local officers, that is to say, on the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners. They are already busy with the municipalities; as yet they have not got very far with them. They can hardly attend to the business of starting rural boards until the new municipalities are really under weigh. When the municipalities on the revised footing are in working order and have become realities, the local Government may hope that leading men, where such exist, will join the rural boards and work upon them.

With regard to the extension of the elective system to the larger municipalities other than Rangoon, I am to say that the Municipal Committees of the towns of Moulmein, Akyab, Bassein, Prome, Henzada, and Toungoo are now being consulted on the subject.

3. It would be comparatively easy to create a district committee for each district, who should manage road and school affairs under the immediate tutelage of the Deputy Commissioner. But if we are to get local people with really local interest to take part in the business, the (practically) executive committees must have very much smaller areas of operation. With such strictly local committees we may secure some beginnings of self-government, or of the intelligent application of local knowledge and local self-interest. The Chief Commissioner does not think that it is possible in Burma to constitute and energise such local boards until the new municipalities are organised on the new footing and have set an example.

4. In regard to paragraph 3 of your letter, I am to observe that sections 11–14 of the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874, give to the Chief Commissioner powers which are ample in respect to taxation, so far as regular, full-power municipalities are concerned. Indeed it may be questioned whether section 14 does not give to the Chief Commissioner a power and throw upon him a responsibility both of which had better be left with the municipality itself. Accordingly the Chief Commissioner recommends that over and above the changes in the law proposed in my letter No. 345–14G.M., dated the 12th June, be made the following:—

Section 8A of draft Bill.—"The first clause of section 14 is repealed. In the second clause of the same section for the words 'Chief Commissioner' is substituted the word 'Committee,' and for the words 'Governor-General in Council' are substituted the words 'Chief Commissioner.'"

5. Again, the control given by section 35 to the Chief Commissioner over works to be executed by a municipality is wide and may be vague. Accordingly the Chief Commissioner would propose to enlarge the powers of the municipal committees by making the following addition to the draft Bill submitted on the 12th June:—

Section 12 of draft Bill.—"Section 35 is hereby repealed, and in place thereof is enacted the following:—

['35. No new work the estimated cost of which exceeds five hundred rupees shall be begun by the Committee, nor shall any contract be entered into by the Committee

in respect of any such work until a plan and estimate thereof has been approved by the Commissioners at a meeting.'

'In case the estimated cost of any such new work exceeds—

'twenty thousand rupees in the case of the municipalities of Rangoon, Moulmein, Bassein, Akyab,

'ten thousand rupees in the case of any other municipality,

it shall not be begun, nor shall any contract be entered into in respect of it, until such plan and estimate have been submitted to the local Government, and sanctioned by it in an order published in the local official Gazette.'"

The words and procedure now suggested are borrowed, for the most part from section 67 of the Rangoon Port Commissioners Act of 1879.

6. For the rest the Chief Commissioner does not think that further control is required in the case of full municipalities. But in the case of second-class municipalities, the Chief Commissioner proposes that the Deputy Commissioner shall, subject to the Divisional Commissioner's sanction, exercise a supervision over all the Acts and proceedings of the municipality. For this provision has been made in the last clause of section 9 of the Draft Bill of June last.

7. Clause 1 of section 9 of the draft Bill makes what the Chief Commissioner believes to be sufficient provision for superseding the action of a municipal committee. The Chief Commissioner would not propose to take any legal power for abolishing a municipality when once it was constituted. It is most improbable that such a power would be used. If matters come to so very serious a pass that there was no choice but to abolish a municipality in order to save the towns-people from ruin, the special aid of the Legislature might be sought. It seems, the Chief Commissioner would submit, unadvisable to hold over municipalities the threat or the fate of disfranchisement at the hands of any power short of the Legislature.

8. In reference to paragraph 4 of your letter, I am to submit that it is no longer necessary to trouble the Government of India with remarks or recommendations touching the financial freedom to be conceded to municipalities. The orders contained in the Finance and Commerce Department Resolution No. 2078, dated the 30th June 1882, give the fullest freedom to municipalities in this respect.

9. Section 34 of the British Burma Municipal Act, 1874, fully provides for the Chief Commissioner's obtaining from municipalities all such accounts, returns, and statements as may be wanted. It might be doubted whether the second clause of that section would not circumscribe the committee's powers too closely. But after the present* expression of the views of the Government of India, it may be anticipated that no unnecessary trammels will be placed upon the account-keeping branch of municipal business.

10. In regard to paragraph 5 of your letter, I am to solicit a reference to section 10 of the draft Bill. I am to add that it is by no means certain that all municipalities will desire to vote fees to members for attendance. But some municipalities have proposed to do this, and for the reasons recited in my letter No. 215–11 R.M., dated the 9th March 1882, it is proposed to take power for such an end.

11. With reference to paragraph 7 of your letter, I am to say that the sums made over at Moulmein and Akyab (as per page 3 of the schedule of the Chief Commissioner's Resolution No. 4A., dated the 28th April 1882) cover the cost of the middle and the high schools, which at those places will be managed by municipalities. The case of Rangoon is different. The high school there is an embryo college, which already partially serves and eventually will, we hope, completely serve the whole province. Scholarships from many schools in many districts will be tenable there. To that school and college will be affiliated law classes, science classes, and perhaps classes in medicine, surgery, and engineering, for the benefit of the whole province. It will be desirable that this institution at Rangoon should remain under some central authority, which will take thought for the whole province and not for Rangoon town alone. The Chief Commissioner expects before long to delegate the control of the Rangoon High School,

* "The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that the Financial Department, as such, should have "nothing whatever to do with the management and keeping of municipal accounts beyond furnishing an "outside audit (when this is necessary), and obtaining the annual returns for incorporation in the statistics of "the Empire" (paragraph 4 of Home Secretary's, No. 959, dated 23rd June).

or college as it will soon be, to the Educational Syndicate of British Burma. But, as at present advised, he would not recommend that the institution should be made over to the municipality of Rangoon.

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BRITISH BURMA.

Home Department.
Public, No. 1465.

Sir, Simla, September 16, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 989–16, dated the 31st July, reporting further on the scheme of local self-government which you propose to introduce in British Burma.

2. You state that you would prefer to let the town Boards get into working order on their revised footing before doing anything to establish Boards for rural tracts. The Governor General in Council is willing to leave the final settlement of this point to your discretion, with the expression of a hope that you may see your way to constituting district Boards in at least a few selected places at an early date, and that the principle of election may shortly be introduced in all the larger municipalities. The opportunity afforded by the amendment of the municipal law should, however, be taken to make legislative provision for the establishment of rural Boards. Possibly the smaller Municipal Boards which you propose to create might eventually be made administrative centres for the surrounding tracts, a few additional members being added to the governing body, and their powers and functions as a district Board being specifically defined. This suggestion is thrown out for your consideration.

3. I am to forward, for your information, a copy of a draft Bill for making provision for local self-government in the Central Provinces, and of an explanatory letter regarding it, and I am specially to draw your attention to sections 26 to 29 of the Bill as indicating the nature of the control to be exercised over local Boards by the executive authorities. These sections may be found suitable for general application, though it may be necessary in the case of the small second-class town Boards proposed by you to supplement them in the manner contemplated in the last clause of section 9 of your draft Bill. From paragraph 7 of your letter under reply the Governor General in Council gathers that you are under some misapprehension as to the nature of the ultimate power reserved to Government of superseding a local Board. There will be no disfranchisement of the municipality or other local area, but the existing members of a Board who have failed in their duty may be removed while the duty in question is performed by others; after which a fresh Board will be appointed or elected. The mode of local administration will not be permanently changed. The procedure is made clear in section 29 of the Central Provinces draft Bill.

4. Referring again to the question of legalising the payment of fees to members of local Boards, the Governor General in Council observes that at Rangoon itself there seems, judging from the proceedings at the recent elections, to be a strong feeling against the proposal on the part of influential members of the community. There is no doubt a risk that, if fees were allowed a class of candidates would come forward to whom the payments would be an object, and who would by active canvassing discourage the candidature of better men who are averse to such proceedings. There may not be much risk of this perhaps in British Burma, but if the concession were made there, it could not well be refused elsewhere, and in India the difficulty of inducing the more respectable members of Native society to come forward as candidates at all is already very considerable. Again, if non-official members draw fees it would be invidious to refuse to allow official members to do the same. But this has always been objected to on general grounds by the Government of India, and the arrangement would in many cases under standing orders require the specific sanction of the Secretary of State. The Governor General in Council does not desire to express at present a final opinion on this subject, but I am to request that you will reconsider your proposal in the light of the above remarks.

5. With reference to section 8 A of your draft Bill (wrongly printed 9 A in your letter), I am to observe that the Governor General in Council thinks the law must

make specific provision for appeals against assessments, or at any rate for review of assessments on application to the Commissioners as in section 104, Bengal Act V. of 1876. In section 11 the approval of the Chief Commissioner should be made necessary to any expenditure of the funds of any local Board outside the limits of its jurisdiction. On the other sections of the draft Bill no special remarks seem called for.

6. I am, however, to say that it would, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, be better to repeal entirely the existing Municipal Act, and to frame a complete measure for the regulation of local self-government in British Burma, both in urban and rural circles. In preparing such a measure the Central Provinces Bill may afford you assistance, though many of its details may be unsuitable to other parts of India and though it does not in its present form deal directly with municipalities. Your particular attention has already been drawn to the sections on control, and there are other provisions in it that may usefully be introduced into any enactment dealing with the question of local self-government.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

(Public, No. 58.)

My Lord Marquis, Simla, November 7, 1882.

In continuation of our Despatch No. 52, dated the 10th October 1882, we have the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information a copy of our correspondence with the Government of Madras on the subject of the extension of local self-government in that Presidency. Copies of our correspondence with the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces will be forwarded by our Legislative Department.

2. We also forward in compliance with the request contained in the 3rd paragraph of your Lordship's Despatch No. 107, dated 5th October 1882, a copy of the correspondence referred to in our Resolution of the 18th May last, with the exception of the documents marginally noted, copies of which were transmitted to your Lordship with our Financial Despatch, No. 291, dated 12th November 1881.

Resolution of the Department of Finance, No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881.*
Letter to Madras Government, No. 3515, dated 10th October 1881.†

We have, &c.
RIPON.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

List of Enclosures.

1. Letter from Government of Madras, No. 217, dated 9th February 1882, and enclosures.
2. Letter to Government of Madras, No. 830, dated 31st May 1882.
3. Letter from Government of Madras, No. 1532, dated 20th October 1882, and enclosures.
4. Letter to Government of Madras, No. , dated November 1882.
5. Home Department Circular, No. 4-70 to 76, dated 10th May 1881.
6. Letter from Government of Madras, No. 1404, dated 3rd August 1881, and enclosures.
7. Letter from Government of Bombay, No. 3510, dated 20th October 1881, and enclosure.
8. Letter from Government of Bengal, No. 603, dated 12th July 1881, and enclosures.
9. Letter from Government of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 630, dated 7th September 1881, and enclosures.

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* See page 8. † See page 20.

10. Letter from Government of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 700, dated 24th September 1881, and enclosures.
11. Letter from Government of Punjab, No. 300, dated 5th September 1881, and enclosure.
12. Letter from Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces, No. 2895—100, dated 6th August 1881, and enclosure.
13. Letter from Resident at Hyderabad, No. 236, dated 21st June 1881.
14. Letter from Financial Department to Government of Bengal, No. 3513, dated 10th October 1881.
15. Letter from Financial Department to Government of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 35—14, dated 10th October 1881.
16. Letter from Financial Department to Government of Bombay, No. 3516, dated 10th October 1881.
17. Letter from Financial Department to Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, No. 3517, dated 10th October 1881.
18. Letter from Financial Department to Chief Commissioner of British Burma, No. 3518, dated 10th October 1881.
19. Letter from Financial Department to Chief Commissioner, Assam, No. 3519, dated 10th October 1881.
20. Letter from Financial Department to Government of the Punjab, No. 3589, dated 13th October 1881.

From THE HONOURABLE R. DAVIDSON, C.S.I., CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE.

(No. 217.)

SIR, February 9, 1882.

THE subject of the further extension of local self-government treated of in your letter of the 10th October last,* No. 3515, has been carefully considered by this Government, and I am now directed to forward, for the information of the Government† of India, copy of Government Proceedings of this date containing communications from the Board of Revenue and Accountant General which will show that the details of the heads of account to which attention was drawn have been closely scrutinised. The views expressed by the Board of Revenue are shared by His Excellency the Governor in Council, the fact being, as is indeed admitted by the Government of India, that in this Presidency municipal and local agency is already almost exclusively employed in lieu of State Agency for the services specified. This Government will certainly persevere in the path which they adopted when the local Acts III. and IV. of 1871 were passed, which fully admit of the extensive development of the services in question; but at present His Excellency in Council does not see his way to adding to the list of those services.

2. If the intentions of the Government of India in regard to decentralisation are rightly apprehended, it will be within the power of the Madras Government to relinquish the municipal contribution for police, and the money thus set free will serve to promote the services already transferred.

3. Among the objects to which additional means may be usefully applied, as they become available, may be named—

Normal schools for primary and lower class school-masters;
Female education, primary and lower class;
Scholarships or bursaries for lower class schools;
Industrial schools;
School libraries;
Medical (including midwifery) training for taluq and village practice.

In all these directions something is already being done, but mainly at municipal and local (not at provincial) cost; and although more may be done as funds become available, there appears to be little opening for the transfer of services from provincial to local administration, in greater number than has already been done.

4. Under Public Works the transfer has, it is thought, been already made as complete as possible; for while, with hardly an exception, save a few ghât roads and the

* *See* page 20. † *See* pages 113 to 125 of Appendix.

Buckingham Canal, the communications of the Presidency have been handed over to local and municipal bodies, the erection or maintenance of Civil buildings cannot be rightly or economically imposed on or entrusted to them. Miscellaneous public improvements for sanitary objects or public convenience are already mainly effected at their cost.

5. Under "Medical," the hospitals and dispensaries in towns and districts are maintained almost entirely from municipal and local funds, which also contribute the amount necessary for training the staff of practitioners required for this service.

6. The cost of vaccination is also mainly borne by them, and it is in contemplation to establish at their cost an extended system of sanitary inspection.

7. As regards education, the cost of primary education is almost entirely borne by these funds, and I am directed to point out that Madras Acts III. and IV. of 1871 fully admit of local administration of higher class education, but it has in practice been found necessary to guard against the tendency to provide superior education, at the cost of the taxpayers, for the children of a very limited class, which is perfectly well able to pay for it; while the primary instruction of the people was correspondingly neglected.

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

Home Department.
Public, No. 830.

Sir, Simla, May 31, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter to the Financial Department, No. 217, dated the 9th February last, submitting, with an expression of the concurrence of His Excellency the Governor in Council, a copy of the Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue of the 1st idem, in which the suggestions of the Government of India for the further extension of local self-government, as embodied in the letter from the Financial Department, No. 3375, dated the 10th October last, are discussed at length.

2. Both the Board of Revenue and the Madras Government point with legitimate satisfaction to the fact that throughout the Southern Presidency Municipal and Local Agency is already very extensively employed in connexion with many branches of public business, and it is stated that His Excellency the Governor in Council does not see his way to adding to the list of these services.

3. The Governor General in Council is glad to admit that, as regards the transfer of provincial services to local funds, more has perhaps been done in Madras than in any other part of India. But it by no means follows that real local self-government has as yet received any sufficient or adequate development. It is no doubt the case that the formal control and management of the local funds is, under the Act of 1871, entrusted to Committees composed, to some extent, of non-official members. But His Excellency in Council observes that while great stress is laid in your letter under reply, and also in the Board's Resolution, upon the amount and variety of the charges that are debited to local funds, but little is said with reference to the actual working and powers of the local Committees. It is, in fact, to be gathered from the Board's remarks that although the only direct official check exercised over the Committees is that involved in the presiding control of the Collectors and Divisional Officers, the Local Boards are regarded as institutions "still in their infancy," and requiring a considerable amount of official "restraint." In the matter of public works it is indeed admitted that a material addition might with advantage be made to their powers by which a vast amount of reference to the Board of Revenue would be saved. It may fairly be inferred from these statements that the administrative powers of the Local Boards have hitherto been extremely limited in character, and that they have not as yet been properly utilised as a means of training the people in the independent management of their own local affairs.

4. The views of the Government of India upon this subject have now been fully explained in the Resolution of this Department, dated 18th May, and I am to

express the earnest hope of the Governor General in Council that the Madras Government will reconsider the question in the light of the instructions therein conveyed. Generally speaking, it would seem that in Madras the official element on the boards unduly preponderates, and that the local area of their jurisdiction is inordinately large. The Governor General in Council does not consider that the objections taken by the Board of Revenue in paragraph 5 of their Resolution to the appointment of sub-committees are by any means conclusive. There would seem to be no reason why the local fund circles in Madras should be so large as to make it practically impossible for the non-official members of the committees to be of any real use, or why under a system of smaller circles good work should not be done. Although the Madras districts are not so completely sub-divided for administrative purposes as those of some other provinces, yet there are sub-collectorates, and taluks in charge of passed assistants, in many districts which might probably be made into local fund circles without difficulty.

5. In paragraph 2 of your letter it is assumed that the Government of India are prepared to relieve the municipalities of police contributions without any equivalent transfer of charge from provincial to local management. This is not the case. But I am to point out that under the head of Education there are still many items which might, in the opinion of the Government of India, be usefully transferred to local management. There is no apparent reason why the rest of the Government primary schools, and the control of Government middle and high schools, should not be handed over to properly constituted local boards, as is now being done in other Provinces. The Madras grant-in-aid system seems peculiarly adapted to the successful working of such arrangements. It would not probably be either possible or desirable to transfer to local control such institutions as colleges, attached collegiate schools, schools for Europeans and Eurasians, normal schools with attached model schools, medical schools, surveying schools, or other schools of technical instruction. But with these exceptions, the Governor General in Council can see no reason for limiting the transference of educational institutions to the management of the local boards. The Department of Public Instruction would still maintain its general control over the system of instruction. The Government rules for grants-in-aid would still hold good. The local officers of the department would work, according to their rank, either as the advisers or as the agents of the boards. In this way there would be no violent change of system, while local effort would be elicited, and the relations of educational department and the local bodies be drawn closer together to their mutual advantage. Arrangements would have to be made regarding the appointment of teachers in the higher schools, in order to secure the selection of suitable men; and many other points of detail would have to be considered and arranged; but there appears to be no insuperable difficulty in so settling matters as to meet the requirements of the Government system, while stimulating the interest of these local bodies in the cause of popular education.

6. I am also to invite the particular attention of the Madras Government to paragraph 21 of the Resolution of this Department of the 18th May, and to point out that it is an essential part of the Government of India scheme that the local committees should, as far as possible, be entrusted with the control of receipts and revenues as well as of expenditure.

7. The legislation necessary to give effect to the arrangements suggested by the Government of India may most advantageously be undertaken in the local Council.

LETTER from THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

SIR, Ootacamund, October 20, 1882.

WITH reference to your letter, dated 31st May 1882, No. 830, I am directed to forward, for submission to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the accompanying copy of a report by the Committee appointed in this Presidency to consider the question of Local Self-government, containing their preliminary observations on the subject, together with the remarks passed by this Government thereon.

From the COMMITTEE ON LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT to the CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, dated Ootacamund, 16th October 1882.

We, the undersigned members of the Committee, directed by G.O., dated 29th June 1882, No. 597, Financial, to consider and report on the subject of Local Self-government referred by the Government of India in their Resolution, dated 18th May 1882, No. 17—747–59, have the honour to submit the following report.

2. The Committee first appointed being empowered by Government to add to their number, the gentlemen noted below have served on it, and a great mass of information and opinion has been invited and obtained from numerous quarters, official and unofficial, European and Native, and carefully considered :—

President.

Hon. H. E. Sullivan, Member of Council,
and subsequently
Mr. H. S. Thomas, F.L.S., F.Z.S., Acting First Member, Board of Revenue.

Members.

Mr. E. Forster Webster, Revenue Secretary to Government.
Colonel R. H. Sankey, R.E., C.B., Chief Engineer and Secretary to Government in Public Works Department.
Mr. H. B. Grigg, Director of Public Instruction.
Mr. H. E. Stokes, Collector and Magistrate of Tanjore.
The Hon. Amaravati Seshayya Sastri, C.S.I., Dewan of Pudukóta.
M. R. Ry. P. Chentsul Rao Gáru, late Head Sheristadar, Board of Revenue.
Mr. R. S. Benson, Secretary to the Committee, and Settlement Officer, Nílgiris.
Colonel J. O. Hasted, R.E., Acting Chief Engineer for Irrigation and Joint Secretary to Government in Irrigation Department.
Surgeon-General W. R. Cornish, C.I.E.
M.R.Ry. A. L. Venkataramana Pantulu Gáru, M.A., and B.L., Subordinate Judge, Vizagapatam.
Mr. H. W. Bliss, Commissioner of Salt Revenue.
Colonel Shaw-Stewart, R.E., Acting Chief Engineer and Secretary to Government in the Public Works Department.

3. As the pioneer in the cause of Local Self-government this Presidency has a past so full of incident, shedding the light of experience on so many points, that the labours of this Committee are thereby rendered far more exact and complicated than if they had little but speculative theory to deal with. If we delayed, therefore, till we could review at length all the matter available, and represent adequately the long and chequered, yet successful history of the endeavours, the experiments, and the considerable advances already made during a period of nearly twenty years, we should have to delay longer than would be in accordance with the wishes of Government. In compliance, therefore, with the recently signified wish for an early expression of opinion we have the honour to submit the following preliminary report of the general tendency of our conclusions, reserving for a further occasion a further exposition of our views, accompanied, if desired, by draft Acts practically applying them, and a set of rules for the approval of Government.

4. First, referring briefly to the previous correspondence on the subject, we will then proceed in accordance with our instructions—

(1) to set before the Government of India the system of Local Self-Government actually in force in this Presidency ; and
(2) to discuss the ways in which it may be possible to enlarge the scope of that system.

5. *Précis of recent Correspondence.*—In their Resolution, 30th September 1881, No. 3353, on provincial decentralization arrangements, the Government of India suggested that considerable revenues and expenditure, provincial and local, now retained in the hands of Provincial Governments, might be transferred to local management, and directed a scrutiny of provincial and local accounts to ascertain how far this could be done. In reference to this Resolution the Government of India addressed the Government of Madras on 10th October 1881, No. 3515, stating that Education, Medical Services,

and Public Works were the most suitable services for transfer, and that the details of these services and also of minor departments should be separately considered and reasons against transfer, if such exist, explained. It was especially desired that the Municipal bodies should be relieved of the charge for Police, an equal amount of expenditnre, with as full control as possible, being transferred under Education, Medical Charity, and Public Works of local interest. No additional burdens should, they explained, be laid on local bodies, but they desired that receipts from (for example) pounds and assessed taxes and receipts appertaining to services transferred, should be made over to meet the deficiency, if any. Municipal legislation should be reviewed with a view to its improvement; and, as regards District Committees, single Committees for each district with the Collector Chairman, and Ancillary Committees in each sub-division presided over by the officer in charge, were suggested. From one-half to two-thirds of the members should, it was said, be non-officials, elected or nominated, as might seem best. Provision should be made for inspection and control and the powers of Government and the local bodies should be defined by statute.

6. The Madras Government replied on 9th February 1882, No. 217, Financial Department, forwarding communications from the Accountant-General and the Board of Revenue on the subject of the above papers. The Accountant-General furnished details of Provincial Receipts and charges which seemed fit for transfer. The Board of Revenue assert that, as regards local self-government, Madras is in advance of other parts of India, in respect of the organisation of local bodies and the amount and variety of the work done by them, and that the influence of Collectors and Divisional Officers as Presidents and Vice-Presidents is admitted by the people to be beneficial. The Board are of opinion that official restraint and control of the local bodies, still in their infancy, is, and will long be, required in the interest of the ratepayers; that the members, half of whom are non-officials, are so selected that the different sub-divisions and interests of the districts are fairly represented and their claims properly weighed by the Local Boards; and that multiplication of Committees is impossible owing to the lack of suitable persons, and would entail disconnected action and waste. The existing Acts, defining the powers and duties of local bodies, require, the Board think, no amendment. The vigorous condition of these bodies and the aid they afford to the Administration may be inferred, the Board say, from the large proportion in which they contribute to, and manage, expenditure under Public Works, Education, Medical Services, and Sanitation. Local and Municipal receipts aggregate almost 70 lakhs, and expenditure (restricted in the year under notice by order of Government in view to meet famine claims) was 28 lakhs under Public Works, $4\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs on Education, $5\frac{3}{4}$ on Medical Services, and $5\frac{1}{4}$ on Sanitation, besides considerable sums on charitable institutions, &c. The Board then review the several Provincial Services with reference to the question of transfer to local bodies.* They consider that local bodies cannot undertake increased responsibility and work in connexion with Education, and that the transfer would lead to inferior Inspecting agency being substituted for that now employed. They find that under other heads all transfers which are expedient have already been made except, perhaps, the stamping of weights and measures. They admit that considerable additions may be made to the powers of Local Boards in sanctioning outlay, whereby unnecessary reference will be saved. They sum up by saying that, except as regards the Police, the views of the Government of India have been for some time anticipated in this Presidency.

7. The Madras Government expressed their concurrence in the Board's views, and did not see their way to adding to the services transferred. They hoped to relieve the Municipalities of charges for Police,† and the money set free would then be available for the further development of the services transferred. Under Public Works, only civil buildings, a few ghât roads, and the Buckingham Canal have been retained as Provincial, and Medical and Vaccination charges have been almost entirely transferred. As regards education, they say that, though the Local and Municipal Acts admit of local administration of higher class education, it has been found necessary in

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* The proportion made local under the chief heads is given as follows:

	Per cent.
Education	32
Medical	30
Public Works	67
Miscellaneous	69

† Since done.

practice to guard against the tendency to provide superior education at the cost of the taxpayers for the children of a limited class which is able to pay for it, while primary instruction of the people is correspondingly neglected.

8. In reply, the Government of India (letter dated 31st May 1882, No. 930), admitting that, as regards transfers from Provincial to Local, more has been done in Madras than elsewhere, observe that it does not follow that real local self-government has received adequate development, and that in the papers forwarded little is said of the actual working and powers of the Local Committees. They infer that the administrative powers of the Local Boards are extremely limited in character. They consider that the official element on these Boards unduly preponderates, and that the local area of their jurisdictions is unduly large; and suggest that Sub-Collectorates and taluks in charge of passed Assistants might be made Local Fund circles. Also that Government schools—Primary, Middle, and Higher—should be transferred to local management under suitable arrangements to meet the requirements of the Government system, such transfer being a set-off against the withdrawal of Police charges. They request that the subject be reconsidered with reference to the Government of India Resolution, dated the 18th May, No. 17.

9. In this Resolution they lay down as a cardinal principle that the area entrusted to a Local Board shall be limited so as to secure local interest and knowledge, and that the smallest administrative unit—the sub-division, taluk, or tahsil—should be the maximum area; that the non-official element on Local Boards should have a large preponderance, not less than two-thirds of non-official members, who should, if possible, be elected, being appointed; and that Government should control the local bodies from without rather than from within, and revise and check their acts rather than dictate them. Sanction of Government should be required for loans, taxes, and alienations of property, and in questions relating to religion or the public peace; and Government should have power either to set aside the proceedings of local bodies in particular cases, or in the event of gross neglect, and with the sanction of the Supreme Government, to suspend the local body temporarily. The function of executive officers of Government should be to watch the proceedings of the local bodies, call their attention to matters requiring it, and remonstrate if they exceed their powers; but the Chairman of Local Boards should be non-officials and, if possible, elected, the appointments, however, being subject to the approval of Government. They regard it as important that Local Boards should have the management of revenue as well as of expenditure; and suggest transfer of license-tax assessments and collections, and of Provincial expenditure with equivalent revenue; and joint establishments for the execution of public works, provincial and local.

10. These papers being referred to us for report we proceed now in accordance with the instructions of Government to preface our suggestions for the extension of local self-government by a very brief sketch of the present constitution of Municipal and Local Fund Boards and of their position in the general administration of the Presidency.

11. *History of the Municipal Acts.*—Municipal action in the rural parts of the Presidency may be said to date from the passing of Act XXVI. of 1850, which authorized the inhabitants of towns to raise voluntary taxes for sanitary and other public purposes. It was, however, but little utilized, and voluntary Sanitary Associations remained the rule until the passing of Act X. of 1865. This Act was originally introduced mainly with the object of obliging the towns to pay for the cost of their own Police, but it was eventually determined to render compulsory the construction and repair of roads, drains, tanks, &c., and the carrying out of all measures necessary for the preservation of public health. The Municipal Commissioners were also permitted to raise further sums for other Municipal purposes, such as lighting, water supply, the prevention of fire, &c. This Act was widely introduced, but the necessity for revising it soon became apparent. It was found that the operation of the Education Act (No. VI. of 1863), which depended on the voluntary principle, was uncertain and unsatisfactory. It was also felt that Section 29 of the Municipal Act, which permitted the Commissioners at their option to levy further sums for such objects as lighting, sanitary inspection, vaccination, hospitals, registration of vital statistics, &c., was practically inoperative, and that the services thus supposed to be provided for were very generally neglected. Accordingly the present Act (No. III. of 1871) was passed and included all the above objects among those to which the Municipal funds should ordinarily be applicable. The sections which rendered the cost of Police a

Municipal charge were struck out and Government at the same time withdrew the contribution which under the Act of 1865 it was bound to make. The qualification for the post of Commissioner was made more elastic: the term of office was increased from one year to three years; the number of ex-officio members was reduced from three to two; the appointment of the Vice-President was vested in Government instead of in the President; and provision was made for the election of Commissioners by the ratepayers, and of the Vice-Presidents by the Commissioners. Speaking generally, the tendency of the Act of 1871 was to at once place the Commissioners in a more independent and responsible position and to diminish the opportunities for Government interference in details, while the sections rendering permissive the election of Commissioners and of Vice-Presidents provided the machinery for granting a still greater degree of independence in the future.

12. *Number and Population of Municipalities.*—Turning now to examine the existing Municipalities, it appears that their number, excluding the town of Madras, is 47, with a population, according to the Census of 1881, of 1,323,964 persons.

13. *Constitution.*—These 47 towns are constituted Municipalities under the provisions of the Towns' Improvement Act, No. III. of 1871 (Madras). The body corporate or Commission consists in each of a President, a Vice-President, and a Board of Commissioners.

14. *The President.*—The Collector of the district is ex-officio President of the Commissioners for all towns within the district under his charge, and in him vests the appointment and dismissal of all Municipal servants, but the salaries to be paid to them must be fixed by the Commissioners at a meeting, and this practically gives them complete control over the scale of establishments to be employed. He has, as President, no executive authority whatever, except in cases of emergency. He conducts all correspondence with Government; but, as there are a number of Municipalities in some districts, it is impossible for the President, in such cases, to attend more than a small proportion of the meetings.

15. *The Vice-President.*—Speaking generally, the real working executive officer of each Municipality is the Vice-President. He must be one of the Commissioners, and is usually appointed by Government, but Government may authorize his election by the Commissioners. This has been done in more than one-half of the forty-seven Municipalities, and we believe the privilege has never been refused to any Municipality which has applied for it. In many of the cases where it has been granted the Commissioners have not availed themselves of it, and Government have been obliged to fill up the appointments thus left vacant.

16. *The Commissioners.*—The Board of Commissioners consist of two ex-officio members and a number of ordinary members. The ex-officio members are the Collector of the district (who is President) and the Revenue Officer in charge of the division of the district in which the town is situated. The ordinary members consist of not less than three persons either appointed by Government or elected by the ratepayers. They hold office for three years and are eligible for reappointment, and they may be removed by Government for misconduct or neglect of duty. They must be owners of land or buildings in the town or carry on business or reside therein. In addition to these Government may appoint any officer of Government who holds a salaried office in the district, provided that not more than one-half of the Board shall be salaried officers of Government. Under the latter provision it is usual to appoint the chief local representatives of the Educational, Medical, and Public Works Departments, and the Boards thus have the advantage, free of cost, of the advice and assistance of the professional officers of Government on all technical questions which come before them from time to time. The average number of Commissioners is 15·7 in each town, and the total number for the forty-seven towns is 740.

17. *Official and Non-official Commissioners.*—As already stated, the law provides that the number of officials must not exceed the number of non-officials in any Municipality. In practice, however, it has been usual to appoint considerably more than one-half of each Board from among the non-official community. Of the 740 existing Commissioners, 421, or 56·9 per cent., are non-officials. It is beyond dispute that all through the past ten years the non-officials were in a position to outvote the officials in the majority of the towns in the Presidency in regard to any question on which their opinions might be in conflict. There is, however, nothing in the reports to show

that such conflicts arose except on rare and comparatively trivial occasions; and, though there have often been strong differences of opinion between the members of the Boards, especially in regard to questions of taxation, the division of the parties has very rarely been coincident with that of officials and non-officials.

18. *European and Native Commissioners.*—The number of Europeans and East Indians on the Boards is 267, or 36·1 per cent. of the whole number. They are, for the most part, Government officials, except in the Hill stations of Ootacamund and Coonoor and in the large towns on the Coast, where there is a considerable mercantile community of European extraction.

19. *Nominated and elected Commissioners.* — Section 9 of the Act empowers the Government to extend to any Municipality the privilege of electing its own Commissioners. It does not appear that the privilege has often been asked for or is much valued by the ratepayers. The Government of the late Lord Hobart, however, resolved to give effect to this provision of the Act, and accordingly 10 of the largest towns, containing together a population of 534,034 persons (exclusive of Madras), have been empowered to elect one-half of their Commissioners. We have not yet before us the most recent reports on the working of the system, but, with the exception of one or two cases, the elections have not manifested that the privilege is so far valued by the people. The failures appear to have been due to the unfamiliarity of the people with the system and also to the disinclination of the respectable classes to offer themselves as candidates at the risk of possible rejection.

20. *Independence of the Boards.*—The Municipal Commissions at present enjoy almost complete financial and administrative independence. The only direct powers of check which are reserved to Government are financial and the only securities for good administration are the subordination of the official members and the system of nomination. No taxation can be imposed without the sanction of the Government, and its sanction must also be obtained for the annual budgets, but the budgets are rarely modified by Government and the orders upon them are usually hortatory only. No sanction exists under which conformity with the budget programme can be enforced. Section 32 of the Act appears to require that all modifications of the budget programme shall be submitted to Government for approval, but, in practice, this is never done. By section 33 the orders of Government on the original or supplemental estimates are made binding on the Commissioners, so far as the means at their disposal will permit; but apparently the duty can be enforced only by a civil suit, which is a sanction practically null; or by the exercise of the power of removal of Commissioners for misconduct or neglect of duty, which is reserved to Government by Section 10 of the Act. We are not aware that this power has ever been exercised. It may be said that, except as regards the imposition of taxation, the financial independence of the Municipal Commissioners is, in practice, complete, and is not restricted by the budget system, which merely secures a systematic forecast for each year, and in no way trammels the Commissioners' freedom of action. They are exempt from interference in the administration of the Act, which confers upon them the necessary powers for the execution of their trust. It is a noteworthy fact that though Government is empowered by Section 29 of the Act to prescribe "rules and restrictions" in regard to the application of the funds raised under the Act, no such rules have ever been prescribed, and thus the action of Government, it would seem, has been more liberal and more favourable to the independence of the Commissioners than the Legislation contemplated it should be.

21. *Sources of Revenue.*—The sources of Municipal revenue are as follow:—

A. Taxation.

(1.) A rate on houses, buildings, and lands not exceeding $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the annual value thereof.
(2.) A tax upon arts, professions, trades, and callings, varying from Re. 1 to Rs. 100.
(3.) Taxes on carriages, horses, and other animals, varying from 4 annas to Rs. 9 half yearly.
(4.) Fees on the registration of carts not exceeding Rs. 2 per cart per half-year.
(5.) A toll upon carriages, carts, and animals entering the Municipal limits, varying from 1 anna to 1 rupee.

B. Other Sources.

(6.) Fees or licenses to carry on offensive or dangerous trades.
(7.) Fees or rents for the use of Municipal gardens, choultries, markets, slaughter-houses, cart-stands, &c.
(8.) Fines and forfeitures.
(9.) Payments for Municipal services rendered to private persons and other Miscellaneous items.
(10.) Grants-in-aid from Provincial or Local Funds.

22. *Receipts and Expenditure.*—We do not think it necessary in this preliminary report to enter into any detailed examination of the several items of receipt and expenditure of the various Municipalties. They are fully set forth in G.O., No. 322, dated 4th April 1882, reviewing the Municipal reports for 1880–81. It is sufficient here to state that since 1871 the Municipal income has shown a general and well-sustained tendency to increase until in the past year the highest figure yet recorded was reached, viz., Rs. 12,51,068 (exclusive of Madras), of which Rs. 9,13,838 was from taxation, properly so called, and the remainder was income from other sources. The incidence of the taxation per head of the Municipal population was 11 annas and that of the income from other sources was 4 annas and 1 pie, giving a total incidence of 15 annas and 1 pie.

The following is a statement of the receipts under each head :—

RECEIPTS.

	1880–81. Rs.
Tax on Houses and Lands	4,05,764
Professional Tax	1,31,144
Taxes and Vehicles and Animals	98,962
Tolls and Ferries	2,60,160
License Fees	17,808
Total Income of Taxation	9,13,838
Rent of Markets, &c.	80,483
Fines	24,793
Miscellaneous	1,24,978
Fees for private Scavengering, &c.	14,828
Contribution from Provincial or Local Funds	92,148
Total Income	12,51,068
Opening Balance	1,42,962
Grand Total	13,94,030
Add collections of Imperial License Tax	1,01,286
Total Income	14,95,316

23. *Objects of Municipal Expenditure.*—The Municipal funds are by law applicable to the following purposes :—

"(1.) The construction, repair, and maintenance of streets and bridges.
"(2.) The diffusion of education, and, with this view, the construction and repair of school-houses, the establishment and maintenance of schools either wholly or by means of grants-in-aid, the inspection of schools, and the training of teachers.
"(3) The construction and repair of hospitals, dispensaries, lunatic asylums, choultries, markets, tanks and wells, the payment of all charges connected with the objects for which such buildings have been constructed, the training and employment of medical practitioners and vaccinators, the sanitary inspection of towns and villages, the application of the Indian Contagious Diseases' Act, the registration of births and deaths, the cleansing of the streets and tanks, and any other local works of public utility calculated to promote the health, comfort, or convenience of the people."

To the above objects of expenditure the Legislation of 1878 added 75 per cent. of the cost of the Town Police, but it has not been levied at more than 60 per cent., and a recent Order of Government has relieved the Municipalities from all present liability on this account. It is thus apparent that every service of a Municipal nature is met from Municipal funds, and the following abstract shows the amount expended on each service :—

EXPENDITURE.

	1880–81. Rs.
Public Works	1,54,103
Drainage	8,893
Water-supply	18,756
Buildings	66,972
Miscellaneous	11,020
Total Public Works	2,59,744
Education	75,564
Hospitals, Vaccination, &c.	2,11,452
Registration of Births and Deaths	7,975
Conservancy	2,92,456
Police	1,36,882
Lighting	49,537
Watering Roads	510
Miscellaneous	97,246
Interest and Repayment of Debt	12,855
Contribution to Local or Provincial Funds	17,799
Supervision, Management, and Collection	89,679
Total	12,51,699

	Rs.	
Balance—		
Purely Municipal	1,42,331	
Due to License Tax	16,661	
Total	1,58,992	1,58,992
Add payment to Government Establishment and refunds on account of Imperial License Tax		84,625
Grand Total		14,95,316

24. *Origin of the Local Fund Act.*—The Local Funds, properly so called, of this Presidency are constituted under Madras Act No. IV. of 1871. The primary reason for the passing of this Act was the necessity which had long been felt for some more comprehensive and more practical measure than had so far been carried out in this Presidency to provide sound elementary education for the mass of the people. The Madras Education Act of 1863, which depended on the voluntary principle, had failed to realise the expectations formed of it, nor had the grant-in-aid system then in force been successful in bringing about any very marked extension of popular education. The Government having for these reasons, arrived at the conclusions that the imposition of a compulsory rate could no longer be postponed, it become necessary to consider for what other purposes local taxation would be required and how far the proposed rate could be incorporated in a general scheme for raising local funds for public purposes of an essentially local character, for it was clearly not desirable that the people should be harassed by a multiplicity of cesses. On full consideration it was deemed expedient to merge the District Road Cess Act of 1866, the Wynaad Tolls Act of 1868, as well as the Education Act of 1863, in the projected measure, and to raise by a single local rate the funds required for popular education, for roads, and other public objects of a local character, which had either not been provided for at all or had been hitherto met, either wholly or in part, by grants from the Imperial revenues. Madras Act No. VI. of 1871 was accordingly passed and immediately introduced into all parts of the Presidency except the Municipal towns, the Zemindari of Jeypore, and the Hill tracts of Ganjam, Vizagapatam, and Godávari.

25. *Number and Population of Local Fund Circles.*—The number of Local Fund circles now in existence is 32, and they contained a population, according to the Census of 1881, of over 29,000,000 persons.

26. *Constitution of Local Fund Boards.*—The constitution of the Boards is so similar to that of the Municipalities already detailed that it is unnecessary to do more than note the points of difference between the two. In the Local Fund Board there is but one ex-officio member, viz., the Collector-President. He has, however, an entirely different executive position from the President of the Municipality, inasmuch as the entire executive power of the Local Fund Board vests in the President and he is directly responsible for the due fulfilment of the purposes of the Act, whereas the President of the Municipality has no executive power whatever except what the Commissioners confer upon him. There is no provision in the Local Fund Act for the election of the Vice-President or members of the Boards, and this constitutes the most important difference between these bodies and the Municipal Boards. According to the latest General Local Fund Report there were 818 members of the 34 Boards then in existence, or an average of 24·1 members on each Board. Of these, 400 members, or 48·8 per cent., were officials, and 418, or 51·2 per cent., were non-officials. Owing to the extensive charges of some of the official members, such as the Engineers and Inspectors of Schools, and their constant absence on tour, the attendance of these officers at the meetings is of necessity more or less irregular and infrequent.

27. *Independence of Boards.*—Taxation under the Local Fund Act is imposed by the Governor in Council, but Municipal taxes are imposed by the Commissioners with his approval. Government also has the power under the Local Fund Act, but not under the Municipal Act, of dictating the number and salaries of the Boards' employés. With these differences, the provisions of the two Acts as to the powers of Government are precisely similar, and neither gives Government power to dictate in particular cases, though both empower the Governor in Council to make rules for the application of funds. As already stated, no rules have been framed by Government under the Municipal Act, but there exists a body of minute rules, 176 in number, compiled by the Board of Revenue and prescribed by Government under the Local Funds Act in 1879. The power left to the Local Fund Boards by these rules and by the orders and practice of Government and the Board of Revenue, to whom the immediate superintendence of the Local Fund administration has been delegated, are comparatively small, and there is no doubt but that the application of these rules, and the restraints imposed by the audit of the Accountant-General, are fruitful sources of irritation and complaint on the part of the Local Boards.

28. *Sources of Revenue.*—The taxes leviable under the Local Fund Act are—

(1.) A rate or cess not exceeding 1 anna in the rupee on the annual rent-value of all occupied land on whatever tenure held.
(2.) A tax on houses, varying from 4 annas to 5 rupees per annum on each house.
(3.) Tolls upon carriages, carts, or animals passing along roads within the circle, varying from 1 anna to 8 annas.

"Provided that the tax on houses shall not be imposed except in villages or groups of villages, or townships, in which a school supported by a Government grant-in-aid already exists, or in which the inhabitants are prepared to establish a school under such rules as may, at the time, be in force in respect of educational grants-in-aid, or in which the Government shall determine to establish a school. Provided also that the net proceeds of all tolls, and not less than two-thirds of the rate or cess actually levied on the annual rent-value of occupied land, shall be applied to the construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and communications."

Besides the above taxes the Local Boards have many important sources of revenue of a miscellaneous character the nature and value of which will be apparent from the following abstract of receipts in 1879–80:—

	Rs.
Provincial Grant for Roads - - - -	65,387
Do. for Schools - - - -	4,670
Do. for General Purposes - - -	2,440
Pound Fund - - - - - -	41,818
Ferry Rents - - - - - -	1,06,012
Avenues - - - - - - -	47,736
Fish Rents - - - - - -	1,01,536

	Rs.
Grass Rents	188
Miscellaneous	3,080
Road Cess	652
Land Cess	43,71,643
Tolls	3,36,177
House Tax	833
School Fees	22,868
Contributions from Municipalities	16,256
Cess under Act VI. of 1863.	
Other Educational Receipts	934
Hospitals and Dispensaries	19,709
Choultries	2,91,585
Miscellaneous	3,033
Travellers' Bungalow Fees, &c.	8,232
Sale-proceeds of School-books, &c.	11,278
Market Rents	29,288
Fines and Penalties	5,742
Sale of Materials	705
Sale of other Property	1,290
Public Works Receipts and Refunds of Expenditure	1,19,198
Contributions from private Individuals in aid of Works	14,769
Miscellaneous	23,967
Capital Account of Loan.	
Miscellaneous Debt Accounts	18,111
Contribution from Provincial Services to meet the deficit in some Circles.	
Total	56,69,137

The income from taxation as opposed to other sources of revenue was Rs. 47,08,472, or only 2 annas and 7 pies per head of the Census population of 1881.

29. *Objects of Local Fund Expenditure.*—The funds raised under the Act are applicable to—

"(1.) The construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and communications.

"(2.) The diffusion of education, and, with this object in view, the construction and repair of school-houses, the maintenance of schools either wholly or by means of grants-in-aid, the inspection of schools, and the training of teachers.

"(3.) The construction and repair of hospitals, dispensaries, lunatic asylums, choultries, markets, tanks and wells, the payment of all charges connected with the objects for which such buildings have been constructed, the training and employment of vaccinators and medical practitioners, the sanitary inspection of towns and villages, the cleansing of the roads, streets, and tanks, and any other local works of public utility calculated to promote the health, comfort, or convenience of the people."

We do not propose in this preliminary report to examine in detail the extent to which these objects have been carried out, but the following few facts will show the large amount and great valve of the local work now being executed by Local Funds and Local Agency. In 1879–80 the expenditure on roads was Rs. 20,00,000, and for this sum 17,129 miles of road were maintained, 107 miles of new roads were completed, and 358 miles were in progress, besides 74 miles of new village roads constructed and 1,375 miles maintained in order. In fact, with one or two trifling exceptions, all the road communications of the country were maintained by the Local Fund Boards. Nearly Rs. 4,00,000 were spent on Education. As many as 145 Inspecting Schoolmasters were employed, and 12,298 schools were prepared for inspection. No less than 1,760 Local Fund Schools were maintained with over 46,000 pupils, while over 3,800 schools, with an attendance of 68,220 pupils, obtained grants-in-aid from Local Funds. Some 125 dispensaries were maintained at a cost of Rs. 2,31, 855 and gave relief to 14,419 in-patients and 603,919 out-patients. The Vaccine staff consisted of 37 Deputy Inspectors and 552 vaccinators, who protected 405,961 persons by vaccination. On the cleansing of tanks and wells and other sanitary works there was an expenditure of Rs. 2,18,405. There were 264 choultries in which over 2,000,000 persons received

food at a cost of Rs. 1,16,983, and 214 travellers' bungalows were maintained at a cost of Rs. 26,609 and gave shelter to 5,978 persons.

The following is the exact expenditure under each head, and it may be stated that it would have been considerably larger but for the restrictions placed on expenditure by the orders of Government after the famine. The balance at the close of the year was accordingly nearly 35 lakhs of rupees :—

GRANT I.

		Rs.
Communications	By Public Works Department	2,74,346
	„ Other Agency	44,189
Civil Buildings	By Public Works Department	19,924
	„ Other Agency	13,822
Miscellaneous Public Improvements.	By Public Works Department	2,593
	„ Other Agency	12,533

Repairs.

Communications	By Public Works Department	13,69,272
	„ Other Agency	2,34,284
Civil Buildings	By Public Works Department	7,400
	„ Other Agency	26,426
Miscellaneous Public Improvements.	By Public Works Department	24,477
	„ Other Agency	45,775
Public Works Supervision		4,24,855
Petty Establishment		21,422
Other Establishment		982
Tolls and Ferries		11,705
Tools and Plant		41,051
Contingencies		8,504
Contributions to Municipalities		8,645
Contributions to other Governments		11,973
Miscellaneous		724
	Total	26,04,902

GRANT II.

	Rs.
Inspection	69,189
Local Fund Training Schools	3,041
Do. Schools	2,34,064
Salary Grants	1,895
Results Grants	62,268
Purchase of Books	13,863
Contributions	1,000
Miscellaneous	1,739
Total	3,87,059

GRANT III.

	Rs.
Hospitals and Dispensaries	2,31,855
Vaccination	1,17,671
Medical Practitioners	3,125
Sanitary Establishment	2,18,381
Markets	9,502
Choultries	2,20,182
Bungalows	13,762
Contributions	80,662
Miscellaneous	55,891
Total	9,51,281

GRANT IV.

	Rs.
Presidency Establishment - - - - -	21,624
Collector's do. - - - - -	14,147
Local Fund Board's Establishment - - -	23,768
General Contingencies - - - - -	11,680
Total - -	71,219
Refund of Cess and Miscellaneous - - -	2,469
Repayment of Debt to Provincial Funds - -	1,68,844
Advance Recoverable - - - - -	2,125
Suspense Account - - - - -	11
Cash Recoveries - - - - -	11
Permanent Advances - - - - -	617
Capital Account of Loan - - - -	19,250
Total - -	22,014
Total Expenditure -	42,07,538

30. *Enlargement of the Scope of the existing System.*—We are of opinion that for the better organisation and development of Local Self-government it is desirable that it should proceed on the same lines as the general scheme of revenue administration prevailing in this Presidency in which the village is the unit of Government, complete in itself as regards its own interests, yet part of a circle and under its control as regards wider interests, such concentric circles or taluks being again subject to the general administrative superintendence of the head of the district.

31. On this principle we would propose to assign to all villagers the most elementary duties of the simplest rudiments of sanitation to the extent of just keeping themselves so clean that they shall cease to be the means of distributing cholera, &c., to their neighbours and on the principle of the spontaneous growth of self-government to attach permissive powers of further advancement in other directions, should the communities be so minded. We think also that they should have their own funds and their own Committees, purely native, nominated by the Taluk Committee, to whose general supervision they might be subject.

32. Each taluk again should, we think, form a Sub-Committee in part subordinated to, and in part independent of, the Central or District Board, which should be the administration centre of each district. Such Taluk Committees would be, in point of fact, the equivalent in many respects of our present Local Fund Boards, having very similar control over all that concerns themselves, and subject to the District Board only in matters involving the general administrative advantage of the district as a whole, and as a part of the Presidency.

33. The minimum number of the members of the Taluk Committee should, we think, be twelve, exclusive of the President and Vice-President. When the principle of election may be extended by Government, the proportion of members to be nominated by Government might, in our opinion, be one-third, and of those to be elected two-thirds, of the whole number, and, when all the members of a Taluk Committee are nominated by Government, not more than one-third, exclusive of the President and Vice-President, need be officials.

34. The Taluk Committees might be entitled to spend in their circles at least half of the money raised in them exclusive of Tolls and Ferry Rents, and, within the limits of those funds, themselves to sanction, without reference to the District Board, all estimates for new work costing not more than Rs. 200, all repairs costing not more than Rs. 500, to have full power over village roads, hospitals, and dispensaries, and, within certain powers of restriction by the District Board, to fix their own establishments, to have general control of such schools as they may establish, to have authority to

open new, and close existing, institutions, and generally to regulate all matters of a non-professional character to the extent now done by the Local Fund Board.

35. In our view the Taluk Committees should further have a voice in the District Board, which is in part to control them, by having the right each to elect two of their members, or such larger number as Government may from time time direct to represent them on the District Board, the numbers being fixed on the basis of the amount of land-cess contributed.

Thus the District Board would be, in large measure, representative of the Taluk Committees, and the control exercised by it in no danger of being unsympathising or uninformed, but on the contrary would have imparted to it an impartial character, capable of weighing the broader interests of the district.

36. The powers of the District Boards, again, might, in our opinion, be greatly enlarged, they being entrusted with the authority now exercised by the Board of Revenue, and subjected only to Government as Municipalities already are. In addition to exercising all the present powers of a Local Fund Board, it is proposed that they should have full power over district and local roads, determining which are district and which are village roads, sanctioning or amending, and incorporating in their own budgets the taluk annual budgets, and generally controlling the action of the Taluk Committees and allotting to each such further sums in excess of 50 per cent. as they may judge right to spend in any taluk.

37. It is proposed that the minimum number should be twenty-four exclusive of the Collector, the nominated officials not exceeding one-fourth exclusive of the President, with one non-official nominated by Government for every four taluk-elected representatives.

38. As regard subordinates, it is felt that they cannot serve many masters and must be held responsible for their conduct only to their immediate masters, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents, in the latter case with appeal, above certain limits, to the Presidents, and in the case of superior officials, such as Engineer and the like, with appeal to Government.

39. With the President and Vice-Presidents also must it rest in the District Boards and Taluk Committees, to give executive effect to the resolutions passed.

40. Whether in Municipalities Vice-Presidents may not advantageously be granted partial independence of Presidents is a matter under discussion.

41. But with reference to the Presidentship, whether of the Municipality or of the Local Fund Board, there is, in the opinion of this Committee, no question that it is imperative that it should continue, as a rule and for the present, to vest in the Collector of the district.

42. Even with Vice-Presidents also our general experience is that rarely indeed has any but an official been able to fill the position satisfactorily. Under the general guidance afforded by the official President there is, in existing circumstances of most Local Bodies, more real advance in the direction of self-government, more real freedom of discussion in the face of cliques of caste or interest, and more impartiality to unrepresented classes; while there is imparted also, in a manner that is very highly appreciated, a strength and prescience which is not to be acquired without administrative training and liberal education. The official, and especially the European official, Vice-President is the educator, the trusted mentor of the Committee. Without being subservient to him they are glad to be aided by him, and it is not be denied that his presence does more than anything else to encourage the attendance of the most respectable.

43. On the important question whether it is better to control from without or to lead from within we desired to inform ourselves, by a perusal of the reports from other provinces, in which the former principle might have been given a trial, and applied for such papers accordingly; but, having now to report before their receipt, we have to submit that, our experience being limited to the latter course, our impression is that it is the one to be naturally first adopted in the education of the people in the direction of self-government, and the safest also to continue for a time, because it brings the officers of Government and the people into constant cordial relationship in the combined endeavour hand in hand to benefit the country of their adoption and their birth respectively, teaching the former every day more and more of the wants

and growing tendencies of the latter, showing the latter at every step the earnest sympathy in the weal of the former and thus cementing a bond of union. At the same time power should be taken for Government at once to fairly try the experiment of control from without in such towns or districts as it might think suitable.

44. We are, therefore, of opinion that, as a rule, the Divisional Officer, be he European or Native, should be nominated Vice-President of the Taluk Committees in his division, though at the same time we would make provision for the elective principle being tried in such selected places as Government might, from time to time, think ripe for it.

45. In this connexion it has been been urged by natives of experience that the inability of their countrymen to take advantage of their electoral opportunities, and to act without official aid, in the management of their own religious endowments (Act XX. of 1863) over a period of nearly twenty years' trial, afford strong presumptive evidence that neither in local self-government would they do better. Without attaching too much weight, however, to the inference, and allowing for possible explanation, the fact remains remarkable that a strong desire to return to official superintendence is very generally expressed, and that the absence of it is the cause commonly assigned for the mismanagement, malversation, and decay, which is the rule. The position might be further illustrated by like failures when self-government has been experimentally left to itself in Municipal matters.

46. As regard funds, the Committee, after making allowance for all that may be surrendered from pound and ferry receipts, are adverse to laying any increased burden of land cess on the people generally, preferring that, for special purposes, in limited areas, they should have the liberty to tax themselves by fees or otherwise. Thus, for instance, have weekly markets been opened, improved, and greatly extended to the marked advantage of the agriculturist and of trade, the fees derived therefrom being constituted a separate fund for their maintenance and extension. On this principle the Committee would make for the people an opening for taxing themselves in such ways as may be most consonant with their own ideas, reserving to Government the power only of veto in the event of their proposing anything imperially injurious or sectionally partial. Fees on marriage pandals, the power of fining for encroachments on their own streets, and such like might be set forth as indicative of the direction which such permissive taxation might take, and the people's following up of the opening given might prove instructive, and would at least have the merit of saving Government from unpopularity in connexion with such self-selected taxation. In villages in which there are temple cars the villagers already exercise a strict rule in maintaining wide streets free of all encroachments. If with the powers and objects above indicated they can be induced to do so everywhere, it will be greatly in favour of the public health and convenience.

47. In this connexion it seems worthy of consideration whether the village site now given gratis by Government might not, under some restrictions against caste partialities, be assigned to village communities as a source of revenue from which to effect their own healthy cleanliness. A light assessment on the superficial area of houses and backyards would, as in revenue matters, be also a convenient way of ascertaining when an absent tenant meant to retain or resign his site, and would prevent the long continuance of ruined houses, ruins which only harbour snakes to the sad mortality of villagers, ruins nevertheless which no one dares to remove because of the uncertainty of the legal position, ruinous sites which are also unsanitary.

48. *Municipalities.*—As noted in the historical sketch of the existing position, there is little left that can be done for the enlargement of the powers of Municipal Commissioners, but some additional Municipalities may probably be created in towns where competent official assistance is available, and the freedom from Police upkeep utilised in the ways indicated by the Government of India. The election principle may also be extended to a greater number of Municipalies and the proportion of the Commissioners to be elected raised from one-half to three-fourths.

49. But the Committee look for more advance in this direction by constituting a far larger number of minor Municipalities, not at the outset under the Municipal Act and independent of Local Boards, but primarily under the limited tutelage of Taluk

Committees, with liberty when educated to take upon themselves the wider duties, responsibilities, and expenses of independent Municipal existence.

50. Not only in this matter and others touched above, but generally, the Committee are of opinion that self-government, if is to be vigorous, healthy, and useful, must, in some measure, be a matter of self-growth, that with all legitimate fostering there must still be some struggling roots, some indication of pushing leaves before we can require a stem to stand above and bear fruit. Therefore we would desire to give to any new Act that may be framed a largely permissive, rather than a compulsory, character. We would make the compulsory duties comparatively few and well-considered, the openings for growth many and wide, so that the Government of India may be satisfied that this Presidency is as ready as heretofore to continue in the matter of Self-Government the advance which it has already made if only it can assure itself of safe ground to tread on.

51. So many and wide, indeed, are the openings which, in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India, we have proposed, that we are not without serious misgivings that practical difficulties may possibly arise, and in that contemplation consider it only prudent to suggest provision being made for the Local Government having power to extricate itself by falling back, whenever it may find it necessary, on lines like those already found to work well in the existing Acts III. and IV. of 1871. That the Local Government should be deprived of all power of extrication, such action "requiring in every case the consent of the Supreme Government," might prove inconvenient.

52. In conclusion, while submitting this preliminary report, we feel that further scrutiny may show us, as we advance, that points here and there may hereafter require to be modified to bring them into harmony with other parts of the scheme, and we do not desire so to bind ourselves as not to be free as we proceed to do our best by the whole scheme. Some points, moreover, have been as yet so very partially considered that we are unprepared to pass even a general opinion on them. It is due also to our absent colleagues to mention that the opportunity for consulting them before submitting this preliminary report has been wanting. It is anticipated that convenient occasion therefor and for further enlarging the numbers of the Native Members of this Committee will shortly present itself, and we should prefer to have delayed this report till that had been done.

H. S. THOMAS, President.
E. F. WEBSTER.
H. B. GRIGG.
J. O. HASTED, Colonel, R.E.
H. W. BLISS.
J. H. M. SHAW-STEWART.
W. R. CORNISH.
RALPH S. BENSON, Secretary.

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS ORDER—dated 20th October, 1882, No. 1531, Financial.

The paper recorded above contains the preliminary observations of the Committee (consisting partly of Europeans and partly of Natives) to which was entrusted the duty of reporting upon the views and instructions of the Government of India in their bearing on the question of Local Self-government in the Madras Presidency after full communication alike with the officers of this Government and with the most authoritative exponents of indigenous South Indian opinion.

Resolutions—
30th September 1881, No. 3353.
10th October „ „ 3515.
18th May 1882, No. 17—747–59, in letter, 31st May 1882, No. 930.
30th June 1882, No. 2078.

2. It is gathered from the Resolutions of the Government of India that the points as to which the Governor-General in Council is chiefly anxious are—

(1.) That in the larger towns and more advanced rural districts election should be the rule, not the exception.

(2.) That in such towns and districts the Chairman should usually not be an official.

3. The sketch which the Committee have submitted indicates the mode in which the elective franchise has been extended to the larger towns* in this Presidency, and, although the privilege may have been sometimes abused and sometimes neglected, there is no reason on the whole to complain of the working of representative institutions in the rural Municipalities.

4. The report further shows that, though in the districts the elective system has not yet been tried, the working of the Local Fund Boards, as at present organised, has been decidedly good.

5. The Government regard with much satisfaction the very great progress that has been made in recent years, and believe that such progress would not have been so great if the maxim *festiña lentè* had not guided the action heretofore taken, but at the same time they are far from thinking that the hour has not come for a decided, although cautious, advance along the whole line in the direction of the further development of local liberties.

6. It would be easy to find not merely conservative, but very advanced liberal, authority for the doctrine that, "if a principle, however progressive it may appear, " can compromise all that has been acquired, it should not be enunciated," Nothing, however, could be further than this from the proposals now under consideration. What this Government are asked to do is only to build higher upon old lines. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council finds, therefore, no difficulty in agreeing to the first of the leading principles mentioned above. He is prepared to increase the number of towns in which the Municipal body is elected, and to introduce election into the more advanced rural districts tentatively at first, but in the full belief that it will soon be possible to increase the number of Local Fund Boards, which are not nominated, but elected.

7. As to the second leading principle, the Collector has hitherto been the President of all Municipalities and Local Fund Boards, wielding, in the former case, often a merely nominal authority, for it is clear that in most Municipal Boards the people have virtually managed their own affairs. His Excellency in Council considers that it will be perfectly safe to go beyond the suggestions on this point now submitted to him in the report read above, and to affirm the principle that in the larger towns, as well as in the more advanced rural districts, the Chairman should not usually be an official.

8. Though, however, the Collector may in most cases cease to be the President, or even a Member of the Municipalities and Local Fund Boards in his district, none the less will it be his duty to act as the adviser and guide of all these organisations, and to report for the orders of Government every case in which he thinks that the action of any of them may be likely to lead to seriously injurious effects.

9. The Government of India, as His Excellency the Governor in Council apprehends, are by no means desirous of leaving a number of bodies, many of which must in the nature or things be inexperienced, to find their own way through the pitfalls and mazes of local administration without help, but there is a wide difference between keeping people in leading strings and emancipating them from all control, the whole difference in fact, which is usually found between the treatment of childhood and adolescence. Occasions may of course arise in which local circumstances or peculiar conjunctures may require a different arrangement, and the Government, therefore, have reserved to themselves the power of directing their representative to assume the presidency of any local organisation, but the occasions for such a step will, it is believed, be always rare, and as the practical education of the people in the management of their own local affairs will continually advance, this power may at length, it is hoped, be permitted to fall into desuetude.

10. There can be no doubt that, as the prosperity and intelligence of the country increase, demands will be made upon the administration which it will be quite impos-

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* Trichinopoly. Madura. Bellary. | Tanjore. Salem. Calicut. | Negapatam. Kumbakónam. Ootacamund. | Cuddalore. Tinnevelly. Mangalore.

sible to supply through direct official agency, and it will be more and more necessary to relieve the highly-paid and elaborately-trained European Superintendents of work which can be, if not at first as well, at least very tolerably done by less trained and often unpaid ability. His Excellency the Governor in Council finds in this consideration a strong argument in favour of the views of the Government of India, altogether apart from the duty of advancing the political education of the people, a duty to which he is far from omitting to attach importance.

11. The Committee have noticed another principle to which the Government of India have called special attention, viz., that the administrative unit of Local Government in rural districts should be smaller than it has been. The suggestion will, of course, be considered more in detail when the Committee have had time to elaborate their recommendations; but meanwhile His Excellency in Council desires to remark that he is in no way disinclined to admit the principle, regard, of course, being had to the nature of particular tracts of country and the diffusion of elementary education within the same.

12. In thus recording his observations on the most salient points connected with this important question for the guidance of the Committee in their further deliberations, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council would further remark that the powers reserved in the 17th paragraph of the resolution* of the Government of India are absolutely necessary to the safety of the changes which are to be made. For a long time to come such acts as the raising of loans, the imposition of taxes in other than duly authorised form, the alienation of Municipal property, or interference with any matters involving religious questions, or affecting the public peace, will require to remain under the control of the executive authority. With these safeguards there is not, in his Excellency's opinion, any doubt of the success of the suggested experiments in this part of India.

13. The Committee are thanked for their most useful labours, and requested to continue them with a view to laying before Government a further exposition of their views, and draft Acts practically applying them, regard being had to the principles affirmed in this Order.

C. G. MASTER,
Chief Secretary.

To the Secretary to the Committee on
Local Self-government.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

Home Department.
Public, 1773.

SIR, Simla, November 6, 1882.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1532, dated the 20th ultimo, forwarding a copy of a preliminary report by the Committee appointed under the orders of the Government of Madras to consider the question of Local Self-Government in the Madras Presidency, together with the remarks passed by His Excellency the Governor in Council thereupon.

2. In reply, I am to convey the thanks of the Governor-General in Council to the Government of Madras for the important steps which are being taken by them with a view to carrying out in the Madras Presidency the policy of the Government of India as laid down in the Resolution of the 18th May, 1882.

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* Dated 18th May 1882, No. 17—747–59.

From F. C. DAUKES, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, to THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS, THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES, THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Home, Rev. & Agri. Dept. / Municipalities, No. 4 / 70/76.

Sir,

Simla, May 10, 1881.

I am directed to request that with the permission of His Excellency the / His Honour the Governor in Council / Lieutenant-Governor you will be good enough to furnish the Government of India with a copy of any rules which may have been issued by the Government of Madras, Bombay, &c. / you under sec. 9 of the Towns Improvement Act No. III. of 1871 (M.C.), and sec. 11 of the City of Madras Municipal Act No. V. of 1878 (M.C.), 7 cl. of the Bombay District Municipal Act No. VI. of 1873 (Bo. C.), and sec. 9 B of the Bombay Municipal Amendment and Continuance Act No. IV. of 1878, 16 of the Bengal Municipal Act V. of 1876 (B.C.), and sec. 17 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act IV. of 1876 (B.C.), 6 of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Municipalities Act No. XV. of 1873, 6 of the Punjab Municipal Act No. IV. of 1873, 6 of the Central Provinces Municipal Act No. XI. of 1873, 6 of the Punjab Municipal Act No. IV. of 1873, for the purpose of regulating the elections of Municipal Commissioners. The Governor General in Council would also be glad to be furnished with a brief report showing the degree of success which has attended the elective system in those Municipalities of the Madras Presidency, Bombay Presidency (including Sind), the Lower Provinces, the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, the Punjab, the Central Provinces, Berar, in which that system has been introduced.

From The Hon. R. DAVIDSON, C.S.I., Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(No. 1404.)

Sir,

Ootacamund, August 3, 1881.

With reference to your letter of the 10th May 1881, No. 4–70, I am directed to forward six copies each of the Election Rules issued under Section 9 of Madras Act III. of 1871 and Section 11 of Madras Act V. of 1878, and to state that at Madras the first election was a success, while a second proved a failure; that in the Provinces the right of election was conferred on the nine towns, noted in the margin, from September 1879, and that in only four* of these have vacancies as yet occurred for introducing the system. The reports received show that the first election held in Negapatam was a marked success, while a subsequent one ended in failure. In Tanjore the first election was not altogether satisfactory, while the second was a failure, and the Government were obliged to exercise their right of nomination. In Bellary there have been two elections, the results of both of which were poor, only a small proportion of votes being polled on each occasion, and the number of candidates being limited. In Trichinopoly the results of the election reported were equally unsatisfactory. The failures appear to have been due to the unfamiliarity of the people with the system, and also to the disinclination of the respectable classes to offer themselves as candidates at the risk of possible defeat.

Trichinopoly.	Calicut.
Madura.	Negapatam.
Bellary.	Kumbakónam.
Tanjore.	Ootacamund.
Salem.	

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* Negapatam. | Tanjore. | Bellary. | Trichinopoly.

From J. B. PEILE, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, General Department, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(No. 3510.)

Sir, Bombay Castle, October 20, 1881.

In replying to your letter, No. 4–71 of May 10th, on the subject of the working of the elective system in Municipalities, I am to express the regret of His Excellency in Council that the answer has been so long delayed, and to explain that the recent appointment of the present Municipal Commissioner of Bombay caused him to misunderstand the object of a reference made to him on the subject, and to suppose that an exhaustive statement, including an exposition of those provisions of the Municipal Act which appear to require amendment, was expected. I am directed to enclose copy of a letter from the Chairman of the Town Council of Bombay, in which he states his opinion on the working of the elective system in that city.

2. I am to say that the elective principle in the Municipality of Bombay, as constituted by the principal Act of 1872 and the amendment and continuance Act of 1878, has, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, worked well. A seat in the Municipal Corporation or Town Council is deemed desirable by men of consequence and high position in both the European and Native communities, and some of the most distinguished professional men take a leading part in municipal affairs. The works executed by the Municipality are conceived on a liberal scale and are carried out with the utmost attainable efficiency.

3. It is noticeable that the elective principle, though not extending to the whole of the Corporation, leads to a considerable numerical preponderance of Natives, although in the Town Council or Executive Committee enough Europeans have been elected to compose with the nominated members a bare majority of Europeans. The harmony and cordial co-operation long existing between the Native and European elements of the population of Bombay are nowhere more seen than in the Municipal Government.

4. On the other hand, there is perceptible in the municipal body a tendency to exhibit a certain jealousy of the Government, an impatience of control, and an inclination to claim as a right concessions, such as the subsidy to the police expenditure, over which Government has retained a discretionary power. His Excellency in Council therefore, is of opinion that it is necessary that the limitations now imposed on the elective principle of the nomination by Government of a certain part of the members of the Corporation and of the Town Council, and the appointment by Government of the Municipal Commissioner, as well as the special powers possessed by that officer, should be maintained.

5. I am to say that demands for an elective constitution have been made to Government from time by other Municipalities in the Presidency, including those of Poona and Ahmedabad, but Government have not hitherto thought it judicious to grant the request of any of them. His Excellency in Council thinks that at some future period, when intelligence and public spirit have made more progress, greater powers of self-government may be granted to the larger towns of this Presidency, but such a concession must be gradual, and at present would be decidedly premature. In Poona especially a spirit of opposition to the Government is likely to be displayed.

6. I have the honour to forward as desired a copy of the rules* framed by Government under section 9 B. of the Acts of 1872 and 1878.

From Brigade-Surgeon H. COOK, M.D., Principal, Grant Medical College, and Chairman of the Town Council, to THE UNDER SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, Revenue Department.

(No. 254.)

Sir, 1881.

In acknowledging the recipt of your letter No. 3090—82 (Confidential) of the 19th current, I have the honour to reply to the four questions therein put, in the following remarks.

2. The Municipality of Bombay consists of a Town Council and Corporation. The latter and larger body is elected by three agencies—one-half by the ratepayers of the

* *See* page 129 of Appendix.

city, one-fourth by the Justices of the Peace, and one-fourth by Government. Inasmuch as the Justices are a body selected by Government, there is to a certain, though perhaps limited, extent, a conservative and electic element in this section of electors tending towards the support of more enlightened measures, and as such to the support of Government influence, as opposed to the possibly lower tendencies influencing the bulk of the people. In the discussion of the great questions which have from time to time agitated the body corporate, I have, I think, been able to recognise these elements.

The proportionate elective power thus distributed is, I think, fairly allotted, and I do not recommend, after some careful thought, that it should be disturbed. Supposing that Government carefully selects its nominees, I think it should wield a sufficient influence. I am of opinion that the degree of success attending the system is on the whole satisfactory.

The Town Council (consisting of 12 Members) is a very important element of city administration. It originates all new works and measures, and by means of its sub-committees gives very careful consideration to each in detail; its members have (or should have) a close personal knowledge of the needs of the city, and the mode of working of the various divisions and sections of the Municipal Office and staff, in each respect superior to that of the Members of the Corporation. That this body should be carefully selected is self-evident. Two-thirds are elected by the Corporation and one-third is nominated by Government, which also appoints the Chairman, who having a casting vote possibly numerically strengthens the Government element in the Council.

The Native electors have of late shown a greater determination to keep these places for members of their own community; and on the last occasion elected only one European out of the eight Members (Sir F. Souter), and this election was probably made from special motives. Up to the present time the election for the Council has worked fairly. There is perhaps some risk that in the future the popular element may prove too strong, but the emergency is not yet existing.

3. Character and qualifications of elected Members, and also their capacity for business :—

The Members of the Corporation are selected from three classes of the inhabitants : (*a*) ratepayers to the value of Rs. 30 per annum, (*b*) Fellows of the University, and (*c*) Justices of the Peace (who from not having establishment may not be ratepayers).

The character, social position, and enlightenment of the ratepayers elected by their fellows are doubtless influenced by the level fixed of the annual payment. I think the rate was placed somewhat perilously low, as a first experiment, and that the franchise certainly should not be extended, at least until education has been much more widely diffused. Perhaps for two principal reasons, 1st, because the lower the class of Native Members elected, the less likely will it be that the better and more qualified Members of the European section of the inhabitants will offer themselves as candidates; and 2ndly, that the class and caste influences here form a danger far greater than exists in England, and possibly than in Ireland, I mean the personal influence exerted by the leaders, religious and social.

As regards the actual (Native) members of the Town Council, I am of opinion that the intelligence, education, mercantile capacity, and social influence of the several sections of society are fairly represented by them, and that questions which do not directly trench on religious feeling, or innate Native prejudices, are, as a rule, effectively and intelligently dealt with. It could hardly be, that with present enlightenment, more could be expected.

4. With reference to the last question put (general result of the system), I am of opinion that it works satisfactorily on the whole. The city has made vast strides in improvement in the condition of the streets and roads (paving, lighting, straightening, widening, and cleanliness) and(to a growing extent) of the houses of the people sanitarily, in its water-supply, in case of communication (railways, tramways, and, recently, public conveyances), in police arrangements, and in general health (especially as regards cholera and small-pox epidemic), and these improvements may fairly be ascribed to the effecient working of the Municipal system. A more efficient system of sub-soil drainage and sewage will, I trust, speedily follow.

From H. M. KISCH, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(Municipal, No. 603.)

Sir, Calcutta, July 12, 1881.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Daukes' letter No. 11—72, dated the 10th ultimo, requesting that the Government of India may be furnished with copies of any rules which may have been issued by this Government under section 16 of the Bengal Municipal Act V. (B.C.) of 1876 and section 17 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876, for the purpose of regulating the election of Municipal Commissioners, together with a brief report showing the degree of success which has attended the elective system in those municipalities of the Lower Provinces in which that system has been introduced.

2. In reply, I am desired to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the elective system is in force in Calcutta and in only three places in the interior of Bengal, namely, Serámpore, Burdwan, and Kishnaghur. In Calcutta it was introduced under Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876, and in the municipalities outside Calcutta under Act II. (B.C.) of 1873 before the Bengal Municipal Act V. (B.C.) of 1876 came into force; that is to say, in Serampore in December 1873, in Burdwan in June 1875, and in Kishnaghur in December 1875. Copies of the rules* regarding the election of Commissioners now in force in the four municipalities are herewith submitted.

3. Nothing is said in the reports as to the degree of success which has attended the elective system in Kishnaghur, but it may be presumed that it has worked there without friction. The results, however, of the several elections which have been held since the introduction of the system do not show any intelligent appreciation on the part of the ratepayers of the franchise conferred on them. At the first general election, which was held on the 16th March 1876, the number of votes recorded was only 176. Only 17 condidates appeared for election, though there were 15 vacancies. In the following year the number of votes recorded at the election rose to 770. There were six vacancies for which ten candidates were nominated by the ratepayers. For two years after this there were no contested elections, a single nomination having been made on the occurrence of each vacancy. At the last election, held on the 20th March 1881, the number of votes recorded fell to 247. There were six vacancies for which seven candidates were nominated. Five of the vacancies were uncontested, while the remaining one was contested by two candidates. The attendance of the elected Commissioners at the meetings has on the whole been fair. During the past year, there were held 16 meetings; one elected Commissioner attended the full number of meetings, four attended on an average 12, and nine on an average 6, meetings; one Commissioner did not signify his consent at the time of his election. There were therefore only 14 elected Commissioners instead of 15 during the year.

4. In Burdwan, the first general election was held on the 5th June 1876, when 12 Commissioners were elected out of 21 candidates. The number of persons who voted on this occasion was 649. No contested elections appear to have taken place after this till the year 1880, when eight candidates were nominated for the three existing vacancies. The number of votes recorded was 240. In the current year again there has been no contested election. There has been a gradual improvement in the attendance of the elected Commissioners. During the past year 17 meetings were held; one Commissioner attended 15, one 12, one 10, two 9, two 8, three 6, one 5, and one 3, meetings. The Chairman of the Municipality thus speaks of the working of the system:—"The elective system is gradually attaining popularity and favour with "the towns-people. There has been an increase during each successive year in the "number of voters attending the polling stations, the candidates themselves exercis- "ing every effort to obtain a seat on the committee. The Municipal Commissioners "greatly appreciate the dignity of their office, and have given evidence of their "appreciation by a more regular attendance at meetings, and by the warm interest "which they manifest in the administration of the affairs of the municipality."

5. In Serampore, the elective system has not proved a success. Since its introduction in 1873 there has been a considerable falling off in the number of persons attending the polling stations. Out of a total number of 5,569 qualified ratepayers in 1873, only 1,793 could be induced to record their votes. In 1875 there were eight candidates for five vacancies, and the number of recorded votes was only 673. In

* *See* page 132 of Appendix.

1876 there were 13 candidates for seven vancancies; the number of qualified ratepayers was 6,395, but only 635 cared to exercise the franchise. In 1878 there were 11 candidates for seven vacancies; the number of votes recorded was only 318. In no case did any of the elected Commissioners poll as many as 300 votes, while in the majority of instances the successful candidates polled less than 100 votes. In reporting on the election in 1879, the Commissioner of Burdwan said that the elective system in Serampore was shown to have no real interest for the majority of the inhabitants, who preferred that the administration should be carried out for them by responsible officers. He considered that it was quite unsuited to the circumstances of Serampore, and was liable to serious misunderstanding and abuse. Objection was taken to some of the Commissioners who were elected, one of whom had induced a large number of persons to come to the polling station to vote for him, on the understanding that they would get a remission of the taxes through his influence. In order to prevent the return of such individuals and to ensure the election of proper persons, the rules for the conduct of elections were last year revised and additional rules were passed defining the qualifications of voters and candidates for election. An election was lately held under the new rules, but the result has not been satisfactory. The rules appear not to have been understood by the people, as several persons, who were not eligible for election under the new rules presented themselves for candidature, and were consequently rejected. The consequence has been that some of the vacancies among the Commissioners have not been filled up. A further report on the subject from the local authorities is awaited.

6. In Calcutta, the working of the elective system has not been satisfactory. The results of the two elections held since the passing of Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876 contain the plainest evidence that the great majority of the qualified ratepayers of Calcutta regard the election of their municipal representatives with absolute indifference, and that they have no desire whatever to exercise the franchise which has been conferred upon them. The result of the second election held in October 1879, though slightly better than that of the first election in 1876, was still very far from what it might have been had the elective system been at all popular with the greater portion of the ratepayers. The number of persons registered as qualified to vote was 7,004 against 4,994 in 1876, but it was still small in proportion to the number of persons qualified to vote. Of the total number registered, 6,025 were Hindus, 604 were Mahomedans, and 375 belonged to other races. Only 5,093 voted against 4,158 in 1876, while in six wards out of the 18, the number actually showed a decrease. In only three wards did more than 500 persons vote, while in nine the number was less than 250, and in four less than 100. Of the 48 Commissioners, 11 were elected by less than 100 votes each, and 23 by less than 200, while only five polled more than 500 votes. In ward No. 18 only nine persons voted for the election of two Commissioners. Many of the ablest and most useful members of the old municipality have not unnaturally shrunk from the disagreeable process of a public canvass, a proceeding singularly distasteful to the ideas of native gentlemen. Nearly all the European members have avoided candidature, and have also, most unfortunately for the interests of the town, shrunk from serving as nominated members with the elected Commissioners. The elections have introduced into the municipality some ambitious young men, whose chief aim is to bring themselves before the public, and acquire notoriety as speakers, much to the detriment of real business. The more the men of this class push themselves forward, the more do the real working men—men of substance and strong interest in the welfare of the town—shrink from participation in the management of municipal affairs. When so little interest is taken in the election, and so few men come forward as candidates, any pushing man can manage to get together enough votes to ensure his election. In the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion it is much to be regretted that the elective system has been prematurely introduced into India. The people at large are not yet ready for anything of the sort. If more patience had been shown in this respect, and the elective system postponed for another generation, it might perhaps have taken substantial root in the country. As it is, the system has been discredited, and is not appreciated by any but a few self-seeking restless men. An attempt has been made to rear a foreign plant on soil in no way prepared for it, and the services of the men who would be most useful in municipal administration have thus been lost.

From the SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 630 of 1881.)

Sir, Naini Tal, September 7, 1881.

I am directed to acknowledge your No. $\frac{4}{73}$, dated 10th May last, and in reply to submit for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, copies of the rules* issued by this Government for regulating the election of municipal commissioners in the towns of Meerut, Bareilly, Allahabad, Benares, and Jaunpur.†

2. I am also to forward copies of the papers noted on the margin, being reports by the Commissioners on the working of the elective system in those municipalities of their respective divisions in which it is in force. The general result is that very little interest is taken in the elections by the people, who are very apathetic and indifferent as a rule; and though the system has ceased to be a novelty, it cannot yet be said to have taken root and to be bearing any fruit. It would, however, be premature as yet to expect different results. Institutions of a durable and thoroughly popular kind grow very slowly. They cannot be forced on the people. The attempt made to introduce a system of popular election ought not, therefore, to be condemned. In time it may be hoped that the people will take more interest in the proceedings and composition of the committees; and the system, as remarked by Mr. E. Colvin, Commissioner of Meerut, contains the germ from which popular representation may eventually spring.

From Commissioner, Kumaun Division, No. 524, dated 13th June, 1881.
From Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division, No. 1603, dated 15th June, 1881, and enclosure.
From Officiating Commissioner, Agra Division, No. $\frac{4260}{\text{XXII.-100}}$, dated 22nd July, 1881, and enclosure.
From Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division, No. $\frac{41\text{ C.}}{\text{XIX.}}$, dated 30th July, 1881, and enclosure.
From Commissioner, Allahabad Division, No. $\frac{3438}{270}$, dated 1st August, 1881.
From Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, No. $\frac{294}{\text{XIX.-146}}$, dated 4th August, 1881, and enclosure.
From Officiating Commissioner, Jhánsi Division, No. $\frac{1757}{\text{XIX.-43}}$, dated 8th August, 1881.

From the SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 700 of 1881.)

Sir, Naini Tal, September 24, 1881.

In continuation of my No. 630, dated 7th September, I am directed to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, copies of the papers noted on the margin, being a report on the working of the elective system in the municipalities of the Benares Division.

From Commissioner, Benares Division, No. 255, dated 6th September, and enclosures.

From W. M. YOUNG, Esq., SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(No. 300.)

Sir, Lahore, September 5, 1881.

With reference to Home Department's No. 4–74, dated 10th May last, I am desired to forward copies of the rules‡ framed under Section 6 of Act IV. of 1873, (the Punjab Municipal Act), for the purpose of regulating the election of Municipal Commissioners at Murree, Dalhousie, Dharmsala, Amritsar, and Lahore.

2. At Murree the results of the working of the system are reported to have been far from satisfactory, year after year house agents who are also householders have been elected and re-elected. They are always residents, while other householders are not, the majority of these do not vote at all therefore. The house agents exercise

* *See* page 137 of Appendix. † *See* page 142 of Appendix. ‡ *See* page 150 of Appendix.

considerable influence amongst the native community containing the majority of voters, and are therefore certain of their seats on the Committee. They are said to be more devoted to their own interests than to those of the public.

3. At Dalhousie and Dharmsala it has been necessary to resort to nomination, as it was found that the house proprietors did not appear to appreciate the privilege conferred on them. At Amritsar last year also it was found neccessary to nominate the members as only 17 candidates offered for the 16 vacancies. At Lahore the system seems to have worked well as regards the election of the native members, but the European community here, as at Dalhousie and Dharmsala, do not appear to appreciate the privilege conferred, and it was found necessary this year to nominate a person to represent European interests.

From L. NEILL, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 2895—100.)

Sir, Nagpur, August 6, 1881.

I am directed to reply to your letter No. 4—75, dated 10th May, requesting—

(*a*) a copy of any rules issued by the Chief Commissioner under section 6 of the Central Provinces Municipal Act (XI. of 1873) for the purpose of regulating the elections of Municipal Commissioners;

(*b*) a brief report showing the degree of success which has attended the election system in the Municipalities of the Central Provinces.

2. A copy of Notification No. 3199, dated 11th September 1874, issuing rules for the election of persons to be members of the Nagpur Municipal Committee, is appended, The same or very similar rules apply to all other Municipal Committees in the Central Provinces, and the elective system may be said to be general. This system was, however, already in force prior to the passing of Act XI. of 1873, and under instructions issued by former Chief Commissioners elections were annually held. The yearly recurrence of such elections was found to cause trouble and inconvenience. Frequent (possible) changes of members was an idea not in consonance with Native custom and feeling, while frequent changes were found to be a source of administrative inconvenience. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, in framing the rules, a copy of which is sent, took the opportunity of providing (rule 5) that a general election should only be held every three years.

3. In the present letter the Chief Commissioner will report on the working of the election system in the towns of Nagpur, Jubbulpore, Harda, and Seoni (in the Jubbulpore Division). These towns may be considered as typical. Nagpur is the head-quarters of the administration; and there, more than anywhere else, it may be expected that new ideas may make way, while at the same time in an old town there are conservative tendencies and associations which go far to counteract any sweeping novelties. Jubbulpore is a more modern town, but one in which, owing to the considerable number of European inhabitants and visitors, and to its geographical position, new institutions have a good field for development. Harda is a new and rising town, a creation of the railway, while Seoni (the head-quarter town of the district of that name in the Jubbulpore Division) is a town somewhat remote from external traffic, but still with a population of sufficient magnitude to enable the electors to exercise a choice in the selection of representatives.

4. According to the Census of 1872 (corrected in some instances by later special enumerations) the population of these towns was—

Nagpur	84,441
Jubbulpore	62,641
Harda	13,003
Seoni	9,557

At first starting we are confronted with the difficulty of determining the approximate number of voters or electors. An elector is defined to be (rule 4) a male householder of full age who has his residence, or chief place of business, in a ward, and possesses a livelihood without resort to charity. The Chief Commissioner inclines to think that, roughly speaking, one in every eight of the town population may be considered as

entitled to vote at municipal elections. This calculation would give us the following number of electors :—

At Nagpur - - - - - -	10,550
Jubbulpore - - - - - -	7,800
Harda - - - - - - -	1,600
Seoni - - - - - - -	1,200

The Chief Commissioner has called in from district officers the returns showing the results of previous elections, and from these has obtained the following statistics.

5. At Nagpur elections were held in 1869, 1870, 1871, 1874, 1877, and 1880.

In 1869 the recorded votes numbered			- - -	4,607
1870	,,	,,	,, - - -	3,896
1871	,,	,,	,, - - -	3,257
1874	,,	,,	,, - - -	5,998
1877	,,	,,	,, - - -	4,307
1880	,,	,,	,, - - -	1,650

It is essential to remember that these are the recorded votes; and that where only one candidate presented himself for election, or where the show of hands was conclusive, the votes were, as a rule, not recorded. There are 16 wards in the town of Nagpur, and consequently 16 elected Municipal Commissioners; and in 1874 votes were only recorded in 13 wards, viz., 250, 185, 714, 70, 507, 108, 978, 803, 326, 322, 393, 800, 542.

Again in 1877 votes were recorded in 13 wards, viz., 23, 104, 100, 500, 165, 375, 170, 2,000, 157, 420, 76, 112, 105.

At the election of 1880, 13 was again the number of wards in which votes were recorded, viz., 6, 95, 49, 25, 500, 60, 265, 125, 132, 30, 225, 88, 50.

These figures seem to show than when elections are annual, more interest is taken and more voters give a vote. The years in which most interest in the elections seem to have been taken are 1869 and 1874. From the papers before him, the Chief Commissioner leans to the opinion that the greater interest evinced in those years was due to the action of Government and Government officers.

Mr. (now Sir) George Campbell, in March 1868, issued instructions to ensure a really popular election at Nagpur. His instructions, some of which were general and others special, to Nagpur said—

" It will not be necessary to record the votes of those who do not choose to attend and vote; but the district officers are requested to use their influence to induce the people to take an interest in the matter and to give their votes. It should be our object to ensure that all classes may be fairly represented, and especially that the labouring classes, who cannot easily make themselves heard, may have those who will speak for them and take care of their interests.

" It is not to be expected that the interest felt in these elections will be great at first; but the Chief Commissioner believes that if the people find that their representatives have a real voice in their taxation and municipal management, an interest will spring up and substantial Self-Government may be gradually introduced. Whenever the Commissioners have not been duly and properly elected under rules previously promulgated, elections will now be held under those instructions," &c., &c.

The larger number of votes recorded in 1869 may, therefore, with reason be attributed to the attention which the District Officer paid to the instructions of 1868. Similarly, it seems that the election of 1874, being the first that was held under the new rules (copy annexed), framed in that year, attracted greater attention and interest. The District Officer was at pains to select proper polling officers, and to explain to them the procedure they should follow in assembling, election, &c., &c.

6. From Jubbulpore the returns are very defective. They show the result of one election and the votes of the successful candidates only. In the election little interest seems to have been taken, and the recorded votes barely exceed 300 in number.

7. At the last municipal election, which took place at Harda in 1879, 13 candidates presented themselves for election, of whom 7 corresponding to the number of wards were elected, and the electors who voted were close on 1,200. This is a large number; but it has in several of the Annual Municipal Administration Reports been noticed that at Harda the Municipal Commissioners take special interest in their duties; and it would seem that the people take an equal interest in electing representatives. In fact, it is reported that so keen is the interest felt at Harda in municipal elections, that

rude forms of canvassing have been introduced—a novelty which is reported in regard to no other town.

8. At the last elections held at Seoni there were 17 candidates for seats in the five wards into which the town is for electoral purposes divided, and 854 votes were recorded. This is a very considerable number; and the District Officer of Seoni reports that special interest is in that town taken in municipal elections.

9. As you have only asked for a brief report, the Chief Commissioner will not give further statistics. In time no doubt more interest will be taken in elections, especially as Municipal institutions seem to the Chief Commissioner to be taking firm root in all towns.

NOTIFICATION by the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

(No. 3199.)

Nagpur, September 11, 1874.

The following rules for the election of persons to be members of the Nagpur Municipal Committee are sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces:—

1. For electoral purposes the area within municipal limits shall be divided into 16 wards, as detailed below:— Wards.

I.	Civil Stations.	
II.	Sitabaldi.	
III.	Sadr Bazar and Takli.	
IV.	City Circles	1 and 2.
V.	Ditto	3.
VI.	Ditto	4, 5, and 6.
VII.	Ditto	7.
VIII.	Ditto	8 and 9.
IX.	Ditto	10 „ 11.
X.	Ditto	12 „ 13.
XI.	Ditto	14 „ 15.
XII.	Ditto	16 „ 17.
XIII.	Ditto	18.
XIV.	Ditto	19 and 20.
XV.	Ditto	21 „ 22.
XVI.	Ditto	23 „ 24.

2. Each ward shall elect one person to be a member of the Municipal Committee. Each ward to elect one member.

3. Each candidate for election as member for a ward shall be a male householder of full age, having his residence, or chief place of business, in such ward, and possessing a livelihood without resort to charity. No person who has been convicted by a Criminal Court of any disgraceful offence shall be capable of being elected; and no person shall be capable of being elected for more than one ward. Qualification for candidate for election.

4. Every male householder of full age, who has his residence, or chief place of business, in a ward, and possesses a livelihood without resort to charity, shall be entitled to vote on the election of a member for such ward. But no elector shall be entitled to vote in more than one ward. Definition of elector.

5. A general election of members for the 16 wards shall take place once every three years, and shall be held in the month of March. General election.

6. The members elected shall hold their seats for a term of three years, counting from the 1st April following the last general election. Term for which members elected.

7. Any vacancy occurring among the elected members during the three years following a general election shall be filled up by a fresh election. Vacancies occurring.

8. The management of election arrangements shall rest with the Deputy Commissioner. Management of election arrangements.

9. Seven days before the date fixed for the election, a polling place shall be appointed in each ward, and a notice shall be conspicuously stuck up at such polling place, specifying the day and hour on and at which the election for the ward will take Polling places and proclamation.

place. Proclamation shall also be made throughout the ward declaring these particulars, and inviting the electors to attend at the time named and give their votes.

Polling officers.

10. For each polling place a polling officer shall be appointed, and on the day and at the time fixed for the election the polling officer shall attend at the polling place, and, having caused to assemble all electors of the ward who are willing to attend, shall call upon them to elect a member to represent their ward.

Proposing of candidates.

11. On a person being nominated for election by any two electors, the polling officer shall ascertain whether the person nominated is eligible for election under clause 3. If he be found eligible, he shall be proposed to the meeting as a candidate; but if he be found not eligible, he shall not be proposed.

If only one candidate be proposed.

12. If only one candidate be proposed, the candidate so proposed shall be declared elected.

If two or more candidates be proposed.

13. If two or more candidates be proposed, the name of each shall be put to the meeting in succession, and the candidate who has the largest number of votes by show of hands shall be declared elected.

Demanding a poll.

14. If dispute arise as to the correctness of the decision by show of hands, either candidate shall be entitled to demand a poll; but such demand must be made immediately on the polling officer declaring the result of the voting by show of hands.

Procedure on a poll being demanded.

15. On a poll being demanded under the foregoing clause, the polling officer shall cause the name and vote of each elector to be recorded in writing.

Challenge of votes.

16. If any vote be challenged on the ground that the voter is not an elector as defined in clause 4, the polling officer shall inquire into the objection, and shall allow or disallow the vote as to him may seem just.

Election by a poll.

17. When all the votes have been recorded and the objections made disposed of, the polling officer shall add up the number of votes recorded for each candidate, and shall declare that candidate elected who has the largest number of votes.

Procedure where the votes are equal.

18. If two or more candidates highest on the list have the same number of votes, such candidates shall draw lots among themselves, and the candidate who draws the highest lot shall be declared elected.

Election subject to confirmation by Chief Commissioner.

19. No elected member shall take his seat until the election has been confirmed by the Chief Commissioner.

From MAJOR G. H. TREVOR, SECRETARY FOR BERAR TO THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, HOME, REVENUE, AND AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT.

(No. 236.)

SIR, Hyderabad Residency, June 21, 1881.

IN reply to your letter No. 4–76, dated the 10th ultimo, calling for copy of rules framed under section 6 of Act IV. of 1873, and for a brief report showing the degree of success which has attended the elective system in those Municipalities of Berar in which that system has been introduced, I am directed to state that no regular rules have ever been issued by the Resident under the aforesaid section of the Act, and that no elections proper have ever been held.

2. Certain rules were drawn up under Act XV. of 1867, and non-official members are appointed under section 6 of those rules, which is extracted in the margin for easy reference.

VI.—Non official members will be appointed by the Resident on the nomination of the Commissioner of the Division, and their names will be duly gazetted in the Residency orders from time to time. In their appointment, due regard will be paid to a fair representation of the interests of the people in all parts of the town.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL.

(No. 3513.)

SIR, Simla, October 10, 1881.

Paragraphs 1 *to* 9 *same as Letter to Government of Bombay, page* 58.

10. The preceding remarks are more or less of general application. In the case of Bengal in particular the distinctive features would appear to be—

(*a.*) That the mofussil Municipal organisation, comprising first and second class Municipalities, Unions, and Stations, is fairly complete, but that Municipalities are saddled with nearly six lakhs of rupees of police charges, while their total expenditure on Education, and Sanitary and Charitable Establishments falls short of one lakh of rupee.

(*b.*) That District Committees exist in most districts for the administration of the Road Cess, and of schools or hospitals and dispensaries, but that the Public Works Cess and the District Post Cess are under Provincial management.

(*c.*) That the expenditure on Education and on Medical Charity is drawn almost entirely from the Provincial revenues, and the assistance given to primary education is small. Municipal contributions for Police, however, amount in all to nearly nine lakhs of rupees per annum.

(*d.*) That the gross Provincial expenditure in 1881–82 is estimated at Rs. 26,90,000 for Education and Rs. 11,63,000 for Medical Services, of which about two-thirds is of a nature similar to that which is in some other Provinces administered almost entirely by Local Bodies, while only a much smaller proportion is so administered in Bengal by means of the grant-in-aid system.

(*e.*) That the Provincial and Local charges for Public Works are, for the same year, Rs. 53,43,000 and Rs. 47,31,000 respectively, but that the whole of the former, and some portion of the latter, are practically, at least, beyond the control of Local Bodies.

11. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will, no doubt, take into consideration whether the organisation of the District Road Cess Committees and their Branches, which appears excellent, might not be applied to a more extended sphere, embracing Education, Medical Services, the administration of grants-in-aid, and other objects, subject to suitable inspection under the orders of the Local Government, and especially whether, in the now greatly improved condition of the Provincial revenues, a much enlarged grant might not be made towards primary education, and entrusted to these Committees. The possibility of relieving Municipalities from nearly nine lakhs of rupees (including Calcutta) now contributed for Police, and the substitution of some more appropriate Educational, Sanitary, or other burdens, will also not escape notice.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor fully appreciates the importance of the extension of Local Self-Government; that the proposals now put forward will receive the most careful consideration from the Government of Bengal; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a considerable burden on the Local Government and its officers, but the Governor-General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay, that can possibly be avoided, to occur in their introduction, that he trusts that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will find himself in a position to report on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES AND OUDH.

(No. 3514.)

SIR, Simla, October 10, 1881.

Paragraphs 1 *to* 9 *same as Letter to Government of Bombay, page* 58.

10. The preceding remarks are more or less of general application. In the case of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, the distinctive features would appear to be as follows:—

(*a.*) That the Municipal organisation is fairly complete, but that Municipalities are saddled with nearly six lakhs of rupees on account of Police charges, while their total expenditure on Education and Sanitary and Charitable Establishments falls short of one and a half lakhs of rupees.

(*b.*) That District Committees already exist, which possess powers of supervision and control over the expenditure of the amount allotted yearly to each district by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor from the proceeds of the Local Rates on land.

(*c.*) That although there is a considerable amount of expenditure on Education from Local Funds, which, possibly, could not with advantage be increased, the expenditure from Local Funds on Medical and Charitable and Sanitary Establishments is small, and that there appears to be room for the transfer to local control and management of a considerable amount of the Provincial expenditure which is now incurred in connexion with Vaccination and Hospitals and Dispensaries.

(*d.*) That the estimate of Provincial and Local expenditure on Public Works for 1881–82 is Rs. 26,61,000 and Rs. 20,64,000 respectively. Of the local expenditure on Public Works only Rs. 3,21,000 is in charge of civil officers, and it is believed that no portion is entrusted to the Committees.

11. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will no doubt take into consideration the question of transferring additional expenditure to the supervision and control of the District Committees, subject to such suitable inspection as the Local Government deem necessary, and the Government of India will be glad to be furnished with a copy of the rules defining the functions and authority of the Committees.

The relief of Municipalities from the contributions which they now make for the support of the Police, and the substitution of more appropriate Educational, Medical, or other burdens will also not escape notice.

12. In conclusion I am to add that the Government of India is confident that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor fully appreciates the importance of the extension of Local Self-Government; that the proposals now put forward will receive the most careful consideration from the Government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a considerable burden on the Local Government and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay, that can possibly be avoided, to occur in their introduction, that he trusts that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will find himself in a position to report on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, dated Simla, October 1881, No. 3516. *See* page 58.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL PROVINCES.

(No. 3517.)

SIR, Simla, October 10, 1881.

For Paragraphs 1 *to* 9 see *Letter to Government of Bombay on page* 58.

10. The preceding remarks are more or less of general application. In the case of the Central Provinces in particular, the distinctive features would appear to be—

(*a.*) That the existing municipal organisation is fairly complete, but that Municipalities are saddled with about one lakh of rupees of Police charges, while their expenditure on Education and on Sanitary and Charitable Establishments is only about half that amount.

(*b.*) That there is no provision of the law requiring the appointment of Local District Committees.

(*c.*) That the expenditure on Education and Medical Services is almost entirely Provincial, but that there appears no reason why a considerable portion of it should not be entrusted to local management and control.

(*d.*) That the estimate of Provincial and Local expenditure on Public Works for 1881–82 is Rs. 8,12,000 and Rs. 3,55,000 respectively; of the latter amount Rs. 3,08,000 is in charge of civil officers.

11. The Governor General in Council desires that you will carefully consider the expediency of creating Local District Committees to be vested with powers over expenditure on local objects, which should be defined by legislation, and to which the control and management of expenditure on Education, Medical Charity, Sanitation, the construction and repair of certain roads, and other Public Works could be entrusted, subject to suitable supervision by the Local Government. The Government of India would also be glad if it were found possible to relieve Municipalities from the charges which they at present bear on account of Police, some more appropriate Educational, Sanitary, or other burden being substituted therefor.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that you will fully appreciate the importance of the extension of Local Self-Government; that the proposals now put forward will receive your most careful consideration; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the overgrowing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a heavy burden on the Local Administration and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay that can possibly be avoided to occur in their introduction, that he trusts you will find yourself in a position to report on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, British Burma.

(No. 3518.)

Sir, Simla, October 10, 1881.

For Paragraphs 1 *to* 9 see *Letter to Government of Bombay on page* 58.

10. The preceding remarks are of a general nature, and will not be applicable in every case to the circumstances of the Province of Burma, in regard to which the distinctive features would appear to be—

(*a.*) That the Municipal organisation is fairly complete in a few large towns, but that the Municipalities are saddled with an expenditure of about 1½ lakhs of rupees on Police, while the total Municipal expenditure on Education and Sanitary and Charitable Establishments is less than one lakh.

(*b.*) That there is no provision of the law for the appointment of Local District Committees, though committees exist in certain places for the management of schools or dispensaries.

(*c.*) That a considerable portion of the Medical expenditure is Provincial, and that while about half the Educational expenditure is Local, it does not appear to be under the control and management of Local Bodies.

(*d.*) That the estimate of Provincial and Local expenditure on Public Works for 1881–82 is Rs. 37,73,000 and Rs. 11,05,000 respectively, Rs. 2,51,000 of the latter amount being in charge of Civil Officers.

11. The Governor General in Council desires that you will carefully consider the expediency of creating Local District Committees vested with powers over expenditure on local objects (to be defined by legislation) to which the control and management of expenditure on Education, Medical Charity, Sanitation, the construction and repair of certain roads, and other public works could be entrusted under suitable and sufficient provincial supervision. The Government of India would also be glad if it were found possible to relieve Municipalities altogether from the charges which they at present bear on account of Police, some more appropriate Educational, Sanitary, or other burdens, being substituted therefor.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that you will fully appreciate the importance of the extension of Local Self-Government; that the proposals now put forward will receive your most careful consideration; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a considerable burden on the Local Administration and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay, that can possibly be avoided, to occur in their introduction that he trusts you will find yourself in a position to report on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, Assam.

(No. 3519.)

Sir, Simla, October 10, 1881.

For Paragraphs 1 *to* 9 see *Letter to Government of Bombay on page* 58.

10. The preceding remarks are of a general nature, and will not be applicable in every case to the circumstances of the province of Assam, in regard to which the distinctive features would appear to be—

(*a.*) That the Municipal system is fairly complete, though the circumstances of the Province are not such as to present any considerable sphere for the introduc-

tion of Municipal Institutions. The total Municipal expenditure in 1879–80 was only Rs. 89,973, of which Rs. 11,133 was spent on Police, and Rs. 1,023 on Education, and Sanitary and Charitable Establishments.

(*b.*) That a District Committee exists in each district, but with functions and authority entirely subject to the executive discretion of the Local Administration.

(*c.*) That only about one-fourth of the total expenditure on Education is Local, but that a higher proportion might advantageously be made so, and entrusted to local control and management.

(*d.*) That there is at present no Local medical expenditure, but that a portion of the present Provincial expenditure on Medical Services might be similarly de-provincialised.

(*e.*) That the estimate of Provincial and Local Public Works expenditure for 1881–82 is Rs. 12,51,000 and Rs. 3,37,000, the latter expenditure only being under the charge of District Committees.

11. The Governor General in Council desires that you will now consider the expediency of entrusting to the District Committees and Municipalities the management of a portion of the present Provincial expenditure, subject to such Provincial inspection as may be deemed neceesary, and the Government of India will be glad if it be found possible to relieve Municipalities altogether of the present charge for Police, an equivalent amount of expenditure on Education, Sanitary Establishments, or the like being substituted therefor.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that you will fully appreciate the importance of the extension of Local Self-Government; that the proposals now put forward will receive your most careful consideration; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures to which this communication refers will impose a considerable burden on the Local Administration and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay, that can possibly be avoided, to occur in their introduction, that he trusts you will find yourself in a position to report on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

I have, &c.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

(No. 3589.)

SIR, Simla, October 13, 1881.

For Paragraphs 1 *to* 9 see *Letter to Government of Bombay on page* 58.

10. The preceding remarks are more or less of general application. In the case of the Punjab in particular the distinctive features would appear to be—

(*a.*) That the municipal organisation appears to be fairly complete, but that Municipalities are saddled with nearly five lakhs of rupees on account of Police charges, while the expenditure on account of Education and Sanitary and Charitable establishments is only about three lakhs of rupees.

(*b.*) That District Committees already exist, but with functions and authority subject, within the scope of the Act, to the executive discretion of the Local Government.

(*c.*) That educational expenditure under local control and management is capable of considerable increase.

(*d.*) That a large proportion of the Medical expenditure is already local, but that the proportion might, perhaps, be increased with advantage.

(*e.*) That the estimate of Provincial and Local Expenditure on Public Works for 1881–82 is Rs. 23,38,000 and Rs. 7,55,000 respectively, the whole of the amount being under the charge of Public Works Officers, and the portion at the Disposal of District Committees being, perhaps, susceptible of increase.

11. His Honour, the Lieutenant-Governor will, no doubt, take into consideration the expediency of entrusting to the control and management of District Committees a still larger share of the expenditure on Education and Medical Services, subject to such Provincial supervision as may seem desirable; and the Government of India will be glad if it be found possible to relieve Municipalities altogether of the charge on account of Police, some more appropriate Educational, Sanitary, or other burden being substituted.

12. In conclusion, I am to add that the Government of India is confident that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor fully appreciates the importance of the extension of Local self-government; that the proposals now put forward will receive the most careful consideration from the Government of the Punjab; and that no efforts will be spared to ensure the success of a scheme which will relieve the Provincial authorities from some portion of the ever-growing details of the work of administration, will tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation, and will lead to the more extended employment of the Natives of India in the administration of public affairs, while conferring on them higher powers of control over all expenditure on objects of local importance.

The discussion and settlement of the details of the measures referred to in this communication will impose a heavy burden on the Local Government and its officers; but the Governor General in Council is so deeply impressed with the importance of allowing no delay that can possibly be avoided to occur in their introduction, that he trusts His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will find himself in a position to report on the whole question in sufficient time to permit of the necessary arrangements being made before the close of the current financial year.

DESPATCH FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL.

(Financial, No. 12.)

My Lord Marquis, Bombay Castle, December 1, 1882.

We have the honour to forward for your Lordship's information a copy of the papers noted in the margin on the subject of the extension of Local Self-government in this Presidency, and to state that draft Bills to amend the Bombay District Municipal Act and the Bombay Local Funds Act in the direction desired by the Government of India have been prepared and will be submitted to your Lordship in due course.

Letter to the Government of India, No. 3584, dated 19th September 1882, with accompaniments.*
Government Resolution No. 3745, dated 3rd October 1882.
Letter from the Government of India, No. 1521, dated 4th October 1882.†
Government Resolution No. 3776, dated 4th October 1882.
Government Resolution No. 4122, dated 16th October, 1882.
Letter to the Government of India, No. 4141, dated 27th October 1882.
Letter from the Government of India, No. 1774, dated 6th November 1882.
Government Resolution No. 4315, dated 9th November 1882.

We have, &c.
JAMES FERGUSSON,
L. R. ASHBURNER,
E. W. RAVENSCROFT.

Resolution of GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 3745, October 3, 1882.

Read again Resolution of Government, No. 3583, dated 19th September 1882.

Resolution.—There are many Municipalities in this Presidency in which there is no direct taxation whatsoever. Amongst such Municipalities may be mentioned

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* See page 39. † See page 70.

Nadiád, Parántej, and Modása in the Northern Division, Sásvad, Junnar Máyni, and Bársi in the Central Division, Athni and Nipáni in the Southern Division, and the majority of the Sind Municipalities. In many also of the Municipalities in which some description of direct taxation does exist the income derived from that form of taxation constitutes but a very small proportion of the total Municipal revenue. As instances of Municipalities of this class may be named Viramgám, Dhanduka, Kapadvanj, and Ankleshvar in the Northern Division, Tásgaon and Islámpur in the Central Division, Sirsi, Bágalkot, and Bayádgi in the Southern Division, and Kotri, Sehwán, Mehar, and Mitti in Sind.

2. In Municipalities of these two classes great difficulty would be experienced in finding a sufficient number of persons entitled to vote at the Municipal elections under the new scheme if the franchise is in them to be limited to persons paying Rs. 5 per annum direct Municipal taxes or in the case in Sind Rs. 3 house-tax, and to the other persons named in paragraph 15 of Government Resolution No. 3583, dated the 19th September 1882. In some of these Municipalities there would be absolutely no persons entitled to vote under the Municipal taxation franchise and in most of the others the number would be exceedingly restricted.

3. The Commissioners of Divisions and in Sind should therefore be requested to ascertain and report at their earliest possible convenience the number of persons who under paragraph 15 of the Resolution would be entitled to a vote at the Municipal elections in each of the Municipalities in their respective Divisions, showing separately in each instance the number under heads 1—7 of paragraph 15 and the number under head 8. In cases where there are either no voters or an obviously inadequate number under head 8 suggestions should be made as to what other mode or system of franchise might most conveniently be introduced in each instance. In places for example the franchise might be conferred on all owners and occupiers of houses of a certain value.

4. The Commissioners should also be requested to report what number of members should in their opinion form the Committee of each of the various Municipalities, City, and Town, in their respective Divisions.

5. A return should be furnished by each Commissioner showing (*a*) the aggregate License Tax collections in each district of his Division for the year 1882–83, and (*b*) the License Tax collections for the same year in each Municipality in his Division. This information is necessary to enable Government to effect the adjustments referred to in paragraph 53 of Government Resolution No. 3583.

6. The Commissioners should be asked to submit at an early date the reports called for in paragraph 23 of the Resolution, and in the meantime the lists of persons qualified to be members of Táluka Local Fund Committees and to vote at the election of such members should be prepared without delay. Information should be furnished to Government of the number of persons in each táluka qualified to vote under paragraph 17 of the Resolution, and also regarding the number of persons qualified under paragraph 18 to be elected or nominated as members of Táluka Local Fund Committees.

7. The grouping of villages mentioned in paragraph 19 should be carried out at once by the Collectors.

8. As the elections and nominations of members of the various Boards, Local Fund and Municipal, will have to be made early in March next the necessity for prompt action and the preparation of the requisite returns and statistics should be impressed by the Commissioners on the Collectors in their respective Divisions.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 3776, OCTOBER 4, 1882.

READ again Government Resolution No. 3583, dated 19th September 1882, paragraph 6.

RESOLUTION.—The attention of the Commissioners of Divisions and in Sind and of all Collectors should be invited to paragraph 6 of Government Resolution

No. 3583, dated the 19th ultimo, in which it is stated that "even now instances may "be found of private persons fitted to undertake the functions of Presidents of "Municipal and Local Fund Boards of whose services His Excellency the Governor "in Council would be glad to avail himself," and they should be requested to report whether they are acquainted with any unofficial person or persons to whom might be entrusted the powers and duties of the President of a Municipality or of a Local Fund District or Táluka Committee.

2. Each Collector should furnish his report through the Commissioner of his Division. Government desire that the reports now called for should be submitted with the least possible delay.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 4122, OCTOBER 16, 1882.

His Excellency the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the following Town Municipalities shall be constituted City Municipalities with effect from April 1st, 1883 :—

NORTHERN DIVISION -	Viramgám. Nadiád. Thána. Kalyán.
CENTRAL DIVISION -	Sátára. Násik. Pandharpur. Yeola. Dhulia. Málegaon.
SOUTHERN DIVISION -	Belgaum. Dhárwár. Hubli. Ratnágiri.

2. Memorials have been received from the inhabitants of Wái and Bársi asking that those towns might also be raised to the status of City Municipalities. His Excellency the Governor in Council is not however at present prepared to comply with their requests. The inhabitants of Bársi have hitherto displayed no public spirit, and the form of taxation obtaining there is reported to be "unsatisfactory in the extreme, far "too much approaching transit duties." On a recent occasion when the introduction of some more direct and less objectionable form of taxation was recommended to the Municipality, the inhabitants of Bársi are stated to have "expressed themselves as only "anxious for the present irregular octroi, failing which they would rather not have "any Municipality." As regards Wái very unfavourable reports have been received concerning the general action of the inhabitants, and the opposition to all beneficial sanitary measures which has been manifested by the most influential section of the population. Under these circumstances Government do not consider it desirable that Wái and Bársi should be raised to the position of City Municipalities. The Governor in Council will however be willing to reconsider the question if after the expiration of a year more favourable reports are received regarding these two towns, and the inhabitants display a wish to introduce a sounder and more equitable system of Municipal taxation and to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the sanitation and protect the health of the town.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

NOTE.—The memorialists from Wái and Bársi have been referred to the Collectors concerned.

FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT.

From J. NUGENT, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to A. MACKENZIE, Esq., C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

(No. 4141.)

Sir, Bombay Castle, October 27, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1521,* dated the 4th instant, and in reply to state that His Excellency the Governor in Council is glad to perceive that, save in the matter of the appointment of Presidents of Local Fund and Municipal Committees, the Government of India would appear to approve generally of the orders regarding the measures to be adopted to give effect to the local self-government scheme in this Presidency, as contained in the Resolution of this Government No. 3583, dated the 19th ultimo.

2. The Governor in Council regrets however that the Governor General in Council has found it necessary to express his dissatisfaction in some particulars with the steps which this Government proposed to take with a view to carrying out the wishes and orders of the Government of India as understood by it, and to criticise with some severity the statements made in paragraph 2 of the Resolution above mentioned.

3. The portions of the Resolution of this Government to which exception is chiefly taken by the Government of India are paragraph 2, which contained a general expression of the views of His Excellency the Governor in Council regarding the system which has hitherto been in force in this Presidency, and concerning the expediency of immediate and extensive changes in that system, and paragraph 6 in which this Government recorded its opinion that for the present at least in the majority of instances the appointment of non-official persons to be Presidents of Local Fund and Municipal Committees was neither practicable nor desirable.

4. As regards the first point His Excellency the Governor in Council regrets that he should have misapprehended the wishes of the Government of India, and is glad to be assured that it is not the desire of that Government to "subvert altogether the existing "system in Bombay, or to confer unlimited powers upon Municipalities and Local "Boards." The Governor in Council is willing to admit that the description given by him of the powers to be assigned to Municipal and Local Boards as "unlimited" was not literally correct. I am, however, to submit that the orders of the Government of India as issued in their Resolution of May 18th last were of such a nature as to give this Government some ground for its belief that if carried out to the fullest extent they would lead, if not to a subversion of, at least to fundamental and vital changes in, the existing system. In the Resolution No. 1093, dated March 25th last, this Government of its own accord volunteered to introduce the elective principle in the City Municipalities at once and subsequently in the Town Municipalities if the experiment proved successful in the case of the chief cities, and contemplated the grant of increased powers in respect of local expenditure aided from Provincial Funds to the Committees created under the system suggested. Government at the same time observed that special difficulties existed in the way of the election of members of Local Fund Committees. In reply the Government of India in its letter No. 831 of May 31st last expressed a hope that this Government would be able to go still further in the direction of developing the system of local self-government than it then apparently intended to do. In the meantime the Government of India had issued the Resolution of May 18th last in which it stated that "members of Boards should be chosen "by election wherever it may in the opinion of the Local Governments be practicable "to adopt that system of choice," and expressed a wish that that system should be established "now as widely as local circumstance will permit." It further stated that the Governor General in Council wished to see non-official persons acting wherever practicable as Chairmen of the Local Boards, and that every Local Board should have not only the entire control over the proceeds of all local rates and cesses levied within its jurisdiction for its own special purposes but along with the charge of any expenditure that is at present Provincial should have where possible the management of equivalent revenue. As it appeared therefore to this Government the system of which the Government of India desired the adoption involved the election as a general rule of the members of Municipal and Local Fund Committees, the substitution in the great majority of instances of non-official for official Presidents, the withdrawal of the local officers of Government from all original direct voice in

* *See* page 70.

and interference with the proceedings of the Local Boards, and the grant of new and greatly increased powers to the new Boards whose deliberations and decisions would no longer be guided and influenced by the experienced officers who hitherto have initiated and controlled the action of the Committees. This seemed to the Governor in Council to be a sweeping and momentous alteration of the system which for years has been in operation in this Presidency, and though quite willing, as he is in duty bound, to co-operate cheerfully and cordially with the Government of India in carrying out the changes which that Government deemed desirable he considered it only proper to state that in his opinion this Presidency generally was not ripe for so sudden and large a change in the mode of local self-government and that the policy of conferring at once such extended powers on new Boards from which the official element would be almost entirely eliminated was one of which the results could not with any certainty be foretold. At the same time, however, he directed the adoption of measures which, except in the solitary instance of the appointment of Presidents of Boards, appeared to him to be calculated to meet the expressed desires of the Supreme Government, and which seem on the whole to be regarded as not unsatisfactory by that Government.

5. As regards the question of the appointment of non-official Presidents this Government, whilst declaring that in its opinion the appointment as a general rule of non-official persons to be Presidents was not at present practicable, did distinctly express its willingness to appoint private individuals in cases where suitable and qualified persons were to be found for the post. Beyond this it appeared to the Governor in Council imprudent to go: but he would now assure the Government of India that, wherever such a course is practicable and any private person is found fit to discharge the duties of President and is willing to accept the office, he will have no hesitation in conferring the post upon a non-official. He is fully prepared to concur with the Governor General in Council in regarding merely as a temporary arrangement the proposal that the Collector should continue as a rule to be President of the Municipal and Local Fund Committees. That arrangement will cease at once as soon as properly qualified private gentlemen can be found and induced to accept the office, and the Governor in Council trusts that the experiments which he hopes soon to make in this direction will prove so successful as to justify the adoption of the measure. I am here to observe that prior to the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, this Government had issued orders calling upon all the Collectors and Commissioners to report the names of any private gentlemen in their respective districts and divisions whom they considered to be qualified for nomination to the post of President of a Municipal or Local Fund Committee. These reports have not as yet reached Government and until they are received His Excellency in Council is not in a position to form an opinion as to the number of appointments as Presidents which can in April next be conferred on non-official persons. I am, however to remark that the number of persons fitted for the post is not likely at first at least to be large, and that in the opinion of the Governor in Council, an opinion which would, he believes, be concurred in by the most intelligent and best informed exponents of the views of the Native community, the instances in which competent Native gentlemen willing to take the post and to discharge its duties efficiently could be found for the office will be but few in the case of all the smaller Municipalities and of the Local Fund Committees, and probably will not at first be numerous even in the larger Municipalities. The Government of India may, however, be sure that the experiment will, under any circumstances, as desired by it "be tried in an ungrudging spirit."

6. With reference to the remark in the last portion of paragraph 4 of your letter under reply, I am to state that this Government fully shares the sentiments of the Government of India in attaching the highest importance to the training of the leading and ablest men in the community to take a real interest and a prominent part in the management of their local affairs, but it considered that the increased powers by the exercise of which the training is to be effected should be conferred somewhat more gradually than the scheme of the Government of India seemed to contemplate, and that before the political education of this class of the community had made some progress it was inexpedient to restrict still further than this Government proposed the authority of the Collector as the local representative of Government.

7. In paragraph 7 of your letter extracts are given from the reports of Messrs. Erskine, Sheppard, Pratt, and Lee-Warner in support of the view that the system of control has hitherto been too strict and too elaborate to encourage much really independent action, the inference being that if there were less control there would be

more and more efficient independent action on the part of private individuals. The Governor in Council highly appreciates the liberal attitude towards the Natives displayed by these gentlemen. I am however to invite the attention of the Government of India to other passages in the reports of the officers above mentioned which support the view of this Government that the emancipation of local committees from the modified control of the Collector as it now exists should be only gradually effected, and that the time has not yet come when as a general rule the post of President could be held by non-official persons. It appears to His Excellency in Council that each report should be considered as a whole and not judged by brief isolated passages which, taken without the context, hardly adequately convey the opinion of the writer on the general subject. In his report Mr. Sheppard writes "much has been done here " to encourage independence in Committees both Local Fund and Municipal, and " during the last 15 years considerable effort has been made to encourage a feeling " of independent interest in public affairs," but that he felt "a doubt whether the " experience obtained so far is of a nature to justify withdrawal from the supervision " provided by the law of Bombay," and that he was of "opinion that real progress is " more likely to be stimulated by relaxing supervision gradually as Committees prove " themselves deserving, than by conceding at one stroke powers which the latter are " not fit for, and the exercise of which will often be a source of considerable em- " barrassment to the members themselves." Mr. Erskine whilst advocating the grant of increased powers to Local Boards and admitting that hitherto but limited freedom of action has been allowed to them, at the same time states that "the management of " District Boards must for many a day to come be in the hands of the head of the " district," that he fails to "understand how the chief executive officers are to super- " vise and control the acts of Local Boards without taking actual part in their " proceedings," that "to banish officials from the Municipal Board altogether would " be in his estimation a false step," that as regards the Boards in Town Municipalities he "would rather see them for the present left as they are," that the present District and Táluka Local Fund Committees "are the best that could be got together" and he has "no desire to recommend any change in their composition," and that he has no wish "at present to see the system of election as the means of obtaining members " of Local Boards extended beyond what had been proposed by the Bombay Govern- " ment" in its Resolution of March 25th last, in which it suggested the introduction of that system in the case of City Municipalities only. Finally Mr. Erskine wrote that as it appeared to him "the intentions of the Government of India have to a great " extent, especially as regards District Boards, been forestalled in the Bombay " Presidency, and the system now in force requires but a little modification to render " it all that the Government of India desires." The modifications made by this Government in that system with a view to carrying out what it believed to be the wishes of the Government of India have been very extensive, and far in excess of those deemed necessary by Mr. Erskine, but His Excellency in Council regrets that they have not altogether satisfied the Government of India. The third officer, Mr. Pratt, from whose report a quotation is made by the Government of India does in the passage quoted remark that in his opinion the powers exercised by the various Local Boards have been so circumscribed and limited that but little real authority has been left to them. He, however, also states that "he does not consider that the Natives as " he has seen them are fit for self-government unless that government is very strictly " watched and hedged in with fixed rules beyond which they cannot go, and by which " they must be bound," that "in City Municipalities the power of control Govern- " ment can exercise is not more than is necessary to the proper administration of the " Municipal funds," that "with regard to town Municipalities the only change " necessary is to constitute as many as are fit City Municipalities," and he thinks that "Chairmen of Local Boards should for the next year or two be, as a rule, " official." The remaining officer, Mr. Lee-Warner, from whose intelligent report the Government of India quotes a short passage regarding a tendency to dictate to Municipal Committees, has elsewhere in his letter given expression to views to which I am desired to solicit the attention of the Government of India. After giving illustrations showing what has been the course followed by non-official Commissioners when acting in accordance with their own wishes and what would probably be the course they would adopt if allowed greater liberty of action, he remarks "if the masses " were prepared to assert their rights I should gladly welcome in its entirety the " present scheme; but until they are educated the abandonment of official control " will throw back their emancipation indefinitely . . . . My humble opinion is " that if the withdrawal of official control, as contemplated in the Resolution (of

" May 18th of the Government of India) is literally carried out the political future of " the country will be sacrificed. I anticipate that the retrogression would imme- " diately commence in matters of taxation and sanitation, public works would follow " next . . . . The withdrawal of official control is in my opinion premature . . . . " If the sheep of India are to be turned adrift in the fields of experimental adminis- " tration without their official shepherds I believe the work of the last 20 years will " be undone." Numerous other passages could be quoted from the reports of the officers of this Presidency which fully support the views expressed by this Government, but as printed copies of those reports have already been supplied to the Government of India it appears unnecessary now to do so. The Governor in Council would merely observe that whilst desiring to co-operate heartily with, and to carry out the orders and policy of the Government of India, he felt that he would have been wanting in his duty had he not attached due weight to and represented the opinions which are almost universally entertained by those best acquainted with the Province entrusted to the charge of this Government.

8. It was not the intention of the Governor in Council to suggest in paragraph 2 of this Government's Resolution of the 19th ultimo that the existing system of Municipal and Local Fund administration in this Presidency is so perfect as to make any change in it undesirable. Nor as it appears to him can such a suggestion be found in that paragraph. The Governor in Council is aware that the present system, like most other systems of administration, has its defects, though practically it has on the whole worked exceedingly well, but he considers that the measures directed to be taken in the above-mentioned Resolution will fully suffice to remedy those deficiencies, and will give to the various Local Boards at least enough freedom of action at the commencement. Time alone can show what will be the result of the experiment which shortly will be on its trial.

9. With reference to the remark concerning the number of City Municipalities, I am to state for the information of the Government of India that after careful inquiry the Governor in Council has seen reason to direct that 14 of the present Town Municipalities shall be raised to the rank of City Municipalities with effect from April 1st next. The number of City Municipalities will then be 24.

10. The Government of India in paragraph 4 of the letter under reply calls in question the correctness of the assertion made by this Government that the elected members of the Boards would be the representatives chosen by the mass of the ratepayers. The Governor in Council is, however, unable to perceive in what respect that statement is inaccurate, unless objection is taken to the word ratepayers on the score that under some possible elective system it might not be necessary that a voter should also be a ratepayer. It seemed to him that judging from the wording of parapraph 13 of its Resolution of May 18th the Government of India considered that the qualification for a vote should be the payment of rates and taxes, and if the elective system was to be introduced this qualification appeared to the Governor in Council to be obviously the most suitable and that most in accordance with the practice obtaining in other countries. For reasons specified in the Resolution of this Government the Governor in Council deemed it unadvisable to give the franchise to persons other than ratepayers except in the case of Municipalities where provision was made for the grant of a vote to certain other classes, most of whom however would also as a rule be ratepayers. The system as detailed in paragraphs 15–19 of this Government's Resolution of the 19th ultimo was that which appeared to the Governor in Council to be that best adapted for general application. Feeling, however, that in all instances its introduction might not be expedient and that in special cases the adoption of special courses might be desirable, this Government had prior to the receipt of your letter called for further reports from the District officers as to what other systems of representation, and what other qualifications for the franchise they would recommend in any places where the general system as proposed by this Government might be unsuitable and the constituency created under it might be too limited in number. As connected also with this question of election of representatives, I am to remark that there would appear to be hardly room or necessity for the deprecation of " a narrow policy " in the determination of the places in which the new system is to be introduced, contained in paragraph 14 of your letter, in view of the fact that this Government had expressed its intention of giving the fairest and fullest trial to the elective system, had mentioned the few districts which it deemed to be as yet too backward to enable the system to be with advantage introduced into them, and had explicity directed that in

all Municipalities one-half of the members of the committee should be elected by the inhabitants qualified to exercise the franchise.

11. With regard to the remarks contained in paragraph 2 of your letter I am to state that the opinions of Local Fund Committees asked for in paragraph 7 of your letter No. 831 of May 31st last were called for without delay, but that as yet replies have been received from only some districts. As the reports of the various Local Fund Committees were coming in but very slowly, and as legislation would be requisite to give effect to the proposals of this Government, it appeared to the Governor in Council expedient to formulate those proposals as speedily as possible and not to defer the issue of orders on the general scheme of local self-government until all the reports had been received. When all the replies have reached Government they will be printed and copies forwarded to the Government of India. As the Local Fund Committees are in part composed of the most enlightened and practical members of the Native community their views will be of value, and it is possible that the arrangements proposed by this Government may finally receive some modification in details if any fresh and acceptable suggestions are made by the Committees. In the meantime, I am to observe, it is satisfactory to note that such reports as have been received show that the scheme framed by this Government is on the whole in accordance with the views expressed by the Committees consulted, and further that the steps taken by this Government to increase the utility and the powers of Táluka Committees meet with the approval of the Government of India.

12. The Government of India is under a misapprehension in supposing that no steps were taken to ascertain what were the views entertained by leading Natives on the suggestions put forward by the Government of India in its Resolution of the 18th May last, and that this Government was in ignorance of what those views were. On the contrary the members of this Government had lost no opportunity of eliciting the opinions of Native gentlemen whom they considered competent to give advice and offer suggestions on the subject, and it may be well understood that the Collectors and Commissioners when submitting their reports had availed themselves of their extensive knowledge of Native opinion and their constant intercourse with Natives of all classes. Moreover this Government had received numerous memorials from various parts of the Presidency setting forth the views and requests regarding local self-government of large and important communities, and was thus in a position to know the wishes and opinions of some of the most intelligent members of Native society. The Poona Sárvajanik Sabha, which may be regarded as representing largely the sentiments and aspirations of the educated non-official classes, more especially the Bráhmans of Poona and its vicinity, had also volunteered, as is its wont, an expression of the views entertained by that association, and its representations received the careful attention which their ability and in many respects their sound practical sense deserved. It is within the knowledge of this Government that the Commissioner, Central Division, looked upon the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha as being the most trustworthy and representative exponent of Native opinion in a portion of the Deccan, and that the Commissioner, Southern Division, who has a wide and intimate acquaintance with the leading natives, was disposed to accept almost entirely the scheme originally recommended by the Sabha. Under these circumstances it can hardly be laid to the charge of this Government that is was not aware of the views of the Native community on this important question. The Governor in Council did not understand that the Government of India desired to have documentary statements of the views of Native gentlemen, whilst no trustworthy opinion could be formed from the public meetings held recently and the resolutions there passed at the instigation of travelling orators and agitators.

13. In paragraph 15 of the letter from the Government of India a hope is expressed that this Government "will be able to include both sanitation and vaccination among the matters for which the Boards will be held responsible." With reference to this remark I am to state that the Governor in Council whilst desirous to comply with the wishes of the Government of India would ask attention to the reasons assigned by this Government in paragraph 29 of its Resolution No. 3583 of September 19th for not conferring for the present at least upon Municipal and Local Fund Committees the management of vaccination and sanitation.

14. In conclusion I am to observe that the Governor in Council notes the caution against the imposition of increased local taxation contained in paragraph 16 of your

letter and that the necessary Bills to amend the District Municipal and Local Fund Acts are now being prepared.

I have, &c.

From THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY.

Home Department,
Public, No. 1774.

SIR, Simla, November 6, 1882.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 4141, dated the 27th October 1882, on the subject of the extension of Local Self-Government, and to state that while the Governor General in Council has nothing to add to the expression of his views contained in my letter of the 4th ultimo, he is glad to receive the assurance given in paragraph 5 of your letter, that the experiment of appointing non-official Presidents will be tried in Bombay "in an ungrudging spirit." His Excellency in Council further notes with satisfaction the steps for increasing the number of City Municipalities which are reported in paragraph 9 of your letter.

I have, &c.

RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, No. 4315, NOVEMBER 9, 1882.

MEMORANDUM from the Commissioner, S. D., No. 3389, dated 24th October 1882—Submitting for early orders letter No. 3932, dated 20th idem, from the Acting Collector of Dhárwár, who points out, with reference to paragraph 12 of Government Resolution No. 3583, dated 19th September 1882, that in the Navalgund Táluka there are two Municipalities containing 7,812 and 7,863 inhabitants respectively; inquires whether the two Municipalities are jointly to elect one member of the Táluka Local Fund Committee or whether they are each to elect one, and in that case of how many members the Committee is to consist; and adds that the division of the táluka into groups of villages cannot be made until the above question is settled: the Commissioner observing that the question raised is one which should be authoritatively decided, and that in his opinion every Municipality in a táluka should return a representative to the Táluka Committee.

RESOLUTION.—The Commissioner, S. D., proposes that every Municipality in a Táluka should return a representative to the Táluka Local Fund Committee. Considering however that in many instances the towns in which Municipalities have been created are of comparatively small size and little importance the adoption of this suggestion appears inexpedient, and it would seem preferable that only those Town Municipalities which contain a population of over 5,000 souls should, as directed in paragraph 12 of Government Resolution No. 3583 of the 19th September 1882, be allowed the privilege of electing a member of the Táluka Local Fund Committee.

2. Each Town Municipality containing a population of more than 5,000 should be permitted to return a member to the Táluka Local Fund Committee. If therefore there are two such Municipalities in a táluka two members of the Táluka Local Fund Board would be elected by the Municipalities through their respective Commissioners. In order, however, to secure the due representation of the interests of the smaller Municipalities, if any, in the táluka and of the great mass of the villages it appears to the Governor in Council expedient that independent of the Municipal and Inámdár members of the Committee six members should be elected to the Táluka Board by the ratepayers qualified to exercise the franchise residing in the smaller municipal towns and villages. In the case accordingly of the táluka mentioned by the Collector of Dhárwár there would be on the Táluka Local Fund Board one Inámdár member, two Municipal members, and six members elected by the ratepayers qualified to vote residing in the villages or towns other than the two municipal towns returning members to the Board, or in all nine elected members. The number of ex-officio

members and members nominated by the Collector would consequently be nine also, two being ex-officio and seven being nominated, the principle being that the number of ex-officio and nominated members combined shall exactly equal the number of elected members.

JOHN NUGENT,
Acting Secretary to Government.

DESPATCH FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

(Public, No. 2.)

My Lord, Fort William, January 2, 1883.

We have the honour to forward, for Your Lordship's information, the additional correspondence named in the margin, which has passed between us and the Government of Bombay on the subject of local self-government in that Presidency.

1. Letter from Government of Bombay, to Government of India, No. 4141, dated 27th October 1882.*
2. Letter from Government of India to Government of Bombay No. 1774, dated 6th November 1882.†

2. The controversy which arose out of the publication by the Bombay Government of their Resolution of the 19th September last was not of our seeking, and we had no desire to prolong it, and did not consider that it would be advantageous to the public interests to do so. We have therefore, as Your Lordship will perceive, abstained from replying to the arguments brought forward by the Government of Bombay in Mr. Nugent's letter of the 27th October in partial support of the interpretation which had been put upon our Resolution of the 18th May, by the Government of Bombay, in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of their Resolution above referred to; neither do we think it necessary to trouble Your Lordship at any length with explanations upon this subject. As no other Local Government in India has understood our Resolution in the same manner as the Government of Bombay appears to have done we may, we think, rest satisfied that the real meaning of that Resolution is sufficiently plain to render any detailed exposition of it on our part superfluous.

3. It will be sufficient to point out to Your Lordship that it has always been our intention that the system of local self-government sketched out in our Resolution of May last should be applied in its full meaning and integrity to those parts of the country only where it might, in the opinion of the Local Goverment, be practicable to adopt it, and where local circumstances might admit of its adoption; and that, as will be manifest to Your Lordship from a perusal of the 14th and 15th paragraphs of the 18th May Resolution, nothing could be further from our desire than to see a uniform ratepaying suffrage established throughout the country. It has always been a cardinal feature of our policy that different modes of election should be tried in different places according to the circumstances of each district and the feelings and habits of its inhabitants.

We have, &c.
RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

DESPATCH FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

(Public, No. 3.)

My Lord, Fort William, January 2, 1883.

In continuation of our Despatch No. 58, dated the 7th November 1882, we

* *See* page 163. † *See* page 168.

have the honour to transmit, for Your Lordship's information, copies of the papers cited in the annexed list on the subject of the extension of the system of local self-government in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh and in Assam.

We have, &c.
RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

List of Enclosures.

1. Resolution by Government, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 393, dated 4th March 1882.
2. ,, ,, No. 414, dated 9th March 1882.
3. ,, ,, No. 5, dated 14th March 1882.
4. ,, ,, No. 9, dated 17th March 1882.
5. ,, ,, No. 22, dated 31st March 1882, and enclosures.
6. ,, ,, No. 36, dated 13th April 1882.
7. ,, ,, No. 37, dated 14th April 1882.
8. ,, ,, No. 111, dated 29th May 1882.
9. Letter from Government, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 372, dated 15th December 1882, and enclosures.
10. Letter to ,, ,, No. 2017, dated 21st December 1882.
11. Letter from Chief Commissioner of Assam, No. 2289, dated 2nd June 1882, and enclosures.
12. Letter to ,, ,, No. 1260, dated 23rd August 1882.
13. Letter from ,, ,, No. 6594, dated 20th December 1882, and enclosures.
14. Letter to ,, ,, No. 1, dated 2nd January 1883.

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solution of THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, ,No. 393, dated Allahabad, March 4, 1882.

Read—

Papers bearing on the above subject, commencing with Government of India's (Financial Department) Resolution No. 3353, dated the 30th September 1881.

Observations.—In dealing with the general subject of decentralisation, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner indicated, at an early stage of the discussion, the demarcation line separating the two sides of the question,—I., the Financial, and II., the Administrative. There is no necessary connexion between the conclusions arrived at by the supreme and Local Government on the subject of financial decentralisation and the arrangements to be made by the Local Government for the extension of local self-government, except in so far that—in making these arrangements, and handing over the necessary funds for expenditure and control to local bodies—the general financial position of the provinces must be carefully kept in view. The financial question being one that concerns the Government only, it is unnecessary to allude here to the details of the contract as finally ratified, except to remark that, coming into operation from the official year 1882–83, it is to hold good for a period of five years. The series of orders, which will issue from time to time in connexion with the decentralisation scheme, will therefore be confined to the second or administrative portion of the case.

Nor is it necessary to recapitulate the steps taken by this Government, from the receipt of the first orders on the subject (dated 30th September 1881) up to the present time, in endeavouring to carry out the policy of the Government of India as to the

extension of local self-government. The subject is one of extreme difficulty in itself, and is further complicated by multitudinous details, every one of which must be carefully seen to if the plan is to have (as His Honour is resolved that it shall have) a fair trial in these Provinces. But it may be well, in this, the first instalment of instructions to be issued on the subject, to indicate briefly the lines on which the Government proposes to act.

2. "Local interest, supervision, and care are necessary," wrote the Government of India as far back as 1870, "to success in the management of funds devoted to Educa-" tion, Sanitation, Medical Charity, and Local Public Works." This is the key-note of the measures now under consideration; and its bearing must be steadily kept in mind in arranging the details, if success is to be attained. Action had already been taken on the lines of the orders of 1870, both in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh; but the orders of the Government of India now necessitate a considerable and immediate extension. The general form which this will take is that of a transfer of responsibility from certain provincial departments to district and municipal committees under certain conditions. To the Heads of Departments concerned the Government looks for loyal co-operation, ready assistance, and sound advice, without reference to individual opinions as to the expediency of the general policy. It is obvious that the measure will necessarily result in curtailing the authority and narrowing the field of the departments concerned; but the policy (in the utility of which His Honour very fully concurs) has passed beyond the region of discussion. What remains to be done is to arrange for its application—so far as this is possible and suitable—to the 49 districts and 109 municipalities of the united Provinces.

3. The first point to be determined, then, is how the local bodies (district and municipal committees), to whom are to be entrusted the "supervision and care" in the expenditure of funds for certain objects, are to be constituted. It must next be decided from what departments transfer of expenditure is to be made to these local bodies; what special heads of charge in each department are to be so transferred, with advertence to the circumstances of each case; and how the establishment necessary for the carrying on of the work is to be localised. The allotment of funds for the administration of these transferred heads will then have to be considered, with special reference to the position of each district and municipality concerned, and to the suitability of revenue items for local management. Subsidiary to these main questions, but extremely important and somewhat perplexing, is that of the legislation (if any) which may be deemed necessary, and the shape it shall take; to what extent existing enactments are insufficient; and how far the issue of rules under these enactments will meet the necessities of the case. The Government cannot divest itself summarily of all responsibility in regard to the transferred revenues, charges, and establishments: it must, while avoiding undue interference, reserve to itself the power of intervening in the public interests; and it must lay down certain general principles which shall regulate the relations of the local bodies to their employés, to heads of departments, and to itself. The elaboration of the details of the scheme, after the broad lines have been laid down, will necessarily be a work of great difficulty: the more so in view of the short time now remaining for the task. It is the desire of the Government of India that as far as possible the reforms now under consideration shall come into operation from the 1st April 1882; and His Honour trusts that all concerned will bear this in mind, and co-operate with him in striving to give effect to the wishes of His Excellency in Council on the subject.

Constitution of district committees.

4. The constitution of district committees is thus the first matter on which, in connexion with the administrative phase of the question, instructions are necessary: for it is at the root of any possible extension of local self-government. The district is to be *quâ* the general measure, the administrative unit; and though it may not be possible to render each district altogether separate and self-contained, this fact must not be lost sight of. Now, in the existing local funds committees (with corresponding educational and dispensary committees) there is ready at hand the nucleus of the new district committees on which is to devolve the task of administering such funds as may from time to time be assigned to them for certain purposes. These committees were formed in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh under the Local Rates Acts XVII. and XVIII. of 1871, the provisions of which (as regards these committees) were reproduced in the corresponding Acts (III. and IV.) of 1878. The standing orders on the subject of local rates committees are to be found in Part VII. (Financial) of the

Manual of Government Orders:* and brief instructions as to the educational and medical committees are to be found in Parts X. and XII. of the Manual.† All existing orders bearing on the constitution of these committees must now be regarded as cancelled; this course is necessary in order to secure a *tabula rasa* for the introduction of the new system, and to allow of the removal of such discrepancies as have hitherto existed in the two provinces, and even in different parts of the same provinces.

5. The members of committee may be divided broadly into two classes—official and non-official. The time has not yet come (even were it expedient on other grounds) to entrust to a committee, composed entirely of unofficial members, the serious responsibilities involved. The official members of the existing committees are eight in number, as marginally noted. Of these, it seems to His Honour that Membership in the committee is beyond the true province of the Commissioner, whose functions should be confined to advice, supervision, and report, and through whom all correspondence between the committee on the one hand and Government and departmental heads on the other should come. Of the other official members, the officer in charge of the district (Magistrate and Collector, or Deputy Commissioner), his senior Assistant, and the Civil Surgeon must, under any circumstances, be retained. To the district officer the Government looks for the general administration of the district: he is in theory, what he ought to be in practice, the representative of Government in all departments: he has assistants—general or special—in the several branches of the administration; but it is to him that the care of the district in all its interests is entrusted, and it is on him that the corresponding responsibility devolves. It would be impossible, under present circumstances, to constitute any committee of the kind in question, save under the presidency of the district officer. His functions will thus be, to some extent, dual: he will be member (and president) of the committee representing local interests, and he will at the same time be the guardian of general interests, and the direct representative of the executive Government. On him will fall, practically, the work of organising and guiding the committee; and it will greatly depend on his energy and tact whether the scheme will succeed or fail in his district. His senior Assistant will also be a member, and should be able to take off his hands much of the labour involved. The Civil Surgeon's presence on such a committee is obviously very desirable. The divisional Public Works officer (Executive Engineer) and the Educational Inspector of the Circle should also, in His Honour's opinion, be ex-officio members, as their advice will often be valuable in matters connected with their respective departments. As the Deputy Inspector of Schools will under the new system be wholly (*quâ* educational work) under the committee, his presence on the local board is undesirable: his name will accordingly be erased. The functions of the District Superintendent of Police, as assistant to the Magistrate in the Police Department, do not in any way require that he be a member of this committee. The local police—village and municipal—are practically under the Police Department, and the District Superintendent of Police is in charge of these establishments under the immediate orders of the district officer. His name also will therefore be removed from the ex-officio list. This revision reduces the official members to five; but the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is strongly of opinion that all Tahsíldárs in a district (except those who are merely officiating temporarily) should be ex-officio members of the committee. The local knowledge and experience of these officers will be most valuable in enabling the committee to understand and decide upon many of the matters coming before it, while their official position will give them a direct interest in the proceedings; and their influence and advice will be specially valuable to non-official members resident within their circle. The only objection to this measure is that (assuming the average number of permanent Tahsíldárs in a district to be five) the official members will number ten; and as the law requires that one-half of the total be non-official, it may be difficult to find a sufficient number of eligible non-official members in some of the smaller districts. On the whole, however, His Honour considers that the benefit will fully outweigh any difficulty of this kind that may be experienced; and the names of all Tahsíldárs as above specified will accordingly be added to the official list.

Commissioner -	*President.*
District Officer -	*Vice President.*
Senior Assistant.	*Members.*
Civil Surgeon.	
District Superintendent of Police.	
Deputy Inspector of Schools.	
Executive Engineer.	
Inspector of Schools.	

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* *Vide* new edition, Part VII., page 28, *sqq.*

† Part X., page 6, *sqq.*, Part XII., page 4, *sqq.*

6. As regards non-official members, the law requires that these shall constitute at least one-half of the total number on the board. This proportion seems to His Honor reasonable; but he will be prepared to sanction a larger proportion (provided it do not exceed two-thirds) if this be deemed advisable in the interests of any district. The question of how these independent members should be selected has been very fully discussed, and the almost unanimous verdict of those consulted is in favour of the system of nomination by the district officer (who is obviously the best judge of fitness), approval of the Commissioner, and confirmation by Government. The people are certainly not yet ready, in these Provinces, for the introduction of any system of election. Native gentlemen prefer to pose as the nominees of Government, rather than to appeal to the votes of a constituency; and apart altogether from the difficulties as to franchise, it is matter of notoriety that the people do not yet desire, and will not yet take any interest in, the election of representatives. Even in municipalities, where election has been to some extent introduced, and where the circumstances are more favourable for the growth of such a system than they can be in a district, the reports recently received (and communicated to the Government of India) point clearly to the conclusion that the times are not ripe for the success of the elective system. When, however, such nomination of non-official members has been made as to secure the requisite minimum proportion (viz., one-half), His Honour would leave it to the committee thus constituted—if they desire to increase their numbers—to elect such other non-official members as may be needed to raise the total number of these to two-thirds of the whole. This modified elective system for supplementary members is all that Sir George Couper is at present inclined to do in the direction of election; but His Honour is desirous that it may receive a fair trial.

7. In nominating native gentlemen to the committee, great care will have to be exercised by district officers. The Government is most desirous to secure a thoroughly representative board. Ordinarily, the non-official members should be chosen from the most intelligent and capable landowners of the district, for they constitute the class from whom most assistance is to be looked for in the administration of local public works and the supervision of local educational and medical institutions, and they would more properly represent the classes from whom the local rates are taken. But these remarks are not intended to disqualify residents of towns, not being landholders, for nomination, should their presence be desirable on other grounds: and it is of course open to the district officer (who should not hesitate to avail himself of the authority) to nominate Government officials who are not ex-officio members, with due regard to the proportions referred to above. The distinction between ex-officio official members and official members who are not appointed directly by Government must not be overlooked.

8. Under present orders membership is for one year only. His Honour would extend this to two years, on the analogy of the arrangement in force in municipalities, which has been found to work well.

9. The removal of a member will rest ultimately with the Government, whose approval is essential to any such measure; but the initiative would of course lie ordinarily with the district officer.

10. His Honour has decided, after considering the reports submitted, that the appointment of territorial sub-committees is inadvisable. It is undesirable further to subdivide the area of local administration, and it would often be very difficult to appoint suitable resident members of such sub-committees in many of the districts of these provinces. The repetition of detail and the risk of friction involved in such a system are also objections to its introduction. At the same time local representation should, as far as possible, be fully secured; and it will of course be in the power of the central committee to meet elsewhere than at the headquarters of the district if such a course be deemed necessary, as well as to appoint, for special purposes, a sub-committee to inquire to inquire into and report on matters coming within its cognizance in any special part of the district. As regards the appointment of sub-committees for the treatment of the different matters (Finance, Education, Medical Institutions, Public Works) which may be entrusted to the district committee, His Honour is not inclined to recognise any such officially. There is no reason why all local business should not be submitted to the general committee, as is done in municipalities. It will be in the option of the general committee to appoint at any time sub-committees for inquiry and report on special subjects, and to nominate tw or more members

specially to supervise certain departments or institutions; but Sir George Couper is not favourable to any measures which would tend to lessen the authority and responsibility of the central commistee, and in this view no detailed instructions on the subject of such sub-committees seem necessary.

11. It will be observed that the action to be taken in districts, on the lines above sketched out, does not necessitate at present any legislative amendments. The authority given by the Acts* (which are identical on the question of committees) is sufficient, in His Honour's opinion, to justify the introduction of such changes as have been determined on. Brief rules for the conduct of business will in due course be prepared and circulated: the procedure followed in municipalities seems as good a one as could well be devised for this purpose, but this subject will be separately treated.

12. The following provisions summarise briefly the orders of Government on the constitution of district committees, and supersede all others previously issued on the subject:—

I. The district committee (formed under the Local Rates Act of 1878, for the administration of such funds as may be placed at its disposal by the Local Government, and for the control of the institutions and works entrusted to it) shall consist of official and non-official members.

II. The ex-officio members shall be the following:—
The District Officer.
The Senior Assistant.
The Civil Surgeon.
The Executive Engineer of the Division.
The Educational Inspector of the Circle.
All permanent Tahsíldárs in the district.

(*Proviso.*—This does not exclude other officials from membership by nomination, subject to the condition of proportionate number of non-officials).

III. The district officer shall be president of the committee: in his absence the Senior Assistant will preside.

IV. The number of non-official members (excluding members who are officials but not ex-officio members) will vary according to the circumstances of each district; but it shall in no case be less than one-half or more than two-thirds of the entire committee.

V. Non-official members, including members who are Government officials but not ex-officio members, will be nominated by the district officer, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of the Division and the confirmation of Government. When non-official members equal in number to the official members have been appointed, the committee may, if they desire to increase their numbers, proceed to elect such other members as may be needed to make up the requisite number.

VI. The non-official members shall ordinarily be chosen from the most intelligent and capable representatives, in the various sub-divisions, of the land-owning class.

VII. Membership by nomination shall be for a period of two years; and such nominations, when confirmed, shall be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Gazette." Non-official members are eligible for re-appointment on the expiry of the original term of their office.

VIII. Removal of members will rest entirely with Government.

13. With these instructions, His Honour leaves the work of constituting district committees to the local authorities. No time should be lost in arranging for this, and the complete list of members, who are not ex-officio on the board, should be submitted by district officers to Commissioners for transmission to Government and notification in the "Gazette." The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner trusts that Commissioners and district officers will do all in their power to enlist the sympathies of members in the discharge of the important duties to be entrusted to them; and His Honor will be glad to learn (in the yearly report of each committee's proceedings, which will in due time be prescribed) the names of such

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* Sections 15 and 20, Act III., 1878. Sections 14 and 15, Act IV., 1878.

gentlemen as have shown themselves prominent in the great work of local self-government.

14. Orders on the other branches of the case will be issued as soon as possible: meanwhile every effort should be made to have the committees in thorough working order without loss of time.

By order, &c.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that this Resolution be published in the "Government Gazette " of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh," and that copies be forwarded to the Director of Public Instruction, the Sanitary Commissioner, the Inspector-General of Police, and the Surgeon-General of these provinces, for their information; and to all Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for early attention.

Ordered, also, that a copy be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department, for information.

By order, &c.

ROBERT SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 414, DATED ALLAHABAD, MARCH 9, 1882.

READ—

Resolution No. 393C., dated 4th March 1882, and connected papers.

OBSERVATIONS.—In the Resolution quoted above, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner issued explicit instructions regarding the constitution of district committees, in view of the extended responsibilities about to be entrusted to them. It remains to be decided what changes, if any, should be introduced into the present system under which municipal committees are constituted.

2. The functions which municipal committees will be called upon to exercise are very similar to those which will devolve on district committees. To them will be made over, under certain conditions, the control of all (intra-municipal) educational and medical institutions; and they will be required to meet the expenditure incurred on account of such institutions. They will, on the other hand, be (*pro tanto*) relieved of the cost of maintaining the police force at present employed by them; and if in this exchange of financial liability the balance be against the municipality, the Government will be ready to make good the deficit by an assignment from the funds at its disposal. For it is not the intention of the Government that the measures taken —with the view of extending and strengthening local self-government—should result in any addition to municipal obligations, any more than it is the wish of Government that these measures should be viewed as a means of reducing equitable existing taxation. The real object is to make over to municipalities institutions and works of a kind suitable for local control and likely to enlist local energy. It is in this view that the Government proposes to make over to municipalities the control—administrative and financial—of the educational and medical institutions within their limits; taking upon itself, in lieu thereof, a proportionate share of police expenditure. It is probable that in some of the smaller municipalities the balance will be against them, and in all such cases an assignment will be made with due advertence to the circumstances of each case; while in the larger cities it will in all likelihood be impossible to equalise the interchange of liability without a contribution from municipal funds. The actual figures will only be ascertainable when the details have been worked out; and this laborious task has already been taken in hand.

3. Meanwhile the question is—To what extent, if any, should the system under which municipal committees are at present constituted be altered, and what legislation is necessary for the proper carrying out of the measure? His Honour has had under consideration the views of selected officers on the general subject, and the yearly reports of the proceedings of the various municipal committees (109 in number) in the

united provinces. It appears to Sir George Couper that the present system, which has now been in operation for nearly nine years, has fully justified the hopeful anticipations formed of it, and that it has on the whole worked extremely well. This being so, His Honour is of opinion that the exchange of financial liability and the transfer to these committees of the additional control of institutions to be made over do not of themselves necessitate any change in the existing constitution of the committees, or any amendment of the chapters of Act XV. of 1873 which deal with their appointment, duties, and powers; and in this view no alterations in the existing system will be introduced for the present.

4. But although committees will remain constituted as at present, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner trusts that, as far as possible, really representative and reliable boards will be got together, the members of which will be prepared to sacrifice themselves to some extent for the public weal, and to lend all the assistance of which they are capable to the official members who are more directly responsible to Government. In this way alone can any success in the carrying out of the policy under discussion be possibly attained. Any recommendations coming within the scope of these remarks, and in accordance with the present system, will receive His Honour's early and careful attention; and no time should be lost in preparing committees as far as possible for their extended sphere of work. Details connected with the elaboration of the scheme will follow in due course.

5. It will be necessary to apply to the Government of India for such an amendment of section 34 of the Act as will justify the action to be taken by the Government in handing over to municipalities the financial responsibility for, and the administrative control of, the institutions and works to be transferred, and in relieving them *pro tanto* of police expenditure. This matter is under separate consideration, and the result will be communicated in due course.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered, that copies of this Resolution be forwarded to the Inspector-General of Police, the Director of Public Instruction, the Surgeon-General, all Commissioners of Divisions, and Presidents of Municipal Committees, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance: and to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department.

Ordered also that it be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh "Government Gazette."

By order, &c.
R. SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 5, DATED ALLAHABAD, MARCH 14, 1882.

READ—

Resolution No. 393, dated 4th March, 1882.
„ No. 414, dated 9th „

OBSERVATIONS.—In the first of the Resolutions above referred to, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner indicated briefly the line of action which, after due consideration, he had resolved to follow in connexion with the decentralisation measures: and the primary question of the constitution of the local committees (district and municipal) having been discussed and settled, the next point to be decided is the extent to which responsibility and authority in the several departments concerned are to be transferred. It will be convenient to deal with these departments separately, as the details vary very considerably in each case. The present orders are accordingly confined to the Educational Department, and apply (*mutatis mutandis*) to both district and municipal committees.

2. Under the system lately in force (that is, previous to the issue of the recent instructions on the subject) there was an educational committee in every district of

the North-Western Provinces. For some years prior to 1877, the authority of these committees was confined entirely to the administrative charge of the primary (halkabandi) schools, which were located in out-lying villages of the districts and conducted in the current vernacular of the provinces. It was found, however, as experience increased, that an extension of this system would be advantageous. In this view, the middle-class vernacular schools—institutions located at sub-divisional head-quarters (pargana or tahsíli)—were made over to the charge of the committees under certain conditions and with certain restrictions. Such is the present state of affairs in the North-Western Provinces; the administrative control of the committees over the primary class is complete, and over the middle-class partial; financially, their position is that of a disbursing agent. In Oudh, on the other hand, owing to circumstances which need not here be mentioned, every school, from the lowest to the highest, has hitherto been left in the hands of the Department of Public Instruction. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner was at first somewhat doubtful as to the expediency of making over to committees in Oudh the same authority in educational matters as that which His Honour is prepared to transfer to corresponding bodies in the North-Western Provinces, on the ground that the former had not had the benefit of the same previous experience. But after full consideration, Sir George Couper has decided to make the system uniform for both provinces; and the remarks that follow must therefore be taken as applying to both.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner proposes that every Government school in every district of the provinces shall now be made over to the administrative and financial charge of local committees, tuitional matters alone being reserved for departmental decision. The only exceptions to this general rule will be —(*a*) schools which will now come under the control of municipal committees; (*b*) normal schools, only one of which is allowed to each division; (*c*) schools directly attached to colleges and carried on in the same building, as at Agra and Benares; and (*d*) special schools, such as (perhaps) the Sanskrit school at Ajudhiya. The expenditure connected with every school, up to and including the class known as high and middle English schools, will be debited (orders on this will issue separately) to local rates, and the schools will be made over to local control. The cost of the schools thus to be handed over to local management is about 10 lakhs of rupees per annum. The majority of schools of the higher class and some few of the middle class are situated within the limits of municipal towns, and the control of these will rest with the municipal committees concerned; but with this exception (which must be understood as applying in all cases) the control of all the Government schools situated within district limits will under certain conditions be vested in the district committees. The schools to be handed over constitute the bulk of the educational institutions of the provinces. It will be no easy task to superintend and control these schools, scattered all over the country, many of them in remote tracts. But this is the task that will devolve on committees; and His Honour looks to them and to the district officers who will preside for a careful and zealous discharge of their duties. Sir George Couper does not wish to hamper the action of committees by laying down minute rules of guidance in this matter: he must leave to each committee the decision of the method to be adopted. But he would suggest that, for the purposes of budget and report, the services of a selected member of the covenanted district staff be put in requisition, as is at present done in the North-Western Provinces, and that the assistance of all members who take a special interest in education be enlisted on some uniform principle so as to secure constant supervision and check all over the district.

4. Working alongside of the Government schools in every district of the united provinces are others which, though aided by grants from public funds, are practically private institutions. The rules under which grants are made in such cases are common to both the North-Western Provinces and Oudh;* they are the result of much discussion and long experience, and His Honour sees no good reason for in any way interfering with them. It will still be necessary that sanction be accorded by Government, except where it may choose to delegate this authority; and the functions of committees, district and municipal, in respect to the grants will thus be limited to recommendations for the continuance or withdrawal of existing aid or for the admission of new schools to the privileges of the system. These functions will be exercised in regard to all the classes of schools which will now come under local control. In regard

* Manual, 2nd edition, Part X., pages 15 *et seq.*

to the grant-in-aid schools themselves, the duty of the committees will extend to scrutiny of bills, passing of accounts, and general visitation and report. The amount of these grants is (approximately) two lakhs of rupees.

5. The question of scholarships is one of some difficulty. These prizes are of two kinds; some being open to general competition by boys from all districts, and others being given to deserving lads in each district. The former class must necessarily remain under departmental control; but the management of the latter will be entrusted to committees. These encouragements to progress and improvement are a most valuable means of affording assistance to students of humble birth and poor means; and the proper administration of such funds will demand inquiry and attention. On this, as on other matters, the advice and assistance of the Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors will be specially valuable to district committees.

6. To aid district committees in their educational work, they will have made over to them the entire district inspecting staff as at present constituted, and represented by the classes of officers known as Deputy and Sub-Deputy Inspectors. In the North-Western Provinces each district, as a rule, has a Deputy Inspector, and all have a Sub-Deputy: in Oudh, the latter class of officers was not deemed necessary. These officers will, under the new system, be the subordinates of the district committees, subject in all respects (save as below) to their control; and they must be made clearly to understand their position in relation to these bodies, through the head of the Educational Department. But the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is of opinion that it will be expedient to keep all Deputy Inspectors for the present on a provincial list. These officers are graded; the rates of pay drawn by the grades vary from Rs. 60 to Rs. 150 per mensem; and it would be impossible to arrange for their transfer and promotion without great confusion and expense were they to be made purely local officers. All questions relating to their appointment, transfer, promotion, leave, and punishment, will accordingly for the present originate with the Director of Public Instruction, or be referred to him. But in the former case, the district committees must be consulted on every point and on every occasion, and it will be for the Government to decide should any differences of opinion arise. In regard to the Sub-Deputy Inspectors, His Honour deems it best that the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of these shall be made by committees subject to the Director's approval, all other matters being left to the committees concerned. The claims of all present incumbents to the privileges now enjoyed by them will of course be respected; but the question of right to pension in the case of subordinate officers hereafter appointed by committees is one regarding which a decision cannot at present be given.

7. The position of the teaching staff in the several classes of schools to be transferred to local control has next to be considered. Under present arrangements, no teacher in a school of status below that of the middle vernacular class draws pay over Rs. 20 per mensem; in the higher schools, the salaries vary from Rs. 10 to Rs. 400 per mensem. Teachers are either (*a*) on the gazetted list, or (*b*) on the classified list, or (*c*) on neither. All drawing Rs. 30 per mensem and upwards and not included in (*a*) belong to (*b*); the others belong to (*c*). This distinction, which represents an obvious difference of status, should, His Honour thinks, be maintained. In this view, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner proposes to subject the control by the committees over teachers of classes (*a*) and (*b*) to the limitations described above in the case of Deputy Inspectors, and to hand over to committees full authority in regard to all teachers in all schools under local control who draw less than Rs. 30 per mensem. The latter authority would extend to appointment (in accordance with the orders as to qualification), promotion (subject to existing standards), leave (under standing rules), and dismissal. While the claims of present incumbents to gratuity or pension must be respected, the Government is not prepared to guarantee any such privileges to nominees of committees who may hereafter be appointed by them to vacancies; and until it shall be ruled otherwise, it must be distinctly understood that none such will be entitled to claim gratuity or pension. Sir George Couper confidently looks to the exercise, on the part of the committees, of consideration and discretion in dealing with the class of teachers thus made over to them. The interests at stake are important, and His Honour will scrutinise carefully the action of committees in the exercise of the authority and patronage which have now been conferred upon them.

8. The system of budgets and reports at present in force in the North-Western Provinces has worked satisfactorily, and may with advantage be continued in these provinces (with the necessary extended application) and introduced in Oudh. Any

information on this subject that may be necessary will be obtained by a reference to the Director of Public Instruction, whose combined budget will show in future all educational institutions under the two heads of—

I. Local (*a*) District,
(*b*) Municipal; and
II. Provincial.

The effect of these measures will be to narrow very much the field and debit of class II., and to add largely to the number and cost of items under class I. The budgets framed by committees for all schools under their control should be forwarded to the Director, through the Divisional Inspector, for amalgamation and consolidation; but their reports should go as at present to the Director of Public Instruction, through the Commissioner of the Division.

9. All correspondence with the district inspecting staff should pass through the district committee, and copies of inspection and other reports should be sent by the departmental officers to the committees concerned—for their information, and for the purpose of obtaining any further information that may be desired. In short, committees should be kept thoroughly informed of all the educational matters affecting their several districts. All references on the general subject of local control over educational institutions should be made to the Director of Public Instruction, who will refer to Government in doubtful cases, and afford all needful information.

10. The question of assignment of funds will be separately dealt with, and general rules for the conduct of business in the educational and other departments will be duly prescribed.

11. The foregoing remarks practically exhaust matters calling for special attention. It only remains briefly to summarise the important points in supersession of all existing orders on the subject:—

I. There will be no separate educational committee: the educational business will be arranged for by the general district (or municipal) committee as it may decide.

II. All Government schools, up to and including the higher English class,* are placed under the administrative and financial control of the committee.

III. As respects these schools, the functions of the committee extend—subject to standing orders—

(*a.*) To the appointment, promotion, transfer, leave, punishment, and dismissal of teachers drawing less than Rs. 30 per mensem (all such transactions being duly recorded in the committee's proceedings, and being subject to review by Government); and to a general authority over all other teachers:

(*b.*) To the location of schools and the building and repair of school-houses, provided that no school of or above the middle vernacular status shall be abolished or created without the sanction of the Director of Public Instruction, and that the provisions of the Public Works Department Code (where applicable) are complied with as to buildings:

(*c.*) To the preparation of budget estimates in the form required by the Accounts Department, and in accordance with the authorised standards (see IX.):

(*d.*) To the scrutiny and countersignature of all bills and accounts:

(*e.*) To the preparation of the annual reports: and

(*f.*) To the general control of the schools in question in regard to all matters affecting their proper administration and financial well-being.

IV. Aided schools, corresponding in status to the classes specified in II., are placed under the supervision of the committees, who will make recommendations as to grants, scrutinise and countersign bills, and arrange for thorough and periodical visitation.

V. The district inspecting staff (Deputy and Sub-Deputy Inspectors) is placed entirely at the disposal of the district committee; but these officers will continue to submit to their departmental superiors (through the committee) any

* Superior (zila) English, Inferior (zila), Middle vernacular, Lower vernacular (boys and girls).

reports or information that may be called for. For the present they will remain on the provincial list, and be generally subject (in matters of status and discipline) to the Director of Public Instruction.

VI. In tuitional matters, that is, in matters connected with the direction of studies and the examination of results, the orders of the Director of Public Instruction will be accepted as final: with these the Committees have no direct concern. It is for the Inspector and his assistants to see that the authorised course of study is in all cases adhered to, and to visit and examine all schools according to departmental instructions, due notice being given to the committee concerned.

VII. A full report must be prepared under the orders of the committee every year on their educational administration; and this should be forwarded not later than the 15th April * to the Commissioner for submission to the Director of Public Instruction.

VIII. Any difference of opinion between the committee and departmental officers will be submitted for the decision of Government; and all correspondence between Government on the one hand and committees on the other on educational matters will ordinarily go through the Director's office.

IX. The committee's budget should be forwarded (through the Divisional Inspector) to the Director of Public Instruction not later than the 15th September * of each year. Unless otherwise provided for, unexpended allotments will lapse to Government at the close of the financial year.

X. No promise or guarantee of pension shall be given to any Deputy or Sub-Deputy Inspector, or to any teacher who may hereafter be appointed by local committees, pending further orders on this subject; but the rights of present incumbents in this respect will not be prejudiced by the change of system.

(Signed) J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered, that copies of this Resolution be forwarded to the Director of Public Instruction, Accountant-General, all Commissioners of Divisions, all District Officers, and all Presidents of Municipal Committees in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

Ordered also, that a copy be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department for information; and that the Resolution be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Gazette."

By order, &c.
ROBERT SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 9, DATED ALLAHABAD, MARCH 17, 1882.

READ—

Resolution No. 393, dated 4th March 1882.
" No. 414, dated 9th "
" No. 5, dated 14th "

OBSERVATIONS.—The last quoted Resolution dealt with the transfer to local committees (district and municipal) of educational institutions. The present orders refer mainly to the control to be exercised by committees over hospitals and dispensaries. These have been hitherto managed practically by the Civil Surgeon (who is ordinarily on both the district and municipal boards), acting under the orders of the (Civil) Surgeon

* These dates are subject to modification, if this be deemed necessary in connexion with other departmental reports and budgets.

General. The object of the Government in applying to this branch of the Medical Department the general policy of extended local control is to secure, as far as this is possible, that the Civil Surgeon shall obtain and utilise the co-operation of other members of the committees in the work. What may be termed the professional element in the management of these institutions (analogous to the tuitional element in schools) will of course rest entirely with the Civil Surgeon; but there is no reason why local committees should not interest themselves and take part in the administrative and financial control of dispensaries.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is of opinion that municipal funds should contribute largely to the support of intra-municipal dispensaries and hospitals. It is true that these institutions are to some degree resorted to by persons resident outside municipal bounds, but such cases are not of such frequent occurrence as to militate against the general principle. The district committees are the natural guardians of all other such institutions, as a portion of the local cess by law ought to be devoted to the maintenance of hospitals and dispensaries. The question of debit, then, is clear in both cases, and under the new scheme this will be arranged for.

3. It is not so easy, however, to decide where the professional control which is essential ought to begin and end, and where the functions of the committees should commence. Obviously the purely professional staff attached to dispensaries, consisting in these Provinces of Assistant Surgeons, Hospital Assistants, and Native Doctors, must remain under professional management and be retained for the present on a general list. The pay of the several grades, except in the case of Native Doctors, varies from Rs. 20 to Rs. 200 per mensem. The incumbents must have regularly qualified in the prescribed curriculum and obtained a diploma. The Government must be in a position (through the Surgeon-General) to appoint, promote, transfer, and dismiss them; and this can only be done by retaining them on a provincial roster and subjecting them to a central authority. But His Honour, while deciding that this must be so, is anxious to give committees a distinct voice in the matter; and in this view it is hereby declared that, except in really emergent cases, which will be of rare occurrence, no action shall be taken in the appointment or removal of any such officials without a reference to the committee, to whose wishes full consideration will always be given.

4. Of the other dispensary officials, the compounders and dressers are quasi-professional; but they will be left, in common with the menial establishment, under the control of the several committees concerned. If, however, the Civil Surgeon be of opinion that the action of any committee of which he is a member is in regard to the employment of compounders and dressers such as may be detrimental to dispensary interests, he will be at liberty to refer the matter through the committee to the head of his department. In the case of men at present employed the transfer of control to committees will in no way prejudice right to pension, but nominees hereafter appointed under the authority of committees will have no claim to gratuity or pension.

5. All the heads of expenditure connected with dispensary management, except one or two which will be alluded to presently, appear well fitted for supervision by such members of committees as may take an interest in the work, especially those heads which are connected with the dieting, clothing, and general treatment of patients at dispensaries. It is in such matters, indeed, that local management will prove efficacious and beneficial. If members will lend themselves to the task of visiting occasionally the hospitals in proximity to their private or official residences, observing whether cleanliness is scrupulously attended to, noting the quality of the food and the mode of its preparation, examining the clothing, ascertaining the character borne by the officials for kindly treatment and attention to duty, there can be no doubt that much good work would be performed in these institutions that is at present left undone. The results of inspections made by members of the committee should invariably be recorded in an inspection book and be reported to the general committee. Committees will not attempt to interfere with professional work or technical treatment; but they can see whether the common round of duty, on which so much of the comfort of those concerned depends, is properly performed. This is specially the case in regard to outlying dispensaries, the visits of the Civil Surgeon to which are few and far between.

6. An important item of dispensary expenditure is the purchase of European medicines, a costly head of charge concerning which orders have recently issued. Each district has now an allowance based on the average number of indoor patients. The allowance is controlled by the Civil Surgeon, who allots to each dispensary as he thinks advisable. This plan has worked well, and may with advantage be retained. All such indents will therefore be submitted to the Surgeon-General, and no extra supply will be passed by him except on good cause shown. The distribution between intra and extra municipal allotments for this purpose must be arranged for (on an average basis), as the debit will be different in the two cases, but the general indent may as before be for the entire district. All surgical instruments which are used for patients who are under treatment in municipal and district dispensaries will be regarded as the property of the committees. But, as in the case of European drugs, no new instruments will be purchased or supplied except on indents passed by the Surgeon-General. The travelling allowances of Civil Surgeons on inspection duty are practically a fixed annual charge.

7. If a committee are of opinion that any new dispensary should be opened or any existing one closed, they will submit proposals to the Surgeon-General, who will (if necessary) refer them to the Government. Hitherto, the systems in operation respectively in the North-Western Provinces and in Oudh have not been identical. In the older province it has been customary to require a guaranteed income raised from private sources before the Government consents to subsidise; in Oudh, on the other hand, the local cess has been accepted as sufficient. His Honour is not prepared to discuss at present the relative merits of the systems, or to decide whether one of the two (and if so, which) shall be abolished. The fact that private money is subscribed is doubtless of itself an incentive to interest in management; while, on the other hand, most of the expenditure is fairly debitable to local rates in all except intra-municipal cases. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner will therefore be prepared to deal liberally with proposals for the opening of new dispensaries where the conditions are favourable, but His Honour would be sorry to see private charity checked in any way.

8. Pending further orders, the present system of budget and report will remain in force. It may be necessary to arrange for the varying grades of pay drawn by the subordinate medical staff by a system of average debits, subject to adjustment at the close of the year on the basis of actuals: this will be separately discussed when the question of assignment is dealt with. There is no objection, *primâ facie*, to the transfer by committees of expenditure from one (district) dispensary to another in accordance with local needs, provided the total grant is not exceeded; or to the entertainment within the grant of a larger menial staff. In these and such like matters, but especially in the subjects treated of in para. 5, the Government looks for really good results from the extended authority now conferred on committees.

9. Connected with the general subject now under discussion is that of vaccination and sanitation. There is no doubt that this department would benefit by increased local control. His Honour therefore directs that district vaccinators and native district superintendents of vaccination shall be subordinated to the district committees. Vaccinators employed within municipalities will of course be subordinate to the municipal committees. The authority of committees over vaccinators will be the same as that which they hold over dispensary compounders and dressers; while in the relation of district superintendents of vaccination to the committees and to the head of the department will be the same as that of the district inspecting staff of the Educational Department under the instructions recently issued.

10. Such portion of the above orders as is authoritative may briefly be summarised as under for ready reference:—

I. There will be no special medical committee, all business connected with dispensary and vaccination work being submitted to the general committee.

II. The administrative and financial control of all medical and sanitary institutions and establishments (save such as may be specially excepted) will be exercised by local committees (district or municipal), professional matters being left in the hands of the departmental officers concerned.

III. Assistant Surgeons, Hospital Assistants, Native Doctors, and Native Superintendents of Vaccination will be borne on a provincial list; and all matters

relating to their appointment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal will rest with the head of the department and the Government. But the wishes of committees in such matters will be fully considered and as far as possible complied with; and no such official will be appointed to or removed from any district (except in case of urgent necessity) without a reference to the committee concerned.

IV. The rest of the establishment will be under the entire control of the committee; but the Civil Surgeon (as regards compounders and dressers) and the Deputy Superintendent of Vaccination (as regards vaccinators) may refer, through the committee, to the head of the department in cases where they are of opinion that an improper selection has been made or detrimental action taken.

V. Existing rights to pension will be respected, but no persons hereafter appointed by committees will have any claim to gratuity or pension.

VI. No existing dispensary shall be closed, and no new dispensary shall be opened, without reference to the Surgeon-General. Similarly, the general staff of vaccinators in a district will not be increased or lessened without the consent of the head of the department.

VII. The present system of budget and report will be retained pending further orders.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that copies of this Resolution be forwarded to the Surgeon-General, Sanitary Commissioner, and Accountant-General of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, and to all Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

Ordered, also, that a copy be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department for information, and that it be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Gazette."

By order, &c.
ROBERT SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 22, DATED ALLAHABAD, MARCH 31, 1882.

READ—

I. Resolution No. 393, dated 4th March, 1882.
II. Resolution No. 414, dated 9th ,,
III. Resolution No. 5, dated 14th ,,
IV. Resolution No. 9, dated 17th ,,

OBSERVATIONS.—In previous Resolutions (III. and IV.) the transfer to local committees of the control of educational and medical institutions has been discussed. It now remains to be considered how far the policy of decentralisation can be extended to the Department of Public Works, and what authority can with advantage be delegated to district committees in connexion with the maintenance and construction of local roads and buildings.

2. Under existing arrangements, district committees in these provinces have practically had little influence or authority in local matters appertaining to the Public Works Department. Their functions have been purely consultative, and even in this respect they have had little opportunity of making themselves heard. It is true that the District Engineer is the Magistrate's Assistant in the Department of Public Works, and Secretary to the local committee in that Department. But it is likewise true that the subordination of the District Engineer to the local committee has been little more than nominal; and that local public works have in a great measure been carried out and controlled, independently of the committee, by the District Engineer as an

official of the Department of Public Works. It could not perhaps well have been otherwise, seeing that the District Engineer, as an officer of the Department of Public Works, is charged with the execution and care of much provincial and imperial work with which local committees are not concerned.

3. It would be unwise, in His Honour's opinion, to dispense altogether with the professional guidance and control of the Department of Public Works in respect to local public works. The Government must have some guarantee that the money now to be put at the disposal of local committees under Acts III. and IV. of 1878 is expended on approved projects and with due regard to system and economy. Further, it would be unwise and improper to dispense with the services of efficient officers of the Department of Public Works who will no longer be required for provincial and imperial works, and to leave the local committees to find their own professional subordinates. The latter arrangement may indeed eventually be advisable; but the position of the existing staff of District Engineers and Upper and Lower Subordinates,—as Government officers who are entitled to promotion and pension, and are liable to transfer, punishment, and dismissal under rules laid down by the Government,—must at present remain unchanged.

4. Subject to the limitations indicated in the preceding paragraph, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner proposes to make the District Engineer and such staff under him as may be required for local public works the subordinates of the district committees; to employ them solely in the designing, execution, and care of local public works; and to hand over to the committees the management and control—under certain rules as to sanction, supervision and accounts—of all local public works, except such as may for special reasons be excepted and transferred to provincial control. The manner in which these proposals are to be carried out is explained in the following paragraphs.

5. The main heads under which expenditure on public works is incurred are—(1) Maintenance (*i.e.*, repairs,), (2) Construction, and (3) Establishment. Under (1) and (2), again, there is the natural sub-division of communications (roads, ferries and bridges) and buildings. Roads are divided, for administrative and account purposes, into four classes. All in the first class are metalled throughout; those of the second are raised and bridged, but not metalled; those of the third class are partially raised and bridged; the fourth class consist of cart tracks, which are neither raised nor bridged. It has been decided that the maintenance of all roads shall be left to the district committees, except such of the first class as may be reserved for provincial control. These last (of which a list will be published) are all important trunk lines, traversing several divisions or districts, and connecting important provincial centres. It is expedient that the management of these should not vest in the district committees, and they will therefore continue for the present to be maintained by the Public Works Department.

6. Ferries are at present under the charge of District Officers. With a few exceptions (to be hereafter specified) His Honour will make over all ferries to the control of the district committees. In the classification of accounts prescribed by the Financial Department ferry receipts and charges are provincial; but the surplus is credited by law to the General Local Rates Fund, and the ferries themselves are essentially suitable for local management.

7. As regards local buildings, these have hitherto been classed departmentally. The charge of all schools up to and inclusive of the higher English schools has under recent orders been entrusted to the district committees, and the maintenance of these buildings should clearly form part of the committee's duties. Similarly, all medical buildings (hospitals and dispensaries) will be transferred, and also such miscellaneous structures as strangers' homes, work-houses, and poor-houses. The departmental officers and depôts (godowns) in each district, which are utilised in connexion with local public works operations, will likewise be handed over to the committees. All accommodation for travellers, whether in the shape of rest-houses or of sarais (which are at present classed under nazúl), will be transferred to the committees concerned; and all inspection houses on roads made over to local control will follow these roads in regard to control.

8. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is further pleased to transfer to the local committees the charge of works classed as Miscellaneous Public Improve-

ments with such exceptions as will be hereafter notified. These works are, as their name denotes, of a mixed character, and consist mainly of drainage and protective works, embankments, and tanks. New works are of infrequent occurrence, but the maintenance of existing ones is important and may suitably be made over to the committees. The exceptions to this transfer (which will be specified by the Public Works Department) are works for which special grants from provincial or imperial funds have been made, and which it is considered advisable to retain under departmental control.

9. The expenditure on maintenance under the several headings indicated above is to all intents and purposes a fixed sum; that is, the charges do not vary to any great extent in any district from year to year. An average will accordingly be struck (on the basis of the 1882–83 estimates, which are of a normal character) for each class in each district, and this will form a portion of the assignment for local public works to be spent by committees in the manner that seems to them most beneficial for local interests on the conditions hereafter to be specified.

10. The maintenance of local communications and buildings will be carried out in such manner as the district committee may arrange. Ordinarily the maintenance of first and second class roads, and of buildings connected with them, will be carried out through the District Engineer and his subordinates. Extensive repairs to local buildings will as a rule be best arranged for in the same manner. Petty repairs to these buildings and the maintenance of third and fourth class roads may often be advantageously carried out under the supervision of individual members of the committees, who (as in the case of the Tahsíldars) are near the spot and can conveniently arrange that the work be properly and economically done. In the maintenance of first and second class roads with their attached buildings, and in carrying out extensive repairs to local buildings, the district committees will have the advantage of the guidance of the Executive Engineer, who will be a member of the district committee; and they will be under the supervision of the Superintending Engineers of the circles in which their districts are included.

11. Under "Construction" comes all new or original local works, whether communications or buildings. These are divided into three classes—(*a*) petty, (*b*) minor, and (*c*) major. Petty works may be defined to be either such new works as cost less than Rs. 500, or extensions and alterations of existing works of the same value, or special, as opposed to ordinary, repairs up to the same amount. The definition may be further widened by the inclusion under it of any self-contained portion of a work up to the Rs. 500 limit which can be executed independently. For these petty works no administrative sanction or entry in the budget is necessary; and such works will, therefore, be absolutely disposed of by the district committees without reference to any other authority. For preparation of plans and estimates the committee will, if they think it necessary, utilise the services of the District Engineer. To provide for such petty works allotments of two kinds will for the present be made:—(1) of Rs. 5,000 per annum to each district in the provinces coming under the first and second classes of Mr. Cust's scheme, and (2) of Rs. 3,000 to all others. For the present, Oudh districts, which that scheme did not include, will be considered as falling within the latter category. The money thus provided will be of the nature of a reserve fund, and will be expended on works of the kind indicated at the unfettered discretion of the committee.

12. Minor works are such as cost from Rs. 500 to Rs. 2,500, with the same extended application of the term as is given to petty works in the preceding paragraph. For these, administrative sanction, professional examination of the projects, entry in the budget, and provision of funds are essential. The discretion of according administrative sanction to such works will rest with the Commissioner of the division, and entry in the budget will depend on the relative importance attached to the work by the committees as compared with other sanctioned works, and on the amount available for original works, exclusive of the allotment for petty works. What this amount will be in any one year it is impossible to say. It can hardly be a fixed sum, even for a short term of years. The distribution of the allotment available among districts from provincial funds in aid of local funds will be made, in view of the relative need of the several districts, by the Public Works Secretariat, subject to the approval of the Financial Department. The total of this allotment can under no circumstances be exceeded, and it is therefore essential that distribution be arranged at head-quarters. The committee will employ their District Engineer to prepare plans

and estimates of such works as they may wish taken in hand, in communication with the Executive Engineer, whose professional advice will be sufficient for all such projects. In regard to these works the Executive Engineer will act in his capacity as a member of the district committee, to which he will be responsible. These works will ordinarily be carried out under the committee's direction by the District Engineer; but in the issue of orders and in taking steps for supervision the committee will be aided and guided by the Executive Engineer.

13. All projects costing over Rs. 2,500 are included in the term major works. These will be few in number. It has been decided to apply to all such costing not more than Rs. 5,000, *i.e.*, from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 5,000, the provisions, *mutatis mutandis*, of the preceding paragraph, except that in cases of this kind the Superintending Engineer's professional sanction must be obtained to the projects. As regards works costing over Rs. 5,000 the administrative sanction of Government will be necessary, and the plans and estimates prepared by the District Engineer—or, if the Chief Engineer so direct, by the Executive Engineer,—will be submitted, through the Superintending Engineer, to the Chief Engineer for professional sanction. In cases where for special reasons it may be considered advisable to treat any major (local) work as a provincial work, and to carry it out through the provincial departmental staff, instead of through the district committee and its local staff, the Government reserves to itself the power of doing so.

14. The functions of the superior officers of the Department of Public Works have been indicated in the preceding paragraphs. The Executive Engineer will be, as it were, the Public Works member of the district committee. He will examine and pass all its projects for minor works; its projects for major works will be examined, or, if the Chief Engineer shall have so directed, be prepared by him and then submitted to the Superintending Engineer; and he will, as the responsible provisional adviser of the committee, guide and aid it in carrying out and supervising the execution of all important works of maintenance and construction. The functions of the Superintending Engineer in respect to the construction and maintenance of local public works will, apart from the professional examination and sanction of projects that will rest with him as indicated in the preceding paragraph, be simply those of an inspecting officer on behalf of the Government, and he will report the results of his inspection to the Chief Engineer. Though he cannot issue orders *suo motu* in regard to original works, it will be his duty to give professional advice and assistance in any matter referred to him by the district committee; and he should at once bring to the notice of the committee any irregularities or matters calling for attention which may come before him during his tour of inspection. All communications between the District and the Superintending and Chief Engineers will pass through the office of the Commissioner of the Division, who is empowered to record upon them such criticism and recommendations as may seem to be called for.

15. There remains the question of Establishment. The local public works establishment will consist of the District Engineer and such lower subordinates and office establishment as may be required with reference to the extent and importance of the local public works of each district. The District Engineer will be an officer of the Department of Public Works of the standing of an Executive or Assistant Engineer, or Upper Subordinate. The separation of the officials for local service from the general staff of the Department of Public Works, and the allotment of them to the different districts of the Provinces in accordance with local requirements, will be effected in the Public Works Branch of the Secretariat. The whole of the local public works establishment in each district will be executively subordinate to the district committee. It will be the duty of the District Engineer to make inquiries and reports, to prepare projects, and to carry out the maintenance and construction of local works in accordance with the directions of the district committee. All reports and projects prepared by him for which sanction must be obtained from superior authority, will be submitted through the committee. All professional instruction and criticism which superior departmental authority may have to offer, will be conveyed to him through the committee. Similarly, all accounts which the District Engineers may have to submit in accordance with departmental rules, and all orders upon these accounts which superior authority may issue, will pass through the committee. The latter will be responsible to the Government that their subordinate and agent, the District Engineer, conducts properly the duties of his office. The Lower Subordinate and office staff will usually be put by the committee under the orders of the District Engineer.

But it, not less than he, will be the subordinate of the committee; and while it is under the orders of the District Engineer, he will be responsible to the committee that its services are properly and fully utilised.

16. The names of all officers of the Engineer, Upper Subordinate, and Lower Subordinate classes who are on the establishment of the Public Works Department and will now be transferred to the local committees, will remain on the provincial list of Officers of the Public Works Department, and for the present the Government in that Department reserves to itself the right of transferring these officers from local to provincial works and *vice versâ*. All questions relating to the appointment, transfer, promotion, leave, punishment, and dismissal of the local officers of the Engineer and Upper Subordinate classes, and all questions relating to the transfer, promotion, permanent degredation, and dismissal of the local officers of the Lower Subordinate class, will originate with the head of the Public Works Department or will be referred to him. But in all cases originating with the head of the Public Works Department, committees will be consulted and weight given to their views and wishes. The punishment (short of dismissal or permanent degradation) and leave of the local officers of the Lower Subordinate class will rest with the committees, In respect to the office and other establishment that will be required for local public works, it is proposed to transfer it permanently to the local committees. The appointment, pay, and punishment of these officials may be left to the discretion of the committees. But for the present certain conditions must be imposed with regard to those of them who already belong to the Public Works Department and are qualifying for pension. The scale of pay allowed to them under standing orders should not ordinarily be departed from. All punishments involving permanent loss of pay or dismissal in the case of officials drawing more than Rs. 30 per mensem must be sanctioned by the Commissioner of the Division. All existing claims to pension will be scrupulously respected, but no employé hereafter nominated by the committees will be entitled to any such privileges. It is impossible to say how far committees may hereafter be empowered to engage officers of the Engineer and Upper Subordinate classes on their own terms; and the Government for the present reserves to itself the duty of filling up any vacancies in these classes. But in regard to Lower Subordinates and office and other establishment, it will be for the committees to fill up as seems best to them such vacancies as may occur.

17. Instructions as to preparation of estimates, submission of accounts, reappropriation of funds, and disposal of unexpended balances will be prescribed in due course, along with the few general rules for the transaction of business which may be considered necessary. Further information on matters of detail will be obtained on reference to the Public Works Department.

18. It remains to notice the arrangements which will be made for conducting the duties which have hitherto devolved upon District Engineers and their subordinate staff in connexion with provincial and imperial communications and buildings. With these the local committees have nothing to do; and the District Engineer and his subordinates will therefore cease to be responsible for them. It appears desirable to relieve the Department of Public Works of the duty of executing ordinary repairs to provincial departmental buildings, except in a few districts where the buildings in question are very numerous and expensive or of a special character. The ordinary maintenance of Police buildings throughout the Provinces has already been entrusted to the Inspector-General of Police, the district agency for estimating for and carrying out repairs being the Magistrate of the District and the District Superintendent of Police. Similarly, the repairs of Jails have been entrusted to the Inspector-General of Prisons, who manages the repairs through the several Superintendents of Jails. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner now directs that the ordinary repairs of all ordinary revenue buildings, of all court-houses, and of other similar buildings, shall, with the exceptions above alluded to, be made over to the Collector and Magistrate of the District. His Honour has no doubt that not only will the latter officer find no difficulty in executing these repairs through his subordinates, but that this mode of carrying out the repairs will be more satisfactory to all concerned than the system at present in operation.

19. The ordinary maintenance of provincial buildings which it may not be deemed advisable to entrust to the Collector and Magistrate, the execution of heavy repairs

to provincial buildings in all districts, the maintenance of provincial trunk lines of road, and the construction of provincial buildings and other provincial works, will now be made over entirely to Executive Engineers and their subordinate establishment. The scheme under which this is to be arranged, embracing the amount, cost, and distribution of establishments, the relation of the engineering staff to the civil officers of Government, and the method of dealing with proposals, projects, and accounts is now being considered in the Public Works Department of this Government, and orders will shortly issue. These details do not affect directly the question of local self-government and the management of local public works through the district committees. It is sufficient, therefore, to have indicated generally in this Resolution the plan upon which Provincial public works are in future to be managed.

20. As the Public Works Digest will be revised and recast in accordance with the altered condition of affairs, it is not necessary to give more than a very brief summary of the more important of the foregoing orders :—

I. The district committee's jurisdiction extends to maintenance of the following classes of works, exclusive of such as may be under municipal control :—

(*a.*) All roads of the second, third, and fourth classes, and such first class roads as are not reserved for departmental management ;

(*b.*) All ferries or boat bridges, except such as may be specially reserved for provincial management ;

(*c.*) All miscellaneous public improvements, except such as are specially reserved for provincial management ;

(*d.*) All accommodation for travellers without exception, and all inspection-houses on roads made over ;

(*e.*) All educational buildings up to and inclusive of zila schools ;

(*f.*) All medical buildings ;

(*g.*) All strangers' homes, workhouses, and poorhouses.

II. In carrying out the above, the committee will be left to arrange as seems best to them, subject to such rules as may hereafter be prescribed. The amount to be placed at their disposal for this purpose will be on an average a normal sum, variable at the pleasure of the Government.

III. Each committee will get a grant for petty original local works which it will utilise in the manner most advantageous for the district. Ordinarily this grant will be from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 3,000 per district, according to classification.

IV. For other local works, minor and major, the following conditions must be complied with before the committee can proceed to execute them :—

(*a.*) Administrative sanction must be obtained ;

(*b.*) Plans and estimates must be professionally approved ;

(*c.*) Entry must be made in the budget ;

(*d.*) Funds must be available.

Up to Rs. 5,000 the authority under (*a*) will rest with the Commissioner, under (*b*) the approval up to Rs. 2,500 must be that of the Executive Engineer, and above Rs. 2,500 that of the Superintending Engineer. For everything over Rs. 5,000 the administrative sanction of the Government and the professional assent of the Chief Engineer will be necessary. Generally, the professional supervision and responsibility of superior officers of the Public Works Department in regard to all (save petty) original works, and to the maintenance of first and second class roads, will remain as at present, on the lines above indicated.

V. The District Engineer and his whole staff will be placed at the disposal of the district committee, and will be regarded as directly subordinate to that committee ; but all officers of the Engineer, Upper Subordinate, and Lower Subordinate classes who are now on the provincial list, will for the present remain so and be generally subject, in matters of status and discipline, to the Government in the Public Works Department. It will be for the committee hereafter to fill up vacancies in posts below the class for which Upper Subordinates are eligible on pay not exceeding the present maximum ; but no employés of any kind appointed by the local committees will have any claim to gratuity or pension.

VI. As regards all local works, the Executive Engineer will act in his capacity of member of the district committee, and the executive functions of the Superintending Engineer will be confined to inspection and report.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that copies of this Resolution be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department, with special reference to paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 12, and 15; and also to the Accountant-General, all Commissioners of Divisions, and all District Officers in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information.

Ordered also that it be published in the "Government Gazette" of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

By order, &c.
ROBERT SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 36, DATED ALLAHABAD, APRIL 13, 1882.

READ—

(1.) Resolution of this Government in the Financial Department, No. 1561, dated 8th October, 1881 (with Appendices A. and B.).

(2.) Resolutions Nos. I., II., III., IV., and V., regarding Decentralisation—Part II., Administrative.

OBSERVATIONS.—In the Resolution of 8th October last, an attempt was made to show how the local rates levied in the North-Western Provinces under Act III. of 1878 stood, as regarded (*a*) the total amount available for expenditure after allowing for the further rate and the 10 per cent. assignment for canals and railways; (*b*) the amounts to be deducted rateably from district credits on account of provincialised establishments and institutions common to more than one district; and (*c*) the balance for purely district expenditure. This matter has now, in view of the decentralisation measures under discussion, become more important than it was before, and the following remarks are intended to put the question of local debit once for all on a clear footing.

2. In statement A, appended to the Resolution of the 8th October last, details were given for each district in the North-Western Provinces. The figures for Oudh were not at the time available, but the present orders apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to that province.

3. Two changes are needed in regard to statement A. The first is in connexion with the deduction made in column 12 for school inspection charges. Under this head the proportions of total charges rateably debited to local rates were the following:—

Direction	-	25 per cent.
Divisional inspection	-	33⅓ ditto.

Now the duties of Divisional Inspectors extend to the examination and visitation of all schools below the status of colleges within the several districts of their divisions. Every district school of whatever grade, is a local school, inasmuch as it primarily exists for the education of the youths of the district in which it is situated, and has no direct connexion with any other district. There is no good reason therefore for limiting the debit to local rates on account of the inspection of schools to one third of the cost; and in future the entire expenditure on account of inspection will be charged to these rates. But to avoid complication of accounts, the 25 per cent. charge for direction (two-thirds to the North-Western Provinces and one-third to Oudh) will be omitted from the calculation.

4. The second change refers to that portion of the establishment connected with the Department of Agriculture and Commerce which is debited to local rates, but not shown in the statement.

5. In statement B., appended to the Resolution of the 8th October last, the opening balances showed the amounts available for purely district expenditure, and for district control, as far as this was considered feasible. The first item in the statement is that of the rural police, a primary charge on the rates; and here no change seems at present necessary. In regard to Education, the second item, there should be added the cost of all schools belonging to a single district, and thus coming under the term "local." This classification will embrace all schools up to and inclusive of the zila schools. When, under the new arrangements under discussion, any one of these schools is made over to a municipality, the local rates will *pro tanto* be relieved; but for the present it will conduce to simplification if the total cost debitable to local rates be shown.

6. In para. 8 of the Resolution of the 8th October 1881, it was stated that the pay of Assistant Surgeons, Hospital Assistants, and Native Doctors had been debited tentatively to Provincial Services. But it appears to the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner that the entire cost of maintaining the local charitable medical institutions over which these officers preside is properly chargeable to local rates; and this will now be arranged for by debiting the pay of these officers to local funds.*

7. The above alterations will have the effect of considerably reducing the closing balances given in statement B., which were intended to show the net amounts available for Public Works. Even before the increased debits now ordered were made, the closing balances in question were represented in two districts† by minus quantities; that is, there was nothing available for Public Works. The result of the changes now made will be to bring the districts marginally noted (statement I., column VI.) into the same category. The reason of this is that local rates are levied in the form of uniform rates upon the annual value or upon the cultivated area of the estates which are comprised in each district. The consequence is that while in some instances rich and highly assessed districts enjoy a local income which more than suffices for their needs in the way of police, education, medical charity, and the maintenance of buildings and communications, other poorer and more lightly assessed tracts, with similar and often greater wants, cannot meet their liabilities. The only possible remedy at present for this state of affairs is that which has been adopted in the past—the Local Government will step in and subsidise the defaulting districts, making grants to them from other funds at its disposal in accordance with their requirements.

Dehra.	Jhánsi.
Bareilly.	Lalitpur.
Budaun.	Kumaun.
Sháhjahánpur.	Garhwál.
Benares.	Tarái.
Mirzapur.	

8. There remains the question of debit of Public Works expenditure to local rates, a matter which has only recently been inquired into. All charges connected with the buildings of such portions of the Educational and Medical Departments as have been put under the district committees will, of course, appear in future in the Public Works Budget under "local." But in regard to communications, it is not easy to classify the roads in a district, beyond a certain point, as local or non-local. It seems to the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner that, taking the unambiguous wording of the Act‡ as a guide, no class of roads in a district can claim exemption. But in view of the fact that there are in almost every district in these provinces certain roads which, being of the nature of trunk lines, are of more importance to the Provinces as a whole than to any one of the special districts through which they pass, His Honor has decided to reserve these roads for Provincial management, and to debit the expenditure connected with them to Provincial Revenues. A list of these Provincial lines of road has lately been published by the Public Works Department. The average cost of maintaining these roads—as at present classified—in ordinary repair is estimated at $7\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees per annum; and by this sum (as well as by the cost of additions and special repairs, estimated at over 5 lakhs in 1882–83) the amount that might under the law be debited to local rates will be decreased. The result of this

* A deduction of 20 per cent. may have hereafter to be made from pay of Assistant Surgeons in view of certain other duties devolving on them, but this will be considered separately.

† Dehra and Lalitpur.

‡ The construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and other communications.

decision is to make local debit and local control concurrent and conterminous—an arrangement which is certainly in harmony with the spirit and intention of the law.

9. The primary charge under Public Works is for the maintenance of existing roads and buildings ; and there are very few districts in the united Provinces in which, after allowing for this item, for allotments for petty works, and for district establishments (*vide* Resolution No. 22, dated 31st March 1882), the balance at credit will not be almost entirely absorbed. In the case of the majority of districts (statement II., column IV.) the balance will be against the local rates. Here again, as at the earlier stage in the case of the poorer districts, the Government will be prepared to meet the debit and to provide for the construction of original works from its general funds to the extent deemed necessary, with due advertence to other demands on its resources.

10. Such items as cost of collection of local rates (which would be a percentage of the cost of the collection of the land revenue), cost of existing local funds establishments in district offices, and repairs to sarais (which will meanwhile be met from the petty allotment grant), though debitable to local rates, have not been included in the statements appended to this Resolution, the precise details not being at present available.

11. The preceding remarks (with the appended statements, the figures of which may be taken as approximately representing the average state of affairs in normal years, and which will form the basis of the district assignments) explain how it is that, after all charges of the kind contemplated by the Act have been debited to local rates, very few districts will be found to be solvent. That this was not before made so apparent is mainly due to the procedure under which provincial and local money was lumped together by the Government and treated as a common fund, from which disbursements might be and were made at the discretion of the Government. But the general financial position of the Government will remain practically the same as long as its present provincial resources are not curtailed. The Government cannot ignore the fact of the failure of the local funds to meet local charges : and it must accept the responsibility of supplementing those funds, both as regards pensionary and other liabilities. The following extract from G. O. No. 1058, dated 19th December, 1877, to the Government of India, will explain the former position of affairs :—

"Under the orders of Sir William Muir, during whose Lieutenant-Governorship the Local Rates Act became law, the whole of the receipts were credited to general provincial funds, and assignments for roads, police, schools, district post, &c., were made quite independently of the actual amount of local rates : in short, the receipts were appropriated to meet the lump charges incurred by Government under the heads specified in the Act, the funds formerly spent on these objects being thus set free for utilisation elsewhere. The general principle on which the accounts required by section 13 of the Act should be prepared was laid down in a letter addressed by the Local Government to the Accountant-General, No. 813A., dated the 17th May, 1872, and was to the effect that on the receipt side should be shown all receipts from local cess and acreage tax throughout the province, and on the expenditure side all charges against roads, police, post, education, and dispensaries. In accordance with these instructions the accounts of the year 1871–72 were prepared and were published in the "North-Western Provinces Gazette" of 19th April, 1873. The general result was stated to be that, while the provincial receipts amounted to Rs. 43,15,847, the expenditure on the several local items had exceeded this amount by the sum of Rs. 32,16,350, which was defrayed from the Imperial allotment made in 1870. During Sir John Strachey's tenure of office the accounts of 1872–73 were submitted, and the Accountant-General raised doubts as to the legality of the procedure which had been inaugurated by Sir William Muir. The subject was carefully considered in all its bearings, but although, at the outset, Sir John Strachey was inclined to share the Accountant-General's doubts, he eventually sanctioned the continuance of the practice. The result of this procedure is that there is hardly a single district in which, viewed in this way, the receipts appear in excess of expenditure."

12. After allowing for normal items under local control, the districts which (*vide* column IV., statement II.) still show balances at credit are the following :—Muzaffarnagar, Aligarh, Muttra, Hamírpur, and Gorakhpur. The question remains—how are these surpluses to be disposed of ? In the first place, they will be decreased by the fluctuating grant for original (local) works that would, under any circumstances, be allotted by the Public Works Department (with the sanction by Financial Department) to the district and by the grant for arboriculture (*vide* columns V. and VI.)

In the next place, the items referred to in paragraph 10 must be adjusted: this will further diminish the amounts. Where there still remains a surplus, this will be considered as allotted to the district, and it will be for the committee to submit (in continuation of their regular budget) a supplementary list of proposals for the utilisation of this surplus. This statement must show in detail all the debits above referred to, the available balance, and the proposals for expenditure. The Government will then pass such orders on the proposals as may seem advisable, and any unexpended balance of the allotment will lapse to Provincial Revenues under the provisions of the Act.

13. These orders supersede all previous instructions on the subject, and the new arrangements will come into force from 1st April, 1882. The details of the several budgets concerned must of course be recast in accordance with the principles now laid down, but the totals will not be altered. The question of the departmental receipts that belong to the local funds concerned is a separate one, upon which further orders will, if necessary, be issued; but it may be remarked that these receipts are of small amount, and therefore of little importance, as far as the question at issue is concerned.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that copies of this Resolution (and of the statements) be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department, the Accountant-General, Director of Public Instruction, Surgeon-General, Sanitary Commissioner, and Inspector-General of Police, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, and to all Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information.

Also that the Resolution (and statements) be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Gazette."

By order, &c.
ROBERT SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 37, DATED ALLAHABAD, APRIL 14, 1882.

READ—

I.	Resolution	No. 393,	dated	4th	March,	1882.
II.	Ditto	414	,,	9th	,,	,,
III.	Ditto	5	,,	14th	,,	,,
IV.	Ditto	9	,,	17th	,,	,,
V.	Ditto	22	,,	31st	,,	,,
VI.	Ditto	36	,,	13th	April,	,,

OBSERVATIONS.—The IIIrd, IVth, and Vth of the Resolutions quoted above, dealing with the question of transfer from departmental to local control of educational and medical institutions as well as of public works, explain the extent to which the Government is at present prepared to go in the matter of decentralisation. The rural police, who are paid from Local Rates in the North-Western Provinces (the system is different in Oudh), are already under the direct control of the Magistrate of the district. Here no change is called for, and in none of the other items debited to these rates—beyond those already transferred—can the authority of the local committees be at present advantageously exercised. This portion of the case is, therefore, for the time being complete.

2. It remains to determine how the committees are to be placed in funds to meet the liabilities for which they have become responsible. In the case of municipal committees the arrangement will be simple. As already explained, the financial transaction between the Government and municipalities is to be simply a substitution of one class of charges for another. There will be increased administrative responsibility and executive control, but there will be no change in the incidence of taxation

or in the total expenditure. The municipal budgets will show the total cost (including pensionary contributions in the case of all who hold qualifying appointments) of both sides, *i.e.*, of municipal police on the one hand and of intra-municipal schools and dispensaries on the other. The balance (which must be certified to by the President of the Committee) will then be struck and will be met by a direct credit to that party to the contract who is entitled to it. The details of this portion of the scheme are not yet ready for publication.

3. With regard to district committees the circumstances are different. The local taxation, from which primarily funds are to be placed at their disposal, is represented by the Local Rates, which are levied under Acts III. and IV. of 1878 along with the Imperial land revenue. Under the law it is incumbent upon the Government to see how each district stands as regards the amount of its Local Rates; to deduct from this amount the sums required for general purposes common to all districts and debitable to Local Rates; and then to allot the balance to the committees concerned. This balance, as explained in Resolution No. VI. of the general series (to the appendices of which attention is invited), is in hardly a single case sufficient to meet the normal yearly expenditure upon the rural police, district schools, dispensaries, and public works—not to mention abnormal items. The balance must, therefore, be supplemented by special grants, and these grants the Government is prepared to make.

4. Omitting the cost of rural police then, with which committees have no direct concern, the funds to be placed at the disposal of committees must be sufficient to defray the estimated expenditure upon schools, medical institutions, vaccination staff, and public works under local control (including aboriculture); and these funds will be met (1) by an assignment of Local Rates to the extent available, and (2) by a subsidy to the necessary amount—first, from the surplus provincial ferry fund, and second, from general provincial revenues. This subsidy will be so arranged as to cover any pensionary charges (sanctioned by the Government) which local funds may not be able to meet.

5. For the year that commenced on 1st April last the budget figures of 1882–83 have necessarily been taken as the basis of assignment. These figures are for the most part normal and average, and in this view they have been adopted for calculation purposes in the statements appended to Resolution No 36, dated 13th April. On no account must the total amount under any of the great heads be exceeded. Under certain conditions (to be specified hereafter) transfers from one sub-head to another will be permitted, but the totals must remain unaltered. Any other course would be certain to result in complications and difficulties.

6. The question of whether it would be expedient to hand over to committees any specific heads of receipt has been carefully considered. The various heads have been gone over in consultation with the Accounts Department and experienced officers, and the concensus of opinion is to the effect that such a step would not be at present advisable. Excise, Stamps, Registration (which is not to be regarded as a source of revenue), and Assessed Taxes are partly Imperial and partly Provincial, and are not fitted for transfer to local management. The bulk of local money is derived from the Local Rates, in the assessment and collection of which committees can (as above explained) have no direct concern. Ferry Fund receipts are by law a provincial item. Nazúl property (except sarais, which will now be transferred from nazúl to public works and debited to Local Rates under "Petty allotments") is provincial rather than local. Pound receipts are also provincial and are insignificant in amount. In short, there are no such heads which are suitable under present circumstances for local control.

7. It is somewhat different in regard to receipts in transferred departments. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner looks to committees to do what they can, in the exercise of legitimate authority, towards securing a fair return from school fees (where such have been sanctioned) a continuance of private charity in connexion with hospitals and dispensaries, and a maintenance of the average income derived from public property connected with local works. The receipts under these heads cannot, however, be expended till after they have been credited in the treasury, and they cannot without grave inconvenience be utilised during the year, as the rectificatien of accounts necessarily involves considerable delay. The assignment to be made for any year, therefore, must be made exclusive of these receipts. But His Honour is anxious to encourage the committees to take an interest in these matters: and in this view is

prepared to allot to them unreservedly the amount by which these receipts in any one year exceed those of the preceding year. Thus, in the Educational Department, if in 1882–83 the receipts in any district be found to exceed by Rs. 1,000 those of 1881-82, this amount would be placed at the diposal of the committee, to be utilised by them as they might deem expedient in increasing the grant for prizes, in enhancing the scholarships, in rewarding deserving teachers, &c. The amount would be placed at their disposal in the year following the year of receipt; and it would be for the committee to apply for it to the departmental head, who would submit the matter to Government. These remarks apply to receipts under all the transferred departments.

8. Such are the general principles on which assignments will be made to district committees. It is impossible to say definitely whether the assignments will hold good for more than one year. The Government is anxious to put committees in as stable a financial position as it can arrange for and to avoid constant changes. But for the present the assignments will be yearly only, and will be open to revision when this is deemed necessary.

J. R. READ,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces, and Oudh.

ORDERED, that this Resolution be forwarded to all Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and communication to District and Municipal Committees; and that copies thereof be forwarded to the Surgeon-General, Director of Public Instruction, and Sanitary Commissioner of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh; and also to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department; and to the Accountant-General, North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDERED, also, that it be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Gazette."

By order, &c.
ROBERT SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 111, DATED NAINI TAL, MAY 29, 1882.

READ—

Resolutions Nos. I. to VII. of the Decentralisation Series, Part II.—Administrative.

UNDER the provisions of section 15, Act III., and section 14, Act IV. of 1878, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is pleased to issue the following instructions for the guidance of district committees in the ordinary transaction of current business. In so far as any of them are applicable to municipal committees, in connexion with institutions to be transferred to their control, these rules shall be held to be in force in such municipalities:—

I.—CONSTITUTION OF COMMITTEES.

1. The Secretary to the committee will ordinarily be appointed by the President. He should be acquainted with English, in which language the minutes will be recorded; but translations into the vernacular must be made, when necessary, for the convenience of native members.

2. The President is the official representative of the committee, and to him all business communications will be addressed.

II.—FUNDS.

3. The assignments made by Resolution No. 37, dated 14th April, 1882, will, for the present, form the funds at the disposal of the committee. Under Education and

Medical the grants will be according to the sanctioned budget. In Public Works the only really fluctuating item will be the grant for original works.

III.—Powers of committees.

4. If any work or institution which is under local control benefit two or more districts, the committees concerned will arrange among themselves as to distribution of cost, referring to Government through the Commissioner in case of disagreement.

5. No existing school (village or halkabandi schools excepted), dispensary, or other institution shall be abolished, no existing road, ferry, or other means of communication shall be abandoned, no new school (village or halkabandi schools excepted), dispensary, or other institution shall be established, and no new road or ferry shall be taken up, without previous reference to and consultation with the departmental authorities.

6. The provisions of rule 5 likewise extend to the prevention of such unauthorised additions or alterations on buildings and roads as would materially affect their classification.

7. No addition from district funds may be made to salaries paid from Provincial or Imperial funds without the consent of Government.

8. No committee shall guarantee any gratuity or pension to any person hereafter appointed by it to any post connected with transferred departments; but committees may apply to Government, when good grounds exist for doing so, and may recommend that any employé who desires to do so be permitted to subscribe for pension under the rules.

9. Every new appointment created by committees shall be reported to the head of the department, who will submit at the close of the year a consolidated list.

10. It is understood that district committees will observe and act in accordance with such principles of administration as the Government has from time to time laid down in the several departments handed over to local control.

11. No portion of the balances or funds at the disposal of a committee shall be invested by the committee in Government securities or in any other way.

IV.—Rules of business.

12. In prescribing the following rules all that the Government desires is to secure a certain degree of uniformity, and to provide generally for the systematic discharge of the duties devolving on committees. It is in the competency of any committee to frame supplementary rules not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of administration prescribed by the Government, wherever this may appear to be expedient.

13. The following records shall be carefully maintained, and shall be open to inspection by members:—

(*a.*) Records or minutes of proceedings (in English).
(*b.*) Records of monthly progress reports.
(*c.*) General cash-book and such other books of account as may be necessary.
(*d.*) List of establishments in each department under local control.
(*e.*) List of all roads, ferries, and bridges in the district under local control.
(*f.*) List of all buildings in the district under local control

14. An ordinary meeting of the district committee shall be held once a month, and shall usually be held on the third Monday of the month. Such other ordinary meetings as may be necessary may be held during the month. The names of the members attending must be duly recorded in the minutes.

15. A special meeting of the committee may at any time be convened by the President. A special meeting should ordinarily be convened for the consideration and passing of budgets, in order that there may be a full attendance of members present. When such business is transacted at an ordinary meeting, the reason for this should be placed on record.

16. Due notice shall be given to all members of ordinary and special meetings, and of the subjects to be discussed at such meetings.

17. For ordinary meetings a quorum shall consist of one-fourth of the total number of members in the committee, provided the actual number is not less than five, of whom at least two must be ex-officio members. For special meetings one-half the total number of members must be present, and one-fourth of those present must be ex-officio members.

18. All questions submitted to committees shall be determined by a majority of the votes of members actually present. In case of equality in the number of votes, the President shall have the casting vote.

19. In the event of a vote having been passed at an ordinary meeting with which the President is unable to concur, it shall be in the President's power to summon a special meeting to re-consider such vote.

20. A general progress report for all departments under local control should be submitted monthly to the committee by the Secretary at the ordinary meeting, and a record of these reports should be kept in a separate volume.

21. All proposals or suggestions for works, establishments, &c., should be submitted by members not later than the 1st September. These should be considered in good time so as to allow of the preparation of the budget by 15th October at latest.

22. A copy of the minutes of each meeting of committee, ordinary or special, shall be submitted for information to the Commissioner of the Division within a week after the meeting.

V.—Accounts and Audit.

23. Every committee shall prepare in abstract a general (administrative) budget in two parts,—Part I. containing (on the charge side) the estimated district expenditure under the heads of Education and Medical; Part II. containing estimated expenditure on Public Works—(*a*) Regular, (*b*) Miscellaneous.

On the receipt side will be shown the necessary assignments and any extra grants in the way of increased departmental receipts to which the committee may be entitled under conditions laid down. This budget will be drawn up in abstract and forwarded to the Commissioner, for submission to Government, not later than the 1st of December in each year. It will show the sanctioned figures of the current year, with brief explanation of all changes. The form (marginally noted) should be followed.

1.	2.		3.		4.
Department.	Assignment.		Expenditure.		Remarks.
	Current.	Proposed.	Current.	Proposed.	

24. Detailed budgets will be prepared departmentally, as at present, according to the prescribed forms, and forwarded through the recognised channels to the Accountant-General and the Examiner of Public Works Accounts for eventual submission to Government.

25. Disbursements under Public Works will be audited by the Examiner, and under all other heads by the Accountant-General.

26. A general district account will be kept by the Accountant-General, to show the unexpended balances that may remain under each department at the close of the year, the Examiner supplying the Accountant-General with the details under Public Works.

27. Under the existing law these balances are absorbed in the general balances of the provinces. But the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner will be prepared, on good cause shown, to re-assign all or part of any such balances, as far as the general finances of the provinces and the exigencies of the special case seem to justify this.

28. On no account shall the total amount of the budget grant under the several heads—"Education," "Medical," or "Public Works"—be exceeded by the committee. It will be in the power of district committees to transfer money under the

same major head of account from one sub-head to another, subject to the following conditions :—

(*a.*) In Educational and Medical such transfer can only be between institutions of the same class, as from one tahsíli school to another; in individual institutions transfer may be made between any of the various sub-heads of expenditure.

(*b.*) In Public Works transfer may be made from one road to another of the same class, and in regard to lump allotments as under—
From 1st to 2nd class and *vice versá* } Up to the extent of 10 per cent. of
From 3rd to 4th class and *vice versá* } total grant.

(*c.*) All such re-appropriations between the minor heads will be reported through the Commissioner to the Accounts Department once a month, and not in each case; but it is not necessary to report any transfers between detailed heads subordinate to the same minor head. A list of the minor heads over which district committees have control is given below :—

22. *Education.*—
1. Inspection.
2. Local schools.
3. Local scholarships.
4. Prizes.
5. Grants-in-aid.
6. Miscellaneous.

24. *Medical.*—
1. Vaccination.
2. Hospitals and dispensaries.
3. Sanitation.

34. *Other Public Works.*—
1. Public Works in charge of Public Works officers.
2. Public Works in charge of civil officers.

(*d.*) All other transfers must be sanctioned by Government.

29. All items of receipt and payment should be entered in the committee's cash-book under their proper headings, and vouchers for charges should be filed for reference in books kept for the purpose. The President should examine these account records at least once a month.

30. The Committee will pay the whole of the receipts under their control into the local treasury, and draw the money they require by cheque in Form A. All money received will be acknowledged by separate receipt. These receipts will bear printed numbers in consecutive series, and the number of each receipt should be entered in the column provided in the cash-book in Form B. The responsibility for seeing that each item of receipt is thus acknowledged and is duly brought to credit in the accounts will rest entirely with the committee.

31. Ordinarily no order for the payment of money shall be issued without the sanction of the committee; but it will be in the competency of the President to authorise *suo motu*, and in anticipation of the committee's sanction at next meeting, the disbursement of—

(*a.*) The salaries of fixed establishment.
(*b.*) Payment of works and repairs that have been sanctioned by the committee.
(*c.*) Sums required for emergent purposes.

32. The District Engineer will disburse money on account of Public Works. It will be for the committee to arrange for payments in other departments in accordance with existing arrangements.

33. Every payment into a treasury should be accompanied by a *chalán* signed by the President of the committee or some officer duly authorised to act on his behalf. The *chalán* must distinctly specify the nature of the remittance, such as "Fees from schools," "Middle vernacular," "Fees from middle (English) schools," "Private subscriptions in support of medical institutions," &c.

34. The salary and contingent bills, &c., of the educational and medical institutions should be submitted to the committee by the educational and medical officers concerned. The bills after examination will be passed for payment under the signature of the President or officer duly authorised to act on his behalf, who will grant a cheque on the treasury for the amount due, retaining the bills for submission to the Account Department with his monthly accounts.

35. Payment from tahsíl treasuries must also be made on cheques issued on the headquarters treasury in favour of Treasury Officer against the assignment of the committee. The Treasury Officer will issue the necessary cash order on the tahsíl treasury.

36. A pass-book must be kept by the President in Form C., which must accompany all remittances into the treasury along with the usual *chalán*. The receipt of each sum will be acknowledged in the pass-book under the initial of the Treasury Officer, who will also enter in it all receipts at tahsíl treasuries which are incorporated in his accounts.

37. Similarly, all payments made on cheques issued by the President will also be entered in the pass-book. The entries will be made by the treasury establishment, and not by the establishment of the committee. Any alteration or correction in the pass-book, which the President thinks necessary, can only be made by his showing cause therefor to the Treasury Officer.

38. In addition to the cash-book a subsidiary register should be kept by the committee in Form D. The daily transactions should be posted in the register from the cash-book under their proper headings. This register will show separately the receipts and expenditures under the control of the committee, and the balance at their credit on each account. Thus it will enable the committee to regulate their expenditure on the different services according to the funds at their disposal.

39. A monthly account in Form E. must be submitted by the committee not later than the 2nd of each month to the Account Department through the Treasury Officer, who will certify the correctness of the total receipts and charges after comparison with his own accounts.

40. The establishment bills, &c., in the prescribed form mentioned in paragraph 34, should be sent with the monthly accounts in support of the payments. No other vouchers are to be sent to the Account Office. A consolidated receipt for all the amounts drawn on cheques should be given by the committee to the Treasury Officer in lieu of the cheques which will be surrendered by him at the end of each month.

41. The allotments for local expenditure will be communicated to the committee by Government, and to the Treasury Officer by the Accountant-General. On receipt of intimation of the allotments from the Account Department, the Treasury Officer will credit the amount in the pass-book of the committee at the instance of the committee. The committee will credit the same in their cash-book on receipt of intimation from Government.

42. The following instructions relate to the Public Works functions of committees. It may hereafter be possible to simplify the procedure, but for the present these orders must be strictly adhered to :—

(*a.*) The committee's budget-estimate in prescribed form (to be furnished to the Public Works Department) will give full details.

(*b.*) No original work shall be entered in the budget-estimate until administrative sanction has been accorded to it, and a complete estimate prepared and sanctioned in accordance with the rules in force.

(*c.*) Committees will be placed in funds, up to the amount of the Public Works assignment, on application by the President to the Examiner in the prescribed form. Letters-of-credit will then be issued by the Accountant-General in favour of the President up to the total amount of the assignment.

(*d.*) The District Engineer shall be the sole disbursing agent of the committee. His functions will be exercised under the immediate orders of the committee, who may authorise him to draw against the assignment by cheques to be signed by the President. In cases where the committee employ any other disbursing agency (such as tahsíldárs), the latter will be supplied with funds in the shape of imprests, and will forward their accounts for incorporation in the cash-book, with vouchers, to the District Engineer.

(*e.*) The District Engineer shall not commence any new work, or put in hand any repairs, without the sanction of the committee; but he may prosecute any works actually in hand at the end of a financial year for which funds have been provided in the budget of the new year. Before undertaking a work which the committee wish to carry out through his agency, the District Engineer must see that the following points have been secured :—

(1.) Administrative sanction.

(2.) Preparation and approval of project and estimate.

(3.) Inclusion in budget.
(4.) Permission of committee.

(*f.*) All disbursements by the District Engineer must be sanctioned by the committee. Such sanction will be established by enfacement of each voucher by the President, and this will be accepted by the Examiner as sufficient. Extract from minutes of committees, directly affecting expenditure, should be forwarded to the Examiner as soon as possible after being passed.

(*g.*) Bills for payment of establishment shall be prepared by the District Engineer, and countersigned by the President; and such monies shall be drawn and paid under standing orders.

(*h.*) The committee's cash-book in prescribed form for all works under local control, a measurement book, and all documents on which payments are to be made, shall be kept by the District Engineer. Each voucher will show distinctly the sub-head of account, work done, amount previously paid on account of it, and other necessary details.

(*i.*) Copy of the cash-book, with vouchers, will be forwarded to the Examiner, through the committee,* by the District Engineer as soon as possible after the close of the month; and the Examiner's account and audit will be duly submitted to the committee for such orders as may be called for.

VI.—Reports and returns.

43. Each committee will prepare and submit, through the Commissioner, at the close of the financial year and not later than 15th June, a consolidated report of its proceedings, containing—

(*a.*) A statement of income and expenditure during the year.

(*b.*) A statement of all institutions and establishments kept up by the committee, showing under each department the various classes and the total under each.

(*c.*) An account of the operations of the year, dealing with the charges of each department separately under the recognised heads, and showing what has been done for the outlay under each head.

(*d.*) General remarks on the working of the committee, on progress up to date, and any suggestions for new measures or for the improvement of existing arrangements.

44. The committee shall place itself in communication with the Accountant-General and the Examiner as to the correspondence of their figures in this yearly report with those of the Accounts Department, any differences being fully explained.

45. Each Committee shall forward to the Public Works Department, in such form as may be prescribed, a monthly progress report of all Public Works under local control. This will be prepared for the committee by the District Engineer.

46. The usual departmental reports and returns will be furnished to the head of each department as at present.

VII.—Miscellaneous.

47. There will be one local fund office for each district, divided (for the present) into two parts: part I. will be that portion of the present Public Works establishment handed over to committees under the provisions of Resolution No. 22, dated 31st March; part II. will consist of establishment connected with the other departments under local control.

48. Details of part I. will be given by the Public Works Secretariat. For the present the office employés now entertained will be taken over by committees; but on vacancies occurring, it will be for committees to appoint their own nominees, in accordance with the general standard approved by the Financial Department.

49. The Public Works portion of the local fund office will be superintended by the District Engineer under the orders of the committee, the other portion working directly under the Secretary or President. But it will be in the power of the President

* It is to be noted that all correspondence of every kind must pass through this channel.

to utilise the services of both branches indiscriminately, when this can be done without detriment to the special work of each.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that copies of this Resolution be forwarded to all Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers, North-Western Provinces and Oudh; to the Director of Public Instruction, Surgeon-General, Sanitary Commissioner, and Accountant-General, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

Ordered also that copies be forwarded to all Presidents of Municipal Committees in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for the information and guidance of Municipal Committees.

Ordered also that a copy be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department, with the remark that final reference in all matters relating to district committees and their funds (except where the questions are purely professional) shall be made to Government in the Financial Department.

Ordered also that the Resolution be published in the "North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Gazette."

By order, &c.
R. SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

From THE OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, HOME DEPARTMENT.

(No. 372.)

SIR, Allahabad, December 15, 1882.

I AM directed to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, copy (together with annexures) of a Resolution on local self-government in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, which is about to be issued by the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner.

I have, &c.

RESOLUTION.—By the Government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 358, Camp Lucknow, December 5, 1882.

READ—

(1.) Resolutions by the Government of India (Department of Finance), Nos. 3353 and 3514, dated 30th September and 10th October, 1881.
(2.) Resolutions by this Government, Nos. I. to VIII. of General Series, Decentralisation, Part II.—Administrative.
(3.) Resolution by the Government of India (Home Department), No. $\frac{17}{747-67}$, dated 18th May, 1882.
(4.) Orders Nos. 145 and 147, dated 21st June, 1882, and Nos. 160 and 162, dated 29th June, 1882, issued by this Government to Divisional and District Officers.
(5.) Replies of Divisional and District Officers to above.
(6.) Resolution by this Government, No. 230, dated 7th August, 1882.
(7.) Minute recorded by the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner, dated 22nd August, 1882.
(8.) Report of Committee appointed under Resolution No. 230, dated 7th August, 1882.

OBSERVATIONS.—In the first and second of the Resolutions quoted above, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, in declaring the principles upon which

the decentralised system of finance as revised and extended was to be applied to Provincial Governments and Administrations, announced his intention that that system should now be accompanied by a material development of local self-government, and indicated generally on what principles and by what methods it seemed desirable to proceed in re-constituting the local committees and investing them with larger financial and executive authority.

2. In accordance with the views and instructions communicated in those Resolutions, the system of local administration in these provinces was carefully revised and re-organised, upon the plan of extending the functions of the existing municipal and district committees, and of placing those bodies in a more independent position. To a considerable degree the arrangements prescribed by the Resolutions of this Government (Nos. I.–VIII.), cited in the preamble above, were put in force and are now in operation. Upon the issue, however, by the Supreme Government of a subsequent Resolution, dated 18th May 1882, which gave a wider scope to, and explanation of, the policy announced, and which defined, in modification of some of the instructions contained in the earlier Resolutions, the principles upon which local self-government should be established throughout India, it became incumbent upon the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner to review the arrangements previously made.

3. Accordingly, steps were taken, first, to obtain regarding the more important points recommended for consideration on the subject of local self-government in these provinces, the opinions and suggestions of the chief officers of this Government, of the municipal and district committees, and of leading native gentlemen most interested and best qualified to advise. The inquiries thus instituted, which were prosecuted by officers in whose ability, experience, and impartiality the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner has full confidence, procured from all the districts under this Government a valuable collection of information and practical advice. It is to be remembered that in these provinces the people at large have not yet had time perfectly to understand the principles or realise the objects of the new policy, both of which indeed are outside the circle of their ordinary experience; and that for the most part they cannot be expected, from want of the requisite preliminary knowledge, to be fully competent to advise as to details; but the Lieutenant-Governor nevertheless believes that the reports received may be taken as a fairly comprehensive representation of the present public opinion of the country upon the various points discussed. The second step was to appoint a committee of officers, selected from different parts of these provinces, with whom were associated four native gentlemen, for the careful consideration of the district and divisional reports and other papers (including a minute by the Lieutenant-Governor, dated 22 August 1882), and for general consultation upon the main questions raised by the 18th May Resolution of the Government of India. To this committee Sir Alfred Lyall is much indebted for clear and well-reasoned conclusions upon all the principal matters referred for deliberation, especially upon the methods best adapted, in the present circumstances of the country, for carrying out the policy of local self-government as declared by His Excellency the Governor General in Council.

4. In proceeding to deal with the various questions to be examined, it will be convenient to begin by considering shortly the constitution of municipalities; and the first point to be decided is whether each municipality should be left to determine for itself whether or not the system of appointing the members of the Municipal Board shall be by popular election, or whether election should be authoritatively declared the only system of appointment now to be employed. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner has resolved to accept the recommendation of a majority of the provincial committee, and to introduce the elective system into all the municipalities of these provinces, save such exceptional townships as Naini Tal and Fatehpur Sikri, where for particular reasons nomination by the Government had better for the present be retained. The elective system, in more or less completeness, is already in force in various places, although, as might perhaps have been expected, the privileges of voting and of candidature seem generally to have made little progress anywhere in popular regard, and to have been used sparingly, if not with indifference. In all countries the practice of popular election, upon any wide scale, extends slowly and by degrees. In India it is still unfamiliar; and the connexion between the use of the suffrage and the administration of local affairs has not hitherto been so close and obvious as to invest the voting privilege with any striking character or remarkable value. Never-

theless, since increased attention to public affairs on the part of the more intelligent sections of the urban population throughout the country may now be anticipated, it is advisable that opportunity should be taken still further to test in various localities the suitableness of the elective system as a means of enlisting the interest and securing the co-operation of the citizens in the management of local affairs. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore requests all district officers to arrange with those municipalities which do not already elect their committees, or which have not already submitted proposals for election, or which are not especially excepted, for the preparation of schemes for introducing the system as early as may be convenient. The municipal committees of those towns in which election is in force should also consider whether the present constitutions cannot be amended or improved; and everywhere the system should be given a fair field for real and effective operation. The Lieutenant-Governor has determined that all Honorary Magistrates, exercising powers within a municipality, shall ex-officio be members of the Municipal Board in addition to the elected members; but in all other respects the entire body will be chosen by some form of voting, and in many cases the Honorary Magistrates are already members, or are likely to be elected. The size and distribution of electoral wards, the number of members that should represent each ward, the qualification of voters and candidates, the registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, and the mode of recording votes, are matters for which the municipalities concerned will frame their own rules. But the Lieutenant-Governor concurs with the majority of the provincial committee in deciding that for the purposes of complete representation, and with the object of avoiding confusion and securing the participation of inhabitants of different parts of each town in the elections, all municipalities should be divided into wards of moderate size, consisting either of large muhallas or of groups of muhallas, possessing from their contiguity or for other reasons interests and concerns to some extent in common. There is much force in the reasons given by the committee against introducing representation and voting by guilds, castes, or sects, as this might in some places foster rivalries and prejudices which the present policy, if it succeeds in bringing together the representatives of the general community on the common ground of civil interests and local responsibility, may very much help to obliterate.

5. The second matter for consideration regarding the Municipal Boards is their chairmanship. In these provinces that position has been held almost invariably by an executive officer of the Government; and from the district and divisional reports it is evident that though in some towns it might be possible at once to substitute non-official for official chairmen, the sense of the municipalities generally is against compulsory substitution, and in favour of leaving the Boards to choose their own chairman. The matter was carefully discussed by the provincial committee, and the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner accepts the proposal of the majority (including all the native members) that, except in a few municipalities to be specified by the Government, where the presidentship of the chief district officer is for the present necessary, Municipal Boards shall be at liberty to choose their own chairman, official or non-official, as may seem to them proper. Accordingly steps will be taken by the Government for ascertaining in what municipalities the chief district officer must, at least for a period, remain as chairman, either in order that he may have time to transfer functions and accounts, often onerous and complicated, to a non-official successor, or for lack of a qualified non-official to deal with special circumstances, or by reason of the expressed wish of the Municipal Board itself. In other municipalities, including all those not situated at the head-quarters of districts, the Boards will elect their chairman, official or non-official, who will for the present hold office for the period of one year, and who may afterwards be re-elected. When a non-official member of Municipal Board is chosen to be chairman, he shall for a period of his tenure of office be appointed an Honorary Magistrate by the Government.

6. The foregoing are the principal points in the constitution of Municipal Boards that seem to require separate and special orders; and in passing from them to the examination of the more complex questions affecting the constitution and functions of the District Boards, the first thing to be determined is the territorial jurisdiction of the Boards now to be formed. At present there is a single Board in each district, formed of members resident in various parts of the district, who meet periodically as an undivided administrative and executive body at the head-quarters of the district. The almost unanimous opinion of those who have been consulted throughout the provinces is in favour of modifying this arrangement by constituting Boards of each

tahsil or fiscal sub-division of the district, not as independent bodies, but as local sub-committees of the central District Board, exercising considerable power and discretion in all matters within the sub-divisional circle. The members of the subordinate Boards would invariably be members of the District Board, which would in fact be an incorporation of the different subordinate Boards within the district area, and would from time to time meet at the head-quarters of the district for the purpose of collective administration. The arguments for the adoption of this plan, drawn mainly from the reports of the district and divisional officers, are ably summed up in paragraphs 4 to 7 of the report of the provincial committee, where is also explained the reciprocal relations to be established between the subordinate and the central Boards. In a few exceptionally situated localities, such, for example, as the hill country of Kumaun and the sub-montane Tarai, it may for the present be advisable to retain the existing constitution of Local Boards; and there may possibly be districts whose local peculiarities may render preferable the distribution of the whole area into other sub-divisions than the tahsil circles. But for the provinces generally the Lieutenant-Governor quite agrees with the arguments in favour of making the area of each subordinate Board's jurisdiction conterminous with a tahsil; and this plan has accordingly been adopted. On the one hand, the formation of representative Boards for the chief subordinate divisions of each district will ensure better knowledge of and attention to local wants, more regular attendance at Board meetings, closer supervision over the departments under local management, and prompter and more effective execution of local works, than is possible with a single District Board, meeting only at head-quarters. On the other hand, to make separate and independent units of local administration within each district would tend to break up piecemeal the organisation of the district, and, while increasing the necessity for, would throw serious difficulty in the way of, the constant exercise of central direction and control. For it must be admitted that there is little or no prospect of obtaining for Sub-divisional Boards throughout the provinces, or even in different parts of many districts, an equal standard or anything like a level, of general intelligence and working capacity. To set up all these Boards as separate administrative bodies, would be to accept the risk of great and confusing variety in the results of their administration, a risk that would be greatest in the remote and backward tracts, where intelligence and energy are often most required, and where these qualities are of course least likely to be available on the spot. The business of settling matters of finance and adjusting public interests between the several Sub-divisional Boards concerned in them, would cause much correspondence and would lead to the multiplication of petty offices, with the probable consequence of wasting much money and time on establishments, and in the preparation, submission, and scrutiny of returns and reports. The plan of making the central District Board an aggregate of the Sub-divisional Boards is, on the contrary, in many ways favourable to the adjustment of the mutual relation between the various subordinate Boards, and between them and the central Board; while it appears to be the best arrangement for maintaining a consistent and systematic administration of local affairs throughout the district. Moreover, upon no other system could the minor bodies generally rely upon securing the membership of the leading men within their jurisdiction; while, lastly, the plan has the great advantage of reducing to a minimum the necessity for official superintendence and interference. If the Sub-divisional Boards were independent, the expedient of placing them in different classes for the purpose of graduating their powers according to the circumstances and conditions of different parts of the provinces and of districts, would in the beginning probably be unavoidable. But all such intermediate classifications are apt to affect the simplicity of the broad groundwork and fundamental principle of self-government; and the Lieutenant-Governor infinitely prefers that the District Board, which will be by far the best judge of the claims and capabilities of each section of its own body, should delegate the proper degree of power and allot the requisite amount of funds to each interior circle. It will be for the District Board, as composed of members representing all parts of the district, to act, after full consultation, upon the system thus sketched out, and to draw up a scheme explaining the arrangements made for distributing the work of local administration to its various subordinate Boards and adjusting their mutual relations.

7. The second point to be determined in the constitution of the District Boards is the method of appointing their members. Whether and to what extent or proportion the membership of the Boards should be determined by election, was specially referred

for inquiry and opinion to all the districts of the provinces; the point was discussed in every district, with the result described in the district and divisional reports; and, as is shown in the committee's report, it is closely debated by the provincial committee. The large towns are much alike everywhere; they are always centres of comparative wealth and intelligence; they form constituencies easily represented; and their administration is always open to public observation and criticism. But the ordinary Indian districts possess none of these characteristics; and as far as can be judged from these papers, the balance of native opinion preponderates decidedly against the unrestricted introduction into them of the elective system. Such a step certainly appears inadvisable at the present time, when the state of society varies so widely in different parts of the country, when the whole principle of self-government is novel and imperfectly understood, and when the practice of general election is not only unknown outside the towns, but is apparently not in accord with the feelings and ideas of those classes of the community that have the largest interest in local self-government, and to whom we must look for its success. It is manifest that local self-government—meaning a system of administration by the gratuitous exertions of persons best acquainted with the characteristics and needs of the neighbourhoods in which they are interested, and possessed of means, leisure, and public spirit enabling and impelling them to devote themselves to that administration—cannot be initiated and developed into real independence except by the co-operation of these classes, represented by men who can lead and will be trusted by the community at large. This is how all systems of local representation have begun in all times and countries; so that it would be remarkable if in such a country as India the best way of beginning were found to be by popular suffrage. That the services of such persons could be secured by open election, that they themselves would seek election, or would generally allow their names to be submitted for the purpose, seems from all the information hitherto collected to be questionable. If therefore we find that the views and prepossessions, as far as they have been elicited, of persons qualified to form a judgment on the best mode of initiating local self-government in the extensive districts of these provinces, are largely in favour of leaving at the outset the constitution of the Local Boards more or less in the hands of the Government, there seems to be no sufficient reason for endeavouring, almost on the spur of the moment, to invent any such elective machinery as would necessarily raise numerous and various questions of franchise and voting rights, and all the practical difficulties inseparable from the attempt to adjust an arbitrary system to the diverse circumstances of the country. In short, the solid and universally recognised fact that local self-government depends absolutely for its success upon the character and ability of those to whom it is entrusted, has led the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner to the conviction that in inaugurating the policy in the districts, a system of careful and consultative nomination by Government of the electoral body is preferable to election by untried and unfamiliar methods. Sir Alfred Lyall believes that this conclusion is supported by the judgment and conforms to the present wishes of a large majority of the people.

8. Having regard then to the extreme importance of placing in competent hands the duties and responsibilities of district administration in the beginning of what is avowedly an experiment, and of maintaining the continuity of existing arrangements which imply (in such matters as, for example, education and sanitation) a standard of civilisation in advance of the average intelligence and culture of native society, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner has decided to adopt in principle the recommendation formulated in the 9th paragraph of the provincial committee's report. The committee proposed that the Government should nominate for each tahsil an electoral body which should elect a certain number of its members to form the tahsil or Sub-divisional Board. They advised, also, that a minimum qualification (on the basis of land-revenue or license-tax assessment) should be fixed, and that details might be left to be settled by local officers. But the differences in the distribution of the population, of wealth, and of property in land, between and within different districts, are so large and manifold, that after much examination of the question it has been found impracticable to fix any comprehensive qualification for election purposes, much less to devise methods of canvassing and election that would be everywhere applicable or universally acceptable. The only comprehensive plan that can be laid down at the first introduction of the system is to determine with reference to the area, revenue and tenures, population, wealth, and to other conditions and special features of each sub-division, how many persons, not being salaried officers of the

Government, should fairly represent its inhabitants and interests. The district officer must then be empowered to prepare in each district the measures that may be most convenient and appropriate to its circumstances and peculiarities, for ascertaining how many suitable persons are available in its sub-divisions, and how they can best be chosen. The proceedings taken will be reported to the Government, and the lists of electors that are drawn up will be duly placed on record. As soon as the lists are complete, the electors will be asked to return from among their own body, by such method as may seem appropriate or necessary, the members of the Sub-divisional Board, who will hold office for a term of three years. All Honorary Magistrates will ex-officio be members of the electoral body for the sub-division in which they exercise jurisdiction; and for the head-quarters sub-division of the district the nomination will usually include a larger number of residents of property and influence than for the outlying sub-divisions. As a general rule, the electors should be residents of the sub-divisions for which they have a vote; but exceptions will be allowed since residence is not necessarily a condition of interest in and knowledge of a locality, and the possession of a certain amount of landed property or of a place of business in a sub-division should qualify a person otherwise suitable. Accordingly, the Lieutenant-Governor directs that each Commissioner in consultation with the chief officers of the district and the existing local committees, shall propose the number of electors to be fixed for each sub-division, and shall decide by what method the lists of the persons who are qualified and prepared to serve can best be filled up. It is not essential that the standard number of electors, which may vary in different districts and sub-divisions, shall in all parts of the country be at once nominated, though the full number of names should be sent up whenever this is not impossible. It may in some few places be sufficient to determine that standard, and to appoint at once as many persons as may be fit and willing to serve, leaving room for additions to be made according to requirements and opportunities. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is disposed to consider that the maximum number of the electoral body for a sub-division should be 100, and the minimum 25, and that the lists should be revised from time to time at intervals, at the longest, of three years. The number of members to be elected to each Sub-divisional Board should not exceed 8; and as vacancies take place from death, resignation, or other causes, the electoral body should be required to elect new members, who shall serve for the remainder of the Board's term of office. In a few outlying and sparsely populated tracts it may not be found possible to appoint a sufficiently large electoral body, and it may therefore be expedient and even unavoidable to proceed to the direct nomination of the Sub-divisional Boards; but it is hoped that in almost all parts of the country, a sufficient number of electors may be found to give latitude in the choice of the members of the Boards. These details, however, are committed to the careful attention of Commissioners, who will have the goodness to report, before the end of the present official year, the conclusions eventually arrived at, and to submit, for sanction and publication in the Government Gazette, the names of the members of the Boards who have been elected or nominated. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees in the unanimous opinion expressed by the provincial committee that it is inexpedient to confer honorary titles ex-officio upon the members of Local Boards, seeing that the value of such titles is likely to be depreciated by their too general conferment; and all that appears to be required is the separate issue by the Government to each member of Local Boards of the notification of his appointment.

9. Upon the third point of importance in the constitution of the District and Sub-divisional Boards, namely, the appointment of their chairmen, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner observes that the question of the chairmanship of the District Board was the subject of prolonged discussion by the provincial committee. Their finding coincides in principle with the opinions and prepossessions generally elicited by the district inquiries and recorded in the district and divisional reports. Of the four native members of the provincial committee, three strenuously insisted upon the necessity for maintaining, by law, the chief district officer as chairman of the District Board. The fourth, a gentleman of large property and influence in his own district, held a different opinion; though it may be added that, while he is said to be exceedingly well fitted for the chairmanship, he had nevertheless declined the office in his own district on the grounds of indifferent health, want of leisure, and residence at a distance from head-quarters. And the district and divisional reports, which in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion evince on the part of the writers a most satisfactory disposition to interpret the genuine feeling and wishes of the people,

indicate clearly that the main current of native opinion runs decidedly towards maintaining the position of the chief district officer at the head of local affairs, until some experience in the transaction of public business and the management of committees has been gained by leading members of the native community. It is beyond doubt expedient that the District Board should be exempt from official pressure and unnecessary interference; but the Lieutenant-Governor is confident that in these provinces all district officers are thoroughly prepared to give every facility and aid to the policy of the Supreme Government, and to promote whatever measures may be adopted for its introduction. There is accordingly, in Sir Alfred Lyall's opinion, no reason why due weight should not attach to the able and impartial reports of the officers best qualified to inform and advise their Government, when they declare that the native community, so far as it has been consulted, has expressed itself very widely in favour of retaining for the present the district officer as chairman of the District Board. It seems that the district officer is trusted and preferred, in the existing complexion of local affairs and feelings, for sound and practical reasons. There can be no question that the experience and business habits of an official chairman will at first be of great assistance to the District Boards; and there must also be borne in mind the strong probability that the Boards will for a time need much direction and advice, possibly even admonition and control; especially where distinctions of creed or caste, or other differences, still keep alive the germs of antagonism among sections of the native community. It may be inferred that, in the majority of districts, the choice will be found to lie between, on the one hand, guiding the Boards by recognised official presidents, who have all the details of business at their command, and respecting whose impartiality as between the various prepossessions and motives of their own members the Boards seem to have no distrust, and, on the other hand, directing their course from the outside by checks, interference, and revision. For the more completely the official element is eliminated from the Board's constitution, the greater will be the need for enforcing a system of external superintendence. Under the former plan there is every prospect, looking to the spirit in which the new policy has been accepted by the officers under this Government, that the Boards, working in harmony with other parts of the public administration, will rapidly acquire experience and self-confidence fitting them for larger independence. And it has to be remembered that the machinery for external control upon which the latter system would be altogether based, though it cannot be wholly dispensed with, requires to be employed with great judgment and much reserve; otherwise we may have controversy instead of co-operation; and the effect may be to weaken rather than to strengthen the good understanding that it is most desirable and even necessary to preserve between the District Boards and the provincial authorities.

10. But however this may be, the middle course recommended by the committee in the 12th paragraph of their report, which course the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner has decided, with a slight amendment, to adopt, will further test the wishes of the country, and will allow time for opinion to form and show itself among the District Boards themselves. The committee recommend that the district officer shall be ex-officio chairman of the District Board, except when the Board, on application made to the Government by a majority of the members, receive permission to elect a non-official chairman from their own body. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner agrees to the principle with this modification, that as soon as all the members of the District Boards shall have been chosen, or at some time before the end of the present official year, they shall be invited to assemble for the purpose of deciding whether they wish to proceed to the election of a non-official chairman, or whether they will leave their chairman's appointment in the hands of the Local Government. If the Board by a majority, at a full meeting of not less than three-fourths of the whole body, decide to propose one of their own number to be their chairman, the Lieutenant-Governor will give their nomination his best consideration, and nothing except some plain reason, to be formally shown and recorded, will prevent him from acceding to their wishes. If, on the other hand, the appointment is left to the Local Government, the ordinary result will be that the chief district officer will be empowered to assume the chairmanship of the newly-constituted District Boards for the first term of office, after which it shall be open to the Boards to consider again the propriety of proposing to elect non-official chairmen. In any case, they shall proceed immediately to the election of a vice-president, or if the Board be a large one, of two vice-presidents; and these officers of the Board shall

preside at ordinary meetings at which the presence of the president is not required. In districts in which the nomination of a non-official chairman has been confirmed, the appointment will take effect by notification in the Government Gazette.

11. A majority of the provincial committee was of opinion that no permanent chairman should be appointed by the Sub-divisional Boards, that it would be sufficient for these Boards to elect a chairman at each meeting, and that the special executive duties that otherwise would devolve on the permanent chairman might be entrusted to the permanent secretary. It is, however, to be observed that some element of permanency in the office of president of the Sub-divisional Boards seems necessary, particularly at first, for the proper transaction of business and in order to preserve continuity of administration and uniformity of procedure. It is understood that in all countries standing executive Boards elect their chairmen for a period more or less prolonged; because the chairman's duty is to hold the balance among parties, and generally to conduct discussion. And in this country as elsewhere, to require the executive Boards for local administration to elect a fresh chairman whenever they meet, would be to open a door to much change and contention, since any decided difference of opinion on matters before the Board might lead to a contest at each meeting over the election of the chairman. For these reasons, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner, agreeing with the minority of the provincial committee, directs that a chairman, who shall hold office for not less than one year, and for such longer period as the Board may deem advisable, shall be elected by each Sub-divisional Board.

12. A few points remain that are common to the constitution of both Municipal and District Boards, and that may be discussed with reference to both. First, in regard to the secretaryship of Municipal, District, and Sub-divisional Boards, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner concurs in the proposals of the provincial committee. Every Board shall have one or more permanent secretaries, who shall be appointed by the Board itself, and shall be paid or unpaid as the Board may determine, provided always that if the secretary be a member of the Board, he shall receive from it no remuneration, and that a Municipal Board may for special reasons apply to the Government for the services as secretary of any native officer stationed in the district, who, if the application is sanctioned, will then become a member of the Board. The secretary will ordinarily be charged with the correspondence and with making proper arrangements, in consultation with the chairman, for the execution of works and measures passed by the Board. Knowledge of the English language is not indispensable in the secretary or chairman, as the language used in the discussions and records of the Board should be a point for the Board's decision. The existing rules for the guidance of municipal and local committees should be followed in conducting business; but Municipal and District Boards may make rules for their own guidance; and, subject to the approval of the District Boards, the Sub-Divisional Boards may also do so for themselves. The strength and cost of the office establishments to be employed by the Boards may in a great measure be left to be determined by the Boards themselves; though the first proposals of the District Boards should be passed by the Commissioner of the Division, who will see that the establishments entertained in different districts are, as far as the funds and the work to be done admit, fixed at the outset according to a uniform standard. The Commissioner shall be the channel of communication between the Municipal and District Boards and the Government.

13. A second point is the membership of officers of the Government, other than the chief executive officer of the district, on Municipal and District Boards. This subject has been discussed by the provincial committee in paragraphs 15–18 and 25 of their report; and in the conclusions of the committee the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is disposed for the most part, though not altogether, to agree. It is advisable that membership of the Boards, Municipal and District, by virtue of salaried office under Government should cease, and that, unless popularly elected, Government officials should not be appointed members of the Municipal Boards. But in regard to Tahsildars, the feeling and opinion of the country, as ascertained and reported by the district and divisional officers, is almost unanimously in favour of their being members of the District Boards; and this fact, combined with the strong recommendation of the majority of the provincial committee, has led the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner to decide that the Tahsildar shall be ordinarily nominated to

the Board of his sub-division and shall be eligible like other members for appointment to its chairmanship and secretaryship. Assuming that for some time to come many Sub-divisional Boards will need control and guidance, the Lieutenant-Governor must repeat his conviction that for the present the arrangement which is preferable and will be more popular is not a system relying for guidance upon external check and revision only, but a system that allows the presence upon the Board of at least one local officer whose position enables him to give material aid of various kinds in the transaction of business. Nor is the Lieutenant-Governor prepared to lay down the rule that State employ should absolutely disqualify native officers, other than Tahsildars, from membership of the District Boards, though such appointments will usually be made upon special exigencies. But since the Tahsildars of a district, if assembled together upon the central District Board, might exercise considerable official influence, the Lieutenant-Governor is willing to direct that, while all members of the Sub-divisional Boards are also members of the District Board, the Tahsildars shall not attend the District Board meetings unless summoned by that Board for reasons to be specially recorded by it.

14. The position in regard to Municipal, District, and Sub-divisional Boards, of the special officers who are attached locally to such State Departments as Public Works, Public Instruction, and Sanitation, is a third point of detail requiring separate consideration. The provincial committee has advised that the Executive Engineer should not, and that the Inspector of Schools and the Civil Surgeon should, be members of the District Board, and that all of these officials should not be members of Municipal Boards. In this conclusion of the committee the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner does not altogether agree. The Civil Surgeon represents in his district the Sanitary Department of the State, while the Executive Engineer and the Inspector of Schools are in their divisions the advisers and inspectors of their respective departments; so that there is practically little or no essential difference in the character of the relative functions of these officials. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that, following the analogy of systems elsewhere in force, it is of much importance, on the one hand, that the Boards should be able to act in consultation with the skilled departmental advisers of the Government, and on the other hand, that in important cases the views and conclusions of the Government should be explained to the Boards through the medium of the professional or scientific advisers of the State. Accordingly, the plan approved by him is that, while the officers referred to shall be entitled to attend meetings of Municipal, District, and Sub-divisional Boards in order to explain the objects and principles of the Government in dealing with the subject-matter of their departments, and if necessary to draw attention to cases requiring early orders, their functions shall be confined to their specialities, and they shall have the right to be present and to speak without being members. It may not ordinarily be necessary for them to attend Board meetings, for many cases will be disposed of by correspondence; but in important and difficult questions, especially those in which principles are involved, personal attendance and participation in discussion will unquestionably facilitate and expedite decision; and upon such occasions they will be expected to exercise their right of representing the Government.

15. Lastly, in the 19th, 26th, and 59th paragraphs of the report submitted by the provincial committee, the subject of the control to be exercised over Boards, Municipal and District, by the district officer and the Government is discussed; and in the the 19th paragraph the arguments and views of the majority and minority of the committee are clearly set out. The conclusion of the majority was to the effect that, while copies of the proceedings of all Board meetings should be promptly submitted for the information of the district officer, the latter, whether a member of the Board or not, should have power to advise the Board, to examine its records and call for and criticise its proceedings, and to suspend its action provisionally pending reference to the Commissioner and the Government. Upon this the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner would remark that if the general result of the reforms now contemplated were to make the district officer entirely responsible as an independent supervising authority for the control and direction of the Boards' proceedings, and thus to substitute stringent powers of suspension and revision from without for recognised predominance within, it is doubtful whether the cause of local self-government would gain by the change, and whether the native community generally and the Boards in particular would welcome it. This was the view of the four native

members, who voted with the minority of the committee; while there is also the separate question whether the powers which the majority of the committee would confer upon the district officer are compatible with his position as chairman of a Municipal or District Board. It would, for example, hardly be in keeping with his position as member and chairman of one of these Boards that he should be able summarily to suspend, by the exercise of his external authority, measures passed by the Board against his vote; for nothing would be more likely to raise misunderstandings between the Boards and Government, and by suppressing independence of opinion and action, to deprive the new policy of its chief meaning and design. Such a power of veto as was suggested by the majority of the committee would, unless used with great discretion and forbearance, either reduce the Board's discussions on any really debateable points to a mere form, or else disappoint and mortify members heartily interested in the free expression and enforcement of their views. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore considers that, although copies of the proceedings of meetings should be submitted to the district officer, who should be authorised and enjoined to make suggestions to the Boards and to call for their records, and to report where necessary his comments and objections to superior authority, the power of provisionally suspending the action of District Boards should rest with the Commissioner of the Division, who, should he after reference to the Board feel obliged to exercise it, must at once report the circumstances to the Government for confirmation. The business of District Boards may be important, but it is not likely, except in very rare instances, to be urgent; and since the ordinary law gives to Magistrates ample power of interference when the public peace or the public health requires the adoption of prompt and decisive measures, it is hardly conceivable that the delay involved in a reference to the Commissioner would give rise to public inconvenience or loss. In regard, however, to Municipal Boards, which may have to confront emergencies arising in large towns, the Lieutenant-Governor considers that a power of provisional suspension may properly be reserved to the chief executive officer of the district, who will not so ordinarily belong to the Boards. But he will of course report his action without delay for the information and orders of Government. The measure of control over the Boards that the Lieutenant-Governor thus proposes to provide, will be embodied in the new laws that will be required for the completion of the scheme of local self-government in these provinces.

16. The foregoing paragraphs deal with the principles and contain all the directions, affecting the constitution and functions of Local Boards, that it seems necessary to explain at present; and there remain for consideration and decision only certain matters of administrative detail connected mainly with local finance. Such of the financial questions of detail as depend upon the adjustment of responsibility between the Provincial Government and the Local Boards, and between District and Municipal Boards, will be treated in a separate Resolution; and it will here be sufficient to indicate generally the principles upon which the adjustments will be carried out.

17. The first of the questions to be considered is the extent to which municipal funds may fairly be relieved of police charges and the method of adjusting the charges for which they are fairly liable. The question was discussed by the provincial committee, and the unanimous conclusion of the committee is stated in the 27th paragraph of their report:—

"The preservation of peace and the prosecution and detection of crime are duties for which municipal revenues can hardly be said to be fairly liable, as these duties seem to devolve more equitably on the central Government of the country than on the scattered municipal towns. But the cost of watch and ward, including under this term such additional duties of a miscellaneous kind (*e.g.*, the enforcement of sanitary rules and the regulation of intra-municipal traffic) as clearly appertain to municipal police, appears to be *the* one of all others that can with most fairness and propriety be debited to municipal funds, and paid for by the people whose interests and property are the immediate objects of the guardianship of the *chaukidari* force."

The conclusion is supported by the analogy of small towns under Act XX. of 1856 and of rural villages, where the watchmen are paid, not from the general revenues of the country, but from funds raised locally, in the former by a house-tax levied for the purpose under the Act, in the latter by the local cess levied from landholders along with the land-revenue under Act III. of 1878. The principal stated by the committee appears incontrovertible. For since the inhabitants of small towns and the land-

holders in villages, in accordance with the long established custom and law of the country, are required to pay for the services of the watchmen who remain on watch at night, who report crime, and who are empowered to challenge and arrest thieves and persons carrying suspicious property within their beats, there is no reason why the inhabitants of the larger towns (in many of which Act XX. of 1856 was formerly in force) should, merely through the transformation of the town into a municipality, be altogether exempted from the charge. It is true that many municipalities have, in addition to the legitimate cost for watch and ward, been required to share the cost of the provincial police employed within their limits; but this arrangement, which is manifestly unfair, will be cancelled; and it now remains only to determine how the legitimate charge for watch and ward is to be computed and adjusted. In a few municipalities the town watchmen as a distinct body have been abolished, their places being taken by regular police, who form one force, and are paid on the same scale, with the district police stationed within the municipality; while in the majority of the municipalities the town watchmen form a separate body, wear a distinctive uniform, and not being liable for service outside their own town, are paid, like the watchmen in small towns and villages, at lower rates than the regular police. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner prefers the latter system, because it marks off a separate body of men for municipal service; but he directs that the question be considered by Municipal Boards in consultation with the Magistrate of the district and the Inspector-General of Police, and that each Board be left to decide which system it will adopt. One condition only must be imposed, namely, that should the former system be preferred, men of the regular police serving as town watchmen shall, while so employed, be relieved of all duties (such as the serving of summonses, the execution of warrants, and the like) that do not belong to the duty of the village and town watchman. Similarly, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner leaves it to each Municipal Board, in consultation with the district authorities and the Inspector-General of Police, to determine what the strength of the town police shall be, and if it is retained as a distinct body, what shall be the rates of pay and the manner of appointing and promoting the men. It is indispensable that the Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police should have over the town police the same disciplinary authority as they have over the watchmen of small towns and villages; but in municipalities where the town police is retained as a separate body, it will be advisable that, subject to approval by the Magistrate, the watchmen should, on the analogy of the arrangements in force for the appointment of village watchmen, receive appointment and promotion from the Municipal Board.

18. The relation between the District and Municipal Boards in respect to institutions, such as schools and dispensaries, in which both are concerned, involves two questions, one pecuniary, the other administrative. In regard to the financial responsibility of the several Boards, the suggestion of the provincial committee, recorded in the 28th paragraph of their report, for the adjustment by mutual arrangement of the cost of the common institutions according to the proportions in which they are attended from town or district, approves itself to the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner. The question of administrative control is not quite so simple, but as a general rule, administrative control should follow financial responsibility; and where two or more Boards are financially responsible for any institution, control should be exercised over it by a joint committee formed of members delegated from the Boards concerned; reports, budgets, and other returns submitted to the district officer or to official departments being sent through the Board which can more conveniently forward them. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that no provision is necessary for the special association with the District or Municipal Board of subscribers to dispensaries, since it is likely that influential subscribers will themselves be on one or other of the Boards, or be adequately represented by some of the members. In respect to High or Zila Schools, the Lieutenant-Governor is disposed to accept to a certain extent the recommendation of the provincial committee. These schools, mostly situated within municipal limits but attended by boys whose homes are without as well as by boys whose homes are within the municipality, will in most districts be, as regards financial responsibility, institutions common to both the Municipal and the District Board, and would therefore be controlled by the joint committee. But the Lieutenant-Governor would not withdraw from the Board's committee the power of visiting, inspecting, and reporting upon these schools; and these powers will accordingly be retained, in addition to the control over endowments, boarding-houses, and local scholarships. In

other respects, as, for example, the exercise of authority over teachers and servants, the regulation of studies and examinations, and the classification of pupils, the schools will continue entirely under the charge of the Department of Public Instruction.

19. The provincial committee have gone at some length into the relation of the Department of Public Works to the Local Boards, more especially the District Board, and have advocated some important changes in the existing arrangements for carrying out local works. The subject in its details falls beyond the immediate range of the present Resolution; and before final orders can be given, the views of the committee must be considered in the Public Works Department. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner however agrees in the general principles that the District Board should, like Municipal Boards, having very large discretion in the expenditure on local works of money at their credit, that the system of sanctioning their projects and keeping and auditing their accounts should be as simple and easy as is compatible with safety and regularity, and that the offices of the Public Works Department should report upon all important projects, and finally, after inspection, upon their execution.

20. It remains to examine the questions, which are of great importance, involved in framing a scheme of local finance. In the first place, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner accepts the principles set forth in the third paragraph of the provincial committee's report, that the income of Local Boards shall, subject to the proper maintenance of the institutions and works transferred to them, be utilised in projects designed and approved by the Boards; that the District Boards shall, for a term of years, be placed in secure possession of a distinct assignment of funds; and that, at least within the limits of that term, the unexpended balances of one year shall be available for expenditure by the District Boards in the following years.

21. Secondly, the chief source of the income of District Boards is, and must continue to be, the local rates, which are levied along with the land-revenue. Under the existing law a fixed proportion of these rates is appropriated to certain provincial purposes, namely, protection against famine and the construction of railways and canals; while the greater part is available for expenditure upon the rural police or village watchmen, the district post, schools, dispensaries, roads, and other institutions and works of public utility. It will be necessary to amend the law (Acts III. and IV. of 1878) under which the local rates are levied and local affairs are at present administered, in order to give legal force to the new administrative arrangements described in preceding paragraphs; and it will be also advisable, while maintaining the rate's percentage and the method of collection, to treat the portion devoted to provincial purposes separately from the portion which, being levied for expenditure managed by the District Boards, will be entirely at the Board's disposal. As far as possible the latter portion will be made over to the District Boards without deductions for central establishments, the charge for these being debited to provincial account.

22. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner further approves generally, subject to detailed adjustment, of the transfer to the District Boards of ferries, pounds, nazul, and the other items specified in the 46th paragraph of the provincial committee's report, both as regards income and expenditure on one side, and control and management on the other. In respect, however, of any of these items in the management of which the Boards may deem the assistance of the district officer necessary, they may be allowed to apply for it.

23. Again, the transfer to Local Boards of the management of excise has been referred to in the report of the provincial committee; but although the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner does not altogether discard the notion of eventually discovering some means of subjecting excise to local management, no practicable scheme has suggested itself, and the question may for the present be laid aside. The only other source of income that has been proposed as suitable, along with its management, for assignment to Local Boards is the license-tax. The proposal for the transfer of this tax was, however, negatived by a majority of the provincial committee for reasons which though by no means exhausting the case against the transfer, seem to the Lieutenant-Governor to be sound and valid; nor is their weight materially counterbalanced, in Sir Alfred Lyall's judgment, by the arguments of the minority in favour

of the proposal. The policy of local self-government has been adopted because the system of committing local affairs to local management is now universally accepted as a necessary element of well ordered administration. But the people of this country, who have been taxed from time immemorial, are not so backward in this branch of political education as still to need to be taught that taxes are necessary and that the payment of them cannot, with due regard to the public interest, be made pleasant. And it is to be recollected that a general tax upon trades and occupations is in no proper sense a local tax; that it is as yet untried in the category of local taxes; and that its management has never, in the Lieutenant-Governor's knowledge, been undertaken by Local Boards of the character now to be instituted. Whether such Boards, unless largely composed of commercial men, would possess a knowledge of the profits of bankers and traders in a district sufficient to enable them to make a just assessment, is open to question. But however this may be, the proper taxation of trades and professions is no essential part of local self-government; and the Lieutenant-Governor does not feel himself justified, at the outset of a new and experimental system, in imposing on gentlemen, who will be asked to undertake much gratuituous labour, an onerous and possibly invidious responsibility that they seem, reasonably enough, somewhat unwilling to assume.

24. There are besides other reasons why it seems inexpedient to make over the license-tax to the Local Boards. If the tax be treated as a local one, its management and income should be assigned to the Boards holding jurisdiction over the areas in which the persons taxed have their places of business. As a number of these persons carry on their trades and occupations in municipalities, it would follow that a considerable part of the tax would be transferred to Municipal Boards at the expense of the general revenues of the country, a result that does not seem at present to be either necessary or desirable, particularly as the provincial revenues are already relieving the towns from the cost of their police. We should therefore have some disarrangement of local finance, and risks of inequality and mistakes in assessment arising from the creation of a large number of independent assessing Boards, while the sum transferred to the District Board would not be the full amount raised in the district by the license-tax. And even if this difficulty were met by setting aside, for the purposes of license-tax management, the clear distinction laid down in all other respects between town and district finances, the assignment of the license-tax to District Boards would by no means facilitate the difficult task of re-arranging local finance. The districts of these provinces vary much and disproportionately to their total area, not only in their revenue upon which the local rates depend, and in other sources of local income, but also, and very materially, in their need for the expansion and improvement of their communications and local institutions, and for the development of their resources. The effect of allotting the license-tax to the District Boards of the districts in which it is collected, would be to increase considerably the funds of districts within which the large commercial towns are situated, while the outlying and agricultural districts would gain little. At the same time the Government would lose control of a source of revenue which is by no means of a local character, and which may usefully be kept as a provincial asset whence the deficiencies of the poorer tracts, or special requirements anywhere, might occasionally be supplemented, and inequalities of local income reduced. For, unless various parts of the provinces are to be kept, even more than at present, in various and very unequal stages of progress, it will be impossible altogether to do away with the system of grants from provincial revenues in aid of local income. And while it is only just that every district should have the benefit of the whole of the funds that are raised within it by special rates or from sources that are properly under district management, it is equally right, and the exigencies of the public finances demand, that we should proceed with great caution in localising funds on which localities have not a clear and primary claim.

25. Nevertheless, if financial considerations should eventually permit, and if there should hereafter be manifested a disposition on the part of the Local Boards to enter into arrangements with the Provincial Government in regard to the assessment and appropriation of the license-tax, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner will be willing to entertain and consider the proposals; but time is needed for working out and testing in practice the whole scheme of local finance for the provinces, and for correcting inequalities, so that no sudden change may take place in any essential part of the existing arrangements for the advance and improvement of the districts.

26. The following is a summary of the more important conclusions arrived at in the foregoing paragraphs:—

(*a.*) *Constitutions and functions of Municipal and District Boards.*

(1.) The system of open election shall be introduced into all municipalities, except in a few very special cases. Details as to the qualifications of voters and candidates, methods of voting, and other similar matters, shall be decided by each municipality, subject to the approval of Government.

(2.) Except in certain municipalities to be specified by Government, where the presidentship of the district officer is at present considered essential, every Municipal Board shall elect its own chairman, who may be official or non-official, and who shall hold office for one year.

(3.) Honorary Magistrates shall ex-officio be members of the Board within whose jurisdiction they exercise powers; and non-official chairmen, if not already Honorary Magistrates, shall for their term of office be appointed Honorary Magistrates.

(4.) Each tahsil or fiscal sub-division of a district shall be represented by a Board; but all the Sub-divisional Boards shall be subordinate to the central District Board, which shall consist of the aggregate of the several Sub-divisional Boards of the district, and shall regulate their powers and functions.

(5.) In all districts in which a sufficiently large electoral body can be constituted, the district officers shall prepare for each sub-division a list of persons who may be chosen to act as electors. The number of these will vary according to the circumstances of each sub-division, but it will not ordinarily be more than 100 or less than 25; and the list shall be periodically revised. Honorary Magistrates shall ex-officio be members of the electoral body.

(6.) The electors shall be asked to appoint, by such method of election or nomination as they may decide upon, a certain number of their own body to serve on the Sub-divisional Board. The number of such members shall not exceed eight; and membership shall be for periods of three years, intermediate vacancies being filled up, for the remainder of the Board's term, by the electoral body.

(7.) The District Boards shall decide whether they will propose to nominate a non-official member as their chairman, or leave the appointment in the hands of the Local Government. In the former case the proposed appointment will be submitted for sanction to the Government; in the latter, the chief district officer will ordinarily assume the chairmanship. The Sub-divisional Boards shall appoint their own chairman. In all cases the chairman shall hold office for one year.

(8.) Each Board, Municipal, District, and Sub-divisional, shall appoint its own secretary or secretaries, official or non-official, paid or unpaid; but no member acting as secretary shall receive any remuneration. Municipal Boards may apply to the Government for the services as their secretary of a native official serving in the district, who, if the application be sanctioned, will thereby become a member of the Board.

(9.) Each Board shall decide what language is to be used in its discussions and in recording its proceedings. Existing rules of business shall, as far as possible, be adhered to. The Municipal and District Boards will decide as to the strength and cost of the establishments to be employed.

(10.) Except as provided in clauses (2) and (7), no Government official shall ex-officio be member of a Board. But all Tahsildars shall be eligible for membership of, and shall ordinarily be nominated to, the Boards of their sub-divisions. They shall not however attend meetings of the District Board unless specially summoned by it.

(*b.*) *Relations of the district officer to Municipal and District Boards.*

Copies of all Board proceedings shall be at once submitted to the chief district officer, who is at liberty to make suggestions to, and call for information from, the Boards. If suspension of a District Board's action be deemed necessary, reference shall be made

to the Commissioner, who may direct provisional suspension, and shall at once report to the Government. Power to suspend provisionally the action of a Municipal Board is given to the chief district officer, who will also report at once to the Government.

(*c.*) *Relations between Municipal and District Boards.*

(1.) The proportion of cost to be borne by each Board for works and institutions in which more than one are interested, will be decided by mutual arrangement.

(2.) The administration of such common works and institutions shall ordinarily be conducted by a joint committee of delegates from the Boards interested.

(*d.*) *Local Finance.*

(1.) Municipalities shall be relieved of all police charges except those for watch and ward.

(2.) The income of District Boards shall be fixed for a term of years, and, subject to the proper maintenance of institutions and works under their control, shall be placed entirely at their disposal, unexpended balances being carried to their credit, and not lapsing.

(3.) The rates levied along with the land-revenue are the chief item of local income, and to it will be added the income under all or any of the following heads :— pounds, ferries, nazul, stage carriage fees, and arboricultural education, and medical receipts. Management will usually follow financial control.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered, that this Resolution be published for general information in the "Government Gazette" of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh ; also that copies be forwarded to the Secretary to this Government in the Public Works Department, the Director of Public Instruction, the Surgeon-General, the Sanitary Commissioner, and the Accountant-General, for information ; also to all Commissioners of Divisions for information and communication to District Officers and to District and Municipal Committees.

By order, &c.,
R. SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 230, DATED NAINI TAL, AUGUST 7, 1882.

READ—

(1.) Resolutions I. to VIII. of General Series, North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

(2.) Government of India, Home Department, No. $\frac{17}{747-757}$, dated 18th May, 1882.

OBSERVATIONS.—The series of orders promulgated by this Government on the subject of local self-government and decentralisation were all, with the exception of the 8th and last, issued prior to the receipt of the Government of India's Resolution of 18th May. The series was based on the general instructions previously conveyed in the orders marginally noted, and on the replies of consulted officers on the points referred to them for opinion. The Resolution of 18th May, however, containing as it does several new suggestions and instructions of an important kind, necessitates a revision of the Provincial Series, in so far as the latter fall short of, or are not in accordance with, the wishes of the Supreme Government.

Financial Department No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881.
Financial Department No. 3514, dated 10th October 1881.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner has accordingly resolved to convene a committee, composed of the officers whose names are marginally noted, for the purpose of discussing and advising on such matters as may be referred to them for opinion, particularly on the best ways and means for giving effect to the latest instructions of the Government of India. Details as to the time and place of the Committee's meeting will be subsequently arranged. Meantime, it is necessary that the lines on which the committee is to act should be clearly laid down, and that the points on which they are required to consult and give an opinion should be indicated. In this view His Honour is pleased to direct as follows:—

Mr. C. P. Carmichael	President.
Mr. R. M. Edwards	Members.
„ E. Colvin	
„ J. Quinn	
„ R. T. H. Griffith	
„ G. E. Ward	
„ M. A. McConaghey	
„ R. T. Hobart	
„ J. Woodburn	
„ H. P. Mulock	
„ J. D. La Touche	
„ R. Smeaton	Member and Secretary.

(*a.*) The basis of the committee's proceedings shall be—(1) the General Series of orders (I. to VIII.) issued by this Government in connexion with the extension of local self-Government; (2) the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th May last; and (3) the replies of divisional and district officers to the letters issued after the receipt of that resolution.

(*b.*) The following is the form in which the committee should submit their conclusions: (1) a concise statement of their views on the points referred to them, as detailed below; (2) the result of these views as necessitating modifications of previous orders; and (3) the result of these views as necessitating modifications of the Acts regulating local rates and municipalities (III. and IV. of 1878 and XV. of 1873).

3. The following are the main questions raised for discussion by the resolution of 18th May:—

I.—*District and tahsíl boards.*—The constitution generally of district and tahsíl boards throughout the provinces for the different parts of it, with reference to the more or less advanced state of those parts. Under this head will come—

(*a.*) The chairmanship and secretaryship of boards, with especial reference to the proposal as to non-official chairman.

(*b.*) Membership of the executive district officers.

(*c.*) Membership of the Executive Engineer, Inspector of Schools, and Deputy Inspector of Schools.

(*d.*) Membership of Tahsildárs.

(*e.*) Powers of tahsíl boards, and their relations to the district board.

(*f.*) Appointment of members—whether it is expedient and practicable that this shall be made by any form of election, or by nomination of the Government as heretofore, or by both methods in a fixed proportion. If any elective system seem possible and advisable, generally or in particular localities, what should be the qualifications of voters and candidates, the general mode of election, the size and arrangement of electoral districts, and the methods of voting?

(*g.*) Relation of the responsible district authorities to the district and tahsíl boards.

(*h.*) Arrangements for carrying out the resolutions and orders of the board through an executive committee of its members.

II.—*Town boards.*—Constitutions of municipal boards—

(*a.*) Similar points as under I., so far as they arise.

(*b.*) Adjustment of police charges in municipalities, and extent to which municipal funds may fairly be relieved of such charges.

(*c.*) Relation, administrative and financial, of district and municipal boards in respect to educational, medical, and other institutions and works (Resolutions III. and IV.), which both are interested. On what principle are these to be placed under district boards or municipalities? How is the appointment in regard to them, of members to represent municipalities on district boards or to represent district boards on municipal boards to be arranged?

III.—*Public Works.*—Public Works transferred to local control—

(*a.*) Arrangements for carrying on the duties assigned to the Executive Engineer in Resolution V., in the event of his non-membership on the district board.

(*b.*) Powers of boards, district and tahsíl, as to the execution of Public Works, the employment of contractors, &c.

IV.—*Financial arrangements.*—Local rates and the income of district boards. These connected topics, dealing with local finance, can best be discussed together—

(*a.*) Collection of local rates by the district board or through Government agency.

(*b.*) Other heads of revenue proposed to be made over to committees, *e.g.*, ferries, pounds, and license-tax.

(*c.*) Functions of committees as to these heads.

(*d.*) Assessment and collection of license-tax.

(*e.*) Share of cost of provincial and central establishments debitable to local income.

(*f.*) Works and institutions to be debited to local income.

V.—*Miscellaneous.*—General rules of business, &c.—

(1.) Should chairman and secretary know English? Should the proceedings be recorded in English? Should the district and tahsil boards frame their own rules of business? What establishments are required for carrying on the work of boards, and at what cost?

(2.) The control to be exercised by the Government over district and municipal boards (paragraph 17 of Resolution of 18th May): how should this be exercised? under what conditions? through what agency? to what extent?

4.—*Legislation.*—A draft Bill, embodying such of the provisions of Acts III. and IV. of 1878, and Act XV. of 1873 as seem *primâ facie* applicable to the new arrangements, has been drawn up, and will be laid before the committee. The Bill is meant to facilitate reference, and guide the committee in making proposals for legislation; and the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner wishes it to be examined and discussed by the committee, in order that any omissions, amendments, and additions that may seem required may be noticed.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner will be glad to learn the views of the committee on all the questions mooted in the preceding paragraphs, at as early a date as possible.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

Ordered that copy of the foregoing be forwarded to the President and Members of the Committee, for information and guidance.

By order, &c.,
R. SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 277, DATED NAINI TAL, AUGUST 28, 1882.

READ—

Resolution No. 230, dated 7th August 1882.

In addition to the officers named in the 2nd paragraph for the Resolution quoted above, the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is pleased to appoint the following native gentlemen to be members of the committee convened for the purpose

of discussing and advising on certain matters connected with the extension of local self-government in the North-West Provinces and Oudh :—

Rája Siva Parshád, C.S.I.
Rája Jai Kishan Dás, C.S.I.
Rája Jagat Sing, Tájpur.

2. With reference to paragraph 4 of the Resolution of 7th August, His Honour has decided not to impose on the committee the labour of reviewing the draft Bill therein referred; and the paragraph may therefore be considered as cancelled.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that copy of the above be forwarded to the gentlemen concerned, and to the President and Members of the Committee convened under Resolution No. 230, dated 7th August 1882.

By order, &c.,
R. SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH, No. 283, DATED NAINI TAL, AUGUST 31, 1882.

READ—

Resolutions Nos. 230 and 277, dated 7th and 8th August 1882, respectively.

The Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner is pleased to direct that the name of Rája Shankar Singh of Bilrám, in the Etah district, be added to the list of gentlemen appointed as members of the Committee convened for the purpose of discussing and advising on certain matters connected with the extension of local self-government in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

J. R. REID,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

ORDER.—Ordered that a copy of this Resolution be forwarded to Rája Shankar Singh, and to the President and Members of the Committee.

By order, &c.,
R. SMEATON,
Junior Secretary to Government,
North-Western Province and Oudh.

MINUTE BY THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF OUDH.

August 22, 1882.

THE existing system of local administration by committees, in towns and districts, is prescribed by the seven Resolutions issued in March and April last. The substance of these Resolutions is here very briefly abstracted, in order to give a connected view of the system.

Resolution No. I., 4th March.—Organises district committees. Membership by nomination for two years: five ex-officio members and all the tahsildárs: District Officer to be president. Non-officials must be one-half, and may be two-thirds of a Committee.

Resolution No. II.—Municipal committees.—No change, except transfer of charge and cost of local institutions in exchange for cost of police.

Resolution No. III.—All Government schools, including the higher class (zila), placed under financial and administrative control of district or municipal committees; also aided schools. District inspecting staff under committee.

Resolution No. IV.—Administrative and financial control of all medical and sanitary institutions and establishments made over to district or municipal committees, professional direction being excepted. (This includes vaccination.)

Resolution No. V.—Public Works.—Roads, ferries, educational buildings, miscellaneous public improvements, medical buildings, &c., &c., all made over to committee, with District Engineer.

Resolution No. VI.—Local debit (finance) charges.—Entire charge for—

(1.) Divisional inspection :
(2.) Rural police :
(3.) Cost of all schools up to zila schools, excluding municipal :
(4.) Pay of all medical subordinates :
(5.) Public Works expenditure—
  (*a.*) Roads, except those reserved and not under local control :
  (*b.*) Buildings, ditto :
  (*c.*) Arboriculture :
(6.) Petty costs of collection and establishment.

As these debits will swamp all the district funds, except of five districts, the deficits are to be supplemented by grants.

Resolution No. VII.—Local credits.—Local taxation is represented by the local rates levied under the Acts. From the proceeds are first to be deducted the sums required for general purposes, and the balance is placed at the disposal of committees.

Therefore the funds are—

(1.) Balance of rates :
(2.) Subsidies—(*a*) from ferry fund ; (*b*) from general revenues.

Specific heads of receipt, including ferries, not to be handed over. Nazúl and Pound too small. Surplus receipts in transferred departments might be handed over, like school fees.

The title of these Resolutions correctly define their object. They are Decentralisation orders, avowedly intended to relieve the Provincial Government and the Heads of Departments of a large quantity of local work ; and their general effect is to extend the powers and responsibilities of the district committees, giving them much more business to transact, much more money to spend, and leaving much more to their discretion in the matters of ordering the work and spending the money. All this promoted decentralisation. But, since the committees were still nominated (in the districts and in some towns) by the chief executive district officer, were presided over by him, and largely composed of official members, these Resolutions made little or no practical alteration in the constitution of the committee.

The Resolution of the 18th May by the Government of India broke fresh ground. It announced that the Government of India's policy had for its primary object, not the improvement of local administration or the decentralisation of authority, but the employment of local self-government by non-officials as an instrument of popular and political education, and as a means of enlisting local knowledge and interests into the management of local concerns. A preponderant non-official element was to be introduced into the committees, and non-official agency was to be utilised for the relief of officials from the increasing burden of details. The elective system was to be set working where possible ; and the principle of giving the committees real power and responsibilities was to be fairly tried. How far these objects (towards which the Resolutions already issued in the North-Western Provinces made, as the orders of the Government of India seemed to prescribe, a cautious and tentative advance) can be further approached or fulfilled is now the point for consideration. The policy is in itself good and sound ; and in these provinces we shall do our best to give it effect.

Municipalities.

So far as the question relates to local self-government in the larger towns, it presents comparatively few difficulties. The existing municipalities raise their own revenues, and can be well entrusted with extended powers of managing their own expenditure. They thoroughly understand their own affairs within the limited township area, and the supervision can be carried on by members without going far from their own residences. The essential point is to place the authority in the hands of capable and representative men, who will use it impartially. In the able letter from this Government to the Government of India, dated 3rd November last, it was shown that the

elective system had hitherto been a failure; but the letter goes on to say that the attempts to introduce the system would probably have been more successful if the mode and procedure of election had been left to the people themselves to arrange. There is no reason why it should be too late to do this now; while the objections drawn from past experience of failure, and from the anticipations that any future attempts must fail because the people are not ripe for any elective system, are met by the Resolution of May 18th. Upon the principles of that Resolution, the answer is that as soon as the non-official members shall have been entrusted with real power, the conditions of the experiment will have changed, and the elections will assume a very different character. It is true, as observed in the North-Western Provinces letter, that the elective practice of England "took hundreds of years of slow growth and education "to bring to its present form;" but it is also to be observed that at no time in our national history were the town or county representatives arbitrarily selected by agents of the central government, as they are in India. The electoral basis was originally very narrow, and has slowly broadened out (very slowly indeed up to 1831); but it always was in some sort distinctly electoral and representative, and the power exercised by the representatives was always independent and substantial.

What we have, therefore, to do in the towns is first to withdraw to a greater degree from official direction of the board's proceedings, and then to place the power in the hands of a body really representing the various interests and sections of the community. However judiciously a Magistrate may select, it is plain that a body of members entirely nominated by the Government, and flanked by a strong ex-officio minority, will not answer our present purpose: a large proportion of them must be in some manner chosen extra-officially; and to this end some kind of electoral process may be essential. It is also important, though not urgently and immediately necessary, that the president should be a non-official, because, since the chairman should lead the board, the position of a high district officer in the chair of an elected committee might often be incongruous. Either his influence would so predominate as to render the change of constitution nominal, or, under the altered constitution, he might be in a minority, and would thus find himself playing a subordinate part, sometimes carrying on an unsuccessful opposition to the popular majority. These considerations refer, however, more to ulterior than immediate contingencies; and where the people really desired to retain, for the present, an official chairman, there would be no great objection, though the official might rarely preside in person, usually deputing his office to a vice-chairman. But the general argument applies, though with less force, to the question of retaining on the committee such departmental officers as the Civil Surgeon or the Executive Engineer. It is to be considered whether they are not in a better and stronger position if they keep only a right to attend at meetings, like Sanitary Inspectors and other officers of the central government in England, and to explain or criticise, without voting.

The real difficulty will probably lie in finding qualified private persons to undertake the labour of personally managing municipal affairs; though here it may be worth while to point out that although the president has hitherto been regarded as the chief executive of a committee, because the chief district executive has always held the office, this is not essentially necessary. The primary function of the chairman of a local board is to conduct the board's deliberations, to frame, introduce, and pass measures, and generally to lead the assembly. When this has been done, he can, and elsewhere than in India, usually does, make over execution and inspection to others, this part of the work being often distributed.

In regard to the finances of municipalities, the only material change will be the withdrawal, entire or in part, of the charge for police. It is in many ways convenient that the regular police, in towns and districts, should form one amalgamated body under central direction; and as cost should, upon accepted principles, follow control, I think the payment of the united police from provincial revenues is just and proper, and accords with the general scheme. No sound distinction in this matter can be drawn (or is attempted in England) between town and county police; there is no reason why the cost of the general protection of the community, and the detection of crime, should be defrayed from local rates inside a town, and from the provincial revenues outside it. But both in towns and districts there are various strictly local duties, connected with sanitation and byelaws in towns, and in villages with the work of reporting offences, that are distinguishable, in kind, from the duties of regular police. If the police in towns are to continue to see after petty offences under the byelaws and such like work, the municipalities may fairly be required to give a grant towards the extra strength necessary, and a few local men may be entertained. This is probably

preferable to the plan of the municipalities keeping up small separate police bodies of their own.

The question of the functions and powers of the municipalities will involve little change; for this, and for governmental control, the present Act appears to provide sufficiently, though some minor amendments may be needed.

Districts. In the districts the work of constructing a system of local self-government by the people will be found more difficult. Our existing committees form a very slight basis for important administration. Our territorial sub-divisions—districts, tahsíls, and villages—are conveniently arranged for the collection of land revenue; but the districts are very large areas to be put under local boards for the management of a quantity of scattered works and institutions: while even the tahsíls are sometimes too extensive charges for such administration from their own local centres. Regular attendance at meetings, and personal familiarity with the needs and circumstances of the administrative circle, are essential for proper working of the boards; and these conditions are not likely to be fulfilled in large areas. On the other hand, if the district area is sub-divided into independent circles, we increase the difficulty of finding private individuals able and willing to undertake troublesome yet important business on an increased number of separate boards. For we have to remember that the men who will answer our purpose are not easily found about the rural districts.

It is true that, as the 18th May Resolution remarks, the people of this country are not indifferent to the principle of local self-government. Undoubtedly the leading men would be very glad to be left to manage public affairs in which they are directly interested without official interference; but then they would manage things according to their own ways and customs. The matter in hand is to get the natives to manage affairs our way; to look after roads, sanitation, schools, dispensaries, and other civilised improvements which the English Government has introduced; and to keep administration in all these respects up to what we consider to be a proper standard. It seems manifest that our only chance of succeeding in this object lies in bringing on to the district boards men of considerable influence and education, who shall be willing to exert themselves to continue our work and to further our views.

How, then, are the boards to be so constituted as to be effectively administrative? It is to be remembered that nowhere in Great Britain, as yet, is the county administration in the hands of elected bodies. In England the direction of county affairs is with the county Magistrates, all nominated by the Lord Lieutenant; they form a numerous body, of whom not all attend; they distribute the business among committees of working members, who report to the Quarter Sessions, that is, to the general assembly of the Magistrates. In Scotland the authority in county affairs is, I believe, reserved almost exclusively to qualified landowners, who act by right of qualification, not by right of election. In certain "local government districts" the governing bodies are elected by the ratepayers, but these are semi-urban tracts. And it is universally agreed that in all local administration everything depends on the character and ability of the men who may be induced by various motives to engage in it. Moreover, the stability of the administering body, and the continuity of system and practice, are maintained by the fact that all the Magistrates are virtually ex-officio life members, and by the existence of a considerable staff of paid and permanent officers, entirely appointed by the boards, whose appointments are often very valuable. So that the independence and efficiency of district boards in England rest upon an institution to which there is no parallel now in India—upon the institution of honorary local dignitaries, Lord Lieutenants, Sheriffs, and Magistrates, who, though appointed by the Government, are in no way its official servants, and who from time immemorial have done the county work for the sake of the power and credit thereto attaching, and in order to keep off the real officials. We have now to consider whether in India we can do better than follow this principle by endeavouring to place on our boards men of influence who will represent the wants and interests of their neighbourhood. Any method of non-official selection which should bring forward such men would be worth trying; the landowners, who pay the local rates, have a prior right to choose their representatives; while it might be possible to put all Honorary Magistrates ex-officio on the board. The number of members might be largely increased, according to the size and general importance of the district. We cannot expect all the unpaid members to attend every meeting; and we should have a much better chance of securing general representation, with a suitable quorum on all occasions, if a considerable number of the leading men, belonging to all parts of a district, were entitled to attend. The result would probably be that the most active and energetic members would take the lead.

But local boards composed of the leading men of a district will not do work after the manner of salaried official functionaries. The board will meet and discuss large questions in which the members are interested, will pass periodical accounts, settle measures, and generally act in its corporate capacity. But it must have a paid set of regular subordinates to work out details, and to see to the exact execution of various particular orders. Although real power and responsibilities will induce gentlemen in India, as elsewhere, to give time and attention to local concerns, we must not strain this argument too far. We cannot rely on this inducement for bringing many non-official persons to work patiently and constantly at sanitary inspection or superintendence, or at the watching road-making or buildings, or at accounts. The board will, in short, want a sufficient establishment; and the more boards we create the greater will be the expense of establishment. It is to be remembered, also, that we have as yet no *sanitary or educational laws for the districts, and that elected non-official bodies will not be subject, under existing laws, to official orders or injunctions in the discharge of their functions in these provinces. In other countries these bodies are controlled by local Government boards who have Inspectors that can watch and report upon the proceedings of the local administrations, and who have legal powers to compel obedience to the central power, where necessary. Here in India the Acts enable the Provincial government to define the authority of town and district committees, to make rules for them, and to set aside their proceedings; but the Acts give us no power to make a board do what it may decline to do. And, indeed, if such power existed, it would have to be very gently exercised; for if any premature indication were given of an intention to place the new boards under too compulsory regulation, we might lose our volunteers. The existing rules prescribe rendition of accounts and reports.

The matter of district finance is very important. Perhaps the single privilege of self-government that is really appreciated is the power of self-taxation; and certainly this has been the main inducement to the English to manage their own town and county affairs. Now in India it is by no means easy to give this power to district boards, unless by requiring them to impose fresh taxes, or allowing them to take off or alter existing taxes. The former expedient may be laid aside, for it would be likely to convince the whole country that our scheme for increasing their liberties is only a plan to extract more money. As to the latter, the first point to be noticed, in considering how to manipulate local finance, is that local rates ought to be raised locally, that is to say, within the area administered. This is the reason why local rates have always been laid on land and immovable property within a district area (the octroi is possible only in towns), for it is most difficult to hit upon any other tax that fulfils the limiting condition. In England it has been found possible to lay very heavy rates on land and immoveables for local purposes; because there the imperial land tax is fixed upon a very light and steadily decreasing valuation; and consequently there is ample room for local rates. Whereas in India the state of things is precisely contrary. We have a very high land revenue, which is constantly being raised for the imperial treasury; we have already put on about as much extra rating as is tolerable, and instead of allowing the local boards to make their own rateable basis for their own needs, as in England, we only work by a percentage on the imperial land revenue. Thus the rateable basis is so fixed that local assessors are not required, while there is little or no margin for raising the percentage; and on this system we are almost entirely precluded from allowing the new boards to lay especial rates on the land. It might indeed be practicable, eventually, so to alter the law as to empower local boards to rate land proprietors on their actual rent-roll; but, although the point might be examined, so considerable a change would need to be very cautiously approached. As for houses, they are already rated in some municipal towns, and in towns which have a house-tax for chaukidári; and a rate on village tenements is almost beyond practical consideration. Nor is it clear that any good would come of making over to the boards the mere collection of existing local rates; though this might be a matter for deliberation. The minor local fees and fines, such as the proceeds of pound and ferries, might be made over; but these will not go far; the other local tax is the house-tax under Act XX. of 1856.

It has been suggested, in the 18th May Resolution, that the license-tax assessment and collection might be made over to local boards. This suggestion should be carefully examined, although here arises the question, above noticed, whether the

* Except chapters X.–XI. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. It is worth considering whether power under these chapters might not be given to a board of Honorary Magistrates.

incidence of the tax is sufficiently local. As the principal firms now pay their whole assessment at the place where their head office is situated, it is probable that the larger towns would gain too much by an arrangement giving to each district or town the proceeds of the license-tax levied in it. Moreover, it is a point which touches the present system of provincial finance, and cannot therefore be decided altogether on local considerations. If we make over to towns and districts this important source of revenue, the provincial revenues must be compensated; while in the way of assessment by the board there are several difficulties. The assessment would become variable and unequal in different places; it would probably place a severe strain upon the integrity of the assessors; the receipts would be very difficult to apportion locally; and after all it is a very partial rating of local property to local needs, for the Act does not touch funded or accumulated property. There is no reason why a trader should pay a special local rate when his neighbour with an equal income not derived from any actual trade or profession escapes rating altogether. Moreover, when a town or district finds that it can really deal at discretion with the assessment, the result is very likely to be that the assessment will be rapidly reduced to the advantage of the richer taxpayers. In towns, such as Cawnpore and Háthras, where the municipal rates are already raised by direct taxation, instead of octroi, it would probably be necessary, if the license-tax were made local, to amalgamate the rating basis of the two demands.

There is no doubt that the system of making lump grants to the districts, in order to balance their income and expenditure, is open to objection; it is not strictly in accordance with the principle of raising locally the revenue that has to be spent locally, and it does not encourage economy. But the foregoing observations show that this system is not easily amended. If we give to each district the whole proceeds of its local rating on the land, the rich and highly-assessed districts obtain ample funds; the poor and backward districts are crippled. If we throw in the license-tax the inequality is greatly increased. Hitherto this inequality has been corrected by allotments in accordance with the ascertained needs of each district, and some arrangement of this kind seems still inevitable; though the problem of further adjusting local expenditure to local resources should be carefully examined. There is of course the alternative of altering the charges instead of adding money to meet them; and it is quite worth considering whether, instead of debiting to the districts certain departmental charges (such as those for Lunatic Asylums and District Dâk) over which the boards have no administrative control, the Provincial grants might not be reduced proportionately. But in a civilised country the more important public improvements must be kept at the same average level in all districts similarly situated; we cannot carry decentralisation to the extreme degree of leaving the poor districts to fall far behind the rich ones; nor do I think that in any country the local bodies have been rendered entirely independent of subsidies from the general revenues. And there is this to be said in favour of a system of grants, that it gives the central government a substantial leverage for working upon the local boards, for offering inducements to boards who will accept reforms and push forward useful improvements, and for maintaining a salutary direction and means of encouragement. But the allotments need not in future be subject to annual revision, and they might be made, not as lump assignments to the districts, but as grants-in-aid to particular departmental needs, such as, for example, roads or schools.

The foregoing observations are made for the purpose of elucidating the general aspects of the question of local self-government, as it is placed before us by the Resolution of the 18th May, without entering into details, and with the view of assisting discussion of the subject.

A. C. LYALL.

From ROBERT SMEATON, Esq., to THE OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

Sir, Naini Tal, September 30, 1882.

I have the honour, as directed by the President, to submit, for the consideration and orders of the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner, the following report of the conclusions arrived at by the Committee appointed under Resolution No. 230, dated 7th August, 1882, to discuss and advise on the points referred to them in connexion with the extension of local self-government in these Provinces. The Com-

mittee consisted originally of the 12 gentlemen first appointed;* but subsequently it was increased to 16 by the nomination of four native members† whose advice and assistance were found extremely valuable in many respects.

2. Considering the variety and importance of the questions referred to them, unanimity of opinion on the part of the Committee was hardly to be expected. To state in detail the views of each individual member on all the points discussed and to explain the grounds of the differing views, besides being impossible without the aid of a stenographic reporter, would be to swell unduly what is intended to be, not a detailed account of the Committee's proceedings, but a brief account of their conclusions. It was understood that what the Government desired to have was the collective views of the Committee. The report therefore must be taken, except where the reverse is distinctly stated, as summarising the conclusions of the majority,—conclusions arrived at after prolonged discussion, and in many cases the result of compromises which brought into comparative harmony opinions that otherwise would have been in hopeless opposition. Only where the minority was large, or where (as in a few cases) the circumstances seemed exceptional, has it been considered advisable to state contending views. It was explained at the outset that any member or section of members was at liberty to submit a memorandum on points calling for special notice; and this course was followed, in at least one instance, where the minority adhered strongly to the view which the collective Committee had negatived.

Preliminary.

3. The Committee desire to place on record, at the outset, their conviction that, in the interests both of decentralisation and local self-government, it is absolutely necessary that the income of each district board (assuming this to be the financial unit under the new policy) whether derived entirely from its local rates, or supplemented by transfer of suitable heads of income, or subsidised by allotments from Provincial funds, should be placed at the unfettered disposal of the board, and lodged directly to its credit in the district Treasury: any unexpended balance at the close of one year being carried forward to the account of the next, instead of lapsing to and being merged in the general revenues of the Provinces. It may appear that this conclusion, in which concurrence was unanimous, would more appropriately be recorded in connexion with Part IV. of the Resolution under which the Committee was constituted, which deals more immediately with local finance. But the Committee regard the principle above enunciated as essential to the success of any real extension of local self-government, and as possessing a vital importance which no detailed proposals as to local income can pretend to.

It is impossible, the Committee consider, to expect district boards to enter with any enthusiasm into the views of the Government in this respect, unless and until they are vested with some sort of financial independence. This independence is at the root of the movement, and essential to its success. Just as the Supreme Government has handed over to the several Local Governments the control of their Provincial finances, subject to certain specific conditions and restrictions, leaving the latter at full liberty to deal with the money as they please; so, the Committee consider, should the Local Government transfer to district boards the control of their local finances, subject to any such specific conditions and restrictions as the circumstances may be found to require. The analogy between the decentralisation measures of 1870, 1877, and 1882 as affecting the Imperial and Local Governments, and the measures now being introduced as affecting the Local Government and district boards, is sufficiently complete to justify the Committee's recommendation of a similar course of action. Just as (to pursue the analogy further) it was first found expedient in the interests of the decentralisation measures alluded to, to subsidise Provincial resources by allotments from Imperial funds, so it may at the outset be deemed advisable by the Local Government—which is in the best position to decide as to this—to place at the disposal of the district boards the income of local rates plus an allotment from general funds. But the committee desire to place on record their concurrence in the view expressed

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* Mr. C. P. Carmichael, C.S.I., President.
Mr. R. M. Edwards, Mr. M. A. McConaghey,
„ E. Colvin, „ R. T. Hobart,
„ J. Quinn, „ J. Woodburn, } Members.
„ R. T. H. Griffith, „ H. P. Mulock,
„ G. E. Ward, „ J. D. La Touche,
Mr. R. Smeaton, Member and Secretary.

† Rája Siva Prasád, C.S.I. | Rája Jagat Singh of Tájpur.
Rája Jai Kishun Dás, C.S.I. | Rája Shankar Singh of Bilrám.

by the Government of India in the Resolution of 18th May last, regarding the general inexpediency of the allotment system, as not involving or requiring the exercise, on the part of district boards, of that supervision which is at once the greatest incentive to economy and the best encouragement to careful nursing of resources. If the allotment system be for the present essential (as it probably is), a point on which the Committee are hardly in a position to advise, then it should be arranged that the grants are for a fixed term of years, and not annually fluctuating; and the principle of unexpended surplus being carried to credit should be recognised—within reasonable limits as to accumulation of balances. From this available income the district board would meet fixed charges, disbursed on account of educational, medical, and other institutions under local control, and pay any other necessary incidental expenses, the balance being left to its absolute disposal for local public works and improvements. Such a procedure would give district boards a direct interest in the economical and useful expenditure of their funds, a result which cannot be looked for from a system under which the boards are hampered by elaborate returns, interference by departmental heads, and a cumbrous system of account and audit. These remarks apply primarily and chiefly, the Committee desire to say, to the expenditure of what, for simplicity, may be termed the balance for public works, a subject on which the Committee's views will be found in more detail in the remarks under Part III.

The Committee believe that just as the experience of later years in regard to the financial relations of the Supreme and Local Governments has shown that the allotment system can with advantage be replaced by one under which heads of income are transferred, so in time it may be possible for the Local Government to substitute for what must probably at present be practically an allotment system, a plan by which certain heads of local income in whole or part would be handed over to the boards; the equilibrium being maintained by the corresponding transfer, when necessary, of heads of expenditure.

With these preliminary remarks, to which the Committee attach great importance, I proceed to record briefly the conclusions arrived at in regard to Parts I. to V. of paragraph 3 of the Resolution dated 8th August last.

I.—District and tahsíli boards.

4. The Committee were unanimously of opinion that the district, although well fitted to be the administrative unit under the general system now in operation, is too large and unwieldy for all the purposes of the new policy. They therefore strongly recommend the adoption of tahsíli boards as likely to secure a fairer representation of local needs, a greater amount of local knowledge, and a better guarantee for regular attendance at meetings, than could otherwise be looked for. Every member of a tahsíli board should be entitled *ipso facto* to a seat on the district board; the tahsíli board sitting ordinarily as a territorial sub-committee, and meeting periodically at head-quarters as a component part of the general committee. This plan, which is in harmony with the existing law on the subject, seems to be the one best suited to the circumstances of the country and most likely to meet the wishes of those interested. Indeed, it is improbable that under any other system would the native gentlemen, who may be expected to serve on the tahsíli boards, consent to take office; and any distinction drawn, or supposed to be drawn, in point of position and dignity batween membership in the tahsíli board on the one hand and in the district board on the other, would certainly occasion much unpleasantness, besides inducing an element of friction which is manifestly undesirable in the public interests.

5. Regarding the functions of the two classes of boards, the Committee were unanimous in holding that, for the present at least, the relation of the tahsíli to the district board must be primarily one of subordination. The time has not yet come, they consider, for the introduction into these provinces of a system under which the outlying boards would be independent of the central body, even in the more advanced districts. The district committee should be the administrative body of the district, deciding as to budgets, arranging allotments, and laying down generally the line of action to be adopted. The functions of the tahsíli boards, on the other hand, should be mainly executive, that is, directed to the carrying out of the policy and instructions of the central board; with power of course to consult as to local affairs, and to make such suggestions to the district boards, in regard to local matters, as may seem to them advisable. The central board would specify how money is to be spent and work executed; the tahsíli board would carry out their instructions, not deviating therefrom without reference made and permission granted. Thus the district board might make detailed allotments for each tahsíl, road by road and school by school; or lump allotments by departments; or partly in one way and partly in the other, at its discretion,

and it would be for the tahsíli boards to take action accordingly. Subject to these conditions, the Committee would not advise that the action of tahsíli boards be unduly hampered, or that they be treated otherwise than liberally. It must be borne in mind that the less the authority given to tahsíli boards, the oftener must the district board meet; and this is to be deprecated because it is not to be expected that frequent meetings will be well attended by members resident in outlying tracts, and the result is apt to be that the deliberations of the board will be practically in the hands of the head-quarters members.

6. The district board should in fact be empowered to delegate its executive functions to the several tahsíli boards subordinate to it (each such board to exercise these functions within its special local area), retaining in its own hands all administrative authority and finality of consultation. As the circumstances of the tahsíli boards will necessarily vary with the varying circumstances of the localities, the Committee would not advise that any hard-and-fast rule be prescribed as to the extent to which and the conditions under which this delegation may be made, but would leave it to the several district boards to act on the general principle above laid down, as may seem to them expedient. It is very probable that in some portions of these provinces a sufficient number of native gentlemen of influence and education, able and willing to undertake the duties devolving upon members of tahsíli boards, will with difficulty be found; in such cases the central board would probably be cautious in the delegation of important functions, and would be ready to interfere upon occasions. Elsewhere again, where the representation is efficient and suitable members are forthcoming, it would be open to the central board to hand over to the territorial sub-committee the entire carrying out of all local works within the local area.

7. The central board should, the Committee think, invariably reserve to itself the right to hear appeals from individuals considering themselves aggrieved by the action taken or orders issued by tahsíli boards, and to modify or suspend such action or orders as may seem open to objection on general or special grounds. The central board should also have the power to resume all or any of the functions transferred by it to tahsíli boards, when such a course—which should be rare—appears advisable in the public interests.

8. The relations of the district and tahsíli boards having been considered, the next question taken up by the Committee was the constitution of these boards, comprising the points referred to in clauses (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), and (*f*), of Part I., paragraph 3 of the Resolution of 8th August: and first, as to appointment of members. If the view taken by the Committee—that the district board should be the aggregate of the several tahsíli boards—be adopted, the question at issue is narrowed to the appointment of members of the lesser boards. Such appointment may be by nomination, or by election, or by a combination of these two methods. The Committee decided by a majority of 11 to 4 that as election is not at present expedient or feasible in any shape, the appointment of all members should be by nomination of Government only; that the attempt to introduce the elective principle into these boards would be generally displeasing to the native community; that those most interested in the matter are strongly opposed to any system, for the present, except nomination; and that to insist despite this strong feeling on the introduction of the elective system would be a grave political blunder. Of the four native gentlemen who were on the Committee, three voted with the majority and expressed themselves strongly in favour of the nominative principle: Rája Shiva Prasád asserting emphatically that he and his compatriots represented in this matter the opinion of the vast majority of intelligent natives in these provinces, who are entirely opposed to any system of election. The *rationale* of the view taken was that the native gentlemen who can with most advantage and propriety represent the people on district and tahsíli boards are mostly men of rank, wealth, and dignity—the natural aristocracy of the country: that such men do not desire to pose as representatives selected by a constituency, and will certainly not consent to make any effort to have themselves returned; that even if secured seats on the board, they would not care to co-operate with other members who, though nominees of the voting body, did not belong to the classes to which they themselves belonged; that, in short, the services of the best men would in many cases be absolutely lost under such a system,—a result which would certainly be a greater evil than the postponement for the present of a measure for which the country is not yet ripe. The minority, on the other hand, were of opinion that although the immediate and wholesale introduction of election pure and simple into all the districts of the pro-

vinces is certainly to be deprecated, the authoritative adoption of the nomination system is opposed to the principles of the new policy, and that a modified system of election should be permissible, it being left to committees to represent to the Government their wishes in this respect.

9. The expression of these latter views led the Committee to proceed a step further: and they unanimously concurred in advising that in the event of the conclusion of the majority being regarded as of too conservative a nature in view of the avowed policy of the Government, a modified system of election, under which a certain number of qualified and suitable persons should be appointed by the Government in each district, to elect from among their own body the requisite number of gentlemen to serve on the boards, would best meet the circumstances of the case. Such a compromise would probably be, the Committee thought, the least objectionable form in which the elective system could be presented to the native community. The nominees would thus be the electoral body; and as it would rest with the Government to appoint these, the evils of a general system of election would be to a great extent avoided, while the principle of election would be secured. The Government might fix a minimum qualification (on the basis of land revenue or license tax assessment), and leave it to the local officers, subject to the confirmation of Government, to settle details. Some such compromise between the two extremes would probably work smoothly; and while it would be free from the complications of election pure and simple, it would serve to introduce the germs of that system gradually into the country. The list of voters should, the Committee considered, be drawn up according to tahsíls; the number of representatives for each tahsíl should then be fixed by the District Officer with reference to the circumstances of the tract; and election should be tahsílwár. No one, not being an actual resident of the sub-division, should be eligible for election to the board: this condition is essential if local representation is to be secured,—an object which the Committee regard as of the first importance in connexion with local self-government in districts.

10. As the Committee felt themselves unable to advise the Government to sanction the introduction of any form of the elective system beyond that alluded to in the foregoing paragraph, they deemed it unnecessary to take up in detail such points as the qualifications of voters, mode of election, size and arrangement of electoral districts, and methods of voting. It has already been said that as regards qualification a minimum scale might with advantage be prescribed by Government, and that the tahsíl should constitute the electoral area. It was agreed by a majority of nine to six that the elections should take place not at the head-quarters of the district but at the several tahsíls; and that the proceedings should be supervised by a member of the district executive staff above the rank of a Tahsíldár, a covenanted officer being deputed to superintend whenever this could be arranged. The minority, comprising three of the four native members, thought that as membership would be for at least two years the trouble involved in coming to head-quarters would be inappreciable, while there would be the preponderating advantages of full and free consultation, of the presidency of the Magistrate and Collector in person, as well as of that *éclat* to which the native community attach great importance and in which the proceedings at outlying tahsíls would necessarily be wanting. Beyond recording their opinion that voting by ballot would be likely not to commend itself to those concerned, the Committee did not enter upon any discussion as to the method of voting, holding that such matters could best be decided by the Government in consultation with the several local authorities.

11. The question of the chairmanship of the district board was next considered and discussed. The three available courses are—

(*a.*) Compulsory appointment of a non-official chairman;
(*b.*) Compulsory appointment of an official chairman (the District Officer);
(*c.*) Optional appointment of an official or non-official chairman.

The three native members who supported nomination were strongly in favour of (*b*), on the ground that the boards, which cannot be expected to spring at once to full power and growth, will certainly not be able to work satisfactorily without the District Officer at their head; that the control of the District Officer from without must mean, if it means anything, that the boards will be driven by him, instead of being led and guided by him; that control from within is what is most needed at this stage of the movement; and that this can best be secured by associating the District Officer

directly with the board, and making him its president. As regards the supposed feeling on the part of natives generally in favour of a non-official chairman, it was stated by Rája Shiva Prasád on behalf of himself and his compatriots generally that no such feeling did really exist; that the people only acceded to the proposal because they understood it to be the express wish of the Government; that if left to themselves they would infinitely prefer to have the District Officer at the head of the district board; and that the best proof of this was to be found in the fact that the papers placed before the Committee showed that in five districts only of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh had a non-official chairman been elected and found willing to act. It was also argued that the religious difficulty, which has already been experienced, and may confidently be expected to recur, is a serious obstacle at the present time to any system other than that under which the District Officer is president of the board.

Another view suggested was that it should be left to the board to elect one of their own body to be chairman, or to appoint the District Officer to be president, at their discretion: no pressure of any kind being put on them, either directly by interference, or indirectly by requiring a reference to the Government in the matter.

12. After a prolonged discussion, the Committee unanimously adopted the following view, which commended itself as the middle course most likely to work satisfactorily: that the District Officer should in every case be ex-officio chairman of the district board, except when the board receive—on application made by a majority of the members to Government—permission to elect a non-official chairman from their own body. The Committee considered that this system, while throwing on the board the responsibility of carrying on work with a non-official chairman, would give the scheme the fairest possible chance; that if boards choose to have a non-official chairman, they have only to apply to Government for the necessary sanction; that to insist on a non-official chairman would be to court failure at a critical time in the progress of the measure, and to lead the native community to suspect that failure was anticipated and would be followed by a speedy return to the *status quo ante*. The Committee further held that in the event of the District Officer not being the chairman, the post should be filled by a non-official: no official except the Magistrate and Collector being eligible for the presidency of the board.

13. As regards the secretaryship of the district board, it was unanimously agreed that it should be left to the board to appoint one or more secretaries to perform the duties of the post, either paid or unpaid, either one of their own body or an outsider; provided always that no member of the board who might be appointed secretary should receive any remuneration as such. The Committee were of opinion that the appointment of secretary is a matter for the board to decide at its discretion, and that its action in this respect should be absolutely unhampered, except as regards the proviso above referred to.

14. In the case of tahsíli boards, there was diversity of opinion. The Committee decided by a majority of eight to seven that there should be no permanent chairman, but that tahsíli board should elect a chairman from among the members on each occasion of their meeting; that the functions of these boards being primarily and chiefly executive, a fixed chairman was unnecessary; and that such an appointment would tend to give the tahsíli board too much the semblance of an independent body. The minority, on the other hand (including the four native members) contended that the appointment of a fixed chairman would greatly conduce to the effective working of the boards, as these would thus have a recognised representative to correspond with the central board, circulate papers, convene meetings, and arrange generally for the conduct of work. These functions the majority held would best be arranged for by the appointment of a permanent secretary to each tahsíli board, in the manner already suggested for the central board; and to this proposal, which was put to the meeting separately, though intimately connected with the forgoing one, the members unanimously agreed. The Committee were of opinion that no restriction as to the selection of a secretary is called for, and that in this matter the action of the tahsíli boards should be entirely unhampered.

15. The membership of the executive District Officers (point *b* in Part I.) was the subject next taken up. It was assumed that the phrase "Executive District Officers" included the whole district staff, from the Magistrate downwards; that the point at issue was whether any of them, as such, are to be constituted ex-officio members of the

board; and that a clear distinction exists between official and ex-officio members. This subject gave rise to considerable discussion, but eventually the following questions were put to the vote and decided, each time by a majority of eight to seven in the negative :—

(1.) Should any of the district executive staff be members of the board in virtue of of their office?

(2.) Should any of them be eligible for election to the board?

The conclusions thus arrived at on the basis of the voting would practically debar any of the district staff (with the exception of the District Officer in his capacity of president) from membership; but the difficulty which these apparently inconsistent rulings involved was got rid of by the adoption of a resolution—carried unanimously —that it should be optional for the Government to nominate one or more members of the district staff as members of the board in any district in which such a course might seem advisable, whether the general system in force in such district be that of nomination or that of election. It is impossible, without going into great detail and giving individual opinions in each case, to reconcile the conclusions on the two points above referred to; but apparently the veto on ex-officio membership was mainly due to a feeling that such membership would partake too much of the nature of a return to the old system, under which the executive staff was largely represented; while the exclusion of such officials from membership by election was the result of a feeling that it was not consistent with the dignity of office that its holders should be selected or rejected at the caprice of a constituency, however carefully organised. It will thus be seen that the Committee advise the reservation by Government of a right to appoint to district boards one or more members of the district staff; and the general view was that it would be expedient for the Government to take action on this, with due advertence to circumstances, pretty widely at the outset. The precise extent to which official nomination should be carried was a matter, the Committee held, which the Government must necessarily decide for itself in each case.

16. Regarding the special officers mentioned in clause (*c*) of Part I. of the Resolution, the Committee unanimously agreed that the presence of the Executive Engineer on the district board was both inexpedient and unnecessary. He could not possibly be present at the meetings in the various districts: his professional assistance and advice would always be available, whether on the board or not: he has no interest in or concern with local works except in his capacity of an inspecting officer: he would naturally advocate the introduction of the elaborate Public Works system, which the Committee consider to be entirely inappropriate to local works under the control of district boards. The case of the Inspector of Schools, the Committee held, was somewhat different, inasmuch as that officer is in charge (departmentally) of local institutions the management and control of which rest with the board, and has therefore a direct interest in the board's proceedings. After some discussion, therefore,—for at the outset the Committee were doubtful, and inclined to deal with the case on the analogy of the Executive Engineer—it was agreed that the Inspector of Schools should be recommendod for a seat on the board, on the distinct understanding that his membership should be strictly limited to the discussion of educational matters. The Committee were or opinion that the Deputy Inspector of Schools should under no circumstances be a member of the board; he is directly under their orders, and it would be inexpedient and anomalous that he should have a seat on a board of which he has been distinctly declared to be the servant. Any information advice or assistance which the Deputy Inspector is in a position to afford can be obtained from him by the board without difficulty.

17. The Committee proceeded to discuss the question of the membership of the Civil Surgeon, whose case (though not specially alluded to in the orders) seemed a suitable one for consideration. The general opinion was in favour of assigning to this officer a place ex-officio on the board, as one of the district staff whose advice and co-operation will be in frequent demand, and who would best be able to give the board the benefit of these when occupying the position of a member. The Civil Surgeon has all along been on the local Board; and although his status in the district is an official one, he has no such direct concern with the administration as to mark him out as an official member pure and simple. His association with the board as a member is therefore, the Committee considered, advisable and proper.

18. On the question as to whether Tahsíldárs should be appointed members of the tahsíli boards (sitting also on the central board on occasion of its meeting) there was

a marked preponderance of opinion that the presence of these officers on local boards is essential to the successful working of the scheme in its present stage; and the Committee agreed by a large majority to recommend that the orders lately issued on this subject should be upheld. Previous to the issue of the recent series of Resolutions on the general subject, Tahsíldars were not necessarily, and very frequently were not actually, members of the local committee; but when the new policy was inaugurated under the Government of India's original orders (of 30th September 1881) the discussion that ensued led the Government to the conclusion that Tahsíldárs should hold ex-officio membership. When the question again came up for consideration on the ground that the elimination, as far as possible, of the official element was *primâ facie* desirable, opinions were called for; and the papers received show that only in two districts of the United Provinces was the view taken adverse to the membership of Tahsíldárs. The Committee cannot but think that a consensus of opinion so strong merits the fullest consideration; and they believe that to exclude Tahsíldárs from the local boards would be to impede the progress of local self-government at a critical point, and seriously to endanger its chances of successful working. Holding as the Committee do that the practical unit for executive purposes should be the tahsíli board, and that the district board should simply be the aggregate of the territorial boards, it seems very advisable to secure at least one official member, who may be presumed to possess local knowledge and business capacity, for each of the outlying boards. The feeling of the people is decidedly in favour of this view; and the majority of the Committee who passed the resolution included three of the four native members, all of whom spoke strongly on the subject.

19. The question referred to in clause (*g*),—the relation of responsible district authorities to the boards—was the subject of prolonged discussion by the Committee. It was understood as referring to the control to be exercised from without, by the District Officer, on the acts and proceedings of the board. That some such control must be allowed for is obvious, otherwise the responsibility of the District Officer in all or any of the multifarious matters coming within the cognisance of the board would *ipso facto* cease entirely. This is not understood to be the intention of the Government; what is wanted is some such power of supervision and intervention as will enable the District Officer to assure himself that matters are going rightly and to take action when they seem to be going wrongly, without unduly hampering the discretion of the board or limiting its authority. The majority of the Committee considered that in the earlier stages of the local self-government movement this control from without by the District Officer should be strong; that the fact of his being or not being chairman of the board is immaterial to the point at issue; that his position as president is simply that of *primus inter pares*, entitled as such to his opinion and vote, and quite distinct from his position as the chief executive officer of the district, responsible to the Government for its general well-being. The minority, on the other hand, including the native members whose views on the subject were noticed in paragraph 11 above, held that the political education of the native community—at which the new policy was understood to aim—would be apt to be somewhat retarded by a system under which the District Officer would be practically as autocratic as in the earlier days of personal government. Admitting that some kind of control is necessary if work is to be carried on properly, they considered that no such incisive a ruling as the majority were in favour of is needed, and that the personal influence of the District Officer would ordinarily be sufficient for all practical purposes. The resolution finally adopted, and carried by nine votes to six, was to the following effect:—That the District Officer, as District Officer, and whether he be president of the board or not, should have power to make any suggestions to the board that may seem to him expedient, and to call on the board for any returns, accounts, papers, or information which may seem to him advisable; that if he should find occasion to dissaprove of the action of the board, he should have full authority to interpose and to suspend such action provisionally, referring the question in dispute to the Commissioner of the division in the event of the board not acquiescing in his view: further that the proceedings of every board meeting (central or tahsíli) should invariably be submitted to the District Officer for information, on the next day but one following such meeting. The Committee, while earnestly advising the Government to provide fully for this control, in justice to the responsible District Officers, do not anticipate that the necessity for the exercise of this prerogative to interfere will be of frequent occurrence, as they believe that the system they have recommended as to the appointment of members will secure the representation on the boards of the most intelligent and

public-spirited native gentlemen to be found in the several districts; and they trust that in the great majority of cases the control from within by the District Officer as president will be sufficient. But they cannot conceal from the Government their conviction that the existence of a different state of affairs is possible; and they believe that in view of such a contingency their recommendations, as summarised above, will best conduce to the general welfare of the provinces.

20. With reference to point (*h*), the arrangements for carrying out the resolutions of the board through an executive committee of its members, the general opinion was that no orders are needed, and that it should be left to each board to make such arrangements on this subject as may seem to it most expedient. No rule could, the Committee think, be devised such as would cover all the cases that may arise; and the matter is one that each board can best settle for itself.

II.—Municipal boards.

21. Following the order of the Resulution, the next subject that engaged the attention of the Committee was that of municipalities, Part II. of paragraph 2; and the first point discussed in connexion with this question was the constitution of municipal boards. Under the existing system a choice of action is permitted; and although theoretically the law leaves it to the Government to decide whether election shall or shall not be introduced into a municipality, the decision practically rests with the municipality concerned, as the Government is always ready to permit election where a wish is expressed for it. The Committee was divided on the question as to whether this system should continue, or whether election should now be the only principle recognised. The advocates of the first alternative, who formed a strong minority, were of opinion that no such hard-and-fast rule as that to which the majority inclined would suit the varying circumstances of municipalities, differing greatly as these do in size, population, wealth, and progress; that the present system, under which the Government is prepared to concede election or to arrange for nomination according to the wishes of those most interested, has worked well, and greatly promoted the growth of municipal institutions in these provinces; that every municipality has in its constitution, and in the liberty to seek alteration therein, a charter which it greatly values—a charter drawn up in accordance with the wishes, opinions, and feelings of the people by those most competent to judge on such matters; and that it is opposed to the essential principle of local self-government to insist that every municipality shall, whether it desire it or not, adopt forthwith the principle of election. It was argued, on the other hand, that if the elective system is to have a fair trial this trial could best be arranged for in municipalities where the principle is already known and appreciated, and where its operation will certainly be more in keeping with popular feeling than in districts; that if the door be left open, and if municipalities be compelled to come up to Government and ask for election, much valuable time and experience will be lost; and that the residents of municipalities, taken all in all are quite ready for the universal introduction of election. A middle course, under which it was proposed that election should be compulsory where the population was over 10,000 and optional elsewhere, having fallen through, the two views summarised above were put to the Committee; and the result was that by a majority of eight to seven it was agreed that election of members should be compulsory in all municipalities; that is, that the principle of election be retained in all municipalities where it now exists, and extended to all those in which nomination at present obtains.

22. On the subject of the qualifications of voters and candidates and the method of voting, the general feeling was that the Committee was not in a position to offer any suggestions, and that these matters should be left for the decision of the municipalities concerned, subject to the orders of Government. The circumstances of the several municipalities scattered over the North-Western Provinces and Oudh vary greatly; and what might be found admirably suitable for Allahabad and Lucknow might be inappropriate in smaller towns elsewhere. On one point, however, the Committee considered that a ruling might with advantage be given—the size and arrangement of electoral districts; and here again opinions were divided. The majority held that the system of election by wards (that is by circles of mohallas) should be made compulsory, the municipal board arranging details as to division of the township into wards. The minority considered that the laying down of any such hard-and-fast rule is to be deprecated, and that each municipality should be allowed to adopt in this respect the system believed by it to be the best adapted to its circumstances, on the principle that in the development of local self-government as great variety as possible is desirable at the earlier stages, and that a uniformity dictated by Government is to be avoided. The majority carried their point by eight votes to seven, three of the four native gentlemen

voting with the minority, who agreed that if restrictions were to be put on municipalities in such a matter the principle above enunciated was probably the best. Voting *en masse* would be a source of confusion, and would probably defeat the important point of proper local representation. Voting by guilds or castes would also be unsuitable, as tending to excite party feelings and social prejudices, The object is to localise, leaving the municipalities to decide as to the extent to which localisation should be carried; and this can best be effected by a system of wards, the area and limits of which it will rest with the several municipalities to consider and decide.

23. The question of the chairmanship of the municipal board was next discussed: Should this be settled wholly by election, or wholly by nomination, or left optional according to circumstances? Under the present law it is open to Government either to nominate or to permit election; but, as a matter of fact, the District Officer has always been chairman of the board.

The first suggestion was to apply to municipal boards the principle advocated by the Committee for district boards; but one objection taken to this was that the District Officer could not possibly be present at meetings where (as is sometimes the case) there are half a dozen municipalities within the limits of the district. Again, there are obviously more facilities for the adoption of the non-official system in municipalities than in districts; for while in the latter it might often happen that the non-official chairman lived 20 miles away from the head-quarters, this difficulty would not arise in the case of municipalities. The sphere of duty and responsibility too is narrower in a municipal than in a district board, and the work altogether lighter and easier. Finally, municipal boards administer their own funds, raised by taxation inaugurated by themselves; and many of them are already in a position to understand and appreciate the advantages of independent action. To insist therefore on the universal chairmanship of the District Officer would be a mistake. But there is a strong feeling among those most interested that in municipalities of the more important kind, where large funds are raised and spent, where the responsibilities are therefore onerous, and where there are extensive cantonment settlements—such as is the case in most of the larger municipalities in these Provinces—it is very necessary to have a thoroughly reliable president, vigilant, capable, and unwearied in watching the great interests at stake; and that, so far as present experience shows, such a president can usually only be found in the person of the District Officer. It was in this view that the native members proposed that the District Officer should be ex-officio chairman of all municipal boards at the head-quarters of districts, leaving it to outlying municipalities to elect their own official or non-official chairman as they pleased. Another suggestion was that the Magistrate and Collector should be appointed chairman in cases where the municipal board might declare it to be unadvisable to appoint a non-official; but this was negatived, as throwing on the board the gratuitous odium of declaring themselves incompetent. The proposal that eventually commended itself to the majority (which included all the native members) was that except in certain cases to be specified by the Government, in which the District Officer should be ex-officio chairman, every municipality should be permitted to elect its own chairman, who may be either official or non-official as the electors choose. Under this system it would be open to the Government to declare in what municipalities the Magistrate and Collector is to be chairman; and its decision on this important point would doubtless be based on such considerations as those advanced by the native members, as well as on the fact, which the Committee accepted as proved, that the people do not as yet wish to be compulsorily restricted to non-official chairmen, and that to insist on this would be a political blunder. The Committee further considered that the detailed work of municipal administration under official chairmen should be carried on as far as possible by the vice-chairmen, one or more of these officials (who should invariably be non-official) being appointed by each board to assist the chairman. In such cases, the chairman should, the Committee considered, make it his aim and endeavour to educate the vice-chairmen in the duties of office, and should gradually dissociate himself from active concern in the proceedings of the board, with the view of ultimately resigning in favour of a non-official president and of exercising such control over the board as may be necessary, from without. This policy would have the double advantage of securing efficient administration for the present, and of training the native members to the work of administration, so as to fit them for its duties when the time comes for them to be left to carry these on for themselves.

24. On the question of the secretaryship of the municipal board, the Committee considered that each board should be permitted to appoint its own secretary, either

one of their own members or an outsider, who may be paid or unpaid, official or non-official; provided always that no member of the board who may accept the post shall receive any remuneration. In the event of a board desiring that any one of the district staff should be their secretary (this often occurs under the present system, the Assistant Magistrate frequently being secretary to several of the municipalities) the approval of the District Officer and the sanction of Government should be necessary to the appointment; and in all such cases the secretary should be considered to be a member of the board.

25. As regards the membership of officials—other than the District Officer when president—on municipal boards, the Committee considered that this had been practically settled when the decision was come to that election should be universal. The general idea was that the official element should be eliminated as far as possible from municipalities, and that the members should be encouraged to manage matters for themselves. The Committee unanimously agreed that such officers as the Civil Surgeon, the District Engineer, and the Deputy Inspector of Schools should not be eligible for membership, holding that these officials will be in a better position, both as regards the municipalities and themselves, if they be accorded the right to attend meetings, and the privilege of explaining, advising, and criticising without voting. The Executive Engineer and the Inspector of Schools have no concern whatsoever with municipal boards; their case need not therefore be specially adverted to. The Committee further considered that ex-officio membership of members of the district staff is, as a general rule, to be deprecated, with due advertence to the cases of the official chairman and secretary previously referred to, and to any exceptional circumstances in special instances.

26. Finally, regarding the control of the responsible district authorities from without on the action of municipal boards, the view adopted was that indicated in paragraph 19 of this report; the Committee holding that, considering the great preponderance of the non-official element recommended for municipalities, it is essential that the District Officer shall have a power of control over municipal boards analogous to that which the Committee advised should be entrusted to him over district boards.

27. The above remarks exhaust the points included in clause (*a*), Part II.; and the Committee next proceeded to examine the question mooted in clause (*b*)—the adjustment of police charges in municipalities, and the extent to which municipal funds may fairly be relieved of these charges. There was practically no difference of opinion on this point. The Committee unanimously agreed that municipalities should be relieved of all police expenditure except such as may be necessary for efficient watch and ward, and so be placed in the same position, *quâ* police charges, as towns constituted under Act XX. of 1856 or villages assessed to the local rates. There is no reason, the Committee consider, why the Government should not undertake the same police duties on behalf of the urban, as it does on behalf of the rural community, meeting all charges over and above the cost of watch and ward. This is the more advisable in view of the transfer to municipalities of the cost of maintaining, in whole or part, the educational and medical institutions made over to them. The preservation of peace and the prosecution and detection of crime are duties for which municipal revenues can hardly be said to be fairly liable, as these duties seem to devolve more equitably on the central Government of the country than on the scattered municipal towns. But the cost of watch and ward, including under this term such additional duties of a miscellaneous kind (*e.g.*, the enforcement of sanitary rules and the regulation of intra-municipal traffic) as clearly appertain to municipal police, appears to be the one of all others that can with most fairness and propriety be debited to municipal funds and paid for by the people whose interests and property are the immediate objects of the guardianship of the chaukidári force.

28. The questions raised in clause (*c*), Part II. of the Resolution of the 7th August last, are of two kinds—financial and administrative. As regards the first, the view taken by the Committee was that the relations between district and municipal boards, as to defraying the cost of institutions and works in which both bodies are interested, should be mutually arranged by the boards concerned. The institutions referred to are practically limited to schools and dispensaries; and the members of the boards are most competent to say in what approximate proportion these institutions are utilised and resorted to by the intra and extra municipal population respectively. It is understood that the Government is in possession of returns showing the percentages

of cost proposed to be debited to the two classes of funds for such institutions, and that these returns were drawn up by the members of the respective boards under the advice of the district and divisional officers. If this be so, the Committee consider that these conclusions should be accepted en bloc; it being open to either board to suggest such variations, for the sanction of Government, as may from time to time seem desirable.

29. The administrative question (which was next considered) is one of more difficulty; and the Committee availed itself on this subject of the advice of the heads of the Medical and Educational Departments in the discussion that ensued. Regarding the control of intra-municipal dispensaries, the general idea was that these institutions could best be managed by the municipal boards concerned. It is true that in many cases intra-municipal dispensaries are largely resorted to by outsiders; and, financially, some arrangement in recognition of this is essential. But the main interest rests after all with the municipality, whose members are always on the spot, and are in a position not only to attend meetings regularly but to visit and inspect occasionally. Another plan suggested was that all such institutions should be represented by a committee of subscribers, who might make over the control to either the district or the municipal board if they so desired. The objections taken to this last proposal were that (1) multiplicity of authority was to be deprecated on general grounds, and (2) intra-municipal dispensaries are usually supported almost entirely from Government funds and municipal allotments, private subscriptions being of small amount. To hand over the control to persons subscribing (say) Rs. 200 towards a dispensary that costs Rs. 1,000 is obviously inexpedient. At the same time the Committee admitted the advisability of associating the subscribers, to a moderate extent, in the management, as likely both to encourage liberality in such matters and to secure efficient administration. In this view the following conclusion was come to by a large majority—That dispensaries within municipal limits should be placed under the management of municipal boards, subject to the Government Orders on the subject as contained in Resolution No. IV. of the general series (dated 17th March 1882); the boards to have power to add to their number, for purposes of dispensary administration, from amongst regular subscribers to such dispensaries who may not be members of the board.

30. The Committee proceeded to consider certain other points which, though not immediately connected with the scope of the Resolution, seemed to them to merit consideration.

(*a.*) Under clause IV., paragraph 10 of the Resolution of 17th March, 1882, vaccinators, compounders, and dressers are placed under the entire control of local boards, as regards appointment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal. The Committee consider that these classes of officials, being of a quasi-professional character, should be treated in the manner laid down in clause III.; *i.e.*, that they should be subject, in regard to these matters, to the authority of the head of the department only.

(*b.*) The Committee are of opinion that any board, district or municipal, in charge of a dispensary, should be permitted to utilise donations given for specific purposes without reference to departmental rules and restrictions. This would only legalise an existing custom which the Committee consider to be specially advantageous, as obviating the delay which is necessarily involved in official routine, and as offering the best inducement in the way of encouraging such liberality. No good reason exists why gifts of this kind should be hampered in any way by departmental rules.

(*c.*) All dispensaries other than those within municipal limits should be administered by district boards, except such as are supported by taxation raised in towns under Act XX. of 1856, which should be under the charge of the District Officer, who should exercise over them the same powers as are elsewhere delegated to boards.

(*d.*) Dispensaries which are supported entirely by endowments would, of course, be managed in accordance with the provisions of the several trusts; but subject to this condition, the administration should vest either in the district or municipal board on the one hand, or in the District Officer on the other, as might be deemed most advisable by the Government.

31. The case of intra-municipal schools was next discussed; and here the view taken was that division of authority should be avoided, and that all local schools, whether

intra or extra-municipal, should be under the control of the district board, excepting the following intra-municipal institutions, viz., free schools, female schools, and schools entirely supported by municipal funds. It was decided that one system should govern all classes of schools, and that continuity of management and uniformity of administration are essential in the case of schools, which open out to members of boards a much larger and more popular sphere of work than hospitals and dispensaries.

32. But the Committee desire to place on record their decided opinion that the zila schools, the highest class of district educational institutions, should not be brought unreservedly within the category of local schools. It is true, and right, that the cost of these (apart from municipal contributions) is debited to local rates, and that therefore they should, *cæteris paribus*, be under local control. But they are much larger, costlier, and more important than any other class of local schools: they teach up to a comparatively high standard; they are superintended by men of standing and scholarship. To hand them over to the district board would be to transfer them practically to the head-quarters tahsíli board; to transfer them to the municipality would be tantamount to limiting the management to a few of the leading men of the town. Both these results are, the Committee consider, to be deprecated, as neither of these two bodies is sufficiently representative to be entrusted with the charge of the highest local schools. Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the *publicum bonum*, the Committee are of opinion that departmental control is essential to the welfare of these schools, departmental control, that is, of a more extensive kind than can, or should, be exercised over tahsíli and village schools. Moreover, it would be impossible to secure the services of capable men, of the class now engaged in tuitional work, if these schools were handed over to local boards. The time has not yet come for making over zila schools to the district board, which would certainly have the prior claim if such transfer were to be made; and it is believed that district boards will be happy to be relieved of the responsibility which such transfer would entail. The Committee are of opinion that unless a suitable compromise between district boards on the one hand and a special school board on the other can be arranged, departmental control must be reverted to. One member suggested the organisation of special boards, consisting of the Subordinate Judge, the Assistant Surgeon, the Treasury Officer, and a few others to be nominated by the District Officer; but the feeling of the Committee was distinctly opposed to this as unsuitable for the proper management of institutions so expensive and important as zila schools. The conclusion eventually arrived at was that, as regards zila schools, all arrangements as to endowments, boarding-houses, and local scholarships (*i.e.*, those specially awarded to deserving boys by the district or municipal boards) should be in the hands of a committee of management to be appointed by the district board; and that in other respects these schools should remain under the entire charge of the Department of Public Instruction. Such a scheme, the Committee think, would best conduce to the interests both of education and of local self-government; for it would allow of the association in the control of those most interested in the success of the higher local education, while not depriving these schools of the benefit of departmental supervision and control.

III.—Public works.

33. Part III., paragraph 2 of the Resolution of 7th August, refers to the question of Public Works transferred to local control.

The Committee having previously decided that the membership of the Executive Engineer on the district board is neither necessary nor desirable, and that his functions, as described in Resolution V. of the general series, can be exercised to more advantage outside than inside the board, proceeded to discuss the important question of the powers of district boards in the execution of local public works. The Committee desire to place their views on this subject clearly on record, believing as they do that it is one of the most important in connexion with the general scheme, and trusting that the Government will see its way to approve and sanction their recommendations. The leading principle to be borne in mind here, in the opinion of the Committee, is that no interference on the part of the Department of Public Works is either necessary or advisable; and that the only matter in which the Public Works Department should have any concern with local boards is the supervision to be exercised by its officers over the execution of the more important and costly local works, which will ordinarily be few in number. It is absolutely essential, the Committee, hold, that district boards should be left to spend their money as they please on local public works, free from the routine involved in the present system of budgets and sanctions, and from the inevitable delays due to the present system of accounts and audit. As matters stand at present, this portion of the scheme is, the Committee regret to say, in a condition

little short of chaotic; for District Officers—though nominally at liberty to exercise, in concert with the boards over which they preside, considerable powers—find themselves hampered at every turn, and their efforts persistently thwarted, under a system which, whatever its other advantages, is essentially bureaucratic and departmental. The great difference observable, and it is very clearly observable, between the local works projected and carried out in municipalities on the one hand and in districts on the other, is entirely due, the Committee believe, to the freedom of the municipalities from these restrictions, and to their being left to carry out their local works through local agency in the manner most suitable to local circumstances. If progress is to be looked for, it is absolutely essential, the Committee think, that the money at the disposal of district boards for local public works should be placed direct to their credit in the Treasury, to be spent at their discretion. This amount would ordinarily be the balance available after meeting the cost of schools, dispensaries, and other transferred institutions; and it should be expendible under precisely the same rules and conditions, as regards budget and sanction, as those which apply to municipal boards. These rules and conditions are detailed in Part IX. (page 33, *seq.*) of the Manual of Government Orders. They are simple, concise, and intelligible: and they provide adequately for all necessary check, without hampering the boards by a system so complicated as that of the Public Works Department. The Committee earnestly trust that the Government will not rest content with any half-hearted measures in this matter. They feel sure that a reform, such as the view adopted by them and summarised above would involve, would be heartily welcomed by every District Officer and local board in the country; and they are convinced that until some such measure is inaugurated, very little progress can at the best be expected in that phase of the self-government policy which is connected with the carrying out of these local works and improvements, in which the people take the keenest interest, and in regard to which their representatives are most able to offer advice and assistance. If the view taken of the present condition of affairs, as regards local public works, appear somewhat pessimistic, the Committee would urge that it embodies the universal opinion of all classes outside the Department who are interested in the public welfare, and that it represents the true feeling both of the civil officers in districts and of the native community in general.

34. The Committee further consider that district boards should be empowered to decide for themselves by what agency local public works shall be carried out. Having made the necessary allotments, it would rest with the central board, (*e.g.*) to leave the repairs of roads to the tahsíli boards concerned, to utilise the District Engineer in the construction of new bridges or the repair of old ones, or to employ any other agency that might be deemed suitable and convenient. The Superintending and Executive Engineers of the Public Works Department should have full power to supervise important works, and to inspect and report upon all works projected and carried out by local boards; but these officers should have no authority to interfere either in the details of execution, the appointment of contractors or otherwise. In short, the boards should be left entirely to themselves as far as possible, and no obstacles in the way of departmental control and interference should under any circumstances be permitted.

35. The next question discussed in connexion with public works was that of administrative sanction. This sanction is understood to mean the recognition of the desirability or necessity of the work for which sanction is asked. The Committee cannot see why such a matter should not be left to the discretion of the district boards concerned, which are surely competent to decide as to such desirability or necessity. It is not apparent why a special reference, either to the Commissioner or to Government, is necessary in such matters; the present procedure almost invariably results in delay, and that often at a time when expeditious action is all-important. If the Government is prepared to take action on the conclusions stated in the preceding paragraphs, to the effect that local public works to be carried out by district boards shall be subject to the same conditions, as regards budget and sanction, as apply to municipal boards, the question of administrative sanction is practically decided. Works considered desirable or necessary would under this system be entered in the board's budget; and if the budget were passed, this would imply the acceptance of the work, and obviate the necessity of separate application for administrative sanction. Any changes during the course of a year would, of course, be met by the submission of a supplementary budget. It would be in the power of the controlling officer (who would practically be the Commissioner, though the budgets would also be forwarded to Government) to check all entries, to return the budget for amendment, or in the

case of non-acquiescence to refer the question to Governmen. In this view, the Committee recommend that the present system of administrative sanction be abolished root and branch, and that the simpler procedure obtaining in municipalities be substituted for it once for all.

36. As regards the condition, antecedent to the commencement of original works, of professional advice (clause IV., paragraph 20 of Resolution V. of the general series), the Committee consider that the present limits are unnecessarily low. These limits are the following :—

Up to Rs.	500 - - - -	Nil.
From ,,	500 to Rs. 2,500 - -	Executive Engineer.
From ,,	2,500 to ,, 5,000 - -	Superintending Engineer.
Over ,,	5,000 - - -	Chief Engineer.

It frequently happens that the Public Works officer whose advice is needed is neither on the spot nor near the place. The division of the Executive Engineer and the circle of the Superintending Engineer are extensive areas; the works are scattered; the services of these officers are often not available for professional advice when most needed; and the result is frequently hurtful delay. Moreover, experience has shown that as a matter of fact the present limits are lower than the exigencies of the case require. The Committee recognise the necessity of securing professional advice before important projects are put in hand, but it is open to discussion at what point the necessity arises. The Committee are of opinion that in regard to works not estimated to cost over Rs. 1,000, boards should be left to decide for themselves; they have their District Engineer to refer to if they wish, and he ought to be competent, if his advice be asked, to pronounce decisively on the engineering points of simple and inexpensive projects. For works costing from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000, the professional approval of the Executive Engineer should be requisite; from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 6,000, that of the Superintending Engineer; and for all others, that of the Chief Engineer. These wider limits would, the Committee believe, fully meet the requirements of the case from the stand-point both of district boards and of the Public Works Department.

37. As regards the system of account and audit, for local public works under the control of district boards, the Committee consider that this question is practically covered by the general resolution in paragraph 33. The system should be, not the elaborate and technical one, for such it is, of the Public Works Department, but the simpler and more appropriate one in force in municipalities. All references on these subjects should be submitted, as in the case of municipalities, to the General Secretariat, instead of being dealt with in that branch of the Secretariat appertaining to the Public Works Department. The Commissioner would practically audit the accounts, and he would of course be empowered to call for papers, ask for information, take objection, &c., subject to the orders of the Government in the General Department. Nothing else, the Committee consider, is needed: any other plan would be a return more or less to the present system—which is largely responsible, the Committee consider, for that starving of local public works, that hampering of local efforts, and that obstructing of local improvements that has notoriously been the case in these Provinces for the last ten or twelve years, ever since the introduction of what is known as the Provincial system. The Committee desire to place on record that these remarks refer wholly and solely to the system, and are in no way intended to imply that the officers of the Public Works Department have done otherwise than act loyally up to the requirements of the departmental code and in accordance with the departmental rules. But the time is past, the Committee consider, for the application of that code and of those rules to local works; and they wish to place on record their emphatic protest against the continuance of a system which is both extremely unsuitable to the circumstances, and the most unpopular that could possibly be devised.

38. The Committee next proceeded to discuss the question of repairs to provincial buildings of a local character, *vide* paragraph 18 of Resolution VI. of the general series. It is understood that the policy of the Government is to entrust all the ordinary repairs of these buildings, as far as possible, to the District Officer, so as to allow of a more economical and expeditious carrying out of such repairs than is possible under the present procedure, which defines sharply the demarcation line between provincial and local, and contemplates a separate establishment for the execution of each class of works in each district. In connexion with this policy (which the Committee consider a sound and right one, seeing that the District Officer is the person most interested in

the proper maintenance of such buildings, and in the best position to command good and cheap labour and material) the two points to be arranged for, if satisfactory progress is to be expected, are the following :—

(1.) The District Officer should be allowed to utilise the services of the District Engineer for such work, without detriment to his other duties.

(2.) The head of the department concerned should allot to the District Officer annually (on the basis of averages) a lump sum to cover such ordinary repairs, leaving it to the District Officer to apply for an extra grant should this be needed.

As regards the first point, the Committee do not apprehend that any difficulty will arise. The District Engineer's duties will ordinarily be of a very simple kind; and it is extremely improbable that the interests of the district board with the District Officer as their head on the one hand, and of the District Officer in his capacity as such on the other, will be found to clash. The advantage of allowing the District Officer to utilise the District Engineer's services is two-fold: (1) he will have in the District Engineer a competent official to refer to if necessary, and (2) he will have in him a subordinate who will be able to keep the accounts of these repairs in the manner required by the Public Works Department. The idea that the District Engineer is to be the servant of the district board only, and under no circumstances to be permitted to do work outside the circle of the board's jurisdiction, seems to the Committee an unnecessarily narrow one. As regards the second point, it is understood that at present the money for repairs is, as a general rule, kept in the hands of the Public Works Department, and doled out by the Superintending Engineer from time to time throughout his Circle. This seems to the Committee to be a mistake. The departmental head is in the best position to know exactly what repairs are usually required: he should be placed in funds from the Public Works grant to that extent, and he should then allot to each district according to its needs, keeping a small reserve in his own hands for emergent purposes.

39. As to the departments to which the above recommendations should apply, the Committee understand that the heads of the Police and Jail Departments are already upon this footing; and that ordinary repairs to police stations and jails are carried out through the Magistrate as head of the police, and the Superintendent of the Jail, respectively. It will be for the Government to decide to what other departments the procedure should be extended—certainly it should apply to all revenue buildings, including the district court and offices—and also what limit, if any, of work or money should be laid down.

40. The following proposal, then, summarises the view of the Committee on this subject: That repairs of departmental buildings—such as revenue and police—which are really local so far as the district is concerned, though not pertaining to district boards, should be under the District Officer; that a lump sum should be placed each year, for this purpose, by the head of the department at the disposal of the District Officer, who should be allowed to spend the money as he pleases, and to utilise the District Engineer and his establishment (when necessary and without detriment to that official's other duties), or the District Superintendent of Police, or the Tahsíldár, or other subordinate, as may seem to him most expedient. The accounts of these "Local-Provincial" repairs must, the Committee apprehend, be kept in accordance with the orders of the Public Works Department; and for this purpose the forms prescribed in Public Works Department No. C. 2239B.R., dated 22nd July last, might with the exception of rule 2 which seems unsuitable, be used.

41. On the analogy of the above proposal, and following out the lines on which it is based, the Committee would suggest that a similar plan be followed in respect of new buildings, in the Revenue and Police Departments at least. That is, the head of the department should allot from his total grant (which has been recently settled, it is understood, tentatively for the next four years) the sum to be expended in each district on original works; this amount should be placed at the credit of the District Officer, who should be left to carry out the work through the District Engineer or otherwise, subject to the inspection of Public Works Officers: all accounts relating to these works being kept in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph. Such a procedure would result, the Committee confidently believe, in cheaper, better, and quicker work than can possibly be looked for under the present system, which, after having had a fair trial for a period of over ten years in the hands

of an able and intelligent body of Public Works officers, has been found by experience to be cumbrous and dilatory to a degree. It is not necessary, the Committee think, to suggest any limit of cost for such buildings as those in question. Professional approval is essential for all projects costing over Rs. 1,000: there are standard plans for the various classes of buildings; and the supervision of the Executive and Superintending Engineers should be adequate for all practical purposes.

42. Finally, the Committee desire to place on record their strong recommendation that in the event of any dispute between the Public Works Department and its officers on the one hand and the local civil authorities on the other, the latter be empowered to request the Commissioner to submit the matter for the consideration and orders of the Government in the General Department. The occasions for the exercise of this power should be rare; and the Committee would not have mooted the question were it not that in more than one instance such a conflict has resulted in unpleasant friction, which could best be obviated by the procedure recommended. The Committee understand that the Government regards the District Officer as its representative *par excellence* in every department—the centre of authority, responsible generally for the welfare of the district; and they view with apprehension any state of affairs in which his authority can be impaired or his position affected by the action of departmental officers of any class.

Part IV.—Finance.

43. In paragraph 3 I have recorded the essential general principle underlying, in the opinion of the Committee, any scheme of local finance that can be expected to work satisfactorily: the following remarks deal with such matters of detail as are referred to in Part IV., paragraph 2 of the Resolution of 8th August. And first, as to the local rates (clause *a.*) which are the backbone of the district finances. These rates are collected at the same time and by the same agency as the land revenue: expeditiously, easily, and without friction. Any interference with this system would be, in the Committee's opinion, a mistake. The rates are a percentage on the land revenue, a fixed sum; and no amount of management on the part of a district board can, under existing circumstances, improve the income from this source. There is therefore no object in arranging for collection otherwise than through Government agency.

44. As regards the other heads of revenue mentioned in clause *b.*— ferries, pounds, and license-tax—the Committee consider that these are all suitable sources of revenue for transfer to local boards, assuming such transfer to be necessary. It is true that in the case of ferries, the transfer to districts of income derivable from ferries within their limits or on their boundary would be a somewhat unequal measure, as the accident of locality would determine to a considerable extent the amount to be enjoyed. But this difficulty could be surmounted, the Committee think, either by an arrangement such as that formerly in force—the districts being divided into "unions" for the division of ferry profits, or otherwise as the Government may direct. In regard to the license-tax, an objection was taken by two of the native members, on the ground that where (as at Cawnpore) there is a municipal license-tax already in force, the handing over to the district board of the Imperial license-tax would be apt to be misunderstood by the people. It was pointed out that as the assessment and collection of the latter are in the hands of the District Officer, the mere transfer of the proceeds could not have any such effect as that anticipated; but apparently the idea at the root of the objection was that any connexion which the district board might have with the management of the license-tax was to be deprecated, as investing the board at the outset with an unpopularity which might prove detrimental both to its usefulness in other respects and to its influence among the people.

45. Besides the three items noted above, the Committee are of opinion that there are others which might appropriately and conveniently be handed over. In the discussion that ensued, several heads of income were considered.

(*a.*) As regards funds collected under Act XX. of 1856, it was held that money thus raised in small townships should be expended locally, and that this can best be arranged under the system at present in force, the District Officer supervising and presiding, and the funds being kept quite distinct from those of the district board. These funds are raised primarily to meet the cost of watch and ward, the object being to make the town's-people pay their share, and thus *pro tanto* to relieve local rates. These towns are practically municipalities in embryo; but the Committee would be glad to see the panchayets

consulted more freely as to expenditure of funds, and associated gradually in the duty of supervision and management.

(*b.*) Such items, as arboricultural receipts, fruit, loppings of trees, dead timber, &c., grass on all roads intersecting the district, income from Government encamping grounds and paráos, licenses for stage carriages and fines in connexion therewith, seem suitable for transfer to district boards.

(*c.*) As regards nazúl, the Committee understand that as a rule the usufruct of such nazúl as is intra-municipal is enjoyed by municipalities; and they see no reason why a similar course should not be followed in districts. Fairs, which are of frequent occurrence in these provinces, are classified for account purposes under Nazúl; but the consensus of opinion was adverse to transferring income raised at fairs to local boards. Where, as is sometimes the case, a deficit has on occasions to be made good by the Government, it is right that the Government should recoup itself; but in ordinary cases the income raised should be proportioned to the estimated expenditure. Local Boards would otherwise be apt to regard fairs as a legitimate and easy source of income, and the result might be an impolitic addition to taxation in this form. The argument that with a view to discouraging the assembly of immense crowds at great melás, pilgrims should be taxed beyond the necessities of the case, seems to the Committee to be unsound: the fact being that the sanitary and conservancy arrangements now enforced at all such gatherings are so strict that already resort is extensively had to sacred spots at times other than those of the great occasions.

(*d.*) Of other items discussed, school fees and dispensary receipts (which are suitable and appropriate) are under standing orders made over to district boards.

(*e.*) The proposal that all or part of the abkari income should be so transferred was negatived by a large majority. The suggestion to credit to local boards fines inflicted for nuisances in the district (*i.e.* extra-municipal) was likewise thrown out, on the ground that these did not form a suitable head for transfer, and that Honorary Magistrates in outlying tracts might be tempted, in the interests of local finance, to exceed the limits within which such fines should be kept.

46. The heads suitable for transfer, then, in the opinion of the Committee, are the following:—ferries, pounds, license-tax, aboricultural receipts, grass on roads, income from encamping grounds and paráos, licenses and fines for stage carriages, nazúl (excluding fairs), school fees, and dispensary subscriptions. The Committee are of opinion that all the heads enumerated above are appropriate and suitable for transfer to local credit; but that, under existing circumstances, no others can at present be recommended.

47. The functions of boards in connexion with transferred sources of income (clause *c.*) were next considered: the question at issue being understood to be whether management should rest with the district board, or with the officers of Government as at present. The advocates of the latter course argued that there was no reason for disturbing existing arrangements, and that to do so would be to imperil the revenue without any corresponding advantage. Ferries and pounds, stage-carriages and encamping grounds, could not (they held) be managed so satisfactorily by a large body like the district board as by the District Officer; to say nothing of the fact that the law, as it now stands, leaves such matters almost entirely in the Magistrate's hands. If the local rates are inadequate, the Government may prefer rather to make over the income from these sources than to subsidise the local rates by direct allotment; but this is a question more of local finance than of local control, and it does not necessarily follow that management should be transferred because the proceeds are tranferred—or *vice versâ*. There are certain matters which a body like a district board cannot possibly manage so well as the District Officer—cannot indeed manage properly at all: among these are ferries, pounds, stage carriages, &c.; and it is better to admit this openly once for all, than to beat about the bush and temporise. Those who supported the former alternative, again held that finance and control should be as far as possible conterminous and concurrent; that boards may reasonably be expected to show some interest in such matters; and that there is no reason why they should not be considered competent to manage the ferries and pounds of the district satisfactorily. Eventually a compromise was arrived at, and the following proposition was unanimously carried:—That the functions of boards in respect of ferries, pounds,

and other transferred heads (except license-tax which is separately treated) allocation primarily administrative, and not necessarily executive; such matters as the should be of ferries and pounds and the assignment of funds for maintenance resting with the board, while the management might be made over to the District Officer, or to such subordinate as he might appoint.

48. In connexion with the assessment and collection of the license-tax, clause *d.* of Part IV., it was unanimously agreed that the present system of collection should be maintained, the duty resting with the executive staff of the district under the Magistrate and Collector. On the subject of assessment, however, opinions were divided. The question put was—Should the assessment of the tax be made over to district boards, or be left as at present with District Officers? The former alternative was warmly supported by certain of the members; but it was eventually negatived, and the latter carried by a majority of nine to seven. The four native members voted on this occasion with the majority, who held that not only was this source of income not sufficiently local (being frequently derived from trade or manufacture carried on elsewhere) but that the district boards are not yet in a position to deal satisfactorily with this subject. Admitting that the political education of the people is the chief aim of the measure, surely that education must be the growth of time; and just as the intellectual education commences with small beginnings, so must the political, if it is to be sound and true. To throw all at once on district boards, which are as yet untrained for the duties devolving on them, the delicate and difficult task of assessing to the license-tax, would be as great a mistake as to expect the child to read before he has mastered the alphabet. Moreover, it would obviously be inexpedient in the earlier stages of the movement to expose these boards, which are meant to be representative bodies, to the odium of assessing the people to the one tax which is, perhaps, of all that are borne on the Statute Book, the most unpopular. Such a course would be apt to discredit the movement at the very outset and seriously to endanger its success, besides being entirely opposed to native opinion on the subject. The result would probably be—firstly, an inequality of assessment all over the provinces, which would be a pregnant source of discontent; and, secondly, a reduction of the assessments, which would react unfavourably both on the Imperial and the Provincial shares of the tax.

49. The view taken by the minority on the other hand is stated in the following memorandum:—

The opinion of the majority of the Committee is to the effect that the duty of assessing the license-tax should not be made over to district boards. The arguments oftenest heard against the other view of the subject are as follows:—

It is feared that the task of assessment will place too severe a strain on the integrity of the assessors, that they will use their power as an opportunity for gratifying their personal feelings, and will not be able to resist the temptation to under-assess their friends and to over-assess their enemies. It is thought that the persons whose income is to be estimated will have no confidence in the rectitude of the assessors, and that this want of confidence will lead to constant objections and general dissatisfaction. A third argument, and the chief one, is that the district boards are unwilling to incur, and unable to bear, the odium inseparably attached to the office of assessor of taxes.

Allowing full weight to these arguments, the reasons which call for this transfer of functions seem far to outweigh the objections against it. The policy of local self-government has been adopted by the Government mainly because it can be made an instrument of popular and political education. It is important that the people should understand that taxes must be raised, and that the payment of taxes cannot possibly be made pleasant. They will best understand this when assessment is in the hands of other than Government officials.

If local boards are to be self-respecting bodies, and to enjoy the respect of their fellow-citizens, substantial powers and responsibilities must be conferred on them. It is important that the best men in each district should sit on the boards; and the best men will not serve if their duties are limited to supervising the expenditure of grants for education, medical charity, and repairs to unmetalled roads. As remarked by the Commissioner of Allahabad, this work, when analysed, really resolves itself into something very small. Medical charity exists in only a few tahsíls; the great bulk of the educational grant consists of fixed charges for establishments; repairing unmetalled roads cannot be made interesting work, and the allotments on this head have been cut down to a very low figure. If, therefore, the principle of

self-government is to have a fair trial, if it is to be a reality and not a sham, the boards must feel themselves, and be seen by others to be, possessed of substantial authority.

For the present, at any rate, the boards cannot be given any power in the assessment and collection of local rates proper. These are, and for the present must remain a fixed percentage on the land revenue, and it is convenient that they should be collected with the land revenue by the district staff. It is only in the matter of the license-tax that substantial power can be given to the district boards, and there is no doubt that the boards can assess the tax more fairly than the District Officer. They possess a knowledge of the profits of trades to which a District Officer can never hope to attain. The income of individual traders also can be much better ascertained by a district board than by the Collector. When the annual list of objections has been disposed of, no Collector would probably be found to maintain that his estimates of income, with whatever care they may have been formed, were other than conjectures.

The question then is whether the district boards will have the courage and the will to deal fairly between man and man in the matter of assessment. There seems to be no reason at present to answer this question in the negative. In cities like Cawnpore, and in Act XX. towns, the municipal assessments are now practically in the hands of local boards, and the work is faily done. If then the principle of self-government be accepted, the experiment of making over license-tax assessments throughout the provinces to local boards should be tried. The alleged unwillingness of the boards to accept responsibility, owing to the odium attached to the exercise of power, touches the root of the whole question. If the boards will not stand forth as independent, if they insist upon sheltering themselves behind the authority of the Collector, the grant of self-government becomes unmeaning, and the policy practically stands condemned. The boards will remain what they are at present,—bodies whose duty it is to tender advice on local affairs to the District Officer, while themselves free of all responsibility.

The district boards should assess only the income derived from trading within their local limits. Though in the case of firms who trade in more than one district the assessment is paid at the place where the head office is situated, there is no insuperable difficulty (since the profits of each district are separately ascertained) in distributing a fair portion of the assessment to each local area. In short, the work of assessment is purely local work; and even if in the richer districts it be found impossible to make over any portion of the proceeds of the tax to be spent locally, the assessment should still be made by the boards. It might be expedient to declare certain works now classed as provincial to be local (for example police stations and revenue buildings), though they would be under the management of the District Officer, and not under that of the district committee; their cost would then be charged against local income, including whatever share of the license-tax might be transferred. In such cases the boards would feel the necessity of providing funds, and this feeling would act as a check upon unduly low assessments. The license-tax has now been worked for several years, and the boards would have the advantage of the experience already gained. After the first year the variations would probably be but slight.

50. There was no detailed discussion as to the measures to be adopted in case the assessment of the tax should be made over to district boards, and it is therefore unnecessary to do more than mention the point in this place. If the assessment is to be transferred, either the tahsíl boards should prepare the lists, and the district board should hear objections; or, if it be thought desirable to distribute the odium of direct taxation over a larger body than a tahsíl board, the assessments might be made at a special meeting of the district board, and objections heard at another special meeting. There are also advocates for the principle that the district committee should assess a lump sum to be paid by each local area, and that the tahsíl board should then distribute this sum over individuals. But until it is decided whether the assessment is or is not to be made over, any discussion of these minor points is unnecessary.

51. Regarding the share of cost of provincial and central establishment debitable to local income—such as the postal arrangements, lunatic asylums, normal schools, educational inspection, registration of traffic, and pay of the subordinate medical establishment—the Committee held that this is a question for the Government to determine. It is very important that such matters should as far as possible be kept

up to an uniform level all over the Provinces, and not allowed to rise or fall according to the circumstances of the several districts. The Government is in the best position to decide what is really needed, and to arrange accordingly by rateable debit to local income.

52. The works and institutions debitable to local income (clause *f.* of Part IV.) were next considered. The law, as it stands at present, practically leaves this an open question; the intention apparently being that the Local Government shall determine all details of such debit. In Nos. III. to VI. of the general series of Resolutions lately issued, full details of all such institutions and works are given; and the Committee see no reason to take objection to any of these details. The classification therein laid down seems to the Committee to have been carefully and accurately drawn out, with due advertence to provincial and local interests; and they desire to place on record their opinion that it is as fair a one as can be devised in the circumstances.

Part V.—Miscellaneous.

53. Under the first series of inquiries in Part V., relating both to district and municipal boards, the following conclusions were arrived at:—

A knowledge of English on the part both of chairman and secretary, though in many respects very desirable, is not necessary to the conduct of business, and should not be regarded as compulsory. It is probable that boards will, whenever possible, elect a secretary who knows English, and probably a chairman also; but there is no good ground for making the condition absolute, and to do so would be to throw difficulties in the way unnecessarily.

As regards the language in which the proceedings of boards should be recorded, the Committee consider that this will depend on circumstances, and that no hard-and-fast rule is either expedient or possible. It seems clear that the proceedings of a board should primarily be recorded in the language of the majority of the members as a whole (not of those present at any special meeting, such a course would be certain to result in confusion): the term "language" being understood to mean any language sufficiently well-known to them to be thoroughly intelligible, and which may be considered to be the most convenient and appropriate. When recorded in the vernacular, minutes of meetings should, whenever possible, be translated into English for official reference; when recorded in English, they should invariably be translated into the vernacular for the information of such members as may be unacquainted with English. The Committee would recommend that the proceedings of boards be published regularly in abstract form in the vernacular, through the medium of the native press or otherwise, for general information.

54. In connexion with the subject of translations, I have to record the general opinion of the Committee that authorised translations of all important Government orders, affecting district or municipal boards, should be forwarded to boards if not along with the English version, at least as soon afterwards as can conveniently be arranged. The District Officer has not the leisure requisite for such work, and he has no translator on his staff. The result is that there is frequently no authorised translation for reference; and the varying versions are a fertile source of confusion and trouble. It is probable that if this recommendation be acted on, the translating staff in the Secretariat will have to be strengthened; but the advantages of the procedure above suggested will far outweigh, the Committee feel sure, any objections that may be taken to it on the ground of increased expense. Moreover, boards would doubtless be willing to contribute rateably, up to a moderate amount, towards any such extra cost.

55. The Committee agreed unanimously in holding that district boards should be permitted to frame their own rules of business, subject always to the approval of the Government. It is perhaps desirable that some degree of uniformity should be observed throughout the provinces; but the Committee do not think that boards should be bound down to any one form, or prohibited from suggesting and adopting alterations to suit local requirements. Tahsíli boards might also be allowed to frame their rules, subject in this case to the sanction of the central board, which would usually arrange for as much uniformity in these subsidiary rules as the circumstances admit of.

56. The question of establishment required to carry on the work of boards was next considered. This was understood to refer to the machinery for carrying on the board's internal business now represented by the local public works establishment and the local funds establishment: and here the view taken was that boards should be left to decide the matter for themselves; settling the strength to be entertained and the cost

thereof, subject to budget check by the Commissioner, as in the case of municipalities. The percentage of cost of establishment should be shown in each budget: in this way the Commissioner would be in a position to compare the figures of one district with those of others in his division, while the Government would be able to do so in regard to divisions, thereby checking any tendency to undue extravagance in this respect. To fix a limit would be apt to induce boards, so experience teaches, to work up to that limit without proper advertence to the necessities of the case. All that is needed is that the budget shall be submitted to and sanctioned by the Commissioner in every case. In connexion with this subject the Committee desire to record their approval of the proposal, which it is understood has been sanctioned in at least one district, to amalgamate the two branches of the establishment, local public works and local funds, holding that such a plan would be both more useful and more economical than the dual system at present in force.

57. The proposal to invest members of boards with honorary titles during membership was considered by all the members of the Committee to be inexpedient, the native members in particular asserting that such a course would tend to destroy the prestige that at present attaches to these titles and to reduce them greatly in the estimation of all classes. A sanad, signed by the Secretary to Government would, the Committee think, sufficiently mark the importance and dignity of the office. It was also agreed that no travelling allowance should be granted to members of boards when attending meetings.

58. The second portion of Part V. deals with the question of the control to be exercised by the Government over district and municipal boards, and opens up a wide subject of great interest and importance. In connexion with this the Committee proceeded, before touching on the general subject, to discuss the question raised by the Magistrate and Collector of Bulandshahr, in his letter to the Commissioner of Meerut (printed in the correspondence laid before the Committee), No. 101, dated the 31st July last, as to the doubtful necessity and practical inutility of the numerous orders received by him as president of the board from the Public Works Secretariat and Examiner. It is unnecessary to summarise the view taken by Mr. Growse, as his letter is available; but the Committee desire to record their unanimous and emphatic concurrence in that view, and to express their conviction that it is a view shared by District Officers all over the Provinces. The voluminous file of Public Works papers in connexion with the subject of local self-government is enough of itself, the Committee think, to condemn that system; but they would refer more particularly to such documents as C. 812E. of 24th July, and C. 2661B.R. of 4th August last, as exemplifying the general objection, and as illustrating that tendency towards over-control and centralisation on the part of the Public Works Department which seems to the Committee to be directly opposed to the essential principles of the system. The Committee are of opinion that with the view of securing uniformity of control and guidance by Government in regard to district boards, all orders issued by the Government to these boards, with whatever subject or department they may deal, should issue from the General Secretariat.

59. The Committee further recommend that the sole channel of communication between the Government on the one hand and local boards on the other shall be through the Commissioner of the Division and the District Officer. This is practically the plan now in operation, but it ought, they consider, to be formally recognised and invariably acted on.

60. As regards the degree of direct and indirect control to be exercised by the Government itself over district and municipal boards, and the manner in which such control should be exercised, the Committee were unanimous in holding that the principles laid down in paragraph 17 of the Government of India's Resolution of 18th May last should be accepted as they stand, and be made the basis of any legislation that may be deemed necessary on this subject. Paragraph 17 should in fact be accepted *en bloc;* it is at once exhaustive and moderate, and any further details are superfluous and unnecessary. The paragraph referred to contemplates the exercise by the Government of the power of general supervision, of suspension, and of overt interference, according to circumstances. Nothing more the Committee consider, is necessary, except to formulate the principles thus laid down, with a proviso to the effect that the Government is at liberty to delegate all or any part of its authority to the Commissioner or to the District Officer, through whom its control over the boards would ordinarily be exercised.

61. The above remarks exhaust the points referred to and discussed by the Committee. Under clause (*b.*), paragraph 2 of the Resolution of 8th August, the Committee were requested to indicate the result of their views as necessitating modification of previous orders and of existing enactments; but as the time was short and the subject-matter wide, this portion of their task was unavoidably left undone, the Committee considering that it could be more easily and quickly done in the Secretariat than amid the distractions of an open meeting. They feel confident that the views expressed and the recommendations made by them, all of them in good faith and for the public good, will be fully considered by the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner; and they venture to hope that, in the great majority of cases, His Honour will see his way to accept and act upon them.

I have, &c.

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH.

Home Department.
Public, No. 2017.

Sir, Fort William, December 21, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 372, of the 15th December, submitting a copy of a Resolution, No. 358, of the 5th idem, by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner on local self-government in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, together with copies of other papers bearing on that subject.

2. In reply, I am to convey the thanks of the Government of India to Sir Alfred Lyall for the manner in which he has sought to give effect to the wishes and policy of the Government of India so far as the circumstances of the Provinces under his charge would appear to admit. The Governor General in Council is particularly glad to observe that the Lieutenant Governor has found it possible to introduce a large measure of local self-government throughout the municipal towns of those Provincss, and His Excellency in Council is sanguine that, under the able and judicious guidance of Sir Alfred Lyall, there will soon be realized not only in these towns but also in the interior of the more advanced districts, a steady and real progress in the work of training the people to the intelligent management of their own local affairs.

3. From paragraph 6 of the Resolution it appears that the District Boards will, for the present, consist of an incorporation of all the subordinate Tehsili Boards within the district area, all the members of the Tehsili Boards being ex-officio members of the District Board. This arrangement will probably work fairly well in cases where the Tehsili Boards are not numerous and where the district area is moderate and communication easy; but it may possibly be found difficult, where the opposite conditions obtain, to secure a full and regular attendance of members at the meetings of the District Board. The Local Government may in such cases deem it desirable either to constitute more than one Central Board in the district, or to provide for the election of a limited number of delegates from each Tehsili Board as members of the Central Board, and provision for enabling this to be done may perhaps usefully be embodied in the legislation which will now have to be undertaken. The point is one which the Governor General in Council commends to the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor.

4. The Government of India will be glad to receive at an early date a rough draft of the amendments in the law which the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner considers to be necessary in order to give effect to the schemes now under acknowledgment.

I have, &c.

EXTENSION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN ASSAM.

From C. J. LYALL, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, General Department, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Department of Finance and Commerce.

(No. 2289.)

Sir, Shillong, June 2, 1882.

In continuation of my letter No. 2239, dated the 29th ultimo, I am directed to forward 25 copies of the Chief's Commissioner's Resolution No. 1912, dated the 10th May, regarding the powers and responsibilities of District and Local Committees, and to express Mr. Elliott's regret that copies were not submitted at an early date for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council.

Resolution of THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM, No. 1912, dated Shillong, the 10th May 1882.

The Chief Commissioner desires to explain the steps which have been taken, with the sanction and under the authority of the Government of India, towards increasing the powers entrusted to the Local or District Committees in the eight plains districts of Assam, in which alone such Committees have been appointed and providing them with funds to meet their enlarged responsibilities.

2. Under the Assam Local Rates Regulation (1879) the following charges were made over to District Committees :—

District Post;

Primary Education;

Repairs of district roads (*i.e.*, such roads as were not classed as Provincial) and general improvements;

and to meet their expenditure under these heads the following sources of revenue were allotted to them :—

Five-eighths of the local rate, together with such collections under old rates and cesses as continued to be made while the local rate was being gradually introduced.

Ferries (excluding some classed as Provincial).

Rents and other miscellaneous receipts, which had always been treated as Local, and, later on, the surplus receipts from pounds.

3. It has now been decided to make over to District Committees the following additional heads of receipt and expenditure :—

Education Department; grants-in-aid to all except high schools.

Medical Department; grants to certain dispensaries.

Minor Departments, Fairs.

Miscellaneous Department; rewards for destruction of wild animals, the cost of establishments for collecting the local rates, for keeping District fund accounts and correspondence, for circuit-houses and staging-bungalows, grants to municipalities and stations, and minor contingencies. Also some rents hitherto reckoned as Provincial assets.

Public Works, including almost the whole of the works hitherto classed as Provincial, and the receipts from Provincial ferries.

The statement printed as Appendix No. 1 to this Resolution shows at a glance the financial position of each district under the arrangements which have now been made for the current year. The following remarks are intended to elucidate and explain the statement :—

4. *Education.*—The District Committees already have the sole management of all matters connected with primary education, *i.e.*, primary schools, stipends of persons under training as teachers in normal schools, scholarships to pupils in primary schools, rewards to teachers, and examination charges. Till now, they have exercised no supervision over secondary education. The Chief Commissioner has resolved to keep for the present the Government high and middle schools under Provincial management, since these institutions require a homogeneity and uniformity of treatment

which they might not receive if managed on independent systems in each district, and since a more efficient class of teachers can be procured for permanent service under the Educational Department than if the teachers could be dismissed and had to be recruited by the District Committees. It may be hoped, however, that the time is not distant when District Committees will show so lively an interest in the spread of education, and when the system of teaching and the course of study have been so far fixed by general consent, that it may be possible to enlarge the power of the Committees over the middle and high or zila schools. For the present, however, the Chief Commissioner thinks it will be enough to make over to local management the aided middle and lower schools. The amount of these grants-in-aid for 1882–83 has been fixed at Rs. 25,770, and this sum will be transferred to the different districts according to the following details :—

	Number of schools.	Rs.
Lakhimpur - - - - -	7	1,674
Sibságar - - - - -	5	1,986
Nowgong - - - - -	11	1,926
Darrang - - - - -	10	1,998
Kámrúp - - - - -	19	3,240
Guálpára - - - - -	21	4,344
Sylhet - - - - -	41	8,916
Cachar - - - - -	10	1,686

Besides these aided schools, the police (primary) schools recently established at each district head-quarters, and the lower normal schools experimentally started in Goálpára, have also been made over with their allotments to the District Committees for management.

5. The Committees in these districts will be placed in the position hitherto occupied by the Provincial Government in regard to these grants. They will be bound to continue the existing grants to the schools which now receive them, so long as those schools fulfil the conditions laid down by the Government of India. They will see that the monthly accounts prescribed by the department are submitted. When applications are made for new grants, they will consider them on their merits, and if they decide to grant them they will provide the funds either from lapses in the sums now transferred, or from any savings they can effect in other departments. The accounts of the grant-in-aid schools will be drawn up as hitherto, and submitted through the Deputy Inspector to the District Committee, instead of to the Inspector of Schools. A brief excerpt from the grant-in-aid rules, so far as they concern the District Committees, has been prepared by Mr. Wilson, and is attached as Appendix II. to this Resolution.

6. There are also special grants made to mission schools in Darrang and Nowgong, amounting to Rs. 1,500 in each case, which have not been made over to the District Committees, as there has not been time to ascertain whether they would be willing to take charge of the disbursement of these sums and of the supervision of these schools, and whether the missionary bodies would like to have the schools made over in this way. The Inspector of Schools will consult both parties, and if the change is desired, it can be made next year.

7. It has been proposed to make a change in the status of the Deputy Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Schools, corresponding to the change which is being made by the Government of Bengal. At present, both these officials are Provincial. The proposal is that the Deputy-Inspector should continue a Provincial officer and member and adviser of the District Committee, with special duties as Inspector of the Government schools, while the Sub-Inspector should become a local officer, with special charge of all local (*i.e.*, primary and aided) schools in the district or subdivision to which he is attached. If this change is desired by the District Committees, it can be carried out next year, and they are requested to give their opinion regarding it before, or when submitting their budgets for 1883–84. An increase will be required in the number of Sub-Inspectors if one such officer is provide for each sadr and outlying subdivision.

8. The question has been considered by the Chief Commissioner whether the receipts from fees and subscriptions on which the grants-in-aid are based ought not to be paid into the treasury, and pass through the treasury accounts, instead of being

retained, as now by the head-masters and expended in the payment of school charges. Looking, however, to the number and minuteness of these accounts, and the trouble the suggested change would give, the Chief Commissioner has not thought it necessary to adopt it. The departmental report will continue to show these receipts as accounted for by the head masters or managers, but the treasury will only be concerned with the payment of the monthly grants on bills countersigned by the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Committee, instead of, as now, by the Inspector of Schools.

9. *Medical.*—The expenditure on dispensaries is of two classes:—The Provincial Government defrays the cost of Hospital Assistants and of European medicines; while the Dispensary Committee meets from subscriptions and contributions and interest on their investments the charges for the dispensary establishment under the Hospital Assistant, the diet of patients, the cost of bázár medicines, and other miscellaneous matters. These local receipts and charges have not hitherto passed through the treasury accounts, and, for the reasons adduced in the case of educational grants-in-aid the Chief Commissioner does not think it necessary that they should be so passed, on the understanding that a Sub-Committee of the District Committee is appointed (the Civil Surgeon being the principal member), which shall be responsible for the safety of balances and the proper keeping of accounts, which will be shown in the annual reports submitted to the Deputy Surgeon-General.

10. As to the Provincial expenditure on dispensaries, it has not been thought that any good would be gained by localising it. No fixed grant could be given for the pay of Hospital Assistants, who must continue to be promoted under the departmental rules and transferred by the Deputy Surgeon-General at his discretion; while the expenditure on European medicines depends entirely on the indents drawn up by an expert, the Civil Surgeon, and could not be criticised with advantage by the District Committees. But the permanent grants made under former orders to certain dispensaries either to meet their abnormal expenditure on patients' diet or to raise the Hospital Assistant's salary in proportion to the greater labour and responsibility involved, will be localised. The sums noted in the margin will be incorporated with the Provincial grants to the dispensaries concerned, and the District Committees will be responsible for making the payments, on account of which grants are given. Nothing, however, need be shown in the treasury accounts except the disbursement of the sums specified on the authority of the Civil Surgeon.

	Rs.
Cachar	120
Sylhet	120
Kamrúp	264
Darrang	120
Lakhimpur	120

11. Under the head of "Minor Departments" come certain semi-political fairs, at which the hill tribes come to trade. The sums which have hitherto been granted for expenditure on these occasions will be made over to the District Committees, as shown in the margin, and the expenditure will continue as before.

District.	Rs.
Lakhimpur	1,000
Darrang	300
Kamrup	100

12. The miscellaneous items shown under head XXIV. on the receipt side, and XXX. on the expenditure side, in Appendix I., are mostly of a petty nature. The expenditure on establishments can best be supervised by local bodies, as, if any economy can be effected, they will be the gainers thereby. The grants to aid the funds of certain municipalities and towns may also be localised with advantage, the District Committee accepting with them the responsibility of carrying out the objects (sanitation and permanent improvements) for which the grants are made. The rewards for the destruction of wild beasts must be given at the rates and according to the rules laid down.

13. In all the cases mentioned in paragraphs 4 to 12, the grants made to Local Funds correspond closely to the average of past years, and had been fixed for the present year, 1882–83, before the intention of localising the items had been formed. They have not been in any way cut down in the prospect of localisation; and the Chief Commissioner therefore feels that he can call on the District Committees to accept them cheerfully as a fixed contract for five years. On the one hand, it may be expected that local knowledge and self-interest will enable the Committees to work somewhat more economically than the Provincial Government has done. On the other, they will experience year by year the steady pressure which the desire for improved administration creates; and they will only be able to yield to this pressure if they can increase their incomes or decrease their expenditure. At the end of five years the Chief Commissioner will review the Provincial and Local

revenues and accounts, and, if the finances admit of it, that is, if the Provincial revenue continues to expand in the way it has hitherto done, he has little doubt that he will be able to increase his contributions to Local Funds.

14. *Public Works.*—It is under this head that the largest measure of decentralisation has been carried out. The whole of what has hitherto been treated as Provincial expenditure in the eight plains districts, excepting only the allotments for the tramway in the Sibságar district and the workshops at Gauháti and Dibrugarh, has been transferred to Local, and is now put under the control of the District Committees. The effect of this transfer is that, while in the Provincial budget of 1881–82, Rs. 14,10,000 were allotted to Provincial and Rs. 3,37,000 to Local public works, the allotments in the budget of 1882–83 are Provincial Rs. 5,89,525 and Local Rs. 10,67,803. In the eight districts to which this Resolution refers, the expenditure on Provincial works will be about Rs. 46,000, on Local works Rs. 10,67,803. The details of all expenditure of this class, district by district, are clearly shown in the statement printed as Appendix III. to this Resolution.

The chief sub-heads under which the expenditure on public works falls are establishment, repairs, and original works. It is necessary to give further explanation as to the manner in which each of these sub-heads has been treated.

15. *Establishment.*—The system hitherto followed has been that in each district the District Committee has entertained such moderate establishments as they thought necessary, consisting generally of a Road Engineer or Overseer and one or more clerks, while for the purposes of the Public Works Department, the eight districts were dealt with as four divisions, each with an Executive Engineer, a certain number of Assistant Engineers and subordinates, and a strong office establishment for accounts and reports. Under the new arrangements, each district has its District Engineer, who is an assistant of the Deputy Commissioner and a member of the District Committee: wherever the work to be done in a subdivision is sufficiently important, an Assistant Engineer has been appointed to it; the subordinate staff (consisting of Sub-Engineers, Supervisors, Overseers, and Sub-Overseers) has been distributed according to local requirements; and the offices of the four divisions have been broken up and distributed over the eight districts. The distribution is necessarily tentative at first, and is liable to revision, according to the arrangements which the District Committees find themselves able to make for carrying on the requisite office work. For the present it has been assumed that the staff sufficient for the needs of each district will be—

1 Head Clerk and Accountant,	1 Clerk and Storekeeper,
1 Second Clerk,	1 Draftsman,

in addition to the existing District Committee's clerks. Wherever an Assistant Engineer is in charge of a separate subdivision, a clerk has been provided for his work; and the menial establishment has been apportioned to the number of the superior officers. It is probable, however, that when the system of accounts, to which reference will be made later on, is in full working order, considerable reductions will be found practicable in the establishment as now apportioned; and the special attention of District Committees is invited to this subject, inasmuch as any saving they can effect in this department will (subject to one or two minor conditions) leave additional funds in their hands for carrying out material improvements.

16. The cost of the staff, as now fixed for the year 1882–83, is shown in column 16 of Appendix III., and the further nominal details will be separately communicated to each district, and will be shown in the Public Works Budget which is now in the Press. With regard to the officials who are transferred from Provincial to Local Funds, it must be understood that they lose none of their rights as members of the Public Works Department. Their promotion, furlough, and pension will still be regulated by the provisions of the Public Works Department Code, and they will be liable to transfer under the directions of the Superintending Engineer; though such transfer will not be made, unless it is absolutely necessary, against the wishes of the District Committee. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, cannot as yet fix absolutely (though he hopes when the system has settled down he may be able to do so) the ratio of the cost of establishment to the total grant, or the absolute grant on account of establishment to each district; but for the present, if an officer's pay is increased by departmental promotion, or if it is necessary to transfer a more expensive officer to take the place of a cheaper one, an increase to the district grant will be made, and the Local Funds will not suffer. But so long as this tentative state of things exists, the Chief

Commissioner cannot absolutely promise that any reduction the Committee may make in their establisment shall certainly go to swell their allotments for original works; though he will make every endeavour that this should be the case.

17. The only way in which this end can be certainly secured is that the local public works shall be entirely carried out by officials locally entertained, and not borne on the list of the Public Works Department of India. The Chief Commissioner sees no reason why this state of things should not in time be reached; the training colleges of Rurki and Sibpur annually turn out young men who, with a little experience, will be qualified to become Assistant Engineers and District Engineers, and clerks can easily be trained to do the accounting and correspondence work of the offices at a cheaper rate than it is now done. When, therefore, a District Committee desires to substitute a locally appointed official for any of those transferred from the Public Works Department, they must report their wish to the Superintending Engineer, who will at once take steps to arrange for the transfer of the departmental official. But till such arrangements can be made, the Committee will understand that the substitution cannot be carried out. The Chief Commissioner has retained no spare funds in his hands out of which he could meet the pay of any departmental officer whom a District Committee wishes to get rid of; all that he can do is to find a place for him, either in one of the non-localised districts, or in another Province.

18. *Repairs.*—Under this sub-head come repairs of civil buildings and of communications. The custom of the Public Works Department is to estimate for repairs of civil buildings in three ways—annual, quadrennial, and casual repairs. The estimate for the year has been made out by adding together the annual, a quarter on the quadrennial, and half the casual repair estimates. As, however, the Chief Commissioner has found reason to believe that the expenditure by the department on this class of repairs has always been liberal, and sometimes excessive, and that local officers can carry them out at cheaper rates, he has reduced the total obtained as above by about 10 per cent. in making the district allotments. The repairs to roads are mostly calculated at so many rupees per mile of road, and these estimates have seldom been interfered with. The details of the calculations, by which the total sums allotted for repairs have been arrived at, will be separately communicated to each District Committee. The sums thus fixed are made over to the Committees with the responsibility of keeping up the roads and buildings in the condition in which they take them over, and the Chief Commissioner hopes that it may be found possible to retain these allotments unaltered from year to year. He will, however, be ready to listen to any representations made by the Committees on this subject during the present and the next year. After the experience of two years has been gained, the allotment for repairs may probably be fixed for at least a term of five years. The Committees will then have that sum to deal with at their pleasure, and if they make any saving out of the repair estimates, they will have so much more to spend on original works. But it will be the duty of the Superintending Engineer to enforce the responsibility they incur of keeping up the roads and buildings in good condition, and not letting them fall into disrepair by starving the expenditure; and if in the course of his inspection he finds any evidence that this is being done, he will report it to the District Committee, and give instructions to the District Engineer as to the measures he ought to take. If these instructions are overlooked, and provision not made for the necessary expenditure, it will be the Superintending Engineer's business to bring the matter to the notice of the Chief Commissioner.

19. *Original Works.*—The plan adopted under this sub-head has been to take all works carried on in the eight plains districts which would under the old system have appeared in the Provincial part of the budget, and transfer them bodily to the Local part, together with their alloted expenditure, keeping only the two workshops and the tramway Provincial. The effect of this, as shown in Appendix IV., has been to transfer to the control of local bodies works on which nearly four lakhs of rupees are to be expended this year. The arrangement was the only one which was practicable on this occasion, as there was not time to carry out to the full the principle of localisation. But in two ways it falls short of the method which the Chief Commissioner desires to follow. In the first place it was not possible to consult the District Committees as to these works and allotments. Their budgets had been framed and sent up for the old class of local works, and the Provincial Budget for these newly-localised works had also been for the most part framed before the present extension of localisation was decided on. In the second place it has been impossible to make a permanent allotment

based on average need and average expenditure. It was necessary to continue works in process of construction. Some districts have more of these works, some less, and it would be unreasonable to stereotype for a term of years an accidental distribution of funds, or to say to a district—"Because you were spending 20,000 rupees on such a "project in such a year, you shall always have 20,000 rupees to spend, even when that "project is completed." It will probably be found, when further experience is gained, that original works may be divided into two classes,—ordinary and extraordinary. In a Province like Assam, where two lakhs a year could be spent advantageously in each of the eight districts, and there are only four or five lakhs to be divided between them, it will probably be advisable to retain a portion of that sum to carry out large works, taking them up one after another, irrespective of locality, and at the same time to apportion a sum to each district to be expended on carrying out smaller works within its limits. Thus, a reference to the Appendix will show that, putting civil buildings aside, there are a large number of important works going on in the Lakhimpur and Sibsagar districts, and a much smaller number in Darrang, Kamrup, and Goalpara, while the Sylhet district is so far behind all others that it neither has any works in progress nor any prepared project, except one, to which an allotment can be made. Some money has therefore been allotted to each district for improvement of its trunk road, and for bridges thereon, and these grants, more or less modified by the experience of a year or two, will become the permanent allotment to which the district will be entitled for its original works. The rest of the money, when the present works on which it is being expended are completed, will be released and available for other similar works to be proposed, with plans prepared by the District Engineer, by the District Committees. The tramway has been kept separate, because, though at present it is merely a small work for the local advantage of a part of the Sibsagar district, it is an experiment which, if found successful, may be the germ of greater things, and its location and extension must be governed by other than local considerations. The two workshops also are not intended for merely local wants, but each is to serve the requirements of three districts, making up such iron and wood work as is needed by them for bridges, ferry boats, and so on. These will be charged to the Local Funds of the district, supplied at cost price.

20. In several districts there is at present a collection of tools and plant, and of stock required for Public Works purposes, chiefly timber and iron. These articles it is not proposed to make over to the District Committees. They will remain in the charge of the District Engineer, who will account for them, according to the Code rules and forms, to the Deputy Examiner. He will issue them, as needed, to any District Fund work, charging the cost to that fund by an adjustment to be carried out between the Comptroller and Deputy Examiner. It is not desirable that the District Committee should, at present at least, lay up any stock; any tools or plant which they require for specific works should be procured by the District Engineer, and entered on the register of tools and plant which he will keep up.

21. It remains to explain what changes are necessary in the constitution of the District Committees, and in their financial position, and in the accounts to be kept and the budgets and reports submitted by them.

22. Under Section 15 of the Local Rates Regulation, not less than one-third of the Committee should be composed of non-official members. The Government of India lately expressed a wish that the number of non-officials should be not less than half; but on looking into the lists it was found that in every district that proportion had already been reached, and that in some cases non-officials were to officials as 2 to 1. Considering the difficulty non-officials have in attending Committee meetings, the Chief Commissioner thinks it would be better that they should always be in the ratio of 2 to 1, as compared with official members; and Deputy Commissioners have been invited to nominate a sufficient number of residents of the district to raise the non-officials on the Committee to the requisite proportion.

23. The rules drawn up by the late Chief Commissioner under Sections 15 and 16 of the Regulation, and published in the Resolution of the 18th June 1880, should be understood to be still in force as to their general spirit and tenor, though in some matters of detail the present Resolution expands and alters them. Branch Committees should continue to be appointed for subdivisions, and Sub-Committees should also be created for education and for the management of the dispensary. Deputy Commissioners will be invited to make nominations accordingly for these Sub-Committees, but the

names will not be gazetted as those of the members of District and Branch Committees are.

24. With regard to the constitution and duties of the District and Branch Committees under their present enlarged responsibilities, the Chief Commissioner would call attention to the views expressed by the Government of Bengal, in the extract attached to this Resolution as Appendix V. He agrees generally with what is there said as to the position of the Branch Committee (or Local Board) and its relation to the District Committee, and as to the impossibility of a Central Committee transacting all the business of a large district, and, while he is not prepared to prescribe these principles absolutely in all districts, seeing that some subdivisions are much less advanced than others, he will gladly accept and sanction any proposals based on these principles which a District Committee may submit. In all cases, however, a District Committee should make a lump allotment of funds and of responsibilites to its Sub-Divisional Committee or Committees, and should leave them to prepare a budget and a scheme of operations, which shall be incorporated in the district scheme.

25. The funds at the disposal of the District Committee will consist of those mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of this Resolution (the entire local rates being made over to them, instead of five-eighths as before, together with a Government grant on account of—

1. Public Works.
2. The other heads of localised expenditure shown in Appendix I., viz., Refunds, Minor Departments, Grants-in-aid, Medical Services, and Miscellaneous.

The grant under head (2) will remain unaltered for the next five years. That under head (1) will vary in different districts for the reasons explained above, though the total grant to the eight districts will not be diminished unless a failure of Provincial revenues makes this necessary.

26. The Chief Commissioner desires that the Committee should feel themselves as much interested pecuniarily in the growth of the revenue as in economical expenditure; and that any increase in the former should go to swell the local funds as much as any saving in the latter. It is found, however, by experience that it adds immensely to the trouble of account keeping if the funds dealt with are made appropriated funds and kept in a separate manner; and the following system is the best that can be adopted. The District Committee, as such, should keep no account of actual receipts; but should trust to the Comptroller for that. They will prepare their estimate in October of what they expect to receive under each of the heads and sub-heads shown in the Budget form (adopting the figure of the preceding year where there is no special reason for altering it), and, if this estimate is sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner, they will receive an allotment, which is all they will be able to spend during the year, unless a supplementary budget is sent up and approved. Suppose, for instance, they estimate the ferry receipts at Rs. 10,000; and the ferries are sold in March for Rs. 20,000. That increase will not affect their income for the year budgetted for; they have received an allotment of (say) 2 lakhs based on their estimate, and that is all they have to deal with. But at the end of the year the Comptroller makes out the Local Fund accounts, and, taking the actual receipts for local rates, ferries, pound surplus, rents, and grants, finds them amount, say, to Rs. 10,000 in excess of the allotment. Whatever the sum is, the actual expenditure will be deducted from the actual receipts, and the balance be placed at the credit of the District Fund to begin the next year with. Thus, if the accounts of 1882–83 are made up in July 1883, and a balance of Rs. 10,000 found to the credit of a district, the Chairman will be informed, and will draw up, in October, the Committee's budget for 1884–85, on the basis of an opening balance of Rs. 10,000, in addition to the allotment made for 1883–84. On the expenditure side the Committee will in future include (1) the cost of the establishment (if any) maintained for keeping the accounts of the local rate and other local funds; (2) the expenditure on district post; (3) on primary education; (4) on grants-in-aid; (5) on other localised departments of secondary education; and (6) on public works. The latter will be divided into—

(*a.*) Establishment.
(*b.*) Old local; repairs and original works.
(*c.*) New local; repairs and original works.
(*d.*) Miscellaneous improvements.

Instead of the present plan, under which the totals of the main heads are submitted first, and the details of public works afterwards, the whole budget should now be submitted at once. The Committee will know approximately what allotment they will

receive, and they should estimate for the expenditure of that entire sum; indeed, if they frame their estimate of expenditure at a higher figure, no harm will be done, provided they place their proposed original works in the order of importance. If, then, the Chief Commissioner is able from any cause to make a larger grant than that of last year, its expenditure can be provided for; if the grant is equal to, or less than, that of last year, he can decide what works to strike out of the budget, in the order of least importance.

27. No work should be begun without an estimate; and, as far as possible, no work should be entered in the budget until the estimate has been prepared and sanctioned; but, if that is impossible, the estimate must be drawn up immediately after the budget is passed, and the work must not be put in hand till the estimate is sanctioned. If the work is to cost less than Rs. 500, the estimate may be prepared in the Public Works form of requisition. For road repairs a mileage rate is sufficient. If the work is to cost less than Rs. 2,000, it can be passed by the Committee's Chairman; if it exceeds Rs. 2,000, it must be sent to the Superintending Engineer for sanction. In any case a copy must be sent, after sanction, to the Comptroller, who will see not only the total allotment is not exceeded, but that the expenditure on the details agrees with the estimate.

28. The Chairman of the Committee shall have power to sanction during the course of the year any work not entered in the budget up to a limit of Rs. 1,000, provided that he can arrange for the funds by transfer from some other head. But he should report at once to the Comptroller, stating the amount sanctioned, its object, and the head from which the amount has been transferred. Any expenditure that is urgently required can be incurred up to a limit of Rs. 200 by the Chairman or the District Engineer, provided sanction is obtained at the next meeting of the District or Branch Committee.

29. The budgets must be submitted to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner before the 1st November, because the main outlines of the financial scheme for the Province have to be fixed by the 15th November. For the next year or two the Chief Commissioner thinks it will be advisable that he himself, or the Commissioner, Assam Valley Districts, should meet the District Committee to discuss with them the details of the budgets, and to learn their views as to the relative importance of different works, the rates of expenditure, and so forth. Arrangements will be made to fix the dates of these meetings in November and December in such a way as shall be most convenient to the Committees and at the same time fit in with the Chief Commissioner's and the Commissioner's tours.

30. The forms to be used in submitting the budget are shown in Appendix VI. They consist of a general form (similar to that used in Appendix I.) for showing all estimated local receipts and expenditure, and detailed forms for the separate sub-heads. These will be sent out to the districts by the Comptroller in July or August, with the figures of columns 3 and 4, actuals of past year and estimate of current year, filled up; and the Committee will insert the figures showing their estimates for the coming year, and submit them with a report explaining the reasons for which the figures are adopted, if they differ from those for the current year.

31. The accounts of the year should be closed in April, and submitted to the Comptroller, who would verify the figures and return them by the 15th May. A meeting should be held in May, at which these accounts and the annual report should be passed. The report should be specially devoted to explaining what has been done during the year, what it cost, why the actual cost differed from the estimate, and if any work in the budget has not been carried out, what the cause was.

32. It remains to prescribe the system of accounts which should be kept up. These will necessarily be a good deal simpler than the elaborate system laid down in the Public Works Accounts Code; and as the expenditure of some five lakhs is to pass now from the more elaborate to the simpler system, the local expenditure on office establishment ought, as remarked in paragraph 15, to be less than it has hitherto been. But at the same time the Chief Commissioner doubts if the system prescribed in the Resolution of 18th June 1880 for the keeping of the old Local Fund accounts is quite sufficient for the larger expenditure now placed under the control of District Committees.

33. The main object of these accounts was to keep up a classified record of all outgoings: they show what is spent, but hardly how it is spent. They satisfactorily enable the Comptroller to see that the Committee does not exceed its allotments, and

that for each sum paid away a voucher or receipt is given; and where the Committee's work is done, as in some districts, by members of the Committee, who receive the lump allotment, and give in no details of expenditure, no further account is necessary. Some changes in form are, however, necessary, and these will be found in the forms attached to this Resolution as Appendix VII.

34. But where expenditure is carried on departmentally, through direct payments made by subordinate officials, it is desirable that some fuller account should be kept. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, prescribes that in the case of all works not made over to contractors (or to members of the Committees who undertake to carry out the work for the allotment assigned) the Public Works Department form of day-book (Form 6*d.*) and the register of works (Form No. 25) should be used.

35. The District Engineer will submit to the Comptroller for audit the establishment bills for salaries and bills for travelling allowance, with the journals on which the travelling allowance bills are based, in the form prescribed by the Public Works Department, and now in use. He will also send up to the Deputy Examiner the monthly and half-yearly statements of stock and of tools and plant, according to the Public Works Code. He will, of course, understand that this Resolution introduces no change as to provincial and Imperial works, the accounts for which must still go up the Deputy Examiner and the Superintending Engineer as above.

36. The accounts and books which it will be necessary for the District Committees to keep up and submit to the Comptroller, to show the expenditure under all heads, but chiefly under Public Works, will be as follows :—

(1.) Cash-book.—Shows all heads of expenditure. Copy monthly to Comptroller.
(2.) Treasury Pass-book to be written up by the Treasury Officer and kept by the Committee. All heads of expenditure. No copy.
(3.) Imprest Cash-books. Copy monthly to Comptroller.
(4.) Registers of advances to Contractors. Copy monthly to Comptroller.
(5.) Monthly progress Report. Copy to Comptroller, who, after checking the expenditure figures, will forward for perusal and return to the Superintending Engineer.
(6.) Day-book for works carried on departmentally. Copy monthly to Comptroller.
(7.) Register of Works. No copy.
(8.) Completion Report. To be prepared when each work in the budget is finished, and submitted to the Chairman of the Committee. A copy should be sent to the Superintending Engineer in the case of all works exceeding Rs. 2,000 in cost.

The forms in which these accounts are to be kept will be found in Appendix VII. to this Resolution.

37. Branch Committees will have their accounts incorporated with those at the district head-quarters, but they must keep up separately the same forms and accounts as are prescribed above, except the Treasury Pass-book.

38. The Comptroller will submit quarterly to the Chief Commissioner in the General Department, a statement showing the actual receipts and expenditure of each district against each of the heads and sub-heads in Appendix I.

39. The orders contained in this Resolution as regards accounts will take effect from the 1st May. The accounts for this month will be submitted to the Comptroller as here prescribed.

By order of the Chief Commissioner of Assam,
C. J. LYALL,
Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM.

(No. 1260.)

Sir,

Simla, August 23, 1882.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2289, dated the 2nd June last, submitting a copy of your Resolution, dated the 10th May 1882, on the subject of the extension of local self-government in Assam.

2. In reply, I am to say that, before commenting on the proposals contained in the Resolution, the Governor General in Council would be glad to be informed what

modifications you would desire to make in your scheme in consequence of the issue of the Resolution of this Department, No. 17—747–759, dated the 18th May 1882, in which the views of the Government of India on the question are fully explained. I am to add that His Excellency in Council has no desire to press you for a very early conclusion on the subject, but will be glad if, before issuing final orders, you would submit your revised proposals for the consideration of the Government of India.

From C. J. LYALL, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, to THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

(No. 5537.)

Sir, Shillong, November 2, 1882.

In reply to your letter No. 1260, dated the 23rd August, I am desired to forward a draft Resolution in which are embodied the measures which the Chief Commissioner proposes to take in accordance with the views of the Government of India contained in their Resolution, dated the 18th May 1882, together with the reasons which have led him to come to those conclusions. I am to express a hope that these measures will be approved by the Government of India, and that an early answer may be received to this communication. The Resolution will not be published till your reply is received, but meanwhile instructions in accordance with the remarks it contains will be issued to the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar regarding the preparation of a scheme for election in his district; to the Deputy Commissioners of Goalpara, Kamrup, Sibsagar, and Lakhimpur regarding the preparation of a scheme for election in the Municipalities of Goalpara, Gauhati, and Dibrugarh, and the Station of Sibsagar; and to the Deputy Commissioners of Goalpara and Kamrup regarding the necessity of inviting the expression of Native opinion in their districts.

Resolution of THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM, No. 1784, Shillong, November 2, 1882.

Read—

The Resolution of the Government of India in the Home Department, No. 7–747–59, dated the 18th May 1882, on the subject of the encourgement of Local Self-Government.

The Chief Commissioner's Circular No. 20, dated the 5th June 1882, forwarding the Resolution for report to the Commissioner of the Assam Valley and the Deputy-Commissioners of the Plains Districts, Assam.

The replies to the above Circular.

The Resolution of the Government of India read in the preamble was received by the Chief Commissioner shortly after he had issued the orders conveyed in his Resolution No. 1912, dated the 10th May last, defining and enlarging the powers and resources of the Committees constituted in each of the plains districts of this Province under the Local Rates Regulation of 1879. It then became necessary to consider how far the further extension of the principle of local self-government in the direction desired by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council was possible in Assam, and the most careful attention of all District Officers was called to the subject in the Circular of the 5th June. The replies which have now been received enable the Chief Commissioner to decide upon the main principles which he thinks should be followed in giving effect to the wishes of the Government of India, and to sketch in a preliminary manner, the details of the scheme, which it will rest with District Officers to fill in more completely, after considering the special circumstances of each locality.

History of local institutions in Assam.

2. Local institutions in this Province are of very recent growth. When the Chief Commissionership was constituted in 1874, only two Municipalities existed in Assam, that of Gauháti, created in 1865 under Act III. (B.C.) of 1864, and that of Sylhet, established in 1868 under Act VI. (B.C.) of that year. The former Act had in 1865 been extended to the town of Silchar, but its provisions were in 1868 withdrawn, the experiment being declared a failure. The Road-cess Act, X. (B.C.) of 1871, was introduced into the Goálpára district, but in no other portion of the Province had any attempt been made previous to the passing of the Local Rates Regulation of 1879, to foster local self-government by any statutory enactment. Road Fund Committees, however, constituted under the Resolution of the Bengal Government in the Public

Works Department, No. 1009, dated the 23rd February 1872, existed in each district for the purpose of aiding the Deputy-Commissioner with their advice in the management of the allotment for district roads; and the rules regarding District Education Committees, issued by Sir George Campbell in July 1873, extended to Assam as to other portions of Bengal.

Municipalities.

3. The Bengal Municipal Act, V. (B.C.) of 1876, is the law now in force on the subject of municipal government; and under its provisions the local government of the following places is administered:—

First-class Municipality	Gauháti,	constituted	1878.
Second-class Municipality	Sylhet,	„	„
	Dibrugarh	„	1877.
	Goálpára	„	1878.
Stations	Sibságar	„	1880.
	Shillong	„	1879.
	Silchar	„	1881.
Towns or Unions	Golághát	„	
	Jorhát	„	
	Sunámganj	„	1881.
	Habiganj	„	
	Bálaganj	„	

Local Rates Regulation.

The Assam Local Rates Regulation, passed in 1879 after a discussion which extended over several years, was brought into force from the 1st April 1880 in all the plains districts of the Province, superseding in Goálpára the Bengal Road-cess Act. The Committees appointed under the Regulation are thus now only in the third year of their existence, while in the majority of the places to which Act V. (B.C.) of 1876 has been extended municipal institutions are equally recent in their origin.

Condition of the Province with reference to local self-government. Sylhet.

4. The conditions of the Province in relation to the problem of local self-government are in many respects peculiar, and important differences exist in different districts. The great district of Sylhet, containing nearly half of the total population under the Chief Commissioner, is perhaps unique in India, certainly in Bengal, in the tendency which its institutions have to promote independence of action on the part of the people, and, to some degree, a spirit of combination among them for a common object. A district of small proprietors, and yet permanently settled at a very light revenue, it is thickly peopled, and the general standard of comfort is high; education is tolerably general; and an acquaintance with the subtleties of Regulation law widespread. The people are well instructed in their rights, and fond of asserting them by joint action and combination. The District Administration had until recent years been exceptionally weak, and the people, thus left to themselves, had learnt the necessity of managing their own affairs as best they could independently of the authorities. On the other hand locomotion is almost entirely by water, and roads are only beginning to be made; distances are great, and the modes of travel slow. To expect that under these circumstances residents at a distance from the administrative head-quarters would undertake the duties incumbent on a District Committee established there was impossible. Moreover, although a general well-being prevails, there is a great lack of large proprietors of independent means, such as exist in most other parts of Bengal, who would be willing to accept the responsibilities and the distinction of administrative office. All the conditions of Sylhet, therefore point to a system of localised Boards, with compact areas entrusted to their charge, at administrative centres so situated as to be easily accessible from all parts of those areas. The first steps towards making such a distribution of administration practicable were taken when the district was divided into subdivisions, a measure to which effect has been given only within the last three years. These subdivisions are now five in number, with a population and area as shown below:—

	Square miles.	Population.
North Sylhet	1,010	439,296
South Sylhet	824	313,017
Habiganj	930	498,902
Karimganj	1,117	343,525
Sunámganj	1,500	379,202
	5,381	1,973,942

To each of these, except the head-quarters subdivision, a Branch Committee under Section 14 of the Local Rates Regulation was appointed, the Committee at head-quarters being designated the District Committee and nominally including all the members of the Branch Committees. The members of the Committees are nominated by the Deputy-Commissioner for the approval of Government, and include representatives of all classes of society.

Cachar.

5. In Cachar, the distinctive features of the district and its population hold a middle place between those of Sylhet and those of the Brahmaputra Valley. The population of the district is about 289,000, and the area, excluding North Cachar, 1,285 square miles. Of the population, 63,000 are immigrant tea coolies, living on 181 tea gardens, which comprise an area of 211,800 acres, or a quarter of the whole district. The native population is almost entirely of the same character as that of Eastern Sylhet, from which it is an overflow: it is well-to-do, but entirely agricultural, and possessed of little education, with no prominently wealthy members to take the lead. The power of combination which is a characteristic of the Sylhetias is even more strikingly shown in the conditions of land tenure prevailing in Cachar, where it is customary for companies of cultivators, bound together by no link of blood, caste, or even religion to combine to take up and hold land in common. They divide the estate thus leased from Government according to private arrangements among themselves, and many persons hold shares in several estates. The number of shareholders in a mirásdári estate generally runs from 10 to 50. But it is obvious that such a community bound together only by mutual agreement in respect of landed property, among whom, by their constitution, transfers are frequent and the elements perpetually shifting, differs widely from the ancient tribal constitution of villages in North-Western India. Society is here more or less in the rudimentary stage; the cultivators are pioneers on the borders of the wilderness, whose association is governed, not by ancestral ties and long-transmitted traditions, but by mutual convenience alone. The conditions of life are still too primitive for the growth of a cultivated and leisured class, and the dead level of easy circumstances allows no one to emerge above his fellows. On the other hand, the tea-planting community is stronger in Cachar than in any other district in Assam. It comprises nearly the whole intelligence of the district, though the public spirit of its members is only evinced for the most part in connexion with the interests they represent. These interests are deeply concerned in the improvement of communications, in improved sanitation, which affects the well-being of the labour force on which the prosperity of the industry depends, and in improved postal communication, a want more present to the European than the Native mind; but in primary education their concern is small, and a Local Board on which tea-planters have the preponderance could not be expected to occupy itself much with this subject. As regards area, the administrative head-quarter station at Silchar is centrally situated and easily accessible from every part of the district except the Hailákándi Valley, a long projection stretching southwards from the Barák into the Lushai Hills. Two Committees, one at head-quarters and a Branch Committee at Hailákándi, are thus called for by the conditions of the district, and have been constituted under the Local Rates Regulation.

Assam Valley.
Goálpárs.

6. The Valley of the Brahmaputra is not nearly so homogeneous in its elements with reference to the problem of local self-government as that of the Barák. In the west is Goálpára, a large but backward district, the greater part of the inhabited portion of which is permanently settled, and divided between 19 great estates, the proprietors of which are the only prominent persons in the district. With the exception of the small towns of Dhubri and Goálpára, where there is a certain commercial and legal element, the bulk of the population are ryots, largely belonging to semi-Hinduised aboriginal races, whose range of ideas is small. No tea-planters exist in the district, except in a small corner of the Eastern Duárs, where one or two experimental gardens have been started. Such a condition of society does not afford a promising field for local self-government, though it may be expected that the leading zemindárs, with their relations and agents, will form a useful nucleus for such a system. One small beginning in this direction has, indeed, recently been made by the introduction, in 1876–77, of the Bengal Chaukidári Act, VI. (B.C.) of 1870, and the constitution of village panchávats for the purpose of assessing the pay of the rural police. This experiment has, it is stated, been successful, and has developed a power of combination and a common interest, which have fostered the capacity for local self-government. But the distribution of the pay of a village watchman drawing Rs. 4 a month among the houses of

his circle, or even the management of a village páthsála or primary school, though excellent things, do not afford any guarantee of the capacity of those who fulfil these duties to bear their part in the administration of more extensive funds, and the supervision of projects embracing the whole district.

Kámrúp.

7. Kámrúp, the first and most populous of the Assamese districts, is totally distinct in its characteristics from Goálpára. The tenure of land is here ryotwári, and each revenue payer, the great bulk of whom hold on an annual lease, deals directly with Government. Large areas, known as mauzas, and averaging nearly 50 square miles each, are managed by means of officials called mauzadárs. The number of mauzas is 74, and the average area of a ryot's holding about $3\frac{1}{2}$ acres. The rural population consists largely, both in the north and the south, of non-Aryan and semi-Hinduised races, and, except at the district and sub-divisional head-quarters of Gauháti and Barpeta, there is little education abroad. A special feature of this district, however, which it probably owes to the fact that it contained the capital of the Hindu Kingdom of Kámrúp, and afterwards the seat of the Ahom Viceroy, the Bor Phúkan, at Gauháti, is the large number of estates held by privileged holders, whose tenure was mainly religious in its origin. These are, 1,563 in number, 35 of which, covering an area of about 30,000 acres, are entirely revenue free, and the remainder, with an area of about 160,000 acres, are held on payment of revenue at half the rates demanded from ordinary ryots. These lá-khirájdárs and nisf-khirájdárs (as they are called) constitute almost the only approach to a landed gentry in the district; and, as many of them are managers of great religious establishments, with an extensive following among the people, they sometimes possess great power and influence. Besides these, there are the mauzadárs, an institution peculiar to Assam, who are at once managers on behalf of Government of their mauzas, and contractors for their own benefit for the payment of the Government revenue. They thus hold a kind of intermediate position, being both Government servants and leaders of the people. They undoubtedly possess great power, and, besides the privileged holders, are almost the only class of natives in the mufassal who have much education. Lastly, there are the tea-planters, who, with two exceptions, are entirely settled on the south bank of the Brahmaputra. They are a less numerous and important class in this than in any other district of the Assam Valley, the 145 gardens shown in the returns being managed by only a few Europeans, and owing their number to the diversity of the tenures on which they are held: their area is about 27,000 acres. The district head-quarters, Gauháti, is inconveniently situated in the extreme south-east of the district, and is difficult of access from the north bank and the west. There is a District Committee under the Local Rates Regulation, and a Branch Committee at Barpeta.

Darrang.

8. Darrang resembles Kámrúp in the character of its rural population (273,333 in number), which, however, is more largely non-Hindu and illiterate. It has only 36,078 acres held under privileged tenures, chiefly by the family of the Rájas of Darrang, who live in the Mangaldai subdivision. The tea-planting community is tolerably numerous, the area held being about 100,000 acres, distributed in 122 estates. The total settled area of the district (including revenue-free land) is only about 350,000 acres, so that the tea interest represents 30 per cent. of the occupied land. There are three Committees under the Local Rates Regulation,—one the District Committee sitting at Tezpur, and Branch Committees at Mangaldai in the west and Bishnath in the east. Besides Government Officials, these Committees are constituted almost entirely of tea-planters.

Nowgong.

9. Nowgong, like Darrang, has a population consisting largely of non-Hindu races in a low stage of civilisation; it includes the Mikir Hills, a tract which may be said to be almost unexplored, as well as a considerable portion of hill territory on the south, bordering on the Khási and Jaintia and North Cachar Hills. Its population is 310,579, more than half of whom (159,639) were at the Census of 1881 classed as "aboriginal "castes and tribes." The occupied area, excluding the hill tracts, where a house tax prevails, is 312,380 acres, of which less than 10,000 acres are held on privileged tenures. The area held by tea-planters is about 70,000 acres, divided into 70 gardens, most of which are situated on the skirts of the Mikir Hills and the ranges to the south of the sadr station. The tea interest thus represents nearly 25 per cent. of the occupied area. The elements of the population, with reference to the problem of local self-government, are thus nearly the same as in Darrang; there are a dearth of persons of sufficient education to represent the district among the natives, a population chiefly composed of tribes hardly removed from barbarism, and an influential body of tea-

planters, who constitute, where their own interests are concerned, the only progressive element in the district. Nowgong has no subdivisions, and the Committee under the Local Rates Regulation is appointed for the whole district.

Sibságar.

10. Sibságar, the next district in order, is one where the conditions are more favourable, perhaps, than in any other of the Brahmaputra Valley. It has a population of 370,274, of whom no less than 206,526 were returned at the Census as belonging to "aboriginal castes and tribes:" but this total includes 117,872 Ahoms, an intelligent and cultivated race of Shán origin, possessing a religious literature of their own, who formerly held sway over the whole valley. The area held on payment of revenue or revenue-free is about 550,000 acres, of which about 50,000 acres are held on privileged tenures, chiefly by the heads of important religious communities and by the descendants of officials of the Ahom rulers. 210,305 acres, or 37 per cent. of the whole occupied area, divided into 233 gardens, are held for tea cultivation by planters, and over 50,000 of the population are tea coolies. The district contains, in Jorhát and Sibságar, two ancient administrative centres, round which are still grouped the descendants of the officers of the native Government, an intelligent and fairly well-educated class. There are numerous embanked roads traversing the country in all directions, the work of former rulers, which, constructed by means of contributed labour, only require restoration, bridging, and maintenance in order to provide for the district the best system of internal communications which exists anywhere in the valley. There are three subdivisions, Golághát, Jorhát, and the head-quarters subdivision, each of which has a Committee under the Local Rates Regulation.

Lakhimpur.

11. The Lakhimpur district, like Sibságar is a great tea-producing tract. Its population is 179,893, of whom 51,588 are Ahoms, and 64,397 belong to other "aboriginal "castes and tribes." The settled and revenue-free area is about 270,000 acres, of which less than 5,000 are held on privileged tenures. The area under tea grants is approximately 170,000 acres, or almost exactly two-thirds of the occupied area, divided into 202 gardens. The coolie population is about 36,000. Under these circumstances, the tea interest cannot but be preponderant, while the selection of suitable representatives of the native population is no easy matter. Thinly peopled, chiefly inhabited by tea coolies and non-Aryan tribes hardly removed from barbarism, education is very backward in this district, and even among the mauzadárs there are several who are unable to read and write. There are two Committees under the Local Rates Regulation, one for the head-quarters subdivision, and the other for that of North Lakhimpur, a portion of the district very inaccessible from Dibrugarh. Tea-planters make up almost the whole non-official element, the exceptions being a few Márwári or Kaiya merchants, as much foreigners in the Province as Europeans.

General conclusions.

12. The above review of the circumstances of the Province with reference to local self-government is a needful preliminary to a discussion of the measures possible in each district, and brings into clear relief the necessity of treating different tracts in different ways, if the result is not to be a breakdown of the experiment. That which is possible in Sylhet is impossible in Cachar: some beginnings of representation by election may be practicable in Kámrúp and Sibságar; they would be out of the question, as applied to the native population, in Lakhimpur, probably in Goálpára, and in Darrang and Nowgong. Where the tea-planting interest preponderates, as in Cachar, Sibságar, and Lakhimpur, there is little danger of communications being neglected, but education might perhaps be allowed to drop out of sight. The English element, which in such districts must necessarily find its place on the Local Boards, is not of a character to be rendered inarticulate by the presence of an official; and the *calibre* of the possible native members is generally such that, to enable them properly to uphold the special interests they represent, as against the representatives of the tea interest, it may be found needful to have an official as moderator and Chairman of the Board.

Municipalities to be separate from Local Boards.

13. It seems desirable to state separately the conclusions to which the Chief Commissioner has come in the case of Municipalities and in that of Rural Boards. The former are governed by the provisions of a very elaborate Act, which, though it will doubtless be amended in some respects by the Bengal Legislature, already affords a complete basis for local self-government in towns. The points of contact between the Mufassal Boards and Municipalities are not numerous; the towns are, as everywhere, more advanced in all respects than the rural areas.

Election in Municipalities.

14. In Municipalities, whether of the first or second class under Act V. (B.C.) of 1876, provision already exists in Section 16 of that Act for the appointment of Com-

missioners by election. In Stations, Section 356 of the Act directs that the Chief Commissioner "shall appoint the Magistrate and such number of the inhabitants of the "Station as to him shall appear necessary to be Commissioners." In Unions, the constitution and appointment of the panchâyat is left by Section 328 to the Magistrate. In Municipalities, however, Section 16 expressly forbids the introduction of the elective system, "unless the Magistrate certifies that at least one-third of the ratepayers "residing therein have signed a petition praying for its introduction." Such a petition, signed not by merely one-third, but by nearly all the ratepayers, has recently been received from the Municipality of Sylhet, and the Chief Commissioner has had great pleasure in directing that all the Commissioners to be appointed for that Municipality shall henceforth be elected. The rules for the qualifications of candidates and voters and the mode of election are now under consideration by the Deputy-Commissioner and the Committee. Mr. Elliott does not desire to force the system of election on any community against their wishes; a petition signed by the ratepayers is, if not the best way, at any rate a simple way, in which they can express their views; he is therefore not prepared (and, indeed, is unable until the law is amended) to introduce the elective system without the petition prescribed in Section 16 of the Act. But he thinks that the Deputy-Commissioners of Kámrúp and Lakhimpur should take measures to invite the ratepayers of the Gauháti and Dibrugarh Municipalities to give expression to their views, and if election be their desire, to submit the needful petition. The Deputy-Commissioner of Sibságar thinks that election could be introduced into that station. There is, as already observed, nothing in the Act which authorises election in stations; but there is also nothing to prevent the Local Government from adopting this mode of selecting the persons to be appointed Commissioners; and Colonel Campbell is therefore requested to act on the analogy of Section 16, and to invite the ratepayers to apply for the introduction of the elective system in Sibságar. The Deputy-Commissioner of Goálpára may, if he thinks fit, take similar action in regard to the Goálpára Municipality. This place, however, since it ceased to be the district head-quarters, has fallen into some decay, and has not shown much sign of vitality. A second-class Municipality is about to be established at Dhubri, and the Deputy-Commissioner will consider whether the elective principle should be introduced there.

Qualification of voters and candidates for municipal elections.

15. If it is found to be the wish of the ratepayers, as expressed in the needful petition under Section 16 of the Act, that the system of election should be introduced into these Municipalities, the Deputy-Commissioners should, in submitting their proposals, state what in their opinion should be the qualifications (1) of voters, and (2) of candidates for the office of Commissioner. It has been suggested in some quarters that the payment of Rs. 2 a year in municipal taxes should be the qualification necessary for a vote; and the Chief Commissioner will sanction this rule, if it be shown that this minimum amount does not exclude too many of the ratepayers, or any who are capable by education and position to give an intelligent vote. The lists of ratepayers should be examined, and the report should show how many will be entitled to vote under such a qualification, and whether it includes all who are likely to exercise the privilege with discretion. For candidates, it has been suggested that the payment of Rs. 4 a year in municipal taxes should be the qualification. This seems unobjectionable, provided that, in addition, the following persons, if residing within the limits of the Municipality, are eligible:—

Government pensioners drawing not less than Rs. 20 a month as pension.
Government servants drawing not less than Rs. 40 as salary.
All persons entered in the lists of jurors and assessors.
All pleaders.
All graduates of any University.

It should be a *sine quâ non* that all candidates should be able to read and write.

Mode of election for Municipal Committees.

16. As regards the mode of election, Deputy-Commissioners should consider whether the election should be by wards, castes, trades, or guilds, or any other method. The Chief Commissioner is informed that in this Province the strict limitation of occupations by castes which is found in Upper India does not exist, and that election by wards will be the generally preferable method. The question should be fully entered into by the Deputy-Commissioners when they submit their proposals. If the election is to be by wards the areas should be so fixed that no influential class or trade should be unable to find representation by reason of the votes of its members being swamped by larger numbers of other but less important classes.

Ex-officio members of Municipal Committees.

17. The next question to consider is that of ex-officio members. At present Section 17 of the Act leaves no option in the matter, but declares that, in addition to the appointed or elected Commissioners the Magistrate of the district, the Magistrate of the division, and the medical officer in charge of the district, shall be ex-officio Commissioners of every Municipality situated within their respective jurisdictions. Mr. Elliott sees no reason why the Civil Surgeon should not continue to be an ex-officio member; but the Magistrate of the district, he thinks, should not put himself forward in the meetings of the Committee, and, unless elected Chairman by the Commissioners, should generally refrain from attending the meetings as member. The same remark applies to the Sub-divisional Magistrates. It is probable that the Act will shortly be amended in this respect.

Chairmen of Municipal Committees.

18. As regards the appointment of Chairman, Section 29 of the Act declares that the Chief Commissioner may appoint any person to hold that office; but unless some other person is so appointed the Magistrate of the district or subdivision is to hold it. The Chief Commissioner desires that in all Municipalities the Commissioners may be called upon to elect their Chairman for his approval: if an official is so elected, the Vice-Chairman should be a non-official.

Summary of opinions and action taken in regard to Local Boards.

19. These observations seem to provide sufficiently for the Municipalities in this Province. The power and duties of the Commissioners are minutely defined in the Act, and until that enactment is repealed or modified its provisions must be followed. It remains now to summarise the opinions expressed by the officers consulted in regard to the District Local Boards, their mode of appointment, area of jurisdiction, powers, and duties.

Sylhet.

20. In Sylhet the five subdivisions have, as already mentioned, been made for the present the units of administration. To each of these a Local Board has been appointed, consisting almost entirely of non-officials and natives of the subdivisions in which they sit. The distribution of the Local Funds has been carried out by the Deputy-Commissioner, who has allotted to each subdivision the whole of the funds raised within its area, and a suitable share, according to its wants, of the Provincial grant.

For the present, the members of the Local Boards are all nominated, and the Chairmen are, except in South Sylhet, the Sub-divisional Officers, the Sub-divisional Inspector of Police being the Vice-Chairman. In South Sylhet a tea-planter, Mr. Marillier, is Chairman, and the Sub-divisional Officer Vice-Chairman. These arrangements are, however, only provisional and intermediate, and the Deputy-Commissioner hopes that the necessity of committing these offices to official members will soon be removed. The only other official members, besides the Sub-divisional officer and the Inspector of Police, are in North Sylhet the Subordinate Judge, the Head-master of the Zila School, and an Extra-Assistant-Commissioner, who is also a large zemindár; at Habiganj a Sub-Deputy-Collector; and at Sunámganj the Munsif. A Committee is at present sitting at Sylhet for the purpose of considering—

(1) how the members of the Sub-divisional Committee should in future be appointed;

(2) how Sub-Committees working in subordination to the Sub-divisional Committees in certain areas can be arranged;

(3) what other branches of the Administration besides Public Works, Education, Medical, Charity, and the District Post, which they now administer, can be made over to the Sub-divisional Committees.

The Chief Commissioner hopes soon to receive from Mr. Johnson matured proposals on these subjects, and specially for the appointment, if possible by election, of the members of the Local Boards. These are questions on which he has done well to consult local opinion, and there is no desire to force him to move too rapidly in the matter. The Committees have been to a large extent cleared of official members, and as soon as they develop any desire for further independence it will readily be conceded. Mr. Johnson is heartily at one with the policy of the Government of India in this matter, and Mr. Elliott is content to leave in his hands its further development in the directions which he may deem most expedient.

Cachar.

21. In Cachar the Deputy-Commissioner reports election not to be possible, and has proposed members for the two Committees between which the district is to be divided, who have been accepted by the Chief Commissioner, and their names gazetted. The two Local Boards, one for the Sadr subdivision, and one for Hailákándi, should, in Mr. Wight's opinion, be independent of one another, and communicate by dele-

gates. If no non-official member is able and willing to accept the office, the Deputy-Commissioner thinks that the Sub-divisional Officer may be Chairman of the Hailákándi Sub-divisional Board, but that he himself should not be Chairman of the Head-quarters Board, to which, if absolutely necessary, an Extra-Assistant-Commissioner should be appointed, in order that the duties of Chairman may, if the Committee so wish, be performed by him. The funds raised locally should be administered by each Board within its own area, the Provincial grant being distributed as required. These proposals have been provisionally accepted by the Chief Commissioner, and the two Local Boards gazetted. That for Silchar contains six official members, viz., an Extra-Assistant-Commissioner on the district staff, a special Extra-Assistant-Commissioner whose official duties are in connexion with political work, the District Engineer, the Head-master of the Zila School, the Deputy-Inspector of Schools, and the Civil Surgeon: besides these, there are 21 non-official members, of whom nine are Europeans (tea-planters), and the remainder Natives. The Hailákándi Committee has three official members, viz., the Sub-divisional officer, the Civil Surgeon, and the Sub-Inspector of Schools, and 10 non-official members, of whom three are tea-planters.

Goálpára.

22. In Goálpára the Offg. Deputy-Commissioner represents that it is not expedient to make any change in the present arrangements. He says that there are but few zemindárs in the district, and few of these could safely be entrusted with authority. There is no middle class between them and the ryots, and it is difficult to get a person able to read and write for service on the chaukidari panchâyats. The present Committee has been selected with care, and represents the district satisfactorily. A Branch Committee has lately been appointed for Goálpára, and, in Mr. Driberg's judgment, nothing more can be done. He has not, however, taken any steps to elicit public opinion on the subject, and the Chief Commissioner is not disposed to accept his conclusions.

Kámrúp.

23. In Kámrúp, Mr. A. C. Campbell also has not apparently invited the public to express their views, and his report is altogether beside the present question. He argues for the creation of Rural Police Circles, managed by panchâyats, the members of which should be selected by acclamation, and he considers that local self-government should begin with those bodies, and should, by selection from intermediate Boards, work upwards to a representative body to aid in the higher branches of District and Provincial Administration. As to the immediate business of reforming the constitution of the Local Boards, no suggestion is offered.

Darrang.

24. In Darrang the Deputy-Commissioner reports that at a public meeting held at Tezpur on the 28th July the Native gentlemen present unanimously agreed that there were no natives at present in the district able to conduct the affairs of a Local Board. The English planters are content with the three Committees at present in existence. Mr. Williams, however, thinks that another Committee might be established at Gohpur, in the extreme north-east of the district, but adds that "in that neighbourhood he "understands that, besides the mauzadár, there is no one capable of being a member "of a Local Board." He thinks that it would be no use to attempt election: there are very few intelligent natives in the district. The nomination system must be kept up for the appointment of members: no native or non-official is fit to be Chairman. At Mangaldai Mr. Primrose is even more decided as to the absence of any natives fit to be elected to the Committee, and the impossibility of any system of election succeeding. No native member could be Chairman, there being none with a knowledge of English.

Nowgong.

25. The Deputy-Commissioner of Nowgong would divide the district by thánas, of which there are four, and would have a selected (*i.e.*, nominated) Board of from 7 to 13 non-officials in each, with funds allotted proportionally to the land revenue of the circle. Each Thána Board should elect its own Chairman. These Boards should not be subordinate to the District Board, and elected members should be substituted for nominated members by degrees. These Boards should have charge of local works, the District Board, constituted of two or three delegates from each Local Board, elected by the members, and of the existing District Committee, retaining in its hands all works of general importance. The Central Board should similarly elect its Chairman, and in time elected members should be appointed to the District Board as the present members go out by rotation. Officials should not be appointed to the Board except by election. Colonel Lamb encloses the proceedings of a meeting

held at Nowgong on the 16th July, which he states consisted chiefly of residents in the station, vakíls, &c., and did not represent the feeling of the country. The proposals of this meeting are, however, very much the Deputy-Commissioner's own; they were that there should be one District Board, and four Local Boards at the four thánas, Roha, Jági, Doboka, and Koliabor, the members of which should be nominated according to the wishes of the people, so far as they could be ascertained. The meeting proposed names of members accordingly. There should be two Sub-Committees for education and medical relief. The Central Board should keep all public works in its own hands, and each Local Board should send one representative to the Central Board. The District Engineer should be under the District Board, and not subordinate to the Deputy-Commissioner. Colonel Lamb encloses two protests from residents of the district, denying the representative character of the Nowgong meeting, and asking that fresh meetings may be called.

Sibságar.

26. In the Sibságar district two public meetings were held to discuss the question of local self-government, one at Sibságar on the 5th July and another at Jorhát on the 12th idem. The Sibságar meeting, which was very numerously attended, decided that there should be a Local Board for each subdivision, with a District Board to control the Local Board: that the Municipalities (*i.e.*, the "Station" of Sibságar and the "Unions" of Jorhát and Golághát) should be under the Local and District Boards: that the district was well fitted for the introduction of the elective system: that candidates should be able to read and write, residents of the district, 21 years old, and of respectable standing in society: that the electors should be persons paying 20 rupees revenue or upwards, or Rs. 2 a year municipal tax, or holders of a waste land grant or a privileged tenure. Applicants should be invited to offer themselves for election, and the Deputy-Commissioner, with the aid of four influential Native gentlemen, should prepare a list from amongst applicants of eligible persons. The Board should consist of one-fourth officials, one-eighth European non-officials, and five-eighths Native non-officials, the European non-officials being elected by the European residents. The term of office should be three years, and the Chairman should be chosen by the Board. The Jorhát meeting decided that election should be adopted: that the Deputy-Commissioner and Sub-divisional Officers should not be members of the Board, and that the Chairman should be chosen by the members. The Deputy-Commissioner should fix the number of members of the Committee, and Europeans should not exceed one-third of the number. Anyone who can read and write, and is a resident, should be eligible as a candidate. The Natives should elect the Native members, the Europeans the European. Representation should be personal, not local. An elector should pay Rs. 30 in land revenue, or be the holder of a grant or privileged tenure.

The Deputy-Commissioner considers the district unfit for election, and denies that either of the meetings was representative. At the Sibságar meeting, he says, the resolutions stated to have been passed were not even put to the vote. He forwards protests from two influential Gossains, from the residents on the Májuli, and others, against the proceedings of the meeting: he states that the Golághát meeting decided against election, and that the planters would not serve on a Committee where they would be liable to be overborne by so many natives as are proposed. Colonel Campbell would begin the elective system by electing gaonburas or village headmen, who are now appointed by mauzadárs, and he would also try election in the "Municipalities."

Mr. McLeod, Sub-divisional Officer of Jorhát, declares that an overwhelming majority of the people are against election, and encloses a petition, which he states is signed by "nearly all the respectable natives, Hindu and Muhammadan, who can "claim to represent local public opinion," alleging that at the meeting of the 17th July no attempt was made to collect votes, and that the signatories are opposed to the elective system.

The Sub-divisional Officer of Golághát, Babu, Mádhab Chandra Bardalai, himself an Assamese, reports that he held a meeting with five respectable native gentlemen, who decided that election was not practicable, and that the best method of constituting the Local Board was by nomination by the Deputy-Commissioner or co-optation by the existing members of the Committee. He says there is hardly any native gentleman in the subdivision who could be made Chairman, but he thinks that in five years time the district may possibly be ripe for the elective system.

27. In the Lakhimpur district the Deputy-Commissioner took counsel with the members of the existing Committee, before whom he laid the Chief Commissioner's Circular of the 5th June. It was unanimously resolved that a Local Board was possible only for each subdivision, and for no smaller area; that election was impracticable; that members should be selected by the Deputy Commissioner geographically, to represent all parts of the district; that the period of service should be two years; that no Native gentleman was fit to be Chairman (a conclusion in which, it is said, the Native gentlemen present were particularly emphatic), and that no European would take the trouble; that consequently the Deputy-Commissioner was the only person who could fill the post. Lakhimpur.

A meeting was held at Dibrugarh on the 20th August, but does not appear to have been very numerously attended. The only resolutions passed were one advocating election, and another appointing a Committee to carry out the objects of the meeting.

28. The Commissioner of the Assam Valley, whose letter forwarding these replies is dated the 17th October, writes with the authority which his ability and long experience give him, and which the Chief Commissioner, though in some respects differing from him, fully recognises. His remarks as to the most important questions,—the capacity and wish of the people for self-government, the elective system, the position of the Deputy-Commissioner, and the necessity of having an official Chairman,—are quoted below in full. As to other points, he considers that the proportion of European to Native members should in no case exceed one-half; that the allotment of funds to the different Local Boards in each district should be done through a Central Board, at which delegates from the Local Boards should attend; and that courtesy titles, if given at all, should only be given to those members who have rendered special services:— The Commissioner of the Assam Valley.

"13. My own views upon this important question I must confess are to a great extent in accordance with those of the majority of the District Officers. I wish, however, distinctly to state that I fully accept all that has been said by the Government of India as to the necessity of giving a political education to the people of this country. The Government of India has indicated in some detail in what manner this purpose may be effected, but it seems to me clear from its Resolution of the 18th May last that it has no desire to force these details upon any Province or district which are clearly not fitted to receive them. What, therefore, I understand we have to consider is not whether any district of this Province is fit for local self-government, pure and simple, but how far we are at present prepared to go upon the lines indicated by the Government of India, in the direction of teaching the people to take an interest in and to manage their own affairs with as little interference as possible on the part of Government.

"14. It is scarcely necessary for me to refer to the backward state of this division in the matter of education, and more especially of high education. I do not think I am exaggerating matters when I state that the very greatest difficulty is experienced here in finding a native of Assam of sufficient education to justify his appointment to any post in our offices worth Rs. 80 a month. This statement, if accepted, sufficiently indicates the material with which we have to deal at the outset in the Assam Valley in giving the people a political education. The reason of this state of things is well known to the Chief Commissioner. Speaking generally, high education in Assam ends with reading up to and passing, or not passing, the Calcutta University Entrance Examination; parents will not send their children to any of the Colleges of Bengal to complete their education, partly owing to prejudice and partly owing to want of means to enable them to do so. The result is that we have to import from Bengal almost everyone to whom we wish to give any post of trust or responsibility. Not only are the respectable Assamese of this division, as a rule, insufficiently educated, they are also by nature devoid of that energy, activity, and those business-like habits which are so needful to make a man a useful member of any Committee to which he may be appointed. All this I have no doubt will pass away in time, but we have to deal now with existing facts, and these are, I think, as I have stated them.

"15. Before considering details as to how far we may go in this division in the direction of carrying out the intentions of the Government of India, it may be as well to state that from inquiries which I have made from natives and others, I am quite convinced that, however much the people of this division may desire that their interests should be better represented at our existing Boards or Committees, they have no desire whatever, and are perfectly conscious of their present unfitness, for local self-government. The people of Assam are an essentially conservative people, and may be said

to be generally satisfied with the present state of things. It would be absurd to speak of the meetings which have been held in this division as in any way representing the wishes of the people. The meeting held at Sibságar may be regarded as having been representative to a limited extent, for the promoter of that meeting, the chief speaker at it, and the framer of its very creditable resolutions, is an Assamese gentleman of considerable acquirements and ability, well known to all the respectable people of the Sibságar district. As regards the other meetings, sufficient, I think, has been said by the local officers to show that they in no way represented public opinion. Another point to be noticed in connexion with these meetings is that of from conversation which I have had with some of the native gentlemen who attended them it seems to me very clear that the object which the Government of India has in view has been only half understood by the people. They have understood more or less the elective system, and the plan of having representative members on the Boards from all parts of a district; they have also understood the proposal to elect their own Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen, and why these officers of the Board should not be Government officials; but when it came to the question as to who was to transact the business of the several Committees, the general impression appears to have been that the Deputy-Commissioner or sub-divisional officer would do all that, and moreover see that it was properly done. I think I am right in saying that nothing of this sort was ever contemplated by the Government of India.

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"18. Regarding the mode of appointing members to the Local Boards, I have no hesitation in rejecting the elective system. The people are not sufficiently advanced to understand what such a system means. Before also we think of introducing the elective system into Assam, we must, I think, consider who there is to elect who is not already on our existing district and branch committees. We do not wish to give the people power to elect men who are not respectable, or who, if respectable, are not educated (in Assam there are many respectable persons who have received but a poor education), or who, if both respectable and educated, have no capacity for business. If, then, we wish to prevent electors from electing unfit candidates for our Boards we must have a system of election subject to Government (that is to say to the District Officer's) approval, or, as proposed at the meeting held at Sibságar, we must have the Government selecting candidates and the people electing what the District Officer selects. This will be little or no advance upon the present system, by which the Deputy-Commissioner nominates and the Government appoints, for the districts of this division are not like those of other more advanced provinces in India, where at least a dozen men might be selected by the District Officer as fit to represent a particular locality, and the people invited to elect one or more of the dozen so selected. Educated Assamese gentlemen of active business-like habits are not so numerous as to allow the people a very large field for election. They may be counted on the fingers in any district; and it is scarcely worth while, I think, to introduce the elective principle into any district which affords little or no opportunity for the people's elective propensities, supposing they have got any.

"All, then, that I think is necessary under present conditions is to insist upon all our Boards being as representative as it is possible for the District Officer to make them. The District Officer should continue to nominate, as he does now; and existing committees may be revised in order to make them more representative than they are. Should, however, the Chief Commissioner be of a different opinion, and wish to introduce the elective principle anywhere in this division, I have no serious objection to urge against its being tried in the two Municipalities of Gauháti and Dibrugarh. When experience has taught us the result of this experiment, we might see our way to extending the principle to other Municipalities, Stations, and even Unions. I cannot, however, say that I recommend the adoption of this proposal. Municipal Government in Assam has not yet proved a success, and there is no reason for supposing that the application of the elective principle at this stage of its existence will make it any more successful. This has already been recognised in Bengal, where there are Municipalities far in advance of any Municipality in this division, into which the elective system has not been introduced. Should the Chief Commissioner desire to go further still, and introduce election not only into Municipalities but also into the constitution of our District Boards, then I would say adopt the resolutions (with perhaps one or two modifications) of the meeting held at Sibságar. As already stated those resolutions have evidently been carefully thought out and drawn up, and I am pre-

pared to admit that if local self-government in any shape, or to any extent, can properly be introduced anywhere in the Province, the district of Sibságar is as well, if not better, fitted to govern itself in matters of local interest than any district of this division. Election, pure and simple, as advocated at the Jorhát meeting, is, I think, out of the question.

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"20. It is essential, I think, for some time to come that the Deputy-Commissioner should be Chairman of the District Board and the Sub-divisional Officer of the Sub-divisional Board, but they need not have a vote; it would be sufficient if they guided, without necessarily influencing the deliberations of the Board, and recorded the resolutions arrived at. The transaction of all business, and the carrying out of all resolutions, must necessarily rest with the Deputy-Commissioner or Sub-divisional Officer as Chairmen of their respective Boards. The proposal to have a non-official Chairman in any district is one which I cannot recommend for the present, though we may possibly be able to see our way to this hereafter. Indeed, I think we may accept it as a fact that no Native or even European would accept the post if offered to him, except under a mistaken apprehension of the duties which would be required of him. The appointment, however, of a non-official Vice-Chairman selected from the most intelligent of the members, who would transact a good deal of business under the supervision of the Chairman, and would thus go through a course of training, which might hereafter make him fit for election to the office of Chairman is, I think, desirable.

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"22. Next, as to the control which Government should exercise over District and Local Boards I entirely accept all that has been said by the Government of India in paragraph 17 of its Resolution of the 18th May. I am not prepared, however, now to suggest any rules declaring to what extent we should control the proceedings of the Boards; this may be considered hereafter, when the Chief Commissioner has decided upon the general question now under consideration. I also fully recognise the truth of all that is said in paragraph 18 of the Resolution of the Government of India upon the question of appointing district officers to be Chairmen ex-officio of Local Boards. I have had some experience as Chairman of two important Municipalities in Bengal (viz., Howrah and Burdwan), and I know well enough how difficult it is to induce the Native, and even some European, members of a Municipal Committee to think and act independently of the views and prepossessions of the Chairman. I think I can also say, without fear of contradiction from any District Officer in my division, that such a thing as independent native opinion expressed at a meeting, whether of a Municipal or a District Committee in this Valley, is rarely, if ever experienced. Indeed, in a matter of this kind much depends upon the character of the District Officer. It is the duty of every such officer to encourage and teach every member of his Committee to think and speak for himself, but the duty is one which is not always recognised, or, if it is recognised for a time, it is often abandoned, owing to the difficulty experienced in carrying it out, for, except in large cities and towns, independent native opinion expressed anywhere in the presence of Government officials can with difficulty be obtained, strive as we will to secure it. Admitting, however, all this, I cannot recommend, for reasons which I have already given, that for the present any rule should be laid down prohibiting the District or Sub-divisional Officer from being Chairman of a District or Local Board. All I can recommend is that they should have no vote at meetings. In the preceding paragraph, I have stated how far I think the District Magistrate should have power to control the proceedings of the Sub-divisional or Local Boards, and see that they act up to the duties required of them."

Subject resumed.

29. As observed by Mr. Ward, the district reports do not go sufficiently into the details of the problem to admit of definite orders being at once passed on all the points that require decision. In the district of Sylhet the Chief Commissioner has already said that he is willing to wait for a further expression of native opinion on the details of the policy which should be enforced. This district, from its size and importance, as well as from the complicated condition of society in it, is one in which caution and careful weighing of all that is suggested on the subject are eminently necessary. In the Assam Valley and Cachar the conditions are simpler, and in reference to them Mr. Elliott thinks that a preliminary settlement is possible.

Unit of administration of Local Boards.

30. In the first place, the Chief Commissioner is of opinion that the unit of administration for the Local Boards must for the present be the subdivision, with the

exception of Bishnáth, in Darrang, which already has a Local Board, and the proposed Board for Golpur, in the same district, should the Deputy-Commissioner see his way to constituting one there. The Májuli in Sibságar also is an isolated tract, which might, perhaps, have an independent administration given to it, and possibly in North Kámrúp it might be advantageous to have a separate administrative area. This tract was at one time proposed for constitution as a subdivision, with head-quarters at Nalbári. There are only two tea gardens in it, and a joint Board at Gauháti, formed of members from the south, which contains the bulk of the tea gardens, and the north, where the representation must be entirely native, would be in danger of conflict between the elements composing it. All proposals, such as that of Mr. Campbell from Kámrúp and Colonel Lamb from Nowgong, for having smaller units seem to be for the present impracticable, both because it would be impossible to multiply establishments, and equally impossible to put a combined establishment for the district under a number of different masters, and also because, if the resources of the district, which are even now not very extensive, are frittered away between a number of local authorities, the incentive to public spirit caused by the management of large interests will be lost, zeal in administration cannot be expected, and waste will be certain to ensue. In saying this, the Chief Commissioner does not in the least mean to deprecate schemes for fostering in villages or mauzas a common interest in local affairs, such as is afforded by the chaukidári panchávats, or by a Committee for the management of a primary or secondary school. Such things are excellent in themselves, and afford an education in the rudiments of public spirit. An active District Officer will encourage them wherever they are found, and the District Boards will no doubt gladly avail themselves of any such local assistance which may be forthcoming or capable of being brought into existence in carrying out local works or managing local institutions such as schools or dispensaries. But these are not on the same level as the District and Sub-divisional Boards, to which the present discussion refers. Mr. A. C. Campbell's scheme of constituting rural police circles, and Colonel Campbell's proposal, that the position of gaonbura, or village headman, should be elective, will receive separate consideration.

Relation of Local Boards within the district.

31. This preliminary question being settled, the next point is to consider what the relations of the Sub-divisional Boards shall be to one another, and how the funds available are to be distributed between them. This might be done either by a District Board, constituted by delegates from the Sub-divisional Boards, meeting once a year for the preparation of the budget at district head-quarters, or by the Deputy-Commissioner. On the one hand it will not in all cases be easy to choose delegates who will be willing to travel to the district head-quarters to take part in this discussion; on the other it may be thought that Mufassal Local Boards will not always receive their due unless some representative is ready to speak up for them. The distribution of funds will, however, affect materially only that portion of the resources of the Boards which is not locally raised; the portion which is locally raised will naturally be for the most part locally spent, though a small contribution may have to be levied for the support of a central establishment for keeping the combined accounts of all the Local Boards in the district. As to the portion which Government contributes from provincial finances, it may reasonably be argued that it is entitled to determine how the money can best be distributed. The Chief Commissioner is of opinion that the latter course may for the present be adopted, unless in any district the Sub-divisional Boards desire to have a delegated Board to settle these matters, when their wishes will be given effect to.

Number of members.

32. The next questions are the maximum number of members of which the Local Board should consist, in what proportion it should be constituted of natives and tea-planters, respectively, and who should be the ex-officio or official members. It appears to Mr. Elliott that a definite number of members should be fixed for each unit of local administration, in order that, if the elective principle is anywhere adopted, the candidates chosen may be secured against being swamped by additions subsequently made: and also, in order that, while adequate representation is maintained, the Board may not be too unwieldy for the despatch of business. He thinks that 8 should be the minimum number in subdivisions where the interests to be represented are few and simple, and 24 the maximum where they are many and complicated; and requests each Deputy-Commissioner to propose a definite limit for each Board in his district.

33. As regards the proportion of natives and tea-planters, what has been written above in this Resolution appears to the Chief Commissioner to show that no measure could be more fatal to the prosperity of the Province than any which would tend to alienate the powerful and energetic tea interest, and to make its representatives unwilling to continue that assistance which they have hitherto so freely rendered, with great benefit both to themselves and the State. It is true that numerically they are far outnumbered by the natives of the Province; but they control a labouring population of no small magnitude, and they own vast tracts of land, which, as has been already stated, in one district (Lakhimpur) are two-thirds of the whole settled area, in another (Sibságar) are 37 per cent. of that area, in a third (Daorang) are 30 per cent., in a fourth (Cachar) are a quarter of the whole district, and in a fifth (Nowgong) are nearly as large in proportion to the occupied area. Their interests lie in the improvement of communications and the cheapening of labour by the spread of colonisation. These are equally the interests of Government. If, on the other hand, they are less interested in the spread of education, it may, the Chief Commissioner thinks, be admitted that the extension of roads, railways, and steamer services, the building of bridges, and the reclamation of wastes, are more pressing needs of the Province than even the extension of our system of public instruction. Education will come of itself with population and wealth, and the latter will be best served by the policy which has hitherto been followed of enlisting the aid of tea-planters in developing their districts. For these reasons, it seems to Mr. Elliott that in all districts where the tea interest is important, half the non-official members of the Local Board should be tea-planters; where it is less extended, the proportion may be smaller; but this ratio should be observed in Cachar, Lakhimpur, Sibságar, and probably Darrang and Nowgong. Representatives of tea-planters.

34. As regards the official or ex-officio members who should be upon the Board, Mr. Elliott has anxiously considered the extent to which effect can be given to the wishes of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council in respect of the removal of official influence from within to without the Boards. His own desire would have been to rule broadly that the Deputy-Commissioner should never be a member of a Head-quarters Board, or the Sub-divisional Officer of a Sub-divisional Board, and that if official assistance is absolutely necessary for the purpose of providing the needful business capacity for conducting the administrative work of the Board, it should be given, as has been done in the case of the Silchar Local Board, by attaching a subordinate officer, ordinarily a native Extra-Assistant-Commissioner, to the Board, whom the members may, if they please, elect as their Chairman. But his officers are unanimous in thinking that, without the guidance and authority of the District or Sub-divisional Officer, the work of the Boards would come to a standstill. The Chief Commissioner took the opportunity of the presence at Shillong of the Deputy-Commissioners of Kámrúp, Darrang, and Sibságar, and of the late Deputy-Commissioner of Goálpára, to consult with them and the Commissioner of the Assam Valley Districts on the subject, and he finds them emphatically of opinion that the participation of the Deputy-Commissioner is for the present indispensable to the conduct of business. There is this to be said in favour of this arrangement in tea districts, that the English members of the Board, by their greater force of character and stronger interest in the objects of expenditure, would be likely, in the absence of some official arbitrator, to overbear the Native element, the weakness of which almost everywhere in this Province is sufficiently apparent. The presence of the District or Sub-divisional Officer therefore, on the Board is not so likely as it perhaps is elsewhere to stifle discussion and check the free expression of opinion, and, as a temporary measure, Mr. Elliott thinks that it may for the present be permitted wherever the local officers are convinced that it is absolutely necessary. Official members, Deputy-Commissioner or Sub-divisional officer.

35. Besides the Deputy-Commissioner at head-quarters and the Sub-divisional Officer at subdivisions, the Chief Commissioner thinks that the Civil Surgeon should be an ex-officio member of the Boards. His presence as an expert and adviser cannot but be beneficial, and his official position is not such as to make his influence in any way adverse to free discussion. It has been suggested that the District Superintendent of Police should also be an official member, since his duties, which involve constant travelling over the roads in the district, give him a better knowledge than is possessed by any individual member of the state of communications as a whole. The District Engineer and Deputy-Inspector of Schools at head-quarters, and the Sub-District Engineer and Sub-Inspector at subdivisions, may, if desired, be members, though the Other official members.

official rank of the latter is seldom such as to entitle them to meet the members of the Board on equal terms, and it will perhaps be sufficient that they should attend meetings only when questions concerning public works or schools are discussed, and should give their advice as experts, but not vote as members. If the Deputy-Commissioner or Sub-divisional Officer is not a member, one Extra-Assistant-Commissioner may be appointed. There will thus at the outside be only four official members on Sadr and three on Mufassal Local Boards. These officers should be looked upon as constituting the maximum number of officials who may be members of Local Boards. It must be borne in mind that the Government of India have ruled (and the Chief Commissioner cordially accepts the principle) that officials, unless elected, may not be more than one-third of the whole number, and that the object in view is to withdraw as far as possible all official influence from the deliberations of the Boards.

Chairman.

36. If the Deputy-Commissioner or Sub-divisional Officer is chosen as Chairman of the Board by the desire of the members, the Chief Commissioner will, as already mentioned, be prepared to confirm their nomination. But an official Chairman should not vote at the Board's meetings, except to give a casting vote when numbers are equally divided. If an official must be Chairman, the Vice-Chairman should be, if possible, a non-official. It is hoped that he may be so trained to conduct the official duties of his office that before long he will be competent to fill the post of Chairman.

Appointment of members.

37. It has now to be considered how members of Local Boards are to be appointed: if by election, the qualifications of (*a*) candidates and (*b*) electors, and the mode in which elections should be conducted.

Election.

The only districts where election has been proposed are Sibságar and Kámrúp; the suggestions in respect to the latter were made verbally by Mr. A. C. Campbell at the recent Conference, and amounted to a scheme of election by popular acclamation, the Deputy-Commissioner and his Assistants visiting each mauza or group of mauzas in turn, assembling the ryots, and inquiring of them whom they wished as their representative. In Sibságar the Jorhát meeting proposed election pure and simple, the Sibságar meeting election from a roll of candidates previously approved as eligible by the Deputy-Commissioner. Goálpára has not had an opportunity of expressing its views, but in Darrang, Nowgong, Lakhimpur, and Cachar, election is by the general voice pronounced to be impossible. Without altogether accepting this view of the case the Chief Commissioner thinks it must be admitted that there are portions of the Province where election could hardly be successfully tried in the present stage of society. At the same time there is one class of the community to be found in every plains district except Goálpára, among whom election is not only feasible, but obviously the best system of representation. There can be no reason, Mr. Elliott thinks, why the number of tea-planters whom it may be decided to appoint to a Local Board should not be elected by the body of planters resident in the sub-division; each estate might have a vote, and any planter or manager (but only one from each estate) might be either candidate or elector. Deputy Commissioners are requested to consult the planters of their districts on this subject, and to submit detailed proposals for an elective system.

Election in Kamrup.

38. With regard to the native population, the Chief Commissioner requests that Mr. A. C. Campbell will work out in detail the scheme of election by acclamation proposed by him verbally, and show exactly in what areas and by what process he would arrange to work it. Mr. Elliott has little doubt that an elaborate system of qualification, of election by voting papers, &c., is premature in a population like that of Assam. Acclamation is the natural expression of popular choice in such a stage of society; and if the temper of the people can be unmistakeably elicited in this manner, without giving an opening to any charge of undue official influence, it would be the most satisfactory mode of election which could be applied. It would be necessary, the Chief Commissioner thinks, to exclude mauzadárs from standing as candidates in their own mauzas, though they might stand in others.

Election in Sibságar.

39. In Sibságar, Colonel Campbell expresses his decided opinion that election is unadvisable, but admits that, if carried out under the condition that the electors should only vote for names on a list of approved candidates, the experiment will be safeguarded from the chief danger which may be anticipated, viz., the election of unsuitable men or disreputable agitators. Mr. Ward opposes the system, but does not strongly object to it under these conditions. Mr. Elliott is extremely anxious to make a beginning in this direction, not only because it is the wish of the Government of

India, but because the principles set forth in the Resolution of His Excellency in Council of the 18th May thoroughly commend themselves to his judgment as sound and wise. He cannot accept the argument suggested by Mr. Ward, that if election gives us the same men as we now have by nomination, which, on the hypothesis that properly representative members are now chosen, it should do, to adopt the former instead of the latter means of selection would make no difference in the situation. It would make this difference, that the elected member would feel, what the nominated member does not, that he has a constituency at his back, whose interests, as well as his own, he is bound to advocate, and to whom he is responsible for the trust reposed in him. Such elected members would assuredly in the course of time realise their responsibility, as the constituencies would their power. More and more public interest would be aroused, and a higher standard of public duty insensibly attained. The process of education may be slow, but it is necessary to make a beginning. The only danger that is to be anticipated is that the experiment may fail through the want of interest felt in it by the people. Sufficient candidates may not come forward, or very few electors may come to the poll. If so, it will at any rate be well that the experiment should have been tried. And, as the Commissioner admits the Sibságar district to be, of all those in the valley, the best suited for such an experiment, the beginning should, Mr. Elliott thinks, be made there. The Deputy-Commissioner will be requested to consider carefully how the details of the system should be worked out, how many of the Government ryots will be included if the qualification proposed by the Sibságar meeting is adopted, whether any other qualification is preferable, into what areas the voters should be grouped, how and where the voting should be carried on, and to report on this and other kindred points, submitting a complete scheme for the Chief Commissioner's approval. The proposals of the Sibságar meeting will be circulated to other Deputy-Commissioners in the Assam Valley, and they will be requested to consider whether, either in their district as a whole, or any part of it, a similar system could be put in force. In Kámrúp and Goálpára the Deputy-Commissioners should suggest to the leaders of native society the propriety of calling meetings to elicit an expression of opinion.

Nomination.

40. Where election is not possible, the best representatives of the native community should be nominated by the Deputy Commissioner, and care taken that, as far as practicable, all parts of the area served by the Local Board are provided with someone to advocate their interests.

Term of office.

41. As regards the term of office, it seems to the Chief Commissioner that two years should be the normal period for which a Commissioner should hold office: but, in order to avoid a breach of continuity; such as would be caused if all members vacated their seats all the same time, the members of the Local Boards first chosen should be separated by ballot into two equal portions, one of which should retire after two years, and the other after three. Thus every year one-half of the non-official members will leave the Board, and require re-appointment before they can re-occupy their seats.

Quorum.

42. The quorum for the transaction of business at Board meetings should, in Mr. Elliott's opinion, be fixed so as not to fall below one-third of the total number of members forming the Board, and in no case be less than four, even with a Board of the minimum number.

Powers of Local Boards. Receipts.

43. The powers which should be conferred upon the Local Boards fall naturally under the two heads of receipts and expenditure. Under receipts, it is to be observed that one of the most important points insisted on by the Government of India is that Local Boards should be given some interest in the development of revenue and the increase of their resources, as well as in the spending of them. It is, however, by no means easy to suggest any considerable head of revenue which could without risk be made over to local control. The resources of the Local Boards arise (with insignificant exceptions) from (1) the Assam local rate, (2) ferry-tolls, (3) the pound surplus, and (4) grants from Provincial Funds. The first is by law leviable at the rate of 1 anna 4 pie on every rupee of annual value: it is already levied everywhere except in Sylhet at the rate of 1 anna in the rupee, the extra 4 pie not being taken, because that addition was made by the framers of the Regulation to provide a famine surplus, under Section 12, clause (*a*), and the Government of India have not required any such surplus to be raised in this Province. One anna is therefore the maximum rate, as the law at present stands. It would be possible to permit the Committees to decrease this rate (as is allowed in Bengal under Section 148 of the Bengal Public Works Cess Act, IX. (B.C.) of 1880), if on a review of their require-

Control over local rates.

ments they thought this necessary. The Governor-General in Council has recently declared that it is his particular desire that the inauguration of the system should not be accompanied by any increase of taxation. But it is to be remembered that in this backward Province every rupee that can be spent in the improvement of communications is well laid out, and that much more money than can be afforded might profitably be expended for this object. It does not, therefore, seem desirable to encourage Local Boards to reduce their collections in local rates, and therefore it will not be expedient, Mr. Elliott thinks, at present to give them any voice in determining its amount, which now bears with an equal pressure on all landed interests in the Province.

Control over ferry receipts.

44. In the case of ferry-tolls, there is more ground for consulting local wants and wishes. The law (Act XVII. of 1878, Section 15) leaves the fixing of the tolls at each ferry to the Local Government, and under this provision ferries in the Brahmaputra Valley and Sylhet have been divided into three classes according to their size, in each of which similar rates are charged everywhere in these districts. In Cachar the classification and rates are somewhat different, but the principle is the same. The classification is at present somewhat irregular, and ferries which in one district would be reckoned 1st class are placed in other districts in the 2nd or 3rd class. These ferries yield a handsome surplus, after paying for the services rendered, and, as the tolls are doubtless capable of adjustment with greater nicety to the amount of the work for which they are paid, the Chief Commissioner would be ready to give due weight to the representations of any Local Board, which, after a careful discussion of the matter, resolved to propose an increase or reduction in the tolls levied at any particular ferry or an alteration in its class. Deputy-Commissioners are requested to report on this point, after consulting the Local Boards.

Pounds.

45. In regard to pounds, the law leaves their management to the Magistrate. This source of income, based as it is on the culpable negligence of the people, cannot by its nature be a popular one; and although it is idle to expect that it will ever, so long as the law remains in force, disappear, it may be hoped that in the course of time it will gradually decrease. It does not therefore seem expedient to give the Local Boards any authority to interfere with it, though a local Committee might perhaps be established in the neighbourhood of each pound, where the materials for such a Committee exist, who should scrutinise its working, and see that the rules are properly administered, and all receipts duly credited. Local Boards might also be given the power to close or transfer pounds, or establish new ones, if they should desire to receive this authority, which is now vested in the Deputy Commissioner.

Expenditure.

46. In regard to expenditure, the present rules are those made by the late Chief Commissioner under the Local Rates Regulation, and published on the 18th June 1880, as modified by paragraphs 26 to 28 of the Chief Commissioner's Resolution No. 1,912 of the 10th May last. These rules generally declare that before any expenditure is incurred a budget must be submitted and approved by the Chief Commissioner; that the initiative in proposing expenditure of any description rests with the Local Committee; that estimates should be drawn up for each work before it is put in hand; that proposals for works costing under Rs. 2,000 may be passed by the Committee's Chairman, estimates in excess of this being sent up to the Superintending Engineer for sanction; that works not entered in the budget may be sanctioned by the Chairman up to a limit of Rs. 1,000, if the amount can be arranged for by transfer from some other head. These orders are contained in rules which the Chief Commissioner is empowered to make under Section 15 of the Local Rates Regulation, and they seem unobjectionable. The present limits of power to sanction expenditure without reference may remain unaltered in the case of Local Boards at head-quarters: at sub-divisions they may, Mr. Elliott thinks, be fixed at one-half those for Sadr Local Boards.

Expenditure on Establishments.

47. In regard to establishments, it seems to the Chief Commissioner that the best method of defining the powers of the Local Boards in this respect will be to prescribe a maximum percentage upon the amount expended on works, which the establishment entertained is not without special sanction to exceed. In the Panjab this limit has been fixed at 20 per cent. Mr. Elliott desires to receive suggestions from District Officers as to the limit which should be imposed in Assam.

Payment of members of Local Boards.

48. In connexion with expenditure, the question has been raised whether the members of the Local Boards should be paid for attendance at the meetings. This has been proposed in some Provinces, and there is much to be said in its favour. But

Mr. Elliott would rather see the members compensated for the trouble to which they are put in attending meetings by receiving travelling allowances. Deputy-Commissioners are requested to report on this point, and to state whether they would recommend the rates of travelling allowance fixed for Government officers, or those fixed for the attendance of witnesses in civil courts, to be applied to the case of members of Local Boards.

Departments administered by Local Boards.

49. At present the departments administered by Local Boards in Assam are the following:—

Local Public Works.
District Post.
Education, Primary Schools, and grants-in-aid to Lower and Middle Schools.
Medical Charity.
Fairs.
Rewards for the destruction of wild beasts.
Circuit-houses and Staging-bungalows.

It has been suggested that, in addition to these, the control of the expenditure on vaccination, and that on Government middle and high schools, should also be made over to them.

Vaccination.

50. In respect to vaccination, though the subject is no doubt one which might most fitly engage the attention of local bodies, it seems questionable whether this Province is as yet ripe for its transfer to local control. For the last two years increased grants have been devoted to this purpose by the Provincial Administration. The Department is one the cost of which is likely to grow as time goes on, and to transfer it now might check its development; besides which, popular opinion is not, Mr. Elliott believes, as yet sufficiently educated in Assam to discern the advantages of extending vaccination. If, however, any Local Board should desire to be entrusted with the control of this department, and can convince the Chief Commissioner that it will be efficiently administered within its jurisdiction, he will be ready to try the experiment of transferring it.

High and middle schools.

51. The same may be said of the higher schools. The justification of the retention of these (which are all Government, not aided, institutions) in the hands of the Provincial Administration is that it is necessary to maintain a uniform system and to set a standard of excellence as an example to local effort. At the same time, the assistance of the leaders of the native community can be most usefully given in supervising the working of the schools, checking anything which may make it unpopular, suggesting any adaptation of existing methods to the popular wish, and so forth; and the Chief Commissioner has already said to the Sylhet Committee that if they will take over the high school there, on the understanding that its status is not to be altered and the departmental rules are to be maintained, he will gladly make it over to their care. The same permission will be given to all Local Boards on the same terms.

Control of Local Administration.

52. Lastly, it remains to define the control to be exercised by the Local Administration over the Local Boards. This is provided for by the machinery of the budget. The initiative is left to the Local Board, which determines the works to be undertaken and submits its proposals for approval by the Chief Commissioner. Mr. Elliott does not see how any change in this procedure can advisably be made; and the only additions he would propose to make to it are (1) to provide that if a Local Board, after due warning, neglect to carry out any work which, in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner, is absolutely necessary, the Provincial Administration may step in and carry out the work by its own officers, charging the expense to the Board; and (2) that in case of prolonged neglect, and persistent inattention to its duties, the Chief Commissioner may supersede a Local Board altogether, reporting the orders and his reasons for it to the Supreme Government, and arranging for carrying out the functions of the Board as may seem most advisable.

Proceedings of Local Boards to be reported.

53. All the proceedings of Local Boards at district head-quarters should be immediately reported to the Deputy-Commissioner, and, in the Assam Valley Districts, by him to the Commissioner of the Division, while those of Sub-divisional Boards should similarly be reported to the Sub-divisional Officer, and by him sent on to the Deputy-Commissioner. The monthly accounts must also be sent in punctually and submitted to the Deputy-Commissioner for examination, whether he is a member of the Committee or not. These are essential requirements, to enable the Deputy-Com-

missioner to exercise the external control and supervision which forms a necessary portion of the scheme as set forth in the Government of India's Resolution of the 18th May last.

Conclusion.

54. Mr. Elliott has now sketched in such detail as at present appears practicable the direction which the legislation considered necessary by the Government of India to define the relations between Government and the local bodies should, in his opinion, take in this Province. There are still many points on which information is wanting. In the course of the coming cold weather the Chief Commissioner hopes to visit every Plains District of the Province, and to discuss with the existing Local Boards and Municipal Committees their projects and requirements. He trusts that District Officers will in this interval consider carefully the various points indicated in this Resolution as needing further attention, and will favour him with their matured views upon all of them not later than the 1st April next.

ORDERED, that this Resolution be published in the "Assam Gazette."

By order of the Chief Commissioner of Assam,
C. J. LYALL,
Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

PROCEEDINGS of a PUBLIC MEETING held at SIBSÁGAR, in the premises of the ENGLISH HIGH SCHOOL, on the 6th July 1882.

THERE were present Adhikar Gossains, Mahantas, Dewans, Government pensioners and officials, Pleaders, Kowars, Gohais, Baruás, Phukans, Rajkhowas, Gogois, Thakurs, Hazarikas, Sykias, Borahs, Medhis, Sájtollas, Mollás, Gowburas, Heads of villages and communities, Traders, Shopkeepers, and others, all numbering about four thousand natives of different parts of the district, a greater portion of whom remained outside the building for want of accommodation.

Babu Dinonath Bezbarua, late extra Assistant-Commissioner, was voted to the Chair, and, after the purport of the Resolution of the Government of India on self-government having been explained, and a translation of the Circular No. 20, dated the 5th June 1882, of the Chief Commissioner of Assam, having been read before the meeting, the following Resolutions were unanimously carried:—

RESOLUTION I.

That a vote of thanks to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India for the great boon of self-government which His Excellency has been graciously pleased to confer on the people of India, and to the Chief Commissioner of Assam and to the Deputy-Commissioner of Sibságar for the liberal manner in which they heartily desire to give effect to the intentions of the Supreme Government, be recorded.

RESOLUTION II.

That this meeting consider that for the present there should be three Boards established in the district of Sibságar, viz., the District Board at Sibságar, one Local Board at Jorhát, and one at Golághát.

RESOLUTION III.

That for the purpose of securing homogeneity of operations of all the Boards in general matters, the District Board should have some control on the Local Boards. All matters of common interest should be decided at periodical meetings of the District Board attended by delegates from Local Boards.

RESOLUTION IV.

That the existing Municipalities in this district, being at present quite poor, they should not be made independent, but should be made subordinate to the District and Local Boards.

RESOLUTION V.

That the district of Sibságar is pre-eminently fit for the system of election, and that this meeting consider the system fully practicable in this district. It is therefore

desirable that it should be adopted here for the constitution of District, Local, and Municipal Boards.

RESOLUTION VI.

That a system of election of Native members according to the following procedure is practicable, and desirable to be adopted in this district.

Procedure.

1. The district should, for the purpose of election, be divided into three parts, corresponding with the sadr and two sub-divisions. The votes of electors should be recorded at the head-quarters of the divisions in which they reside. Should the Deputy-Commissioner and the Sub-divisional Officers consider it inconvenient to the electors of the distant parts of the division to give their votes at head-quarters, they may fix other places for recording votes of such electors.

2. Persons possessing the following qualifications may only apply for membership :—

i. That he is above 21 years of age.
ii. That he is a resident of the district.
iii. That he is educated and that he has a competent knowledge in reading and writing of at least the Vernacular language if not English.
iv. That he is a man of respectable standing in Native society.

3. Only such persons as are above 21 years of age, and who possess any of the under-mentioned qualifications shall have the privilege of an elector, viz. :—

i. That they pay to Government an annual land revenue in this district or sub-division not less than Rs. 20.
ii. That they pay in this district or sub-division not less than Rs. 2 as municipal tax.
iii. That they are either holders of grants of lá-khiráj or of debottar land.

4. The Deputy-Commissioner and the Sub-divisional Officers will issue notices explaining the system of election under which the Boards are to be constituted and the necessary qualifications for eligibility for the office of members, and inviting qualified candidates to send in to the Deputy-Commissioner of Sub-divisional Officer their applications on or before a fixed day, specifying the Board in which they may desire to serve.

5. The Deputy-Commissioner and the Sub-divisional Officers will appoint in each division a Committee of one Government officer and four independent respectable Native gentlemen to prepare a list of candidates from among the applicants whom they may consider qualified under Clause 2 of this procedure as to be eligible for the office of member. Should any or all the Native members of this Committee be themselves candidates for membership, the application of any of them should be decided by the other three members and the Government officer of the Committee or by the Deputy-Commissioner or the Sub-divisional Officer himself.

6. The Deputy-Commissioner and the Sub-divisional Officers will issue second notices through the mauzadárs, containing the list of eligible candidates, the dates of election, and the particular spot or spots at which votes will be recorded and the qualifications of electors, and requiring the qualified electors to appear at the fixed spot or spots on the fixed dates with their pattas or any other documents testifying to their property qualifications, and to give their votes.

7. At least not less than seven days shall be fixed during which electors may come and give their votes.

8. Copies of the aforesaid notices should be circulated in every village through the mauzadárs and mandals, who should be directed to take signatures of the principal inhabitants of every village on the copies of the first notice, and the signatures of all the qualified electors on the copies of the second notice, and every mauzadár should also be directed to explain to the qualified electors their new rights and duties to give votes.

9. The Deputy-Commissioner and the Sub-divisional Officer will appoint for each subdivision a Committee of not less than three members, selected from among the following officers, to receive and record votes; or make any other arrangement for record of

votes as the Deputy-Commissioner and the Sub-divisional Officers may consider proper :

The Assistant-Commissioner.
The Extra-Assistant-Commissioner.
The District-Superintendent of Police.
The Head-master of School.
The Deputy-Inspector of Schools.
The Sub-Inspector of Schools.

10. On the dates and at the spot or spots fixed for record of votes, the members of the above-mentioned Committee should be present and receive votes of electors. A list of the candidates shall be fixed there at a prominent place accessible to all the electors.

11. The Committee shall be provided with a small book or a sheet of paper for each candidate, containing his name, in which the votes given in favour of each qualified candidate shall be recorded.

12. An elector shall have the right of only one vote, to be given in favour of one of the candidates of the published list.

13. The candidates may be present at the time of record of votes, and there shall be no objection to their speaking with the electors, provided they do not thereby cause any disturbance to the Committee.

14. The required number of members shall be those who shall have obtained the highest number of votes received at one electoral centre, if there be one, or the highest number of votes accumulated from several electoral centres, if there be more than one in the same division.

15. On the demise or resignation of any member his place shall be filled up until the next general election by a person nominated by the members of the Board.

16. Should the number of candidates who have obtained votes be short of the required number of elected members the elected native members will choose from among the candidates of the published list as many as may be necessary to make up the required number of members.

Resolution VII.

That the Boards should be constituted of official and non-official members according to the following proportion, viz. :—

European and Native official members - -	one-fourth.
European non-official members - - -	one-eighth.
Native non-official members - - - -	five-eighths.

That official members may be nominated or elected, as the Deputy-Commissioner considers desirable.

That European non-official members shall be elected by the European residents in the district or by the Europeans and Natives if the European candidates so desire.

That Native non-official members shall be elected by all classes of people.

Resolution VIII.

That after every three years all the elected members shall retire, with the privilege of being re-elected, and a new election shall take place.

Resolution IX.

That this meeting consider that there are Native gentlemen in this district fit for the office of Chairman, but this meeting do not, by expression of this opinion, mean to be understood as praying for appointment of specially Native gentlemen as Chairman. In the opinion of this meeting, the Boards should be allowed, as desired by the Supreme Government, to elect their own Chairmen, whoever they may be, submitting their nominations to the Local Government for sanction.

RESOLUTION X.

That a Committee be formed of the following gentlemen to sign, on behalf of this meeting, the foregoing proceedings, and to submit the same to Colonel A. E. Campbell, Deputy-Commissioner of Sibságar, for his favourable consideration :—

Babu Dinonath Bezbarua.
„ Gunga Gobind Phukan.
„ Debanand Adhikar Gossain.
„ Akshay Kumar Ghose, B.A., B.L.
„ Indibar Barua.
„ Bishnu Prosad Barua.
„ Poddeshar Phukan.
„ Sidhes Phukan.
Dewan Faizar Raheem.

The meeting was dissolved, with a vote of thanks to the Chair.

We, the undersigned Members of the Special Committee constituted by Resolution X. of the public meeting held at Sibságar on the 6th instant, beg to submit, on behalf of the general meeting, the foregoing proceedings to Colonel A. E. Campbell, Deputy-Commissioner of Sibságar, for his favourable consideration.

DINA NÁTH SARMA BEZBARUA, Chairman.
GUNGA GOBIND PHUKAN.
BISTU PROSAD BARUA.
INDIBAR BARUA.
PODDESHAR PHUKAN.
SIDDHESWAR PHUKAN.
DEBÁNANDA GOSWÁMI ADHIKÁR.
SYED FAIZUR RAHIM.

SIBSAGAR:
The 14th July 1882.

From A. MACKENZIE, ESQ., SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
to THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM.

Home Department.
Public, No. 1.

SIR, Fort William, January 2, 1883.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 6594, dated the 20th December 1882, forwarding a copy of a Resolution No. 1784, dated 2nd November 1882, embodying the measures which you propose to take for giving effect to the views of the Government of India on the subject of local self-government.

2. In reply, I am to say that the orders contained in your Resolution of the 2nd November 1882 are generally approved by the Governor-General in Council. It is possible, however, that a further communication may have to be addressed to you with reference to some of the detailed arrangements proposed in your previous Resolution, No. 1912 of the 10th May 1882, to the carrying out of which difficulties are anticipated.

I have, &c.

ACT No. I. OF 1883.

THE CENTRAL PROVINCES LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT ACT, 1883.

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An Act to make better Provision for Local Self-Government in the Central Provinces.

Whereas provision has been made by the Central Provinces Land-revenue Act, 1881, for the appointment of mukaddams for the several villages in the territories administered by the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces; and

Whereas provision has been made in the settlement-records of the districts in those territories for the levy of rates for the maintenance of roads, schools, and the district post, and it is proposed that the Government shall, from time to time, assign certain sums, or the income accruing from certain sources, for expenditure on objects tending to promote the welfare and improvement of the inhabitants of each of those districts;

It is hereby enacted as follows:—

Preliminary.

1. This Act may be called the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act, 1883. Short title.

It shall extend only to the territories for the time being administered by the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces; and it shall come into force at once. Local extent. Commencement.

Definitions.

2. In this Act—

"Assistant Commissioner" includes an Extra Assistant Commissioner in any district where there is no Assistant Commissioner:

"Financial year" means the year commencing on the first day of April:

"Village" includes any tract of land which, at the last settlement of that land, has been recognized as a village, or which the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, declare to be a village for the purposes of the Central Provinces Land-revenue Act, 1881; and

"Mukaddam" means the executive headman of a village appointed under that Act.

Formation of Local Administrative Areas.

Aggregation of villages in circles and groups for purposes of local self-government.

3. (1.) The Chief Commissioner shall, by order in writing, for the purposes of the local self-government of each district, aggregate the several villages thereof in circles and the circles in groups.

(2.) There shall be excluded from the circles and groups formed under this section such portions of the district as are for the time being included in the limits of a military cantonment or of a town having a municipal committee.

(3.) The Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, by order in writing, vary any order made under this section.

Constitution of Local Administrative Bodies.

Establishment of local boards for groups and of district councils for districts.

4. There shall be established for each group of circles a local board having authority over that group, and for each district a district council having authority over the entire district, except such portions thereof as are for the time being included in the limits of a military cantonment or of a town having a municipal committee.

Constitution of local board.

5. The local board for a group of circles shall consist of—

(*a*) representative members, one or more for each circle, being the mukaddam or mukaddams of a village or villages within that circle;

(*b*) representatives, one or more, of mercantile classes or professions, resident within the area comprised in the group, and elected by, or appointed on behalf of, those classes or professions; and

(*c*) such person or persons, if any, not exceeding in number one-third of the board, as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time appoint.

Constitution of district council.

6. The district council of a district shall consist of—

(*a*) representatives of groups of circles within the district, one or more for each group, being a member or members of, and elected by, the local board for that group;

(*b*) representatives, one or more, of mercantile classes or professions, resident within the district, and elected by, or appointed on behalf of, those classes or professions; and

(*c*) such person or persons, if any, not exceeding in number one-third of the council, as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time appoint.

Power to set aside election or remove member in case of conviction of offence.

7.—(1.) If a person convicted by a criminal Court of an offence the commission of which in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner shows him to be unfit to be a member of a local board or district council is elected as such member, the Chief Commissioner may declare his election void.

(2.) If a member of such a board or council is so convicted of any such offence, the Chief Commissioner may declare his office to be vacant.

Incorporation of district council.

8. Every district council shall be a body corporate by the name of the district council of its district, shall have perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property, both moveable and immoveable, to transfer any moveable property, and, with the previous approval in writing of the Deputy Commissioner, any immoveable property, held by it, and to contract and do all other things necessary for the purposes of its constitution, and may sue and be sued in its corporate name.

Duties of District Councils and Local Boards.

Matters to be administered by board and council.

9. The following matters shall, subject to such exceptions as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time, by order in writing make, be under the control and

administration of the district council and of the local boards within the areas subject respectively to their authority :—

(*a.*) The construction, repair and maintenance, of roads and other means of communication :

(*b.*) The management, maintenance, and visiting of schools, hospitals, dispensaries, markets, rest-houses, saráís and other public institutions, and the construction and repair of all buildings connected with these institutions :

(*c.*) The construction and repair of public wells, tanks and water-works, the supply of water from them and from other sources, and the preservation from pollution of water for drinking and cooking purposes :

(*d.*) The planting and preservation of trees on public ground :

(*e.*) The establishment and maintenance of relief-works in time of famine or scarcity :

(*f.*) The establishment and management of pounds, including, where the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871, is in operation, all the functions of the Local Government and the Magistrate of the District under sections four, five, six, seven, twelve, fourteen, and seventeen, and clause (*a*) of section eighteen, of that Act :

(*g.*) The management of such public ferries as may be entrusted to their charge under section 7 A of the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, as amended by this Act :

(*h.*) Any other local works or measures likely to promote the health, comfort, or convenience of the public ; and

(*i.*) The maintenance of any building, or other property, vested under this Act in the district council.

Relations of Local Boards to District Councils.

Duties of local board.

10.—(1.) A local board as the agent of, and subject to the control of, the district council, shall, within the area subject to its authority, have the control and administration of, and be responsible for, all the matters specified in section nine except such of those matters as the district council may think fit to take under its direct control and administration, and such as the Chief Commissioner may have excepted by order under section nine.

(2.) It shall be the duty of the district council to enforce the responsibility imposed on a local board by sub-section (1).

Reports, estimates and accounts to be submitted by board to council.

11. Every local board shall submit annually to the district council of its district, on or before such date as the council may appoint in this behalf, a statement of the requirements, and an estimate of the probable expenditure, of the board for the coming financial year, and a report of its proceedings, and an account of its receipts and expenditure for the past financial year, and shall also submit to the council such other reports, if any, as the council may, from time to time, require.

Limits on expenditure of local board.

12. A local board shall not incur expenses or undertake liabilities, to any amount exceeding the limit imposed by the district council of its district.

Power for council to reverse or vary resolution of board.

13. A district council may, by a majority of two-thirds of its whole number, reverse or vary any resolution of a local board for an area within its district.

Power for council to provide for performance of duty in default of board.

14.—(1.) If the local board makes default in the performance of any duty imposed on it by or under this Act, the district council may, by order in writing, fix a period for the performance of the duty.

(2.) If the duty is not performed within that period, the council may appoint some person to perform it, and may provide for the expenses of, and incidental to, its performance out of the funds appropriated to or for the purposes of the local board.

Power to declare local boards independent.

15.—(1.) The Chief Commissioner may from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, declare any local board established under this Act to be an independent board, and may in like manner cancel such notification.

(2.) A local board so declared shall, while the notification is in force, so far as may be, have within the area subject to its authority the powers, and perform the duties, of a district council under this Act, and shall cease to be the agent of, and under the control of, the district council.

School Committees.

Appointment of school committees.

16.—(1.) Every district council, and every local board as the agent of, and subject to the control of, its district council, may from time to time appoint school committees for the several schools under its control and administration, and shall as far as may be practicable conduct the management of any school for which such a committee has been appointed through that committee.

(2.) All school committees existing within the area subject to the authority of any district council or local board at the time that council or board comes into existence shall be deemed to have been appointed under this section.

Joint Committees.

Joint committee of two or more local boards.

17.—(1.) A local board may, from time to time, concur with any other local board or boards for an area or areas in the same district, in appointing, out of their respective bodies, joint committees for any purpose in which they are jointly interested, and in delegating to any such committee any power which might be exercised by either or any of the local boards, and in framing and modifying regulations as to the proceedings of any such joint committee.

(2.) If any dispute arises between two or more local boards acting under this section, the decision thereon of the district council of their district shall be final.

Joint committee of two or more district councils.

18.—(1.) A district council may, from time to time, concur with any other district council or district councils in appointing, out of their respective bodies, joint committees for any purpose in respect of which they are jointly interested, and in delegating to any such committee any power which might be exercised by any or either of the district councils, and in framing and modifying regulations as to the proceedings of any such joint committee.

(2.) If any dispute arises between two or more district councils acting under this section, the decision thereon of the Commissioner, if the councils are in the same division, or, if they are not in the same division, of the Chief Commissioner, shall be final.

Conduct of Business.

Chairman.

19.—(1.) Every district council and local board shall, from time to time, elect one of its members to be chairman for one financial year at all meetings at which he is present.

(2.) If the chairman so elected dies, resigns, or becomes incapable of acting, the council or board shall elect another of its members to be chairman for the period during which the person so dying, resigning, or becoming incapable would have been entitled to continue in office, and no longer.

(3.) An election under the foregoing provisions of this section shall not be valid until it is approved, in the case of the chairman of a local board, by the Commissioner of the division, and, in the case of the chairman of a district council, by the Chief Commissioner.

(4.) If when any meeting is held the office of chairman is vacant or the chairman is absent from the meeting, the members present shall appoint one of their number to be chairman thereat.

Regulations as to meetings and proceedings.

20.—(1.) Every district council and local board may, from time to time, make regulations as to the time and place of its meetings, the conduct of proceedings at meetings, and the appointment, powers and proceedings of committees:

(2.) Provided that every regulation made under this section must be consistent with this Act and with any rules made by the Chief Commissioner under this Act.

Officers and Servants.

Employment of officers and servants.

21.—(1.) Every district council may employ such officers and servants as may be necessary and proper for the efficient execution of its duties and may assign to them such pay, leave allowances, gratuities and pensions as it thinks fit.

(2.) A local board may employ such officers and servants, and may assign to them such pay, leave allowances, gratuities and pensions as the district council of its district thinks requisite and sufficient.

(3.) In the case of an officer lent by the Government, the council or board may contribute to any leave allowance, gratuity, or pension, which he may become entitled to in accordance with the rules for the time being in force.

(4.) If, in the opinion of the Commissioner,

(*a*) the number of persons employed by a council or board under this section, or the pay, allowances, gratuities or pensions assigned by the council or board to those persons, or to any particular person, is or are excessive, or

(*b*) any such person is unfit for his employment,

the council or board shall, on the requirement of the Commissioner, reduce the number or remuneration, or, as the case may be, dismiss the unfit person.

Vesting of Property.

Power to vest property in district council.

22. The Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that any property, moveable or immoveable, which is vested in Her Majesty and is situate in the Central Provinces, shall vest in any district council; and thereupon that property shall vest in that council for the purposes of this Act, subject to all rights over, and all debts, liabilities, and obligations, (if any) affecting, that property.

Finance.

Constitution, custody and application of district fund.

23.—(1.) There shall be formed for each district a fund to be called the district fund, and there shall be placed to the credit thereof—

(*a*) the net proceeds (after deducting the expenses of collection) of all rates levied in accordance with settlement-records in that district for the maintenance of roads or schools;

(*b*) such portion (if any) of the surplus of the rates so levied for the maintenance of the district post as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time assign in this behalf;

(*c*) the surplus accruing in that district under section eighteen of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871;

(*d*) the proceeds of public ferries payable into the district fund of that district under section 7A of The Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, as amended by this Act;

(*e*) all sums assigned, from time to time, by the Chief Commissioner for expenditure on local works in that district, under section five of the Central Provinces Additional Rates Act, 1878, section seventeen of the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, or any enactment amending either of those Acts;

(*f*) all such rents and profits accruing from nazul property in that district as the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, direct to be paid to the district council;

(*g*) all sums contributed to the fund by the Government, local bodies, or private persons; and

(*h*) all sums received by the district council in the execution of this Act.

(2.) The district fund shall be vested in the district council, and the balance standing to the credit of the fund shall be kept in the Government treasury of the district.

(3.) The district fund shall be applicable to the payment, in whole or in part, of the charges and expenses incidental to the several matters specified in sections nine and twenty-one, within the area subject to the authority of the district council, and, with the sanction of the Chief Commissioner, outside of that area, and also to the following purposes:—

(*a*) the payment of school inspectors and normal school teachers appointed and controlled by the Government and employed in the district, and the provision of scholarships and prizes for schools in the district;

(*b*) the payment of subordinate medical officers (including vaccinators) appointed by the Government, and employed in the district; and

(*c*) the expenses attending the audit of the accounts of the district council and of the local boards within the district.

Provided that the amount expended from the district fund in any financial year on primary education shall not be less than the estimated net proceeds for that year of

the rates levied in the district in accordance with the settlement-records for the maintenance of schools.

(4.) When a local board has been declared independent under section fifteen, such portion of the district fund as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time fix in this behalf shall, during its independence, be annually set apart and placed at its disposal, and shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as a separate district fund.

Annual estimates of income and expenditure.

24.—(1.) Every district council shall appoint a finance committee consisting of not less than three of its number.

(2.) Every district council shall, on or before the prescribed day in each year, hold a meeting at which the finance committee shall submit to the council, in such form as the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, by rule prescribe, an estimate of the income and expenditure of the council for the next financial year.

(3.) The district council shall consider the estimate, and may provisionally approve of it with or without modification.

(4.) The district council shall, on or before the prescribed day, cause a copy of the estimate as provisionally approved by it to be sent to the Deputy Commissioner.

(5.) The Deputy Commissioner may object to the estimate on the ground that any expenditure on salaries, works, or otherwise, proposed therein, appears to him to be unnecessary or excessive, or that any particular contained therein appears to him to be erroneous, defective, or improper.

(6.) If the Deputy Commissioner so objects, he shall signify his objections in writing to the district council; if he does not so object, he shall signify his approval in like manner.

(7.) When the Deputy Commissioner signifies, under sub-section (6), objections to an estimate, the district council shall consider his objections, and either modify the estimate so as to remove them, or refer the estimate with the statement of objections, through the Deputy Commissioner, to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner shall signify to the district council his approval of the estimate, with or without such modifications as may be needed to remove the objections wholly or in part as he thinks fit.

(8.) When the Deputy Commissioner or Commissioner has signified his approval of an estimate, or the district council has modified an estimate so as to remove the Deputy Commissioner's objections, no expenditure which is not provided for in the estimate as approved or modified shall be incurred during the year to which the estimate relates without the previous sanction of the Commissioner.

(9.) "Prescribed day," for the purposes of sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) of this section, means such day as the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, by rule prescribe for the purposes of that sub-section.

(10.) When the Deputy Commissioner is a member of the district council, the Commissioner shall take the place of the Deputy Commissioner for the purposes of this section, and the reference under sub-section (7) shall be to the Chief Commissioner.

Annual accounts and audit.

25. Accounts of the receipts and expenditure of every district council shall be made up to the last day of every financial year, in such form as the Chief Commissioner, from time to time, prescribes, and shall be examined and audited as soon as may be after the end of each financial year by such persons as the Chief Commissioner, from time to time, appoints in this behalf.

Inspection of estimates and accounts.

26. The district council shall cause a copy of every estimate provisionally or finally approved under section twenty-four, and of every account made up under section twenty-five, to be kept at its office; and any person may at all reasonable times inspect any such estimate or account.

Publication of abstract of accounts.

27. An abstract of every annual account of a district council, showing the income of the district fund under each head of receipts, the charges for establishment, the works undertaken, the sums expended on each work, and the balance, if any, of the fund remaining unspent, shall be prepared by the district council in such form as the Chief Commissioner from time to time prescribes, and published annually in the English and vernacular official Gazettes.

Control.

Deputy Commissioner's power of supervision.

28.—(1.) The Deputy Commissioner of a district shall have power to supervise the proceedings of the district council, and of every local board, joint committee,

or school committee in the district, and in exercise of that power may (among other things)—

(*a*) enter on and inspect, or cause to be entered on and inspected, any immoveable property occupied by the council, board or committee, or any work in progress under its direction;

(*b*) call for and inspect any document which may be for the purposes of this Act in the possession or under the control of the council, board, or committee; and

(*c*) require the council, board or committee to furnish such statements, accounts and reports as he thinks fit.

(2.) Where a joint committee is appointed by the district councils of several districts, the Deputy Commissioner of any of those districts may exercise a like power in respect of the proceedings of that committee; but if any difference arises between two or more Deputy Commissioners acting under this sub-section, it shall be referred, when the districts are in the same division, to the Commissioner, and, when the districts are not in the same division, to the Chief Commissioner, whose decision shall be final.

(3.) The power given under this section to a Deputy Commissioner in respect of a local board or school committee may, with the sanction of the Chief Commissioner, be delegated by him to a subordinate not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner.

(4.) When the Deputy Commissioner is a member of the district council, the powers given to him under this section shall, in respect of that council, vest in the Commissioner.

Power to suspend execution of orders, &c.

29.—(1.) If, in the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner, the execution of any order or resolution of a district council, local board, joint committee, or school committee, or the doing of any act which is about to be done, or is being done, in pursuance of or under cover of this Act, is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public, or to any class or body of persons, or to lead to a breach of the peace, he may, by order in writing, suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof within his district.

(2.) When a Deputy Commissioner makes any order under this section he shall forthwith forward to the Commissioner a copy of the order, with a statement of the reasons for making it; and it shall be in the discretion of the Commissioner to rescind the order, or to direct that it continue in force, with or without modification, permanently, or for such period as he thinks fit.

(3.) The Commissioner shall forthwith submit to the Chief Commissioner a report of every case occurring under this section, and the Chief Commissioner may rescind or modify any order made therein, and make in respect thereof any other order which the Commissioner could have made in respect of the same.

Extraordinary powers of Deputy Commissioner in case of emergency.

30.—(1.) In cases of emergency the Deputy Commissioner may provide for the execution of any work, or the doing of any act, which a district council or local board is empowered to execute or do, and the immediate execution or doing of which is in his opinion necessary for the service or safety of the public, and may direct that the expense of executing the work or doing the act, with a reasonable remuneration to the person appointed to execute or do it, shall be forthwith paid by the district council.

(2.) If the expense and remuneration are not so paid, the Deputy Commissioner may make an order directing the person having the custody of the balance of the district fund to pay the expense and remuneration, or as much thereof as is possible, from that balance.

(3.) The Deputy Commissioner shall forthwith report to the Commissioner every case in which he uses the powers given to him by this section.

Power to provide for performance of duties in default of district council.

31.—(1.) When the Chief Commissioner is informed, on complaint made or otherwise, that a district council has made default in performing any duty imposed on it by or under this Act, the Chief Commissioner, if satisfied after due inquiry that the district council has been guilty of the alleged default, may, by an order in writing, fix a period for the performance of that duty.

(2.) If that duty is not performed within the period so fixed, the Chief Commissioner may appoint some person to perform it, and may direct that the expense of performing it, with a reasonable remuneration to the person appointed to perform it, shall be forthwith paid by the district council.

(3.) If the expense and remuneration are not so paid, the Chief Commissioner may make an order directing the person having the custody of the balance of the district fund to pay the expense, and remuneration, or as much thereof as is possible, from that balance.

Power to supersede council or board in case of incompetency, default or abuse of powers.

32.—(1.) If a district council or local board is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of, the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or otherwise by law, or exceeds or abuses its powers, the Chief Commissioner may, with the previous approval of the Governor General in Council, by an order published, with the reasons for making it, in the local official Gazette, declare the council or board to be incompetent or in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and supersede it for a period to be specified in the order.

(2.) When a district council or local board is so superseded, the following consequences shall ensue:

(*a*.) All members of the council or board shall, as from the date of the order, vacate their offices as such members;

(*b*.) All powers and duties of the council or board may, during the period of supersession, be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the Chief Commissioner from time to time appoints in that behalf;

(*c*.) Where a council is superseded, all property vested in it shall, during the period of supersession, vest in Her Majesty.

(3.) On the expiration of the period of suspension specified in the order, the council or board shall be re-established by appointment or election, and the persons who vacated their offices under clause (*a*) shall not be deemed disqualified for appointment or election.

Power of Commissioner.

33. In all matters connected with this Act, the Commissioner shall have and exercise the same authority and control over the Deputy Commissioners subordinate to him, as he has and exercises over them in the general and revenue administration.

Rules.

Power of Chief Commissioner to make rules as to district councils, local boards, and school committees.

34. The Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Act and with reference (if necessary) to the varying circumstances of different local areas—

(*a*) as to the qualifications, mode and time of election or appointment, term of office, and remuneration and allowances (if any) of members of district councils and local boards and as to the filling of casual vacancies in such councils and boards, and as to the number of the representative members for each circle or group of circles, and as to the number of the representatives of the mercantile classes or professions, to be elected or appointed to each local board or district council;

(*b*) as to the appointment, powers and duties of school committees, the term of office of members of such committees and the mode of removing them;

(*c*) as to the conduct of proceedings of district councils, local boards and school committees, including the fixing of a quorum, the giving of the casting vote in cases of equal division, the minimum number of meetings to be held and the maximum interval between successive meetings, the formation of committees other than school committees, and the delegation of powers to such committees;

(*d*) as to the mode of entering into and executing contracts and transfers of property on behalf of district councils, and the authority on which money may be paid from the district fund;

(*e*) as to the appointment and payment of auditors of the accounts of district councils and local boards;

(*f*) as to the apportionment of the district fund between the general purposes of the district and the purposes of particular parts of the district, and the appropriation of funds raised in a particular area to the purposes of that area; and

(*g*) generally, for the guidance of district councils, local boards, school committees and Government officers, in all matters connected with the administration of this Act and for settling their relations to one another.

Procedure for making rules under section 34.

35. The Chief Commissioner shall, before making any rules under section thirty-four, publish in such manner as may in his opinion be sufficient for giving information

to persons interested, a draft of the proposed rules together with a notice specifying a date at or after which the draft will be taken into consideration; and shall, before making the rules, receive and consider any objection or suggestion which may be made by any person with respect to the draft before the date so specified.

Exceptional Provision.

Power under special circumstances to except districts from operation of Act.

36. If the circumstances of any district or part of a district are, in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner, such that any of the provisions of this Act are unsuited thereto, he may, by order in writing, except the district or part from the operation of those provisions; and thereupon those provisions shall not apply to the excepted district or part until again applied thereto by a subsequent order of the Chief Commissioner.

Supplemental Provisions.

Acquisition of land. X. of 1870.

37. Where any land is required for the purposes of this Act, the Chief Commissioner may, on the request of the district council, proceed to acquire it under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1870; and, on payment by the district council of the compensation awarded under that Act, the land shall vest in the district council.

Penalty on member, officer, or servant being interested in contracts made with council, board, or committee. XLV. of 1860.

38. If any member, officer or servant of a district council, local board, or joint committee appointed under this Act is, otherwise than with the permission in writing of the Commissioner, directly or indirectly interested in any contract made with that council, board or committee, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence under the Indian Penal Code, section 168.

Publication of rules and orders.

39.—(1.) All rules and orders made by the Chief Commissioner under this Act shall be published in the official Gazette both in English and in such native languages as the Chief Commissioner may direct.

(2.) The publication in the official Gazette of a rule purporting to be made by the Chief Commissioner under section thirty-four shall be conclusive evidence that it has been made as required by section thirty-five.

Time for councils and boards coming into existence.

40. The several district councils and local boards under this Act shall come into existence at such time as the Chief Commissioner, by order, appoints in that behalf.

Rates payable under Settlement-record.

Confirmation and recovery of existing rates and accounts of same.

41.—(1.) All rates for the maintenance of roads, schools or the district post, for the payment of which provision has been made in any settlement-record previous to the passing of this Act, shall be deemed to have been legally imposed, and shall be recoverable as if they were arrears of land-revenue payable directly to Government and due on the land in respect of which they are payable.

(2.) An account of the gross receipts and of the charges (if any) of collection of all such rates in each district shall be kept by the Deputy Commissioner of that district, and shall be annually rendered by him to the district council of that district.

Power of Chief Commissioner with respect to rates.

42. The Chief Commissioner may from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette,

(*a*) prescribe in what instalments, and at what times, the rates referred to in section forty-one shall be payable, and make rules for their collection by village-officers or others; and

(*b*.) exempt any land from liability to pay the whole or any part of any such rate, and vary or cancel any such exemption.

Amendment of the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878.

New section to follow section 7 of Act XVII. of 1878.

43. After section seven of the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, the following shall be inserted, namely:—

"7 A. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces may direct that any public ferry wholly or partly within the area subject to the authority of a district council or local board in any district in those provinces, be managed by that council or board,

In Central Provinces management

may be vested in district council or local board; and proceeds paid into district fund. Amendment of sections 6 and 17 of same Act.

and may further direct that all or any part of the proceeds from such ferry be paid into the district fund of that district; and thereupon such ferry shall be managed, and such proceeds or part thereof shall be paid, accordingly."

44. In section six of the same Act, after the words "section seven," and in section seventeen of the same Act, after the words "section seven," where they first occur, the following shall be inserted, namely:—"and section 7 A."

DESPATCH FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

(Financial, No. 369.)

My Lord Marquis, Calcutta, December 5, 1882.

In our Despatch No. 169, dated the 1st July 1881, we referred to Your Lordship the question, whether appointments under Municipal and Local Fund Boards, and similar Local Bodies, should be subject to the restrictions imposed in the case of appointments to the ordinary Government service, including the necessity of reference to Her Majesty's Government, when the salary attached to those appointments exceeds a certain limit. We expressed an opinion that, in view of developing local self-Government, and the generally successful administration of Local Funds by Local Boards, it would be inexpedient to impose upon Local Bodies in such cases any restrictions other than those imposed by the Legislature.

2. In Financial Despatch No. 48, dated the 9th February 1882,* Your Lordship concurred in these opinions, and authorised the issue of instructions in accordance therewith. These instructions are embodied in our Resolution No. 2078 of the 30th June 1882, of which copy is sent herewith. In particular, we invite Your Lordship's attention to the second clause in the last paragraph of the Resolution. It seemed to us that the grounds on which the relaxation was allowed did not apply to appointments paid from Local Funds administered by Local Governments and not by Local Bodies, and we have therefore decided that, as regards such appointments, the existing restrictions regarding appointments payable from the general revenues shall continue in force.

3. A case has now arisen which is not provided for in these rules. By section 136 of the Bengal Cess Act (No. IX. of 1880, the Lieutenant-Governor is empowered, "on the application of two-thirds of the Committees in any division, to appoint a "Divisional Superintendent of Works, with the necessary office establishment, for the "control and supervision of the executive works establishment in all districts of such "division." In exercise of this power, the Lieutenant-Governor has recently sanctioned the appointment of a Superintendent of District Works for the Bhagulpore Division on a pay of Rs. 1,100 a month, and the question has arisen whether in such cases the sanction of the Government of India or of the Secretary of State is necessary, if the salary of the appointment exceeds the prescribed limits.

4. We are of opinion that in such cases the appointments should be held to require the sanction of the Government of India or of the Secretary of State, as the case may be, in accordance with the general rules. We consider it inexpedient that a Local Government should have the power of creating an appointment, paid from any source, with a salary of Rs. 1,100 a month attached to it; and it would be anomalous to hold that a Local Government cannot create an appointment of this class if the cost is payable from a fund which it administers, but may create it if the cost is payable from a fund which it does not administer.

5. We request to be informed if Your Lordship approves of our view; and should it be concurred in, we recommend that the sanction given by the Government of Bengal to the appointment of a Superintendent of District Works for the Bhagulpore Division may be confirmed.

We have, &c.
RIPON.
J. GIBBS.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

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* *See* page 23.

RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DATED SIMLA, JUNE 30, 1882, No. 2078.

READ again— Simla, June 30, 1882.

Proceedings in this Department (Accounts and Finance) of July 1881, Nos. 1,106 to 1,109.

Read also—

Despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 48, dated the 9th February 1882, and the following extract from Resolution in the Home Department, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}759}$ (Public), dated the 18th May 1882 :—

> Para. 22.—Another point deserving of notice is the control that should be exercised over the execution of local works. It will not always be possible for a Local Board to entertain a competent Engineer of its own; and in any case when Government buildings and important works of other kinds are made over for maintenance, there must be some effective guarantee for thoroughness of execution. It will probably be most convenient that, while all subordinate establishments are entirely under the control of the Boards, Government should supply the District Engineer and furnish professional supervision, the Boards defraying in such manner as may be determined by the Local Governments with reference to the amount of work done for each Board the payments to be made to Government on this account. Care must, however, be taken that the Boards are left unfettered in the initiation and direction of operations, and that the Engineer is placed in the position of their servant and not of their master. The power of check vested in the District Officer will suffice to remedy any carelessness or improper working on the part of the Boards. If this arrangement is carried out, it will probably be found possible to make over to the charge of the Boards most of the public buildings in the districts, and other works of various kinds which would otherwise have to be kept in the hands of the Government Officers. Double establishments will thus be avoided, and public money saved.

RESOLUTION.—On a reference from the Chief Commissioner, British Burma, the Governor General in Council has recently had under consideration the question whether the creation and abolition of appointments under Municipal and Local Fund Boards and similar Local Bodies, or the modification in any way of the pay of such appointments, are, or should be, subject to the same restrictions of various kinds, including reference to Her Majesty's Government when the pay of the appointment exceeds a certain amount, as appointments the cost of which is charged against the General Revenues.

2. The rules which govern the procedure to be observed in reporting for the sanction of the Home Government the creation of new offices carrying pay exceeding Rs. 250 a month, and additions to salaries which raise them above Rs. 5,000 a year, are contained in the Despatch of the Secretary of State for India No. 63, dated the 17th March 1864. But these rules, as they are understood, apply only to charges which fall on what are called "General Revenues" in contradistinction to Local Funds.

3. Provincial Funds form a portion of the General Revenues and are administered by Local Governments just as Imperial Funds are administered by the Government of India; the distinction between them is merely one of account and internal administration; but between Local Funds and General Revenues the distinction is clear, and involves a principle of importance.

4. It is true that the principal Local Funds, both incorporated and excluded (*e.g.*, District Road Cess, Municipal, Port, and Port Trust), are composed in the main of taxes, dues, and fees which do not differ materially in their nature from those taxes, dues, and fees which form a part of the General Revenues; but the essential distinction consists in the special agency and special principles, by, and in accordance with, which Local Funds are administered and in some cases raised.

5. The practice of the Government has been to leave these funds to be administered by Local Bodies, in pursuance of the policy of developing local self-government; only such powers of general control are generally retained as may suffice to authorise interference in cases in which the public interest would otherwise suffer. This policy has been consistently kept in view since Local Bodies were first created. The course

of legislation all over the country has accordingly been in the direction of enforcing the responsibility and maintaining the authority of such Bodies. For instance, in some of the Acts relating to the constitution and mode of working of Municipalities and District Committees, no restriction whatever has been placed by the Legislature on the powers of those Bodies for the creation of new appointments; and in others the powers of general control which have been reserved are not such as would allow of the enforcement of those restrictions which apply to such appointments when the cost of these is payable from the General Revenues.

6. The Local Bodies to whom these powers have been entrusted exercise them, as a rule, with discretion; and there is nothing in the method of their administration in the past which would justify the imposition of any special restrictions. Seeing, therefore, that it is desirable to develop local self-government, and that Local Bodies may reasonably be expected to give due weight to the need for economy in the administration of Local Funds, the Governor General in Council is pleased to rule—

(1st) that Local Bodies to whom the administration of Local or Municipal Funds has been committed shall be competent, subject to the general restrictions imposed by the Legislature or to such special reservations as the Government of India may lay down in any case (*e.g.*, that referred to in paragraph 22 of the Resolution in the Home Department, dated the 18th May 1882), or with reference to any particular class of appointments, to create, as well as to abolish, without reference to higher authority all appointments the pay of which is chargeable to such Local or Municipal Funds;

(2nd) that as regards Local Funds administered by Local Governments and not by Local Bodies, the existing restrictions regarding appointments payable from Imperial or Provincial Revenues shall continue in force in respect of appointments payable from such funds.

Ordered, that the foregoing Resolution be communicated to the several Departments of the Government of India, the several Local Governments and Administrations, and the several Officers of the Account Department.

Ordered also, that it be published in the "Gazette of India," together with the Resolutions in this Department Nos. 1622 and 1623, dated the 10th instant.

D. M. BARBOUR,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

DESPATCH FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(Financial, No. 71.)

India Office, London,
February 28, 1883.

My Lord Marquis,

Para. 1. I have considered in Council your Letter, dated the 5th of December 1882, No. 369, forwarding a copy of your Resolution of the 30th of June 1882, No. 2078, relative to the power of municipalities and other local bodies, to which the administration of local funds is entrusted, to create appointments the cost of which is chargeable to such funds.

2. That Resolution is intended to embody the instructions the issue of which was sanctioned by the Despatch to your Government dated the 9th of February 1882, No. 48; and in the second clause of para. 6 of your Resolution, you have rightly decided that the relaxation of the existing restrictions on the creation of appointments does not apply to appointments paid from local funds, administered by Local Governments, and not by local bodies.

3. Subsequently, the question was raised whether the sanction of the Government of India or of the Secretary of State was requisite in the case of an appointment which was created by a Local Government, but the salary of which was chargeable to a local fund not administered by that Government.

4. Large powers of administering local funds have been entrusted by law to certain local bodies with a view to developing local self-government; and it therefore appeared

desirable not to insist too strictly upon the right of Government to authorise appointments, the creation of which might be necessary for the successful administration of those funds. This consideration does not, however, apply to a case in which the right of sanctioning an appointment is expressly reserved to a Local Government; and I concur in the opinion expressed by your Government that it would be anomalous to hold that a Local Government cannot create an appointment if the cost is chargeable to a fund which it administers, but may create it if the cost is payable from a fund which it does not administer.

5. I therefore authorise the issue of instructions in accordance with this decision.

6. In the 4th paragraph of the Despatch to your Excellency of the 9th of February 1882 above-mentioned, Lord Hartington drew attention to the possibility that, in a case of mixed service, a local body might, by increasing the pay of an officer without the concurrence of the Government, impose on the public revenues a greater charge for furlough allowance or pension than was contemplated by the Government when lending his services to the local body.

7. The great extension which has been recently announced to the system of local self-government makes it all the more necessary to guard against the inadvertent addition, in this or any similar manner, to the burden falling on the public revenues. The principle should be that the local bodies may spend their income as they think fit, subject to the general restrictions laid down regarding their powers of financial administration; but that they may not, without the sanction of superior authority, give claims to pension, inasmuch as that would impose a charge on their successors, which is beyond their powers. Such a sanction, moreover, should only be granted when it is clear that the local funds are in a position to bear it, without crippling their resources in the future.

8. In accordance with your recommendation, I confirm the sanction given by the Government of Bengal to the appointment of a Superintendent of Works for the Bhaugulpore Division, on a pay of Rs. 1,100.a month, under Section 136 of the Bengal Cess Act (No. IX.) of 1880.

I have, &c.
KIMBERLEY.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 26 February 1883;—*for*,

"COPY OF OR EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, AND THE VARIOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, ON THE PROPOSED MEASURES FOR THE EXTENSION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA."

India Office,
2nd March 1883.

J. K. CROSS,
Under Secretary of State.

PART II.—(APPENDIX.)

(*Mr. Stanhope.*)

Ordered by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
15 *March* 1883.

PART II.—(APPENDIX.)

EXTENSION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY.

No. 3625 of 1881.

From G. F. Sheppard, Esquire, Commissioner, N.D., to John Nugent, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Financial Department, Bombay.

Sir, Camp Cambay, 3rd December 1881.

I have the honour to reply to Government Resolution No. 3950 of 25th October last,* Financial Department, regarding the new scheme of Provincial finance and the development of local administration.

2. It is admitted by the Government of India that this Presidency is in advance of the rest of the country in the practical application of the principles of local self-government. As a rule, all expenditure charged as Local is locally administered. Committees already exist for the supervision of municipal expenditure. All Educational institutions, except high schools and Anglo-Vernacular schools, are similarly controlled; as are also all *Medical* institutions, except civil hospitals. There is no Provincial expenditure or sanitation, drainage, or water-supply; and with the exception, therefore, of control over the high schools, of civil hospitals, vaccination and public works, it is somewhat difficult to suggest how local supervision can be extended.

3. Inasmuch, also, as no Police charges are borne by any Municipality in this Division, no funds would be released, as suggested by the Government of India, to meet additional expenditure.

4. The success or otherwise of the Bombay system must naturally depend, in great measure, upon the measure of enlightenment at which the people represented by and forming our committees have arrived. It will, I fear, be admitted by those who are most conversant with the working of these local bodies, that there is, as a rule, little of life in their proceedings, or of public spirit in their supervision. It will generally be acknowledged that if the results obtained are traced to their source, they will, in eight cases out of ten, be found to have been effected by the pressure put on the committees by the official members, and doubts will be freely expressed whether the experience gained here affords much encouragement for any immediate enlargement of the system.

5. It may be alleged that our system of control has been too strict and elaborate to encourage much really independent action, and, to some extent, this is true. A Municipal Committee, with a flash of public spirit, agrees to abolish the establishment (composed, in great measure, of relatives of the members) entertained for the departmental collection of town duties, or consents to an amended system of octroi. This is hardly done, when Government intervenes and directs that the octroi system shall be entirely altered, or that under no circumstances shall the taxes be farmed out. So, in Local Fund affairs, orders are not unfrequently issued by Government which interfere with any feeling of independence in the local administration of the fund.

6. I am not now urging that such control has been altogether unreasonable or unnecessary under the existing system, but I submit that the first effect of relaxing it, as long as unlimited discretion is nominally given to the local body, will be in most districts to throw a severe additional burden and responsibility on the official portion of the committee. My opinion is that the comparatively small measure of success already obtained is probably owing to the limit of discretion permitted to committees having been *too large*. The use of committees should be not so much to *originate* as to *control*. Hardly any one will be found willing to admit that the time for surrendering self-government unreservedly into the hands of local bodies has arrived: many will be ready to admit that committees may be organised to conduct efficiently the internal management and administration of Local Funds *under sufficient official control*, and that to such committees more latitude might be allowed than at present in carrying out the *details* of principles laid down for their guidance.

7. I have already, in another place, submitted my opinion that, if Government should be pleased to lay down certain legal rules regarding municipal taxation, committees might be allowed more unrestricted discretion, and that, under such circumstances, the concession of the elective franchise might be unobjectionable. If, for example, it should be determined that *direct* taxation should take the place of *indirect*, a law should be passed giving local bodies discretion to choose between an impost on houses, property, income, or other direct sources, and to raise and expend funds up to a certain limit per head, unfettered by any supervision or check beyond that (if considered necessary) of the Commissioner of the Division. Some sort of official check, must, in my opinion, be exercised for many years to come. I do not believe that the strongest and most enlightened non-official committee in Gujarát would, if such control were withdrawn, be independent enough to resist the pressure which would be put on it by the public. If unfettered by any law or official control, the first action of such committee would be, by increasing the octroi, to throw the burden of taxation on the backs of their neighbours.

8. Suggestions for the gradual withdrawal of State aid from Medical institutions have been already laid before Government in this office No. 1671 of 9th June 1881. This may, in my opinion, be better effected by encouraging private practitioners than by throwing more cost on Local Funds. If the public have learnt to value the European system of treatment, it is only reasonable that such as can afford to do so should be gradually required to pay for this, and European experience has proved that both treatment and medicines are more valued, and probably more efficacious, when the distribution of the latter is not wholly without payment. The Local Funds might supply a dispensary and pay the

* See page 61 of Return.

medical man a certain annual sum for attendance on the really poor, while Government might grant a small subsidy for attendance on its own servants.

9. On a similar principle, I am of opinion that the time is approaching when higher Education should be paid for by those who require it. A very large proportion of the Educational funds is now expended on the classes who have not contributed a pie towards the Local Funds. The number of children of shop-keepers, money-lenders, persons of independent means, and Government pensioners, now receiving education in our schools, is out of all proportion to the number of children of the Local Fund cess-payers. If more money is spent on *village schools*, and education more popularized, efficient local committees may perhaps be found to control the management, if some broad rules were laid down, as in the case of Municipalities, for their guidance. The real share in the internal economy and arrangements, which this would give the managing body, would ensure the interest and co-operation of the members.

10. I should much like to see a portion of the sum now spent on higher education devoted to technical and agricultural classes. Something more practical, less purely literary, appears to be required for the great mass of our Local Fund rate-payers, and I believe that if the grant-in-aid system were more liberally extended to indigenous schools, literary education itself would suffer but little from the change. There are numbers of trained "masters," as there are of passed medical students, ready to step in as soon as Government surrenders the monopoly. Local interest would soon be enlisted on the side of these practical classes, and the *elementary* education, at any rate, would be watched with attention by the Local Committees.

11. To such bodies, the local control of the *Vaccination* Department may, I think, be conveniently entrusted.

12. It must, however, be remembered that the experiment of entrusting the higher branches of professional details to the local bodies has already had a trial in this Presidency. Some years ago, almost every Local Fund Committee employed its own engineer, and the result was eminently unfortunate. The system broke down, and I would not suggest its revival, although it must be admitted that when assistance from professional officers is obtained from Government, the difficulty must always arise of subordinating such officers to any authority except that of their own department.

13. With regard to public works, some collectors have remarked on the unpopularity of the Department, and on certain instances of unsatisfactory work done thereby. Owing to the financial strain of late years, works which, at the commencement of the Locol Fund regime, were usually considered *Imperial* (such as main lines of communication), have been thrown on the *Local Funds*. This, as it entailed the surrender of many small local works, was unpopular, and often required official influence to carry through. To popularize such expenditure in future, it is essential that Government should provide a portion of the cost, either by a subsidy to the Local Funds or by undertaking the work, receiving the Local Fund grant as a contribution. This will be more acceptable to the public, as the heavy charge of 15 per cent., now so disliked by the committees, would not be chargeable. The latter would put aside a certain proportion of their funds for such works, and the expenditure of the balance on purely local works of utility and improvement might then be entrusted, with more latitude in discretion, to the committees. Practical difficulties, however, though perhaps not insurmountable ones, will be found to arise. Each member will be disposed to consider the works in his own immediate neighbourhood of most importance, and some control will be necessary. Modifications of the rules might be made bearing in the desired direction.

14. This is not, however, a proper opportunity for the discussion of details; and as my letter is already, I fear, too long, I will not attempt to review the opinions of the collectors. Original reports, as per margin, are appended, and I would particularly request the attention of Government to that of Mr. Richey.

Ahmedabad, No. 3319, of 18th November 1881.
Kaira, No. 4401, of 18th November 1881.
Kolába, No. 3796, of 22nd November 1881, and accompaniment.

I have, &c.
G. F. SHEPPARD,
Commissioner, N.D.

No. 3,319 of 1881.

From J. B. RICHEY, Esquire, C.S.I., Collector of Ahmedabad, to G. F. SHEPPARD, Esquire, Commissioner, N.D.

SIR, Camp Baola, 18th November 1881.

I HAVE the honour to submit the report called for in your No. 3,290 of the 3rd instant.

I have, &c.
J. B. RICHEY,
Collector.

REPORT.

Camp Baola, November 1881.

IN the process of discentralising, the Government of India propose to transfer resources and charges to the Provincial Governments, and that the Provincial Governments should in turn transfer resources and charges to local bodies, comprising non-officials—in other words, that some of the work now done by departments should be done by local committees. The largest area at present represented by a local committee for administrative purposes is the Collectorate; if control of larger funds and more important charges are to be given to local bodies, it would, I think, be well to have a larger

area represented. The committee of a Collectorate can deal with *local* expenditure or with such as is of a simple routine character. Higher Educational, Medical, and Public Works charges and others which it may be possible to submit to some local control, require a wider view, and a larger choice of persons fitted for such control than is afforded by a Collectorate. I think it might be possible to extend local control to such higher charges if the areas furnishing the local body were large enough to represent public as well as local interest.

In their Resolution No. 3,950 (paragraph 6), Government define the question on this head to be—in what way a large proportion of Provincial expenditure may be entrusted to the District Local Fund Committees and Municipalities; but, on the other hand, in their paragraph 8, they submit for consideration the means and agencies of Local Government, and I have therefore felt at liberty to suggest the formation of Provincial Committees as a means for giving effect to the proposed extension of local control to matters beyond the range of District Committees.

2. Some parts of the Presidency can, I think, at once supply Native committee men capable of giving valuable advice and assistance on matters now reserved to the departments, and their association with public officers, as desired by the Government of India, is likely to attract popular co-operation in the furtherance of the interests entrusted to them. Where the instinct for public affairs is but little developed, the encouragement to its growth would be of itself an object. In order to judge how best local bodies may be given enlarged means and powers, it seems well to review those already under such control. The Local Fund Committees' duty is defined in Section 4 of Act III. of 1869. The first-named is the promotion of the public health.

Under this head the committees pay for vaccination, contribute to or maintain dispensaries, and occasionally spend money in special measures for health. It is sought to transfer further "to local control Provincial expenditure on Vaccination, Sanitation, Hospitals and Dispensaries."

Vaccination.

Any extension of control in vaccination would, I presume, involve the transfer of control over establishment charges from the department to a committee, which would have to represent an area equal to the circle in charge of the Superintendent of vaccination. It appears to be a subject within the competence of non-official persons to assist in managing, and in which local information might be of value.

Sanitation.

The chief duties of the Sanitary Department in the districts are, I suppose, at present statistical. Works of sanitation are executed by the Local Funds and Municipalities. I do not see what increase of expenditure or control could be given to local committees without a change in the work of the Department.

Hospitals.

It is difficult for a Revenue officer to make any suggestion as to the association of local representatives in the management of hospitals, but the functions of a hospital and a dispensary differ only in degree, and as the Local Fund Committees deal with the funds assigned to dispensaries, a Committee representing a Province might, within certain limits, have a voice in the disposal of those assigned for hospitals. The relations of Government, both to higher education and to medicine, will inevitably, within a few years, be modified by the increase of private schools and medical practitioners, with whom Government will not desire to compete unduly. In dealing with the questions that will thus arise, the association of Native representatives in the control of the departments would be found valuable.

The second in the list of duties laid upon Local Fund Committees is provided for education. They have a direct control over the expenditure on primary education.

An extension of local control would imply that middle and higher education should, in some degree, be subjected to local committees.

In this Department again, although the *District* Committees would hardly be able to deal with expenditure on middle and higher schools without departmental difficulties, there would probably be room for useful action of a *Provincial* Committee.

It is in medical and educational work that private liberality and municipal grants supplement the public purse; such work, therefore, is particularly suited for the control of bodies representing the local public.

The third duty laid upon the Local Fund Committees in Bombay is the providing for public convenience, under which head are specified Roads and Water-supply. A great deal of valuable work has been done by the committees in road-making, and there should be no question that any funds placed under their control for public works would be well applied. All that would be needed would be that the system of working on a well-considered scheme for a term of years should be rigidly adhered to.

The risks to which the Local Fund Public Works expenditure is now exposed are, that the funds may be diverted from their most legitimate objects to others favoured by the interests or tastes of powerful members of the committee, or directly ordered or desired by Government. The transfer of Provincial Funds to the control of the local committees for public works ought to operate to reduce these risks, for on the one hand the objects of expenditure would be very carefully limited and scrutinized, and on the other hand the position of the local committees would be so strengthened under the new system that Government would hardly commit them to expenditure of Local Funds on objects which they disapproved.

The present Government of Bombay have already gone some way in the direction proposed in this correspondence as regards public works. In this district, and I notice in Ahmednagar also, Provincial

grants have recently been made to supplement Local Funds for Railway feeders, and I believe these are not the only cases ; the measure proposed by the Government of India is therefore not a new one as regards public works in Bombay.

With reference to the question whether any of the duties under Minor and Miscellaneous Departments can be transferred to local control, I have the honour to submit the following :—

Cattle and Horse-breeding.

The present practice as regards Government stallions is that the bulk of the charges are met from Provincial Funds, but that, as a rule, new charges are thrown upon Local Funds, although the Local Fund Committees have no control over the expenditure generally. The extent to which it is equitable to charge the Local Funds with such expenses must depend upon the circumstances of the district as a breeding ground. Probably in most cases the section of the community to be directly benefited by the Government stud operations is but small, and the public convenience resulting somewhat remote. Recent Resolutions of Government have indicated a desire to transfer the increasing expenses of these operations to the Local Funds. This, I think, might well be done if the funds were given Provincial grants to meet the increased charges, but hardly otherwise without overruling local opinion on the point. The Officer in charge of the stud operations would probably be quite ready and willing to work through the Local Fund Committees, and it is possible that more economy and better results might be obtained through their agency.

Land Improvement.

It might be thought worth while to try the agency of the local committees for the administration of the Land Improvement Act. It is possible that the Native members of the committees would take an interest in the subject, if the Government provision appeared in the budget submitted to them, and their assistance were invited ; they have the best means of knowing cases which would be provided for by the Act, and of smoothing the way for its operation.

Manufacturers and Trade.

The collection of information regarding manufacturers and trade, and the means open to Government or Municipalities to develope and promote them are matters in which local bodies could be employed with promise of much public advantage. The subject is closely connected with municipal taxation and with the improvement of communications by rail, road, or sea, which are largely under local control, but it is also of great public importance. I have not the report of the Famine Commission at hand for reference, but if I do not mistake, the Commission advocated the employment of local bodies for this purpose. If well qualified men were selected among the traders and merchants of the provinces to form local Chambers of Commerce, they might be associated with the District officials in the work of registering trade statistics, and independently might perform many useful functions, such as the representing trade interest with Railway Companies, Native States, Municipalities and all bodies making revenue on traffic—supplying Government with information as to internal trade, particularly that now least accessible relating to independent territory—the advertisement of manufactures and collection of samples and the receiving and advertising of samples from other provinces, or from Europe. Only a small expenditure by Government would, I should suppose, be necessary to pay for the collection of statistics, and to assist the working establishment of such bodies, until, as it might be hoped, they had proved useful enough to be maintained by the interests which they would represent. It is suggested in the Government Resolution No. 3950 that a portion of the assessed taxes of a local area might be transferred to local control. A very appropriate object to which to assign a portion of the License Tax of a district would be the working of such a machinery, as above suggested, in the interests of the local trade and manufacture.

Should the enquiry set on foot by the Government of India result in an extension of the powers and duties of the local committees in this Presidency, it might perhaps lead to a settlement of the question regarding the pensions of Local Fund servants, and to the Department being again allowed Public Service Postage privileges; their withdrawal is a small grievance, it is true, but it involves a good many inconsistencies.

J. B. RICHEY,
Collector.

No. 4401 of 1881.

From G. F. M. GRANT, Esquire, Acting Collector, Kaira, to G. F. SHEPPARD, Esquire, Commissioner, N.D.

SIR, Camp Kapadvanj, 18th November 1881.

As directed in your endorsement No. 3091, dated 15th ultimo, I have the honour to submit my opinion on the matter referred to in Government Resolution No. 3774, dated 12th idem.

2. From the further instructions received, I gather that I am not expected to comment on the first nine paragraphs of the Government of India Resolution which, as has been observed, do not, except on points of Provincial interest, bear strongly on this Presidency. I think, however, it must be admitted that the severe financial strain alluded to made itself felt, in no inconsiderable degree, by the bodies administering Local Funds, or rather the one-anna cess, which is the only one that calls for notice. A very large proportion of this amount used to be spent on tanks and wells, and in keeping up or improving what I may call cross country roads, while the main trunks were undertaken from Imperial and Provincial Funds. When these could no longer be supplied, the local bodies fully recognized the paramount importance of main lines of communication, and in the districts I am acquainted with, these

have been carried out by them on a scale and at an expense which would not have been contemplated before the financial strain began. This could only be done by devoting less to the minor and purely local improvements to which the fund was originally, in a great measure, devoted and to the benefits of which the villagers are most strongly alive. It is a common thing for a patel to say "Nothing has been spent in my village since the Local Fund was started," or "Our village pays so and so, and only so much as been spent in it." I mention this to show what an exclusively local feeling, in the majority of cases, prevails, and to bear out my view that of late years the expenditure on purely local works, highly valued by the people, has, if I may so speak, somewhat fallen to arrears. In any scheme for the re-disposition of Local Fund burdens, the desirability of a liberal margin for works of this kind should not be lost sight of, or the levy will become much less popular than it used to be. I have no doubt that the action of the local bodies was wise, but it was, in some measure, forced upon them, and neither the causes nor the results are fully appreciated by the people at large.

3. As regards such portion of paragraph 11 of the Government of India Resolution as refers to the possibility of having on municipal or local committees elected members, it does not appear to me that the introduction of such a system into the mofussil is advisable, if possible. If any steps were taken in such a direction, it should be experimental and the experiment made with the Municipality of some large mofussil town. Paragraph 6 of Resolution No. 3950, dated 25th ultimo, sums up the provisions which have been made for rendering such bodies as representative as possible in this Presidency, and I believe great care is at present taken that the classes concerned should be well represented, while in any elective scheme, it would be difficult to guard against one class being far more represented than others. I feel no doubt that official influence is still most necessary to make these institutions work successfully, except, perhaps, in the case of some large city, where many educated persons can be found. I have referred in the previous paragraph to the intensely local feeling which prevails among the great body of the agricultural class, to whom, for many years to come, the village will be the main object of interest. In some districts I have observed, as no doubt have others, that non-official members will make great efforts to benefit their own neighbourhoods, without any reference to the general welfare. This district, probably, can supply better material for Local Fund Committees than any other in Gujarat, or perhaps in the Presidency, but it is this material that the local officers naturally seek out, and it would be a great misfortune if particular localities were over-represented, and others neglected. On the whole, so far as Local Fund Committees and minor Municipalities are concerned, I do not think the existing arrangements would benefit by any alteration.

4. As regards the main matter referred for opinion, *viz.*, in what way a larger proportion of the Provincial expenditure may be entrusted to the control and management of the District Local Fund Committees and Municipalities, the proposal to relieve the latter of the charge they now bear for Police under Bombay Act VI. of 1873, Section 24, Clause 1, appears to me most judicious, but I believe such charges are only made on City Municipalities. Any sum so saved would, in the natural course of events, be spent on the sanitation or other public wants of the city.

5. I have gone carefully over the different minor Provincial heads of receipt and expenditure subordinate to the major heads specified in the Bombay Government Resolution. Model farms are, to a great extent, and might be entirely, under local management, with, for a time at all events, a supplementary grant, receipts falling short of expenditure. In a previous letter I stated what appeared to me objections to stallion charges being defrayed locally, and the same would apply to management, as I think no one but officials would be interested in the matter, and these only in cases where there was a natural bent that way. Where bulls maintained for breeding, by which I believe much good might be effected in some localities, the case would be different. The other heads under 'Minor Departments' do not seem to require notice.

6. As regards education, one-third of the one-anna cess is devoted to this, and by these means primary schools are started and maintained. Fees, of course, go a very small way towards meeting the expense, and, small as they are, it is not easy to raise them without giving a check to education. If it be proposed that the expenditure for middle and higher education also should be controlled by subsidized local bodies, I suppose increased control would have to go with it, but with no wish to be illiberal, I fail to see that any good would result. The School Committees supposed to interest themselves in the primary schools, are, generally speaking, careless or inefficient. Of course, in a large town, intelligent and educated Native gentlemen might be found fairly fit to control both expenditure and education, but this would not, in my opinion, be the case in small Municipalities. In most villages there are now only primary schools, to the improvement of which the School Committees, in my opinion, contribute little.

7. Each of these matters has to be considered in three ways, *viz.*, with reference to large Municipalities, small Municipalities, and areas, where Local but not Municipal Funds exist. I am of opinion that in large municipal towns, committees might be found able to manage expenditure on account of education as suggested, and to exercise such control over education as it might be thought fit to entrust to them; but that this is not practicable elsewhere.

8. It is only fair to notice what I believe will be fully borne out by the Educational Department, that Municipalities, large and small, are most liberal in their contributions towards the support of education whenever their means allow.

9. As regards the heads of Vaccination, Sanitation, Hospitals, and Dispensaries, under the Provincial head of Medical Services, I think they might be very well locally managed, except in the case of hospitals, suitable subsidies, of course, being given, the receipts under these heads being none, or very trifling. Vaccination and sanitation require little but superintendence, and as dispensaries are generally situated in large or small towns, and no very great degree of intelligence is required for their supervision, they might very well be looked after by local committees. Their accounts, also, are simple. The only difficulty I see in this matter is that more work will be thrown on District officers, who, already, have a great deal to do, the amount of writing required from them having especially increased. It is true they are now required to visit dispensaries, but the management of these departments and institutions would call for a good deal of attention to detail.

10. I do not see anything under the head of Miscellaneous which could conveniently be transferred to local bodies. Most Municipalities nominally offer rewards for the destruction of snakes, but, in most

parts of Gujarát, the higher classes are averse to the destruction of any animal. Travellers' bungalows form, perhaps, an exception, and might be so transferred.

11. As regards public works, I am not quite sure, from paragraph 5 of the Bombay Government Resolution, whether I am called upon for an opinion, in case it be so, I may say that I am averse to any change in the present arrangement, though, I think, Municipalities should be bound to employ the agency of the Public Works Department on all works costing more than a fixed amount. This may seem like curtailing rather than extending their powers, but I am sure that the waste saved makes up for the percentage paid, and that the work will, in nine cases out of ten, be better executed. In some instances, the municipal officers are anxious and willing to take up important works, without the necessary qualifications, and the Municipalities, thinking to save the percentage, are too willing to give in to them.

12. As regards Local Funds, of late years, as I pointed out, the committees have, with the aid of the Public Works Department, carried out works of much greater magnitude than they used to undertake, and I believe they are quite able to manage any expenditure in connection with roads, tanks, &c., or, in other words, such works as they at present take in hand.

Following the general scheme, they would, I presume, if undertaking all the roads of the district, be subsidized from Provincial revenue, so that the small village works most prized by the people, and, though making little show, most useful, may receive their full share of attention.

13. I will, in conclusion, with reference to the expression '*fixed* Provincial grant' used in paragraph 7 of the Bombay Government Resolution, remark that I suppose it to mean fixed year by year. The chief items of expenditure, it is suggested, may be transferred, vaccination, education, &c., are such as may be expected to increase annually, while the one-anna cess, I need not point out, is a very inelastic source of revenue, and the less elastic in proportion to the forwardness of the district.

I have, &c.

G. F. M. GRANT,
Acting Collector, Kaira.

No. 3796 of 1881.

From J. ELPHINSTON, Esquire, Collector of Kolába, to G. F. SHEPPARD, Esquire, Commissioner, N.D.

SIR, Camp Tale, 22nd November 1881.

I HAVE the honour, in accordance with your No. 3290 of 1881, dated the 3rd instant, forwarding for report Government Resolution No. 3950, dated the 25th ultimo, to submit my opinion on the three points mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Government Resolution above quoted, regarding which an expression of opinion is called for.

2. I beg, at the same time, to forward, for perusal, reports which have been sent to me on this subject by the District and Acting Huzur Deputy Collectors.

3. The report of the latter is deserving of consideration as showing the opinion of a well educated and intelligent officer with nine years' experience in the Educational Department.

4. As regards the question referred in paragraph 5 of Government Resolution No. 3950 of the 25th ultimo, the idea of promoting self-government by entrusting Provincial, Local and Municipal Boards with the management of the revenues hitherto expended from Provincial sources and with a share in the responsibility for properly executing such works is as new as it is liberal; if the members of such Provincial Boards be well selected, on the grounds of their intelligence, independence, and knowledge of the wants of the country (much good especially economy in commencing new works) might follow from their being entrusted with the administration of Provincial Funds. As an instance of the ill-effects of not consulting the people of the country in questions affecting the expenditure of large sums of public money, I might quote the two instances within my own knowledge. About thirty years ago great efforts were made by the authorities at Ratnágiri to divert the trade from Rájápur to Wághotan after an expenditure of several lákhs in the construction of the Phonda Ghát to go to Wághotan and of a pier, travellers' bungalow and other conveniences for the use of travellers at Wághotan. The scheme had to be abandoned and the Ponda Ghát road had to be carried on by a long detour to Rájápur, while a road could have been made direct to it from Kolhápur by the Anaskura Ghát for much less money. The object of diverting the trade from Rájápur was that the creek near that town was becoming shallower every year and the entrance to it by sea was not so good a harbour as that of Viziádurg which leads to Wághotan. The trade of Rájápur was, however, too conservative to move from the old and well known place of trade to the newly appointed one; so all those who bought land to settle at Wághotan were heavy losers, for after a few years the experiment had to be abandoned.

6. A similar attempt has been made within the last twenty years to divert the trade from Kumta to Kárwár in south Kánara. This might have succeeded had Government fulfilled their promise of constructing a railway from the Dhárwár Districts to the latter port, trusting to which many wealthy merchants expended money in the purchase of land, construction of buildings, and in investments which are likely to prove worthless, now that Government have decided to abandon the project of a railway to Kárwár in favour of one to Marmagaon in the Portuguese territory. In their efforts to convert the former fishing villages of Baitkul, Konay and Sadáshivgad into the sea-port, with the new name of Kárwár, Government have expended many lákhs of rupees, which are now likely to be so much money thrown away when the whole of the trade of the Southern Marátha Country is brought by rail to Marmagaon in foreign territory. These are some of the evils inseparable from a bureaucratic and despotic Government, where the governed have no voice in the disposal of public money. I would therefore hail the project to intrust a portion of revenue now Provincial, such as assessed taxes, to Provincial and Local Boards, to whom the control of expenditure and supervision of works would be entrusted, as a liberal measure, which is likely to induce men of public spirit and intelligence to take an active interest in their self-government and to prevent the perpetration of economical blunders.

7. Provincial Committees of this kind to have a voice in the disposal of Provincial Funds should also be selected from a wider area than what the members of our present Local Fund Committees are chosen from; one defect in the construction of which is that, being of narrow experience and limited interests, they are too apt to wish to limit expenditure to the immediate neighbourhood of their own village or táluka, and do not yet in all cases understand the benefit of works which are of service to neighbouring tálukás or zillas. This defect is one which may be expected to disappear gradually with wider experience. As pointed out in the 3rd paragraph of the Acting Deputy Collector's letter, members of Local Fund Committees should be encouraged to exercise supervision over all public works within their limits, reporting any delinquency or shortcoming of subordinates to the nearest public official, who should at once take notice of such complaints by bringing them to the knowledge of the subordinates' superior; a case similar to those quoted by the Acting Huznr Deputy Collector came under my observation at Dhárwár, where a public work official laid the foundations of a school-house on the site of a well which had been filled up, though his mistake was pointed out to him by the villagers, with the result that the walls cracked and extensive special repairs were required the very year the school was opened. This is an instance of neglect and apathy which, it is hoped, is very rare; but were Local Fund members encouraged to visit sites selected for Government buildings and to inspect such buildings when in course of construction and to communicate their views as to the correction of anything evidently undesirable, it might have a useful effect.

8. I agree with the opinion expressed in the fourth para. of the Huzúr Deputy Collector's letter, *viz.*, that committees, to have the extended powers contemplated in the Government Resolution under contemplation, should be more numerous, and in the case of Provincial Committees, where questions affecting the welfare of more than one zilla are concerned, they ought, I think, to be selected from the more enlightened of each district, meeting annually at a convenient time of the year for travelling, at the most central place in the two or three districts concerned.

9. With reference to the points suggested in the 7th paragraph of the Government Resolution under notice, I consider that provided the portion of revenue now Provincial which it is proposed to make over to municipal funds is at least equal to the sums now expended by Government on the objects contemplated, *viz.*, education, medical, charity, and public works, then the management of these sums would be a worthy object of consideration to public-spirited Municipal Committees; but great care should be taken in the selection of the Commissioners to ensure their being both public-spirited, intelligent and energetic. The same remarks apply to the local bodies, to whom it is suggested to make over a fixed Provincial grant, together with the school fees with liberty to extend education within the limits of their charge by the aid of increased receipts in the shape, I suppose, of school fees, besides donations and endowments. The working of such a system might entail expenditure of somewhat more time than now, but the result would be well worth it in the end. The Educational Inspector, the Deputy Educational Inspector, the Collector, and his Assistants would sit in these committees, and discuss questions such as the raising of school fees where money is wanted, and the lowering of them in case of poverty where an increase of the pupils was the object aimed at, the result of their deliberations would, I suppose, as now go through the Commissioners to Government, whose sanction would ensure the Local or Provincial budgets being as practical and beneficial as they are now; the chief objects gained by the new proposal being an increased interest in self-government as well as a better general knowledge of how public funds are disposed of besides the one mentioned before, *viz.*, that plans involving great expense which are contrary to the native public opinion would not be so likely to be attempted.

10. As regards the third point mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Government Resolution—vaccination, sanitation, hospitals, and dispensaries are already subject to the local control of Municipal and Local Fund Committees; if Government desire to put civil hospitals also under them, of course with the supervision, as now, of the Superintending Surgeons and Sanitary Commissioner, there is no objection to the measure, but the expenditure of Provincial Funds which have hitherto been devoted to these institutions should not be reduced, and authority might be given eventually to raise extra taxes in future, with the sanction of Government, when the Provincial Funds now available for these objects no longer suffice to maintain them with due regard to efficiency.

I have, &c.
J. Elphinston,
Collector.

No. 1574 of 1881-82.

From Ra'o Baha'dur S. C. Chitnis, Huzúr Deputy Collector, Kolába, to J. Elphinston, Esquire, Collector of Kolába.

Alíbag, 17th November 1881.

Sir,

With reference to your endorsement No. 3645, dated the 5th instant, I beg to report as follows.

2. Government Resolution No. 3950 of the 25th October last circumscribes the points on which opinion is called for. The first two paragraphs only introduce the subject. The points mooted in paragreph 3 are in paragraph 4 commended to the consideration of the Accountant General.

3. With regard to paragraph 5, I am respectfully of opinion that, as proposed therein, a good proportion of the Provincial and Local revenue, which is now spent by, or under the exclusive supervision of, the Public Works Department, should be transferred to local bodies, such as Municipalities, in regard to the works to be executed within their local limits, and the District and Táluka Local Fund Committees in regard to the works in the remaining area in the district. Whenever necessary, it should of course be possible to secure the advice and co-operation of the officers (paid from Provincial Funds) of the Public Works Department, but the actual execution of the works should be formally under the eye

of the local bodies. In the existing arrangements, whenever a Local Fund Committee assigns funds for works to be executed by the Public Works Department, the Committee has nothing to do with the works until *after* their completion when only an outside view is taken of the same for passing completion certificates; while, on the other hand, the officers of the Public Works Department often show an impatience of any supervision on the part of any members of the local committees, who do not happen to be highly placed, such as Collectors or their Assistants. One result of this is that superior officers of the Public Works Department being necessarily not able to remain all the time at the works while in progress, the works are constructed without the wholesome check provided by the prospect of sudden visits of a respectable member or two of the local committees, and the consequence sometimes is that works cost more than they should or are so badly done that soon after their execution they either give way or have to be specially repaired or pulled down. In stating this, I am aware of the other side, *viz.*, that such visits from non-professional persons are useless, and that often they might prove only undue interference. Against this the reply would be—1*st*, that most of the ordinary public works do not require much professional knowledge in *the execution* as distinguished from *the preliminary conception and estimate*; and 2*nd*, that if we encourage well-selected members of local bodies to take an interest in this form of local management, they can soon acquire the necessary ordinary professional experience, as much as is possessed by Maistrees who actually construct the great bulk of our public works. As to the second point, a few rules (the framing of which is evidently a matter of detail) can prevent the supervision of the members of local bodies from degenerating into obstructive interference. The change in system, now proposed by the Government of India, will also remove another noticeable shortcoming in the existing arrangements, which is this—at present, if a defect should somehow creep into the plan and estimate of a work, and if, during the construction, a member of a local committee were to point it out either to the subordinates of the Public Works Department engaged in the construction or even to their superiors, no prompt and effective notice is taken of the suggestion on the plea that the sanctioned plan cannot be deviated from. As instances I may mention that when I was Deputy Educational Inspector, I found it necessary, during the construction of some costly buildings, to suggest to the Public Works Department that wall cupboards, pegs to hang maps from, and a seat for a clock might be provided; and I was replied to, that the items in question were not included in the estimate, and that, if necessary, the correspondence must come through the Inspector—a process, the resort to which often proved too late, inasmuch as the walls, &c., were already completed.

4. As regards paragraph 6, I beg to observe that though our Municipalities, town and city, do not, for the present, require any change in their constitution, in order to have the objects now in view well accomplished, yet, there may well be some increase in the members of the District and Táluka Local Fund Committees, so that there may be eight non-official members instead of seven in the District, and five instead of four in the Táluka Committees.

5. Referring now to the 7th paragraph, which sets forth the main points for consideration, I beg to state that where Municipalities at present contribute towards the cost of the Police, they may be relieved of it, an equal expenditure on education, medical charity, &c., being, as proposed, thrown over them. By the expression "equal expenditure," especially when it is read with the light of paragraph 11 of the Government of India's letter No. 3513, dated the 10th October 1881, to the address of the Bengal Government, *vide* page 640 of the *Bombay Government Gazette* of the 20th October 1881, Government appears to mean expenditure equal to what the Municipalities would be relieved of. But, as a matter of fact, small Municipalities such as those in this district do not at present contribute anything to the cost of the Police, their income being barely enough for the main objects of the Municipal Act, which speaks of the contribution to the Police as a special charge to be imposed when the Local Government should see it proper to do so. If, therefore, these small Municipalities paying no Police contribution are to be made, as they may well be, to undertake new burdens on account of education, medical charity and the like, they must, in fairness, be also assisted by assigning to them not only the local receipts, such as school fees, but also such amounts from the Imperial or Provincial Funds as will fairly represent the present actual cost to the State on those counts. If this is done, arrangements will have to be devised to secure the advantage of departmental experience and scrutiny. I believe this is at present done in educational matters in the Bengal and Madras Presidencies, where the Deputy Educational Inspector acts under the orders of the District Boards or Committees headed by the Collector, and the Educational Inspector does, besides his regular inspection, the functions of an adviser to the committee. The question how far that system should be introduced into this Presidency was, however, last year considered by Government, in consultation with the Commissioners and the Director of Public Instruction; and the outcome was a set of rules which give to the committees a more direct supervision over the schools than they enjoyed hitherto; and I am respectfully of opinion that if in the proposed scheme Anglo-Vernacular and higher schools are also transferred to the control of our local committees, the present system should be only extended with some alterations requiring that matters, like the scales of pay, as also the number of appointments, should receive the consent of the committees. Similar arrangements will have to be devised in connection with medical charity, sanitation and public works.

6. As to the second question, what I have stated above is substantially a reply to it. I beg only to add that, since the educational demands of the country are, as may be expected, gradually increasing with the growing appreciation of the people, the fixed Provincial grant must be sufficiently liberal and not merely based upon the actuals of past years.

7. As to the third question, my opinion is decidely in the affirmative, provided Government would assign liberal Provincial allotments to the management of the local bodies. The institutions and officers whom the local bodies will have to look after will evidently not be many, nor would the work in regard to them be a heavy one. Of course, suitable help from the departmental officers in the form of occasional advice and scrutiny will be a necessary adjunct to the proposed scheme.

8. In conclusion, I beg to observe that if, in enforcing the proposed scheme, sufficient funds are placed at the disposal of the local bodies so as not to compel them, at least for the present, to go in for fresh taxation to meet the fresh responsibilities to be thrown upon them, and if the administrative

system is arranged in the manner above alluded to (by me without descending into details, which I believe are not meant to be discussed at this stage of the general question), the scheme certainly bids fair to prove a real and substantial step towards "the development to self-government in India."

I have, &c.
S. C. CHITNIS,
Deputy Collector.

No. 3675 of 1881.

(MEMORANDUM.)

Camp, Tárápur, 9th December 1881.

THE Commissioner, N. D., presents compliments to the Secretary to Government, Financial Department, and, in continuation of this office No. 3625, dated 3rd instant, has the honour to forward a report* from Mr. Lely, First Assistant Collector, Surat, on the subject of extension of local self-government.

* No. 450, dated 17th November 1881.

G. F. SHEPPARD,
Commissioner, N. D.

To the Secretary to Government,
Financial Department.

Below Collector's No. 2990 of 4th instant, forwarding the Commissioner's No. 3290 of 3rd idem, under Government Resolution No. 3950 of 25th October, relating to the further extension of local self-government.

No. 450 of 1881.

Camp Jalálpor, 17th November 1881.

IN my humble opinion it would be well if less stress were laid by Government upon *meetings* of the Local Fund Committees. They worry the members without securing their co-operation; the end in view would be at least equally gained by circulating the budget and other interesting papers and by encouraging each person to record his opinion in writing thereupon. More use might also be made of the printing press. If the correspondence and proceedings on all important subjects were translated and printed and copies placed by post in the hands of all members, a good effect would be produced not only in stimulating an interest in public affairs but in diffusing a correct knowledge of them. The practice of summoning members to attend here and there disinclines many influential men from serving, they compare it to being called as a witness to a Court which gives no batta.

2. In the efforts to extend self-government among the extra-urban population, the most trusty and sensible bodies of men, either in town or country, have been little utilized. I refer to the patels of villages. It is true that owing to narrow experience they take a village view of things and are therefore in a false position when placed, as a few of them are, on the District or Táluka Committees. It is setting them to be ruler over many things before their faithfulness has been tried upon a few things. They are the men however who once administered fairly well the local government of their little communities, and they are the men with whom to begin, if it is desired, to engage the popular sentiment now.

3. To gain their cordial co-operation it would be necessary to set before them some work in which they already feel a keen interest and in which their control will be of real value. It is the absence of the former of these conditions which makes the Local Fund Committee a farce. It is the absence of the latter which has rendered generally abortive the attempt to interest village patels in education by means of "School Committees." The time has not yet come for them when they can exercise with advantage any active control over the school and its masters. This admission underlies the rules drawn up for the guidance of the committees, in which many duties are prescribed but not an atom of *real* power is conferred. It is hopeless to expect any people to put themselves to trouble upon these terms, and consequently the committees seldom go near the schools except under some special official pressure.

4. Both the above conditions meet in minor public works. At present these are divided in the local budget into—

1. Works to be executed by Public Works Department Agency.
2. Ditto ditto Civil Agency.

To these might be added a third, *viz.*, "Village Agency." Suppose a new wall to be sanctioned for a village whose head patels are ascertained to be men of capacity and character. The collector might hand over the budget item to them in a lump, and tell them to do the best they can for their village. Subject to a final production of accounts, the widest latitude might be allowed them in the execution of the work, *e.g.*, if they could economize in cartage and cost of material and spend the saving on a water trough, they should not only be exonerated but applauded.

5. Itwould be essential to the success of this attempt that there should be no half-confidence. Any overt supervision during the work would lessen the credit the patels may expect to receive both from Government and (what is of more moment to them) from their fellow villagers and neighbours. They should be treated not as contractors to be checked, audited and controlled at every turn, but as administrators to whom an *assignment* of local revenue has been made. The main safeguard against malversation, besides regard for their own reputation and fear of the Penal Code in the back ground, would be that

they have more interest than any one else in seeing the money laid out well. It is their own village that will benefit by it. To bring this more clearly home to them, it might be explained beforehand that no further allotment, even for repairs, would be made to that village for the same work on any pretence for a period of, say, 20 years. If this was strictly enforced, any miscarriage would fall not, as now, on the general funds but upon them and theirs.

6. It is not as if the present means of getting the works done anything like perfect. Formerley they were all under the supervision of the Mámlatdár; now most of them are under the Public Works Department; and I do not think any impartial person can assert that one method is much better than the other. Departmental supervision over a large number of small and scattered projects is practically impossible. That the patels are able to secure good and cheap work, if they like, is abundantly proved by the wells and other works which they get done for their own private use.

7. The chief Practical difficulty would probably be to overcome their dislike to accept so much responsibility. They would be afraid of getting into trouble through their ignorance of accounts, and this fear would operate most in the minds of those who have most character to lose and are therefore most sensitive. Some little management would, no doubt, be necessary to induce even the most energetic to meet heartily the advances of Government. Very likely, too, peculation would sometimes take place, however cautiously the villages were selected. Still all this only means that the experiment of bringing in the people to aid the administration cannot be really tried to however limited an extent without some trouble and some hazard. My own belief is that, if the patels were judiciously encouraged to construct their own works, and were given a direct interest in keeping them in repair, a spirit of emulation would in time begin to grow and spread.

8. The following rates are submitted with reference to the service head mentioned in paragraph 3 of Government Resolution No. 3950, dated Bombay Castle, 25th ultimo, the letter of the Government of India upon which the Resolution was passed, does not appear to have been circulated.

EDUCATION.

Direction - -
Inspection - -
Government Colleges -
} All these sub-heads will probably be still Provincial.

Government Schools—High, Middle, Low.—The high schools might be transferred to their respective Municipalities with great advantage, and that too without necessarily entitling the latter to equivalent assignments of revenue, the resources of the State might much more fairly be applied to the elementary education of the rayats who contribute most of the taxes. The high schools are filled almost entirely with a distinctively town population, and hence seem most appropriate objects for close connection with the Municipalities. Even the few boys from rural districts who attend take up their abode for the purpose in the town and become *pro. tem.* citizens. As to the other classes of schools, my information as to the present arrangements is imperfect. A reference has been made to the Deputy Educational Inspector, but his reply has not yet been received.

MEDICAL SERVICES.

Medical Establishment - -
Vaccination and Sanitation - -
} Such of these charges as are Provincial should remain so.

Hospitals and Dispensaries.—Under this head come the charges for the dispensaries, and (2) the civil hospital of the districts. At present the general practice with respect to the former is that Government makes a grant-in-aid on the basis of not more than half the average expenditure, leaving the rest to be made up from local sources. It would appear desirable to throw the entire burden of each district dispensary upon the Municipality with a subsidy from the Local Funds, if the institution is in a municipal town, and if not, then the entire cost might be borne from the Local Funds. The object is one that ought peculiarly to commend itself to the popular sympathy and support, but hitherto has failed to attract either to any great extent. Perhaps a closer connection with the Municipalities would quicken an interest in the matter.

The whole charges of the civil hospital, including the pay of the higher establishment, might also, it is submitted, be thrown on the Municipality with perhaps a subsidy from the Local Funds. There may be statistics to show accurately whence the patients come. Cursory enquiry seems to show that in most cases the civil hospital is supplied chiefly from the town in which it is established. Even those which take a wider range do not attract patients from outside the district, and, in short, the civil hospital is for most purposes as thoroughly a local institution as the dispensary.

Grants for medical purposes to hospitals and dispensaries supported from private sources will, it is presumed, be dealt with on a consideration of each particular case.

Additional grant on account of promotion to higher rank of Assistant Surgeon will, it is presumed, remain Provincial.

Expenses during epidemics might ordinarily be made a local charge on the same principal as vaccination.

Lunatic Asylum.—There is only one for the whole of Gujarát and Káthiáwár, and it would obviously not be an appropriate local charge.

MINOR DEPARTMENTS.

It does not appear that any item under this head would at present be transferred with advantage to Local. "Model Farms" and "Experimental Factories" might require consideration; but as there are none in Gujarát, the subject has no practical interest here.

Miscellaneous.

No remarks.

As to the assignment of revenue to be made to local control to meet any increased expenditure, one or two remarks are submitted. If high schools and medical establishments be transferred, the

corresponding receipts of fees, fines, endowments, and contributions will of course follow also. There will still in doubt be a balance to be made up, and it is submitted that, if there is no insurmountable objection, it would be very advisable to assign to the Municipalities the Provincial share of the License Tax collected within their limits. There can be no doubt that, after Government had so long exempted the trading classes from fiscal burdens, the imposition of this tax caused much irritation, which could not but be allayed if the money was returned to the hands of the payers in the shape of what they most appreciate—English education and English medicine.

F. S. P. LELY,
Acting First Assistant Collector.

Below Thàna Collector's No. 5854, dated 8th December 1881.

No. 3704 of 1881.

Financial Department, Camp Bhalada, 13th December 1881.

Forwarded to Government, in continuation of this office No. 3675, dated 9th instant.

G. F. SHEPPARD,
Commissioner, N. D.

No. 5854 of 1881.

From W. B. MULOCK, Esquire, Acting Collector, Thána, to The COMMISSIONER, N. D.

SIR, Thána Collector's Office, 8th December 1881.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to Government Resolution No. 3950 of 25th October last, forwarded with your endorsement, No. 3290 of 3rd November, that Government having held that the agency for local administration does not call for immediate attention in this Presidency, nothing need be said on the point. I should however have thought that something might be done to improve this agency as anything more apathetic than it is at present could not well be conceived. The allowing of half the Municipal Committees to be elected might have the effect of ameliorating matters as then they would be responsible to their electors or constituencies for the proper discharge of their duties.

2. The necessity for improving the agency may be judged from the fact of defalcations having taken place in three Municipalities of this district—Kalyán Panvel and Bhiwndi—in no one case was the offence brought to light by the Commissioners, nor did they seem anxious in any way for the prosecution of the offenders. On the other hand, where there is Europeon control, as at Bándra and Thána, the difference is most marked. The financial state of the corporations is good, and much interest is taken in the welfare of the towns.

3. Regarding the larger proportion of the present Provincial expenditure to be entrusted to the control and management of the District Local Fund Committees and Municipalities, I am of opinion that increased expenditure of the nature contemplated should not be granted to Municipalities until their agency is improved, but the same objection does not hold good with respect to District Local Fund Committees which have a large number of European officers on them, and the accounts of whose funds are regularly written and audited by Government officials. To them, I think, the toll receipts on the two large Provincial roads (the Bombay and Agra and, 2nd, the Panvel and Poona), aggregating some Rs. 50,000 a year, might with advantage be handed over for expenditure. At present the roads are under the Public Works Department, and the trees under the District Local Fund Committees. I believe repairs would be more efficiently done if local supervision were ensured and the double responsibility with regard to the road and the trees abolished.

4. The first suggestion of the Government of India that municipal bodies should be relieved of the Police charge does not apply to this district. No Police charge beyond the annual petty repairs of the Police chaukis within their limits being thrown on municipal towns.

5. The second suggestion on the local control of education is carried out to some extent inasmuch as there are School Committees, but they rarely visit a school or pay the least attention to their duties and never favour me with their views on the subject.

6. Suggestion No. 3 is also, to a certain extent, adopted, as at present there are Dispensary Committess who inspect these institutions and take but a very limited interest in their management or development. I don't see how local control could be increased in this line, unless the management of the funds were handed over them, and this I certainly do not recommend.

I have, &c.
W. B. MULOCK,
Acting Collector.

No. 783 of 1882.

Financial Department.

From H. N. B. ERSKINE, Esquire, Commissioner in Sind, to His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir JAMES FERGUSSON, Bart., K.C.M.G. and C.I.E., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

Commissioner's Office, Camp Tando Alahyar,
25th February 1882.

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks, in reply to the Resolutions of your Excellency's Government, quoted in the margin, on the subject of the further extension of local self-government, and have to express my regret at the delay that has occurred in sending my reply, which has resulted from a severe attack of sickness, which prevented my taking up the subject at an earlier date.

Government Resolution, Financial Department, No. 3774, dated 12th October 1881.*
Government Resolution, Financial Department, No. 3950, dated 25th October 1881.†

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* See page 58 of Return.

† See page 61 of Return.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

2. In the first Resolution my opinion is asked on the important subject discussed by the Government of India in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Resolution of that Government, No. 3353, of the 30th September last, and your Excellency desired that "any proposals which may be submitted may be restricted to what is immediately practicable as an extension of local self-government." In the later Resolution your Excellency's views are still further explained, and information is asked on three points—

1st.—Whether the Municipal bodies should be relieved altogether of the charge they now bear for Police under Bombay Act VI of 1873, Section 24, and should undertake an equal amount of expenditure on education, medical charity, and public works of local interest?

2ndly.—Whether education might not be locally controlled to a larger extent than it now is?

3rdly.—Whether Provincial medical expenditure, especially under the heads of Vaccination, Sanitation, Hospital and Dispensaries might not with advantage be transferred to local control and management?

3. To take these questions in order, I find that, with regard to the first, the opinions of local officers are divided; thus the Collector and Magistrate of Karáchi writes:—Municipal bodies "have no control over the Police expenditure, and on that and other grounds the transfer of such charges to Provincial funds is desirable." On the other hand the Collector and Magistrate of Shikárpur "would be sorry to see Municipalities altogether set free from payment, as their proceedings in connection with the same furnish a very good side test of the need for Police and sometimes of the efficiency of the latter." The Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Sind Frontier District takes the same view as the Collector of Shikarpur, and asks—"Is not the town Police exactly one of the matters for local self-government—there is none in which the Native merchant is more interested, although care is required that such interest should not result in unnecessary expenditure, as it occasionally used to." The Collector and Magistrate of Hyderabad has not expressed any opinion on the point, and in the Thar and Párkar District the charges now borne by Municipalities for Police are very trifling.

4. It will be seen that among District Officers there is a strong feeling in favour of Municipalities having a voice in the settlement of their own Police arrangements, but this, it appears from the general tenor of their remarks, is very much due to an impression that the Government provision for Police purposes is inadequate, and that it is therefore better that those who feel the want should have the power of remedying it, and because experience has shown that there is no question in which the Native members of municipal bodies take a more lively interest.

5. There is, I think, a good deal to be urged in favour of allowing municipal bodies to have a voice in determining the strength and cost of the Police employed for their protection—but on the other hand I think it may fairly be assumed that if Government take over the Police, they will make ample provision to secure its being made efficient, and that they will be ever ready, at any time, to consider any representation that may be made to them by any local body on the subject of the alleged insufficiency of the provision made. On the whole then, as the entire management and supervision of the Police cannot possibly be left to the local bodies, and as they cannot be allowed entire control over Police expenditure, I am of opinion that it is desirable that municipal bodies should be relieved altogether of the charges they now bear on this account.

6. The relief that would be afforded by this change in Sind would be as nearly as I can calculate from the information before me as follows:—

	Rs.
In the Karáchi District - - - - -	31,514
Hyderabad do. - - - - - -	13,721
Shikárpur do. - - - - - -	9,340
Upper Sind Frontier District - - - -	4,096
Thar and Párkar do. - - - -	486
Total - Rs.	59,157

7. As regards the second point whether education might not, with advantage, be locally controlled to a greater extent than at present, there is less divergence in opinion, as, with the exception of Colonel Ross, Acting Collector of Hyderabad, who expresses a general opinion that the time has not yet come to extend self-government in Sind, and the Deputy Commissioner, Thar and Párkar, whose district is a wild and altogether exceptional one, the other officers agree in thinking that in all large municipal towns it would be a move in the right direction to place the management of schools more directly under the municipal bodies.

8. They consider, however, and in this I agree with them, that all arrangements connected with inspection of schools should continue to be a Provincial charge and should be under the sole control of Government as at present. On this point Colonel C. F. Boulton, now Collector of Karáchi, remarks—"Bearing in mind that the object of Government is to assign to local control such outlay as can be easily understood and appreciated by the people, I would suggest that all expenditure on education, except charges incidental to inspection, be transferred from Provincial Funds. The necessity for masters, teachers, books, &c., and the advantage of encouraging education by the system of payment according to results must be obvious to all, but it is not so certain that the necessity for an elaborate system of independent inspection is equally well understood by district communties, whatever may be the case in large centres, and in my opinion the charges for the maintenance of that system might, at least for the present, remain against Provincial Funds."

9. The same view is taken by the Acting Educational Inspector, who writes that Mr. Hart-Davies, the Educational Inspector, has, on several occasions, very strongly expressed his opinion that education within municipal limits ought to be supervised and managed by municipal bodies, the general supervision only resting with the Educational Department. He continues as follows:—

"The total expenditure upon education in municipal towns amounts at present to Rs. 1,14,260. The share borne by Municipalities does not exceed Rs. 21,000, the rest being provided for by Provincial and Local Funds, by the former Rs. 46,040, and by the latter Rs. 47,220."

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

The objects of expenditure at present are—

		Rs.
1.	Higher education, including charges on account of scholarships paid to students going up to Bombay - - -	34,070
2.	Middle Class school education (1st and 2nd grade) - -	8,860
3.	Primary education - - - - - -	57,600
4.	Special education :	
	(*a.*) Training School - - - - -	3,390
	(*b.*) Agricultural Class - - - - -	900
	(*c.*) Engineering and Drawing Classes - - -	2,500
	(*d.*) Medical School - - - - -	6,940
	Total - Rs.	1,14,260

"N.B.—The Engineering and Drawing Class has been recently amalgameted with one of the High Schools."

But he then proceeds to qualify his general opinion in favour of local control by expressing a doubt how far the small Municipalities, and such are numerous in Sind, could bear the extra charges that would be thrown upon them, were they called on to defray all charges. The relief they would obtain by being relieved of charges for Police would be almost nominal, as in many cases they pay only for one or two constable, and thus a charge of the kind proposed would either have to be met by fresh taxation or by grants from Provincial Funds. These small municipal bodies should, however, it seems to me, receive liberal aid from Local Funds, which, in return, should be assisted by Government, and if this is done, I think this difficulty may be successfully overcome. In populous towns and cities the municipal bodies should be able with but little help to undertake all charges for education (except inspection), but in the small district communties, both as regards schools and dispensaries, aid will be a necessity, as it is not desirable to increase taxation.

10. As regards primary education in rural districts, no change will be needed, as the entire cost is now met from Local Funds. Only last year, I may mention, a system was introduced with the object of having such education controlled by local committees. With regard to these, the Acting Educational Inspector writes:—

"The separate committees appointed in connection with each school have not fulfilled the expectations which were formed of them, but the *ex-officio* members of Local Fund Committees are certainly doing good work; and to them, in my opinion, Government will still have to look for a judicious and wise administration of funds entrusted to the management and control of local bodies."

It will, of course, take time to induce local committees really to interest themselves in education, and it would have been wonderful if the committees had proved better than they have done, but with time and encouragement I see no reason to think that such committees will prove themselves unequal to the duties placed upon them.

11. On the whole, then, I am satisfied that by increasing local control, the cause of education must benefit, and that if school fees and a grant from Provincial Funds is made over to local bodies, no difficulty is likely to occur, provided always that existing arrangements as regards supervision are continued.

12. I now come to the third and last point, how far Provincial medical expenditure, especially under the heads of Vaccination, Sanitation, Hospitals and Dispensaries could be transferred to local control and management.

13. In my opinion it would be a mistake to leave the control of any but the subordinate establishment for vaccination to the discretion of local bodies. As in the case of education so with this the supervising establishment should, I think, be appointed by Government and paid from Provincial revenues, that is, the Deputy Sanitary Commissioner should, with his establishment, remain on its present footing. From a correspondence that has recently been submitted to your Excellency's Government, your Excellency is aware that the Municipality of Karáchi, in which city compulsory vaccination is enforced, have expressed a desire that their connection with the vaccination establishment should be confined to the payment of a fixed annual sum, and as it seems to me that the Deputy Sanitary Commissioner is the proper person to control such an establishment, I am of opinion that their request is a reasonable one that might well be complied with. With this exception control of the vaccination establishment might well be left to District Committees supervised by the Deputy Sanitary Commissioner, as at present.

14. Sanitation too may safely, I think, be left to local control and management.

15. As regards hospitals I have greater doubts. The civil hospitals are under the control of Civil Surgeons—officers with whom local bodies have no connection; and as divided responsibility is not likely to work satisfactorily, it seems to me that civil hospitals should continue to be a Provincial charge managed entirely by Government.

16. Dispensaries, on the other hand, might with safety be made over to the control of local bodies. On this point (with the exception of the Thar and Párkar District, which is exceptionally situated,) there is no difference of opinion. But even in the case of dispensaries a reservation is necessary, namely, that the supervising establishment should be paid and appointed by Government. This reservation is necessary, because the local bodies could not possibly appoint such officers, or determine their salaries, which are fixed by Government with reference to a standard which it is altogether beyond the province of any local body to interfere with. But with this exception it would be advantageous to leave the management in the hands of local committees.

17. On the general subject of placing dispensaries under local management, I have consulted Mr. Hewlett, Deputy Surgeon-General, who takes much interest in the welfare of these institutions, and he, not without reluctance, as your Excellency has directed the Surgeon-General to report on this matter for the whole Presidency, has given me the benefit of his opinion.

He writes, and I quote his remarks in full, as they are very much to the point:—

"In order to carry out the wishes of the Government of India, it seems to me desirable that the appointment of the Medical officers should be left to Dispensary Committees subject to the approval

of the Commissioner in Sind, whose sanction should be obtained for the salary for each post. At present there would be a difficulty about this, as these persons are members of the Indian Medical Subordinate establishment, but as time goes on, there will be in this direction a career open to the students not in Government employ, who are being educated at the Sind Medical School at Hyderabad. In the meantime, arrangements might perhaps be made, subject to the approval of the Surgeon-General, for transferring the Medical subordinates now in charge to the direct control of Dispensary Committees, but I think no Medical subordinate should be removed from his charge except with the concurrence of the Commissioner in Sind or Deputy Surgeon-General. It should be understood that, in the event of Military exigencies requiring such action, these subordinates, as long as they remain on the Government establishments, will be liable to be recalled to Military duty, and that in that event the Dispensary Committees must make their own arrangements.

"If this is done, the pay abstracts, instead of being forwarded to the Deputy Surgeon-General, might be passed on the countersignature of the chairman of the committee. The contingent bills for petty supplies would, in like manner, be subject to the scrutiny of the Dispensary Committees, and passed as above. I feel some hesitation in making this suggestion, knowing how the amount of these bills is likely to increase, unless they are subjected to the scrutiny of the Deputy Surgeon-General, but I think such action would be in accordance with the spirit of the order.

"Indents for medicines and instruments might likewise be countersigned by the President or Vice-President alone. A scale has been prepared by the Surgeon-General, which should be a guide to the controlling officer, in checking demands. If any difficulty arose, the Deputy Surgeon-General would always be glad to give his advice.

"I think the monthly and annual returns should be still sent to the Deputy Surgeon-General for transmission to the Surgeon-General, but I would suggest, instead of going to the expense of having monthly returns, that merely a monthly statement should be prepared bringing to notice the principal facts which have occurred during the month, and that only one annual return be furnished, from which the Surgeon-General could prepare his annual report.

"In the same way, I would propose that the submission of monthly cash accounts be stopped, and that only annual cash accounts be submitted, through the Commissioner, to the Surgeon-General, but instead of the Accountant-General being the sole referee on questions of expenditure, I think that the decision of the Commissioner in Sind should be final.

"I think a Government officer should inspect dispensaries, and that the Deputy Sanitary Commissioner, as at present, should be the officer to whom this duty should be entrusted. He should report any deficiency or shortcomings to the President, sending a copy to the Commissioner.

"In making these remarks I have tried to indicate the manner in which the wishes of the Government of India may be best carried out, but I am not at all sure that, except in the case of the larger Municipalities in the Presidency, that the Dispensary Committees are, as a rule, sufficiently earnest or competent to have such largely increased powers entrusted to them."

I quite concur in the views expressed by Mr. Hewlett, and am fully alive to the danger referred to in his last paragraph, but if self-government is to have a beginning, this danger must always be faced. I have no doubt that some failures will result from conferring such powers, but I think it may fairly be hoped that time and patience will give efficient management, and in giving effect to a measure of this kind, such difficulties must be accepted as a necessary consequence.

18. I have now referred in detail to the points raised for discussion by your Excellency's Government, and it only remains for me to endeavour to show, as well as I can with the information now before me, what the financial effect of the changes proposed would be.

19. With this object, I have prepared two statements, one showing, as nearly as I can calculate, what sums in each district, under the main heads of I. Police in Municipalities; II. Education, III. Medical Services, now paid from Provincial Funds, might be transferred either to District Local Fund Committees or to municipal bodies, and what sums would have to be paid to such local bodies from Provincial Funds to enable them to meet these additional responsibilities. In this statement I have not made any addition for inevitable increase in the cost of management, as my object is to show, as nearly as possible, the exact effect of the proposals as matters now stand.

20. In this statement (marked A), I have included the cost of Civil Hospitals, excluding the Civil Surgeons' pay, although I have recommended that these hospitals should be retained under Government management—this I have done in case your Excellency's Government does not approve of my recommendation, and I have likewise included the Thar and Párkar District, though I am very doubtful if the time has yet arrived when any attempt should be made to extend self-government to that large district, the greater part of which is sand hills and desert, and in which the small population is so scattered and so sparse that no common feeling exists between the different tribes, and in which the small communities have hardly arrived at the stage when the power of self-government could, with advantage, be entrusted to them. I have recently made the experiment of appointing a District Local Funds Committee for this district, but from what I have seen of the country and its inhabitants, I am not very hopeful that even this beginning can bear good fruit for some time to come. If, however, for the sake of uniformity, it is considered preferable to treat the Thar and Párkar District in the same way as others, a grant from Provincial revenues will be essential, as the small funds, local and municipal, could not bear the charges now paid from Provincial revenues without help.

21. I likewise attach a second statement (marked B) which gives the results if the estimated cost of civil hospitals is deducted under head III., Medical Services, and if the Thar and Párkar District is for the present excluded from the arrangement proposed for the Province of Sind generally. These two statements will, I trust, enable your Excellency to see clearly the effect of the proposals made.

22. The general results, as shown in Statement A, may be thus stated:—

(*a.*)—A sum of Rs. 59,157 now paid by Municipalities for Police will, in future, be defrayed from Provincial revenues.

(*b.*)—An outlay of Rs. 33,654, now made from Provincial Funds on account of salaries to masters, will, in future, have to be borne by Municipal Funds, and also Rs. 5,446 on account of miscellaneous charges.

(*c.*)—A sum, amounting to Rs. 8,509, now borne by Provincial Funds, for vaccination and sanitation will, in future, be a charge on Local Funds, while Rs. 19,979, paid from the Provincial Funds on account of hospitals and dispensaries will be divided between Local and Municipal Funds, the former taking over Rs. 2,800, and the latter Rs. 17,179, and lastly a sum of Rs. 21,097 will, in like manner, be transferred, Rs. 2,288 being a charge against local and Rs. 18,809 against Municipal Funds.

23. If these transfers are made, then sums now credited to Provincial Funds on account of school fees, and likewise contributions received from the Sind, Panjáb and Delhi Railway Company as contributions towards the cost of the civil hospitals at Karáchi and Kotri will have to be credited to Municipal Funds, the amount of such contributions is Rs. 14,290.

24. The total sum now disbursed from Provincial Funds on account of the heads to which I have referred is Rs. 88,685, or if the contributions referred to in the preceding paragraph are deducted, Rs. 74,395, which represents the present charge against Provincial revenues. The charges to meet which these sums are disbursed will, should the proposed scheme be carried out, be divided between Local Funds and Municipal Funds, Rs. 13,597 being transferred to the former and Rs. 60,798 to the latter.

25. While, however, Local Funds will not be relieved of any charges by the modifications proposed, Municipal bodies will be relieved of Police charges amounting to Rs. 59,157. As, therefore, District Local Funds will have to incur extra liabilities to the extent named, this will have to be made good to them by a grant from Provincial revenues, or by making over certain assessed taxes. As Municipal bodies also will incur increased liabilities, this increase, amounting (as shown in detail in Statement A) to Rs. 14,273, will have to be, in like manner, made good to them.

26. It may at first sight not be apparent why when fresh charges amounting only to Rs. 60,798 are made over to Municipal bodies, and they are at the same time relieved of charges amounting to Rs. 59,157, so large a payment should be made to them, but the explanation is that in certain districts only is there a Police expenditure in excess of the new items of expenditure incurred, and thus in such districts only will the municipal bodies benefit. There is such excess in two districts only ; in the Karáchi District it amounts to Rs. 10,510, and in the Upper Sind Frontier District to Rs. 2,122. These sums represent what will be clear gain to these Municipalities, and will provide funds for the extension of education, &c., without any extra grants from Provincial Funds beyond the amount required to meet charges to be transferred now. Whereas in other districts, owing to the relief afforded by the taking over of the Police charges transferred to them, the local municipal bodies will have to receive help in the shape of grants from Provincial Funds. It is clear that the expenditure from different districts cannot be lumped together and treated as a whole, and thus an extra charge will be thrown on Government amounting to Rs. 12,632, as shown above. The manner in which this occurs I have endeavoured to make clear in Statement A hereto appended. In the statement, it will be observed, I have merely entered the charges now borne by Provincial Funds, and local bodies that will have to be transferred and the amount of such charges showing then how in future they will be distributed, as this seemed to me the shortest way of showing the results of the changes suggested.

27. Thus, while Government at present pay from Provincial Funds (deducting contributions and fees) Rs. 74,395, they will in future be called on to disburse Rs. 87,027, or an excess of Rs. 12,632, which represents the gain to the Municipalities in the Karáchi and Upper Sind Frontier District by the Police being taken over by Government.

Present Outlay - - - - -	Rs. 74,395
Do. Cost of Police to be taken over - -	„ 59,157
Difference - - - - - -	Rs. 15,238
Add—Future Cost of Police - - - -	„ 59,157
Gain to Municipalities of Karáchi and Upper Sind Frontier on account of Police transferred - -	Rs. 12,632
Future Total Costs to Government - - -	Rs. 87,027 or
In excess of present cost - - - - -	„ 12,632

28. But in this estimate no margin is allowed for fresh expenditure by the spread of education or vaccination or by the establishment of new dispensaries, &c., and therefore, unless the Government contribution to local bodies were to exceed the sums shown, the arrangement would in no way be a favourable one for the latter, and in the event of the local bodies being entrusted with the control and management of the different public establishments referred to, it would, in my opinion, be necessary for Government to make over a somewhat larger sum than has been shown in order to leave a margin to work upon—what this amount should be it is unnecessary to discuss at present.

29. In the foregoing remarks, and in Statement A, I have, for convenience sake, dealt with municipal bodies as a whole, but when actual effect is being given to the arrangements proposed, the circumstances of each municipal body will have to be separately considered, and a separate allowance or grant made for each from Provincial Funds. This might be done by making over the proceeds of certain assessed taxes within the limits of the Municipality. If this is not done, I am inclined to think that it would be better for Government to look upon the whole group of municipal bodies in a District as one, and allot funds accordingly to the District, leaving the distribution of such funds to be effected according to circumstances by the head of the district who knows the circumstances of all, or he might be made to refer his proposals to the head of the Province for sanction. I see objections to such an arrangement, but at the same time there seem almost greater objections to Government dealing separately with every petty Municipality. It might perhaps be better, if the Provincial grant is not to be in the form of a grant of taxes levied in municipal limits, to deal separately at first with City Municipalities, only leaving the smaller ones to be dealt with in the manner I have already suggested.

30. It is perhaps hardly necessary for me to discuss the source from which the increased charge to be thrown upon Provincial Funds should be supplied. I may, however, remind your Excellency that at present a sum is annually credited to Provincial Funds from the local cess levied in Sind. The sum so levied of late years has been Rs. 20,000, which sum has been expended on public works through the Department of Public Works. Perhaps the simplest way of meeting the increased charge against

Provincial Funds in Sind would be to make over the sum now taken from Local Funds to meet the increased charges that will be thrown upon the committees managing such funds. The increased charges which I have suggested should be thrown on these funds amount by my estimate nearly to Rs. 14,000, so a transfer of the sum now taken from Local Funds for public works would not only cover the cost but leave a margin for useful public works. There would then only remain the sum to be made over to municipal bodies, namely Rs. 14,273 ; but this would not be a new charge, for, as shown in paragraph 27, the total fresh cost of the proposed arrangements, including all charges both local and municipal, was Rs. 12,632 only, and if the local fund portion is deducted and settled as proposed above, the actual disbursements from Provincial Funds, independent of this contribution from Local Funds, would be less than at present, in other words, the present expenditure, plus the grant now taken from Local Funds, if the latter were foregone, would more than cover the proposed expenditure.

31. The figures I have given all refer to Statement A ; if Statement B is taken, there is some difference arising from the charges for civil hospitals being shown as a charge against Provincial Funds and from the Thar and Párkar District being omitted. The results obtained are as follows:—Government now expend from Provincial revenues Rs. 35,950, these charges will be transferred to local bodies, and Police charges, amounting to Rs. 58,671, taken over instead, but Government will still have to make over Rs. 18,106 to make up to some local bodies for increased expenditure thrown on them, so that the actual expenditure for Provincial Funds would be Rs. 76,777, namely to be expended by Government on account of Police Rs. 58,671, to be allotted to Local Funds Rs. 12,997, and to municipal bodies in the Hyderabad District Rs. 5,109. I do not think I need add more regarding this statement.

32. There are in Sind some funds which are in reality Local Funds, which I have not included in my calculations, because it appears to me the present discussion cannot be held to affect them ; these are the Port Funds of Karáchi Harbour and the Indus Conservancy Fund. The former, as your Excellency is aware, is managed by a specially appointed Harbour Board, and already is a good instance of local control and management. No change therefore as regards it seems desirable.

33. The Indus Conservancy Fund is, on the other hand, from its nature not one that could with advantage be made over to local management and control. The object with which the fund is kept up is that the channels of the river Indus may be kept in order, snags removed, &c., &c., and the Department can best be managed, as at present, by the Conservator of the river, and his Assistants who are intimately acquainted with the river, and the work to be done, controlled as now by the Commissioner, who annually has an opportunity of seeing that the work is well done. It would be impossible to let the District Committee of any one district manage the fund required for the whole length of the river, and I need hardly say the Conservator and his Assistants could not be placed under a number of different committees and expected to obey all of them. Such an arrangement would never act, and the best arrangement therefore seems to allow this fund to be managed as it has hitherto been.

34. I have now, I think, referred to all the points to which it is necessary for me to allude. I have said nothing on the general question of the advisability of extending self-government in Sind, but, perhaps, I may be allowed to offer a few remarks on this point before I conclude.

35. Less has, I think, been done in Sind, except in two or three large cities and towns, to encourage the people to take an active part in the management of public affairs than in other parts of the Bombay Presidency, but where the attempt has been fairly made, it seems to have succeeded. At the same time there is not in Sind the village organization that exists in other parts of the Presidency, the chief zemindar of the village has greater influence than a single cultivator would have elsewhere, while the village community has less. There is, in fact, no "village community" in the sense in which the term is ordinarily used.

36. In cities and towns, however, there are many intelligent men, who only want encouragement to take an active interest in the management of the affairs of their native place. One Collector, Mr. Sinclair, C.S., writes:—"I must say that I have found the non-official members of the two City Municipalities here (Shikárpur and Sukkur) very fit to transact any business not connected with the great beef question in which the Mussalmans all vote one way and the Hindus the other (often without quite knowing what they vote for), and I should be glad to see them get a little more of their head in matters which so closely concern themselves." The Táluka Committees, he reports less favourably of, but they have had but little encouragement, and as matters are now managed, it is not easy to give the members encouragement, for under the system introduced by your Excellency's Government, by which a seven years' forecast of expenditure has to be proposed at one time, and subsequently carried out, there is really but little left for Táluka Committees to do. As all the funds are expended on large works, and none remain for the many smaller works, in which such committees would naturally take a real interest or for the petty village improvements which it was one of the professed objects of the Local Fund system to encourage by giving the committees the means of executing them from Local Funds. Too much may, in some districts, have been expended on such works, but it seems to me matters have now been carried to the opposite extreme, and too little is done to improve villages and towns from Local Funds.

37. But whether the different local bodies are fit to exercise the powers of self-government to a greater extent than they have done or not, I think we must be prepared, if a real attempt at self-government is to be made, to accept many failures. There are many points on which the views and wishes of most communities are quite at variance with those of Government. To illustrate this, I need only mention the subject of raising municipal taxes. Your Excellency is well aware that, if most municipal bodies had their own way, they would raise their revenues by taxes that would in reality be nothing, but transit duties, and would shift the burden of taxation, as much as possible, off their own shoulders while, in many places, I fear, they would rather see their town unswept and dirty than pay taxes to ensure its being properly cleaned.

38. This objection to tax themselves even for purposes which Government have laid down as essentials may occasion difficulty, as taxes must be voted by the Commissioners themselves, and they

may at times refuse to consent to increase taxation to make up for lost income resulting from the abolition of transit duties or other causes. Everywhere the Commissioners exhibit the greatest objection to direct taxes, such as the house-tax, and if really acting independently of official influence, would, I fear, even get rid of such taxation where it exists. If, however, too much is not attempted at once, and if the official element, though less numerous than the non-official, as it is even now, is able to retain a powerful influence, while the non-official members are encouraged to express their wishes freely, then I believe that gradually the fitness for self-government of the people will be developed, and they will gradually come to exercise a stronger and doubtless beneficial interest in the management of their affairs, and certainly it seems to me that the more they can be encouraged to do so, the better for Government as well as for the people themselves. At present in Sind, as a rule, the management of Municipalities and also of District Local Funds is far too much in the hands of officials, and as popular institutions they are (with the exception of some City Municipalities) little better than shams. The only really representative bodies that I can think of are the Panchâyats that exist in most towns; these are generally purely caste institutions and their range is limited, but still there must be good organisation to enable them to work as smoothly as they do, and it may safely be said that those capable without the power of the law to back them of working these must be capable, if they can only be induced to take a proper interest in the matter of forming useful members of municipal and other local bodies.

39. These remarks, however, are hardly applicable to the large district of Thar and Párkar, which is some twelve thousand square miles in extent, with a population of less than twenty to the square mile. The great mass of the inhabitants, whether Sodas, Khotas, Udejas, or Bhils are utterly uneducated, and a large majority are nomadic in their habits. Such people could not be induced to attend committees or interest themselves in the matters that would have to be discussed, and I have therefore doubts whether the time has come when it would be wise to endeavour to introduce self-government even nominally among them, and have suggested that for the present no such attempt be made.

I have, &c.
H. N. B. ERSKINE,
Commissioner in Sind.

A.

STATEMENT showing what the Results would be if certain Heads of Expenditure were interchanged between the Provincial Revenue and Local and Municipal Funds in the Province of Sind.

HEADS.	Provincial Funds.		Local Funds.		Municipal Funds.		Remarks.
	From	To	From	To	From	To	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Karáchi District.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	31,514	—	—	31,514	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	10,956	—	—	—	—	10,956	
2. Miscellaneous - -	1,938	—	—	—	—	1,938	
III.—Medical Services—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	3,200	—	—	3,200	—	—	
2. Civil Hospitals in Karáchi and Kotri.	7,200	—	—	—	—	7,200	
3. Dispensaries at Bu la Khán and Manora.	2,200	—	—	2,200	—	—	
4. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries and Medical purposes.	2,200	—	—	900	—	7,300	
	33,694	31,514	—	6,300	31,514	27,394	
Deduct—Items which at present are credited to Provincial Revenues, and will henceforward be transferred to Local Bodies, *i.e.*, School Fees 3,940 + 50 Miscellaneous under Medical + 2,400 Contributions from Railway for the Kotri and Karáchi Civil Hospitals.	6,390	—	—	—	—	6,390	
	27,304	—	—	—	—	21,004	
Payment from Provincial Revenues to Local Funds to meet charges transferred.	—	6,300	—	6,300	—	—	
Additional grant to be incurred by Provincial Revenues, being the difference between the expenditure of Rs. 21,004 to be transferred from, and Rs. 31,514 transferred to Provincial revenues for charges within Municipal limits.	10,510	—	—	—	Saving to Municipality.	10,510	This sum represents the increased charges to be borne by Government.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

Statement A.—*continued.*

HEADS.	Provincial Funds.		Local Funds.		Municipal Funds.		Remarks.
	From	To	From	To	From	To	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Hyderabad District.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	13,721	—	—	13,721	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	16,380	—	—	—	16,380	—	
2. Miscellaneous - -	2,874	—	—	—	2,874	—	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	2,831	—	—	2,831	—	—	
2. Civil Hospitals - -	(*a*)3,080	—	—	—	—	3,080	
3. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	5,482	—	—	786	—	4,696	
Deduct—School fees at present credited to Provincial Revenues and henceforward be transferred to Local Bodies.	5,120	—	—	—	—	5,120	
	25,527					21,910	
By transfer of existing charges from Provincial Revenue to Local Bodies.	11,806	—	3,617	—	—	8,189	In this district there is merely a transfer of existing expenditure from Provincial revenue to local bodies, but no fresh charges to Government.
Shikárpur District.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	9,340	—	—	9,340	—	
II—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	6,318	—	—	—	—	6,318	
2. Miscellaneous - -	634	—	—	—	—	634	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	2,478	—	—	2,478	—	—	
2. Civil Hospitals - -	3,913	—	—	—	—	3,913	
3. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	2,740	—	—	—	—	2,740	
4. Miscellaneous - -	2,325	—	—	—	—	2,325	
	18,408	9,340	—	2,478	9,340	15,930	
Deduct—School fees at present credited to Provincial Revenues which will henceforward be transferred to Local Bodies.	2,780	—	—	—	—	2,780	
	15,628					13,150	
By transfer of funds from Provincial Revenues to meet charges transferred.	6,288	—	—	2,478	—	3,810	In this district there is merely a transfer of existing expenditure from Provincial revenues to local bodies, but no fresh charges to Government.
Upper Sind Frontier District.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	4,096	—	—	4,096	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2. Miscellaneous - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2. Civil Hospitals - -	986	—	—	—	—	986	
3. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	(*b*) 602	—	—	602	—	—	
4. Miscellaneous - -	988	—	—	—	—	988	
	2,576	4,096	—	602	4,096	1,974	

Note 1.—Hyderabad (*a*). This does not include the cost of the Lunatic Asylum at Hyderabad, which amounts to—

1. Allowance to Civil Surgeon - - - - -	Rs.	3,000
2. Establishment, &c. - - - - - - - -	„	3,079
3. Diet, &c. - - - - - - - - -	„	5,030
	Rs.	11,109

Note 2.—Upper Sind Frontier (*b*), Rs. 602. This sum is on account of contribution for the Kashmor Dispensary which was not spent in 1880-1, the dispensary not having been opened then owing to want of a Medical subordinate.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

Statement A.—*continued.*

HEADS.	Provincial Funds.		Local Funds.		Municipal Funds.		Remarks.
	From	To	From	To	From	To	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Upper Sind Frontier District—cont.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Payment from Provincial Revenues to Local Funds to meet charges transferred.	—	602	—	602	—	—	
Extra grant required from Provincial Revenues, being the difference between the expenditure of Rs. 1,974 to be transferred from and Rs. 4,096 to be taken over by Provincial Revenues.	2,122	—	—	—	Saving to Municipality.	2,122	This sum represents the increased charges to be borne by Government.
Thar and Párkar District.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	486	—	—	486	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2. Miscellaneous - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2. Civil Hospitals - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	3,360	—	—	600	—	2,760	
	3,360	486	—	600	486	2,760	
By transfer of funds from Provincial Revenues to meet charges transferred to Local Bodies.	2,874	—	—	600	—	2,274	
ABSTRACT.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	59,157	—	—	59,157	—	Grants-in-aid to Schools have not been included in the figures under this head, as it is supposed that these will as heretofore be paid from Provincial Revenues.
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	33,654	—	—	—	—	33,654	
2. Miscellaneous - -	5,446	—	—	—	—	5,466	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	8,509	—	—	8,509	—	—	
2. Civil Hospitals - -	15,179	—	—	—	—	15,179	
3. Dispensaries at Bula Khán and Mánora.	2,200	—	—	2,200	—	—	
4. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	20,384	—	—	2,888	—	17,496	
5. Miscellaneous - -	3,313	—	—	—	—	3,313	
Deduct—School fees and other items shown above as receipts by Government, but which it is proposed to make over to Local Bodies.	14,290	—	—	—	—	14,290	
Balance Rs. -	74,395					60,798	
Extra charges devolving on Provincial Revenues while the Municipalities of the Karáchi and Upper Sind Frontier Districts gain an equal sum nominally deducted from the Police charges to adjust the Abstract.	—	12,632	—	—	12,632	—	
	*74,395	46,525	—	13,597	46,525	60,798	
Allotment to be made from Provincial Revenues to enable Local Bodies to meet the responsibility thrown on them.	27,870	—	—	13,597	—	14,273	
* Total to be paid from Provincial Revenues—							
1. Allotment - - Rs. 27,870							
2. Additional charge to be met on account of Municipalities in Karáchi and Upper Sind Frontier - Rs. 12,632							
Total Rs. 40,502							

H. N. B. ERSKINE,
Commissioner in Sind.

B.

STATEMENT showing to what Extent the Liability of Government as shown in Statement A., dealing with the Exchange of certain Heads of Service in connection with the Extension of Self-Government System will vary if Government retain Civil Hospitals, as at present, and exclude the Thar and Párkar District from the operation of the Scheme.

HEADS.	Provincial Funds.		Local Funds.		Municipal Funds.		Remarks.
	From	To	From	To	From	To	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Karáchi District.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	31,514	—	—	31,514	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	10,956	—	—	—	—	10,956	
2. Miscellaneous - -	1,938	—	—	—	—	1,938	
III.—Medical Services—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	3,200	—	—	3,200	—	—	
2. Dispensaries at Bula Khán and Manora.	2,200	—	—	2,200	—	—	
3. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries and Medical purposes.	8,200	—	—	900	—	7,300	
	26,494	31,514	—	6,300	31,514	20,194	
Deduct—School fees at present credited to Provincial Revenues and henceforward to be transferred to Local Bodies.	3,940	—	—	—	—	3,940	
	22,554	—	—	—	—	16,254	
Payments from Provincial Revenues to Local Funds to meet charges transferred.	—	6,300	—	6,300	—	—	
Additional grant to be incurred by Provincial Revenues, being the difference between the Expenditure of Rs. 16,254 to be transferred from and Rs. 31,514 to Provincial Revenues for charges within Municipal limits.	15,260	—	—	—	Saving to Municipality.	15,260	This sum represents the increased charges to be borne by Government.
Hyderabad District.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	13,721	—	—	13 721	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	16,380	—	—	—	—	16,380	
2. Miscellaneous - -	2,874	—	—	—	—	2,874	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	2,831	—	—	2,831	—	—	
2. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	5,482	—	—	786	—	4,696	
	27,567	13,721	—	3,617	13,721	23,950	
Deduct—School fees at present credited to Provincial Revenues which will henceforward be transferred to Municipal Funds.	5,120	—	—	—	—	5,120	
	22,447	—	—	—	—	18,830	
By transfer of existing charges on Provincial Revenues to Local Bodes.	8,726	—	—	3,617	—	5,109	
Shikárpur District.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	9,340	—	—	9,340	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	6,318	—	—	—	—	6,318	
2. Miscellaneous - -	634	—	—	—	—	634	

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

Statement B.—*continued.*

HEADS.	Provincial Funds.		Local Funds.		Municipal Funds.		Remarks.
	From	To	From	To	From	To	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Shikárpur District—cont.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	2,478	—	—	2,478	—	—	
2. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	2,740	—	—	—	—	2,740	
3. Miscellaneous - -	957	—	—	—	—	957	
	13,127	9,340	—	2,478	9,340	10,649	
Deduct—School fees at present credited to Provincial Revenues which will henceforward be transferred to Local Bodies.	2,780					2,780	
	10,347	—	—	—	—	7,869	
Payments from Provincial Revenues to Local Funds to meet charges transferred.	—	2,478	—	2,478	—	—	
Additional grant to be incurred by Provincial Revenues, being the difference between the expenditure of Rs. 7,869 to be transferred from and Rs. 9,340 to Provincial Revenues for charges within Municipal limits.	1,471	—	—	—	Saving to Municipalities.	1,471	This sum represents the increased charges to be borne by Government.
Upper Sind Frontier District.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	4,096	—	—	4,096	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries to Masters - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2. Miscellaneous - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	(*a*) 602	—	—	602	—	—	
	602	4,096	—	602	4,096	—	
Payment from Provincial Revenues to Local Funds to meet charges transferred.	—	602	—	602	—	—	
Additional grant to be incurred by Provincial Revenues, being the Police charges to be taken over by Government.	4,096	—	—	—	Saving to Municipalities.	4,096	This sum represents the increased charges to be borne by Government.
ABSTRACT.							
I.—Police in Municipalities - -	—	58,671	—	—	58,671	—	
II.—Education—							
1. Salaries - - -	33,654	—	—	—	—	33,654	
2. Miscellaneous - -	5,446	—	—	—	—	5,446	
III.—Medical—							
1. Vaccination and Sanitation -	8,509	—	—	8,509	—	—	
2. Dispensaries - -	2,200	—	—	2,200	—	—	
3. Grants-in-aid for Dispensaries.	17,024	—	—	2,288	—	14,736	
4. Miscellaneous - -	957	—	—	—	—	957	
	67,790	58,671	—	12,997	58,671	54,793	
Deduct—School fees shown above as receipts by Government but which it is proposed to make over to Local Bodies.	11,840	—	—	—	—	11,840	
Balance Rs. -	55,950					42,953	

Note.—Upper Sind Frontier (*a*) Rs. 602. This sum is on account of contribution for the Kashmor Dispensary which was not spent in 1880–1, the dispensary not having been opened then owing to want of a Medical subordinate.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

Statement B.—*continued.*

HEADS.	Provincial Funds.		Local Funds.		Municipal Funds.		Remarks.
	From	To	From	To	From	To	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
ABSTRACT—cont.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Extra charges devolving on Provincial Revenues, while the Municipalities of the Karáchi, Shikárpur and Upper Sind Frontier Districts gain an equal sum nominally deducted from the Police charges to adjust the Abstract.	—	20,827	—	—	20,827	—	
Allotment to be made from Provincial Revenues to enable Local Bodies to meet the responsibility thrown on them.	18,106	37,844	—	12,997	37,844	5,109	
Total to be paid from Provincial Revenues— 1. Allotment - - Rs. 18,106 2. Additional Charges to be met on account of Municipalities in the Karáchi, Shikárpur and Upper Sind Frontier, *i.e.*, 15,260 + 1,471 + 4,096 - Rs. 20,827 Total Rs. 38,933							

H. N. B. ERSKINE,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 736 of 1882.

From ARTHUR CRAWFORD, Esquire, Commissioner, S. D., to THE SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Financial Department.

SIR, Camp Ránebennur, 14th–16th March 1882.

Mr. MOORE, when acting for me, referred Government Resolutions Nos. 3774 and 3950 of 12th* and 25th† October 1881 for the opinion of the Collectors and Presidents of District Local Funds and Municipalities of the Division, and I have lately received their reports,

2. They may be said to be unanimously opposed to any present extension of the existing self-government in respect of Local Funds and Municipalities.

The remarks and suggestions of Mr. Todd, Assistant Collector of Kánara, appear to be worthy of consideration and are appended.

3. I myself have, for years past, aimed at improving the status of Municipal Commissioners and at inducing them to take an active and intelligent interest in municipal matters. I see year by year a perceptible improvement, but I am bound to admit that except, perhaps, in the two largest towns, Belgaum and Dhárwár, it would as yet be unsafe to entrust Municipalities with more than they have to superintend at present.

4. In Belgaum and Dhárwár the experiment might be tried of handing over to the Municipalities the funds now spent on education, on vaccination and on dispensaries, and the system, if found successful, might be extended to smaller Municipalities.

5. Municipal Commissioners usually look after the dispensaries very thoroughly, but the whole question of dispensaries is one that must soon be dealt on a system very different from the present. The soundest plan, in my opinion, would be gradually to open the door to private practitioners by offering the use of dispensaries to picked gentlemen who have graduated in the Grant Medical College. There are many of these in Bombay who complain, and not without reason, that they can get no private practice in the mofussil, because they cannot compete with Government and Municipal dispensaries. This subject, however, hardly comes within the scope of the present reference.

6. I think that both District Local Fund Committees and Municipalities might be benefited and strengthened if every Municipality annually elected and sent a member from the non-official body of Commissioners to serve on the District and Táluka Local Fund Committee.

7. The interests of every large town are usually the interests of the country-side around that town. The nomination of a non-official Municipal Commissioner to represent the town and its vicinity on the Local Fund Committees would be popular and enhance the importance of the whole body of the Municipal Commissioners.

8. After carefully considering the whole subject, I am reluctantly obliged to record my opinion that at present no more can safely be done in the direction suggested by the Government of India. We are, in fact, in this Presidency already far in advance of most other parts of India.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR CRAWFORD,
Commissioner, S. D.

* See page 58 of Return. † See page 61 of Return.

REMARKS and Suggestions of Mr. Todd, Assistant Collector of Kánara, referred to at the close of paragraph 2 of the Commissioner, S. D.'s letter to Government, No. 736 of 14th March 1882.

There are only two kinds of local bodies in this district, *viz.*, the Local Fund Committees and the Municipal Bodies, and I do not consider either of these corporations, so far as this district is concerned, at present fit to be entrusted with a more extended local administration.

The members of Local Fund Committees show, with hardly an exception, an entire absence of interest in the administration of the funds at their disposal, there being the greatest difficulty in getting any attendances whatever, even at budget meetings of the Táluka Committees, and at any other meeting none but official members ever attend. Even in the case of the District Local Fund Committees, whose members are selected from a class whose interest it most certainly is to see that the funds are disposed of in a way most advantageous to the district, the meetings are very scantily attended, and in the last meeting, when the seven years' budget was under consideration, not a single non-official member attended. I certainly consider that it would be, to say the least, inadvisable to place further financial responsibilities on bodies who take so little concern as to the expenditure of the sums already under their control. Membership of these Committees is undoubtedly looked on as a kind of social distinction, but none of the members are willing to take upon themselves the burthen of active membership, and when any of them do attend, it is generally with some purely selfish end in view.

The members of the Municipal Corporations undoubtedly take a greater interest in the management of their funds than do those of the Local Fund Committees. But the interest is not of as intelligent an order as might be wished. The great fault with all the municipal bodies in this district with which I am connected is their apathy in seeing that their orders are properly carried out. They individually, certainly with some notable exceptions, do nothing but talk and vote at Committee meetings, and do not attempt either by action or by example to improve sanitation or encourage education or initiate any useful work within the limits of their respective Municipalities. Every thing has to be started and urged through by the President and Vice-President, or, in some instances, by more than ordinarily active and intelligent chairman. I believe these corporations are improving and will improve, but I would deprecate placing any larger administration into their hands before they have learned properly and efficiently to administer the funds now at their disposal; I would prefer that they should have acquired the art of walking before attempting to run.

I do not, however, see any chance of the Local Fund Committees improving under the present system. I believe myself the fault lies in there being too few members. We want more agricultural proprietors—men who have practical every day knowledge of the wants of the district—on the Committees. These people sometimes make themselves heard, notwithstanding their not being sufficiently represented on the Committees, *e.g.*, when some large garden-holders raised a subscription and started the idea of the internal roads in the Siddápur Táluka. Another reason for the want of interest shown by members in the administration of the Local Funds is that the District Budget is drawn up during the monsoon, at a time when it is very difficult and generally inconvenient for members to attend. This applies, of course, only to the District Committee, but the Táluka Committees have a grievance. They are, of course, very generally ignorant of necessary works outside their own táluka and they make, therefore, no allowances for necessary works beyond their own frontiers and budget for the whole of the táluka income. This is, of course, unreasonable, but still they are naturally disgusted when they find items in their budgets omitted from the District Budget, especially as they do not know why these items have been omitted and to conclude that very little attention to their wishes is paid by the District Committee when framing the general budget, and naturally they lose any interest they may have had in framing their own Táluka Budgets and so gradually lose all interest in the administration of the Local Funds. This, I believe, is a growing evil, and I am convinced that in time it will be rare for any member to attend any meeting of the Local Fund Committee.

I believe the remedy for this is, first to raise the number of non-official members in each Táluka Committee to about twenty, to abolish the present District Committee as a separate body, but to have a Committee meeting to frame the general budget at a central point in the Collectorate during the fair weather, and let the Táluka Committees send up five of their members from each táluka to form the District Committee, together with the present official members of that Committee and the Mámlátdárs of the different tálukás. The five members might either be elected by the non-official members of the Táluka Committees or they might take up the duty in rotation, thus giving a seat on the District Committee to each táluka member once in five years. If this scheme were adopted, I have no doubt that a very valuable representative body would be formed, to whom, after some experience, an extended administration of funds for local purposes might, with great advantage, be entrusted. The present Local Committees, however, not being able to efficiently manage the funds now at their disposal, are most assuredly unfit to be entrusted with any higher and more onerous duties.

(True Extract.)

M. D. SOMAN,
Acting Chitnis to the Commissioner, S. D.

No. R.—1513 of 1882.

From E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, C. D., to THE SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Financial Department, Bombay.

SIR, Camp Mahábaleshvar, 17th April 1882.

I HAVE the honour to forward a *précis* of the opinions of the Collectors of this Division on the scheme of the Government of India, as published in Government Resolution (Financial Department) No. 3774, dated 12th October 1881.* Together with this *précis*, I submit the original reports.

2. Briefly the general opinion is, that little or no further local powers can be given than those now held by the different local bodies, such as Local Fund Committees and Municipalities.

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* See page 58 of Return.

3. Mr. King is strongly opposed to the new scheme of the Government of India, and considers that, if carried out to the fullest extent, it is fraught with danger to the safety of the supremacy of England in India. No doubt there are many who hold the same view, but the Government has decided, and all it now requires is an expression of opinion as to how its views can best be carried out.

4. All the officers in this Division consider that but very little more self-government than the people now enjoy can be accorded to them. Mr. Pratt, the Collector of Sátára, would wish the five years' and seven years' budget system set aside.

5. My own opinion is that the only extensive and radical changes that can be made are:—

(*a*) In the Educational Department.
(*b*) In the Local Fund Department.
(*c*) In Municipalities.

(*a*) In the Educational Department.

6. In this branch, the people have at present no voice whatever in the Provincial share of the expenditure, most of which is disposed of in Bombay and Poona and in one or two large towns. Agricultural, industrial and technical education, as I have before this pointed out, is neglected, the Collectorates or Divisions apparently not receiving their share of the Provincial grant. If all the higher education is needed and appreciated, then let it be paid for by those who require it. There are always sure to be ample scholarships open to the deserving poor. In education we have hitherto attempted too much. All that is necessary to teach in village schools is simple reading, writing and arithmetic. In the larger towns let there be English schools and higher education, but, by all means, let the people pay for it. Once decide this, give a Provincial grant and give the Local Fund body fuller powers to deal with this and with Local Funds.

(*b*) Local Fund Department.

7. As regards Public Works Local Funds, I quite agree with Mr. Pratt that the present system is bad. The Local Fund body has an existence in name but not in reality. It frames a budget which again is manipulated in the Secretariat, and the body do not again know their own child. Government exercises far too much interference with Local Funds. If five or seven years' budgets are required, which I entirely doubt, let them be prepared by the local bodies, or, at any rate, let the alterations be few and only on very strong grounds. I would give the Local Fund bodies far more real power than they now have.

(*c*) Municipalities.

8. As regards Municipalities, the smaller Municipalities are not fit even for the powers they now have, therefore, certainly not ripe for higher powers; but the Government of India has determined to grant some extension of powers. I would recommend that such increase of powers should only be granted to the chief City Municipalities. To these I would grant, under certain restrictions, the right to elect a certain number of the Commissioners. The questions will be, what should constitute a qualification for election and what a qualification and right to vote? A property qualification should be the chief qualification for election. Were Government to merely give an educational qualification, *i.e.*, a vote to all graduates and vakíls, the Municipalities will be filled with noisy wind-bags, poor and dangerous, because they have no stake in the country. The experiment is altogether a dangerous one, and, therefore, I hold that the chief, if not only, qualification for election should be a property qualification. The qualification for a vote should be a property qualification or an educational qualification, together with a certain term of residence, the person being a house-owner.

I have, &c.
E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

No. 5233 OF 1881.

From the COLLECTOR OF NA'SIK, to THE COMMISSIONER, C. D.

SIR,

Nasik Collector's Camp Sinnar, 21st November 1881.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your No. R.—4137, dated 22nd October, below Government Resolution, Financial Department, No. 3774, dated 12th October 1881, on the subject of revised local financial administration.

Obervations regarding the future management of the Imperial and Provincial Revenues.

2. As there seems to be no question of imposing any fresh taxation or even of modifying the existing forms the matter resolves itself into two points—

(1.) Re-adjustment of expenditure between Provincial and Local Funds.
(2.) Additional power to be given to local bodies over local expenditure.

3. As observed by the Government of India, the local organizations in the Bombay Presidency, in the forms of Municipalities and Local Fund Committees, are already tolerably complete, and I shall assume that in this respect no further modifications are called for as regards the constitution of these bodies, for the present at least.

4. The subjects for discussion are, Police, Education and Medical and other sanitary establishments. As none of the Police expenditure in this district is defrayed from local sources, there is nothing to be done, I presume, but to confirm existing arrangements.

5. As regards education, the total expenditure of last year was Rs. 94,000 in round numbers, of which Rs. 40,000 represents the Provincial grant. The balance was made up from Local Funds fees and contributions. The grant-in-aid by Municipalities amounted only to Rs. 1,284, but it must be remembered that a large number of residents in municipal limits are Local Fund cess-payers, and thus contribute to education and have to pay school fees, in some cases, at higher rates than those prevailing elsewhere.

6. Taking the local contribution as a whole, I do not think it can be considered as insufficient, as compared with the Provincial grant. The only question is, how far Municipalities as such should make a larger contribution. The immediate pressing wants of most of our Municipalities, as you are aware,

are sanitation and a better water-supply. In some of the smaller towns the bulk of the available income is devoted to conservancy, and there are really no funds to spare for Educational purposes. In Yeola the local resources are being strained to the utmost to raise funds for a water-supply. In Násik the need of better drainage and water-supply is admitted, and can only be met by raising a loan which will tax the rate-payers to the utmost for many years to come. Again in Malegaeon the introduction of a better system of drainage is only delayed by want of funds.

7. From the above you will see that, in my opinion, it is neither advisable nor feasible just now to call upon Municipalities for extra expenditure on education.

8. As regards Educational control, there are now Local Committees for, I believe, every school in the district, but their functions are limited to reporting and advising on school matters. The people themselves have a voice in determining whether the Modi or the Balbodh standards shall be adopted. Beyond this it may be said that the administrative control over education resides entirely with the Educational Inspector and his Deputies, aided by the advice and co-operation of the Collector and his Assistants.

9. I cannot say that I am prepared to recommend any scheme for extending the local control: the village communities are too ignorant and apathetic and too much divided into parties and factions to render it safe to admit them to any real power in the matter: the question then of local control may be put aside so far as regards the inferior schools, and these apart, there are very few schools in this district left for consideration, and they are confined to the large towns. But here, also, caste prejudices and local enmities prevail, and I do not see how any popular control could be introduced with any advantage to the schools themselves. In making these remarks, I have been acting on the supposition that the views of the Government of India are in favour of extending some control over school administration to those persons who derive the benefits of the teaching, and in my humble opinion this is somewhat impracticable. In this sense, therefore, none of the educational expenditure can be said to be locally controlled at present. But if we extend the term to embrace official action, then it may be said that nearly the whole of the expenditure is locally controlled as shown above.

10. Upon full consideration I cannot say I am prepared to make any special recommendation for altering the existing state of things : if education halts and does not advance as fast as it should do, the fault lies more with the apathy and want of co-operation of the people themselves than with the system. As it is, there is a local body entrusted with the duty of watching over every school and suggesting what is wanted, and the persons interested can always make their wants and wishes known through this medium ; at the same time it might be feasible to have a District Educational Board constituted somewhat after the manner of the District Local Fund Committee, who might have supreme control over the general Educational expenditure, subject always to Government sanction for the annual budget, while the internal administration of the schools would rest, as hitherto, with the officials of the department.

11. The Medical question is a very large one comprising, as it does, so many forms of sanitary administration. What is desired, as it seems to me, is that not the control but the burden of expenditure should be transferred as much as possible to local shoulders. For in matter purely medical and professional, such as the treatment of patients in dispensaries and vaccination, the only real control must be departmental.

12. The statistics are as follows for dispensaries for the past year:—

The total expenditure for the district was Rs. 12,000 in round numbers: of this sum Rs. 5,500 represents cost of the civil hospital at Násik and the Provincial Dispensary at Peint ; there was a Provincial grant-in-aid of Rs. 2,200 to Local Fund Dispensaries and one of Rs. 600 to the Municipal Dispensary at Yeola. The local contributions were Rs. 2,700 (about) from Local Funds and Rs. 575 from Municipalities. Putting aside Násik hospital and Pient dispensary, the local expenditure was considerably in excess of the Provincial.

13. I should hope there was no intention of altering the existing status as regards civil hospitals, and as to Peint you are aware the circumstances are exceptional: a handful of officials are isolated in an unhealthy climate. The local resources are utterly inadequate, the dispensary was established when the territory was a Native State, and now that Government have succeeded to the revenues, it would hardly be graceful to commit so retrograde an act as closing the dispensary which is a boon much appreciated by all classes of the population.

14. As regards other dispensaries, I am aware that it is the wish of Government that they should be self-supporting or maintained solely out of local resources; as regards the former alteration, I fear it will not succeed. The Natives are, I believe, appreciating European treatment and medicine more and more every year, but the time has not come yet when they will themselves defray the whole cost: the attempt to introduce payment for medicines as you are aware proved a failure some years ago and had to be abandoned. If only those institutions are to be maintained which can support themselves, then, I fear, the majority of our dispensaries will have to be closed, and I most earnestly deprecate such a measure.

15. I am far from saying that our local dispensaries fulfil all that they might do or that the results are entirely commensurate with the expenditure incurred: still they do much good, and their loss would be severely felt. They benefit the servants of Government who have to live in unhealthy places far from their homes as well as the local population, and in cases of outbreak of epidemic sickness, they are a nucleus from which medicine and attendance are forthcoming. To maintain such institutions is a most legitimate function of our Government, and the State is repaid in many ways indirectly.

16. I have shown, while on the subject of education, how severely taxed our municipal resources are even now, and how urgently more funds are wanted for necessary improvements. The burden of municipal taxation in this Presidency is now very high as compared with many other parts of India, and I feel that it is quite impracticable to add materially to that burden by calling for extra cesses to pay for Medical institutions, and it is the same with Local Funds : our income is pretty nearly fixed and cannot be added to. Government have called on us to open up communications, as far as possible, and the maintenance of these is taking up the bulk of our means. What little is left over after defraying fixed and necessary charges must, in all fairness, be devoted to purely local wants, such as

village water-supply and other conveniences near to the doors of the people themselves and which they look upon as the chief return they get for their contributions.

17. I have been ever anxious to extend the system of charitable dispensaries, and there are many parts of this district still sadly in want of them, but if we are left to our own local unaided resources, then we shall have to go backwards instead of forwards.

18. The pay of vaccinators is defrayed entirely from local sources. The expenditure last year was Rs. 3,756 from Local Funds and Rs. 334 from Municipalities. This does not include the cost of superintendence, which falls on Provincial revenues. The amount so debited during the past year was Rs. 1,974 ; I do not see that Local Funds can provide more.

19. All other sanitary works are at present a local charge, defrayed either by Local Funds or municipal revenues.

20. I have so far briefly shown the existing distribution of the charges for maintaining our Medical and other Sanitary institutions, and I have endeavoured to show how difficult it will be to add to the existing local burdens, and I have also shown that, in my humble opinion, the attempt to make any such institutions self-supporting will be a failure, certainly so among an agricultural population. In large towns, with an educated and enlightened population, it may be otherwise, but my present remarks are confined solely to the Násik District. I have to add some remarks as regards the extension of local control.

21. I believe there is no wish to make any material alteration in the constitution of our existing local bodies, *viz.*, Municipalities and Local Fund Committees, as they are admitted to be fairly efficient and adapted for the objects for which they were created. The question to be discussed is, how far more control might be given to them over the funds which they have to administer; City Municipalities are already sufficiently independent, but there are none such in this District. A move might be made by extending the number of City Municipalities and introducing the principle of election of non-official members under certain conditions as to the elective body. As regards the smaller Municipalities, my experience goes to show that they could hardly be invested with more local powers than they now possess, and that official supervision is absolutely necessary.

22. As to Local Funds, I am respectfully of opinion that more power might well be left with the District Local Fund Committee. They may frame a budget and may be quite unanimous as to the real wants of the district, but the ultimate disposal lies in higher hands and the local body have simply to obey orders and submit. In fact, they are left no power whatever save over a few details. This is a delicate question to discuss, and I shall forbear from going into any details, being content with indicating generally the direction in which I think improvement might be made. In this district I may say that the wishes of the Táluka Committees are almost invariably complied with, so far at least as funds are available, and here the local voice is allowed the fullest play.

23. The Government of India have noticed that the greater portion of the Local Funds expenditure is incurred through the Public Works Department. This is owing to the system introduced a few years ago, whereby the Local Engineers were abolished and their duties mainly transferred to the Executive Engineers. In this district the money so expended is almost entirely on account of repairs to made-roads which require professional knowledge. Wherever feasible other works are carried out through the Civil officers, economy being the result both as regards saving of the contribution to the Public Works Department and also as to the quality of work done: but unfortunately the Mámlatdárs, on whose immediate shoulders the work falls, are so heavily over-tasked by other duties that much cannot be expected from them in respect of local works. Attempts have often been made to get works executed under the supervision of those most interested in them, *viz.*, the villagers themselves or Táluka Committees, but the experiment has seldom proved other than a failure.

24. It has been suggested that some of the Provincial expenditure might be transferred to the control of the District Local Funds Committees. But I have already observed that these committees have little power beyond that of framing budgets which may or may not be carried into effect. Nothing would be gained by calling upon them to draft Provincial items into their budget. But if the District Committee were given some real power, it would be otherwise, and it might become in reality a District Road Board, analogous to those existing in England and Scotland, responsible for the due maintenance of the roads and the proper expenditure of the money entrusted to them. Under some such scheme and with a reserve to Government of the right of control finally, if necessary, the Provincial tolls and Provincial grants for roads might very well be made over to the Local Committees to be incorporated in the general Local Funds. It would involve no change in the executive machinery.

25. You will observe that the only suggestions I have ventured to make, are the formation of School Boards with powers to control the whole of the educational resources and an enlargement of the functions of an increase of powers to be given to District Local Fund Committees. As regards Police, there is nothing to be said ; and on the subject of medical and sanitary organization generally, I have ventured to deprecate the imposing on the people heavier burdens than they are able to bear under existing circumstances, while I have pointed out that in municipal matters generally I am not of opinion that the powers of the local bodies can materially be extended. But taking matters as they now are, it is entirely in the power of Government to allow local control the fullest scope by interfering as little as possible with the wishes of local bodies and committees, where these wishes are expressed in well-considered resolutions approved of either unanimously or by large majorities, and with such a policy prevailing, there seems little need of any very definite administrative changes.

I have, &c.

W. RAMSAY,

Collector of Násik.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

No. 5255 of 1881.

From W. RAMSAY, Esquire, Collector of Násik, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, C. D.

SIR, Násik, Collector's Camp Sinnar, 22nd November 1881.

Observations on future administration of Provincial and Local Funds.

IN reply to your No. R.—4505, dated 16th instant, below Government Resolution, Financial Department, No. 3950, dated 25th October 1881, I have the honour to refer you to my No. 5233, dated 21st instant, which contains all the suggestions I am at present prepared to make.

2. One subject, however, was omitted by me, viz., the Patfálla cess levied in the Málegaon Division only, and which has been the subject of correspondence before now. I am most strongly of opinion that the management of this fund might well be left to the Collector, advised by the Executive Engineer for Irrigation. I do not see how there can be any more local popular control, unless there be a sort of Panch in each village to settle how the village contribution is to be expended, but this system would not work, as it is found necessary to adjust the expenditure more or less tálukawár.

I have, &c.

W. RAMSAY,

Collector of Násik.

No. 6528 of 1881.

From H. T. OMMANNEY, Esquire, Acting Collector of Khándesh, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, C. D.

SIR, Camp Varangaon, 12th December 1881.

Administration of Imperial and Provincial Revenues.

I HAVE the honour to make the report called for in your Nos. 4137 of the 23rd October 1881, and 4505 of the 26th November 1881. The scope of the report required is pretty clearly defined in the 6th paragraph of Government Resolution No. 3950 of the 25th October 1881, and in the last sentence of Government Resolution No. 3774 of the 12th October 1881.

2. The organized local bodies, on whom it is proposed to throw greater responsibilities, are the Local Funds and Municipal Committees.

3. As regards Local Funds Committees, their inability to take a broad view of their duties has resulted in Government's practically taking the whole management of Local Funds into its own hands. The people are not yet educated in local self-government sufficiently to form really useful committees to deal with large areas and large works. All I can recommend, therefore, as regards Local Funds, and my remarks are suggested by the conditions of this district only, is that Government should be readier than it now shows itself to recognize what works and expenditure are really of a Provincial character, and having made the admission, should proceed to set free money that is urgently required for strictly local needs. And with the same object Government should insist on greater economy by the Public Works Department, especially in the matter of road construction and repairs.

4. The power and influence of Municipal Committees are more real than those of Local Funds Committees, and in paragraph 7 of Government Resolution No. 3950 of the 25th October 1881, it is to Municipal Committees that Government looks for greater activity and usefulness. The local works to which the Government of India's proposals are applicable are there shown to be education, local public works, vaccination, sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries.

5. Of the expenses of the schools in their limits the Municipalities of this district already undertake some share. They contribute often to the buildings of school-houses and occasionally provide extra teachers of English; in fact, they do as much as their finances can afford. There is no objection to the experiment being tried of giving the schools entirely into their charge with the Educational cess of the town, and the school fees, and a grant somewhat in excess of the balance required to make up the present cost of the school. I propose a grant in excess of the present actual expenditure in order to form the nucleus of a Building and Improvement Fund. But the amount of the excess grant, if any, must depend on the circumstances of each Municipality.

6. The Municipalities in this district receive no pecuniary help to speak of from Government in the matter of local public works, vaccination and sanitation, unless it be in the form of a loan. These are the principal objects for which the municipal taxes are levied. Help from Government would enable the Municipalities to do without octroi, which cannot be unobjectionally worked without a system of bonded warehouses, even if that would enable them completely to meet the views of the Government of India, which I doubt. I regard octroi as an un-English and most expensive tax, and quite inapplicable to towns of less than 20,000 population.

7. In the matter of hospitals and dispensaries the present policy of Government is liberal enough and works satisfactorily, and no more extensive system of medical charity is required.

I have, &c.

H. T. OMMANNEY,

Acting Collector, Khándesh.

No. 8880 of 1881.

From J. Mc L. CAMPBELL, Esquire, Acting Collector, Poona, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, C. D.

SIR, Camp Vádgaon Rasai, 12th December 1881.

Administration of Provincial and Local Fund.
R.—4137 of 23rd October 1881.
R.—4505 of 16th November 1881.
R.—4707 of 29th do.

WITH reference to your memoranda marginally noted, on the subject of extending local self-government, I have the honour to offer the following remarks.

2. The City and Town Municipal Boards and the Táluka and District Local Fund Committees give to the people of this Presidency as much self-government as, in my opinion, they were ripe for. No new agency seems required, nor do I think it necessary that any change should be made in the mode of electing the committees above referred to.

3. But as the Government of India, in their Resolution No. 3353 of 30th September 1881, seems to contemplate an extension of elective self-government, it becomes necessary to consider whether anything of the kind could be introduced here and to what an extent it could safely be adopted, if forced upon us. Probably one of the first things to be proposed would be to give to the people of Poona City some voice in the election of Municipal Commissioners. I do not myself think any change necessary. Under the present system, the non-official Commissioners are fairly representative men, and through them the feelings and wishes of the people are sufficiently represented to the Municipal Committee. But if the question is raised, it appears to me that to allow one-half of the non-official members to be elected by the people, is the furthest extent to which a franchise can be given. At present, the Committee consists of 9 official and 27 non-official members. If Government were to insist on some of the Commissioners being elected by the inhabitants of the city, I would suggest that the total number of Commissioners should be raised to 40, of whom 10 should be *ex-officio*, 15 non-official members appointed by Government and 15 non-official members elected by dwellers within the municipal limits.

4. Apart from the numbor 40 being more easy to divide into proportionate shares than 36, the inclusion of the civil station in municipal limits will make it necessary that the executive Engineer, Poona District, should be added to the list of *ex-officio* Commissioners and that some representatives of the inhabitants of the civil lines should be added to the number of non-official Commissioners.

5. I think that the only qualification for a vote should be the paying a minimum (to be fixed hereafter) of taxes. We have no body of men here corresponding to the Justices or the Fellows of the University in Bombay. Pleaders, Jurors and Assessors are the only classes who are likely to assert any special claim for consideration. But there is no reason for giving jurors or assessors a vote, unless they are substantial citizens; and pleaders who have not attained sufficient position to be qualified under the taxation test, are more likely to be hungry agitators than discreet supporters of municipal self-government.

6. As to the question of entrusting a larger proportion of the present Provincial Expenditure to the control of the Local Fund Committees and Municipalities, I think that committees would take a much greater interest in education if they had the management of all the funds devoted to schools. At present, the Local Fund Committees have to do with only the lower schools, and Municipal Committees have nothing to do with the managing of schools They only contribute a lump sum which they generally grudge. If a suitable contribution was made from Provincial Funds and the Committees held responsible for the efficient management of the schools, I think they would really interest themselves in education. The contribution from Provincial Funds might, for the present, be fixed at the average expenditure from these funds in the past five years. Similarly all hospitals and dispensaries might be put under the Committees, a contribution being made from Provincial Funds and the Deputy Sanitary Commissioner being made an *ex-officio* member of the District Local Fund Committee. I regret that I am not prepared to make any detailed suggestions on these points, but I have no doubt that if a suitable contribution is made from Provincial Funds, the existing committees might, with advantage, be trusted with the control of expenditure on vaccination, sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries, and with a wider range of controi than they, at present, have over schools.

I have, &c.
J. McL. CAMPBELL,
Acting Collector.

No. 5663 of 1881.

From G. WADDINGTON, Esquire, Acting Collector, Sholápur, to THE COMMISSIONER, Central Division, Poona.

SIR, Sholápur Collector's Camp, Pandharpur, 12th December 1881.

I HAVE the honour to report, as requested in your endorsements Nos. R.—4137 of 23rd October and R.—4505 of 16th November, regarding the extension of local self-government.

2. I observe that Government desire that any proposals on the subject may be limited to what is immediately practicable, and the special points upon which opinions are asked for are defined in paragraph 7 of the Government Resolution received under your second endorsement.

3. As to point I., therein noted, *viz.*, the relieving of municipal bodies of the burden of paying Police charges—these charges have in this district not ye been actually imposed on the Municipalities, though it was proposed to impose them. I am, however, personally opposed to the costs of Police being made a municipal charge—1stly, because the Municipality cannot undertake the administration of the Police; 2ndly, because the up-country Municipality cannot afford to meet such charges without the imposition of special taxes to meet them. The latter difficulty might be met by the transfer, as proposed, of a portion of certain items of revenue now Provincial, but I, for the second reason given, do not consider Police expenditure a legitimate municipal charge. As to point II.—the greater extension of local control over education—steps have quite recently been taken by which the responsibility for primary education has been transferred, in a great measure, to the Collectors, and local committees have been appointed to supervise the school; but the system is still merely experimental, and it is hard as yet to say how far it will succeed. The plan proposed of making over a fixed Provincial grant, together with the school fees, to a local body with a view to the extension of local education, might possibly be introduced in some few of the larger towns; but I am very doubtful, judging by the little interest that, so far as I have observed, is taken in the progress of the schools by the School Committees already appointed, whether the plan would answer.

BOMBAY REPORTS *continued.*

4. As to point III.—the extension of local control over the expenditure on vaccination, &c.—this subject is, I understand, to be treated of by the Medical Department.

5. You will see from the above that, in my opinion, nothing can at present be done towards the "extension of the principle of local administration"—a view which, looking at paragraph 4 of the Resolution of Government of 25th October, appears to be, to some extent, shared in by Government.

I have, &c.
G. WADDINGTON,
Acting Collector.

No. 8696 of 1881.

From J. KING, Esquire, Collector of Ahmednagar, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Central Division.

SIR, Ahmednagar Collector's Office, 23rd December 1881.

WITH reference to your Nos. R.—4137 and R.—4505, dated respectively the 22nd October and 16th November last, I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum in which I have expressed my views on the observations of the Government of India regarding the future management of the Imperial and Provincial revenues and the further extension of local self-government.

Observations on the future administration of Provincial and Local Funds.

I have, &c.
J. KING,
Collector.

MEMORANDUM.

The Resolution of the Supreme Government is very comprehensive. It is evidently designed to search every corner of the Empire and to include tracts which have been added to it within the memory of the present generation, as well as Provinces which have been under the influence of British Rule ever since the Honourable Company became a sovereign power.

2. I presume that in calling for opinion upon the policy which underlies the Resolution, the Government wish to learn the views of their servants, so far as they are grounded upon experience gained in actual administration, and not to decide upon the respective merits of despotic and popular Government in the abstract. I shall therefore confine my remarks as much as possible to what I know, and my suggestion I may feel called on to make should be held to apply solely to those districts in which the same conditions already exist.

3. This district, as well as all others with which I have any personal acquaintance, is in the position which the Supreme Government seems to consider most favoured. Matters such as primary education and minor public works *have* been, for many years, under local management, and *no* contributions are levied from Municipalities for Police or other objects with which they have no concern.

4. It follows that no large and obvious reform in the direction indicated in the passage just quoted is called for here, and all I have to do is to point out how far the principles approved by the Governor General are capable of extension under circumstances in which the foundation of self-government has been laid, and a superstructure already erected, no part of which is so obviously ill-designed as to demand demolition, and the point at issue is, whether it might not be carried up another story, even if the costly columns which the architect's original plan provides were replaced—not without much careful under pinning—by piers, of such homely material as the locality affords.

6. On this view of the subject two points seem to call for notice—1st, the possibility of enlarging the scope and responsibilities of Local Committees, municipal or otherwise, by transferring to them the control over certain items of revenue which in the extension of decentralization are to be left at the disposal of the Provincial Government; and 2ndly, the propriety or expediency of admitting the non-official element in local committees to a larger share in administration either by increasing the number of independent members, while the principle of selection remains the same as at present, or by referring the selection to the unfettered choice of the people, or by a combination of both these methods.

7. The funds at present administered locally in Ahmednagar are the District Local Fund which was recognized by Bombay Act III. of 1869, and the funds of the different Municipalities maintained or established under Bombay Act VI. of 1873. In considering the first point laid down, these two funds must be kept distinct, and I will begin with enquiring whether the Local Fund revenue could be extended by the addition of any item of revenue allotted by the Resolution to Provincial Funds.

8. The income of the Local Fund is composed of—

Bombay Act III. of 1869 - -	1st.—The One-anna Cess.
Bombay Act II. of 1868, II. of 1878	2ndly.—The Ferry Fund.
Act XV. of 1864, Bombay Act III. of 1875 - - - -	3rdly.—The Toll Fund.
Act I. of 1871 - - -	4thly.—The Pound Fund.
Bombay Act VIII. of 1868 - -	5thly.—Fees for sale of poisonous substances.
	6thly.—The Staging Bungalow Fund.
	7thly.—Fees on earth, sand, stone, &c.
	8thly.—Sale proceeds of building sites.
	9thly.—Contribution to public works by private persons.
	10thly.—Contribution from Provincial revenue on account of Abkári.

These amongst them embrace, I think, all items of the revenue which can be classed as Provincial rates, and a study of the scheme wherein the other item of revenue which may henceforward be credited to Provincial Funds are set forth, does not suggest many obvious additions to this list.

9. The land revenue is already practically shared with the Local Fund by the Imperial or Provincial Government, and nothing more can be looked for from that quarter. *Irrigation* also returns its quota eventually in the shape of increased land revenue. It would however be only fair that the Forest revenue should contribute where the balance was on the right side. The one-anna cess is really 1-17th of the gross land revenue, and something like the same proportion would be a fair contribution from remunerative forests. It would not be likely to produce much in Ahmednagar for some years, but the principle seems as sound for one form of vegetable product as for another, and the fact that ordinary land revenue is paid by a *quasi*-tenant, while the State farms its own forests, does not seem to make any difference.

Land Revenue and Irrigation.

Forests.

10. A revenue item like "A'bkári" is one which might very equitably be shared between Local and Provincial authorities, depending, as it does, very extensively upon local habits, so far as the retail sale in liquor and intoxicating drugs is concerned. I think a donation not less than one-fourth the net revenue raised in that way might fairly be made over to Local Funds. This would be half of the Provincial Government share.

"Excise."

11. Under the new system, the whole Post Office revenue will fall to the share of the Provincial Government. There are no figures in the statement appended to the Resolution to show what amount the Bombay Government may expect to realize under this head. Should there be a profit, some share of it might very reasonably be handed over to Local Funds. It might, with equal justice, be appropriated to either Public Works or to Education, but until the people themselves show some more esteem and regard for education, I should be inclined to think that the physical convenience furnished by good roads should be allowed to determine the destination of a grant from the Post Office.

Post Office.

12. I think that the Local Funds might very reasonably be allowed to participate in the profits of any State Railway which passes through the district. The actual effect on the fund to begin with is to reduce its income. Ferry and toll receipts fall off on lines of communication superseded by the Railway. Feeder roads have to be maintained, if not constructed, and dharmsháles have to be built. As I have no figures to guide me as to the value of the share, if any, which the Government of Bombay may acquire in Railway receipts, I can say no more on this point, but I *know* that the Dhond and Manmád State Railway has reduced the Local Fund income and increased its expenses hitherto.

Railway.

13. The items of Provincial revenue then which appear to me to be fairly chargeable with contribution for local purposes to be disposed of by Local authorities are "Forests," "A'bkári," "Post Office" and "Railway." There are others in which any one can easily discern a certain fitness, such as "assessed taxes," but the obligation on the Provincial Government to provide for Police, which is really a local exigency, must be remembered. "Registration" is a Department which the Supreme Government do not wish to look to as a source of revenue. Its profits therefore ought not be reckoned as available for division.

14. The resources left at the disposal of the Provincial Government allow it to exercise much influence both in primary education and public works, though both are in the main supported by the Local Fund; but if both these objects are to be promoted in a large and enlightened spirit, it is very desirable that there should be some central authority to mould the departmental policy, and that it should have those sinews which alone can give it potential energy; and the Provincial Government should certainly have a good reserve for emergencies.

Education.

15. For these reasons I do not think that Local Committees should be entrusted with control over those funds which are at present placed at the disposal of the Provincial Government under the heads "Public Works" and Education. I would sooner trust to the generosity of Government if occasion should arise when Local Funds are insufficient to meet a pressing want than have the responsibility of making a fixed grant serve under all circumstances.

16. Under the head "Medical" Bombay is credited with Rs. 89,000 and debited with Rs. 11,36,000. This is only what might be expected from the nature of the case, and it would do no good to ask the Provincial Government to make over their meagre assets to enable Local Funds to provide for "Sanitation," "Vaccination," "Vital Statistics" and "Dispensaries." All these have been declared to be objects to which the attention of local committee can most appropriately be directed; most of them, especially the last, are at present cared for more or less everywhere, but in Ahmednagar, through the poverty of the committee and not from any lack of interest or sympathy, much still remains to be done, and with Local Funds at their present figure, the day when the duty of the committee in this respect shall have been discharged, is far distant. If a considerable slice of the A'bkári revenue were made over for local expenditure, it would be a very great assistance in this direction, though, I fear, some politicians would find fault with the morality of the suggestion on the ground of its obviousness.

Medical.

17. I think I have now noticed all the items of Provincial revenue which seem to have any affinity to items of Local Fund revenue or might reasonably be called upon to contribute to the Local Fund revenue on principles of analogy or equity, as well as those which, though promising at first sight, are found on examination to be more appropriately or conveniently left at the entire disposal of the Provincial Government. It remains for me to consider how far a similar analysis is applicable to the case of Municipal Funds.

18. I need not linger long on this branch of the subject, nor need I recapitulate the sources of municipal revenue as they are well known. Suffice it to say that municipal taxation has been lately re-modelled with a view to prevent any conflict with Imperial interests on the one hand and commercial interests on the other, and that in the process no sources of legitimate income now allotted to Provincial Funds have been discovered. As far as I am aware which could with *most* propriety be administered by Municipal Committees.

19. Some of the items mentioned above when I was dealing with Local Funds, might, of course, be made over to Municipal Committees instead of to Local Fund Committees, or these might share them

in any desirable proportion, but Municipalities are, relatively, far richer Corporations than Local Fund Committees, and stand much less in need of assistance. They have a relatively small area to spend their income in, and though they are sometimes called upon to undertake large and expensive works in it, which are forced upon them by the density of their population, they have an opportunity of providing for the construction of these by temporary increase of taxation and for their maintenance by judiciously augmenting the rates in proportion to the benefits they confer, which is denied to the District Committees, who have to deal with vastly larger areas, while their revenue is eminently inelastic, and they have no power of imposing taxation for any purpose.

20. For these reasons, I am inclined to think that no items of revenue which the Provincial Government may be disposed to surrender should be made over to Municipalities; while the Local Funds are still only slenderly endowed, I can certainly think of none to which a Municipality would have a better claim.

21. I now come to the second point, and in dealing with it I will reverse the order. I have observed hitherto, and take the constitution of the Municipal Committees first, because they are so much *more* powerful than the Local Fund Committees, owing to the influence they can bring to bear directly on the people who are subject to municipal taxation.

22. I have never had anything to do with a Municipal Corporation in which the non-official members were created by any form of selection other than the exercise by Government of the right of nomination. When the community is divided into sections, broadly differenciated according to religion and race, and split up into sub-sections with special characteristics, it is not difficult for an intelligent official after some short experience to select the persons who are recognized by popular repute as the leaders, and to recommend them for seats in the Commission.

23. Where there are rival leaders each attracting a considerable share of popular favour, it would often happen that the number of places to be filled up would allow the President to give a seat to each, and an assembly so formed might easily be more representative in the truest sense than one in which the issue was determined by a popular vote, which, in almost all cases, would exclude the minority of any caste or creed from representation.

24. The circumstances of a corporation like that of a Presidency town are so peculiar that no success in the way of self-government carried on by elected representatives, of which its administration can boast, can fairly be quoted as a precedent for the extension of the elective principle to mofussil Municipalities. The town probably owes its importance, and perhaps its existence, wholly to European influences, and may be trusted to be loyal in the main. The case is not the same in ancient Hindu and Mussalmán towns, where traditions of the glories of older dynasties still linger, while the memory of the oppression which they exercised has faded from people's minds.

25. I presume that Government are not anxious to make governing more difficult by any reform they would introduce which would give more power to municipal bodies, and in that case before they throw open the mofussil corporation to the ambition of every ready-witted adventurer, they should consider that the door once unfastened can never be secured again. They *may* gain adherents by a policy of confidence in one election; but it may be found difficult to maintain a preponderating voice, when the excitement of political strife has taught the people a new sensation, and it has been discovered that the same arts which secured the return of a Government candidate, can be made with the help of copious misrepresentation, to tell with equal and it may be greater weight on the other side.

26. It may perhaps matter little whether Whig or Tory wins a borough or county where every man, or at least the vast majority of men, be they Whig or Tory, is honestly anxious for the safety of the constitution in the first place, and parties are only divided as to how this may best be maintained, but in a dependency like India we are ever and anon reminded that there is a party who have profited by our schemes for their enlightenment so far as to learn the use of engines, like the press and the right of public meeting in the service of a patriotism which may be commendable from their point of view, but is full of menace to the supremacy of England in India.

27. If candidates of this stamp were likely to succumb in the fierce struggle of a contested election, their fate would be exemplary, as well as satisfactory; but their claims to popular support are just as good as those in which the success of the average English Demagogue is based, and judging from the rapidity with which anti-constitutional politicians in Europe disseminate their doctrines, and the hold they acquire on the masses, I think that we may well pause before we decide to invite kindred spirits to exhibit their prowess in the municipal arenas of this country.

28. I do not, however, mistrust them as the friend of the people, though that is the character in which they would probably find it expedient to pose. Nothing is more unlikely than the erection of a popular government on the ruins of the British Empire, and it is as the secret ally of the old despotisms—cherished because indigenous—that the Hindu reformer will prove really dangerous. As such he is not so destructive perhaps as as a Nihilist or a Socialist, but his very aptitude for reconstruction makes him really more formidable, for he has materials ready to his hands.

29. To restore to the vassal princes, not only their independence but their ceded provinces, to bring under their yoke the multitudes whose fathers felt it and to whom their rule, with all its caprice and cruelty, is still more attracting than self-government—to give back to the *Brahmin* his old supremacy and influence over prince and peasant—this is the patriot's duty as understood here, and if it is incompatible with loyalty to one rule, the prospect of seeing those who inculcate it born to power on the shoulders of the people, and paralysing the executive at the Committee table, seems hardly encouraging.

30. The organization of the Local Fund Committees is perhaps as good as can be expected. The elective principle in a restricted form is recognized in the constitution of both the District and Táluka Committees' popular election on a large scale does not seem to be a proper method of selecting the members of a board like the Local Fund Committee in the present stage of popular intelligence, and would not, to my thinking, bring forward better men than the present system.

31. It may be doubted if the privilege of membership is highly valued except as a personal distinction or is likely to be exercised with much benefit to the public. As a rule, the non-official members are fitted neither by training nor natural capacity for the discussion of schemes which have

any scope wider than the very narrow limits by which the members' own interests are bounded. I believe that if anything like real power were entrusted to Táluka Committees, that is, if the non-official members could combine and carry a measure in spite of the official members and the District Committee were bound to respect their resolution, no scheme of permanent road improvement would be found possible. The money would be spent in works useful enough in their way, such as wells and dharmshálas and in patching up the village roads where they had become simply impassable. I think it very possible that in this way the actual physical comfort of the people generally might be more promoted for the time being than by schemes of costly communications which absorb most of the revenue for years, and are, to a certain extent, a tax on posterity, but the people would never advance.

32. The selection in a rural district of persons honest and intelligent and public-spirited enough to interest themselves in public affairs without remuneration or reward is not so easy a matter as might be supposed (as I know very well from experience gained when conciliation was introduced), and when they are selected it does not follow that they represent the people generally. I was surprised to find a Brahmin vakíl, a member of Sarvajanik Sabha, and my own Chitnis, a Brahmin of great intelligence and thorough knowledge of revenue work, both utterly posed in a matter in which the custom and manner of life of the kunbis were in issue, and when I expressed astonishment at their ignorance, their excuse was that they had nothing to do with such people.

33. If the isolation of caste can breed this indifference in the better educated class, it is easy to understand why it should be a rare thing to meet a Native who expresses any interest in persons whose lives and labours lie apart from his own, and yet no man whose sympathies are not enlarged to this extent can be reckoned as representative of anything except the narrow prejudices in which he has been born and educated.

34. I think it may be doubted whether self-government is valued for its own sake by the Natives of this country. One of the most respectable and intelligent members of the Municipal Commission at Ahmedabad, during a meeting protracted over several hours under the presidency of Mr. Hope, complained to me in sober earnestness that whereas "the Natives paid the Sahibs to govern them, the Sahibs had turned round and made them governor themselves." This was no doubt said under a feeling of whimsical irritation which the enforced absence of the speaker from his own business at a time when the market was very active had induced, but I believe that the great majority of our mofussil Commissioners and Committee-men would tell the same tale if they were minded to be candid. At any rate, the number of non-official members whom I can remember, other than pensioned servants of Government, who take any visible interest in public affairs (except perhaps when some job is on the tapis), is surprisingly small.

35. On the other hand I do not see any reason to suppose that the majority of the people are a bit better satisfied with the administration of affairs by a committee including non-officials than they are with the decision of a single official. Allegations of personal spite and undue influence are contained in nearly every petition against the decisions of a Municipal Managing Committee. I believe that in most cases such allegations are utterly groundless, but the fact that they are put in at all seems to me to show that there is very little respect for citizen councillors among the citizens at large. There are, I allow, brilliant exceptions—men who are universally respected and trusted by their fellow townsmen, but their energy and zeal only make the sluggishness and apathy of their colleagues more conspicuous, and their decisions would be just as generally accepted, if they were members of the executive and salaried servants of Government.

36. It is, however, a very great advantage when the executive is aided and supported by men of this stamp from an independent basis, and on this ground, and also because much valuable information can be gained from non-official colleagues, who by their position and the circumstances under which they are consulted, give guarantees for the accuracy of what they import, I am cordially in favour of the association of independent members with governing bodies, local or municipal, wherever there is a sufficient number of men of weight and character to make it probable that the friction of Government will be relieved and not increased by combining a non-official with the official element.

I have, &c.
J. KING,
Collector of Ahmednagar.

No. 15 of 1882.

From W. R. PRATT, Esquire, Collector of Sátára, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, C. D.

SIR,

Sátára Collector's Office, Camp Sátára, 4th–9th January 1882.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your No. 4505 of the 16th November 1881, to submit a memorandum by myself and my First Assistant Collector on the subject of Government Resolution No. 3950 of the 25th October 1881.

New Scheme of Provincial Finance.

I have, &c.
W. R. PRATT,
Collector.

MEMORANDUM on the subject of Extension of Powers to Local Bodies discussed in the Correspondence ending Government Resolution No. 3950 of 25th October 1881, Financial Department.

As far as Collectors are concerned, the question appears to consist of two parts:—

1st.—What amounts and items of Provincial revenue shall be transferred to the management of local administration?

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

2nd.—What power of expenditure these bodies should have, how they should be constituted, what checks should be put on their actions, what branches of administration should be put under their control?

2. With regard to the first point, it is impossible to give any general opinion, any transference of funds must depend on the funds available in the locality, the need the locality has for increased expenditure and the capability of the local bodies who may be in existence, or capable of being called into existence of intelligently administering such funds.

3. To judge of the items of revenue to be handed over, it must be first settled as to the expenses that have to be incurred. The only branches of expenditure, which it is practicable for local bodies to administer, are Educational, Medical, Public Works.

4. It will have to be decided, what amount of control and to what extent local bodies are to be entrusted with powers. Are they to decide on the propriety of building schools, and as to pay, status and number of masters, the amount of fees paid, and standards of education; are they to pay for and appoint the medical officers in their dispensaries and pay for medicines; are they to undertake the construction of buildings erected from their funds and to repair roads, &c.

5. According as other fields for expenditure are opened out to them, in like proportion will other funds have to be provided, and it will then become a question as to what those funds are to consist of.

6. Supposing it is contemplated to give local bodies a proportion of the License Tax, Income Tax, A'bkári License fees, Miscellaneous fees, &c., these bodies will doubtless have much more to spend; but as giving up these items of revenue will lessen the funds at the disposal of Government, contributions hitherto given will be withheld, and there will be really be no more money available for expenditure, only that certain funds and expenditure will be transferred to the management of local bodies.

7. It must, therefore, be first decided as to what branches of administration are for the future to be managed under local supervision, and having settled the necessary cost of such branches of administration, to hand over to the local bodies funds sufficient for the purpose. It will matter little whether these items handed over are taxes, rents or fees levied in the locality or not, so that sufficient funds are handed over to pay the cost of the administration so transferred.

8. The main point is the second, and that is, what re-organization or extension of our local bodies should be aimed at, and what powers should be entrusted to them, and what check in future is to be put on their perfect liberty of expenditure of certain funds.

9. As far as my experience goes, we are not in a position in this Presidency to recommend any extension at all. Our local bodies have as yet not had a fair opportunity of showing whether they are fit for exercising even the limited powers the legislature have already entrusted to them.

10. Our local bodies may be said to be two, Local Fund Committees and Municipalities. With regard to the latter, they have as yet been no more than a set of dummies, they have had no power of spending public money. The Local Fund Committees that I have seen are merely allowed to sanction a certain statement of expenditure that is put before them every year. Everything is cut and dried before it comes before them, and they have nothing to do but to acquiesce.

11. The system hitherto followed has been quite the contrary of that now recommended by the Government of India. We had five years' budget a few years ago, and now we are going to have seven years' budget, *i.e.*, that the Local Funds expenditure is fixed and settled, under certain rules of Government, for the next seven years. The Committees have no power to even remonstrate, the matter is settled before their opinion is asked for.

12. When I first had charge of Local Fund duties, there was some discretion given to local bodies and they had some funds at their disposal and could discuss the advisability of expenditure, they could propose and refuse money for certain works. Now the Táluka Committees have literally nothing whatever to do with the expenditure in their tálukás, and the District Committee is little better off, being bound by rules which give them no voice in the disposal of the greater part of their revenues.

13. Before considering the increase of power to be given to local bodies, I should be inclined to try first how they can manage those they have, and before proposing to increase the funds at their command, I should like first to see how they are capable of controlling those they now nominally have at their command.

14. For this purpose I would recommend that the number of members constituting the different local bodies be largely increased so as to include some other people than officials or those under their influence, and to ensure that some of the members have a real knowledge of the requirements of their district.

15. They should be allowed to be unfettered in their discussion as to the objects on which money should be spent, and have a certain amount every year at their disposal, so that they may be able to see that the different works in which they have had a hand have benefited under their management. I say only a certain sum, because I am an advocate for a certain proportion of all Local Funds being kept as a general fund from which the wants of the whole district are to be supplied, and over which some special control must be kept in order that it may be laid out to the advantage of the whole district.

16. I hold that, as yet, in this Presidency, we have given local bodies no opportunity of showing whether they are fit to administer the Local Funds of their tálukás or districts. The first step should be to see what can be done with the material at hand, and having made the experiment, to advance in proportion to its results.

17. With regard to Municipalities, this district is the most primitive I have had yet to do with; they are not fit to manage the funds they already have at their disposal. They require to be thoroughly remodelled and educated as to the duties they are expected to perform. At present a Municipal Commissioner has only two ideas, one is to tax every body but those living within Municipal limits, and the other to tax the poor as much as he can, but the rich not at all, or at any rate, as little as possible.

18. Another notable point in administration by local bodies is that the public good is a word that is hardly understood. They can understand the good of an individual, or of a class, or of a certain interest, but not of the public. For this reason they require to be controlled by those who have no interests, but those of the public good, at heart.

19. The conclusions I have come to, are that, before handing over more funds or enlarging the field in regard to the administration by local bodies, we should try and see how they act in regard to the funds and duties they now are supposed to administer and perform, and the first step in this direction will be to knock on the head all five-year and seven-year budgets, and let local bodies really have some voice in the disposal of their funds, and, to render these bodies capable of knowing, more intimately than they now do, the wants of their district, I should largely increase their numbers.

20. With regard to Municipalities in those places where there are really intelligent members, I think that their sphere of action and management of funds might be increased. But they will always require a strong official element to keep them going, as their want of real care for the public good prevents them exerting themselves or their best judgment, in any matter but those that affect some petty party-feeling. But with regard to the Municipalities in this district, they are not fit to administer the funds they now have at their disposal, and will not be fit for any extension of their powers for some years to come.

W. R. Pratt,
Collector of Sátára.

No. 506—b.s. of 1881–2.

From W. Lee-Warner, Esquire, First Assistant Collector, Sátára, to The Collector of Sa'ta'ra.

Sir, Camp Shirwal, 9th November 1881.

In reply to your No. 6709, dated October 28th 1881, I have the honour to submit the following remarks. I propose first to state briefly the object which the Government of India Resolution No. 3353, dated September 30th, 1881, has primarily in view; secondly by way of contrast to state, as briefly, the present condition of affairs in Sátára; thirdly to submit a few suggestions on the four heads in which the scrutiny required is to be conducted under paragraph 11 of that Resolution.

2. The object of the Government of India is to introduce no new departure in finance or administration, but to render real and effectual a scheme of local responsibility and self-government which was enunciated in 1870, re-affirmed and extended in 1877, and now proclaimed as the distinctive feature of reform upon which the present Government of India have decided to embark. The object is to attract sympathy, secure local watchfulness and interest, and foster independence and self-government by giving local bodies a direct control over certain public funds. The machinery for this control exists already in the District Local Fund Committees with the ancillary but subordinate Táluka Committees and the Municipal Committees in the larger towns invested with the authority of Municipal institutions.

3. If the object of Government is correctly stated, it is essential that the fact should be grasped that an entire change of altitude on the part of the Government of Bombay towards these local bodies in Sátára should be adopted. The transfer of Local Fund revenues to the general control of the central Public Works Department in Bombay was the commencement of a policy of centralization which has well nigh destroyed the vitality of Local Fund Committees. This result is alluded to with emphasis by the Government of India, who observe that nearly the whole of Rs. 21,20,000 is expended through the Public Works Department (paragraph 10, letter dated October 10th, 1881). That transfer was followed by a system of five years' forecaste budgets, now extended to seven years. In making such forecastes the control of posterity (for in India five years see a total change of district *personnel*) was withdrawn. Any accident may place in the hands of a President who has not served five weeks in a district, the disposal and distribution of the revenues of the district for seven years to come. The tendency is to concentrate all expenditure on great showy works, and to sacrifice the small and detailed works which supply a district with wells, chauris, dharmsháláś and all that stock in trade of a rural community which alone in the words of the Government of India "tend to reconcile the public to the burden of local taxation and confer on the Natives higher powers of control over expenditure on objects of local importance." A few days ago the Táluka Local Fund Committee of Wái complained to me that in the last three years not a single suggestion of theirs had even been considered. Their water-supply had not been improved, and no village buildings constructed or repaired. The charge is true, and applies to all the tálukás under me in a greater or less degree. That it is true of another division of the Collectorate is stated in the administration report of Mr. G. Jacob, who wrote that he could not procure the attendance of a quorum at Karád, as the Local Fund Committee ceased to have any powers. If my memory serves me, the District Deputy Collector wrote in the same strain. The rescue of these ancillary institutions from effacement is therefore the first step to take, and it can only be done by giving every táluka an annual grant of, say, Rs. 1,000, or even Rs. 500, from the Local Funds of the district, for which they may prepare a budget of expenditure to be discussed, reviewed and finally incorporated in the District Budget. When I last assisted in Násik to prepare a Local Fund Budget ten years ago, the Táluka Committee was a reality. When I lately assisted to draw up the forecaste for seven years of the Local Fund expenditure in Sátára, not one officer in charge of a division of the district was prepared with or expected to secure the consideration of any local scheme. On taking charge of my present office the same contrast struck me. There were no notes or records to show that the strictly local wants of each táluka had even engaged the attention of my predecessor. Meanwhile, it must not be supposed that the villages are reconciled to the present centralization or look with sympathy on a budget of large works in which they have but little direct interest, and no immediate responsibility.

4. The case with the Municipalities is not so bad. At least they have control over their revenue. But here, again, there is a tendency somewhat increasing to dictate to Municipal Committees in a manner which may secure uniformity of municipal administration at the cost of the spirit of independence which is the life and soul of municipal self-government. The emancipation of Municipalities from frequent interference from above, and the restoration of powers to Local Fund Táluka Committees appear to me essential before the policy enunciated by the Government of India can even be started on any line which shall lead to success. "Self-government" is, I submit, a meaningless expression whilst these measures are postponed.

5. When these have received the attention which they deserve, it will be useful to undertake the scrutiny recommended in paragraph 11. In connection with it I beg to offer the following remarks:—first, what items of receipt and charge can be transferred from Provincial to Local heads, and what items already local, but not so administered, might suitably be so.

6. First as to receipts. No part of the land revenue need be transferred. I think, in Municipalities, fines and confiscations under excise on spirits and drugs might be transferred to municipal revenue, and the nákedárs would have a direct interest in guarding the revenue. Receipts would probably increase from the actuals of Rs. 655 in 1879-80 to Rs. 1,20,000 assessed taxes, and the Provincial part of customs should remain Provincial as at present. Fines and forfeitures under salt should be local revenues, and the receipts would probably rise from Rs. 40,000 to double that amount. Stamps and registration should be Provincial as now. Receipts from public gardens and Model or Experimental farms under Minor Departments should, with receipts from fairs, be local. I omit the subject of education, though I should like to see all school fees local revenue, but on this subject the Director of Public Instruction will doubtless give a special opinion. All hospital receipts and contributions and miscellaneous under Medical should be transferred to local. The corresponding charges on the expenditure side in the Civil Budget estimate should follow these transfers of receipts. The machinery of administration would be the Local Fund Committee, which should be divided into táluka ancillary and subordinate committees, and in the case of hospital and dispensary administration by the Municipality, where there is one, and elsewhere by a special Hospital Committee detached from the Local Fund Táluka Committee, strengthened specially by the addition of the Hospital Assistant, the Civil Surgeon or some other professional member. I believe the Hospital Committees would be popular, and in time induce public-spirited Natives to add to the contribution receipts. Under Public Works Budget all receipts from all roads, tolls and ferries and bungalows in a district should form the local revenue of that district, the charges of maintenance and extension being transferred accordingly. These proposals are both incomplete and crude, but without the full budget statements before me, it is not possible to offer a satisfactory opinion. I feel that the most valuable opinion which Government could obtain would be the opinion of a small committee of three District Officers of wide district experience and sound judgment, who could obtain only from the Accountant General the information which their experience of the country could turn to account. I feel that I do not possess either the information or the experience which would justify me in committing to paper my own rough opinion.

7. The above remarks apply with special force to the second question, what re-distribution of items is desirable in order to lay on local and municipal bodies those which are best appreciated by the people. I think the Government of India's proposal about the Municipal Police is an obvious and desirable change. Municipalities might well undertake the Medical charges, and the duties of watching over the excise salt, and dangerous substances within their limits. But a detailed opinion under this head must necessarily be postponed until the question of transfers previously discussed is disposed of.

8. In regard to question 3, what measures are necessary to ensure more local self-government, I have already anticipated my main contention. It is essential that the independence of municipal institutions should be fostered, and their powers guarded against arbitrary interference, even when gilded with the name of reform. The Táluka Local Fund Committees must be rescued from destruction by really entrusting to them some definite responsibility and some regular share (no matter how small) of the district local revenue. I have no hesitation in saying that the Assistant Collectors of Sátára have all of them, for some years past, allowed the privileges of Táluka Committees to lapse to the great injury of local self-government: and I trust that the Resolution of the Government of India will force this subject upon the attention of Government. I do not think that fresh legislation is required. The present law is amply sufficient if its provisions are duly enforced.

9. In regard to the equalization of local and municipal taxation, I can think of no reform which is required in Sátára, except such natural changes as the ordinary progress of administration will effect. The attempt to "favour forms of taxation most in accordance with popular sentiment" must be pointless. Popular sentiment would declare itself without one dissentient voice in favour of transit duties, taxes on imports and exports which the Government have exempted from Customs, and would favour class differential imposts to the benefit of the upper classes. This the Government cannot permit, and for some years to come it must keep the form of taxation very much in its own hands. It will therefore be wise policy to say as little as possible about popular sentiment, which can only be appealed to in order to be corrected and set on one side.

10. I regret that I am unable to offer a more valuable opinion on a question of this importance, but the want of the detailed budgets, no less than the want of leisure, makes it difficult to do so.

I have, &c.

W. LEE-WARNER,

First Assistant Collector.

No. 1057 of 1882.

From G. F. SHEPPARD, Esquire, Commissioner, Northern Division, to JOHN NUGENT, Secretary to Government, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Poona, 21st June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to submit the report called for in Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th instant.*

2. Several portions of the Government of India's letter appear to apply very imperfectly to the circumstances of this Presidency. As already explained in my former letter (No. 3625, dated

* See page 70 of Return.

3rd December 1881, Financial Department) much has been done here to encourage independence in Committees both Local Fund and Municipal. In some instances (Surat, &c.) a good deal of the executive administration is left to Sub-Committees. Considerable powers are extended to such bodies, the charge for instance of the department of *Roads*, or of *Lighting*, or of public gardens, &c., and there is practically little interference with their discretion.

3. Similarly, many of our Municipalities are left very much to themselves under a non-official Chairman, or an Executive Commissioner. Indeed, in some instances, as in the late case of Bándra, the discretion allowed would appear to be almost more than desirable! In short, during the last 15 years, considerable effort has been made to encourage a feeling of independent interest in public affairs, and if the measure of success attained has not been full, it may be doubted whether "the cause of comparative failure" is that assumed by the Government of India.

4. In my former report I ventured to express a doubt whether the experience obtained so far is of a nature to justify withdrawal from the supervision provided by the law of Bombay, and I believe that I am not alone in the opinion that real progress is more likely to be stimulated by relaxing supervision *gradually*, as Committees prove themselves deserving, than by conceding at one stroke powers which the latter are not yet fit for, and the exercise of which will often be a source of considerable embarrassment to the members themselves.

5. But the orders under report appear to be imperative, and I must turn to the task before me, which is, in some respects, a very difficult one.

6. The first subject for consideration is the constitution of the proposed Boards, *Local* and *Municipal.*

(1.) *Local.*—The existing unit in Bombay—the *Táluka* Board—may be maintained. The only change required will be to raise the number of non-official members from 4 to 6. Of the latter, two may be holders of alienated land, to be elected as at present; and four representative members.

7. The subordination of the Táluka Boards to the District Committee should be maintained, and *for a time* at least, the number of ex-officio members in the latter should not be decreased, the number of non-official members must, under these orders, be raised from 7 to 10.

8. (2.) *Municipal Boards.*—No change in these as at present constituted will be necessary.

9. So far the new machinery will differ very little from that now existing. (In fact the Government of India scheme resembles our own so closely that it would appear to have been borrowed from Bombay). The *duties* of the Boards will have to be considered under the second head of the subject.

Election of Members.

10. On this subject the orders of the Government of India are hardly definite enough to be of much guidance. The "qualifications" to be insisted on are not alluded to. Under our system every endeavour has been made to secure "* both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members;" but this is a difficult matter, and to "ensure" this, the unit must be the *village* and not the táluka!

* Para. 10.

11. The preparation of a "Register of qualified †candidates" will be a very difficult and invidious task. It will be better, I think, to leave this matter *to the electors* under simple rules, providing

† Para. 13.

(*a*) that the members appointed are of good character;
(*b*) that there are not too many of one caste (or profession) on the Committee, and
(*c*) that as far as possible all sections of the community shall be represented.

(In this respect I fear that we shall seek in vain for improvement under the new system. Our endeavour has been to interpose between the selfish influence of the higher castes and the lower classes of the people, and thus to encouraae the growth of independence in the latter, which however is not yet strong enough to make a stand unaided.)

Method of Election.

12. Here, again, the wishes of the Government of India are very indefinitely made known. As the Local Funds of this Presidency are raised from the Land Revenue payers, the franchise must be confined to such persons, unless the License Tax receipts are added, in which case the payers thereof will vote. In either case, only a very small proportion of the voters will be likely to have any knowledge of the several candidates, and the vast majority will be supremely indifferent on the subject.

13. It might be well at first to equalize the qualification for a vote, by limiting the franchise to those who pay not less than rupees 2 per annum to the Local Funds. (This is the lowest class of the Income Tax.)

14. It was said in a late debate on the county franchise in England that "before extension was conceded, four things ought to be proved, *viz.* (1) that the present state of matters is defective, (2) that the defect will be cured by the proposed extension, (3) that the new voters are anxious to vote, and (4) that they are fit to vote." The two former questions have been decided by the Government of India in the case before us. I am of opinion that the two latter will be found to be "not proven."

15. Apparently, the only course open will be to supply each village with a list of qualified voters, and to appoint a day for the registration by the village officers of such votes as may be given. If the qualification above suggested should be adopted, the standard will be sufficiently high to exclude, as a rule, the wild and unintelligent classes.

16. If every taxpayer in Municipal towns is to have a vote, it will in many cases be equivalent to universal suffrage, as in most Municipal towns all but a fraction pay *something* (if only the hálálkhor tax). The difficulty of election in large cities will consequently be very great, and this consideration led to my addressing Government on the subject in my letter disposed of by Resolution No. 1343, dated 10th April 1882, Financial Department. I need not repeat the views I have already submitted.

17. I have not alluded to "the questions of common interest"* to be entrusted to the Boards, as I thought that these had better be considered under the second portion of the subject, *viz.*: "the degree of control to be retained over the Local Boards."† It will be necessary to remember that in some parts of the Presidency, the powers delegated by this measure will inevitably fall into the hands of a class whose prejudices are still very strong in many matters of social and "general" interest. The members will not uncommonly be men paying nothing in the way of taxes themselves, and who have heretofore consistently opposed anything in the shape of *direct taxation*, as well as any liberal policy relating to the *social rights of the lower classes.* I fear, therefore, that it will be necessary to insist on considerable reservations before committing "questions of general interest" to the management of the Boards.

* Para. 10.

† Para. 17.

18. I am not prepared at this moment to suggest an exhaustive list of such reservations, but think that in matters affecting the following interests, the control of the Collector should continue unweakened—

(1.) The public water-supply (rural and urban).
(2.) Admission of lower castes to schools.
(3.) Meat supply (slaughter-houses, &c.)
(4.) Fishing grounds (public rights in, &c.)
(5.) Destruction of noxious animals (snakes, dogs, &c.)
(6.) Cultivation of *indigo—silk* manufacture.
(7.) "Through" communications.

19. The duties of the Táluka and District Committees are defined by the rules now in force, which are practical and exhaustive as far as they go. But some independent authority has now to be conferred, and this will perhaps be best done, at the commencement, by allowing the Táluka Boards a certain amount, say a fourth, of the available annual balance, to be expended at their discretion. The remainder, after deducting the amount required for the general improvement of the country by through communications, to be at the disposal of the District Board. This portion of the question, however, will not arise here for several years, a careful forecast of works required during the next few years having already been prepared and sanctioned by Government.

20. Before the new Boards can be legally invested with all the powers contemplated, it will be necessary that portions of Bombay Acts III. of 1869 and VI. of 1873 should be repealed, and it is, I venture to submit, a matter for serious consideration whether, until experience has been gained of the working of the new scheme, this extreme course should be adopted. It might be better that the existing powers of officials should be *held in abeyance* for a time rather than altogether abrogated by law.

21. I would respectfully urge that the word "adviser" should be substituted for "servant' in para. 22 of the Government of India's letter.

I have, &c.
G. F. SHEPPARD,
Commissioner, N. D.

No. 2560 of 1882.

From W. WOODWARD, Esquire, Collector, Panch Maháls, to THE SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, General Department.

SIR, Godhra, 21st June 1882.

As directed in Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th current, I have the honour to report on the late Resolution of Government of India on the subject of local self-government.

2. In offering remarks on Government Resolution No. 3950 of the 25th October last on the same subject, I expressed myself as follows — (my No. 3074 of 19th November 1881 to address of Commissioner, N. D.) :—

"I am not disposed to think that, generally speaking, any increase in the funds now committed to local bodies would be attended with compensatory advantages to the public service. In the present absence of enlightenment and advancement in the ideas of mofussil communities, an extension of funds would merely mean an augmented responsibility on the official head of the Institution without the corresponding assistance and effective co-operation of the members composing it. With the exception of Bombay, Poona and a few other large towns, where the march of intellect has proceeded with rapid strides, it would be vain to look for that social and intellectual progress without which or rather *pari passu* with which only could any enlargement of civic responsibility be recommended. From the foregoing considerations I arrive at the conclusion that advanced communities may be profitably entrusted with the control of larger funds, while such as have not marched with the times are not capable of higher trusts. Education is the *vis motor* which alone will bring them to a level with those now ahead of them.

"To apply these general remarks to my own district, I cannot advocate any change here. The better classes of the Maháls, though equally civilized with the inhabitants of many other districts, have not in my opinion reached that educated standard which qualifies for superior administrative authority. A District Local Fund Committee has not yet been organized, while the Municipal Bodies, though amenable to reason, are not quick at origination or execution."

3. To this opinion I have little to add. But I would draw attention to the fact that the Native element is very well represented on all the local Boards existing, and I cannot but think to a sufficient extent consistently with good and effective administration. To take the Municipalities there are 4 official to 9 non-official members in both Godhra and Dohad. The District Local Fund Committee now in process of organization will consist of 4 official and 7 non-official, while the Táluka Committee consists of 3 official and 4 non-official members. The Dispensary Committee is comprised of almost all

Natives and School Committees are wholly Native. There will be no objection to increasing the numerical superiority of the non-official members beyond the rather difficult one of finding suitable persons to occupy the position.

4. It will be admitted, however, from the above that the political education of the people is alive and progressive, but as all education is not only a matter of time but of means and opportunity, I cannot advise any hasty advance. I believe that the Native element is fairly represented, that any preponderating superiority would be injudicious (except as I have before said, whereas in Bombay, Poona, &c., civic rights and obligations are intelligently understood) and that any rapid development of it with consequent power and authority would be premature and attended with the most disastrous results.

5. I have no hesitation in asserting that the majority of citizens is neither prepared for nor willing to undertake administrative responsibility. There are many reasons which might be advanced. The people are to a certain extent apathetic, but I do not lay much stress upon that as they always show themselves fully alive when their own immediate interests are concerned. I consider one reason is their selfishness, taken up with their own affairs they would plead want of leisure to attend to local or municipal matters. Another is that they are distrustful of themselves, but have profound faith in the Sirkar's administration, and hence I doubt much their inclination for a change. But I would observe that to control, to watch, to caution and to advise Native Boards, and generally to see that they do no wrong, would be a far harder and more dangerous task for the hardworked official than to do the work himself, and that excepting in the most enlightened communities the contemplated intention of relieving the administration would be utterly frustrated.

6. Lastly, I view with the gravest concern the proposal (para. 16) to distinguish all Native members of Local Boards with the courtesy titles of Ráo or Khán Bahádur. Such titles have hitherto been regarded as a distinction for long and meritorious service, and are greatly respected and prized. To throw such honoraria broadcast through the land would bring them into contempt and disrepute and make their bestowal no mark of honour or merit. I would suggest that the proposal should be so far modified as to admit only members of conspicuous ability and industry to the title after their term of office was over.

I have, &c.
W. WOODWARD,
Collector, Panch Maháls.

No. 1873 of 1882.

From G. F. M. GRANT, Esquire, Acting Collector, Kaira, to J. NUGENT, Esquire, Secretary to Government, General Department.

SIR, Kaira Collector's Office, 27th June 1882.

IN accordance with Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th instant, I have the honour to submit my views and opinions on a Resolution of the Government of India, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}59}$, dated 18th ultimo.

2. I may observe, with reference to para. 3, and the District and Táluka Committees, that there exists in Bombay the system, with only very small variation as to details, which the Government of India, so lately as the 10th of October 1881, desired to see generally introduced. Each body contained non-officail members, nominated in a proportion of not less than one-half. It appears, however, that the Government of India have already seen reason to change the views they then entertained.

3. With reference to para. 5, under the system established here, and referred to above, the management of Local Funds has never been in the sole hands of the Government District Officers. Non-official members are encouraged to attend and to give their opinions, and in case of habitual non-attendance, are removed or called upon to resign. I would submit, therefore, that, so far as this Presidency is concerned, what is recommended in that paragraph is already being done, and that the management of these funds, whether local or municipal, cannot be called autocratic. Were I able, for instance, to take my own course, independently of other members, I should certainly substitute direct for octroi taxation in all municipalities in the district, and believe they would all greatly benefit by such an autocratic proceeding; but even here, where all the municipalities are town-municipalities, I can take no such step owing to the opposition of non-official members. The President has greater influence in Local Fund Committees than in Municipalities, chiefly for the reason that he necessarily is acquainted with the wants of the whole district, while even the most intelligent non-official member knows and is interested in only his own neighbourhood; consequently, the non-official members seldom combine, and each, finding he cannot carry his own project, falls into the disinterested view of the President. In the towns, the non-official members are thrown together, very often have common interests, and are not infrequently better acquainted with the matter in hand, the area being so circumscribed, than the Government officer presiding. It is not uncommon, even at meetings in small towns, to have a discussion carried on by non-official members without the interference of the Chairman, and decided without his vote.

4. I would observe, with regard to para. 6, that the opinions ascribed to many active and well-intentioned district officers are not, to the best of my belief, those of district officers in general. I believe it to be quite true that the vast majority of the people are entirely indifferent to the principle of self-government, and that this being the case, it has been developed quite as far, in this Presidency, as it advantageously can be. Again, there are many public matters in which the same majority take but little interest, but this is not so in the case of Municipal and Local Funds. There are few villagers who do not take a keen interest in the latter, and all townspeople are more or less concerned in the expenditure of the former. I feel quite certain that the great majority would prefer that a large share of the management of these funds should be in the hands of European officers, who undoubtedly, in most instances, have their confidence. The more personal interest such an officer shows in affairs, the more popular he usually is, and great disappointment is felt if he even appears to be under the influence of Natives round him. As for people of India being remarkably tolerant of existing facts, I think this

means no more than that they are, in general, disposed to be contented with their lot, and are averse to frequent and experimental changes, an aversion shared by very many people, not wanting in education or intelligence, in other countries besides India. Such discontent as prevails cannot certainly be traced, in this Presidency, to any dissatisfaction with the management of Local Funds, which has never, hitherto, been found fault with even by those "advanced" Natives, who are so ready to criticize and censure all the acts of Government which do not precisely fall in with their own views. If a district officer were asked to what sources the discontent among different classes within his charge might be traced he would, in all likelihood, instance the Civil Law, the Forest, Salt, and A bkári Acts, and the License Tax. As for the increase of work, it is not at all due to the administration of Municipal or Local Funds, for, with a simple system once established, the amount of work in connection with them varies little from year to year, but to the increase in the number of departments, and the continual changes in and additions to the law—changes originating chiefly with those who have reputations for ability to develope, or create if need be, but most irksome to all executive officers, and odious to the mass of the people.

5. I may observe, in connexion with the same para., that, so far as this district is concerned, education has not so far succeeded in developing a *class* of public-spirited men. Higher education has received comparatively little attention in Gujarát, and it is very difficult to get a Native of that province who can adequately fill the place of head clerk. It will not be contended that the education provided in a village school is calculated to devolope public spirit. There are a few men distinguished for intelligence and education beyond their fellows, but these are precisely the men whom the Collector recommends for position on the Local Committees.

6. With reference to para. 7, as I have already observed, the experiment towards self-government made in this Presidency has been perfectly successful, and embodies all the suggestions as to constitution of self-governing bodies which the Government of India, so lately as the 10th of October last, thought if advisable to make.

7. Paras. 10 and 11 seem to admit of the maintenance of District, Táluka, and Municipal Committees as at present. I presume "tahsil" is identical with "táluka," and this the Government of India recommend as the maximum area to be placed under a local board. The táluka is in no part of Gujarát so large as to make it advisable to make smaller sub-divisions for local purposes, and I am of opinion that the cardinal principle laid down at the end of para. 10, will be in no way violated by making the táluka the area of jurisdiction for the primary committee.

8. In the same paragraph it is observed that in some provinces it may be thought best to have a District Board with controlling power over the smaller local Boards; this would seem to be specially desirable in this province (which I cannot help thinking must be far in advance of others) where District Committees already exist. As to para. 11, so far as Bombay is concerned, there seems no necessity for settling the relations between Municipalities and Local Fund Committees. There are already Acts to regulate both bodies, and, in my experience, they have never clashed in any way.

9. As regards this Presidency, the wishes of the Government of India, with reference to numerical strength of non-official members, as expressed in para. 12, can be carried out without any legislation, so far as the Local Funds are concerned. All that is necessary is to modify the rules made under section 12 of the Act, so as to provide for an increase of non-official members in both Táluka and District Committees. At present the non-official members are never fewer than one-half, and in their letter of the 10th October last, the Government of India themselves proposed that the porportion should be "of not less than $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{2}{3}$ of the whole number of members." Even this change is quite unnecessary, if executive officers are to be excluded from the Committees, a point to which I will allude in connection with para. 18. In the case of Municipalities the existing law directs that the official members shall not form more than one-half of the whole body, and a slight change in the law would be necessary. As to the latter part of the same paragraph, I would venture to express my opinion, that, unless a system of election is resorted to, there is no reason to depart from the present system, according to which members of Táluka and District Committees (unless they resign) retain office during life or good behaviour, while appointments of non-official members of Municipal Committees are re-considered every three years. Should a system of election be anywhere considered advisable, I think two years would be too short a term, and would recommend five years in the case of Municipal, and seven in the case of Local Fund Committees. This would prevent the frequent recurrence of elections, which, however conducted, must occasion a good deal of trouble both to voters and to executive officers. For the same reason, I would prefer to avoid retirement by rotation at short periods, and the attendant by-elections.

10. I have already expressed my opinion with reference to the letter of the Government of India of the 10th October last, that a system of election will be found altogether unsuited for District and Táluka Committees, and in the case of Municipalities, will only be found practicable in large cities like Poona, Ahmedabad, or Surat, where there really are bodies of citizens sufficiently educated to carry on affairs. In this district there are at present none by Town Municipalities, and even in Nadiád the men so educated are very few in number, and some already have seats at the board, which I should be very sorry to see risked at an election. As regards the Local Fund Committees, I feel convinced that no elections would procure a body one-half so representative as is assembled on the present system. If I may be allowed, I will take the method of election suggested in the paragraph under notice, and would ask what guarantee there is that a single Mussulmán would anywhere be returned to a Committee in Gujarát. The Mussulmán community is very numerous, but not very wealthy, and backward in the matter of education; the Collector therefore, where an exception can be found, will take care to have him put on the Committee; but he would never be elected, as most of his co-religionists would be excluded from voting by almost any qualification that could be devised.

11. Again, I think it must be admitted that district officers take pains to find out men of more than average ability and enlightenment, and get them placed on the Committees, though not to the absolute exclusion of those who represent property. On the other hand, I think it is a great mistake to suppose that in agricultural districts, and outside of large cities, education tends to make those Natives who

possess it popular, or that the Native press or those who profess to lead opinion at the centres of education represent Native thought generally. The man who comes back to his village educated above the level of his father and his father's contemporaries, is generally an object of suspicion and dislike. There is in this district a Police Patel of a large and populous village not far from the railway, who, having received an education seldom given to one in his position, has been placed on the District Local Funds Committee, appointed a Magistrate of the 3rd Class, and invested with powers. He is nevertheless by no means generally popular, and I think it quite possible that he would not be elected to a seat in the Committee. Money is, in the eye of most of the people, the leading qualification a man can have, and it seems to me more than probable that a very class whom the Government of India apparently wish to enlist, would, in a district like this, and under a system of election, be entirely excluded.

12. As regards Municipalities, it might be somewhat easier to conduct elections in their case than in that of Local Fund Committees, but in my letter No. 4401, dated 13th November last, to the address of the Commissioner N. D., on the Government of India Notification No. 3353, dated 20th September last, I gave my reasons for thinking such a system suited only to large cities, such as Poona or Ahmedabad.

13. I have ventured to make the above remarks, because from para. 13 of the Resolution, it appears that the question whether members of committees should or should not be elected, is left entirely for decision to the Local Governments; I have, however, received from the Commissioner, N. D., an extract from Government letter No. 1967, dated 29th ultimo, with an endorsement calling on me for any suggestions I may have to offer as to the best means of introducing the representative element into Táluka and District Local Fund Committees. As already stated, my opinion is that the existing system is the best at present attainable for that purpose, but the suggestions are perhaps called for with a view to change. I imagine I shall be correct in reserving all detailed proposals for my report to the Commissioner, N. D., but, as direct reference is made to system of election in the Government of India Resolution, a few suggestions may not be out of place here.

Táluka Committees to consist of:—

(1.) Assistant Collector in charge.
(2.) Mámlatdár or Mahálkari.
(3.) Inámdár (holding a village) to be elected, as at present, by other Inámdárs of the same status.
(4.) Three members by election with the following qualifications:—
  [1.] Able to read and write, and
  [2.] Either revenue or police patels of villages, or holders of not less than 100 acres of Government land within the táluka, who have not been convicted of any offence, or dismissed from public employment.
(5.) A Mussalmán member to be nominated by the Collector with the Commissioner's approval.

The Public Works Officer and Deputy Educational Inspector would cease to be members, but should attend all meetings of the Committee.

This would give five non-official members against two official, or a proportion of more than two-thirds of the whole number of members.

As to the desirability of two official members being retained, with votes, and the propriety of the Assistant or Deputy in charge taking the chair, I will make some remarks when coming to para. 18.

I would recommend that qualified candidates be invited to offer themselves, instead of the District Officer submitting to voters a list of persons qualified. The latter would, under the above conditions, be numerous, and very many unwilling to serve, while many more would have no chance whatever of election.

As for the voting body, I would recommend that it consist simply of the Matedárs of villages, any candidate, of course, losing his vote. These Matedárs are very fair representatives of the community in an agricultural district like Kaira, and it is most desirable, if a system of election be introduced, that it be, at first, extremely simple.

I would have the Matedárs' votes collected by the Taláti, and forwarded through the Mámlatdár. I think it would be necessary that the Mussulmán member should, for the present, be nominated by the Collector.

District Committees to consist of:—

(1.) The Collector as President.
(2.) Two Assistant Collectors, or, when these are not available, an Assistant and Deputy Collector in charge of Districts.
(3.) The Executive Engineer (replaced in educational matters by the Educational Inspectors).
(4.) An Inámdár, holder of an alienated village, elected by the Inámdár members of the Táluka Committees.
(5.) A Mussulmán member, to be appointed by the Commissioner from among the Mussulmán members of the Táluka Committees.
(6.) The members of each Táluka Committee, who headed the poll at the táluka elections, making in the case of Kaira seven members.

Under such an arrangement the Huzur Deputy Collector would cease to be a member. I do not consider his presence in the Committee essential. There would be 9 non-official members against 4 official, or more than two-thirds of the whole number.

Two sets of elections would be avoided by simply taking from each Táluka Committee the member who had obtained most votes at the táluka election.

Municipal Committees.

In the case of cities there would be no difficulty in arranging elections by wards; there are "paras" in large towns like Ahmedabad and Surat, which would answer closely to wards. There is, however, no City Municipality in Kaira.

As regards towns the Committee to consist of :—

(1.) The Collector as President.
(2.) The Assistant or Deputy Collector Vice-President.
(3.) The Mámlatdár or Mahálkari.
(4.) Two Mussulmán members to be nominated by the Collector, with the sanction of the Commissioner Northern Division.
(5.) Five or six elective non-official members other than Mussulmans, with the following qualifications :—
  (1.) Able to read and write.
  (2.) Holding Hereditary District office (as Desái, &c.) or paying Licence Tax on profits of not less than Rs. 2,000, or exercising the profession of pleader (Sanandi) or medical man (duly qualified), or holding the position of Inámdár or Vahivátdár of the place where the municipality is situate.

Persons convicted of any offence, or dismissed the public service, to be disqualified.

Under such an arrangement, the Chief Constable would cease to be a member, and as there are other officers who could represent police interests, it is not, I think, important that he should be a member. There would be 3 official against 7 or 8 non-official members, or less than ⅓ of the whole number.

The voting body should, in my opinion, be confined to residents paying License Tax and residents paying Rs. 50 or upwards assessment on Government land. I would exclude Mussulmans, who would be otherwise represented, from voting, and would give more or fewer votes according to the amount of License Tax or assessment paid.

14. The above does not pretend to be more than a sketch of a simple and introductory system of partial representation by election, such as might be practicable, if the system were finally decided on. I am quite aware that both consideration and discussion would be necessary before it could be carried out, and must express my regret if I have gone beyond the proper limits of this report, by introducing what may be regarded as details. I have endeavoured to be as brief as possible.

15. I think I must be correct in supposing that the titles of "Ráo Bahádur" and "Khán Bahádur" will be given only to members of District Committee. The distinction is, at present, very highly prized, and it would excite comment if it were enjoyed alike by the Chairman of the Poona or Ahmedabad Municipality and a member of the Táluka Committee of the Jhálod Mahál.

16. With regard to paragraphs 17 and 18, the powers it is proposed to give to the executive authorities are, no doubt, considerable, but it certainly seems to me that all the measures set forth in these paragraphs are suggested by an impression—incorrect, so far as this Presidency is concerned—that measures are dictated to the local bodies by Government. It is true that both the Local Funds and the Municipal Acts (in the case of town municipalities) do give the power so to dictate, but it has been very seldom exercised, and the powers it is now proposed to give to the Local Government amount to very much the same thing. The action from without on the part of the executive will, I am convinced, prove most inconvenient in practice, as very much business will have to be settled by correspondence, which is now disposed of in a few words at a meeting. When a non-official member now brings forward his measure for the exclusive benefit of his own village or neighbourhood, the Collector is able to point out that his object is selfish and not for the general good, there is a laugh at the member, who withdraws his motion, and the matter ends. But it is easy to see that in a meeting consisting entirely of Ráo Bahádurs, such a matter is likely to be dealt with in a different manner, and that compromises may be effected in individual interests, which the Collector, if he does his duty, cannot subsequently avoid noticing. But he will derive his knowledge of the proceedings (I suppose) from a copy furnished to him, and the result will probably be a long and disagreeable correspondence with the Chairman. It is my opinion that the executive officer's work will be very largely increased. In the one matter of keeping down establishment he will have great difficulty, and where a house-tax exists, the narrowest scrutiny will be required to check exemptions. I now speak with reference to Municipalities, but with regard to Local Funds I would point out that it is most desirable, in my opinion, that Government, as the proprietor of all waste lands, should be represented by vote. The improvement of such waste lands may often be justifiable on the ground of the general good. I am perfectly sure that there is not an intelligent Native in this district who would not recognize the immense advantages it has derived from the presence of the Executive Engineer, Mr. Little, at Local Fund meetings, and who would not regret his disappearance from them.

17. I am strongly of opinion that to take away the executive officers from the local boards will ensure the failure of any scheme that may be set on foot.

18. I do not think I need make any remarks on paragraph 21, for in my letter No. 4401, dated 11th November last, to the address of the Commissioner, Northern Division, I stated my views fully, after going through the various items of Provincial Revenue and Expenditure. Very little can, in my opinion, be done with advantage in the way of transfer; pound and ferry receipts are already credited to the Local Funds, and to entrust the assessment of the license-tax to Local Committees, unless the sharpest look-out were kept on them, would be to ensure its extinction in a few years. I am satisfied that the extent and results of general eudcation among the Natives of this district are not such as to warrant their being endowed with the special and expensive education the Government of India proposes to confer on them.

19. With reference to paragraph 22, I can only say that things are now very much as the Government of India would have them, except that the Engineer is neither the master nor the servant of the local bodies but their fellow-labourer, and consequently can and does initiate operations within his professional knowledge. Who among the Patels and merchants who constitute these bodies would be competent to take his place in this respect, I am wholly unable to say.

20. Since writing the above, I have received Government Resolution No. 2214, dated 16th instant, on a letter of the Government of India, No. 831, dated 31st ultimo. There is no recognized sub-division except an occasional Mahál here and there between a táluka and a village, and a táluka is by no means too large a sub-division to be managed by a primary committee. In fact, the introduction of

smaller jurisdictions is by no means strongly urged in paragraph 11 of the Resolution. It is not, of course, of much consequence whether a body is called a Táluka Committee or a rural board, a District Committee or a District Council; I have adhered to our own word "Committee," because it is thoroughly familiar to the people, and has passed into their language. A multiplicity of small boards would, in my opinion, supply the executive officers with more work than they can possibly do.

21. I can see no good reason for in any way mixing delegates from Local Fund Committees with Municipal members. Their duties do not in any way clash, and the funds they have to deal with will, I presume, be separate. I believe these bodies are kept quite distinct in England.

I have, &c.

G. F. M. GRANT,
Acting Collector, Kaira.

No. 2241 of 1882.

From W. A. EAST, Esquire, Acting Collector, Kolába, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Alíbág, 30th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to reply to Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th instant, on the subject of the extension of local self-government in the Bombay Presidency.

2. I would remark in the first instance that the scheme of intrusting Municipal and Local Committees with the administration of their own funds has long since been adopted in Kolába as in every other Collectorate. In the case of the former, Government interference with the action of the Commissioners takes, as a rule, the form of that direction and control from without, which the Government of India approves, details of administration being carried out by the Commissioners themselves. At the same time there is no doubt that the official members, notably the Chairman and Vice-President or President, supply the motive power, acting in fact as the spring to the mechanism without which it would come to a standstill. This is only in accordance with my experience in many districts; I can recall no instance in which a Mofussil Municipality has worked satisfactorily where a Government official, as a rule the Chief Executive Officer of the Táluka, has not been available as Chairman.

3. The reason of this is not far to seek; excluding cities to which my remarks are throughout not intended to apply, the class of persons from which Municipal Commissioners are drawn are not at heart persuaded of the advantage of the measures which Municipalities exist to carry out. Sanitation in particular they look upon as profitless vexation; and although they appreciate a pure water-supply, they would, if left to themselves, forego it rather than allow themselves to be taxed to furnish the necessary funds. In Kolába each of the four small town municipalities would, I feel sure, vote itself out of existence tomorrow with acclamation, if permitted.

4. In backward rural districts, it will, in my opinion, be many years before the elective system can profitably be introduced in Municipalities. To do so now would be to impair the moderate usefulness which they show, and to render Municipal meetings, which on the whole get through a fair amount of work in a reasonable time, debating platforms for wordy agitators, more intent on bringing themselves to notice than on furthering the public good. The smaller rural Municipalities could not be used as instruments of political and popular education without risk of incurring the fate of material instruments and being themselves blunted and spoiled.

5. It should, I think, be borne in mind that local self-government is not on the Bombay side the new thing, the untried scheme, in which light it presents itself to the Government of India. For years past Municipal and Local Fund Committees, with their advantages and shortcomings, have been reported upon and discussed in every conceivable aspect, and the Bombay Government with its varied experience can fairly claim that in this direction it has nothing to learn from outside.

6. The Municipal Commissioners are at present selected from the persons most likely to take an intelligent interest in the improvement of their town, and especial care is shown that all classes of the community should be represented. The appointments are at present for a period of three years, but there would be no objection to reducing it to two.

7. Members of District and Táluka Local Fund Committees are selected in the same manner. From the nature of the objects to which Local Funds are devoted there is less scope for the exercise of individual opinion than in the case of Municipalities, and at the time, not perhaps far distant, when Local Funds will all be absorbed in repairs no margin being left for original works, the work of the Committees will be still more cut and dried than now. I doubt whether (apart from the position) considered as a source of power or field for usefulness, the post of member of a Local Fund Committee would be much in request, and certainly the instances of members who make use of their opportunities for good by looking after works in progress or suggesting useful expenditure of funds (except for their own immediate advantage or that of their villages) are so rare as to be phenomenal. As will be seen from the accompanying marginal statement the main expenditure in Kolába from Local Funds is on communications, under which head would come all expenditure from Provincial revenues. Roads, bridges and the like, especially in a district with strongly marked natural features, which prescribe their situation and direction unalterably, are so essentially connected with the due administration of the country, that Government could not safely hand the funds for their maintenance

Agency.	Civil Buildings and Miscellaneous Public Improvements.	Communications.
Original Works.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Civil Agency - - -	1,447 1 6	474 0 0
Public Works Agency -	12,471 15 8	26,384 8 6
Repairs.		
Civil Agency - - -	2,025 15 5	3,235 6 5
Public Works Agency -	5,020 11 11	16,765 6 1
Total -	20,965 12 6	46,859 5 0

over to a Committee with discretion, at all likely to be used, to divert them to other purposes. If the Committees are not to be free agents, it seems scarcely worth while to invest them with a larger share of power than they have at present. Their opinions are always, where possible, carefully considered and acted upon.

8. The only source of revenue mentioned by the Government of India, in the expenditure of which the local boards have no share, is the license tax. If this tax is likely to be maintained in future years, I see no financial objection to its being made over, as a quasi-Provincial grant, to local collection and administration. In Kolába it amounts to the moderate sum of Rs. 15,000 or Rs. 16,000, which is less than the average annual Provincial grants. Of course to prevent its entire disappearance, it would be necessary to invest the local board, whether Municipal or other, only with the power of distributing its incidence, an old expedient in Native taxation to which we are indebted for that modern administrative stumbling block—the Khote. Each town, village, or perhaps táluka, would be rated at a lump sum, and the local board empowered to assess and collect from individuals.

9. It is quite possible that assessments would be more equitable than at present, but the position of the assessors would not be very enviable, and a certain result would be great discord and evil speaking in each Native community.

10. I am not sure that I fully understand the working of the arrangement described in par. 22 of the Government of India's letter, except that it seems to suggest a half return to the old arrangement in this Presidency, by which each Local Fund Committee had its own Engineer, and on the abolition of which increased employment was found for the officers of the Public Works Department. The success of the present plan, of course, varies with the character of the Executive Engineer, but as a rule, I have seen as little reason for desiring that that officer should be the servant of the Local Fund Committee as for apprehending that he may prove its master. Where purely Government buildings are concerned, those for instance for the accommodation of Government servants in their public or private capacities, the Local Fund Committee should have no voice ; all Government buildings, such as dharmsháls and rest-houses, are naturally looked after by the Local Fund Committee, and the Executive Engineer defers to their opinions, except in purely technical matters.

11. I would therefore beg to report my opinion, in summary, so far as the Kolába District is concerned, that in their present state of general advancement and capacity for self-government, the people have already as much of the latter as they can properly administer or appreciate in the Municipal and Local Fund Committees; and I would most respectfully deprecate the district being made the subject of experiment in political and popular education, for which it will not be ripe for many years to come. At the same time I would add that so far as can be done without change in existing institutions, and without impairing administrative efficiency, the opinions of those best able to judge amongst men of education and experience will be ascertained and acted upon in future as in the past.

I have, &c.

W. A. EAST,
Acting Collector.

No. 1774 of 1881.

From J. G. WHITE, Esquire, Collector of Surat, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department.

SIR, Surat, 30th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to submit the report called for in Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th instant.

2. The rural and urban boards should be quite distinct and independent of each other.

3. I am in favour of each táluka being subdivided into groups of ten or twelve villages, each of which according to its size should return one or more members to the Local Board.

4. Each Local Board should return one or more representative to the Táluka Board, and each Táluka Board to elect one or more delegates to represent them at the District Council.

5. I think titles should be confined to members of the District Committee ; but if it is thought advisable to extend them to the Táluka Boards, the members of the latter might be designated Ráo and Khán Sáhebs and of the former Ráo Bahádurs and Khán Bahádurs.

6. The chairman of the lowest rural Board to be chosen by its members, but the Táluka Board to be presided over by the Assistant Collector or (in his absence) by the Mámlatdár in the character of advisers.

7. The District Committee to be presided over by the Collector, or in his absence by the Senior Assistant until it is found possible for a non-official chairman to be appointed by the members. The District Board to include men of local influence and position in addition to those appointed by the Táluka Board to represent it.

8. The Assistants in charge of táluka and Engineer to be always members of both the District and Táluka Boards. In regard to paragraph 22 of the Resolution of the Government of India, the appointment *by Government* of an Engineer appears to me to be incompatible with his being in the position of servant to the District Boards, for officers of the Public Works Department will be averse to take their orders from even the highest Local Board. It is here that I anticipate collision, for that department is not in favour with the ryots, on account of the little work turned out by it in return for a fabulous outlay ; and if local self-government is not to be a sham, either the District Boards must be allowed to employ their own engineers, or the present rate of 15 per cent. for supervision of works reduced to about half that amount. The Engineer sent to a district should be kept there for three or four years at least, and should be an admittedly competent man. In this way alone can there be "some effective guarantee for thoroughness of execution" as insisted on by the Government of India, for the hasty visits of Superintending Engineers are next to useless for the discovery of bad work. In fact, if every district were to be supplied with an efficient and willing Engineer, the services of Superintending Engineers, so far as they relate to local works, might be dispensed with, and, I should imagine, a very considerable reduction be effected in their large establishments.

9. As regards Municipalities, I feel doubtful whether a city should be divided into wards, and elections made by the residents in them qualified to vote, or by sects, the Hindus, Musalmáns, Pársis, &c., electing in proportion to their numbers. The latter would perhaps be the better method. The question as to what should be the qualifications for voting, can be settled on the lines adopted in Bombay. As regards a chairman of the City Board, the difficulty in Surat will be to find a qualified non-official who will be willing to remain in office for any length of time, and frequent changes of chairman are to be deprecated. As far as this is concerned, however, I dare say things would work much as they do now that a managing committee and chairman are appointed every month.

I have, &c.
J. G. WHITE,
Collector.

No. 1526 of 1882.

From G. W. VIDAL, Esquire, Acting Collector, Broach, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department.

SIR, Broach, 3rd July 1882.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the report called for by Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th ultimo, on local self-government.

2. As I only took charge of this office on the 1st July, and as my predecessors have left no expression of their views on record, it is impossible for me with the time now at my disposal to deal exhaustively with the various points raised in the correspondence.

3. From the reports of the Assistant and Deputy Collectors, which tally in the main with my own preconceived opinions on the subject, I have arrived at the following conclusions :—

(*a*) No immediate change in the mode of appointment of non-official members on the existing District and Táluka Local Fund Committees should be attempted. These Boards as at present constituted already fulfil in some measure the objects which the Government of India has in view, namely, the creation of an intelligent interest in local affairs. The sense of responsibility in the non-official element of these Committees is no doubt, generally speaking, small ; but the results have not been altogether discouraging, and I much doubt if any greater interest and activity would be evinced were the present system of appointment by selection suddenly superseded by popular election. The development must be gradual, and the rural population must be further educated before they can be safely trusted with electoral responsibilities. This education can best be imparted by gradually introducing the election system in the City Municipalities. and the larger Town Committees. The utmost change at present desirable with regard to the Local Fund Committees would be the nomination of a larger proportion (say $\frac{2}{3}$rd) of non-official members to both the District and Táluka Boards. It would also be advisable to make the appointments of members of Local Fund Committees for short periods of, say, five to seven years, instead of, as now, for life.

(*b*) In introducing the election system in City Municipalities it would be best at first starting to allow not more than a moiety of the non-official members to be elected by popular vote, the remaining half as now being nominated by the State. After, say 3 years' trial, if found to answer, the proportion of popular representatives might be increased.

(*c*) In the case of Town Municipalities the minimum proportion of non-official members might be increased from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{2}{3}$, but no system of popular election should be attempted until the experiment has been fully tried and found to succeed in the case of City Municipalities.

(*d*) With reference to para. 11 of the Resolution I would suggest that the Municipal Committee and Local Fund Committees should, as now, be kept entirely distinct, though the control over Local Fund receipts levied within Municipal limits may properly be made over to the Municipal boards.

I have, &c.
G. W. VIDAL,
Acting Collector.

No. 1439 of 1882.

From G. B. REID, Esquire, Acting Collector of Ahmedabad, to J. NUGENT, Esquire, Secretary to Government, General Department.

SIR, Ahmedabad Collector's Office, 5th July 1882.

WITH reference to Government Resolution 2100 of 7th June 1882, on the subject of the extension of local self-government, I have the honour to report that as I have been serving for the last three years in a foreign State, and as I have only within the last day or two assumed charge of the Ahmedabad Collectorate, I feel that I have no opinion to submit on this important subject which would be worth the consideration of Government.

I have, &c.
G. B. REID,
Acting Collector.

No. $\frac{P}{1344}$ of 1882.

From E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Central Division, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Financial Department.

SIR, Poona, 28th June 1882.

IN reply to paragraph 1 of your letter No. 1967, dated 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that in my opinion the undermentioned Town Municipalities might be converted into City Municipalities :—

(1.) Násik.
(2.) Sátára.
(3.) Pandharpur.
(4.) Dhulia.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

2. I have called for the information referred to in paragraph 11 of Government Resolution (Financial Department) No. 1093, dated 25th March 1882, in regard to the above Municipal towns, and will submit the same as soon as the reports of the Collectors and Presidents are to hand.

I have, &c.
E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

No. $\frac{P}{1343}$ of 1882.

From E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Central Division to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Financial Department.

SIR,

Poona, 28th June 1882.

WITH reference to paragraph 11 of Government Resolution (Financial Department) No. 1093, dated 25th March 1882,* I have the honour to submit reports as per Margin received from the Collectors and Presidents of City Municipalities in my Division. I also append the following statements compiled from the Collector's reports :—

Sholápur Collector's letter No. 1792, dated 12th April 1882, with accompaniments.
Commissioner's letter No. E, dated 2nd June 1882, to the Collector of Sholápur.
Sholápur Collector's letter, No. 2559, dated 10th June 1882, with accompanying statement in reply to the above.
Poona Collector's letter No. 3273, dated 27th May 1882, and accompaniments.
Nagar Collector's letter No. 3931, dated 19th May 1882.
Commissioner's letter No. F, dated 2nd June 1882, to the Collector of Nagar.
Nagar Collector's endorsement † No. 4551, dated 10th June 1882, in reply to the above.

(*a*) Statement showing the number of persons entitled to vote under different tests.
(*b*) Statement showing the number of Commissioners, ex-officio and non-official, and the date on which the term of the appointment of the non-official members expires.

I have, &c.
E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

RETURN showing the Number of Persons entitled to Votes in the Municipal Franchise in the City Municipalities of the Central Division, Pecuniarly, Educationally, and Professionally.

No.	Test.	Poona.	Ahmednagar.	Sholápur.
1	*Imperial License Tax*	1,157	291	562
	Total	1,157	291	562
2	*Imperial Land Assessment.*			
	Land Assessment. Persons paying one rupee and above	73	400	245
	Land Assessment. Persons paying less than one rupee	97	2	11
	Rent of Land (Ground-rent). Persons paying one rupee and above	43	—	59
	Rent of Land (Ground-rent). Persons paying less than one rupee	33	—	63
	Total	246	402	378
3	*Municipal House Tax.*			
	Persons paying Rs. 3 and above	2,213	506	—
	Persons paying Rs. 1 and up to Rs. 3	3,954	2,206	—
	Persons paying less than one rupee	1,327	2,254	—
	Total	7,494	4,966	—
4	*Municipal Halálkhor Cess.*			
	Persons paying Rs. 3 and above	5,595	817	4,221
	Persons paying annas 12 and up to Rs. 3	4,466	3,908	6,630
	Total	10,061	4,725	10,851
5	*Municipal Wheel Tax.*			
	Persons paying Rs. 12 per annum	167	—	—
	Persons paying Rs. 6 per annum	66	—	—
	Persons paying Rs. 4-8-0 per annum	85	—	—
	Persons paying over Rs. 3	—	—	69
	Persons paying Rs. 3 per annum	194	—	113
	Persons paying under Rs. 3	—	—	45
	Total	512	—	227

* See page 34 of Return.

† Not printed.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

Return showing the Persons entitled to Votes, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Test.	Poona.	Ahmednagar.	Sholápur.
6	*Municipal Water Tax.*			
	Persons paying Rs. 24 per annum	28	—	—
	Persons paying Rs. 18 per annum	21	—	—
	Persons paying Rs. 12 per anuum	942	—	—
	Persons paying Rs. 1 to 3 (3,705), Rs. 3 to 6 (2,008), Rs. 6 to 9 (240), and Rs. 9 and above (496)	—	—	6,449
	Total	991	—	6,449
7	*Educational and Professional.*			
	Graduates of Universities	30	10	1
	Under-graduates of Universities	120	25	15
	Pleaders, Engineers, Medical Men, and Professionals	150	30	90
	Others educated but not having University standing not being professionals	300	12	40
	Total	600	77	146

E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D

STATEMENT showing the number of Ex-officio and Non-official Commissioners of the City Municipalities of the Central Division and date of termination of their Appointments.

Names of Municipalities.	Number of Ex-officio Commissioners.	Number of Non-offiicial Commissioners.	Date of termination of appointments of Non-official Commissioners.
Poona	9	27	12th November 1883.
Ahmednagar	9	25	9th December 1883.
Sholagur	9	19	20th January 1884.
Total	27	71	

E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

No 1792 of 1882.

From C. WADDINGTON, Esquire, Collector, and President Municipalities, Sholápur, to THE COMMISSIONER, Central Division, Poona.

Sholápur, 22nd April 1882.

SIR,

I HAVE now the honour to reply to your letter No. $\frac{P}{733}$ of the $\frac{6}{10}$ April 1882, on the subject of the introduction of the principle of representative Municipal Government, so far as it would affect the City Municipality of Sholápur.

2. As to the qualification for a seat on the Municipal Board, it should, I consider, be pecuniary as well as professional, and I would adopt with modifications the standard laid down in Sections 5 and 8 of the Bombay Municipal Act III. of 1872. The scheme I would propose is somewhat as shown in appended memorandum.

3. If the franchise be made pecuniary only and the qualification set at a minimum of Rs. 10, as shown in my Rule '*a*,' the approximate number of persons entitled to a vote in the City Municipality of Sholápur would be seventy-nine. If professional as well as pecuniary, I estimate the probable number at one hundred and eight.

The number of the present Commissioners is :—

Ex-officio	9
Non-official	19
Total	28

4. I append a table showing the date upon which the period of appointment in the case of each non-official Commissioner will expire.

5. I have thus given the information asked for. I would, however, conclude my letter by placing on record my opinion that the time has not yet come for such an extension of local self-government as is

contemplated by the proposal now under consideration. I do not think that in Sholápur, or in any other large mofussil town, will there be found such an amount of intelligence and public spirit among the inhabitants as will tend to make the proposed change a successful one.

I have, &c.
G. WADDINGTON,
Collector, and President Municipality, Sholápur.

MEMORANDUM of proposed Scheme.

Subject to the specific qualifications noted below (*c*), the following persons shall, if they reside in the Municipal limits of the city of Sholápur, be qualified to be appointed members of the Municipal Body, viz. :—

(*a*) Ratepayers, who have attained the age of 25 years and who have been assessed to the water-tax or bhangi cess, or to both, for the half year commencing on 1st January and ending on 30th June last preceding the date of the election, at a rate of not less in the aggregate than Rs. 10 per annum.

(*b*) Sanadi Vakils and matriculated students of the University of Bombay.

(*c*) Notwithstanding above rule, no person shall be qualified to be elected or appointed or to be a member of the Municipal Body during such time as he—

(*a*) is an uncertified bankrupt or insolvent, or
(*b*) is a Municipal Executive Officer, or a clerk or servant of the Municipal body,
(*c*) has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any contract or employment with, by, or on behalf of, the Municipal body,

and any member of the Municipal body who during the term for which he has been elected or appointed—

(*d*) becomes disqualified for any of the aforesaid reasons, or
(*e*) is absent for not less than three consecutive months from Sholápur, or
(*f*) is sentenced to imprisonment,

shall cease to be a member of the said Municipality.

G. WADDINGTON,
Collector, and President Municipality.

No. 2559 of 1882.

From G. WADDINGTON, Esquire, Collector of Sholápur, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner Central Division.

SIR, Sholápur, 10th June 1882.

IN reply to your letter No. E, dated 2nd instant, I beg to submit a statement giving the information asked for, as far as possible, with regard to the water-rate ; this rate has not yet been sanctioned, my proposals being now under your consideration. The figures in the statement therefore show the estimated number of persons who will be liable to this tax.

Title to vote at Municipal elections.

2. I would however, remark that the statistics given in the return must practically be of little or no use, as a large number of the persons liable to halálkhor cess will pay water-rate also, and some of the same persons will probably be liable to wheel-tax also. The figures also include many females who, I imagine, will not be entitled to vote.

3. With regard to the persons paying Imperial land assessment, I have shown only persons residing in Sholápur, and the assessment payable by them on lands included in the Revenue Survey limits of "lands of Sholápur." Should you require information as to lands held in other villages in the district by residents of Sholápur I will submit it, but it will take some time to collect.

4. The information as regards Pandharpur, asked for in your telegram of the 7th instant, will follow.

I have, &c.
G. WADDINGTON,
Collector.

RETURN showing the Number of Persons entitled to Votes in the Municipal Franchise at Sholápur, Pecuniarily, Educationally, and Professionally.

Number.	Test.	—	—	—	Number of Payers.	—
1	Imperial license tax -	—	—	—	562	—

		Land Assessment.		Rent of Land.		Total.
		Persons paying less than one rupee.	Persons paying more than a rupee.	Persons paying less than a rupee.	Persons paying above one rupee.	
2	Imperial land assessment	11	245	63	59	378

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

Return showing the Persons entitled to Votes, &c.—*continued.*

Number.	Test.	—	—	—	Number of Payers.	—
3	Municipal house tax -	No such tax is in existence.				
		Number of persons paying under Rs. 3.	Number of persons paying Rs. 3.	Number of persons paying Rs. 6.	—	—
4	Municipal halálkhor cess	6,630	3,527	694	—	10,851
		Number of persons paying under Rs. 3.	Number of persons paying Rs. 3.	Number of persons paying over Rs. 3.	—	—
5	Municipal wheel cess -	45	113	69	—	227
		Number of persons paying Rs. 1 to 3.	Number of persons paying Rs. 3 to 6.	Number of persons paying Rs. 6 to 9.	Number of persons paying Rs. 9 and above.	—
6	Municipal water rate -	3,705	2,008	240	496	6,449
		Graduates of Universities.	Undergraduates of Universities.	Pleaders, Engineers, Medical men and Professionals.	Others educated but not having University standing nor being Professionals.	—
7	Educational and professional - -	1	15	90	40	146

G. WADDINGTON,
Collector.

No. 3273 of 1882.

From J. G. MOORE, Esquire, Collector, and President Municipalities, Poona, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Central Division.

SIR, Poona, 27th May 1882.

REFERRING to the correspondence on the scheme for the extension of local self-government in the Presidency of Bombay ending with your reminder No. I.—908, dated the 4th instant, I have the honour to forward a statement showing the approximate number of persons who (1) will derive their right to the franchise from each description of direct rate or tax, Government or Municipal, and of those who (2) derive their right from an educational or professional franchise.

2. It is impossible without a nominal roll to give the exact total of the persons in the city who would be entitled to the franchise, because some people are included under more than one head of taxation and others under all the heads, so that the totals of the six direct taxes included in the statement added together would give a very incorrect idea of the numbers. These totals amount to 20,461, but the persons who pay "house tax" all pay "water rate" and "wheel tax" and "halálkhor cess," so that 991 + 512 + 7,494 = 8,997 must be deducted from 20,461, leaving a balance of 11,464, and of these some probably pay "license tax" and "land assessment." I may, therefore, safely say that the number of persons who derive their right to the franchise by paying direct taxes will be found to be about 10,000, to which may be added about 400 from the purely educational and professional franchise.

3. But I consider it unadvisable to extend the elective franchise to all these persons first. It will be better to begin with a much smaller number, and gradually to lower and extend the franchise. From a return furnished to me by the Municipal Office, I find that the number of persons paying direct Municipal taxes amounting to Rs. 10 and more per annum is 1,620. This added to the 400 who come under the purely educational and professional franchise will give a total of about 2,000 voters, which will be found as a commencement sufficient.

4. Any person who pays *all* the direct Municipal taxes and who is entitled to vote from an educational or professional franchise, should be considered eligible for a seat on the Municipal Board, provided that he is not less than 40 years of age. It is but fair, I think, that those who pay *all* the Municipal direct taxes should have the preference over those who pay only one or two such taxes, and they are more likely as large tax-payers to look closely into the working of the Act. A Municipal Commissioner must be an educated man. It is preferable that he should understand English, but I would not insist on this, as we might not get a representative of some caste or sect who knows that language. A Municipal Commissioner should also be a man of mature years. We do not want boys on the Committee.

5. Any one who pays direct Municipal taxes amounting to Rs. 10 or more per annum, or who derives his right from an educational or professional franchise is, in my opinion, entitled to vote, provided that he is not less than 30 years of age.

6. I append a statement showing the Municipal Commissioners, ex-officio and non-official, and the period for which each of the latter has been appointed.

7. The total number of Municipal Commissioners is 36. Half of these are, under recent orders, to be elected by the people. There are 18 Peths or wards in the city, so that there will be a representative of each Peth, but care must be taken that the different castes are properly represented.

I have, &c.

J. G. MOORE,
Collector, and President Municipalities, Poona.

RETURN showing the Number of Persons entitled to Votes in the Municipal Franchise at Poona, Pecuniarily, Educationally, and Professionally.

Number.	Test.	—	—	—	Number of Payers.	—
1	Imperial license tax -	—	—	—	1,157	—
		LAND ASSESSMENT.		RENT OF LAND.*		
		Persons paying one Rupee and above.	Persons paying less than one Rupee.	Persons paying one Rupee and above.	Persons paying less than one Rupee.	Total.
2	Imperial land assessment	73	97	43	33	246
		Persons paying Rs. 3 and above.	Persons paying Rs. 1 and up to Rs. 3.	Persons paying less than one Rupee.	Total.	—
3	Municipal house tax -	2,213	3,954	1,327	7,494	—
		Persons paying Rs. 3 and above.	Persons paying annas 12 and up to Rs. 3.	Total.	—	—
4	Municipal halàlkhor cess	5,595	4,466	10,061	—	—
		Persons paying Rs. 12 per annum.	Persons paying Rs. 6 per annum.	Persons paying Rs. 4-8-0 per annum.	Persons paying Rs. 3 per annum.	Total.
5	Municipal wheel tax -	167	66	85	194	512
		Persons paying Rs. 24 per annum.	Persons paying Rs. 18 per annum.	Persons paying Rs. 12 per annum.	Total.	—
6	Municipal water rate -	28	21	942	991	—
		Graduates of Universities.	Undergraduates of Universities.	Pleaders, Engineers, Medical Men and Professionals.	Others educated but not having University standing nor being Professionals.	Total.
7	Educational and professional - -	30	120	150	300	600

* This means ground rent.

J. G. MOORE,
Collector of Poona.

No. 3931 of 1882.

From J. ELPHINSTON, Acting Collector, Ahmednagar, to E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Central Division.

SIR, Camp Sangamner, 19th May 1882.

Qualifications to hold a seat as Municipal Commissioners, &c. &c.

IN reply to your letter No. P-733, dated 6th-10th ultimo, I have the honour to state that in my opinion the persons possessing the undermentioned qualifications should be entitled to hold a seat as Municipal Commissioners :—

(1) Persons who pay a license-tax of Rs. 10 or more.
(2) Persons who pay a local fund cess of Rs. 4 a year or more.
(3) Persons who pay a house-tax of Rs. 4 or more.
(4) Persons who are Vakils or Graduates.
(5) Government servants on receipt of a monthly salary of Rs. 200 or more.
(6) Government pensioners in receipt of a monthly pension of Rs. 100.

2. The undermentioned persons should be entitled to vote :—

(1) Persons paying license-tax to Government.
(2) Persons paying local fund cess of Re. 1 or more a year.
(3) Persons paying a house tax of Re. 1 or more.
(4) Vakils or Graduates of a University.
(5) Government servants in receipt of a monthly salary of Rs. 20 or more.
(6) Government pensioners in receipt of a pension of Rs. 5 or more.
(7) All assessors.

3. The approximate number of persons who would be entitled to a vote in the City Municipality of Ahmednagar, if the franchise were made pecuniary only, would be 6,410 persons, and if educational and professional as well as pecuniary, 6,859.

4. The total number of the present Commissioners is 34, of whom 9 are ex-officio and 25 non-official. The period for which each of the non-official Commissioners was appointed will expire on the 10th December 1883.

5. The following persons should be disqualified from serving as Municipal Commissioners :—

(1) Persons who have suffered imprisonment for six months or more.
(2) Insolvents.

6. Women should be disqualified to vote.

7. The above views convey the opinion of the Managing Committee of the Ahmednagar Municipality, and I see no reason to differ from the conclusions which they have arrived at.

I have, &c.
J. ELPHINSTON,
Acting Collector.

No. F. of 1882.

To the COLLECTOR OF AHMEDNAGAR.

SIR, Poona, 2nd June 1882.

WITH reference to your letter No. 3931, dated 19th ultimo, I have the honour to request you will forward, as soon as possible, a statement showing the designations of the ex-officio and the names of the non-official Commissioners of the City Municipality of Ahmednagar, and as regards the latter, the period for which they have been appointed and the date on which their appointment as non-official Commissioners will expire in each case.

2. I append copy of a statement furnished by the Collector of Poona showing the number of persons who would be entitled to vote according to the various tests mentioned, and request that a statement in the same form for the Ahmednagar City may be forwarded as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

No. R.–941 of 1882.

From E. P. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Central Division, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Financial Department.

SIR, Poona, 3rd July 1882.

WITH reference to Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 17th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the report called for.

2. I presume that it is not allowed to officers to criticize the new departure about to be taken by the Government of India, and that all that is now required is an opinion as to how we can possibly make the new scheme work in a satisfactory manner.

3. The subject is at present divided into two main points :—

(*a*) The extension of the privilege of electing all or a portion of its Commissioners to the large Municipalities, and the granting them nearly full and unchecked control over their expenditure and proceedings.

(*b*) The proposition that there shall be both Taluka and District Committees which shall have certain funds at their almost uncontrolled disposal. That these Committees shall consist of a large proportion of elected members, the Collector of the District being a member without power and without vote.

4. The mass of the people have, I am convinced, no care or desire for local self-government. As a body they are totally unfitted for it either by education or previous training. They rightly feel that whatever is required will be better, more honestly and impartially done by Government servants who have their good at heart. In our large towns and cities the case is different. There we are training up a considerable number of persons who being educated and intelligent, and in many cases well-to-do, have natural ambitions and aspirations, and who desire to have some share in the government of their town and in the election of their Commissioners.

5. To these * chief Municipalities, now City Municipalities, the Government of India has now decided that the time has come when they may be granted the right to elect a certain number of their Municipal Commissioners. These I would term City Municipalities of the 1st class, and the number of elected Commissioners should I think be one-half, the Collector being President with a casting vote.

* Poona
Sholápur.
Ahmednagar.

6. There are also certain † Town Municipalities in which Municipal institutions have made satisfactory and intelligent progress. These should now be brought a step forward and created City Municipalities as provided for in the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI. of 1873), but I would add the privilege of electing one-fourth of the Commissioners. These I would term City Municipalities of the 2nd class. By degrees as these towns advance in importance, and on the Commissioners proving they have learnt to take an intelligent and honest interest in their duties, they in their turn might be advanced to the position of City Municipalities of the 1st class.

† Násik.
Pandaharpur.
Sátára.
Dhulia.

7. In the experiment which is now being made, by far the most important point is to see that we do not advance too quickly. Capacity for self-government must be learnt and acquired before it can be granted. The whole scheme will be a miserable failure unless the Collector is given the power and position to guide.

8. I have always held that a grave error in the Municipal Act was the provision that a Municipality should not be established unless the townspeople applied for it and the application was proved to be the general wish of the townspeople.

9. Sanitation and improvements of every kind are being pressed on on every side, but nothing can be done without funds. These cannot be secured without Municipal institutions.

10. I consider that Municipal institutions in some form or another are a necessity, and that every town or village should be compelled to have its Municipality in some form or other. In towns or villages of 2,000 inhabitants the Municipalities should be on the form of our present ordinary Municipalities in which Government officers exercise a good deal of check and control. But I would give the people the right of electing one-fourth of the members of the Municipal body.

11. If we are to do any really practical good we must go even further, and in every town or village of less than 2,000 inhabitants there should be some kind of Municipal body. In villages of less than 2,000 inhabitants it should consist of a Panch of three persons, two to be elected by the people and one nominated by the Mámlatdár.

12. The next point that arises is the question of funds.

13. The Municipalities now raise their own funds by different forms of taxation. In some the people have been sufficiently advanced to introduce a house-tax.

14. There is no doubt that a house-tax, being a direct tax, is unpopular. Still it is the fairest of all taxes. In some places by the imposition of a house-tax the Municipalities have been able either to abolish or greatly reduce the octroi.

15. When the Bombay Municipal Act was passed the levy of a house-tax should have been compulsory. An enactment should now be passed making a house-tax a general tax.

16. In all Municipalities the house-tax should be a part and portion of the town revenue. The town or village pound-fees should go to Municipal funds. All ground-rent now credited to Government, the sale proceeds of land sold for non-agricultural purposes, and all fines and penalties for converting land to non-agricultural purposes and for breach of Municipal rules, should be credited to Municipal Funds.

17. By this means we should have in every village funds for sanitation, and for small local necessary improvements, the people are being gradually taught to take an interest in local self-government.

18. *Next* as regards the constitution of the different class of Municipal bodies and the powers and control of local officers of Government.

19. I am very strongly of opinion that a very grave mistake will be committed if even in the City Municipalities of the 1st class the power and control of the Collector is withdrawn. It is that power alone which will prevent gross misappropriation and waste of public funds.

20. In City Municipalities of the 2nd class and in ordinary Municipalities those powers should be maintained as now provided for in the District Municipal Act. In the village Municipality should the one member appointed by Government be outvoted and he consider the point of importance he should be allowed an appeal to the Mámlatdár of the táluka, whose decision, after personally visiting the village and making full enquiry, should be final.

21. The next point for consideration—

"The proposition that there should be both Táluka and District Local Fund Committees which shall have certain funds at their almost uncontrolled disposal. That these Committees shall consist of a large proportion of elected members, the Collector of the District being a member without power and without vote."

22. Up to the date of the introduction of the one-anna cess nothing or next to nothing had been done to improve the condition of the country. Excepting one or two great trunk lines of road there was not

a road to be seen. Each Collectorate is now covered with a well-considered network of roads. Produce which was comparatively valueless, as no better purchaser than the village Sowkár could be found, is now, owing to the roads constructed from Local Funds, enabled to be carried by the cultivator to better and larger markets. Only those who have had experience of the miserably neglected state of the country before the Local Fund system was introduced can fully appreciate the great change and advance made. It is a fact that purely local village and táluka wants have not been met to the extent which could be wished. But the general good of the whole district has had to be considered ; the funds available have not been large, and there have been no balances available for purely local wants. Looking at the fund itself, the small total yearly amount available for new works, the pressing wants of a country newly opened, and the small amount collected from each village, it must be acknowledged that it would have been a most gross misappropriation had those entrusted with the supervision of Local Funds frittered away the money in small works only useful to the villages themselves.

23. I contend that, reviewed as a whole, the manner in which the Local Funds have been expended, and the vast amount of solid and lasting improvement made, is a credit to our local officers, who may well be proud of what has been accomplished.

24. The present Local Funds, which are not sufficient for the present pressing wants of the district generally, must in some way be supplemented. They cannot be devoted to purely village and táluka purposes, and therefore I hold that the present Táluka Committees *in connection with this Fund* should be abolished. That the Fund must be looked upon as for the general improvement of the District. That therefore the Committee managing this Fund should be a District Committee and the Collector should, as now, be President, having the casting vote and power of control. It is not the interference of the Collector but the interference of Government which has weakened the District Local Fund Committees and which has weakened the powers of the Collector. As a natural consequence the members finding that the power of their President has gone have themselves collapsed.

25. When I speak of the interference of Government I refer to the system of 5 and 7 years' Budgets, which has taken all life and independence out of the Local Fund Committees. The Committees naturally look to their President, the Collector, for guidance and support, but when they find the Collector with his hands tied firmly by a 5 or 7 years' Budget, they feel he has nothing to say in the matter and cannot help them.

26. There had in or two Districts of the Presidency been some waste by the manner in which Local Funds were expended in the neighbourhood of the Huzur Station, and on ill considered roads designed on no general plan or scheme. It was no doubt to check this that the 5 and 7 years' Budgets were introduced. The aim was good, but the method adopted was faulty. The necessary check might have been imposed in a more suitable way, leaving at the same time independence to the Collector and the District Local Fund Committee. The Committees might have been called upon to take into their careful consideration the wants of their District as regards local and inter-cellectorate communication and submit a well-considered scheme of communications to be worked out as funds, after giving due weight to other pressing requirements, were available. This would have preserved the independence of the District Committees ; they would have felt that they had some say in the scheme which was being worked out. Neither the Collectors nor the District Committees have had very much to say to the present 5 and 7 years' Budgets, which are the Local Budgets either altered and manipulated in the Secretariat or the Budgets authoritatively returned to be re-cast on some decided principle.

27. I am of opinion that it is not now too late to remedy this evil. The Committees should be called upon to suggest a moderate scheme of communications which should be reviewed and approved by Government, the views of the local body being given full weight. The Committees then in preparing their yearly Budgets would bear this scheme in view and set apart such funds as could be made available.

28. I now come to the question of what funds should be at the disposal of the District Local Fund Committee.

29. I have already pointed out that the present Local Funds are barely sufficient for the maintenance of present works. Such being the case we must look for some fair and reasonable means of increase.

30. Not a single revision settlement report goes before Government without producing strong evidence of the good done by Local Funds. In most cases the right to increase is partly justified by the improved means of communication. It is true that the Local Fund gets its one anna extra on all extra revenue, but I contend this is, in fairness, insufficient, and that Local Funds which have to maintain the communications already constructed, and to which much of the increased revenue is due, should receive at least 2 annas or one-eighth of the increased revenue.

31. In the same way as the one anna extra or Local Fund cess has been imposed on land revenue, so should one anna be imposed over and above on all Abkári contracts, and be made over as an item of revenue to Local Funds. I am convinced that the Abkári revenue would not suffer by such an arrangement. Even if it did, I consider the grant would be a fair and proper one to make.

32. Having proposed that the Local Fund Committees should be for the District alone and that the present Táluka Committees should be abolished, *in connection with Local Funds proper,* I now propose that there should be a separate Táluka Committee to attend to purely táluka wants and having funds of its own for its disposal. To this Committee, which should be one-half elected and one-half nominated, I would assign the assessed taxes, such as the present License Tax, also sand and quarry fees, and such further taxes as in virtue of its first privileges of local self-government it might see fit to recommend for the approval of Government.

35. Under the system I propose we should then have :—

Municipal—

1st.—Village Panchâits for municipal purposes.

2nd.—Ordinary Town Municipalities under the District Municipal Act.

3rd.—Second Class City Municipalities under the District Municipal Act with the privilege of electing one-fourth of its members.

4th.—First Class City Municipality with the privilege of electing half of its Commissioners.

General Local Bodies—

1st.—A táluka local body having nothing to do with the work of the General District Local Fund Committee and having small funds at its disposal for purely táluka local works. This Committee to consist of 6 members, half elected and half nominated, the Mámlatdár of the táluka being the Chairman.

2nd.—The General District Local Fund Committee for general District duty with our present Local Fund, and such additional funds as Government may be pleased to grant or the body may propose to levy.

34. As regards the proposition in para. 22 of the letter of the Government of India that the Engineer shall be the servant of the Committee, I entirely and absolutely disagree with this. The Executive Engineer should be an ex-officio member of the District Committee with equal power with other members.

35. It would be no saving to put him under the Committee. The Government must have its District Engineer. The true saving to Local Funds will be not to charge the present 15 per cent., which is, I believe, over and above real cost, but to charge the cost of extra establishment, Local Funds of course paying for its own tools and plant.

36. *Finally as regards Education.*—I consider that subject to Departmental Rules, all primary education should be placed under the control of a school board elected from amongst themselves by the members of the General District Board. That the Educational Inspector and his Deputy and Assistant or Deputy Collectors should be ex-officio members of this board, the Collector being President and having a casting vote.

37. *Finally, as regards the system of Election.*—I consider that in Municipalities it should be—

1st.—That to be qualified as a Commissioner a person shall be a resident and shall pay all direct municipal taxes up to a certain amount. That no man under the age of 25 can be a Commissioner.

2nd.—That no man can have a vote unless he is 21 years of age and pays direct taxes in the 1st class cities up to Rupees 10, in 2nd class cities up to Rupees 5.

3rd.—That all Graduates, Vakils, and those generally who are admitted under an educational franchise, as also all Jurors and Assessors of 25 years of age, being residents, shall have a vote.

That half the Commissioners in 1st class cities be elected and half nominated. That in 2nd class cities one-fourth the Commissioners should be elected and the rest nominated.

That in ordinary Municipalities one-fourth the Commissioners should be elected and the rest nominated.

That the District Committee be composed of a President and exactly double the number of Members that there are tálukás in the District.

That the Collector be President with a casting vote and the same powers as now. That one-half the members be nominated and half elected.

The qualification for a vote being the payment of 10 Rupees, Local Funds.

The qualification for a seat being payment of 20 Rupees, Local Funds.

Each táluka to send a representative.

The Collector to be President, and to have the casting vote.

I have, &c.
E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

No. 3221 of 1882.

From W. RAMSEY, Esquire, Collector of Násik, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Násik Collector's Office, 22nd June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to reply to Government Resolution, General Department, No. 2100, dated 7th June 1882, on the new proposals for local self-government.

2. I may state at the outset that I have myself long been an advocate for allowing greater powers in matters affecting local wants and requirements to District Local Fund Committees and also to Municipalities, and so far as the general principle goes it has my most hearty concurrence; at the same time I am bound to express the opinion that the wishes of the Government of India can hardly be carried out in their entirety or all at once: the leap would be too sudden and the people themselves are hardly prepared for it. The change must be gradual, and I feel no difficulty in expressing my humble opinion as to the manner in which that change had best be carried out.

3. In this Presidency we have already a very highly organised system of local government in the shape of District and Táluka Local Fund Committees and Municipalities in the large towns. I presume there is no wish to supersede these organizations, and that what we have to consider is the best means of strengthening these bodies, giving them more power and responsibility, and getting out of them a larger amount of real State work, beneficial alike to the Government and the community. And in so doing I do not lose sight of the fact that our object must be the education of the people rather than merely better administration; we must face the fact then that at the outset at least the new system will not be productive of economy or better administration but rather of the contrary.

4. As regards Municipalities separate orders have been issued by the Government of Bombay, and returns are being submitted bearing on the question of election. The general question also of the transfer of funds to local management has been reported on and commented on by Government in their Financial Department No. 1093, dated 25th March last; it seems therefore needless to enter into those points now, but taking the orders of the Government of India seriatim, I will proceed to note how far, in my humble opinion, the proposed changes are feasible.

5. I have already reported on the points mooted in para. 2, and without going into needless details, I may say the only items of Provincial revenue which I think could be handed over to local control are educational grants and grants for road repairs. But this question has already been considered by the Government of Bombay.

6. As regards para. 3 I would only observe that we already possess the required local bodies, and all that is wanted is to enlarge their sphere of usefulness. Very little change in the law seems necessary; as it is, in the cases of both Municipalities and Local Fund Committees one-half of the members should be other than Government officials, and I know of no objection to the elective system being introduced as regards these non-official members. At the same time I do not think this will produce better or more efficient members, as the present system of nomination secures the presence of the most intelligent and best educated among the people themselves. As it is also an Inámdár is now elected to sit by his fellow-Inámdárs, and the same principle might be extended to other classes.

7. The most difficult question is how far the Táluka Committees can be entrusted with the entire disposal of the Táluka Funds. As matters now stand the tálukawar system has been abandoned, and local funds are expended on a consideration of the wants of the entire district. As regards long lines of road this could not be otherwise; a line runs through several tálukas, and it would be a bad system to have a different controlling authority in each táluka. The present system is as follows. All necessary expenditure of a general character is provided for by the District Local Fund Committee. This comprises establishments, repairs of lines of roads and to some buildings and new works of a large character. The remainder is placed rateably, at the entire disposal of the Táluka Committees, and their decisions are almost always attended to. A similar regard might I think be paid by Government to the wishes of the District Committee, and if one-half of the members of the latter were elected, local representation and management ought to be secured. I do not see how the local Committees can be entrusted with larger funds than they now possess without endangering the interests of the District as a whole, as there would be every risk of funds required for general purposes useful to the whole community being diverted to small local wants and frittered away in petty expenditure, each village perhaps claiming its own share of the general revenues. Such a system would I think be fatal to economical administration, and we have no money we can afford to throw away.

8. As regards para. 10, then it may be observed that the net-work of Boards therein referred to does already exist in this Presidency, and the only question is as to how far they need remodelling or having their hands strengthened, and some rough suggestions in this respect have been made above.

9. It is for Government to consider whether more Municipalities might be started with advantage. Previous experience has not been encouraging, and one by one the smaller Municipalities have been abolished as being worse than useless: Manmád, Chandor and Dindori are instances in this district, and I could not honestly recommend the experiment being tried over again.

10. I fear that the suggestion that local boards might be allowed to settle the rates of land cesses to be levied during the year would not be workable and clearly could not apply to this Presidency.

11. (As to para. 11, I do not see my way to recommending any fusion between Municipalities and District Boards, save in so far that grants of Local Fund money might in some cases be made to Municipalities for road repairs or other public works as is now provided for by the law, but the grant once made, there should be no further control on part of the District Board or friction would be certain to occur. The functions of these separate bodies should be kept quite apart.)

12. The proportion of non-official members on the Boards, adverted to in para. 12, already exists in this Presidency, and no change in the law seems necessary. At the same time I think the number of the members of the Táluka Committees might well be enlarged so as to ensure better discussion and wider views.

I can see no objection to say one-half of all Boards being elective. As regards the methods of recording votes, I presume no expression of opinion is here called for, as it is a question calling for much consideration and reference to local opinion, for which time is necessary. If only the principle be affirmed the details can easily be settled hereafter.

13. The question of control as raised in the 17th and following paras. is an important one. At present Government possess large powers under both the Municipal and Local Funds Acts, and those would probably suffice: having this power Government might well learn the disposition of all existing revenues to the discretion of the local bodies, power being in all cases reserved to the Collector either *proprio motu* or on a representation duly made to him to refer any matter in dispute for the orders of Government or any proceedings which might appear to be objectionable. Again, sanction of Government would have to be obtained before imposing new taxation, or increasing old, or for raising loans. An appeal ought also to lie to Government in the event of the dismissal of any higher paid officials. With these exceptions, and with the general powers vested in Government, it ought to be feasible to leave Municipalities quite unfettered; but I still think the Collector should be President of all Boards as now, but with no special power of veto save only by way of a reference to Government as above provided for.

14. However desirable it may be that the Boards should not be fettered by official cantrol, still I do not think the time has yet arrived in which the official elements could be dispensed with, as otherwise I fear in the case of the Táluka Boards at least and the smaller Municipalities nothing would be originated and every one go to sleep.

15. As regards the appointment of chairmen to Local Boards I see no reason at all why the selection should necessarily be from the official class, although in many cases it will be highly necessary that this place at least at first be filled by an official: but the chief local executive officer ought most certainly always to have a seat on the Board, and I cannot concur in the propriety of depriving him by a vote in the event of his filling the office of chairman. The appointment should be subject to the sanction of the Collector.

I do not see how the executive officers could well exercise any useful control if not themselves members of the Boards, and the unseemly collusion anticipated by the Government of India need not in my opinion be a subject of anxiety.

At present there is great difficulty in getting non-official persons able or willing to serve as Chairman or Executive Commissioner in the smaller Municipalities, and this difficulty will not be removed in a day.

16. The question raised in para. 21 is a most important one. I do not myself see how the wishes of the Government of India can be carried out without upsetting our whole fiscal system and seriously endangering the steady progress which is undoubtedly being made towards local improvement of every sort. In the first place the local funds of any one táluka cannot be spent with advantage all within that táluka or be administered by the local board. This principle has long ago been settled by Government and found to be necessary. Again the license tax assessments are not intended for local wants, and to hand them over to the discretion of the Táluka Committees would lead to a great waste of public money. If the license tax proceeds are to be made a local item, then I presume the up-keep of all Government buildings or works will be imposed as a burden to be defrayed from it, but unless very strict rules be enforced as to the mode of expenditure we shall find dharámsháls and chavdies springing up in every village, while useful Government buildings are falling into utter disrepair for want of allotments.

17. The more I consider the contents of para. 22 the more impracticable do its suggestions appear to me. For each Táluka Local Fund Committee to have independent establishments of its own would mean only so much money thrown away. No establishments are wanted for small local works, and schemes of general utility can only as now be directed from the central board of the district. We have now no Local Fund establishments; petty works are carried out by day labourers or small contractors under the orders of the Mámlatdárs, large works being carried out by the Public Works Department; of course if all expenditure within the district is to be made local, then the Public Works staff would remain as it is, its designation only and direction being changed, but it must remain a District organisation and cannot be broken into petty Táluka establishments all independent and with no mutual co-operation or collective actions. However much we may wish to foster local independence, such a scheme would sacrifice everything to an idea, and the result would be a sort of chaos.

I am assuming of course that at first no Imperial or Provincial buildings or roads are to be made over to Táluka Committees.

18. I have endeavoured to be as brief as possible in all I have written, as with the mass of reports that will be submitted to Government on this subject, I feel that nothing ought to be put down that is not to the point. It may be objected that I have criticised freely but suggested little, but I cannot make suggestions which I do not approve of or think feasible. I cannot see my way to carrying out all the wishes of the Government of India, and all I can advise is that in maintaining our existing organization we should enlarge their sphere of action to some extent, improve their constitution by enlarging their numbers and introducing an elective system and leave them rather more to themselves than we now do; but further than that I cannot conscientiously go nor can I recommend the handing over to petty local bodies of large sums of public money with little or no control over the manner of its expenditure.

I have, &c.
W. Ramsay,
Collector of Násik.

No. 4061 of 1882.

From J. G. Moore, Esquire, Collector of Poona, to The Secretary to Government, General Department, Bombay.

Sir, Poona, 26th June 1882.

In compliance with Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th instant, I have the honour to submit direct, as desired, my remarks and proposals on the subject of elective system in Municipalities and administration of Local Funds, &c.

I have, &c.
J. G. Moore,
Collector.

Remarks on the Resolution of the Government of India, No. $\frac{17}{747-59}$, dated the 18th May 1882, circulated under Bombay Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th June 1882.

Para. 6.—I am one of those who hold that the mass of the people of India are indifferent to local self-government and that they take no interest in public matter so long as their pockets are not touched. At our large cities and towns, however, there is (compared with the masses) a small number of men who have been educated at our Schools, Colleges and University, who wish to take a part in the administration of the country. These, as a rule, are not land-owners or possessors of other immoveable property, and they have no stake in the welfare of the country, some are pleaders, and others have no employment beyond writing to the papers. Many of these will, I think, be found to be too young to be entrusted with local administration, and when we come to the older men, we shall find that most of these are neither graduates nor under-graduates, but pensioned Government officers, generally tired of work, who prefer to enjoy their pensions in peace. These remarks particularly relate to Poona; in the districts, there are hardly any educated men except Government servants.

Para. 7.—Some of the Municipal Commissioners in Poona render assistance, but, elsewhere, they are mere dummies, and have, as far as I can see, no desire to change the role: as for Honorary Magistrates, my experience tells me that they are not zealous.

Paras. 10, 11, 12.—If the scheme is to be carried out, it must be done cautiously and gradually, or we shall find ourselves in a state of inextricable confusion.

If there are to be Local Boards, we must commence with one Central Board only at the Head Quarter station of the district.

Paras. 13, 14.—In Poona City, the elective system might be tried to a comparatively large extent, and in each táluka on a very small scale. In the interior, very few people qualified to exercise the franchise will be found, and we shall meet with few persons duly qualified to represent the people on Municipal or Local Boards.

Para. 15.—"The best men in many cases do not at present present themselves as candidates for Municipal office," nor will they under the elective system. They are quiet, gentlemenly men, too proud to beg for votes, and unless they do so, they will not be returned; so we shall find that those pushing men who go about begging for votes will be returned, and these will certainly not "in many cases" be the best men.

Para. 17.—I decidedly hold that if the views of the Government of India are to be carried out in their entirety, the two checks mentioned in this para. should be stringently exercised.

Paras. 18, 19.—If according to the wishes of the Government of India we are to have a large preponderance of members elected by the people on the Boards, I subscribe to the opinion that the chief executive officer will be in a more dignified position if he merely supervises the proceedings and does not vote. He should, however, have the power of representing to Government any ill-advised action on the part of the Boards. But it is my opinion that it will be preferable at the outset to leave the chief executive officer in his present position and to have a smaller number of members elected by the people on the Boards.

Para. 21.—Local Boards should not have anything to do with License Tax assessments and collections. They might, as a commencement, be allowed to administer primary education and pounds and ferries, and subject to the remarks on paras. 18 and 19, they may also administer Local Funds, but if there is to be a preponderance of self-elected members on the Local Boards and if the collector is debarred from a vote in the administration of Local Funds, he will be reduced to a mere cypher in his charge and he will be unable to inaugurate or carry out any improvements; his position will be most unenviable and undignified.

Para. 22.—The proposal that the Executive Engineer shall be the servant of the Local Boards will place that officer too in a very undignified position. The people of India should have some experience in self-government before they are invested with authority over European officers. I foresee much friction in this arrangement which will not be conducive to the public welfare.

J. G. Moore,
Collector of Poona.

Proposals.

1. That in the city of Poona, the system advocated by the Government of India be carried out to a modified extent as regards the Municipal Board.

That any one who is not less than 30 years of age and who pays not less than Rupees 10 per annum in the shape of direct Municipal taxes, or any one who is entitled to vote from an educational or professional franchise subject to the above limit of age, shall have the power to vote.

That any one who is not less than 35 years of age and who pays *all* the direct Municipal taxes, or who is entitled to vote from an educational or professional franchise subject to the above limit of age, shall be eligible for a seat on the Municipal Board.

That 18, or half of the whole number of Commissioners, shall be elected by the people and the remaining non-offical members, (9 at present) by Government.

That the Collector of the District shall be President and shall have the casting vote.

2. That as regards Local Boards, the present District Local Fund Committee be called the "Central Local Board," with the same administrative powers as at present.

There are now 6 official members and 7 non-official members nominated by Government. That in future 2 non-official members shall be nominated as at present and 8 members or half of the whole number shall be elected by the people.

The qualification for a vote shall be the same as that for the City Municipalty of Poona, the payment of Rs. 10 to the Local Funds being substituted for "Rs. 10 direct Municipal Taxes."

The qualification for a seat on the Board being the same as that for the City Municipality of Poona. The payment of Rs. 20 to Local Funds being substituted for "all the direct Municipal Taxes."

That each táluka shall send a representative of the people to the Central Board.

That the Mámlatdár of each táluka shall make out lists of persons entitled to vote and entitled to sit on the Board and send them to the President, who will send a list of the latter to each person entitled to vote and request him to send his vote to the President.

That the Collector shall be President and shall have the casting vote.

That Táluka Local Fund Committees shall be abolished, and that in lieu thereof the Assistant Collectors shall, after giving a full month's notice, assemble any persons belonging to the táluka who may wish to be present at the Head Quarter station of the táluka, and after hearing all their wants, shall reduce them to writing and shall forward the proceedings to the Central Board.

These proposals embrace, in my opinion, all that is necessary as an inauguration of the system of self-government. We must not introduce any sweeping measures at first. The elective system has to be tried, and the above suggestions will give it a trial, on a small scale, and will gradually educate the people to take a more important part in self-government, after time and experience shall have shown them to be fit for it.

J. G. Moore,
Collector of Poona.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

No. 2838 of 1882.

From G. WADDINGTON, Esquire, Collector, and President Municipalities, Sholápur, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Sholápur, 27th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to report, as requested by your endorsement below Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th instant. I understand that my opinion is called for on the scheme as a whole and not on minute details for carrying out the scheme.

Extension of local self-government.

2. With all deference to the views of the Supreme Government I make bold to state that after some 25 years' experience of the Natives of this country I am strongly of opinion that as a body the people are most indifferent to self-government and take but the very smallest interest in public matters. I am therefore far from sanguine as to the results of any experiment in the direction of the extension of the sphere and powers of Local Bodies.

3. Assuming however that the extension of local self-government will be for the interest of the people, and that it is therefore imperative upon Government to further such extensions by the appointment of Local Boards, both Municipal and District, the subject has been divided by the Government of India (see para. 6 of the proceedings) into two heads.

4. With regard to the first head, the constitution of Local Board, the details as to the proportion of official and non-official members, period of service and so forth, may I think be well left to the Local Government as proposed in para. 12 of the proceedings. With regard to electoral franchise Sholápur is one of the towns lately selected by Government for experiment in this direction, and I have submitted my views on this question separately.

5. The second head, *viz.*, "the degree of control which Government should retain over such bodies and the manner in which such control should be exercised," seems to me to constitute the real difficulty. I am unable to see how the executive officers of Government are, without being even members of the Local Boards, to "watch the proceedings of local boards * * and * check by official remonstrance any attempt to exceed their proper functions or to act illegally or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner," such interference on the part of the executive officers having no status on the boards themselves would apparently be not only unwarrantable but illegal.

6. The above is the expression of my own personal opinion; I need hardly add that should the experiment of carrying out the present views of the Government of India be initiated I shall, as a servant of Government, loyally do my utmost to carry them out.

I have, &c.
G. WADDINGTON,
Collector, and President Municipalities.

No. 3673 of 1882.

From W. H. PROPERT, Esquire, Collector of Khándesh, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Dhulia, 7th July 1882.

WITH reference to Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to submit herewith a memorandum drawn up by me on the subject of local self-government.

Local self-government.

I have, &c.
W. H. PROPERT,
Collector of Khándesh.

MEMORANDUM upon the Proposal contained in the Preamble to Government Resolution No. 2100 of 7th June 1882.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The task devolving upon District Officers under the above Government Resolution is indeed a difficult one, and it can scarcely be expected that a period of about 15 or 20 days will suffice for the elaboration of a scheme the nature of which is utterly opposed in all its bearings to every previous order and regulation, under which, up to the present time, the administration of the country has been carried on.

2. Were we called upon to record arguments *against* local self-government, instead of having to submit proposals in favour of its adoption, our course would be simple and the labour light. As the case stands, however, many experienced and conscientious officers will have to sacrifice their own convictions and feelings while endeavouring to give loyal support to the sweeping changes proposed by the Supreme Government.

3. In the Government Resolution now under consideration, our *views* and *opinions* are asked for. It does not therefore seem to be the intention of Government that officers filling responsible positions should blindly and passively express concurrence with the views recorded in the various letters from the Government of India on the subject of local self-government, but that they should fairly discuss and, if necessary, record objections to, any points which may appear to them, as regards their own districts, unworkable in themselves and likely to prove unsatisfactory to the masses of the people, whom it has ever been the aim of the British Government to foster and protect.

4. In the Resolution forming the preamble of Bombay Government Resolution No. 2100, the Government of India has, it appears to me, considerably extended the proposals made by them in their despatches of last year, *i.e.*, they now intend, wherever possible, to forbid Executive Officers interfering

actively with the proceedings of Local Boards, thus making the non-official members solely responsible for many of the chief items connected with the administration of a district.

5. One of the agreements adduced in favour of the scheme is that we already have the nucleus of local self-government in the form of Municipal and Local Fund Committees. These we certainly have, and as regards the former, I see no reason to doubt that in large cities and towns where something like public opinion exists, and where there is a large non-official section of the community, both European and Native, ready and willing to consider and carry out municipal improvements in an enlightened manner, the result of quasi self-government has been and will be satisfactory.

6. Between, however, the Municipal Committee administering its own funds and a Local Committee disposing of the funds of a district containing perhaps 10,000 square miles (as in the case of Khándesh) the difference is very great. A Municipal Committee works as it were in a ring fence, all its receipts are raised and expended in the town to which it belongs. It has only the interests of that town to consider, and there are only a few points to which its attention can be directed, *viz.*, roads, markets, drainage, lighting, conservancy, water supply, &c. These are well defined objects, and whether Government officers interfere or remain aloof *if only a good Chairman be forthcoming*, the Committee in most cases may be safely trusted to administer its own funds.

7. I have said "*if only a good Chairman be forthcoming*," and on this point must in a great measure depend the working of the whole Committee. As regards my own experience, I can safely say that I have never yet met a really efficient *non-official* Chairman, while as regards *Native officials* filling that post I have known many men who possessed energy, firmness, independenee, and in fact every quality enabling them to lead and influence their fellow Commissioners.

8. I of course refer to Municipalities in the Mofussil. I have had no experience of such institutions in the Presidency towns.

9. The Government of India in paragraph 6 of the Resolution lays great stress upon the fact that as education advances there is rapidly growing up *all over the country* an intelligent class of public-spirited men, whom it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power, to fail to utilize. Such men, however, I confidently assert, have as yet not shed the light over our purely agricultural districts. The last thing an educated Native thinks of, or takes to, is farming or agriculture. He first tries for employment under Government, and if he fails in obtaining a place he becomes a Vakíl, Mukhtyár or clerk, and seeks employment in our large cities ; he does not cultivate nor does he settle down in rural districts, and for this reason I say that it will be very difficult to secure the services of educated and public-spirited men on the proposed sub-local boards ; in fact, the class of men particularly referred to by the Government of India is just the very one we shall fail to find.

10. Our non-official Local Fund Committees, both District and Táluka, have not, I readily confess, proved as useful as might have been expected ; but I certainly do not think that the fault lies with the executive officers who have been associated with them. My own experience convinces me that at any rate up to the present time committees, consisting of unpaid members, are in most cases apathetic, and that they feel little or no interest in matters which do not concern them personally.

11. It is just possible that increased responsibility may give rise to increased energy, but I have no reason for thinking that this will be the case. It must be remembered that the duties which the Supreme Government proposes transferring to local Boards will in many cases be very onerous. To arrange for and properly supervise the expenditure of 3 or 4 lakhs of rupees is no light matter. Subordinates, as we all know, are not immaculate, and money is eaten in all departments in spite of close official supervision. What will be the result when supervision is entrusted to unpaid Local Boards whose various members are engaged in their avocations elsewhere.

12. Mofussil Municipalities are as a rule unpopular institutions, and I feel quite sure that in numberless cases, were it not for the exertions and persuations of the local officials, such a thing as a Municipality would never be heard of. The ordinary non-official members of small Municipalities object to taxing themselves or their fellows, care nothing about sanitation, ventilation or conservancy, and in their hearts vote the Municipal Act a bore and an innovation. There may be *exceptions*, but the rule is as I have stated above. Now the question is, how will these men succeed when made responsible for a large expenditure of public money over a considerable extent of country without (be it remembered) receiving any remuneration for their services, except the trifling title of Ráoor Khán Bahádur.

13. My fear is that at any rate for a long time we shall not obtain the services of the best men *even amongst such as I have noticed above.* On the Bombay side, we have but few Native gentlemen of independent means, and we cannot expect our vakils, merchants and agriculturalists to give up gratuitously a great portion of their time to self-government. Moreover, as regards the greater portion of a district such as Khándesh, I do not believe that we shall be able to find non-official men *competent* to render efficient service as members of Local Boards.

14. Again, I doubt the popularity of the scheme amongst the masses of the people. Self-government will of course commend itself to the highly educated Native youth of the present day, and I have but little doubt that a great many of the members of a certain institution or society whose head-quarters are located at Poona, consider themselves competent (as was said of a statesman now deceased) to perform the functions of Archbishop of Canterbury or assume command of the Channel Fleet at a moment's notice ; but such men are not to be found everywhere, and in my opinion the inhabitants of our agricultural districts would much prefer being governed as at present by officials entertained and paid to look after their interests. The feeling of mutual distrust so deeply engrafted upon all eastern people is likely to prove a bar to anything like self-government on a large scale.

15. In the above remarks I have faithfully and conscientiously described the class of people whom we shall have to employ under the new scheme. It is just possible that in some points I have under-estimated the administrative qualities of the non-official community amongst whom I serve ; this time alone will show. I am certain, however, of one thing, *viz.*, that every effort will be made by local officers to give the scheme a fair start.

16. Having concluded my general remarks, which I fear contain many objections to the proposed scheme, I now proceed to consider the subject of Committees, their constitution, appointment or election, and functions.

17. Upon these points, as also the question of funds, method of expenditure, &c., it is difficult to submit practical recommendations in the form of a report, especially with such a short period of time at one's disposal. The changes proposed by the Supreme Government are so tremendous, and the idea of local self-government (to be applied throughout British India) so utterly novel, that at present the minds of even the most experienced executive officers must be in a state of doubt and perplexity. I cannot therefore think that our reports will be of much value. Whatever is decided must be decided after mature deliberation and interchange of views between those who, *although* filling official positions, know more about the people of India than any other class.

18. At present we have four kinds of Committees in a Collectorate :—

(1.) School Committees in villages or towns where schools exist.
(2.) Municipal Committees in towns brought under Act VI. of 1873.
(3.) Táluka Local Fund Committees.
(4.) A District Local Fund Committee.

19. To all of these except the village school committees the officials of the district belong, and in all they play a very prominent part, inasmuch as they alone almost invariably supply the energy and very frequently the intelligence, required for the performance of the Committee's duties.

20. For the future the village school committees should I think remain in their present form. The members will of course represent from time to time any improvements required in their villages beyond the requirements of the school itself.

21. Next we come to what will be really the most important committee of all, *viz.*, the Táluka Board. This should be supplied from the representatives of groups of villages, *e. g.*, if a táluka contain 100 villages there might be 10 members each representing 10 villages ; to these might be added four of the chief inhabitants of the táluka town, thus forming a board of 14 non-official members.

22. The District Board should consist of 1 or 2 representatives from each Táluka Board. This arrangement in the case of Khándesh would give a total of 16 or 32 members. To these should be added 6 or 8 members chosen from the head-quarters of the Collectorate, or partly from the head-quarters and partly from other towns, supposing an inhabitant of the latter to be a specially qualified person.

23. Now there arise two questions which must be settled after careful enquiry and discussion,—Shall the members of the Táluka and District Boards be elected or appointed by Government, and shall they contain a proportion of official members ?

24. As regards the first of these points, I think that except in very few special cases the Táluka and District Committees should for a time, at any rate, be appointed by Government. The fact of their being appointed will in no way affect their power, standing or authority. The system of election will not be understood at a moment's notice by the inhabitants of rural districts. If therefore it be the wish of the Supreme Government to introduce the system of Local Boards at once, it will be necessary to *appoint* members, and the preparation of lists of voters can be proceeded with gradually while the Boards chosen by appointment are engaged in inaugurating the new system.

25. The Native gentlemen with whom I have spoken are in favour of official members at any rate at first, and regarding this point I put forward the following question :—

Will it be possible at once to secure sufficient intelligence and knowledge of practical routine among the non-official representatives, chosen as they must be, in many cases from the agricultural population, enabling them to deal with questions involving the economical and satisfactory expenditure of many lakhs of rupees annually, unless for a time at least executive officers are employed, not only to watch as suggested by the Government of India, but to supervise and direct the proceedings of the Local Boards ?

26. I myself think that it will *not* be possible, and I consider that we should begin by extending and reorganizing our present Local Fund and other Committees, so that under the guidance of executive officers they may in time gain sufficient experience to enable them eventually to work without official assistance.

27. Why force on the new system in its entirety until a little experience has shown how it works in chosen localities? It may fail despite the good intentions of the Government and the most strenuous and loyal exertions on the part of executive officers. The people of India have ever looked to officials for guidance and support. Why decree a sudden separation between this class and the governed ?

28. In their despatch of last year, the Government of India purposed allowing certain officials to belong to the Local Boards, and they *should* belong to them and have a voice in their deliberation. If, however, they have no vote, and are only supposed to be present as advisers, then I say, keep them aloof from the Boards, as it certainly would not enhance the dignity of a Collector to sit as adviser to a Board, the members of which might, if they pleased, ignore and oppose every opinion expressed by him.

29. Municipal Committees I would leave at their present numbers. The withdrawal of the official element would of course necessitate a change in the law as well as the rules, and additional non-official members would have to be chosen to supply the place of the officials. A system of election in the case of Municipalities could be easily introduced, and the lists now being prepared under instructions from the Commissioner C. D. will supply materials for its introduction.

30. I do not on the present occasion intend going into details as to the rules which should govern the proceedings of the Boards, &c. Such matters can be settled by a Committee after the more important points connected with local self-government assume a practical shape.

31. If a system of election be considered essential even in rural districts, the voters should consist of the following in the case of village communities—

1st.—The Patels and Kulkarnis, including all branches of the watan.
2nd.—Vanis, Brahmins and other educated persons.
3rd.—All persons who pay License Tax.
4th.—Cultivators paying land rent above, say, Rs. 10 or Rs. 15 annually.

32. In tálukas containing large villages and a fairly cultivated area the above classes will be found; in wild tracts, an election system appears to me almost impossible, and if self-government be applied to such the members of Local Boards *must* be *appointed* by the Collector with the sanction of Government.

33. It is not a difficult matter to decide the functions of Local Boards, but the manner in which those functions should be exercised is a problem requiring careful solution.

34. It appears to be the intention of the Government of India to transfer to the Boards the entire management of Local and Municipal Funds, the administration of the latter being entrusted to a Committee chosen as at present from amongst those residing with municipal limits. It is also proposed that the Local Boards should have the management of such Provincial Funds as may be made over to them by Government.

35. Now Local Fund expenditure in a Collectorate in the Bombay Presidency includes the following items:—

Vaccination, Public Works, such as Roads, Bridges, &c., Dharmshálas, Road Tolls, Roadside Trees, Wells, Staging Bungalows, Stallions, Pounds, grants in aid to Dispensaries, &c.

With the transfer of these to Local Boards will be included Hospitals, Dispensaries, Schools, &c., &c. In fact the Local Boards will perform the duties now assigned to many different Departments and trained officers, assisted by numberless subordinates specially educated for the work devolving upon them.

36. If the active interference of all officers under whose control the present system is carried on be withdrawn and forbidden, I for one utterly fail to perceive how the work of a District is to be performed. The Government of India in its para. 22 goes so far as to say that the District Engineer should be placed in the position of a servant of the Local Boards; whence then is to come the scientific knowledge required for the preparation and elaboration of large schemes? Can it reasonably be expected that the Local Boards in agricultural districts will *ever* become sufficiently advanced in education and science to originate and carry out important public works?

37. Again, the Government of India appears desirous of giving the Local Boards *entire control* over subordinates. These men are at present Government servants, serving under fixed rules as regards fine, dismissal and pension. For the future I suppose they will be subordinate in every way to the Local Boards, and the latter, in the exercise of their just authority, will have the power of dismissal, &c., &c. It is difficult to perceive how the proposed system can be worked otherwise. There cannot be *entire control* on the part of the Boards, and separate authority vested in the head of the department to which the subordinate belonged previous to the introduction of the new form of Local Government.

38. The question regarding the exercise of the functions of the proposed Local Boards, and the rules for the management of funds placed at their disposal, *must* be discussed and decided in Committee. The details of a subject so vast and so difficult cannot be settled and disposed of in a practical manner by a single officer, however intelligent he may be, in a mere written report.

39. As a conference is to be held at Poona I see no advantage in prolonging this letter. My views and opinions have been expressed (not too freely I trust), and I have tried to present a rough sketch showing how I would propose to constitute the Local Boards. The details of the scheme must be settled after consultation.

40. I append for the information of Government two reports on the subject of local self-government prepared at my request. One was written by Mr. Mahadeva Vishnu Kane, Head Master of the Dhulia High School, a man well educated and altogether a representative of the modern school. The other was drawn up by Mr. Govindrao Ramchandra Garood, a pleader of Dhulia, and perhaps the leader of Native society in Khándesh.

W. H. Propert,
Collector of Khándesh.

To W. H. Propert, Esquire, C.S., Collector of Khándesh.

Sir, Dhulia, 22nd June 1882.

As desired in your note of the 15th instant, I beg to state that I have carefully read the Resolution of the Government of India No. 17—747-59, dated the 18th May 1882. In the remarks and observations I proceed to make on it in compliance with your wishes, I shall confine myself principally to the two subjects of (I.) the constitution of Táluka and District Local Fund Boards and Municipalities, and (II.) the funds which should be placed at their disposal and the work which they should be entrusted with.

I. *How Táluka and District Local Fund Boards and Municipalities should be constituted.*—Speaking of Khándesh, it cannot be asserted of all the tálukas in it that they are so far advanced in point of enlightenment as to understand and appreciate the advantages which local self-government possesses over the system which obtains at present. Some tálukas, such as Dhulia, Jalgaon, Bhusával and Erandol, may well be expected to manage their own local affairs; but there are others, such as Taloda and Sháháda, which probably do not possess sufficient intelligence to be able to do so. However, that there are some tálukas in a zilla which are in a very backward condition is no reason why those which are sufficiently advanced should not enjoy elective franchise in the management of local affairs.

Táluka Boards. For purposes of election of members to constitute Táluka Local Fund Boards, I am of opinion that each táluka should be divided into twelve circles, which pay or contribute equal or nearly equal sums towards the Local Funds of the táluka. Each of these circles should return one member to the Táluka Local Fund Board. There will thus be twelve members elected by the people of the Táluka in each Táluka Board. To this number Government may add four members, but none of the Government nominees should be Magistrates, Police officers, or Sub-Judges. The Committee thus constituted should elect their own chairman and appoint a sub-committee for the management of their affairs. The Assistant or Deputy Collector in

charge of each táluka should watch the proceedings of the Táluka Board, and should report to the Collector any irregularity he may discover in them. The Local Fund Boards for those tálukas, which may be considered to be in a backward state, will wholly consist of members nominated by Government with the same proviso as in the case of Government nominees on the elected Boards. Separate lists for different tálukas of persons eligible to serve on Táluka Boards, should be prepared by the Assistant Collector in charge of each táluka in consultation with some independent persons ; and the electors may elect some one of the persons thus declared eligible. The lists by whomsoever they are prepared should be sufficiently comprehensive to give full scope to liberty of election. These lists must include names of all retired Mámlatdárs, Shirastedárs to Collectors and Assistant Collectors, Deputy Educational Inspectors, Inspectors of Police, Sub-Judges, and Aval-kárkúns, all practising pleaders, graduates of the University, and all servants of Government who get Rs. 50 and upwards, excepting Magistrates, Police officers, and Judges. I am of opinion that votes should be personal. Each person contributing so much annually, say Rs. 5 and upwards to the Local Funds, should have one vote. Capital may be represented on the Boards by giving one vote to every one who pays so much License Tax to Government. Graduates of the University must be allowed to vote as such. The members of Táluka Boards may enjoy the courtesy title of Ráo Sáheb during the tenure of their office. The elections should for the present be biennial. The first year of election the Mámlatdár or Assistant or Deputy Collector in charge should explain to the people, who are to be called upon to elect a member for the Táluka Board, the principals of elective government, the advantages to be derived from it, the manner in which and the object for which men are to be elected, the work they are to do, the responsibilities that they are to discharge, and such other points as may suggest themselves to him as likely to conduce to the success of the new scheme and to lead to proper men being returned. He should, if necessary, be present at the polling, different days being fixed for this purpose for the different centres. He is however not to try, directly or indirectly, to influence the free choice of electors. The Táluka Boards should possess certain independent powers, and should be subordinate to the District Boards in the exercise of certain other and higher powers. The Managing Committees of Táluka Boards should meet at least once a week for the transaction of such business as the Chairman may place before them for consideration, the Boards themselves meeting once a month to consider such proposals as may be submitted to them by the Managing Committee. The members of the Managing Committees of Táluka Boards should as far as possible be residents of the táluka towns. Each Táluka Board should elect one of their own body to represent them on the District Local Fund Board, so that in this Board every one of the táluka will be represented and by a person who in the opinion of his constituents is best able to look after and secure the interests of his táluka. The District Local Fund Board should have a chairman and a Managing Committee of their own election. The members of District Boards may enjoy the courtesy title of Ráo Bahádur during the tenure of their office. The Managing Committees of District Boards should assemble once a fortnight for disposal of business, the Boards meeting at least once in three months. Members attending quarterly meetings of the District Boards should receive an allowance from the Táluka Boards, which they represent, to meet all expenses connected with their journey to the zilla town where the meetings are to be held. The members of the Managing Committees of District Boards must be residents of the zilla town or its immediate vicinity. The Municipalities of all towns whose population is not less than 10,000 souls should be elective. For the purposes of election in this case towns should be divided into wards, different wards returning one or more members according to their importance or according to the number of voters which they may contain. The qualification necessary to make a man entitled to vote should be the payment of municipal rates amounting to, say, Rs. 10 per annum. The Municipalities may consist of 12 elected members and four Government nominees, who are however not to be ex-officio members, nor Magistrates, Police officers, or Judges.

District Board.

Municipalities.

The Chairman of Táluka and District Boards and Municipalities may receive an honorarium at the end of their term of office, so that they may well be held responsible for the acts of the bodies over which they preside.

II.—To begin with the Táluka Boards. They should have the disposal of a certain portion, say three-fourths, of the total Local Fund collection of the respective tálukas, and of the income derived from the cattle pound proceeds of those towns which have no Municipalities. They are to be charged with the proper maintenance of Local Fund Public Works now existing, such as roads, public wells, dharmsháls and school-houses, and with the construction of such other new works of a like nature as they may deem to be necessary for the health, convenience, and welfare of the people of the tálukas. The Táluka Boards should in October of each year prepare a budget and submit it for sanction to the District Board. It may be acted upon after it has received the necessary sanction. If the allotment of Local Funds made to a Táluka Board is too small in any year to provide for any work of public usefulness, that, in the opinion of the District Board, may be necessary, that Board must have power to grant a sufficient sum to the táluka from funds reserved to itself for providing works which are of general usefulness, such as travellers' bungalows, bridges, ghát, &c. I do not think that it advisable just in the beginning to make Government buildings, such as Mámlatdárs' kacheries and Sub-Judge's Courts over to Táluka Boards for maintenance. This may be done if and after these Boards are found able to keep their own buildings in thorough repair. The Táluka Boards may entertain such establishments, within limits laid down by the District Board as may be found necessary to meet all ordinary requirements.

District Boards.—The funds at the disposal of the District Boards for providing works of general usefulness would be made up of (*a*) the portion of Local Funds of tálukas not placed at the disposal of the Táluka Boards, (*b*) the proceeds of tolls on Local Fund roads, (*c*) the charges collected from travellers using travellers' bungalows constructed from Local Funds. The District Boards should prepare a budget for the ensuing official year in or about October in each year, and submit it to the Commissioner through the Collector. It may be acted upon after the necessary sanction is received. Government may grant a sum from Provisional Funds if any great work has to be undertaken.

Municipalities.—The taxes at present imposed by the different Municipalities under Government sanction must remain intact under the new Municipalities, whether elective or nominated, Government sanction, as at present, being made imperative for any new taxes that may be proposed to be imposed. Their work is to be the same as at present. The provisions of the present District Municipal Act may be altered so as to substitute members nominated by Government in the place of ex-officio members, the Collector of the district continuing to be the President of all the Municipalities in his district, but, as Government of India desires, assisting them by advice and counsel without actually taking part in their affairs. He is to be the medium between them and the Government. His sanction may be made necessary to render certain of their acts valid and lawful.

With a view to lessen the burden on the paid Magistrates of Government I would propose that every Municipal town may have, according to its magnitude and importance, one or more Honorary Magistrates with power to try only such Municipal cases as may be sent to them by the Chairmen of those Municipalities. I believe that every Municipal town, with a few exceptions, possesses persons who by their education, character, and respectability, may be safely entrusted with magisterial duties of the kind indicated above. There are even now honorary Municipal Magistrates in some towns. These Magistrates, or such of them as, by the way in which they may discharge their duties, commend themselves to the favourable notice of Government will be available in cases of emergency for trying other than Municipal cases.

I have thus stated briefly my opinions on the most prominent points touched on in the Resolution of the Government of India referred to above. I have avoided going into details, but tried to indicate the principles on which, in my humble opinion, Táluka and District Local Fund Boards and Municipalities should be constituted under the new scheme, and suggested what funds may be placed at their disposal, and what work they may be entrusted with.

I beg to remain, &c.
MAHADEVA V. KANE.

To W. H. PROPERT, Esquire, Collector, &c., Khándesh, Dhulia.

SIR, Dhulia, 23rd June 1882.

I BEG to apologise to you for not being able to answer your favour of the 15th instant earlier than this owing partly to indisposition and partly to professional engagements during the week.

I read the Government Resolution you so kindly sent to me. The subject therein discussed is so vast and so important, that I feel myself almost embarrassed to form an opinion as to what should be done to bring the scheme set forth in the Resolution into practical operation. I state, however, what has already been said in the Resolution, that unless the Government officials put their heart and soul into it and exert themselves in right earnest nothing can be done to attain the noble object in view.

In the beginning it would be well to entrust only the Municipal and the Local Funds to the management of the Committees now to be formed. The formation of these bodies will by no means be an easy task. The system of election may however be generally introduced in a qualified form. The Mámlatdárs may be asked to prepare lists of persons of sufficient intelligence, knowledge and position to be found in their tálukás, and these persons may be made to select from among them the number of members required for the Táluka Committees. The general list to be prepared by the Mámlatdár may be so drawn up as to have at least ten electors for every person to be elected. The Táluka Committee may contain at least ten members, but the number may not exceed in any case twenty.

The Táluka Committees may hold their general meetings every quarter or thrice a year, and at each two-thirds of the whole number of members should be present to form a quorum. These meetings should be held at convenient times so as to cause the least inconvenience to the members who may have to attend them. A Managing Committee consisting of one-third of the entire number of members may also be maintained for the transaction of the current business of the Committee.

Each District should also have a District Committee for which each Táluka Committee might select at least two of its members to represent the táluka. This Committee should meet twice a year for joint consultation, and at each meeting one member at least from each Táluka Committee must attend.

I also think that in three or four of the more advanced tálukas of the District the experiment of a completely free election may be tried provisionally. In the case of these tálukas the list of electors instead of being drawn up as before may be made to include all the persons in each village who pay any direct tax to Government, or any local or Mnnicipal cess, as also persons of education and social position. All the persons whose names may thus be entered on the list will form the elective body of the táluka. For the sake of convenience and simplicity of procedure each táluka may be divided into four groups, each of which may on an average be allowed to return four members for the Táluka Committee. All the electors of each group may assemble together, at a convenient place on a day to be fixed before hand, and the Mámlatdár, Mahálkari or the Aval-kárkun in the táluka attending their meeting on the day so appointed the elections may take place in his presence. If the number of voters on the general list for each group be found to be too large to make it convenient for them all to meet in one place, still smaller groups may be made, or an intermediate class of electors may be formed by requiring each ten or twenty voters to return one elector, and the electors thus returned may meet together and in their turn select from among them the limited number of members to be returned by their group.

I also think that this principle of election may even more advantageously be adopted in reorganising the several Municipalities in the District.

The great drawback to the effective working of this benevolent scheme exists in the want, in the present state of the society, of sufficient men in each táluka who could devote their time and energy to the affairs of the Committee or bear the expense and inconvenience of attending its meetings. This difficulty may be partially obviated by allowing the members of the Committees moderate fees to cover the expenses of their attendance. Some remuneration may also be allowed to the members of the Managing Committees as compensation for their trouble. With best thanks,

I beg to remain, &c.
GOVIND V. GURROOD.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

No. 5223 of 1882.

From J. ELPHINSTON, Esquire, Acting Collector, Ahmednagar, to THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Ahmednagar, 3rd July 1882.

I HAVE the honour to report, in accordance with Government Resolution No. 2100, dated the 7th ultimo, upon the proceedings of the Government of India, dated the 18th May, which were circulated therewith.

2. I observe that in paragraph 6 of the Resolution His Excellency the Governor General expresses his own conviction that the only reasonable plan is to induce the people to undertake the management of their own affairs, and that in the 5th para. he expects loyal assistance from the servants of Government in this policy. With this premise I would remark that the loyalty can of course be safely reckoned on, and the policy which is sketched out in paras. 10 to 22 of this Resolution can be tried in this district. There are now existing Táluka and District Local Fund Committees which are Boards of the nature described in paragraph 10 of the Resolution, except that these Committees are not elective but selected on the grounds of rank, respectability and intelligence combined. If they are to be elective in future it would be well at least to fix a property qualification of at least Rs. 4 Local Funds cess payable by each voter which is recommended by the Municipal Committee of Ahmednagar, and it would be safer at first to limit the elections to the Táluka Committees and to leave the District Commissioners to be as now selected by the Collector and President of the Local Fund Committee, because so very few people apparently have much influence beyond the immediate surroundings of their own village that such a thing as a whole táluka voting for any one or two men with any intelligent understanding of what they are about and of the probable result of their action is not to be expected. The Collector's selection might, if Government think fit, be directed to be made out of the number of the members elected for each táluka, so that the members and the District Boards would each and all be men elected by the majority of the inhabitants of their own town or village ; but that they be selected from among those Boards for the more honourable and responsible post of member of the District Board. I notice that in paragraph 10 of the Government of India's Resolution it is suggested that the District Council be composed of delegates from the different Local or Táluka Boards. I prefer selection to election in this case, because it is in my opinion the only check to corruption which is not at all unlikely to be resorted to in the primary election of the Local or Táluka Boards.

3. I notice that in the same paragraph the rate of land cess is spoken as a common matter which may be settled by the District Councils in each district. I presume this refers to the Local Funds cess and not to the assessments to the land revenue. This though not likely to be so very prejudicial to the Government of the country as if the land revenue were to be reduced and enhanced at the will of the District Council, yet even the rate of Local Funds cess which is now levied on a percentage of 6¼ on the land revenue is too important a matter to have its rate and incidence settled off-hand by each District Council, it would probably cause too great a diversity of incidence in each district to do so. District Councils should be permitted to make suggestions to Government on such matters of general application to a whole Presidency, and possibly it might be found practicable to admit of delegates. or men selected from each District Council for their well-known loyalty, probity and sagacity being called to His Excellency the Governor's Council to express the views of each district in regard to such important matters.

4. The District Council should, in my opinion, exercise a controlling power over the Local Boards as now in Local Fund matters ; the limitation in area of the jurisdiction of the Local Boards referred to in the latter part of the 10th paragraph above quoted, should, I think, be attained by allowing elections for seats in the Local or Táluka Board to be held in all towns or large villages of 2,000 inhabitants and over at the rate of one member to every 2,000 or 4,000 inhabitants, and in smaller villages to group neighbouring villages together till the aggregate of their population is equal to that of a town containing that population.

5. Municipal Committees now have a tenure of office of three years : this is a reasonable limit not requiring such frequent changes as that proposed in para. 12 of an election every two years.

6. Paragraph 13 suggests that the sub-divisional officer (I presume the Mámlatdár of each táluka) be instructed to prepare a list of candidates qualified to sit upon the Local Board if the qualification is a property one ; this could be done by Mámlatdárs publishing a list of men whose land or license-tax amounts to the minimum required for a member of the Local Board. A statement of the property and other qualifications recommended for both members and electors and of disqualifying circumstances formed part of the proposals connected with local self-government contained in the letter of the Chairman of the Nagar Municipality, 262 of 1882, dated the 19th of June, a copy of which I enclose with a recommendation that its proposals on this point be adopted. The members of Municipal Committees (to the extent allowed by Government) and of Táluka Local Boards should be separately elected : the Municipal Commissioners need not necessarily be members of the local Board, though there is no reason against the same man being a Municipal Commissioner and a member of a Local Fund Committee.

7. With respect to paragraph 16 I have some doubts whether it would not diminish the respect now paid to the titles of Khán and Ráo Bahádur if they were given to each member of a Local Board whose lease of office and with it his title was terminable every two or three years. These titles are now usually given for life and to men who have done special service to the State or who are of exalted rank ; for instance, the Mámlatdár and Sub-Judge in each táluka is now only called Ráo or Khán Sáheb, while a First Class Sub-Judge or a Deputy Collector only are styled Ráo or Khán Bahádur ; a few days ago I was one of a party who assembled when the District Judge of this station gave Mr. Moro Krishna Dabholkar, a well known Jághírdár of this district (who has two large and wealthy villages in Inám and has besides civil powers therein) the Sanad of the Governor General giving him the title of Ráo Sáheb only. His ancestors once took a prominent part under the Peshwa's Government in the administration of a wide tract of country. The title of Ráo Sáheb would entirely lose its signifiance if it were attainable by every Banniah or Marvadi who could secure a majority of votes on each triennial

election of members of a Local Board. Titles to carry weight should be more permanent: for instance men who have acted in the District Council 2 or 3 times might be styled Ráo Sáhebs, and delegates or members selected to represent each district at the centre seat of Government might be given the honorary titles of Khán and Ráo Bahádur.

8. Para. 21 of the Government of India's letter proposes to add license-tax assessments and collections as well as pound and ferry receipts (which are now items of the Local Fund revenue) to the management of the Local Board. If by this it is merely meant that the total net revenue derived from or an allotment of license-tax is to be managed by Local Boards in carrying out the works entrusted to their charge, the experiment might be tried; but I protest against the actual assessment to license-tax being submitted to them, as I feel sure that in the majority of instances the result would be for each member of the Board to strike off or reduce the license-tax to which he is now individually assessed. The tendency on the part of Municipal Commissioners to do this has again and again come prominently to notice in the matter of house taxation, which is a direct tax greatly disliked by Municipal Commissioners generally, who generally prefer transit duties because the burden of such taxation does not fall upon them, and almost invariably the lists of Municipal house taxatian require revision by Government officials to prevent poor men being taxed as high as or higher (proportionately to their income) than the rich.

9. As regards the point referred to in para. 22 of the Governor General's letter, I consider that thoroughness of execution can only be secured by having as now a District Engineer whose establishment should remain as now under his sole supervision, leaving it to the Local Boards and their Chairmen to approve of works completed and to signify their disapproval when works have not been properly constructed. Public buildings such as charitable dispensaries and dharamshálas, pounds and such like improvements effected at the cost of Local Funds are now open to the inspection and criticism of the Local Fund Committees; but I see no possible advantage from making over to the charge of such Boards public buildings such as Sub-Judges' Courts, Mámlatdárs' offices, &c.; there is no doubl · establishment now, and public money is in my opinion as well husbanded now as it would be if transferred to the management of Local Boards. I regret this report was not submitted on the 1st instant as desired by Government. I waited for the reports of the district officers, the last of which reached me on the 30th ultimo; I enclose them for perusal.

I have, &c.
J. ELPHINSTON,
Acting Collector.

No. $\frac{1836}{5\text{ Cont.}}$ 1882.

From ARTHUR CRAWFORD, Esquire, Commissioner, Southern Division, to JOHN NUGENT, Esquire, Secretary to Government, General Department.

SIR, Poona, 20th June 1882.

WHEN the Memorandum of the Sarvajanik Sabha on local self-government appeared in the papers, I invited the opinions of several officers in my Division on it. Among others Mr. Cumine, Acting Collector, Ratnágiri, was consulted, and he forwarded me the accompanying two letters which he asks me to send as his reply to Government Resolution No. 2100 of 7th instant, regarding the Government of India's scheme.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR CRAWFORD,
Commissioner, S. D.

From the COLLECTOR of RATNA'GIRI to the COMMISSIONER, S. D., Poona.

SIR, Ratnágiri Collector's Office, 4th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your confidential letter of the 5th May on the subject of extended self-goverment in this Presidency.

2. The extremely temperate and well written letter of the Sabha deals with two subjects, (*a*) Municipalities, (*b*) District Boards.

3. As regards the first point, you propose to add to the list in their second para. (which at present does not touch this District at all), the towns of Vengurla and Ratnágiri. But Vengurla only contains by the 1881 census 8,960 people, so that it cannot legally be raised into a City Municipality. Ratnágiri, however, contains 12,175: and I think that it might decidedly be turned into a City Municipality. But whether Government might go further and extend to it (as proposed by the Sabha) a modified scheme of election is, I think, very doubtful. When speaking of the principle that Ireland ought to governed according to Irish ideas, Lord Lytton said the other day, and very truly, that if India had been governed according to Indian ideas, we should not have had a single drain, market or public privy from one end of the country to the other. And therefore I say the elective franchise ought not to be given except in towns where you have already carried out a good many sanitary reforms: where you have shown the people by experience the good of them, and where you are confident that the people themselves will maintain and extend them. Ratnágiri is not ripe for this. The present Commissioners of the town can, I think, be well trusted with "increased administrative freedom and augmented power of financial control." But when you come to the lower classes, I say that they have not been yet sufficiently accustomed to sanitary improvements to make them likely to vote for more.

4. As regards District Boards the case is quite different; for here the works to be carried out are of a popular, and not an unpopular kind. And first of all I would say that whether the Táluka Committees be legal or illegal I quite agree with Mr. Todd that they are dead and buried, and that so far as we refuse to recognise this we are wrong. Under the system obtaining since 1877 we spend all our spare funds on some large work that takes years to carry out, instead of frittering it away as before on a little bit of road here and a litttle bit of road there that began nowhere and ended in the air. But

this means that the Táluka Local Fund Committee get no money to spend on new works, and therefore are disgusted. There is nothing interesting *in* turning the tiles of a few dharmshálas, and you can't expect them to get anything interesting *out* of it. Let them die. I am very sorry to see that the Government of India are trying to rehabilitate them.

5. Assuming then that the Board must be a District Board, the next question is, of whom should it consist: and this is closely connected with the question of how it should be appointed. That each táluka should have one representative is, I think, quite clear: but I am not quite so sure about the Municipalities, as they have already the management of their own funds. But I think that members sent by them being already accustomed to self-government would at any rate at first be very useful in the Committee. At all events I have no objection to them, nor to the two representatives of Inámdárs. But I would certainly cut out the two representatives of the educated classes. What on earth have the Vakíls of the District Court got to do with the public works of the district, unless indeed they pay for them as land-holders or shop-keepers, in which case they would be represented already. As regard the chairmanship and the constitution of the Board I consider the proposals of the Sabha surprisingly liberal, and I must confess I prefer them to the proposals of the Government of India. The only thing I am afraid of is that the Board might be rather unwieldy; for even in this district there would be 26 or 27 members.

6. Turning now to the mode of appointment of members. The Government of India say that they are convinced self-government will not fail in India because of any lack of interest on the part of the people. But would the people here take the trouble to elect representatives? Would you find representatives who would give up their time unpaid, and come long distances to attend meetings? I very much fear not. I very much fear that both candidates and voters would fail. Each man who voted would vote with a view of getting some particular well or dharmshála built at his own village. As time went on and he did not get it done he would declare the whole thing was a farce, and give up going to vote. He would conclude that the Committee were eating the money themselves, and the appointment of representatives would fall into the hands of a small clique, if it did not expire altogether. While, therefore, I should be very pleased to see the people interested and electing representatives themselves, I cannot blind myself to the glaring probability that they will be too apathetic to do it. I think the attempt will fail. The people are not ready for election yet. However, I think the experiment with the safeguards proposed by the Sabha itself might be tried. If it fails it can't do much harm. I would give Government the *power* to nominate ¼th of the Committee and to reserve ¼th for officials, but I would not make it *compulsory*; for we might get such a good Committee elected that there would be no one left out whom it was desirous to nominate. And again in a district like Khándesh with very many tálukás, it would not be necessary to have so many officials as ¼th of the Committee on the Board. And while I would have the Collector as *ex-officio* Chairman of the District Board, I would have as few officials as possible on the *Managing* Board, and insist on the Chairman of it being a non-official. To enlist the interest of the members we must make them largely independent of the officials. If they find themselves dummies, as they largely are at present, the whole thing will fail.

7. As regards the time that the District Committee is to remain in office, I would prefer 5 years to 3, and I would make the 5 years begin so as to fit in with the 5 years' Budget. That is to say, a Committee would be appointed in 1890 say. It would do nothing that year but prepare its 5 years' scheme. It would take over charge in 1891, and carry out its own scheme till 1896, when it would give way to a Committee which had previously got its own Budget cut and dry. I think that the members would be far more likely to interest themselves in the work if they had *both* the choosing *and* the completing of the works. That if you are to have a District Board of the kind proposed, you must give them the entire power and responsibility for administering the local revenues goes without saying. It is not likely that people will continue to elect representatives, or that those representatives will continue to come 100 or 150 miles, merely to register the Collector's decrees.

8. The question then is, when you had got your Board together, how would it work? Each representative would go to Committee pledged to get some little work done for his own neighbourhood. His "ábru" would be distinctly bound up in getting it done, and when he had been elected several times and failed to get it done the electors would get disgusted and he would become so ashamed of himself that he would cease to attend. Again, would not 15 or 16 men, of distinctly parochial minds and contending interests, would not they when met together in Committee be almost certain to come to a deadlock, and settle on nothing. This is what I am afraid of: on one side the Scylla of the members getting disgusted and absenting themselves, on the other the Charybdis of their abandoning all great schemes, like the Ámbá Ghát road, and frittering away the money on the petty works at their own villages.

9. To keep up their interest and get them to attend meetings I would propose by all means to give them the honorary title of Ráo Bahádur so as to increase their importance. I would also, as the Sabha propose, pay the *travelling* expenses of members of the Managing Committee, so that they should not be out of pocket. But after all, do what we will, their interest must always be in proportion to the amount of money that they are allowed to spend. The Native community in Bombay take the greatest interest in their Municipality because they have Rs. 30,00,000 to spend. And Government instead of decreasing the available Local Funds by throwing Imperial charges on them ought surely to do just the opposite. The local bodies ought to be the pioneers of improvement, and when they have carried out a work of distinctly Provincial if not Imperial importance like the construction of a ghát road or a telegraph line and have proved to the satisfaction of Government that the work was a judicious one, Government ought to step in and set them free to begin something else instead of leaving them crippled for years as they now are.

10. Assuming then that something or other must be done in the direction indicated by the Sabha, I think that the Board sketched by them with the modifications mentioned above would be as good as any. I think that making the district the unit is the true plan, and that any attempt to rehabitate the Táluka Board as insisted on by the Government of India is a mistake. But I think it very probable

that the immediate result of the extension of self-government will be a temporary return to the system of disconnected petty local works instead of large and large-minded schemes of Provincial utility.

I have, &c.
A. CUMINE,
Acting Collector.

From the COLLECTOR OF RATNA'GIRI to the COMMISSIONER, S. D.

SIR, Ratnágiri Collector's Office, 10th June 1882.

ON consideration I see that part of the 6th paragraph of my letter of 4th instant to you is ambiguous. I mean where I say that the attempt to introduce election will probably fail, and yet that the experiment should be tried. What I should have said was that the system of election, if suddenly introduced all over the Presidency, would almost certainly fail; but that the experiment might well be tried of introducing it in a few selected tálukas first, leaving the old principle of nomination still working in the rest. In a Táluka like Sálsette, for instance, which contains so many Pársis and well-to-do Bombay-like people, I think that election would have a fair chance of succeeding: whereas in the jungly táluka of Wáda in the same Collectorate it would have hardly any chance at all. Should Government determine to introduce the elective system tentatively into one táluka of each district first, I would suggest the Vengurla Táluka for this Collectorate. It is small, manageable, and contains a number of well-to-do Dhárekaris, principally Shenvis. As to the other tálukas I would *nominate* the representatives of them.

I have, &c.
A. CUMINE,
Acting Collector.

No. 1984 of 1882.

From ARTHUR CRAWFORD, Esquire, Commissioner, Southern Division, to J. NUGENT, Esquire, Acting Secretary to Government, General Department.

SIR, Poona, 3rd July 1882.

I HAVE the honour to submit my views and opinion on the Government of India's local self-government scheme ending with their despatch No. $\frac{17}{747-59}$, dated 18th May last.

Reply to Government Resolution No. 2100 of 7th June 1882.

So far as this Presidency was concerned the Government of India had previously been informed in general terms that we preferred to let our present system of District and Táluka Local Fund Commitees work on for some years to come, and that except in certain 10 City Municipalities (where greatconcessions were proposed) but little could be done at present in the direction of extending local self-government.

2. It would be tedious, and is in fact scarcely necessary now, to review the history of our Local Fund administration. It is sufficient to mention that after several surprising changes of principle in administration, the District has become the unit for local self-government, whereas the Táluka Committee was formerly the nucleus of the whole system.

3. Many District Officers prefer the present or district system. As many more probably prefer the táluka. There is very much to be said on both sides, and District Officers have probably formed their opinions from their personal observation in different districts under different circumstances, at different times.

4. Thus the District Officer who worked in the Famine District, and saw how his efforts were paralysed by the want of roads and communications, abuses the táluka system as the cause of the neglect of main communications throughout the country in favour of petty works which he found to be useless in the crisis,—while the District Officer whose experience lay more in the Konkan (or below Ghát) or other Districts, comparatively untouched by famine, now inveighs bitterly against the district system, by which his Local Funds are called on to contribute to large works of general utility, while the petty wants of the District are starved and the Táluka Committees by consequence reduced to nonentities.

5. Probably the ablest paper that has been written on the whole subject is that of the Sarvajanik Sabha on the 1st May. It is evidently penned with a perfect knowledge of the growth of the present system and of all details of present administration. My own opinion of it may be gathered from a confidential letter (of which I append a copy) which I addressed directly it appeared to certain District Officials whose opinion I specially value.

6. The Sabha propose to continue the district as the unit, and in this as in most other matters of detail, I and most of the officers I have consulted prefer their scheme to that of the Government of India which involves a complete "bouleversement," and a return to a system based on the táluka as the unit.

7. It appears to me however that the Government of India have now left us no option in the matter, and that it is no longer open to us to discuss whether the district or the táluka shall be the unit for the development of local self-government.

8. Paragraph 4 of the Government of India's despatch, No. 831 of 31st May last, amounts to a *direction* that the old Táluka Committee system shall be revived and the táluka become one unit in future.

See Government Resolution No. 2314 of 16th June 1882.

Accordingly, I base what follows on the supposition that we are to return as soon as may be to the Táluka Committee.

9. Now *as regards Public Works and the development of the country,* the merits and demerits of the district and of the táluka system respectively may be broadly stated as follows :—

(*a*) The merit of the district system is, and has been, that under it large schemes and expensive works of great general benefit are possible. The demerit lies in the neglect of the innumerable petty wants of the masses, wells, dharmshálas and the like, and the consequent growth of something like dislike on the part of the cess-payers to the cess itself.

(*b*) The merit of the táluka system is that it enlists the interest and sympathies of the masses who see the country covered with petty works immediately and visibly beneficial. The demerit is that no large general scheme for the development of any large tract, even of two or three tálukas lying near to each other, has been or ever will be undertaken by a Táluka Committee.

10. In reverting to the táluka system I do not see why all the dangers of each system cannot be provided against if the Táluka Committees are distinctly understood to be generally subordinate to the District Committee, and if the latter hereafter includes delegates from the Táluka Committees or (as the elective principle extends) contains representatives elected by the tákulas. I would go further, as already suggested in my No. 736 of 14 March 1882, and would provide that every Municipal Town shall elect from the body of the Commissioners one or more persons to sit on the District Committee.

Vide Government Resolution No. 1254 of 31st March 1882.

11. As regards education, medical aid and sanitary measures the táluka is probably preferable to the district as the unit provided, the District Committees continuing to exercise a general control over the Táluka Committees.

Composition of the Committees on Boards.

12. Here I apprehend again that we have no option, and that the instructions of the Government of India* "REQUIRE that the Boards SHOULD BE CHOSEN BY ELECTION," whenever possible, whether in the case of District or Táluka Committees or Boards or in the case of Municipalities.

*Para. 13 of the Despatch of 18th May last.

The question of qualification whether for a voter or for a member is not one on which I am prepared to give an opinion off-hand. A qualification very suitable for a large and populous distrtct will probably be very unsuited to a sparsely inhabited or outlying tract.

I have called for certain returns and shall be able to put definite proposals before Government by the time this reference is disposed of.

But there is one point on which the Government of India leaves more discretion, *viz.*, as to whether the District Officers should or should not be ex-officio members presiding at the Boards and having a vote. The Government of India desire that *ultimately* official precedency should disappear, but do not absolutely insist that this great change should be now summarily carried out.

In my humble opinion it is absolutely essential for the success of the scheme and for an efficient control over the expenditure of public money, that *at the outset* the District and Táluka officers should preside at the Boards with the power of voting. It may be, I hope it will be, that in a comparatively short time the Táluka and District Boards may have so far educated themselves in the transaction of public business, in the keeping of accounts, in the control of expenditure, that they may be trusted wholly alone.

With Municipalities it is different, the various Committees have no small official experience, some of them possess competent members who have as chairmen managed the affairs of the town very fairly. I would therefore begin with the larger municipalities, gradually extending the concession to the smaller towns, and altogether eliminate official control.

13. The skeleton then of the future system should in my opinion be something like this :—

(*a*)—The general supervision of the District Local Fund to be in the hands of the District Committee.

(*b*)—The District Committee to reserve so much of the annual income at the disposal of the District as will suffice to pay general or fixed recurring charges, and also to reserve* so much as may be needed for contribution to any system of large works to be constructed jointly, from loans or otherwise, with the Provincial Government, Native States, or adjacent districts.

(*c*)—The balance of the income of each táluka to be handed over to the Taluka Committee to expend unfettered by the District Committee.

(*d*)—The District Committee to hold office for 5 years and its budget to be for 5 years. Every District Committee man to be eligible for re-election.

By this means each Committee would ordinarily have a chance of carrying out its own scheme of large works.

(*e*)—The Táluka Committees should be appointed for 2 years only. Few petty works undertaken by a Táluka Committee will take more than 2 years to execute.

(*f*)—The Collector to be ex-officio a member of the District Committee and to have a vote. His Assistants and Deputies in charge of tálukas to hold the same position with reference to Táluka Committees.

(*g*)—The Executive Engineer and the Educational or Deputy Educational Inspector to be also ex-officio members of both Táluka and District Committees but without votes.

(*h*)—Dispensaries to be managed by Local Committees as heretofore, the chairman of each Dispensary Committee being ex-officio a member of the Táluka Committee and having a vote.

(*k*)—Vaccination to be controlled by the Dispensary Committees, also in all the villages around the Dispensary.†

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* *Note.* These reservations or deductions would of course be percentage deductions from the income of each táluka.

† *Note.* The groups of villages could be easily told off to each Committee.

As to Public Works.

(*m*)—All large works of general utility decided upon by the District Committees to be executed by the Executive Engineer.

(*n*)—All works in the budgets of the Táluka Committees to be executed by the Committee unless they ask for Public Works Department supervision of any particular work.

As to Schools.

(*o*)—The District Local Committee as at present to decide absolutely where schools shall be maintained and opened, and to be unfettered in their control of the Educational Budget so far as all education, higher and technical excepted, is concerned.

(*p*)—The District Local Fund Committee to have power to appoint, promote, suspend or reduce Schoolmasters on the recommendation of the Educational Inspector of the District.

(*q*)—The Táluka Committee on a like recommendation to have power to fine, or in extreme or urgent cases to suspend.

(*r*)—The District Committee on the recommendation of the Táluka Committee to decide where school-houses are to be built and to vote the money.

(*s*)—The Táluka Committees to supervise the erection and maintenance of school buildings.

(*t*)—The District Committees on the recommendation of Táluka Committees to have power to modify existing rates of fees in exceptional cases.

(*u*)—The Táluka Committees to sanction grants for—

(1) Contingencies and prizes.
(2) To determine the percentage of free to paying students.
(3) To determine the strength of the teaching staff in each school.
(4) To sanction, if necessary, alterations in school hours.
(5) To sanction the grant of special allowances to Schoolmasters who undertake to teach night classes in addition to their usual work.

Dispensaries and Vaccination.

(*v*)—The Local Committees to have unfettered control over menial servants as to indents for and issue of medicines, instruments, furniture, clothing, diet, petty expenditure and contingencies, repairs to buildings, and also to have power on the sudden outbreak of epidemic (such as cholera, cattle disease and the like,) to incur emergent expenditure in anticipation of a grant from the Táluka Committee to whom immediate report should be made.*

13. Such is roughly the scheme I would propose. I believe it to be practical and practicable, but of course the details require to be much amplified.

14. Having built up the scheme, the next thing is as to the funds. Nothing is clearer than that the present resources of the District Local Fund Committee will not nearly suffice.

15. The Government of India admit this in explicit terms, and suggest that other funds should be handed over to the Committee.

16. We should be informed then as soon as possible what funds are to be placed at the disposal of each district, so that we may judge if the total income available will suffice. If not, it must be supplemented, and this can be done partly by special Provincial grants for special large works, partly by special or additional local taxation which it might be left to the District Committees to raise with certain restrictions obviously necessary for the protection of Imperial interests.

17. To take a special case, the Imperial Government are about to lay out a Railway system in the Southern Marátha Country, to cost perhaps 4 millions sterling. It will enormously benefit and develope the whole Southern Marátha Country. It is surely not unreasonable that within the tract to be thus developed works subsidiary to the Railway scheme should be constructed by the District Committees (or Local Government Boards) and the Provincial Governments together, and that either by a moderate enhancement of the Local Fund cess or by any other feasible taxation the tract benefited should pay for such works.

18. I am myself satisfied that if the Táluka Committees are left with a fair allotment of funds for their petty works such additional taxation would not be unpopular.

19. I must here submit with great urgency that with the introduction of this great reform, the time has come for the re-settlement of the financial relations of the various Districts with the Provincial Government.

20. It would be idle now to follow up each case, but it is an undoubted fact that for one reason or other of late years—the main reason being the starving of the Provincial Funds by the Government of India itself—there has been a tendency to load the District Local Funds with far heavier burthens than in fairness they should be required to bear. With the District Local Fund Committees it has been in each case a question whether to accept the proffered terms, however hard, or to do without the work altogether!

21. I mention the following three cases in point :—

1st.—The Phonda Ghát and Nipáni Road, and the Belgaum District Local Fund Committee being required to find Rs. 74,356 or 40 per cent. of the whole cost, when the road is palpably a Provincial road passing at this point through the Kolhápur State. The Belgaum Committee had to consent and to find the money or to go without the road and lose even the Kolhápur and Provincial contributions.

Government Resolution No. 285—C.W. 894, dated 8th July 1881.

* *Note.* Government are aware that I propose a much greater reform regarding Dispensaries, but it does not necessarily find place in this paper.

2nd.—The Amba Ghát. This is distinctly a road of immense Provincial importance—a great safeguard in future against famine—and had the Provincial Government had the money to give, I do not doubt it would have borne all the cost; but it had not the money, so the poor Local Funds of Ratnágiri have had to borrow a large portion of it from the Government of India, thereby crippling their resources for many years to come.

3rd.—The Konkan Telegraph system *viâ* Kolhápur to Ratnágiri, Chiplun and Rajápur.

No one has even disputed the great public and State importance of this line. If open six years ago it would have saved thousands of lives and lákhs of property simply by warning the craft along the coast of approaching cyclones. Yet the Government of India, or rather the Telegraphic Department of the Government of India, would not lay the line till it got a guarantee (!) of so much per cent. on the cost of the line from the poor Municipalities of Chiplun, Ratnágiri and Rajápur, and also (again) the Ratnágiri District Local Fund!

22. These and similar arrangements, all so opposed to the generous policy which dictates the local government scheme we are discussing, ought surely to be revised and placed on a fairer footing for the District or Táluka Boards before they are called upon to assume fresh responsibilities.

23. In like manner let the percentage charged for Public Works supervision of works be reduced to a fair amount. The present charge of 15 per cent. is universally condemned. So also let the deductions for account supervision be remitted.

24. It should be borne in mind that this new scheme of local self-government is part of a scheme for the general administration and *political education of the Empire.* It is not a mere question of account as between a contractor and his employer!

25. I turn now to Municipalities. I have above explained how I think that the official element can be eliminated and control be "rather from without than from within." I see no difficulty in making this reform, but it must be very gradual, and in this Division the only Municipalities I can recommend as entitled at present to be converted from Town to City Municipalities are Belgaum, Dhárwár, Hubli and Ratnágiri, perhaps Kárwár.

26. I deprecate any attempt to introduce the elective system into smaller towns till we have had some experience of election in the larger towns selected by the Bombay Government.

27. The control of schools by all Municipalities, however, should be much extended; and I do not think we could do better than adopt with such modifications as local peculiarities may demand the Sukkur Municipal school rules, copy of which I append.

Changes in the Law.

28. These are very well discussed by my friend Mr. Clarke-Jervoise, the Collector of Belgaum, and it is not necessary at this stage that I should add to his remarks.

29. In conclusion, I need not assure His Excellency in Council that I shall honestly and zealously exert myself to the utmost to give the best effect to the Government of India's scheme. I keenly appreciate the importance of it, the magnitude of the experiment, and how much success depends upon the tact and discretion of all European officers employed in the Mofussil.

30. I earnestly hope we may not fail in this respect, but it is my duty to state plainly that failure is certain if District Officers and Assistant Collectors are frequently changed in future.

I have, &c.

Arthur Crawford,
Commissioner, S. D.

To A. C. Jervoise, Esquire, Collector, Belgaum; J. R. Middleton, Esquire, Collector, Dhárwár; F. Charles, Esquire, First Assistant Collector, Dhárwár; J. H. Todd, Esquire, First Assistant Collector, Kánara; A. C. Cumine, Esquire, Acting Collector, Ratnágiri.

Sir,

You will doubtless have observed in the Bombay dailies of the 1st May an admirable paper by the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha on the subject of extending self-government in this Presidency.

From Government Resolution No. 1254 of 31st March 1882, on my letter No. 736 of 14th idem on this subject, copies of both of which documents are appended for your information, you will perceive that in all probability there will be a conference on the subject in the monsoon.

I am most anxious to be in possession beforehand of the views of the best and most experienced officers in my Division on this most important question, and I am, therefore, addressing you personally and confidentially, inviting you to give your most earnest consideration to the paper of the Sarvajanik Sabha; and to favor me, say within a month's time, with your views on it and the papers herewith sent. I shall highly value any practical suggestions that may occur to you on the whole subject.

Without committing myself, I am, at first sight, very favorably disposed to the scheme of the Sabha. As a matter of detail, however, I would omit Kárwár (which is purely an official town) from the test given in the 3rd paragraph and I should add Vengurla and Ratnágiri to it, and I would engraft on their scheme my proposal* to let all Municipal towns nominate members to serve on the District Local Funds Committee.

* *Vide* para. 6 of my letter appended.

Oblige me by regarding this as addressed to you personally and by treating it as strictly confidential.

I am, &c.

Arthur Crawford,
Commissioner, S. D

APPENDIX C.

RULES for the guidance of the School Committee in the Town of Sukkur, sanctioned at a Quarterly General Meeting of the Sukkur Municipal Commissioners, held on the 20th of January 1876 and agreed to by the Educational Inspector in Sind on the 4th of April 1876.

1. For the proper management of the schools in the town of Sukkur a Committee shall be appointed, consisting of a President and six members, of whom the non-official members shall hold office for one calendar year at a time, but shall be eligible for re-election. The President and five members of the Committee shall be appointed by the Managing Committee of the Municipality, shortly before the beginning of the calendar year. The Deputy Educatioual Inspector of Shikárpur shall be an *ex-officio* member of the School Committee. Vacancies occurring during the course of the year may be filled up by the School Committee.

2. The School Committee shall have a paid Secretary on a salary of Rs. 10 per mensem. The appointment of the Secretary shall rest with the Committee, but he must possess a good knowledge of English.

3. The School Committee shall meet for the transaction of business at least once in each month at such time and place as the President may appoint. Two members shall form a quorum. The ordinary monthly meeting shall be held on or about the first day of each month.

4. A special meeting may at any time be called by the President, and he shall call a special meeting on a requisition signed by two members.

5. The correspondence of the Committee shall be carried on by the President with the assistance of the Secretary.

6. The members of the Committee shall visit the various schools at such times as may be convenient to them, and they are invited to submit to the Committee at its monthly meeting such remarks as they may wish to make on the state of the schools.

7. The grant made by the Municipality shall be drawn in monthly instalments, and any saving there may be shall be sent to the Government Savings Banks once every six months.

8. The School Committee shall out of the funds at its disposal arrange to pay all the expenses of the Vernacular Schools, the contingent expenditure and the wages of the menial servants attached to the Anglo-Vernacular School and the contribution of Rs. 1,080 per annum due from the Municipality to Government on account of part of the salaries of the masters. The School Committee, however, is not responsible for the repairs of buildings, which will be effected as hitherto by the Municipality.

9. The President shall be authorised to disburse money for all fixed charges. Other expenditure must be regularly sanctioned at a meeting of the Committee.

10. The accounts shall be kept by the Secretary, and shall be placed on the table at each meeting of the Committee. It shall be the duty of the Secretary to calculate accurately the income and expenditure of the Committee, and to warn the President if there is any danger of a deficit.

11. The Committee shall decide what fees are to be levied in the Vernacular Schools. All fee collections and grants-in-aid received from Government shall be credited to the school funds.

12. On the first of each month the head master of the Vernacular Schools and the mistress of the girls' school shall forward their pay abstracts to the Secretary, who shall at once submit them to the President for payment.

13. The Secretary shall see that the contribution of one-fifth payable to Government on account of the pension charges of the masters whose salary is above Rs. 10 is regularly paid into the treasury to the credit of Government before the 15th of each month, and shall forward a receipt for the same to the Educational Inspector.

14. The head master of each school may receive one-fifth of the fee collections made in it, and the teachers in the various schools shall receive as a reward one-fifth of the Government grant-in-aid to their schools, which shall be divided amongst them proportionately to their salaries.

15. No other reward or present shall on any account be made out of the school funds without the joint assent of the School Committee and of the Educational Inspector.

16. Appended is a statement of the establishment at present sanctioned. No increase to the salaries or to the number of teachers shall be sanctioned without the joint assent of the School Committee and of the Educational Inspector. The Committee, however, has full authority to modify the menial Establishment as it thinks proper.

17. The appointment and dismissal of all masters and mistresses and servants, whose salary is under Rs. 11, shall rest solely with the School Committee.

18. The appointment of masters and mistresses in the Vernacular Schools whose salary is not less than Rs. 11, shall rest with the Educational Inspector, who shall, however, appoint only on the recommendation of the School Committee. The head master of each school shall, if possible, be a person trained in the Normal School.

19. The dismissal of masters and mistresses in the Vernacular Schools, whose service entitles them to pension, rests with the Director of Public Instruction, but the Committee may remove any such master or mistress from any school in Sukkur, after giving six months' notice to the Educational Inspector to enable him to provide for the man elsewhere, should he think fit to do so.

20. The Committee may, in case of misconduct, fine teachers and servants in the Vernacular Schools, and servants in the Anglo-Vernacular School sums not exceeding one month's pay.

21. In the Anglo-Vernacular School the Committee shall regulate the contingent expenditure and cost of prizes and the menial establishment. It may grant to the masters casual leave, under the rules in force, but such leave shall be at once reported by the head master to the Educational Inspector. In other respects the management of the Anglo-Vernacular School shall rest with the Educational Inspector.

22. In the Vernacular Schools leave may be granted by the Committee, under the rules contained in Supplement F of the Civil Leave Code to the various teachers. The Committee may appoint substitutes for the persons on leave on salaries not exceeding Rs. 10 per mensem, if it has the funds at

its disposal to enable it to do so. Deputation allowance is inadmissible in case of any master whose salary is less than Rs. 100.

23. The course of instruction pursued in the Vernacular Schools shall be that prescribed by Government, and the schools shall be regularly examined every year for grants made by officers of the Educational Department. The Committee shall instruct the masters in all points as to how they are to manage their schools, but may consult the Educational Inspector in any cases in which they are in doubt.

24. All returns hitherto sent by the masters to the Deputy Educational Inspector of Shikárpur shall in future be sent to the Secretary of the Committee, and the schools shall be generally managed in the same way as Government schools are managed, subject to any modifications in the system which the Committee may from time to time think fit to adopt.

25. The Deputy Educational Inspector of Shikárpur shall from time to time visit the schools and examine the boys and inspect the records in order to see whether the registers are properly kept and the returns regularly sent in. It shall be his duty to report to the Committee any irregularities which he may detect.

26. At the end of each year the Committee shall submit to the Managing Committee of the Municipality a report of the condition of the schools and the accounts for the year. The accounts will be audited by the Educational Inspector, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Committee to lay them before him duly supported by vouchers.

27. These rules shall not be altered without the assent of the Managing Committee of the Municipality. List of sanctioned establishment on the 6th April 1876 :—

New Sukkur Vernacular School.	Rs.
Head Master	45
1st Assistant Master	20
2nd do. do.	15
3rd do. do.	15
4th do. do.	10
Branch Schoolmaster	8
New Sukkur Girls' School.	
Mistress	25
Old Sukkur Vernacular School.	
Head Master	20
1st Assistant Master	15
2nd do. do.	12
Contribution to Anglo-Vernacular School	90
Scholarships in Sukkur High School	25

To ARTHUR CRAWFORD, Esquire, Commissioner, Southern Division.

SIR, Belgaum, 11th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your letter dated the 5th ultimo, in which you invite me to express my views on certain proposals made by the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha on the subject of local self-government, which appeared in a condensed form in the Bombay dailies of the 1st idem.

2. I have also to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of a copy of your letter to Government, No. 736, Financial Department, dated the 14th of March last, on the same subject.

3. The order in which the Sabha have discussed the further extension of Local Government to the bodies that now partially possess it is :—

1. Municipal.
2. Local Fund.

Municipal Administration.

4. The first that point the Sabha refer to is the declaration of Government that it is proposed to extend to certain 10 City Municipalities the privileges of electing one-half of the total number of their Municipal Commissioners on a liberally extended franchise.

5. The Sabha then mention certain 18 Town Municipalities which, having a population of over 10,000 inhabitants, they state can, under section 6 of the District Municipal Act, "claim" to be City Municipalities, if their population, and the representatives of the population have, by adoption of sanitary improvements, &c., and by intelligence, established a claim to superior powers of self-government. They suggest that the said 18 Municipalities have established such claim, and they propose that they should be converted into City Municipalities, and given a right of election.

6. It is to be noted that the Sabha recommend for these proposed City Municipalities "a modified scheme of election." I presume that the term "modified" has reference to the scheme which Government propose introducing into the 10 existing City Municipalities ; and that the Sabha's suggestion is that the other 18 proposed City Municipalities should be given the right to elect a certain number, less than one-half, of the total number of Commissioners.

7. My opinion is that it is not advisable to act on the Sabha's proposal. I understand that in giving for the first time a right of election, to a limited extent, to the 10 existing City Municipalities, Government have not pledged themselves to any thing more definite than an experiment, and that they have selected those municipalities in which they believe the experiment will have the best chance of

showing whether the measure will improve, or will injure, the municipal institutions, will advance or retard sanitary and other improvements, will expedite or delay the conduct of business in the Municipal office.

8. I am inclined to think that the Sabha have not exercised any discrimination when naming the 18 Town Municipalities that they propose should be converted into City Municipalities with rights of election, but have mentioned all or nearly all municipalities containing over 10,000 inhabitants. The proposal as applied to Kárwár is simply ridiculous, Kárwár being little more than a bázár supported by the European and Native officials and the Jail. The Municipal limits are, however, widely extended, so as to include one or two neighbouring villages; and in this way a Municipal population of over 10,000 is acquired. Other Municipalities are also mentioned in the Sabha's list which, unless the inhabitants have changed in disposition very much within the last three years, could certainly not be entrusted with rights of election—I allude to Bhiwndi and Kalyán in the Thána district.

9. My opinion is that the proposal of Government will sufficiently extend the experiment of right of election; and that, as it would be a serious matter to withdraw such a right when once given, it should be thoroughly understood that the present is a purely tentative measure, the success, or otherwise, of which will be determined by Government at the end of a term of three, or, at the most, five years. If, in the meantime, the measure is apparently successful, it might be introduced, on probation for a fixed term, into other selected Municipalities.

10. It will be noted that the Sabha have proposed the conversion of certain Town Municipalities into City Municipalities, in order that they may have the right of election. I may therefore mention that I should not be opposed to the Municipality of Belgaum being raised to a City Municipality *without the right of election.* I hope eventually it may have this right; but I think it would be rash to commence by bestowing that right too generally before we have seen its effects in the Municipalities which Government have already selected.

11. I will now venture to put before you a few remarks, which, perhaps, if I were writing in an ordinary official letter I should hesitate before placing on paper.

12. What I wish to say is that whether we convert Town into City Municipalities, or give or refuse elective rights, it will, as the law stands at present, remain that the management of the municipality and the disposal of its funds is too much under official control. This must necessarily be the case so long as Commissioners of Divisions and Collectors have power, whether by law, or by reason of their position, to dictate to the Committees a course of administration or expenditure of income. At present it is almost impossible for an officer to ascertain the real opinions of non-official Municipal Commissioners.

13. Unquestionably, very few, if any, District Municipalities would show such good results, sanitary and other, if it were not for the constant, never ceasing, pressure of official influence, aided by a law which places the final decision of all questions in the hands of the Government, or the officials, who may be originators of the discussion.

14. But this is not *Municipal* administration, it is as much Government administration as if the population were in no way represented. Government is no doubt often greatly aided by intelligent non-official Commissioners, but they, like all others, look for support and approbation to the officials more than the people they represent.

15. No raising of Town into City Municipalities, or bestowal of rights of election, will have any effect in altering this state of things. Such measures may, added to the proposed bestowal of an honorary title on Municipal Commissioners, make Municipal Commissionerships more attractive; but, until official dictation ceases, it is a limited number of really earnest, or naturally contentious, men whose views will be truthfully represented by their speeches and by their votes.

16. I do not suppose that the introduction into a Town of the Municipal Act, present or former, would ever have been proposed by any officer, or sanctioned by Government, if it were not for the knowledge that the management and administration would be, in point of fact, official. The Commissioner expects from the President, the President expects from the Vice-President, and the Vice-President expects from the Mámlatdár and other official members that cordial co-operation in carrying out their views which shall ensure at least a verbal assent from the non-official members.

17. The District Municipal Act has been drawn out on a very broad basis of official control. The real test of the ability of a City or Town Municipality to exercise local self-government would be to relieve it of official influence. But this is almost impossible under the existing law, as will be seen from the following summary:—

City Municipalities.

(1.) The Collector is the President.
(2.) The Collector as President presides at the meetings of the Commissioners.
(3.) If for some reason he cannot preside his nominee presides (unless he fails to make the appointment).
(4.) The Collector, as President, has—
  (1.) The sole authority to submit questions of importance for the decision of the Commissioners.
  (2.) A casting vote in the decision of such questions.
  (3.) The power of suspending any resolution carried against a minority of not less than two-fifths of those who have voted on the motion.
  (4.) The power of referring the matter for the decision of the Governor in Council; or, in other words, of appealing to the Governor in Council against the decision of the said majority.

Town Municipalities.

(1.) The Collector is the President.
(2.) His Assistant is the Vice-President.

(3.) The power and responsibility for carrying out the purposes of the Act is vested in the Collector, as President, finally.

(4.) He can overrule the opinion of the whole body of the Commissioners.

(5.) His Assistant, as Vice-President, can also overrule the opinion of the whole body of the Commissioners, subject to appeal to the Collector, as President.

(6.) The Collector, as President, as his assistant as Vice-President, displace the Chairman who has been elected by the Commissioners, at all meetings which they attend and as they have at such meetings the sole authority to submit questions of importance for discussion, so they can decline to submit for discussion questions which they do not consider it advisable to bring forward.

18. It is further to be noted that the Commissioners of Divisions who are required to report to Government (Section 98) their opinions of the manner in which the Act is carried out, have also by Government Resolution No. 1631 of the 11th June 1874, had delegated to them the power of deciding finally on the references made to them by the President of a City Municipality who may have suspended a resolution of the Commissioners. It must therefore be well known to the Municipal Commissioners that, in order to carry any motion brought forward by the President, at the request of the Commissioner of the Division, the former has but to secure the necessary minority, and refer the matter for the decision of the officer who was the prime mover in it and whose decision is almost a forgone conclusion. The securing of a minority of the requisite strength should not be a difficult matter where one-third of the Commissioners are officials. With their votes, and the votes of only *two* out of the *twenty* non-official Commissioners, at a full meeting, the majority of two-fifths would be obtained.

19. The law as it stands gives so much scope for official control in City Municipalities, and subjects the Committees of Town Municipalities so completely to the dictation of the revenue authorities, that, unless it is amended, it seems almost hopeless to expect the Commissioners to realise their responsibilities, or show any independence.

20. I propose then for City Municipalities, that the authority of the President to preside at meetings should not only be withdrawn, but that a provision should be made that he should in no case preside. The meetings should be presided over by a Chairman to be elected for the year, who should be a non-official and who should have the authority to submit questions for discussion, possess a casting vote, and have that power of suspending resolutions which the President now has, he should then refer the matter to the President for submission, with that officer's opinion to the Commissioner of the Division. A copy of all proceedings held at meetings should be sent to the President, who (this as a rule, not a law) should not attend meetings unless he has some special reason for doing so. The object of this latter provision is that the Commissioners should learn to depend more on their own opinions, and discover the necessity of forming their opinions independently of the guidance of the Collector. The result, would, I think, be an increased appreciation of individual responsibility.

21. As regards Town Municipalities, the independence and responsibilities of the Committee might be increased by restricting the President's and Vice-President's powers of overruling the opinions of the other members to cases in which the majority is not more than three-fourths of those who may have voted on the motion, and by providing that the Chairman shall, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, be elected from the non-official members, and that he shall not be displaced at any meeting by the President or Vice-President. As in City Municipalities so in the Town Municipalities, neither the President nor Vice-President should attend meetings except for some good reason; but copies of the proceedings should be sent to the Vice-President, for submission, with any remarks he may have to make to the President.

22. Such changes as I propose in the previous two paragraphs would, I think, go some way towards securing what I understand to be the desire of the Government of India, *viz.* that official control should be from without rather than from within.

23. I will now pass on to the subject of

Local Funds Administration.

24. I observe that in your letter No. 1254 of the 3rd April last, you reported to Government that the Collectors and Presidents of District Local Funds and Municipal Committees might be said to be unanimously opposed to any present extension of existing self-government in respect of Local Funds and Municipalities. I would, however, submit that this does not altogether represent my views. I have not by me as I write the letter which I addressed to you on the subject; but I remember that the general purport of it was, that, as regards Local Fund administration, it was so official that local self-government in this branch could not be said to have an existence, and was not therefore open to extension. With the utmost respect I would here add, in allusion to your remark that "we are in fact in this Presidency already far in advance of most other parts of India," that whatever may be done in other provinces, we are, though in passession of a good law for Local Fund administration by Local Boards, as backward in practice as though neither Boards nor cess-payers had a voice in the matter. For all practical purposes the representatives of the cess-payers are non-existent; and the whole administration of the Funds devolves on the officials who meet at the District Committees and who have to carry out any orders that Government may be pleased to pass respecting the assignment of funds towards certain objects, or for the advancement of schemes which Government have directed shall be considered with a view to their being carried out. Practically the Commissioner of the Division has been given by Government the entire control of the Local Funds. The "control and general supervision" over the proceedings of the District Committee, which is by Bombay Act III. of 1869 given to the Commissioner has been, by Government Resolution No. 341 A.—588 of the 23rd December 1873, interpreted so as to compel the Committee "to omit, or to insert, any particular work or item of expenditure," as they may be instructed by the Commissioner. The Committee have certainly a right to appeal to Government, but if the Commissioner should be acting in accordance with the expressed views of Government in insisting on funds being provided for particular projects, an appeal to Government would exhibit the President of the Committee, who is the Collector of the District, in

opposition to the Commissioners and to Government, who expect him to carry their views through the Committee.

25. The Local Fund Budget, Rule 3, lays down that "the Local Fund Committee shall initiate all expenditure from Local Funds;" but this sole right of initiation of expenditure is completely nullified by abovementioned resolution, which obliges the Committee to insert any particular work or item of expenditure which may be initiated by the Commissioner.

26. The law of the Act is good. It imposes (Section 4) on the Committee the "duty * * to ascertain, and, in so far as the means at its disposal will allow, to provide for the requirements of the district." The non-official and the local revenue official members have unquestionably a more intimate knowledge of the local requirements of the district, *i.e.* the wants of the local population than any one else can have. The non-official members live among the cess-payers and the revenue official members move about among them for a great part of the year. They hear from them what their most pressing wants are and they learn from hearing them the wisdom and farsightedness of that provision in Local Fund Budget Rule 3 which enjoins that "the Committee shall * guard against Local Funds being concentrated on large distant objects to the neglect of more immediate local wants."

27. The Committees are made to duly appreciate their responsibilties to the cess-payers by the provision that they may be sued against in the name of their Presidents ; and I do not imagine that, if a suit were brought against a Committee by a cess-payer for maladministration or malversation of that fund which Government has (Government Resolution No. 2074, Revenue Department, of April 7th, 1873), impressed on their officers to be "the property of those by whom it has been contributed,' the members of it would be permitted to pay damages and costs out of that fund. They would be made jointly and severally liable, unless they could plead the orders of the Commissioner or of Government, and throw the defence on their shoulders.

28. These measures are admirably devised to secure efficient and judicious local administration of local funds, and to teach local residents the responsibilities and advantages of local self-government. But they are liable to be upset at any moment by the action of the Commissioner or of Government, when either authority desires to initiate expenditure, and to order provision to be made for undertakings which have not been contemplated by the Committee.

29. The rural population of the district must necessarily know better than any one else what their own local wants are, and as they are the cess-payers from whom the Local Funds are mainly collected they have a distinct right to have those wants supplied before any expenditure is undertaken which has for its object the general development of the country. As a matter of fact the general development of the country is an undertaking altogether outside the duties of Local Committees. Their duties are strictly local, such as the improvement of the internal communications, water-supply, &c. &c., of the District in which the cess is raised.

30. I am quite sure that the Local Fund Committee of this district would under no circumstances have initiated the expenditure of over Rs. 74,000 on a section of a provincial road, of which section only three miles is within the district limits. The Local Funds were originally raised, in order to supply means for satisfying the many minor requirements of the locality or district, which the Provincial Funds could not meet. They were never intended to be utilised as contributions towards Provincial works, and I feel confident if application were made by any cess-payer to the Civil Courts, an injunction to restrain the Committee from making such contributions would be granted without hesitation. Government have, however, directed the contribution to be made; and passed their Resolution (285 C. W.—894 of 8th July 1881) on the subject without any reference being made to the Committee.

31. Less than six years ago Government in their Resolution No. 5878 of the 14th October 1876, stated—

> "*It is the fixed policy of Government* that the local wants of the people should be attended to in the expenditure of the one anna cess before projects for the general development of the resources of the country, such as long roads, are taken in hand."

Yet recently Government have approved of a scheme which involves an estimated contribution from the Local Funds of two Districts for two Provincial roads of no less than Rs. 7,69,356, of which the Belgaum is Rs. 5,29,356. The scheme further provides for local roads at a cost to Belgaum of about 2 lákhs of rupees : and provides for a loan, the repayment of which will seriously affect the fund for 50 years, during which many lákhs of rupees will go simply in payment of interest on the loan.

32. I refer to these matters merely to exemplify how, although there is every provision for Local Fund administration by District and Táluka Local Boards, local self-government cannot at present be more than purely nominal.

33. So long as Government or the Commissioner take the initiation of expenditure out of the Committee's hands, and order them to supply funds for the keep of Government stallions or other undertakings, such as expensive roads, &c., it is vain to expect that either the cess-payers or their representatives can regard the so-called local self-government as a matter of fact. During my late tour through the district I have not once, that I can remember, had any application for the making or improvement of a road, but I doubt if I have made a single camp without hearing the universal cry for well and repairs to tanks. Water is an immediate, urgent, local want all round the district, and it is not a satisfactory reply to give to the cess-payers of a village which is distressed for want of this necessity of life, that the having to provide funds for the construction of roads in a distant part of the district, obliges me to postpone considering their wants. The old tálukwár system of expenditure had its advantages, in that it ensured such attention, as the collections in the táluka permitted, being paid to the requirements of its inhabitants. If works were not done in one village, still the inhabitants of it heard of something being carried out in some not very distant village, and so had evidence that the payments they made were being applied to local wants. The Táluka Committees moreover had a direct interest in ascertaining the more urgent wants of their charge when they were certain that the chief portion of the collections made in it would be expended where it was collected.

34. It appears to me that, with respect to local self-government we were more in advance when the Local Funds system was first worked, and for some years after, than we are now. The non-official members of both Táluka and District Committees used certainly to take a greater interest in the preparation of the Budgets than they now do. The Presidents and members of the Táluka Committees (I speak from my own experience) felt a real interest in their Budgets. They had the assurance that a certain number of works would be carried out in the táluka. They carefully studied their income from the one anna cess and discussed with zeal, not unattended sometimes, with high, but laudable, excitement which of the many suggested works should be carried out. They had a sure and certain knowledge that those public works which were set down against the two-thirds of the one anna cess would be entered in the District Budget, and if there still remained some urgent local requirement which their means from the above source would not admit of being entered in the Táluka Budget, they had good grounds for hope that the District Committee, whose Budget was drawn against other funds in addition to the one anna cess, would try to help them. No official dictation cramped their field of action; they possessed unrestricted freedom to initiate such expenditure as could be met from their income, and year after year the number of small, but locally extremely important, works that they saw executed in accordance with their opinions gave them a proof that local self-government was a reality, entailing grave responsibility on them, and bestowing on each member individually no small amount of power as one who could initiate in Committee the satisfaction of a local want.

35. With the abandonment of the tálukwár system of expenditure the importance of the Táluka Committees began rapidly to fade; for both the members of the Committee and the people whom they represented soon began to understand that they had lost the former guarantee that their wishes and wants would receive attention at the District Committee's meetings.

36. The official members of the District Committee, being no longer compelled to expend a certain definite amount of money on the immediate wants of each táluka found themselves irresistibly drawn away from the contemplation of minor works of immediate importance to a village, to the consideration of larger undertakings for the development of the district. What has been frequently described as "frittering away the funds in small sums with nothing to show," but which was really the keeping open of numerous useful country roads and cart tracks, or the annual construction of some small foot bridge over a torrent, began to give way to the construction of moorummed roads at great expense, and necessitating annual repairs costing considerable sums, but at the same time very insufficient when completed as far as the allotment will permit. In the meantime the cry for water for man and beast remains unsatisfied. If we continue to repair, or add to the number of these roads, there are but very limited funds for improving the water-supply. If we abandon them as causing a large and unsatisfactory expenditure, we leave the means of communication in a worse condition than it was when we first began to improve it. The rural population who are the cess-payers, who do not travel about very much, and who when they do travel, are well contented with the ordinary cart tracks, especially when the expenditure of Rs. 10 or Rs. 20 here and there removes real difficulties, would gladly exchange the made-road for a few wells, tank, bunds, or rest-houses here and there; but we can afford but very few such works, because, having taken advantage of the abandonment of the tálukwár system which placed a restriction on ambitious projects, we have raised up these white elephants of fair weather roads which swallow up a great portion of our income in keeping them in condition. I can say for myself, and I do not think that I am alone in the matter, that the satisfaction with which I enter in the Budget Rs. 2,000 for a well is in marked contrast to the feelings that I entertain when I put down the same amount for "road repairs."

37. The gist of what I have written is that, not only to revive that amount of local self-government which formerly existed, but to ensure the Local Funds being expended in a manner which will answer to the "fixed policy of Government" as enunciated in their Resolution, 5878 of the 14th October 1876, we must return to a tálukwár system of administration and expenditure.

38. That the system of local self-government should be tálukwár is I think the very decisively expressed opinion of the Government of India in their latest Resolution, as published in the dailies—

> "Para. 10. * the Governor General in Council desires that the smallest administrative unit—the sub-division, the táluka, or the tahsil—shall ordinarily form the maximum area to be placed under a local board."
>
> "* * * * the cardinal principle, which is essential to the success of self-government in any shape, is this, that the jurisdiction of the primary boards must be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of its members."

38. I need scarcely add after what I have written, that I consider it to be absolutely essential that the initiation of expenditure should rest solely with the Local Boards. This was the manifest intention of Government when the Local Fund Budget rules were prepared; and was declared in Government Resolution 234A—336 of 16th June 1875:

> "3. Government consider that the measures adopted secure the most complete financial control over their own funds by the several Local Fund Committees, *inasmuch as the initiative in all matters of expenditure is placed entirely in their hands.*"

These intentions have of late been lost sight of, and you will not fail to remember that Government have recently on more than one occasion decided that an undertaking should be carried out, and that the Local Funds should pay or subscribe towards it. The most recent is, where the Commissioner, Central Division, recommended the building of sheds, for cattle attacked by rinderpest, from Provincial Funds, but the Government directed them to be built from Local Funds. Both in small and large matters have Government within the last year taken into their hands that financial control, which seven years back they pointed out rested completely in the several Local Fund Committees. I do not think that it can be said that I am not justified in repeating that we have not advanced, but have retrograded in the system of self-government by rural Boards, to that extent that nothing but a shadow of it remains. Is it to be wondered at that the Local Fund Administration of a District has lost its interest for the non-official, and, to a great extent, for the official members of the

Committees, when the real difference between it and the Administration of the ordinary Public Works Department in a District is too slight to be appreciable?

39. I will conclude this letter by offering my opinion on the ten suggestions made by the Sabha for the re-constitution of Local Fund Committees—

I.—I concur in the proposal that every táluka should have a representative on the District Local Fund Committee; but would have that representative elected *for a term of three years,* by the non-official members of the Táluka Committee.

II.—I have never understood the object of insisting on an Inámdár being on the District and Táluka Committees. If there is a really good man amongst the Inámdárs he is pretty certain to be asked to join one or other of the Committees.

III.—I do not see why the "educated classes" (a very indefinite term) should be specially represented, and I apprehend that any such distinctive representation would give rise to undesirable jealousy, and undeserved reflections on the intelligence of the other, and probably more useful non-official members.

IV.—All nominations of the Táluka Committees should be made by Government. The nominations to the District Committee would be made as I proposed under Head I.

V.—The ex-officio members of both Táluka and District Committees should be as at present provided.

VI. The Collector should be the ex-officio President of the District Committee, and the Assistant Collector or Deputy Collector the President of the Táluka Committee. I make this proposal after having thoroughly weighed the pros and cons; but, unwilling as I am to continue anything approaching to official influence as affecting votes, there are so many difficulties in the way of substituting any other individual, official or non-official, that I feel compelled to hold to the existing practice.

VII.—I concur that fresh nominations of non-official members should be made every three years.

VIII.—The proposal that the *executive* work of the District should be entrusted to a managing Board is hardly susceptible of being carried out. The Board would be useless unless they visited works in progress, and they could hardly ever meet together, certainly not often enough to jointly overlook the execution of works, or perform other executive duties. I think, however, it might be attempted in a táluka.

IX.—No duties performed by members should be paid for in whole or in part.

X.—I entirely concur that the executive power and responsibility of administering the Local Fund assets should be vested in the District Committee, and that Government should only interfere in questions of principle and for general supervision.

40. Referring to the concluding remarks of the Sabha respecting the transfer of certain funds to the Local Fund and Municipal Boards, I do not think it would be safe to go much farther in that direction than has been proposed by Government with respect to the Bombay, Poona, and Ahmedabad Municipalities. Government have proposed to transfer to those Municipalities the administrative and financial control of the funds for primary education and medical charity. I decidedly advocate placing charitable dispensaries under the control of all Municipalities in which they are established, and when such an institution is not in a Municipal Town the control should be in the hands of the Táluka Local Fund Committee, subject to that of the District Committee. The Surgeon General should no longer have power to do more than inspect and record his opinion on the management, or on the qualifications of the medical officer or subordinate in charge. He should not remove, or transfer, such officer or subordinate without the written consent of the local Board, nor should he have the power to reduce or reject indents for medicines made on the authority of such local Board. Such interference imperils the success of these institutions. We have still a good deal to do in spreading the knowledge of the benefits derived from European medicines and method of treatment, but when a good medical native subordinate is appointed to a Dispensary, the people far and near soon hear of him, and mark their appreciation of his beneficial treatment. To handicap such a man by reducing his indents below requirements, or to direct his transfer for some departmental irregularity which no one knows or cares anything about, is most mischievous. You may remember that last February the Surgeon General when examining the Dispensary at Belgaum, thought that he had discovered some irregularity regarding the supply of medicines, for which he at once held the Hospital Assistant responsible, and wrote a minute ordering his transfer, and that he should not again have charge of a Dispensary. The minute was subsequently cancelled, but if it had not been, the matter would certainly have been referred to Government, as the transfer would have deprived the Municipality of a hardworking, able, and very popular medical man, and have risked the transfer of public patronage to the neighbouring Dispensary at Shahpur.

41. With the help of the Civil Surgeon and the Deputy Sanitary Commissioner, we can only dispense with the interference of the Surgeon General, but shall be in a far more satisfactory position without it. I earnestly trust that my views on this subject may appear worthy of favourable consideration.

42. I am not of opinion that the management of any other funds should be transferred to the local Board. Until there has been some training for real local self-government, it would be unwise to take advantage of the Sabha's demand, and to call on such Boards suddenly to assume a mass of responsibilities and duties which trained officials find sufficiently burdensome.

43. Finally, I beg that nothing I may have written will be regarded as in the smallest degree wanting in respect to yourself or Government. What I have written is intended as a plain exposition of my own views; and if, as is not unlikely, the accuracy or judgment of much that I have said may not be admitted, I still trust that I may not be thought to have wilfully given offence or to have assumed a tone of captiousness and fault-finding, which would be as unbecoming in a letter addressed to yourself as it would be repugnant to my own sense of propriety.

44. I have had my letter copied in my own house as I have not thought it advisable that it should be read by any member of my office establishment.

I have, &c.

A. CLARKE-JERVOISE,

Collector of Belgaum.

BOMBAY REPORTS—*continued.*

No. 2721 of 1882.

From THE ACTING COLLECTOR of RATNA'GIRI to THE ACTING UNDER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department.

SIR, Ratnágiri Collector's Office, 27th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to submit my views on the Government of India Resolution on the preamble to Government Resolution No. 2100 of 7th June 1882.

2. The subject of the extension of local self-government naturally falls under two heads:—

(*a*) Municipal Boards.
(*b*) Rural Boards.

3. Now, as regards Municipal Boards I am respectfully of an opinion that no legislation whatever is required. All that need be done is to turn a certain number of Town Municipalities into City Municipalities. This will largely increase the independence and administrative freedom of the Commissioners: and ought thus to fully answer the purpose of the Government of India. Each Collector will be able to say what Town Municipalities he would recommend for the enlarged powers: and as far as this District is concerned, I have already proposed Ratnágiri. As regards the proportion of non-official to ex-officio members in these City Boards, the Act requires the exact proportion laid down by the Government of India, *viz.* at least two to one. These town Boards should always, I think, be left entirely independent and apart from the rural Boards. The Government of India (I am thankful to see) say that election should be only gradually and cautiously extended to the smaller municipalities. There is no doubt that with the mass of the people sanitary reforms are unpopular. They hate drainage, markets, public privies, &c.: and therefore it seems to me that the elective franchise ought only to be conferred in towns where these improvements have been already carried out and not where they still remain to be carried out. For the people will vote against them.

4. Turning now to the rural Boards, the first point seems to me (with submission) to be, shall they be District Boards or Táluka Boards. And this depends upon what we want them to do. At present (I say it with the greatest respect) I think that the Local Funds are in great measure diverted from the works of purely local utility for which I believe they were originally intended and are spent on great main lines of communication which are of most vital importance to trade and as safeguards against famine; but which, being of Provincial importance, ought (I respectfully submit) to be paid for from Provincial Funds. I had much rather see these works done from Local Funds than not done at all: and as there seems no prospect of getting them done otherwise than by Local Funds, and as they are (in my opinion) of much more importance than the petty local works, I am in favour of doing them from Local Funds. But the Local Funds do not suffice for *both* classes of work: and if enough is not to be added to the funds to make them suffice for both classes, we shall have to choose one or other.

5. Now if we chose that the funds should be spent on petty local works, the Board should certainly be (I submit) a Táluka Board. I would hand over the one anna cess at any rate entirely to that Board. I would have all the Táluka Boards quite independent, consisting of about five members each, all non-officials: and I would watch what they did, examine their accounts, inspect their work, but interfere as little as possible in their meetings. I think that this system would attract and interest the members, and would please the people. There is no doubt that during the last 5 years or so, while we have been constructing main roads, the village well has been left undug, the village dharmshála unbuilt, the village chávdi unrepaired. The people cannot understand the present system, and murmur accordingly. This plan would silence those murmurs.

6. But in the meantime would Government be continuing out of Provincial Funds, the making of through lines of communication? The revival of the tálukwar system of spending Local Funds would mean that the poorest part would get the least money: and the most rugged and least developed tracts would get the least development. Would Government come to the rescue and spend Provincial money in opening up these backward parts? If they would, then I should strongly advocate the Táluka Boards, and should be rejoiced to see them set a-going.

7. But as I fear that Government would be unable then, as it is unable now, to find funds to the requisite amount: and as, if we have to choose between the two classes of work, the great and the small, we ought (I submit) to choose the former, I am respectfully of opinion that the Boards should be District Boards. It is only with District Boards that we should have any chance of getting large-minded Provincial works executed. The existence of Táluka Boards is incompatible with great schemes: and under the present system they have died of having nothing to do.

8. As regards the constitution of the District Boards, I should propose that the official members be left as they are: but that there should be a Native representative for each táluka, and so many more Native gentlemen as shall be required to bring the number of non-officials up to double the number of officials. Any attempt to suddenly introduce the elective system indiscriminately all over the country would of course end in failure: but it might be tried in one selected táluka in each Collectorate, nomination being used in all other cases. The District Board so constituted and so appointed ought to meet a short time before it actually takes charge, and frame a 5 years' budget. It ought then to hold office for those very 5 years, so as to have the satisfaction of carrying to completion the works it itself had planned. It would be sufficient if the District Board met four times or even twice a year: and for carrying on current work there ought to be a small Managing Board and a paid Executive Commissioner. Each Native member of the District Board having come up pledged to get some dharmshála or well built at his own village, and being ignorant of, and indifferent to, the wants of other parts, it is clear that if left to themselves the Native members would be very liable to come to a deadlock and settle on nothing at all. I submit therefore that the Collector should be the President of the District Board. But the managing committee should be composed entirely of non-officials.

9. The great difficulty would be to find Native gentlemen who would give up their time and come long distances for the public good. We should have to hold out as many inducements as we could: and to tempt them I would certainly confer on them some title or other, but not one that would put them above our over-worked Mámlátdárs. I would pay the travelling expenses of the Managing Board

and certainly allow a good salary to the Executive Commissioner. I would interfere with the Managing Committee as little as possible, and the proposals of the Government of India in this respect seem to me, with submission, essential to the success of the experiment—"Control should be exercised from without rather than from within. Government should revise and check the acts of the Local Bodies and not dictate them." But after all the main way of exciting and sustaining interest is to give control of more funds. Native gentlemen will not continue attending if they find that all the available funds are required for current repairs and for some one great work and that there is therefore nothing over for them to dispose of. To swell their finances a little there seems no objection to handing over the License Tax receipts to the rural Boards, if Government could spare them, but it would not do to let them have the assessing of them. And as for handing over to them most public buildings in the District I think that Government offices should never be so transferred.

10. For carrying out such a scheme as the above no legislation seems necessary, though of course the Local Fund rules would have to be re-cast. I have borrowed it in great measure from the Sarvajanik Sabha's letter, though I cannot agree with them in thinking that vakils, &c., should be specially represented, or the Inámdárs, considering that it is not they but their tenants that pay the local cess.

11. I respectfully trust that I may be allowed to say in conclusion that I should have liked to have seen extension of local self-government put off for 15 or 20 years, till we got through communications into better order, and could afford to devote our money to wells and chávdis.

I have, &c.

A. CUMINE,

Acting Collector.

No. 2748 of 1882.

From THE COLLECTOR of RATNA'GIRI, to THE ACTING UNDER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Ratnágiri Collector's Office, 29th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a careful report by Mr. Symonds on the subject of the extension of local self-government which seems to me, with submission, well worthy of perusal by Government.

2. I quite agree with him that if the Táluka Committees are to be revived and made a success they must be remodelled, made independent of the Mámlatdár, and supplied with some money to spend, which they have not got now. But the difficulty seems to me to be "If you hand the funds over to the Táluka Committees, what will you have left for the District Committee: for you certainly wont have enough for both, unless you add a good deal to the existing Local Funds." The District Committee would have nothing to spend, and no one would attend it.

3. The idea of using the village Patels to appoint representatives seems to me a good one. I am sure I hope Mr. Symonds is right in thinking that "there will be no difficulty in getting good men to serve as members as it is looked upon as an honour, and the attendance will be good when the members learn that they have power." But our experience that "the best men are often not willing to undertake the duties" of a Municipal Commissioner (para. 11) is apt to make us despondent. For if a man wont take interest in matters at his own door and attend meetings held in his own town, it is to be feared that he will scarcely interest himself in works, and attend meetings held, at the other end of the táluka. And I think, that though placing "real power" in the hands of the small Municipalities would attract the best men, it would hardly be wise to do it, for those men would be averse to sanitary reform, the thing chiefly needed in their town.

4. I have already in my own report submitted that it would be unadvisable to give members higher titles than the Mámlatdárs or to let them have anything to do with assessing the License Tax.

I have, &c.

A. CUMINE,

Acting Collector.

No. 267 of 1882.

From W. P. SYMONDS, Esquire, Acting Second Assisting Collector, Ratnágiri, to A. CUMINE, Esquire, Acting Collector of Ratnágiri.

SIR, Ratnágiri, 18th June 1882.

As required by your office No. 2582, dated the 16th instant, I have the honour to report my views on the scheme for doveloping local self-government, put forward by the Government of India, as published in the extract from the proceedings of the Government of Bombay, in the General Department, No. 2100, dated 7th June 1882.

2. I believe the policy to be a most liberal and enlightened one, and I have no doubt that if the independent members of the Local Boards see that they are entrusted with real authority and real responsibility, they will in a very short time become equal to the position, and prove that the people of this country are, with the moral support of a strong Supreme Government, as capable of intelligent local self-government as any people in the world.

3. There will of course be many difficulties at first, such as the constitution of the Boards so as to get the best men, and represent adequately the opinions of the intelligent part of the population, the control to be exercised by Government officials, and the passing of measures, sanitary and the like, which Natives as a body are not yet sufficiently educated to appreciate, and which an independent Board might be inclined to ignore. But I think that none of these difficulties are insurmountable, and I believe that, as stated by the Government of India, the system will afford the officers of Government "a fairer field for the exercise of administrative tact and directive energy than the more autocratic system which it supersedes."

4. With regard to rural local bodies, the táluka will presumably be the administrative unit, and the present Local Fund Committee will be the nucleus of the rural Board. At present certain objections attach to the Táluka Local Fund Committee. The members are chosen in a way which does not give the most useful members and which does not represent the various classes which should be represented. All the work that there is, is done by the Mámlatdár, the other members rarely doing more than suggest some petty scheme for the advantage of their own particular villages. And lastly, the Committee has at present no authority to do anything. In fact, after recommending works for execution for several years and finding them still unsanctioned, the Assistant Collector is often positively ashamed to call the members together.

5. There will be no difficulty in getting good men to serve as members as it is looked upon as an honour, and the attendance will be good. When the members learn that they have power, I would increase the number of members. The Inámdárs should continue to nominate a representative, and there should be at least one representative from each tarf, or subdivision of táluka. The headmen of the villages in each tarf should be called upon to nominate their representative, and in case of rival claims, a simple system of election might easily be introduced. Then if there were any important class not represented this should be remedied.

6. The members should then be called upon to elect their own chairman. The Mámlatdár should be a member ex-officio, but should not be chairman, and should not be allowed to vote. His province should be to assist the deliberations with his advice. The Assistant Collector should be President of the Táluka Committee, and the Collector of the District Committee as now, but their control should be limited. I think the best way would be to give them simply a power of veto. They would also have the power of convening meetings, and of making suggestions, but not of voting. In the event of a Committee persisting in a course which the President considers impolitic, an appeal to Government would be necessary.

7. By these measures I think the proper constitution and independence of the Committees would be secured. But of even more importance than this is the question of the amount of authority to be given them, and in this the principal point is the amount of the funds to be placed at their disposal. I note in para. 1 of the Resolution of the Government of India that the scheme of local self-government is considered an integral part of the general policy of decentralisation of finance. Three or four years ago a step in the opposite direction was taken. Local Funds were directed to be spent over a whole district, visiting particular tálukas in turn instead of by tálukas as hitherto. Now if the Táluka Committees are to have any vitality at all, it will be necessary to return, to some extent, to the method of expenditure of Local Funds by tálukas, or at least for the District Committee to allot every year a fixed sum for the Táluka Committee to Budget against. It would not be worth while to improve the constitution of the Táluka Committees unless they are to know definitely what sums they are to have at their disposal.

8. The District Committee might conveniently be formed of delegates chosen by the Táluka Committees in addition to the present members.

9. It will not be possible, I imagine, to give these Committees control over the collection of Local Fund cess, as this must be collected along with the Land Revenue, but pound and ferry receipts might be supervised by them.

10. I think there will be no difficulty in providing for the supervision by the District Engineer of the works executed or maintained by the Local Boards. But I think it would be better for the District Committee to set aside an annual contribution on this account for the whole district, than for the Local Boards to contribute sums with reference to the work done, as proposed in Section 22 of Resolution of the Government of India.

11. In the constitution of Municipal Committees a greater difficulty presents itself. The best men are often not willing to undertake the duties. At present the Municipal Committee does not at all represent the population of the town. The chief cause of this is no doubt, as stated by the Government of India, that the best men have no sufficient inducement to give up time and attention to the transaction of public business. It is not unlikely that if we can make it fully understood that "real power is placed in their hands and that they have real responsibilities to discharge," the best men may be willing to come forward. It will then be necessary to draw up tables showing the way in which the various trading communities, and castes, are distributed in the town, and then call upon each community or caste to nominate one or more representatives. Election might be resorted to in the case of rival claims, but a caste meeting or assembly of merchants would probably settle on a representative without this. The members should be called upon to elect their own chairman, not being an official member. The official members might be the same as now. I would even add the head-schoolmaster and the dispensary doctor, but they should confine themselves to debate without voting. The Collector and his Assistant should have powers similar to those in the case of the rural committees.

12. It is necessary that the Mámlatdár should be a member, as his local knowledge and experience cannot be dispensed with. Moreover, he must always be the executive officer of the Collector and his Assistant, who are responsible for proper local government. But it is an essential part of the scheme that he should not be looked upon as prime mover and director. The Board should undertake and be responsible for the management of all Municipal concerns, both of revenue and expenditure, the President being restricted to placing his veto on changes which appear impolitic, and suggesting for the consideration of the Board such measures as from time to time appear desirable.

13. There is a difficulty which I have referred to before. In some towns sanitary arrangements are still far from perfect; can it be expected that Native members of a Committee will carry out the views of Government on this subject, when their own daily habits are totally opposed to those views, and when they believe that most sanitary precautions are a mere fad, far more likely to cause trouble and expense than to do good? But still I think this matter may be disposed of by "administrative tact and directive energy."

14. Another point is that statistics, which are such an important matter under our administration, will inevitably become less accurate when local self-government becomes an accomplished fact.

15. With reference to the proposal of the Government of India to confer the titles of Khán and Ráo Báhádur on members of the Committees, I cannot but think that it is somewhat ill advised. The effect would be to lower very much the value of this title to all the present holders, and to raise members of Committees to a higher rank than Mámlatdárs. There is a lower rank, that of Khán Sáheb and Ráo Sáheb, which Mámlatdárs hold during time of office, which would amply satisfy members of Committees, and afford quite sufficient inducement to them to covet the position. At present they are addressed as plain "Mister," which is not considered an honour.

16. The proposal that the License Tax assessments and collections might be made over to the Local Boards appears open to grave objection. I think it is an important point that the Boards should only be concerned with the collection of revenue which they are themselves to spend. In the case of the License Tax it is not, I suppose, the intention of Government to hand over the proceeds for local expenditure. The members of Boards would therefore have no interest in its proper collection. But they would, it is to be feared, have a direct and personal interest in its improper assessment.

17. I regret that this report is much more imperfect than I should have wished to make it owing to the short time given me for its preparation.

I have, &c.
W. P. SYMONDS,
Acting Second Assistant Collector.

No. 2778 of 1882.

From R. E. CANDY, Esquire, Acting Collector of Kánara, to THE UNDER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Revenue Department, Bombay.

SIR, Kárwár, 5th July 1882.

I HAVE the honour to report in accordance with the instructions of Government as Local self-government contained in Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th June 1882.

2. Kánara differs essentially in many respects from other parts of the Bombay Presidency, there being no village system such as is found in the Deccan.

3. Below the ghâts, the villages are numerous and thickly populated. The population is chiefly composed of the fisher and cultivating classes, who have little or no education. Above ghâts houses are few and far between, but the families which inhabit them are often wealthy and influential, though it must be admitted only half-educated. Around these houses hamlets of labourers and tenants spring up. These people are devoted to agriculture, and neither care nor know anything of what is going on in the world outside their circle. These observations are recorded for the purpose of showing how difficult it will be to create a system of self-government.

4. Two hundred years ago the country was ruled by the Sonda Kings, and authority was in the hands of few; this period was followed by the cruel tyranny of Tippoo Sultan, to be succeeded by the paternal rule of the Madras Government. In fact, until Municipalities were established under the Bombay Government, the people had no notion of self-government, and even now such ideas are feeble.

5. When Act XX. of 1863 was passed, and Government washed their hands of all interference in the affairs of religious endowments, full power was vested in the Temple Committees, of which one was given to each táluka consisting of eleven members. The temple trustees, it was settled, should be appointed by the Committee and removable by them. The Collector and Revenue officials were directed not to supervise the action of the Committees in any way. If the question be asked, "Has this arrangement been successful, and do the temple trustees act honestly and for the good of the interests committed to them," the answer on every side will be No! and many persons, I feel convinced, would be only too glad if the Collector were to overhaul the accounts and insist that the trustees should repair the temples, and spend the funds on the temple worship and for the benefit of the devotees. I have introduced this subject because it is an example of what occurred in the past, from which alone we may infer what will probably take place in the future. Government must proceed most cautiously, as I feel sure we are inaugurating a scheme a quarter of a century before this part of the country is ripe for it. I would beg most strongly to suggest for the consideration of Government, the advisability of amending Act XX. of 1863, and placing the administration of all temple endowments under the Local Boards.

6. Kánara, I may say, is a district in which autocratic government has prevailed and been loyally acquiesced in by the people, and it will no doubt take some time before their minds will be able to grasp other views and regard self-government with satisfaction. Among Vakils, pensioners, Sowkárs, and a few land-holders, we shall be able to find men willing and competent to serve on Local Boards, but not among the mass of people. I have not had much time or opportunity to converse with Native gentlemen of my district on the subject, but one point I have certainly elicited. The members of the boards must be in a measure independent and must have power to carry out their schemes without hindrance from the Mámlatdár, otherwise all interest will die away and self-government must of necessity be failure.

7. I have drawn up a scheme which, I think, might be tried as an experiment. I would however beg most respectfully to point out that Government will not be wise in conferring on all members of such Boards the honorary title of Ráo Bahádur. Mámlatdárs and Subordinate Judges are styled Ráo Sáhebs, and they occupy the highest positions in the tálukas in which they reside. In Kánara there are only 3 officers who have attained the rank of Ráo Bahádur, *viz.* the First Class Subordinate Judge, the Police Inspector, and the Collector's Dafterdár. After years of toil passed in the service of Government they have gained this title as a reward of merit, but what will it be worth if it is to be shared by every member of a Táluka Board who may be quite ignorant and unfit for the position he occupies. Are Mámlatdárs also to remain Ráo Sáhebs, while the Vakils, ryots and others under their

authority become Ráo Bahádurs? The very idea seems preposterous. I would suggest the following plan. Let each member of the Board be styled Ráo Sáheb, then will they sit as equals at the Board with the Mámlatdár and other Government officials and let the distinction of Ráo Bahádur be reserved for such members as by their public spirit, their honesty, zeal and work make their names stand out from among their fellows.

8. In the same way I would most earnestly deprecate any action which shall tend to cast any slight on the authority of District Officers who are responsible for the welfare and peace of the people entrusted to them. Government have been served loyally and well by their officers hitherto, and these officers may now be trusted to loyally carry out the wishes of Government and foster the efforts of the people to attain the art of self-government, but the authority of these officers should not be weakened.

9. The scheme which I have sketched is naturally very rough, but it is impossible to work up details without long and free discussion.

10. I have not made any place in my scheme for Municipalities, as I think that so far as this district is concerned, they are working fairly, and I have made provision for their representation at the District Board where their interests will be touched.

I have, &c.
R. E. CANDY,
Acting Collector of Kánara.

SCHEME FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF LOCAL BOARDS.

1. In each táluka of a District, there shall be a Local Board invested with power to administer Local Funds Schools, Dispensaries, religious endowments, &c.

2. Where the táluka is entirely rural, such Board shall consist of 12 members, of whom 3 shall be ex-officio, viz. the Mámlatdár, the Chief Constable and the Táluka School Head Master. The other nine shall be elected by the votes of the people who are entitled to vote.

3. In addition to the Táluka Boards, there shall be a District Board of which the official members shall be the Collector as President; each Assistant Collector in charge of tálukas, the Police Superintendent, the Civil Surgeon, the Executive Engineer of the District and each Mámlatdár.

4. Each Táluka Board shall select two members every year out of their number to sit on the District Board; each Municipality should in a similar manner select two members of the Municipal Corporation to sit on the District Board.

5. It shall be lawful for the Collector, whenever any question arises between two Táluka Boards or affecting the general interests of the District to summon a meeting of the District Board, giving a notice of 15 days.

6. All questions discussed at such meetings shall be decided by a majority of votes, the President having the right of a casting vote.

RURAL BOARDS.

7. In Kánara there are eight tálukas, so there will be eight Táluka Boards to be constituted as laid down in para. 2.

8. The members of these Boards should meet once a week on market day at the táluka town at any hour they find convenient; if in the evening, they should meet at the school house or other building which may be convenient. Five members shall constitute a quorum.

9. The points for determination are:—

I.—What persons should be eligible for election.

(1.) Landholders who pay Rs. 200 assessment and upwards.
(2.) Persons assessed under the License Tax at Rs. 60 and upwards.
(3.) Government servants who draw a salary of not less than Rs. 50 a month who are not in the Revenue or Judicial Departments.
(4.) Pensioned servants of Government who draw a pension of not less than Rs. 20 a month.
(5.) Graduates of any University.
(6.) Ministers of any religious denomination, *e.g.* Missionaries, Kazis, Swamis and Sanyasis, and
(7.) Vakils who have passed the examination and have received Sanads.

10. It will be the duty of the Collector to see that correct lists of persons falling under the above seven classes in each táluka are prepared. Notice will then be sent by postal cards to each such person informing him his name is in the list, and if within one month he does not reply his assent shall be inferred.

II.—Who shall have the right of voting at elections.

(1.) Persons who pay Government assessment of Rs. 50 and upwards.
(2.) All persons assessed under the License Tax.
(3.) All Government servants who receive a salary of not less than Rs. 20 a month.
(4.) All pensioners who draw a pension of not less than Rs. 10 a month.
(5.) All matriculates of any University.
(6.) Vakils practising in any Courts.
(7.) All Patels and Shánbhogs.

Lists of such persons shall be prepared in each táluka at least three months prior to the date of an election taking place, and the Collector should have power to hear and determine applications for admission to the electoral body and also to reject them.

III.—How, when and by whom shall elections be conducted?

12. In Kánara, every táluka is divided into Phirkas, each of which comprises a number of villages and is managed by a Shánbhog or Kulkarni. Where one Phirka does not contain a sufficient number of persons eligible for election, the Collector may group two or more Phirkas together.

13. Each Shánbhog shall take the votes of the electors as he sits to collect the revenue. Each elector shall write the names of those he chooses with his own hand, or if he cannot write the Shánbhog shall write at his dictation. It shall be lawful for any elector who chooses to send in his vote by a letter to the Mámlatdár. When the Shánbhog sends in his report of the 1st instalment, he shall send in all the votes received by him. These shall be tabulated in the Mámlatdár's office and submitted to the Collector for sanction.

14. The names of those elected with the number of votes each has received shall then be published and submitted to the Commissioner for final sanction and publication in the *Government Gazette.*

15. Every third year three members shall retire in rotation, but shall be eligible for re-election.

16. When the members of each Táluka Board have been duly elected they shall proceed to elect a chairman from among themselves and shall appoint a Secretary to the Board on Rs. 15 a month.

17. The Local Fund Cess, Dispensary Grants, Ferry, and Toll proceeds, Pound receipts, License Tax and other miscellaneous receipts shall then be handed over to the Board, and they shall be required to administer the funds keeping up all Local Fund roads, trees, bungalows, pounds, bridges, school-houses, dispensaries, dharmshálas, wells, tanks, ferry boats, &c.

18. The Board shall bank with the Táluka Treasury. Money shall be drawn by cheques which shall be signed by the chairman and two other members.

19. All accounts, papers and proceedings of the Board shall remain in the Táluka Kacheri as the other Government records with the Mámlatdár.

20. The Board may give contracts and make their own arrangements for the execution of works.

21. They may fine, suspend and dismiss all persons employed and paid by the Board.

22. It shall be the duty of the Executive Engineer, and his subordinates, to prepare all estimates and undertake the execution of any works which the Board may require. Such application shall be made through the Collector.

23. No Board shall impose any fresh tax without the sanction of the Local Government.

IV.—Relations between the Assistant Collector in charge of the Táluka and the Táluka Board.

24. He may be present at meetings and give advice, but shall not preside or dictate any policy. He shall regularly examine all the accounts kept by the Board and bring to notice any irregularity or fraud. He shall also when on tour, visit and inspect all works carried on under the orders of the Board. No completion certificate shall be accepted unless countersigned by the Assistant Collector. The Assistant Collector shall have power, if he discovers any fraud, to suspend, under the orders of the Collector, any member of the Board implicated, pending the enquiry.

25. A statement of the receipts and expenditure will be submitted quarterly to the Accountant General through the Collector of the District, and a copy of the same to Government through the Commissioner of the Division.

26. At the close of the year, *i.e.*, in June or July, the Board should submit to the Collector a short report through the Assistant Collector showing receipts and expenditure for the previous 12 months.

27. There shall not be any permanent District Board, but if at any time any question arises affecting the District as a whole, it shall be competent for the Collector to convene a meeting of the District Board which shall be composed of the members as stated in paras. 3 and 4 at a time and place fixed by him.

28. During the time each such delegate is engaged on the District Board he shall be allowed by his Táluka Board batta at the rate of Rs. 3 per diem.

29. The Collector shall preside at the meeting of the District Board and shall take the votes of the meeting on each question, he himself having a casting vote.

30. The decisions arrived at by the District Board shall be binding on each Táluka Board.

31. The Collector when on tour shall inspect the accounts and records of each Táluka Board, and shall inspect as many works as possible, inviting the members of the Boards to accompany him.

32. Once a year the Collector shall depute a trained accountant from his office to examine and audit the accounts of each Táluka Board. He shall draw up a memorandum of all mistakes for communication to the Board.

33. While on this work, he shall receive batta from each Táluka Board in turn.

34. No members of any Local Board shall be dismissed without the sanction of Government.

35. Every member shall be held to be a public servant as defined by the Penal Code. Appeals from orders passed by the Táluka Boards shall lie to the Collector whose orders shall be final.

R. E. Candy,
Collector of Kánara.

No. 4394 of 1882.

From H. N. B. Erskine, Esquire, Commissioner in Sind, to His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir James Fergusson, Bart., K.C.M.G. & C.I.E., Governor and President in Council, Bombay, General Department.

Right Honourable Sir, Commissioner's Office, Karáchi, 15th July 1882.

I have the honour to submit the report called for in Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th ultimo, on the Resolution of the Government of India, dated the 18th May, on various matters connected with the extension of local self-government.

2. The Government of India in paragraph 8 have divided the subjects to be considered into two heads—

1st.—The mode in which local Boards, whether Municipal or District, should generally be constituted, and

2nd.—The degree of control which the Government should retain over such bodies, and the manner in which that control should be exercised.

3. With regard to the first point, I have always been of opinion that no really representative body can ever be secured under one system, either of election or nomination, except in exceptional instances, such as the Presidency towns. The only local bodies I have ever seen which could be said to be popular bodies were the old Village Panchâits—bodies possessing no sort of legal status, but yet so full of vitality that even after they had been superseded in many large towns by Municipal Committees, they had double the influence and power of the latter. These Panchâits worked through the heads of the caste, or perhaps I should say availed themselves of caste organization to a great extent, and had through the dread felt by the people of being put out of caste, very great power indeed, while popular feeling was quite sufficient to act as a check on the actions of the members of the Panchâit.

4. I have seen so much good work done by these entirely independent Committees, that I certainly have never been able to understand the oft-repeated cry that Natives of this country have no capacity for self-government. It is only when their own Panchâits are Europeanized and converted into Municipal Committees that Natives cease to take an interest in municipal matters. Nor is this to be wondered at, for the members of Municipal Committees find themselves smothered in Acts and Rules, Budgets and Bye-laws, till they cannot venture to do anything, while at the same time they have no real authority to compensate for this, for they cannot punish, neither can they tax. Moreover, in the case of the greater number of small Municipalities the whole system is a sort of parody of self-government. A number of wealthy and respectable gentlemen are appointed or elected Municipal Commissioners on account of their position, and are asked to meet in solemn conclave to decide what is to be done in the course of the year with some petty sum like £50 or £100, which, after fixed charges have been arranged for, is all that is left for disposal, and then we express wonder that the members show littlle interest in the proceedings. Men accustomed to deal with thousands, and indeed many with lákhs of rupees on their own motion are accused of indifference, because they do not show animated interest over the expenditure of a few rupees on a new latrine, or over the question whether the man in charge of the public market should receive Rs. 6 or Rs. 7 a month!

5. Even in our larger municipalities the hands of the Commissioners are so tied and their powers so confined, that even though they have to discuss more important matters involving a much larger outlay, they rarely can get up much enthusiasm, and where they have been got to show such interest, this can generally be traced to the influence of some official who has in the first instance laboured to attract the Commissioners and induce them to take an active part in the management.

6. All this has long ago convinced me that our present Boards, whether Municipal or District, are never in their existing forms likely to show much vitality or do much good except through the ex-officio members. These last, almost without exception, have always worked conscientiously and well, but it has been work after a European model, not after a Native, and therefore a great deal of it possesses no permanency, as when its author leaves the work is too often dropped. But it may be asked, what would these bodies be now without their ex-officio members?—to that I must reply, veritable dry bones without any life in them. But that is the very reason I object to the present system, because I am satisfied that so long as it is maintained, so long also must Boards remain to be shams.

7. When, however, the question is asked, how can existing faults be remedied and how can Native members be induced to take an interest in Municipal and Local Funds proceedings, I feel the question is one I am unable to answer in a satisfactory manner. It is not the composition of the Boards that is so much in fault as the procedure, but still many gentlemen of a class that would be extremely useful on Boards, now object to be nominated because they feel that their position, without any real authority, is anything but an inviting one. But it may be asked, how comes it that they have no real power when everywhere they exceed in number the official element? There are several reasons for this, but one is quite enough to give, namely, that out of the non-official elements a large portion in the nature of things must side with officials, and that anything like independent action becomes difficult and places the actor in an invidious position. The more interest a Collector takes in his district, the more anxious he is to carry on improvements, and therefore the more he feels opposition to his schemes. Overworked as he almost invariably is, he grudges time wasted (as he thinks) in useless discussions, and therefore generally checks it as much as possible.

8. Boards might well be considered as divided into four classes, viz.:—

1. The Board of a City Municipality.
2. Do. Town do.
3. District Local Fund Committee.
4. Táluka Local Fund Committee.

9. The first of these classes is even now tolerably independent, in some places quite so, and as the power of electing representatives is to be conferred on these Municipalities, these Boards are likely soon to become practically independent of the official element in them. I see no reason to think that the change proposed in the case of these cities will not give satisfactory results, and I have no further suggestions to make regarding them.

10. In the case of the second class Town Municipalities, I do not think (so long as our system continues) that really efficient working Boards could be obtained were they freed at once from the

control of officials. I would rather see them for the present left as they are, until, from seeing the power possessed by Boards in the City Municipalities, they show a real desire for emancipation.

11. As regards the third class District Local Fund Committees, I think the present Boards are the best that could be got together, and I have no desire to recommend any change in their composition.

12. The same may be said of the fourth class. They do, it is true, nothing or next to nothing now, but this is simply because the direct action of Government has interfered with their usefulness; but this is a point that will require consideration when discussing the degree of control that should be exercised by Government.

13. These four classes if encouraged to act, and if more financial control is placed in their hands, will, I think, meet the wishes of the Government of India, as described in para. 10.

The question raised in para. 11 is one that, so far as Sind is concerned, may be left for a time. No difficulties have yet been experienced and until some such arise, it would be in my opinion a mistake to make rules to meet possible contingencies.

14. With regard to election as the means of obtaining members of local Boards, I have no desire at present to see the system extended beyond what has been proposed by your Excellency's Government. In time the principle may be extended, but such changes should be gradual. If, however, any further extension in this direction is contemplated, then the system sketched in para. 13 by the Government of India seems well suited for the purpose.

15. With regard to the system of election to be followed in City Municipalities, if it is to be by quarters and wards, then I think the system recommended by the Collector of Karáchi for that City Municipality might be tried for all in Sind, and I think to that the qualifications recommended by him might also be accepted. At the same time the number of exceptions would have to be increased, as I am of opinion that men who have been convicted of certain classes of serious offences and sentenced to imprisonment should be excluded from the voting list, and likewise men who for gross misconduct have been dismissed from the public service, and possibly some others also.

Letter No. 2599 to Government, dated 3rd July.

16. Personally, instead of voting by wards, I should like to see in some towns a system of voting by castes and occupations tried: but it may be well in one province to avoid confusion by at first only trying one system.

To come now to the second point—the degree of control to be retained by Government over the local Boards, and the manner in which such control should be exercised.

17. There is, at present, a great deal too much control, and if any advance in local self-government is to be made, the first thing required is to relieve Boards of much of this control now felt to be most vexatious. Greater powers in the matter of expenditure must be conferred on the Boards and they should be relieved from the constantly recurring petty checks by the Accountant General, which are now felt to be so unnecessary and vexatious. This can only be done by conferring increased power of sanctioning expenditure on the Boards, and the remark applies equally to Municipal and Local Fund Committees. It is desirable that Government, to quote the words of the Resolution, "should revise and check the acts of local bodies but not dictate them." At present interference goes far beyond this, and local bodies have to obtain sanction for almost every act they wish to perform. Increased powers may safely be conferred on local bodies; if they are not fit to be more free from control than they now are, they are not fit to exist. Unfortunately of late years in the Bombay Presidency the tendency has been to restrict, not extend, the powers of local bodies, particularly in the case of Local Fund Committees. They are ordered now to prepare at comparatively short notice a Budget for seven years, and are ordered not to depart from a scheme thus prepared without first entering on explanations and getting special sanction, and so on. The system has always seemed to me the most faulty one, and I am satisfied the effects have been evil. Really important small local works, which cannot be foreseen, but which are much wanted by the people, are left unprovided for, and the money is expended on works which, useful though they may be, are not the class of works for which Local Funds were raised. Restrictions such as these should be swept away, and real power over expenditure be conferred on the local body. Budgets, of course, are necessary, and must be adhered to as much as possible; but the local body who prepared the Budget should have power, if circumstances alter, to amend it of their own authority, and references to higher authority should be unnecessary.

18. I see no objection to Boards having to obtain sanction for certain Acts, such as the raising of a loan, the imposition of taxes in other than duly authorised forms, and the other matters referred to by the Government of India, and I think that the power possessed now by the local Government to interfere either to set aside the proceedings of a Board, or to suspend any member of a Board, or even in extreme cases to suspend the Board, should be retained.

19. In considering the point next brought under discussion, whether the chief executive officers of towns, sub-divisions or districts should be chairmen or even members of local Boards, I think no hard-and-fast rule should be laid down, but if these officers are not in future to hold the responsible position they now hold, they should in fairness be relieved of the trouble, labour and responsibility that now falls upon them. I do not, I fear, quite understand how they are to "supervise and control the acts of those bodies without taking actual part in their proceedings." It is explained that what is intended is that the officer should supervise and control "the proceedings of the Board from outside, acting as arbiter between all parties and not as leader of any;" but this explanation is not clear. What does it mean? Is the officer to have the power of veto? if not, how is he to act as arbiter? I do not rightly understand what is intended, so feel unable to say more regarding this point; but one thing I feel satisfied of, that if the chief officer of the District is not to be President of any Board on which he sits, that he should not be on the Board at all. If his presence is not essential, by all means relieve him of such duty, but in such case his responsibility should also cease. At present there is usually a small working Committee composed of members of the Municipal Board, and when a non-official member of the Committee can be induced to be Chairman of such Committee, such an arrangement is undoubtedly a good one and is preferable to the office being held by an official member, and the same may be said of Sub-Committees that are often appointed for special purposes; but to banish officials from the Board

altogether would be, in my estimation, a false step. Such an arrangement may in time be possible, but that time has not yet arrived, and so long as officials are on a Board, I see but little use in forbidding them to vote. If the official element is now too strong, reduce the number of members on Committees, and this I think might with advantage be done, but I would not tie the hands of those who are left on the Boards.

20. The above remarks apply rather to Municipal than to District Boards. The management of the latter must for many a day to come be in the hands of the head of the district, but if the Táluka Committees are properly encouraged and given some money to spend, they will soon learn to take a real interest in local works, and when they do, more power can with advantage be transferred to them. But no Local Fund Committee can have any real life in it till existing orders regarding Budgets have been cancelled and more power given to the Boards.

21. In conclusion, I may add, it appears to me, that the intentions of the Government of India have to a great extent, specially as regards District Boards, being forestalled in the Bombay Presidency, and that the system now in force requiries but a little modification to render it all that the Government of India desires.

I have, &c.
H. N. B. ERSKINE,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 2599 of 1882.

General Department.

From Colonel C. F. BOULTON, Acting Collector of Karáchi, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Collector's Office, Karáchi, 3rd July 1882.

I HAVE the honour to report on the matters referred to me by Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th ultimo, and relating to the question of local self-government.

2. The points are briefly set forth in para. 8 of the Resolution—

1st.—The mode in which local Boards, whether Municipal or District, should generally be constituted.

2nd.—The degree of control which Government should retain over such bodies, and the manner in which that control should be exercised.

3. In regard to the first, my opinion is that, for some time to come, it will not be possible in Sind to effect any great improvement in the constitution of Táluka and District Local Fund Committees which now consist of certain ex-officio members and a proportion of non-official members nominated by the Commissioner in Sind. Non-official members of Táluka Committees or Boards must, necessarily, be persons residing within that administrative unit, and the choice is so limited that it is generally very difficult to select persons who give any promise of taking an interest in Local Fund matters. They are taken from among those who contribute to Local Funds, and are generally chosen because it is believed their appointment will be the most acceptable to the people of the táluka.

4. The District Committee non-official members are generally selected because they are more or less the most prominent and influential persons in the district. Every precaution is taken to have the best men to assist in the management of the funds, but it must be confessed that with rare exemptions there has been no success in Sind in securing any intelligent aid, and I have never noticed any desire on the part of the non-official members to master any details.

5. In this district, and the same may be said of all districts in Sind, more or less, certain recurring charges must be met from Local Funds, and after providing for these the sum available for expenditure at the will of the Committee is not large. The essential want in Sind is good bridged roads, and until these have been made there will be no necessity to have elaborately constituted Boards to discuss the disposal of funds that practically must be considered as already disposed of for many years. The Táluka Committees now appointed are as able to consider other matters, such as the management of schools, &c., as would be any Committee elected by votes ; for, as I have said, there is no great field to choose from in Sind, and as a rule the best men are already taken.

6. The important questions mooted in the Resolution much more affect the constitution and working of City Municipalities, where nearly all the ability and intelligence of the districts is concentrated : but the following observations only apply to the Karáchi Municipality.

7. Four questions appear to arise for consideration—

1st.—What should be the qualification of persons entitled to vote at the election of Municipal Commissioners ?

2nd.—What is the most suitable system of election to be introduced?

3rd.—What should be the qualifications of a candidate for election?

4th.—What control should be retained by Government over Municipalities, and how should it be exercised.

8. I have recently in my report No. 2040, dated 27th May last, to the Commissioner in Sind, for the information of Government, shown the general effect of granting the franchise to all who pay any kind of direct tax, and I submitted my opinion that this would be a system which must include a great many persons who, from their position and mode of life, are not those who can with any advantage be entrusted with votes.

9. It seems to me that one good general principle to adopt in conferring the franchise is to bestow it on those who have a quasi-permanent interest in the city, such for instance as the possession of landed property. Some would thus become qualified who are unfit to vote, but this must happen in whatever system is introduced, and the number can be greatly reduced by fixing a minimum value of such property and excluding those who hold only on temporary occupation leases, by which is meant leases terminable with notice and granted as a rule for the erection of mat or other huts of a temporary character.

10. I would suggest that a vote be conferred on every person whose name has been registered in the City Survey Register for a period of 3 months as owner or occupant of freehold property, or leasehold premises held on a permanent occupation lease, the annual house-tax on which is not less that Rs. 3, or the annual rent of which is not less than Rs. 100, which is the equivalent, the house-tax being 3 per cent. on the annual rent.

Exceptions.

(1.) Women.
(2.) Persons entered as occupants not in their own right butas managers or trustees of temples and charitable institutions.
(3.) Public bodies like the Harbour Board, Telegraph, Government, &c., a right to vote on behalf of their principals would probably be granted to the recognised representatives of firms or trading and banking corporations owning properties.

11. A property qualification only would not include many competent persons who form important sections of the population, and I therefore propose the following additions:—

(*a*) Those who pay license-tax.
(*b*) Those who pay Municipal wheel and animal tax to the extent of Rs. 12 per annum.
(*c*) Pleaders and professional persons habitually residing in Karáchi.
(*d*) Matriculated students and University graduates.
Proviso.—That no person shall be entitled to more than one vote, and that this vote shall be confined to the ward where he resides.

12. It is admitted that any system that is now introduced must be tentative and subject to improvement as experience is gained. These proposals do not contemplate anything more than a commencement of the system to be gradually developed.

13. The next point is as to what system of election should be introduced. I have already suggested that the election be by quarters which should be sub-divided into wards, according to the number of representatives for the quarter. It is essential to know first how many Commissioners are to be elected and the divisions could then be carried out under the orders and with the approval of the Commissioner in Sind, the general principle being sanctioned by Government. Accurate registers of voters in each ward need to be kept and revised from time to time, and I think this should be done in the Municipal Office, any person aggrieved having the right to apply to a Magistrate: in the case of Karáchi, perhaps the City Magistrate would most conveniently dispose of this duty, being always on the spot.

14. The appointment of polling officers and the question of voting openly or by ballot are matters upon which it does not appear to me necessary to offer any suggestions, as there is nothing in the circumstances of Karáchi to render any special procedure advisable.

15. Respecting the qualifications of a candidate I think that any one qualified to vote should also be eligible to be a Municipal Commissioner, provided, always, that he should be able to read and write, and should be practically a resident in Karáchi. The time is probably not far distant when no one will be held eligible who is not able to understand English so as to take part in discussions, but however much this is to be wished, it is not practicable yet. I certainly think, however, that a Municipal Commissioner ought to be able to read and write his own language.

16. The last point is the degree of control by Government and the manner of exercising it. I have consulted one of the leading Native gentlemen of Karáchi, who speaks not out of his own experience only but after discussing the subject with many others, and I think I cannot do better than give his opinion *in extenso.* He writes,

"I do not demur to the check by Government exercised from without, in reviewing the annual reports, the budget and other general acts and proceedings of the Municipality in expressing their approval or disapproval of the manner in which the Municipality generally should in any year or on any occasion have conducted their business or in insisting on Government sanction being obtained to the imposition of taxes, raising of loans, alienation of Municipal property and the like. On the contrary, I fear that if this check were even partially withdrawn the interests of the public might suffer.

"As to the check exercised from within by Government, either through their representatives the Collector or other official members, or directly by interfering and setting aside particular proceedings or orders of a local body or suspending them for a time, I regret that I cannot agree that Government should, at any time, have power to reverse the proceedings of the Municipality in particular cases. If they have such power 'local self-government' will be merely a sham and a delusion. Every person dissatisfied with any particular order of a Municipality would complain to Government, and although Government would not, in the majority of cases interfere, yet if the party complaining happened to be a Government Department, it is by no means clear that Government would equally refrain from interfering. It would be unseemly in me here to give particular instances, but I feel quite convinced that to give Government power to set aside particular acts of the Municipality will be to inflict a deathblow at their independence. Such particular proceedings, if illegal, could always be set aside by the law courts, and if legal but indiscreet, may be condemned by Government in their general annual review of Municipal work, but any interference beyond this is, in my opinion, to be strongly deprecated. I do not, however, object to the power claimed in this Resolution of suspending the Board temporarily, though I think it would be better for Government instead of suspending a Board, to exercise the power vested in them by Section 91 of the District Municipal Act.

"With respect, however, to the interference of Government by appointing the chairman, my opinion is that for a long time yet to come such interference is necessary for the efficient working of a body like the Municipal Board. Punctuality and regular working would only be secured if there be at the head a person of standing appointed by Government and acting under a sense of responsibility to them. There is no objection to the Government appointing an official as chairman, but such appointment should be personal and should be tenable for a fixed term.

"The Collector, in my opinion, should not be President of the Municipality, as he is both Collector and Magistrate of the District and is otherwise at the head of all executive matters in the

district. His connection with the Municipality gives that body an official and governing character and weight which I do not think they should possess. Municipalities, too, having such a high and responsible official at their head, do not in the transaction of public business exhibit any energy and do not evince that scrupulous desire to avoid the slightest transgression of others' rights and interests which they would do otherwise.

"It seems to me, therefore, that if the system of 'local self-government' is to succeed, the Municipality should be left to themselves to manage their own affairs with no other Government interference than that of appointing their chairman and 9 other official members and of exercising a general control from without. The 9 official members should be appointed by Government but should not be ex-officio members. I fail to see why the Superintendent of Police, his Assistant, and the Town Inspector should all of them be ex-officio members."

17. These observations exhibit so much good sense that I think they are worthy of being submitted to Government for consideration. I agree with the writer generally in his remarks regarding the control from without. I am not, however, so certain that some control from within is not necessary. If we could be sure of securing by the system of election all independent and intelligent Commissioners, the case would bear a very different aspect. As it is, or rather as it may be expected to be, by far the larger proportion of those elected will, for the present, be persons of no independence of character, prepared to act in any way that might be dictated to them by the more determined man bent on carrying some point of his own and whose influence would quite swamp the official members. If it be said that in the one case the Municipal Commissioner yields to the influence of the President, while in the other case he yields to his brother non-official member, it may be answered that the Collector and President is unbiassed and acts only in the interests of the Municipality; he has no personal motives to serve, and if any one person is to influence the acts of the whole body, it is far better that it should be one who is perfectly disinterested. I do not therefore concur in the opinion that the Collector should not be President of the Municipality, for I do not think that any other system would succeed until habits of self-government have become much more familiar to the people than they are likely to be for some years. As to the appointment of the chairman, I see no reason why the Municipal Commissioners should not appoint their chairman as provided in the Act, but it might be provided that the President of the Municipality shall not be the chairman, which in Karáchi he always is. This would give the Commissioners perhaps a greater idea of their independence, while it would still be in the power of the President to exercise any legitimate influence when matters were submitted to the general meetings.

18. With regard to the appointment of ex-officio members, I incline to the opinion that there are too many and that it would be better for Government to appoint at least half the official members.

19. My opinion then is:—

(*a*) That there should be 31 Municipal Commissioners.

(*b*) That of these 5 should be ex-officio members—

The Collector—President.
The Huzur Deputy Collector.
The Mukhtyarkar of Karachi.
The Superintendent of Police.
The Deputy Educational Inspector.

(*c*) That there should be 5 salaried official and 5 non-official members appointed by Government.

(*d*) That 16 members should be elected.

(*e*) That control from without should be retained by Government in all the matters detailed in the Resolution and in the making of rules and by bye-laws. But further interference should be confined to the cancelling of illegal orders and the exercise of powers under Section 91 of the Act.

(*f*) That the orders of the Municipality on all other matters should be final.

20. These proposals are not supposed to be by any means a perfect scheme, but it will probably be found to be a scheme that is, as a commencement, workable, and can be gradually improved as experience may show to be necessary.

I have, &c.
C. F. BOULTON,
Collector of Karáchi.

No. 3369 of 1882.

From COLONEL L. D'A. DUNSTERVILLE, Collector of Hyderabad, to THE UNDER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Bombay.

SIR, Hyderabad Collector's Office, 29th June 1882.

As directed by Government Resolution No. 2100, dated 7th instant, I have the honour to submit herewith direct to Government a memorandum on Government of India Resolution No. $\frac{1}{7747}$, of 18th May 1882.

2. I am forwarding a copy to the Commissioner in Sind.

I have, &c.
L. D'A. DUNSTERVILLE, Colonel,
Collector.

MEMORANDUM submitted by Colonel Lionel D'Arcy Dunsterville, Collector of Hyderabad, Sind, on the subject of the Resolution of the Government of India in the Home Department, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}59}$, dated Simla, the 18th May 1882, published in Government Resolution in the General Department, No. 2100 of the 17th June 1882, received by the Collector on the 20th instant.

1. I venture to express my warmest admiration of the scheme for the development of local self-government throughout British India which is set forth in the Resolution of the Government of India.

2. I can only express my unfeigned regret that, for the present and, indeed, for some years to come, this Province must be content to share, to a very limited extent, the advantages which should follow on the adoption of the principle advocated.

3. The fact is that "the intelligent class of public-spirited men" of whom it is said in para. 6 of the Resolution of the Government of India that "it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power, to fail to utilise," does not exist amongst the Natives of Sind, the reason of this being that education, though advancing, is as yet extremely backward as compared with the progress made in the older Provinces.

4. In February 1843, Sind became a British possession, and in December 1853, or nearly 11 years afterwards, the first Government schools were opened in the Province, *viz.* one Vernacular School on 15th December, and one English School on the 21st December 1853 at Karáchi, under the auspices of Mr. (now Sir) H. B. E. Frere. The number of schools and of scholars in the several districts of Sind is now as follows :—

VERNACULAR.

District.	Schools.	Scholars.
Karáchi	47	3,015
Hyderabad	73	4,073
Thar and Párkar	10	799
Shikárpur	94	6,811
Upper Sind Frontier	7	329
Total	231	15,027

ENGLISH.

Karáchi	5	479
Hyderabad	4	364
Thar and Párkar	1	18
Shikárpur	5	578
Upper Sind Frontier	1	22
Total	16	1,461

5. Looking to education as a means to the end, we can only take count of the Vernacular Schools as feeders to the English Schools, and of these last as feeders to the University, and it is to a University education that we must in India chiefly trust for the formation of a class at once intelligent and public-spirited.

6. When, therefore, I record the fact that the total number of scholars from Sind who have graduated at the University is but 7 (that is to say, one in each of the following years since 1865, *viz.*, 1867, 1872, 1874, 1877, 1878, and 1881,) but little more need be said to justify the statement I have made in the 3rd paragraph of this memorandum.

7. I am happy to add, however, that there are many intelligent English-speaking young men growing up in the three large towns of Karáchi, Hyderabad, and Shikárpur, who, although their scholastic studies have stopped short at matriculation, * are still eager in the pursuit of knowledge whilst following their several avocations, some in the service of Government in various departments, and others as pleaders in the Courts of Justice, whilst a number are now being trained to the medical profession at the Hyderabad Medical School.

8. Such men as these, we may fairly hope, will speedily learn to take an intelligent and public-spirited interest in the management of local affairs, so soon as the adoption of the policy of the Supreme Government admits of its development, and the movement once begun will surely extend itself to the smaller towns and, in process of time, to the village communities.

9. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that in this Province the experiment must be begun in, and for a long time confined to, the City Municipalities, and an opening for this will be at once afforded should the suggestion of His Excellency the Governor in Council be adopted with respect to the election of Municipal Commissioners, on which subject I reported in my No. 3355, dated 28th instant, to the Commissioner in Sind.

10. If this be done, and if the newly constituted Board of Commissioners be relieved from "check and interference in matters of detail," and if the degree of control retained by the Government and the manner in which it is exercised be such as is prescribed by para. 17 of the Government of India's Resolution, then, I think, we may fairly expect to see, and that very speedily, a real development of the art of self-government, such as, under existing conditions, it is impossible to attain.

11. I fully concur in all that is said in paras. 18 and 19 of the Resolution as to the advisability, when possible, of withdrawing executive officers from the position of chairman of the local boards.

12. In the City Municipality of Hyderabad, however, as at present constituted, there is not one non-official Commissioner who could adequately fulfil the duties even of a chairman of the

* A few have taken a first degree in Arts.

Managing Committee, and the appointment must needs be held by one or other of the official members.

13. Under our present rules, the appointment rests with the Collector, as President, and the present chairman is the Assistant Collector in charge of the Hyderabad Táluka, his predecessor having been the Huzur Deputy Collector, a gentleman who is a native of Hyderabad.

14. I would suggest, therefore, that the present arrangements in this respect remain in force for, at least, one year after the constitution of the new Board. This will give time to the new Commissioners to show what metal they are made of, and a report should be submitted by the Collector and President to the Local Government, at the expiration of that time, which would enable it to judge of the fitness of any new Commissioner to be appointed non-official chairman of the board or of the Managing Committee.

15. Meanwhile, the official chairman might be directed to abstain from voting at any meeting of the Managing Committee.

L. D'A. DUNSTERVILLE, Colonel,
Collector of Hyderabad.

No. 2046 of 1882.

Judicial Department.

From H. E. WATSON Esquire, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department, Poona.

SIR, Deputy Commissioner's Office, Jacobabad, 30th June 1882.

WITH reference to Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to state that I am respectfully of opinion that the Upper Sind Frontier District is not in a sufficiently advanced state to render advisable at present the introduction of Local Boards as proposed by the Government of India.

2. The population consists chiefly of half-wild Beluchis who have only of late years been induced to give up their predatory and nomadic habit and to settle down to agriculture and peaceful pursuits. The Bunyas residing in the District came, for the most part, from Kutchee in the Khelat territory, and are an ignorant race of people. Except the Government officers there is hardly any one in the District who can read or write. I would submit that Boards composed of persons drawn from such a population could hardly be entrusted with the powers proposed in the Resolution of the Government of India.

3. Moreover, the Government of India themselves contemplate the utilization on these Local Boards of an intelligent class of public-spirited men (see paragraph 6 of their Resolution), and in paragraph 10 of the Resolution they say that they desire that Local Boards should be formed in every District where intelligent non-official agency can be found. It apparently is not proposed that these Boards should be formed in a District like this where the people are illiterate and cannot be said to be either intelligent or public-spirited.

4. The Commissioner in Sind has proposed, in his report to Government (No. 783 of 25th February 1882), that the scheme for local self-government should not be extended to Thar and Párkar, and Government in their Resolution No. 964 of 16th March last, have expressed their concurrence in this. I would point out that the remarks made by the Commissioner in the last portion of paragraph 39 of his report, appear to apply with almost equal force to this District. The great mass of the inhabitants are utterly uneducated and a portion of them are still nomadic in their habits, and they are not likely to interest themselves in matters that would have to be discussed by the Boards, and it is therefore doubtful whether the time has come when it would be advisable to introduce self-government even nominally amongst them.

5. Under the circumstances detailed, I would submit that the introduction of Local Boards into this District should be deferred until education and civilization have made greater progress.

Should, however, Government decide to appoint such Boards, it appears to me imperatively necessary that the Mukhtyárkars should be the chairman, and I think that at first nothing except pounds, ferries, dispensaries and the repairs to roads and buildings should be entrusted to them.

I have, &c.
H. E. WATSON,
Acting Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier.

No. 2870 of 1882.

General Department.

From W. F. SINCLAIR, Esquire, Collector of Shikárpur, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Revenue Department.

SIR, Collector's Office, Shikárpur, 22nd June, 1882.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of papers marginally * noted, and as ordered to report direct.

* No. 2100, dated 7th June 1882, calling for a report on the working of the elective system of Municipalities.

* * * * * *

3. In the matter of the 6th paragraph, I concur most emphatically; and have been working and insisting on my officers working on those principles therein laid down, for a year, with great success in the two City Municipalities of Shikárpur and Sukkur, and the large towns of Rohri and Lárkhána; with less in the smaller Municipalities and the Local Fund Committees.

4. The difficulties arise chiefly from the novelty of the attempt, local business in Upper Sind having been to such an extent conducted on the principles of "Sáhib-ko-khushi," that even the best officers often know very little of the conduct of business in Committee. Considerable success, however, has

attended the extensive use of vote by correspondence which is the more useful here on account of the vast size of the district.

* * * * * *

8. I venture to differ from His Excellency the Governor General in Council in opinion, as expressed in his 9th para. Local self-government is no new thing in this Presidency; and the Bombay revenue system forces our officers to cultivate such an acquaintance with the country and people under their charge, that we are not in the least compelled to take leaps in the dark.

* * * * * *

9. With reference to para. 10 the Bombay Local Fund system closely resembles that of the Irish County Cess. In both, the difficulty of getting members to attend District Committees is met by having Táluka Committees; and the tendency of the latter to jobbery and to disjointed action, is checked by the control of the District Committee.

10. In the most perfect example of what can be done with one system—the Kaira District—little more direct interference on the part of the President was required than from the prating Judge at an Irish Assize.

11. It does not follow that he should lose interest in the work or fail to encourage and develope it.

12. Some notion of such a system appears to have been in the mind of the writer of the Government of India's minute when concluding his 10th paragraph, but he seems to have been quite unaware that it was in full working order in this Presidency.

13. The 11th paragraph requires little notice. The Municipal and Local Fund Committees, as a rule, work without friction in respect of questions of common interest; and in most District Committees, the Municipalities are practically well enough represented.

14. Most of the pith of paragraph 12 is already law under our District Municipalities Act, 1873. The majority of non-official members in Local Fund Committees is not so marked. In Sind, where the practice is regulated by Commissioner's Special Circular No. 15 of 20th October 1881, the non-official members are in a minority, both in the Táluka and District Committees, which, I think, is a pity.

15. The subject of the 13th paragraph has already been taken up in this Presidency, and I am actually preparing a scheme for the introduction of election into the City Municipalities of Shikárpur and Sukkur, and collecting materials for proposals on the subject of the large towns of Rohri and Lárkhána. No difficulty is anticipated. The officer best acquainted with the people of this city tells me that the outgoing members are pretty sure of re-election.

16. It would, however, be only prudent to give notice that certain classes of persons were ineligible as members, *e.g.* those who had been sentenced to imprisonment for certain offences, or had formerly been removed from a municipal committee by order of Government, or politically deported from any Native State, or dismissed from the service of Government and declared incapable of re-appointment, bankrupts. &c. To disqualify such persons beforehand will be less unpopular, than to unseat those already elected.

17. In the smaller Municipalities and the Local Fund Committees the most sanguine of Liberals could not now recommend election. The former would be mere pocket boroughs of the lowest sort, and the rural community would not know what was meant.

18. The 15th and 16th paras. call for no remark.

19. The 17th paragraph is, I think, the first public expression of an opinion that I have long held, and have latterly, so far as the present system of local government permits, acted upon experimentally. I find that in the two large City Municipalities it is not really necessary that I should go down to every meeting; and that any statement or explanation which I have to convey, is just as well conveyed by a written minute laid before the Committee. This practice saves time and trouble, and avoids the appearance of influencing the Committee. It is much easier to make people understand in a minute than in a speech that I give them my opinion and want them to give theirs about their own town and their own money. The less active Local Fund Committees and lesser Municipalities, however, require the spur of the presence of the Vice-President or President, to keep them alive.

20. The subject of the latter part of this paragraph is sufficiently dealt with in section 91 of the District Municipalities Act; but there is no similar provision for Local Funds.

21. The 18th paragraph starts new doctrine on a technical point. I have touched a little upon it above, and I think that the chief of a district should be ex-officio President of Committees, as he is here now, but that he need not be always in them. There is here a marked difference between the Local Funds and the Municipalities. It is difficult to see how the extensive operations of the former could be carried out by any machinery less powerful than that which now administers it. This machinery is not the creation of any single Government. It is the result of many years' work and thought bestowed upon a subject, the most interesting of all to all Collectors and their Assistants.

* * * * * *

I have not failed to encourage the same independence since I have had charge of a district myself. Nothing can more encourage the non-official members to speak their minds than seeing that the officials do it, and any unseemly contest is rendered almost impossible not only by the high character and strict discipline of the service, and the personal friendship which almost without exception unites the officers of each district, but by the constant verbal and semi-official correspondence which goes on between the Collector and his staff in any well managed district. Every proposal has been well discussed between them bofore it comes to the vote, and they know each other's opinions already.

22. The Municipalities stand on a different footing. Their executive is the managing committee, which is a mixed body composed of official and non-official members. The chairmen of these are frequently non-official, and when non-official members can afford the time and trouble for this duty they are very often the best. The real point is, to get the best chairman, whether official or non-official.

23. As regards the President or chairman's *ordinary* vote, he is in many cases better without it; and it is my own ordinary practice to abstain from voting. But he should have a *casting* vote to avoid deadlocks.

24. In paragraph 21, His Excellency the Governor General in Council suggests that the license tax assessments and collections might be made over to Local Boards. I am sorry to say that I do not

believe that any such Board can, or will, conduct the difficult business of assessment properly. There would undoubtedly be fraud and corruption. Collection, of course, they *could* do. *A'bkári* (excise) revenue they could probably manage very well. Of other funds, they have already in this Presidency got the pound fees, ferry and road tolls. The administration of the Indian Ports Act might with great advantage be handed over to them throughout the Presidency ; and in Sind, that of Bombay Act I. of 1863 (for registry of vessels on the Indus).

25. The subject of para. 22 was disposed of finally in this Presidency in 1875 ; and I think that there is no reason for altering the present orders, which are very liberal to the Committees. I am myself, and I believe that almost every Collector in the Presidency is, under the greatest obligation to the officers of the D. P. W. for ready and willing assistance, and it is an Executive Engineer to whom is due the superiority of the Local Fund system in Kaira over that of every other district that I have seen.

26. It will be seen that in my opinion the views of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council are to a great extent already acted up to in this Presidency, and can be fully enforced in the spirit, if not in the letter, without altering the existing laws and the orders now in force, the results of long experience and progress.

I have, &c.
W. F. SINCLAIR,
Collector of Shikárpur.

Note.—Certain passages of this letter have been omitted as unsuitable or irrelevant.

EXTRACT Paras. 20 and 39 from the Commissioner in Sind's Report to Government, No. 783, dated 25th February 1882.

Para. 20. * * * I am very doubtful if the time has yet arrived when any attempt should be made to extend self-government to that large district, the greater part of which is sand hills and desert, and in which the small population is so scattered and so sparse that no common feeling exists between the different tribes, and in which the small communities have hardly arrived at the stage when the power of self-government could with advantage be entrusted to them. I have recently made the experiment of appointing a District Local Fund Committee for this District, but from what I have seen of the country and its inhabitants, I am not very hopeful that even this beginning can bear good fruit for some time to come. If, however, for the sake of uniformity, it is considered preferable to treat the Thar and Párkar District in the same way as others, a grant from Provincial revenues will be essential, as the small funds (Local and Municipal) could not bear the charges now paid from Provincial revenues without help.

Para. 39. These remarks, however, are hardly applicable to the large district of Thar and Párkar, which is some twelve thousand square miles in extent, with a population of less than 20 to the square mile. The great mass of the inhabitants, whether Sodas, Khosas, Udejas, or Bhils, are utterly uneducated, and a large majority are nomadic in their habits. Such people could not be induced to attend Committees or interest themselves in the matters that would have to be discussed, and I have therefore doubts whether the time has come when it would be wise to endeavour to introduce self-government, even nominally, among them, and have suggested that for the present no such attempt be made.

R. I. CRAWFORD, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, Thar and Párkar.

No. 179 of 1882.

Financial Department.

From Major R. I. CRAWFORD, Deputy Commissioner, Thar and Párkar, to J. MONTEATH, Esquire, Acting Under Secretary to Government, Bombay.

SIR, Deputy Commissioner's Office, Hyderabad, 12th July 1882.

WITH reference to Government Resolution in the General Department, No. 2100 of 7th June last, I have the honour to submit an extract from the report of the Commissioner in Sind (No. 783, dated 25th February 1882), and to state that having regard to the circumstances of the wild district of Thar and Párkar, and the backward condition of the better classes of its population, I fear that for the present it would be absolutely hopeless to think of entrusting any unfettered executive powers to the discretion of local Boards.

I have, &c.
R. I. CRAWFORD, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, Thar and Párkar.

No. 1191 of 1882.

From T. H. STEWART, Esquire, Survey and Settlement Commissioner, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department.

SIR, Poona, 28th June 1882.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Government Resolution in the General Department, No. 2100, dated 7th June 1882, and in compliance with the request contained therein, beg to submit my opinion upon the very important question therein raised and discussed.

2. It has long been known that in the matter of local self-government the Bombay Presidency is already considerably in advance of most provinces in India, but it is not a little gratifying to find that the onward stride has been so material that while the Government of India find it necessary to prescribe in general terms the very rudiments of local self-government, we have the whole network of Local Boards already established. The District Committee with its ancillary Táluka or Tehsil Committees has already become an institution forming an integral part of the executive administration, and Municipal Committees, with carefully framed rules and bye-laws, are scattered over the face of the country, scarcely a single town of any importance being without one. In the existing condition of these Boards a great advance has been made towards the realization of the principles contained in the Resolution, and it only remains to consider how and to what extent their constitution and management may be brought into harmony with the ideas which pervade the notification of the Government of India.

3. The chief points requiring notice appear to be as follows :—

1st.—The constitution of Local Boards, both urban and rural, as regards the proportion of official to non-official members.

2nd.—The manner in which non-official members should be appointed to the Boards.

3rd.—In the case of the elective system being established, the manner in which the system should be carried out.

4th.—The nature of the control to be exercised by the Local Government and its executive officers over the proceedings of Local Boards.

4. The number of official and non-official members on Municipal Committees is at present determined under the provisions of Bombay Act VI. of 1873, the Mofussil Municipalities Act, and as regards City Municipalities, the large preponderance of the latter element is provided for by section 7, clause 1. In Town Municipalities the tendency of the legislation in section 9, clause 1, is to give a majority to the non-officials over the officials, although the members actually on the Board may in some cases be equal. I observe from Government Resolution in the General Department, No. 1297 of 11th April last, commenting on the Administration Reports of the Presidency Municipalities, that the whole number of official members in all the Municipalities was 855 against 1,621 non-official. It seems to me therefore that in the Bombay Mofussil the distribution of seats in the municipal committees has been so far regulated already to meet the wishes of the Government of India that the provisions of the Act, in that respect need little or no change. If, however, the chief executive officials of the District or Sub-divisions are not to be office-bearers or even members, the whole Municipal Act will have to be considerably altered and modified, as the Collector as president and the Assistant Collectors as vice-president have distinct functions conferred on them by it. Whatever may be said with regard to the limited number of City Municipalities, I should be very sorry to see any immediate step towards exclusion of official members from Town Municipalities, which without the experience, example and business habits of official members to guide them, would be utterly helpless for good, if not actually productive of mischief. Let the number of non-official members be increased, if necessary, to satisfy the cry for extension of self-government, but on no account let the Committee be like an army without officers, as it would be if the official members were withdrawn. I observe that the Government of India anticipate failures and checks in carrying out their views, and if such failures and checks were merely trifling and occasional it would not greatly matter, but the danger is that by too rapidly placing administrative power in the hands of persons but little trained to exercise it, the whole system may become unpopular and the disgust of the people may produce a tide of reaction which it will take years to stem.

5. And this leads me to a consideration of the materials we have at hand for the constitution of such boards. In the chief mofussil cities there has been for many years past a small knot of educated men who have shown an undoubted interest in local affairs and who have a real thirst of local power and repute. In these we have the nucleus for working City Municipal Boards, but great care and caution will be requisite for some time to come in arming them with virtually independent executive powers. We have to deal in this country with an evil which is unknown in England, and that is the bigotry of caste. It can scarcely be denied that however educated and however public-spirited generally the Native of this country may be, he is sorely tempted to throw his training and his conscience to the winds if the prejudices of caste are called into play in the decision of any municipal or local question. Herein lies a great danger, and it is a danger which the lower classes of the people will be the first to discern and to experience. In the Town Municipalities the danger is intensified, for in them the means of expressing public opinion are few, and besides a sprinkling of educated Bráhmins there are usually no other persons capable of criticising or exposing the misdeeds of those in office. Whatever control may be exercised from without there are numerous small opportunities which Board members will have for petty tyrannies such as would not be likely to attract the notice of the higher executive authorities.

6. The present method of selecting members of District and Táluka Local Fund Committees has never appeared to me very satisfactory, and I think most District Officers will agree with me that we do not reach the classes whose interest in local affairs is keen or intelligent. At present the District Board is composed, besides ex-official members, of one Inámdár and six landed proprietors, while the non-official members of the Táluka Board are usually one Inámdár and three land-owners. In the rural districts the land-owning classes are seldom men of education or business habits, and the natural consequence is that the work of the Board is almost entirely carried on by the official members. I cannot, however, see the necessity of confining the selection of members to the classes who pay the cess, seeing that competent canditates are so few and that in reality the work is done by officials who are not cess-payers. There are in most districts and in most tálukas persons of the class of pensioned Deputy Collectors, Mámlatdárs and resident Vakils who take an interest in public affairs and have time to give to them, whereas the land-owners have but little leisure from their pressing daily

avocations. I cannot see any reason why persons of this class should not be called upon to assist with their experience and example in the management of local affairs. One or two might with great advantage be appointed to the District and Táluka Committees.

7. As regards the choice of persons to fill seats on the urban and rural Boards I cannot at present recommend any material change except in City Municipalities, such as Poona, Surat and Ahmedabad, where the experiment of the elective system should first be tentatively and partially introduced. If it proves successful, and it is found that really practical working members are returned and not merely talkers and professional agitators, the system might gradually be extended to the other cities and the larger town municipalities. Any attempt to introduce it into the rural districts at present would I feel certain be premature and disappointing.

8. In the event of an experiment being made with the system of election to City Municipal Boards it must be hedged round with many limitations and precautions. The qualifications for candidature must be high, and that of voters should be kept up so as to exclude the ignorant and uneducated classes whose votes would be at the mercy of those who can afford to bribe or who can command them by the terrorisms of caste or the weight of local influence. My experience of *City* Municipalities has been so small, that I do not venture to suggest any scheme for the determination of the franchise. I would only recommend that as most mofussil cities are already divided into wards or "peits," advantage should be taken of this sub-division, and the first step in the direction of progress might be that in selected cities each "peit" should be called upon to return one member to sit upon the Municipal Board.

9. With regard to the last point, viz., the control over Local Boards, it may be inferred from the above remarks that I am not in favour of doing away at present with executive control from within. This is simply because I believe that in the Bombay Presidency the time has not yet arrived for it. Within the last twenty years the progress towards self-government has been in my opinion as material as could be desired. It has been slow but sure, and every step has in consequence been well marked and permanent. If the views of the Government of India expressed in this Resolution are kept as the end ultimately to be attained, and if independence is gradually made over to Local Boards as circumstances permit, there is every reason to believe that in the course of another twenty years the goal will be much nearer at hand. In this Presidency there is not much likelihood of the matter being allowed to rest, as there are individuals and associations whose chief objects are to agitate for extended powers to representatives of the people. It is better, in my humble opinion, to relax the control of our executive officers by slow degrees and to avoid checks and blunders altogether, than to rush at once "*in medias res*" and to endeavour to wade to success through a series of blunders and scandals, each of which must be productive of danger to the cause it is hoped to promote.

I have, &c.
T. H. STEWART,
Survey and Settlement Commissioner.

No. 82 of 1882.

To J. NUGENT, Esquire, Acting Secretary to Government, General Department, Mahábaleshvar.

Sarvajanik Sabha Rooms, Nagarkar's Wada, near Vishrambag,
Poona, 28th April 1882.

SIR,

WE are directed by the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha to submit the following representation on the subject of the extension of local self-government in the Bombay Presidency on the lines laid down in the recent Resolutions of the Government of India on the subject, and to request you to lay the same before His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council for his favourable consideration.

First, in regard to the extension of Municipal independence, Government is well aware that the Sabha has pressed this subject on the attention of Covernment on various occasions during the last 8 years and more. It hails therefore with satisfaction the announcement that Government has at last been graciously pleased to make (dated the 25th ultimo) that in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor in Council the time has arrived when the intelligent population of the ten leading cities in this Presidency (Poona, Sholápur, Ahmednagar, Ahmedabad, Surat, Broach, Karáchi, Hyderabad, Shikárpur, and Sukkur) may be safely entrusted with the privilege of electing one-half of the total number of their Municipal Commissioners, and that the franchise shall be a liberal one, including both property, education and professional qualifications. This limit of the property or rate-paying qualification has not been yet fixed, but the Sabha feels assured from the liberal spirit of the Resolution that it will be of a sort to secure an adequate and full representation of the various elements of the population. In this connection the Sabha humbly requests that Government will duly consider the limit proposed in the memorial forwarded by the inhabitants of this city on the 25th ultimo, as it combines all the conditions of a practically safe and progressive concession.

2. It is also announced in the same Resolution that Government contemplates passing a legislative enactment to amend the Bombay District Municipal Act with a view to enable it to concede the elective franchise to the population of Town Municipalities also. The Sabha, however, thinks that no immediate necessity exists for legislation on this head. Government can, under the provisions of section 6 of Act No. VI. of 1873, raise the status of many of the existing Town Municipalities, and convert them into City Municipalities, and this conversion will enable Government to extend at once a modified scheme of election to these Municipalities. According to the provisions of section 6 every town whose population is or exceeds 10,000 can claim to be a City Municipality, provided that, as stated in Government Resolution No. 1631, dated 11th June 1874, there is clear evidence that the population in general and their representatives, the existing Municipal Commissioners, have by their intelligence and adoption of sanitary and other improvements established a claim to superior powers of self-

government. The towns which in the opinion of the Sabha can fairly claim the concession of higher powers of self-government are those mentioned in the following tabular statement:—

No.	Name of the Town.	Population according to the Census of 1882.	Annual Income exclusive of Balance for 1879–80.
			Rs.
1	Dholka - - - -	20,854	10,651
2	Viramgám - - - -	19,661	28,633
3	Nadiád - - - -	24,551	22,122
4	Ránder - - - -	10,280	17,647
5	Bulsár - - - -	11,315	13,118
6	Thána - - - -	14,299	18,113
7	Kalyán - - - -	12,804	12,295
8	Bhiwndi - - - -	15,607	11,189
9	Dhulia - - - -	12,489	23,582
10	Násik - - - -	22,436	41,335
11	Sátára - - - -	23,903	36,135
12	Bársi - - - -	15,140	15,971
13	Pandharpur - - -	16,275	47,290
14	Dhárwár - - - -	27,136	20,511
15	Hubli - - - -	37,961	31,041
16	Kárwár - - - -	13,263	10,108
17	Belgaum - - - -	26,947	28,481
18	Lárkhána - - - -	10,643	22,476

The existing municipal administration in all these 18 towns appears to have been satisfactory, and the divisional reports on the municipal administration bear official testimony to the same. Some of these towns, such as Thána, Dhulia, Násik, Sátára, Dhárwár, Belgaum, and Kárwar, are the head-quarters of their respective districts, and as such must, no doubt, contain a large intelligent population, while the others are the head-quarter towns of their respective tálukas. It will be seen that the annual income of every one of these towns, excluding the balance, exceeds Rs. 10,000, while that of Pandhárpur, Násik, Sátára, Hubli, Belgaum, Viramgam, Dhulia, and other exceeds Rs. 20,000, and in the case of Pandhárpur is nearly half a lakh of rupees. In November last his Excellency the Governor during the course of his tour in the Southern Marátha Country visited Pandhárpur, and the inhabitants of that city, represented by their Commissioners, concluded their address of welcome with the prayer that the inauguration of the present enlightened policy of the Imperial Government with respect to local administrations emboldened them to hope that their Municipality would soon be raised to the rank of a City Municipality. The Sabha has reasons to believe that a similar desire is entertained by the population of most of the towns mentioned in the foregoing statement. The Sabha, therefore, expresses a hope that His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council will, without waiting for new legislation, see fit to avail himself of the powers conferred upon him by section 6 of the existing Act, and invest the Municipalities of the forementioned towns with higher powers of self-government by raising them to the rank of City Municipalities. In the interests of progressive advancement it is not merely the power of electing the Municipal Commissioners which the people desire, but that power together with increased administrative freedom and augmented power of financial control. Both these aims can be secured in the case of the above-mentioned towns without fresh legislation being resorted to, if Government graciously carries out its avowed intentions by giving fuller effect to the powers it already possesses under the existing law.

3. Turning next to the other side of the reform sketched out in the Government of India's Resolutions in regard to the constitution and working of District Boards, the Committee of the Sabha are anxious that Government should take early steps by fresh legislation to amend the constitution of these bodies. The present Local Funds Act (Act No. III. of 1869) is far from satisfactory in this respect. (1) Unlike the Bombay District Municipal Act, the Local Funds Act has left such important questions as the constitution of the Committees to the discretion of the Executive Government. Properly speaking, this question of organization ought to have been dealt with by the Legislature itself. Under Rules 29 and 31 framed under section 12 of the Act the power of electing the Inámdár members in these Committees is conceeded to the Inámdárs, though the Act itself contemplates nothing of the kind. (2) Again, neither in the Act itself nor in the rules made thereunder has any limit been fixed to the tenure of office of the non-official members of these Committees, whether nominated or elected. The Sabha need hardly remark that the right of election is scarcely worth having, if those upon whom it has been conferred are not to exercise it afresh after the lapse of a reasonable interval. (3) Again, the Táluka Local Fund Committees, established under Rule 31, appear to the Sabha to be in their inception illegally constituted; for according to that rule these Committees consist of seven members only, while section 2 of Act No. III. of 1869 says that the members of a Local Fund Committee "shall be not fewer in number than eight inclusive of the President." (4) Moreover, whatever useful purpose these bodies may have served during the first ten years of their existence, when they had possessed a kind of statutory control over the revenues of the tálukas, they no longer serve such a useful purpose, inasmuch as the former orders requiring the Local Funds revenue of each taluka to be spent in that táluka only have been cancelled by a Government Resolution No. 499-A—1503, dated 5th November 1877. Since that date the Táluka Committees have been completely merged in the District Committee, and they now fulfil no other function than that of being mere ministerial agencies with the right of representing their wants to the central body. The Committee of the Sabha submit that it is in accordance with all sound principles of legislation that such radical changes ought not to be left to the mere

discretion of the Executive Government. The reasons above set forth will, it is hoped, satisfy Government that urgent necessity exists for fresh legislation in regard to the constitution of District Boards.

4. In the event of such fresh legislation being undertaken, it will be necessary for Government to see in what direction further reform is urgently needed and can be safely carried out. When the Local Fund cess was first established in 1863, it was authoritatively declared that the Local Funds' money was raised and administered as the property of those by whom it was contributed, and the Government Resolution No. 3115, dated 16th September 1863, laid down as a cardinal principle, that "the tax-payers should have an influential voice in the disposal of the funds." Now leaving aside the Táluka Local Fund Committees altogether, the tax-payers are allowed in the District Committees only seven members against six ex-officio members. The District Local Fund Committees as a rule administer as large a revenue as, and in many cases much larger than, the revenue which the least important of the existing ten city municipalities has to administer. Of the ten city municipalities in this Presidency the municipality of Ahmednagar has the smallest income, which is about Rs. 51,000 per annum. Now the population of Ahmednagar, according to the census of 1872, was 32,841 with about 20 non-official representatives to take care of its municipal interests as against nine official representatives. The Local Fund receipts of the Ahmednagar District amounted in 1879-80 to Rs. 86,504, exclusive of the balance for the previous year, and the rural population of the district according to the census of 1872, excluding the municipal population of Ahmednagar and other municipal towns in the district, was 727,203, and yet the local interests of so large a rural population are supposed to be duly taken care of by only seven non-official representatives as against six official ones. The Sabha begs to submit that it is a glaring injustice to those who pay the Local Fund cess, and who were promised an influential voice in the disposal of the said funds, that they should not be treated with the same liberality with which municipal tax-payers in the large cities have been treated. The consequences of this absence of an absolutely and relatively fair representation of the official and non-official elements in the District Commttees have been that no interest is felt in their work by the non-official members, and that the Local Funds' revenues have not been as well taken care of as the municipal revenues. In support of this statement we respectfully invite the attention of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to the answer of Mr. E. P. Robertson, the Commissioner of the Central Division, in reply to Chapter I., question 26, of the Circular questions issued by the Famine Commission (*vide* Information and Evidence collected to answer the questions issued by the Famine Commission, 1878, Bombay volume, page 105). In that statement Mr. Robertson greatly deplores the action of Government in throwing famine charges on Local Funds' revenues, though it was in no way responsible for the same. This diversion of Local Funds to defray famine charges is only one among many other similar instances of mismanagement which might be quoted. These considerations will, we hope, satisfy Government that it is necessary that the non-official element should be stronger in numbers both relatively and absolutely to resist official pressure and should possess a real power of control over these funds.

5. The case for the reconstitution of these bodies might be made much stronger, but as in paragraph seven of the recent Government Resolution in the Financial Department, the Government has expressed its opinion that the time has now arrived when it may properly be considered whether some change in the constitution of Local Committees, whether Municipal or Local Funds, may not with advantage be introduced, and whether extended powers in respect of the expenditure of public money, derived from local taxation and provincial subsidies, may not, with benefit to all concerned, be conferred upon local governing bodies formed under a new system. The Committee of the Sabha deem it unnecessary to further strengthen the case in favour of reconstituting the Local Fund Committees. We are, therefore, directed to submit for the favourable consideration of Government the following scheme for the reconstitution of Local Funds Committees :—

(1.) Every táluka should have in the District Local Fund Committee one member who should be elected by those who pay Rs. 50 in the shape of land assessment or any other tax on which the one anna cess is levied.

(2.) The large Inámdárs who are holders of alienated villages in the District should be entitled to elect two members out of their own body to represent them in the District Committee.

(3.) Two members should be allowed to the educated classes represented by the list of Jurors and Assessors of the District, the graduates of the University resident within the District, and Pleaders practising in the District.

(4.) Government should then nominate half the number of the elected representatives to complete the number of non-official members.

(5.) The ex-officio members should be one-third of all the foregoing members or one-fourth of the entire body.

(6.) That the Collector and Magistrate of the District should be the ex-officio President of the District Fund Committee.

(7.) That the District Committee so constituted should remain in office for three years, after which period fresh election and nomination should take place.

(8.) That the executive work of the District Committee should be entrusted to a Managing Board which should be elected by the general body, and that the Managing Board so elected should continue in office for one year.

(9.) That the members of the Managing Board should be paid a fixed allowance in the shape of remuneration for attending the meetings of the Managing Board.

(10.) That the entire power and responsibility for administering the local revenues and for carrying out the purposes of the amended Act should be vested in the members of the District Committee collectively, and that the Government should not interfere in the details of administration, but should confine its interference to questions of principle only, and to general supervision.

We beg to submit a few observations on some of the clauses of the scheme above set forth. *Clause* (1.)—As the Government Resolution dated 5th November 1877 has removed the only justification for the existence of Táluka Local Fund Committees as separate bodies, and as moreover they appear to the Sabha to be illegal in their inception, it becomes all the more necessary to allow every táluka in the

district one member at least in the Central District Committee to take care of its local interests. The only question then is whether these táluka members should be elected by the rate-payers themselves or should be nominated by Government. The Sabha begs to submit most respectfully that it sees no reason why District Local Fund Committees shonld not be treated with the same liberal spirit with which all the City Municipalities in this Presidency have been treated, for the argument in favour of extending the elective system to the first class municipalities holds good in this case also. This contention is further supported by the recorded opinion of His Excellency in Council, that Government admits the necessity of so amending the present District Municipal Act as to enable Government to extend the elective system to Town Municipalities, whose population as a general rule does not much differ in character, capacity and intelligence from the rural or semi-rural population of the district at large. A táluka covers a large area, and is not so manageable as a town. In order to obviate this objection we have fixed a high limit of rate qualification. There are not in a táluka more than a few hundred people who pay more than 50 rupees as assessment. This number will certainly prove very manageable. The minimum test proposed will practically be found to give the voting power to those only among the occupancy holders who may be safely taken to represent the best element of their class, and who will be found intelligent enough to make a proper use of their privilege.

Clause (2).—As regards the Inámdár members of the District Committee the policy of Government has for a long time been in favour of election, and the Committee of the Sabha feel it unnecessary, therefore, to emphasize the point by further argument. The present practice is to allow one member only to the Inámdárs of the District, but the Sabha contends that it does not secure the adequate representation of the class. A reference to the 28th, 29th, 44th and 45th columns of the revenue and finance statement No. A., Imperial Revenue and Finance, published at pages 212-215 of the Administration Report of Bombay for 1880-81, will show what proportion the alienated revenue in each district bears to the Government land revenue proper, and the Sabha believes that two Inámdár representatives in the proposed District Central Committee are certainly not more than this proportion sufficiently justifies. These Inámdár members do not represent the class they belong to so much as their tenants who, to a great extent, have eventually to pay the Local Fund cess. The Inámdárs moreover as a class, and more especially the larger ones among them, are an intelligent body and are the natural leaders of their respective local communities. Having regard to all these circumstances the Sabha thinks that it is justified in submitting the proposal made above.

With regard to the third proposal, the Sabha begs to add that, having regard to the fact that a considerable portion of the charge for elementary education is even at present thrown on local revenues, and also to the declaration recently made by the Government of India, that the Local Committees should be entrusted with the entire financial and administrative control of primary education within their respective jurisdiction, it becomes necessary to allow the educated classes an independent voice in the administration of the said fund. The Educational Inspector and his Deputies are even now allowed ex-officio seats in the Local Funds and Municipal Bodies to guard the interests of their Department, and the Sabha submits that the same reasons which dictate the appointment of the Educational Inspector and his Deputies as ex-officio members in these Local Fund Committees, necessitate also the adequate representation of the educated classes therein. The ex-officio educational members are supposed to watch the official interests of the department, and they cannot always be expected to do justice to educational questions from the non-official point of view. These can be properly taken care of by non-official representatives only. Moreover, these classes represent the intelligence and public spirit of the district, and they have a special aptitude and possess an anxious desire to make a proper and intelligent use of the right of election, and the responsibilities of power.

With regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh clauses of our scheme, it is necessary to add that they are dictated by the necessity and the desire of giving a working majority to Government. According to the scheme set forth above, the different interests in the district will be equally balanced, for including the ex-officio members and their nominees from amongst the non-official classes, Government will have half the Committee nominated by itself, the other half only being elected by the rate-payers. Government will, moreover, have the advantage of having its leading representative in the District as the President of the Committee, who by his casting vote will always secure a majority to Government on those few occasions when Government may reasonably feel that in the interests of the people themselves the unanimous opinion of their local representatives should be for a time overruled. Under the present circumstances of the country the Sabha holds that whatever may be said against it on the ground of abstract theory, practically Government for a long time to come must possess the power alluded to above, and on occasions exercise it in the interests of the people themselves and also in those of self-government.

With regard to the 8th proposal we are directed to submit that the arrangement proposed above is necessary in the interests of efficient self-government. As matters at present stand the District Collector as President of the Committee is virtually the sole executive authority. The arrangement is far from being satisfactory, and the Sabha sees no reason why the arrangements in the District Committees in this respect should so materially differ from those pursued in all the leading City Municipalities. The President as the local representative of the Central Government ought to be the supervising and not the executive officer so far as the functions of the local bodies are concerned.

With regard to the 9th proposal we are directed to add that if the members of the Town Council of Bombay are paid such an allowance as is contemplated therein, the Sabha sees no reason why the members of similar executive Councils in the Mofussil should not be paid also. The small amount of money that will be paid in this way will, the Sabha believes, be more than compensated for by the greater responsibility enforced, and the keener interest that will be consequently evinced in the work of the Committee.

With regard to the 10th and the last proposal we are directed to add that under the ill-defined provisions of the present Act, Government possesses vast powers of interference, which circumstance is often prejudicial to the interests of self-government. The testimony of Mr. E. P. Robertson, Commissioner Central Division, quoted in the earlier part of this representation, is a sufficient proof that the official view in this respect almost entirely coincides with the non-official opinion that

Government under the ill-defined provisions of the present Act possesses vast powers of interference, and that on occasions it has used these vast powers in a way prejudicial to local interests, and those of self-government generally. It is necessary, therefore, that the powers of Government should be clearly defined in order that the local Committees and their respective local communities may be trained to habits of self-reliance and of self-government and to a due appreciation of administrative and financial freedom. The Sabha thinks that for the present the powers of interference by Government with District Committees should be of a similar nature to those enjoyed by it in connection with City Municipalities.

With regard to the deprovincialization or transfer of funds to Local and Municipal bodies, the Sabha thinks that a reasonable and sound principle has been laid down by the Government of India in directing that every item of receipt and expenditure which the people are likely to understand the use of, and capable of administering it efficiently, should be handed over to them for administration. Primary education, medical charity, sanitation, minor public works, are the departments recommended by the Government of India for deprovincialization, and the Sabha is glad to perceive that His Excellency the Governor in Council has announced his intention of partially deprovincializing primary education and medical charity. The selection of the three Municipalities of Bombay, Poona and Ahmedabad for trying the experiment of transferring the administrative and financial control of primary education to local bodies is no doubt happy, but the Sabha sees no reason why the same policy may not be pursued in the case of District Committees, if they are strengthened by the infusion into them of a really competent and strong non-official element. In addition to the departments mentioned above as suited for deprovincialization, there is one which in the opinion of the Sabha ought to be deprovincialized also. That department is the excise revenue. Government has repeatedly announced that it looks upon its connection with this revenue with the greatest disfavour, and it has often professed its readiness to sacrifice it altogether, could it thereby check the total consumption of spirituous drinks. Upon the plea of checking all illicit consumption of spirituous drinks, the excise authorities have granted freely licenses for retail sale, and the number of liquor shops is annually increasing to the great astonishment of those who are aware of the openly declared intentions of Government as contained in Government Resolutions marginally noted. Throughout the length and breadth of the country the increased consumption of spirituous drinks is a constantly growing evil, and this is admitted on all hands save and except by the department which is interested in the growth of the A'bkári revenue. In the latter half of 1880 the Poona Municipality through its Managing Committee passed a resolution deprecating the increased consumption of spirituous drinks in the city of Poona consequent upon the increasing number of liquor shops in the city, and the District Collector and Magistrate was requested to avail himself of the earliest opportunity to reduce the number of liquor shops in the city as the only means by which the increased consumption of spirituous drinks could be successfully checked. But the authorities concerned declined to act upon the recommendation of the Municipality, on the plea that the consumption of spirituous drinks in the city of Poona was not more than the legitimate wants of the city justified. The Sabha, therefore, begs to propose with a view to remove this conflict of interests that while the tax on trees, and the import and still-head duties should remain Imperial, and be divided half and half between the Imperial and Local Governments, the revenue derived from license fees on the retail sale of spirituous drinks and narcotic drugs be deprovincialized and handed over to local bodies for administrative and financial control.

Government Resolution No. 3459 of 17th September 1838.
Government Resolution No. 2065 of 22nd June 1844.
The Court of Directors' letter No. 17, dated 14th June 1843.

We have, &c.

SHIVRAM HARI SATHE,
S. H. CHIPLUNKAR,
Secretaries, Poona Sarvajanik Sabha.

No. 86 of 1882.

To J. NUGENT, Esquire, Secretary to Government, General Department, Poona.

Sarvajanik Sabha Rooms, Nagarkar's Wada, near Vishramdag,
Poona, 6th June 1882.

SIR,

IN further continuation of our letter No. 82, dated 28th April last, and your reply to the same informing us that Government would take it into its careful consideration, we are directed by the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha to forward to you the following representation on certain matters connected with the concession to the people of Poona of the elective franchise in respect of their municipal administration, and to request you to place the same before His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council for his favourable consideration.

1. In the Government Resolution issued from the Financial Department, No. 1093, dated the 25th March 1882, it is stated in paragraph 9 that "the qualification for a vote for the election of the representative Commissioners should be the payment of any direct tax, whether Government, Local Fund or Municipal," and that "all persons accordingly resident within the Municipal limits and paying Government land assessment, License Tax, Local Fund cess, or any direct Municipal tax would be entitled to a vote." In paragraph ten of the same Resolution it is further announced that Government do not intend to limit the franchise to those persons only who pay direct rates or taxes, Government or Municipal, but that it is intended to make the franchise not only pecuniary but also educational and professional. Now, while fully approving and appreciating to the utmost the intentions of Government in making the franchise educational and professional also, the Committee of the Sabha feel unable to extend their support to the proposed extension of the franchise to those who pay no direct Municipal taxation, but who, on the other hand, pay direct taxation to Government in one shape or another. The Committee of the Sabha are fully aware that amongst the ten leading cities to whom it is now proposed to extend the Municipal franchise, there are some, notably those in Sind, where

there is little, if any, direct Municipal taxation. If therefore, as is likely, the provision made in paragraph nine of the Resolution in the Financial Department is specially intended for such cities as levy very little direct Municipal taxation, the Committee of the Sabha have nothing to urge against the proposed measure which, however, they think should be distinctly announced to be provisional and temporary in its nature. If the proposed measure, however, is intended to operate in the case of the City of Poona and others similarly situated, where nearly 50 per cent. of the Municipal revenue is derived from direct taxation, the Committee of the Sabha respectfully beg to record their humble protest against the proposed measure. It is an acknowledged principle in forming local representative bodies that as their principal duty consists in the imposition and expenditure of local taxation, the electoral franchise should vest in all who contribute to the local rates to the exclusion of all who do not. Under such circumstances it is highly impolitic to give the electoral franchise to those who, however largely they may contribute to the Imperial or Provincial revenues, do none the less pay no direct Municipal taxation. The Committee of the Sabha, as stated above, are fully alive to the necessity, which from considerations of expediency has arisen, of giving the electoral franchise to those who pay no direct Municipal rates, and we are accordingly directed to repeat that the proposed measure should be limited by way of exception to those cities only where but for such a modification of the original cardinal principle a local representative Municipality would be an impossibility, unless the people of such cities were first asked to submit to direct Municipal taxation as a necessary condition of their getting a representative Municipal body.

2. The Committee of the Sabha have been able to collect some statistics of the number of voters to be found within the Municipal limits of the City of Poona if the franchise is pecuniary only. The Poona Municipality levies a house-tax, a water rate, a wheel tax and a bhangi cess. These are the only four forms of direct Municipal taxation prevalent in Poona, and they represent together 40 per cent. of the income of the Local Municipality. And if as has been suggested by the people of Poona in their Memorial to Government on this subject, dated the 25th March last, the minimum qualification be placed at Rs. 10, there will be found within the Municipal jurisdiction about 1,500 rate-payers who annually pay Rs. 10 and upwards to the Municipality. The following tabular statement shows how these 1,500 rate-payers are distributed over the different parts of the City of Poona :—

No.	Name of the Sub-Division.	Number of rate-payers paying Rs. 10 and upwards.
1	Aditwar Peit - - -	338
2	Shukrawar „ - - -	170
3	Shanwar „ - - -	165
4	Badhawar „ - - -	156
5	Kasaba „ - - -	145
6	Sadasiva „ - - -	97
7	Bhawani „ - - -	77
8	Nana's „ - - -	67
9	Vethal „ - - -	59
10	Rastya's „ - - -	55
11	Narayen „ - - -	46
12	Ganesh „ - - -	30
13	Somawar „ - - -	23
14	Ganja „ - - -	21
15	Mangalwar „ - - -	12
16	Nyahal „ - - -	9
17	Gadtetal „ - - -	3
	Total -	1,473

3. The Committee of the Sabha think that to begin with the forementioned constituency will suffice for the purposes aimed at as far as the pecuniary qualification test is concerned. The Government of India in their recent Resolution also approve of the principle of fixing the qualification at a high figure in the first instance. It has moreover this recommending feature about it, that it will be perfectly manageable. As the proposed measure is declaredly tentative in its character, it is better that the electoral body should be as compact and manageable as circumstances will permit, and after a few years, when both the people and the District authorities shall have gathered experience from the working of such a limited system, it will be time enough to extend the franchise in such a way as to include the lower strata of society. In Bombay the electoral body consists of about 30,000 voters, and the highest number of those who availed themselves of their privilege was attained a few years ago when about 8,000 people had come to the poll, the average number of voters in ordinary years varying from 4 to 5 thousand people. This experience of Bombay teaches us that no practical purpose is served by giving the voting power to many who have not yet had the intelligence and public spirit necessary to enable them to appreciate the privilege properly and to exercise it discreetly. Under these circumstances the Committee of the Sabha beg respectfully to submit that the minimum pecuniary qualification test should not be placed below Rs. 10 of Municipal taxation per annum.

4. The Committee of the Sabha have no data to show what additional number of voters will be secured if the pecuniary franchise is extended to those who instead of paying any direct Municipal taxation, none the less pay direct Imperial or Provincial taxation. If the license tax payment be accepted as a qualification, the Committee of the Sabha understand that the number of those assessed at present in this city is 1,124, but inasmuch as many of those falling under that catagory will have come under the Municipal rate qualification, the additional voters thus secured will represent a very small figure.

Assuming such to be the case, it is not worth while to sacrifice the principle which lies at the bottom of local representative bodies, that none but those who contribute to the local rates should have the power of voting. Should the Government, however, think that an electoral body of 1,500 voters paying Municipal rates is too small for a city like Poona, with a population of nearly 100,000 souls, the Committee of the Sabha would beg to suggest that the minimum limit of pecuniary franchise be placed at Rs. 5 of Municipal taxation per annum. According to this arrangement the Committee of the Sabha have reasons to believe that the electoral body will consist of about 4,000 voters.

5. With regard to the educational and professional franchise, the Committee of the Sabha beg to submit that it should be much more liberal than what has been laid down in paragraph 10 of the recent Government Resolution in the Financial Department. In that paragraph it is contemplated to extend the educational and professional franchise to graduates of the Universities or Medical College, and to Vakils and Pleaders only, resident within the Municipal jurisdiction. As suggested in our recent memorial to Government, submitting the views of the inhabitants of Poona on this subject, which Government have been pleased in their reply to approve generally, the educational franchise especially should be extended to the list of jurors and assessors resident within the Municipal jurisdiction. In the same paragraph the Government have given expression to their desire that "as far as possible all persons of respectability, character and means should possess a voice in the election of representative Commissioners;" and the Committee of the Sabha believe that the noble intentions of Government in desiring to give the voting power to "all persons of respectability and character" will be best fulfilled by extending the educational franchise in the way recommended above. If in important questions affecting the life and death of Her Majesty's subjects the gentlemen constituting the body of jurors for the Poona District are consulted, and if their opinion is generally allowed a great weight by judicial officers presiding at the Sessions, the Committee of the Sabha fail to see any adequate reason for declining to give such gentlemen of respectability and character a proper voice in the election of representative Municipal Commissioners. If the educational franchise is limited in the way contemplated, it will secure an electoral body of not more than 150 people, including of course the Pleaders of the District Court resident within the Municipal jurisdiction. If, however, the franchise is enlarged in the way recommended in the memorial to Government from the people of Poona, there will be secured an electoral body of over 400 people whose ability, intelligence and public spirit to appreciate the privilege properly and to exercise it discreetly is unimpeachable.

6. Following the precedent set in the case of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, one-third of the total number of the Municipal Commissioners to be elected by the people should be exclusively elected by those who would be entitled to a vote according to the educational and professional qualification tests. Such an arrangement becomes essentially necessary in order to secure an adequate representation for the minority in the Mnuicipal Council. In addition to that, however, there is another very important consideration which demands that the arrangement proposed above, which is precisely similar to that proposed by the inhabitants of Poona in their memorial to Government of 25th March last, should be carried into effect. By a recent Government Resolution in the Educational Department, No. 414, dated 23rd March last, the Municipality of Poona, along with those of Bombay and Ahmedabad, has been selected by Government to try the experiment of handing over the administrative and financial control of primary education thereto. The selection made by Government is no doubt extremely happy, but in order to secure the success of the experiment, and to ensure it against all risk of failure, it would be essentially necessary to give the educational and professional classes a few independent seats in the Municipal Council. If, however, the seats are not so reserved, and those who under the educational and professional franchise become entitled to a vote are merged into those who under the pecuniary franchise become entitled to a vote, there is every likelihood of a repetition of the sad and sorry spectacle which the present Municipal Commissioners of Poona presented in October last when they withdrew altogether their petty contribution to primary education. In the present backward state of the country its educational interests cannot be too scrupulously and jealously guarded, and to secure them against all risk the arrangement proposed above becomes a positive necessity. The Committee of the Sabha trust that the proposed arrangement will recommend itself to Government, the more so because it will render unnecessary the formation of separate school boards, as contemplated by the Resolution in the Educational Department alluded to above. If the Municipal Council itself is made sufficiently strong by the infusion thereinto of a strong educational element, then there would be no necessity whatever of having two Committees working within the same jurisdiction, which cannot fail to bring on very undesirable conflicts or produce general indifference.

7. Before concluding, we are directed to submit a tabular statement showing the different wards into which the city of Poona should be divided and the number of seats to each ward on the principle of allowing one member to about 100 voters:—

Rastia's Peit.			Shanawar Peit.		
Nyahal „		1	Narayen „		2
Somawar „			Nana's „		1
Godetal „			Ganesh „		
Bhawani „		1	Vetal „		1
			Ganja „		
Sadasiva „		1	Kasha „		1
Sukrawar „		1	Mangalwar „		
Budhawar „		1	Aditwar „		2
		5			7

We have, &c.

SHIVRAM HARY SATHE,
S. H. CHIPLUNKAR,
Secretaries, Poona Sarvajanik Sabha.

Below a Copy of the Letter from the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, No. 86, dated 6th June 1882.

No. 2307 of 1882.

FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Bombay Castle, 24th June 1882.

Forwarded to the Collector of Poona for any remarks he may wish to offer (to be submitted through the Commissioner C. D.)

J. MONTEATH,
Acting Under Secretary.

No. 4124 of 1882.

Poona, 29th June 1882.

Para. 1. I am respectfully of opinion that the Sabha are right in holding that "the electoral franchise should vest in all who contribute to the local rates to the exclusion of all who do not."

Paras. 2 and 3. I think that the proposal to make the minimum qualification the payment of municipal taxes to the extent of Rs. 10 is sensible, provided that the payment of "*direct*" municipal taxes is intended.

Para. 4. I would not at first reduce the limit of pecuniary franchise to a lower limit than Rs. 10.

Para. 5. There is no objection to extend the educational franchise so as to include Jurors and Assessors.

Para. 6. I do not support the proposal in this para. that one-third of the total number of Municipal Commissioners should be exclusively elected by those entitled to a vote according to the educational and professional qualification. This would leave too small a number to be elected by purely taxpayers. According to the constitution which I have recommended in my proposals separately submitted, there will be no fear of a repetition of "the sad and sorry spectacle" referred to by the Sabha. I may at the same time remark that the contribution to primary education was withdrawn while I was Acting Commissioner, S. D., at the instance of a Native gentleman who is supposed to be *one of the most enlghhtened residents in the city of Poona,* and one who would certainly be entitled to a vote according to the educational and professional, and juror and assessor franchise.

Para. 7. There should, I think, be a representative elected by the people for each Peth.

J. MOORE,
Collector of Poona.

No. R-2942 of 1882.

FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Submitted to Government. Poona, 3rd July 1882.

2. I entirely concur with the remarks of Mr. Moore which harmonize with my letter No. R-2941 of this day's date to Government.

3. I consider that it would be most unjust to the taxpayers generally and most unwise in every way that any portion of the Municipal Commission should be elected by those entitled to vote according to the education or professional practice. The proposal is merely an attempt on the part of the Sabha to secure as much power as possible in its own hands. It would be a great misfortune if the Municipal body should be filled with a large number of young men who beyond their education have no stake in the country. It is the taxpayers who require to be represented. It is sufficient for the educated if they hold the right to vote under the educational franchise.

E. P. ROBERTSON,
Commissioner, C. D.

No. 3995 of 1882.

From the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Opium and A'bkári, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, General Department.

SIR, Poona, 20th July 1882.

As it is some time since I had charge of a district, I fear that any opinion I can offer on the proposed schemes for local self-government can have little practical value. I beg, however, to submit the following remarks for what they may be worth, premising that I fear that one result of the introduction of the scheme into this Presidency without considerable modifications will be a dangerous weakening of the power of the Collector and of Government control throughout the mofussil.

2. It appears to me impossible that imperial sources of revenue, such as excise, forest and the land revenue, can be handed over to the management of local boards, nor can such boards relieve the district officers of any of their duties relating to vatandárs or to magisterial and Police work. The hope, therefore, that the establishment, or development, of such boards will materially lighten the work of district officers appears to me unfounded. It will, on the contrary, I expect, be found that the correction of errors which these boards will probably fall into will add greatly at any rate at the outset to the work and anxieties of Collectors.

3. The only matters in which local rural boards can take a part are those relating to schools, dispensaries, and local public works.

4. As to the first of these, there seems to be no reason why all schools should not be put under loca boards (municipal, or rural), provided that Government will hand over to them funds sufficient for the maintenance of schools now kept up wholly or in part from provincial, or imperial funds. The boards may be allowed to say where schools are wanted—whether English should be taught, or not—whether the written or printed character of the vernacular should mainly be taught, and so on. I would also allow them to say what castes should be admitted to the main school-houses, provided they supplied

due facilities and accommodation for the low caste children whom they wish to keep separate from their own.

But the Educational Department as an independent authority must be responsible for the teaching, for the choice of books and for the efficiency of the masters; and the Engineer must in the same way be responsible for the efficiency of the buildings, the recommendations of the board receiving in both departments due consideration. The local boards might also be allowed to fix the scale of fees and to regulate exemptions from fees, provided they arrange their finances so that the cost of education shall be duly met.

5. As to dispensaries, all that a local board can do is, considering the funds at their disposal, to say where they can establish one, and on which of certain standard scales, leaving it to technical experts, the medical authorities and the Engineer, to design the building,—to the Engineer to erect it and keep it in repair, and to the medical authorities to regulate the expenditure on medicines and medical appliances.

Having established a dispensary, the local board can do no more than provide the funds wanted and keep an eye on the Hospital Assistant, to see that he attends to his duties and secures the confidence of the people.

6. As to public works, I think that buildings connected with the collection of imperial revenue, the administration of justice and the preservation of order must remain under the direct control of the officers of Government. To transfer through lines of communication to the charge of local boards would be a mere form. Their opinion as to whether any such line of road should be kept up, would receive due consideration, but if Government decided that the road must be kept up, the local board must be bound to provide the money which the Public Works Department decides to be necessary for its maintenance. Similarly, as to works which have been executed from local funds, the board might deliberate as to whether any line of road could be given up, but none could be given up unless the controlling authority approved; and the local board would be found to provide funds for keeping all other works in the state of repair deemed necessary by the controlling authority.

7. Unless new funds are handed over to the local boards the balance available for new works after providing for the up-keep of those already completed will in most districts be small, and experience has, I think, shown that if it be spent tálukwár it runs a great chance of being frittered away. There must be taluka boards, but they must be subordinate to the district board, and the district must be the "unit;" otherwise none but the most petty works will be possible. There are many tálukas which, after providing for the up-keep of existing works could never pay for a dispensary, and could hardly build one school, or one dharmshála, per annum.

8. The Government of India desire that the deliberations of local boards shall be uninfluenced by any official control. This will, I fear, lead to ill-advised undertakings and to expenditure for the benefit of individuals and classes to the neglect of the general community. But if the Government of India insist upon it, this system must no doubt be introduced. It however seems to me that when the board has determined the objects on which money is to be spent, and the amount available, the actual expenditure should be under the control of the officers of Government; otherwise there will spring up a set of irresponsible and ill-controlled men,—secretaries to boards and board overseers,—who are sure to be corrupt and to abuse their authority.

9. The passages about giving local boards control over sources of revenue seem to indicate that it is the wish of the Government of India to make this new system a means of introducing fresh taxation. But unless extreme official pressure is applied, local boards will not put on fresh taxes. Their tendency will be to limit their provision of funds to objects for which existing funds suffice. In municipalities, little scope for new taxes can practically be given even if boards should wish to introduce them. Government will, I presume, veto transit duties and keep down octroi. I do not suppose that in the tálukas Government will allow the local boards to alter the one-anna cess, or the scale of pound fees, or give them much scope in fixing rates of tolls. I fear the result of giving local boards power to assess for the license tax woold be that influential men, especially electors and members of boards, would be under-assessed.

10. I am strongly of opinion that the Collector should be president of all boards, and that the Assistant Collector should be vice-president of all táluka and municipal boards within his charge. If the Government of India insist that officers in these positions should not vote, their wishes must be obeyed. But I think that an official president, even without a vote, is much better than a non-official one.

If the Collectors and Assistant Collectors are allowed to be presidents and vice-presidents, then I would put on the boards the same official members as at present; otherwise, I would have no *ex-officio* members and let the boards be entirely non-official.

11. It is proposed to give the title of "Rao Bahadur" to all members of local boards. The official title of all Mámlatdárs is "Ráo Sáheb." It seems to be inexpedient that members of táluka boards, or of town municipalities, should have higher rank than Mámlatdárs. I therefore think that either all Mámlatdárs should be made "Ráo Bahádurs," or that this title should be confined to members of district boards and city municipalities, and that members of taluka boards and town municipalities should have no higher title than "Ráo Sáheb."

12. I would propose that the electoral body should be constituted as follows:—

For táluka boards the electors should be—

1. All representative vatandárs, being males of 21 years of age or over.
2. All persons, being males of 21 years or over, who pay license tax on incomes of Rs. 2,000 or over.
3. All assessors.

None should be qualified for election except electors and salaried servants of Government, the Collector having power to refuse to any such servant permission to serve on a local board.

The district board should be chosen from táluka boards, each such board choosing two of their members to sit on the district board. The táluka elections should take place at jamábandi time, each

elector giving his vote openly before the officer settling the jamábandi of his village. The newly elected committee should, within ten days, appear before the same officer and elect two of their number to sit on the district board. The term of office might be three years.

13. The qualification for a vote in municipal towns should be the payment of direct taxes, the qualifying amount to be fixed according to the circumstances of each town.

14. Having a vote in a municipality should be no bar to a duly qualified person voting at elections to the táluka board.

I have, &c.
C. B. PRITCHARD,
Commissioner of Customs, Opium and A'bkári.

No. 4156 of 1882.

From W. R. PRATT, Esquire, Collector of Sátára, to JOHN NUGENT Esquire, Secretary to Government, Revenue Department.

SIR, Sátára, 13th July 1882.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Government Resolution No. 2100 of the 7th June 1882, to submit a report from Mr. Lee-Warner, First Assistant Collector. As Mr. Lee-Warner's abilities are well known to Government, his opinion will doubtless be considered of value. For the most part I agree in Mr. Lee-Warner's remarks.

2. Judging from experience, I do not consider that the Natives as I have seen them are fit for self-government, unless that government is very strictly watched and hedged in with fixed rules, beyond which they cannot go and by which they must be bound.

3. As I have remarked in a former report, Natives as far as I know them have no notion of the public good. They understand the good of each individual or of each caste, and they are induced by a certain amount of fear—Government interference—to adopt measures that they in their innermost hearts consider very unnecessary. Moreover they do not care to understand the principle on which rules for spending the money entrusted to them are made, and are backward in attempting to carry out the principles the rules have been framed to protect.

4. If the principles enunciated in our Municipal and Local Funds Acts had been fairly acted up to, we should have had some years of experience to show us how the Natives, entrusted under these Acts with certain responsibilities, had exercised their power. As it is, though several years have elapsed since the Local Fund Act has been passed, the power reserved to the Native Committees has been gradually decreased until they are now a set of dummies with nothing to do and no money to spend.

5. The District Committee is in but a little better plight, as all its funds but a small margin are budgetted for under the orders of superior authority.

6. Municipalities are somewhat better off, but even they have had pressure occasionally applied to them, which has prevented them from exercising the powers entrusted to them by the legislature.

7. Before giving Native Local Bodies more power, I think it would be quite sufficiently a step in the right direction to give them permission to exercise without interference the power they are given under the wording of the legislature ; if they are found to exercise their powers with intelligence for 2 or 3 years, then give them further power.

8. I am quite in favour of election and of having more members. In Municipalities, the only qualification for voters should be payment of House Tax. I would have no restriction as to the qualification of members further than merely that they should never have been inmates in either the Civil or Criminal Jail, and insolvent or dismissed from Government service.

9. For Local Fund Committees there should be more members. I would allow one member of a Táluka Local Fund Committee to sit as a member of the District Local Fund, such member to be elected by the members of the Táluka Local Fund Committee : a certain sum of money should be invariably given to each Local Fund Committee to spend in their Táluka. They can very well look after repairs to schools, dharmshalas, chavdis, village roads, wells, &c. They could undertake the building of smaller works and superintend the planting of trees.

10. The chairman should now even be the Mámlatdár. Until these Committees have been allowed to exercise a little power and employ themselves in really laying out a certain sum of money, they will have had no opportunity of acquiring business habits and be at loss how to arrange to keeping within a Budget, or for satisfying the somewhat intricate rules that govern Local Fund Procedure. For Municipalities no particular change in their constitution is necessary ; some Municipalities already elect their own Chairman. In the Márathi copies of the Act in this collectorate it is laid down that the Mmálatdár shall always be Chairman, but this is an incorrect translation of the English Act ; and though the mistake appears to have been rectified by Government Notification published at page 696, *Bombay Government Gazette*, Part 10, of 1874, the rectification appears to have been lost sight of. I know Municipalities of which the Chairman is a non-official ; the work is fairly well performed, but the Chairman is the Municipality. He alone does everything, the other members sit still. Rules are not attended to, and the money is handed over to the Chairman and no accounts insisted on. This is the kind of confusion that must be expected if official supervision is withdrawn. The letter of the Law and the wording of Rules are apt to be overlooked ; the consequence will be illegalities and incomplete accounts.

11. In any concessions that it may be thought fit to give, Government should have ample power to veto any propositon and also to prevent expenditure of funds, if they consider the object of such expenditure is not for the public good.

12. As for increase of funds to be expended by Local Bodies, the License Tax might be given them, and I would allow Municipalities to increase it if they wished. One great objection is—on the part of Natives—to Taxation, and the different forms it takes and the number of times they have to put their hands in their pockets.

13. They do not understand the difference between Imperial, Provincial, Local and Municipal Taxations, all of which is in a way supplemented by voluntary and special contributions. It would be

a gain to concentrate taxes, and to this end I think that the license tax might include the extra tax levied on shopkeepers living in Municipal limits. Again, all taxes should as far as possible be gradually brought to the English standard of a rate according to expenses to be incurred, and fixed on the income of the payer.

14. In electing members for any Public Bodies, I think that some restriction should be put upon the numbers that each caste should send up as members of any Public Body.

15. In all countries it is observed that the man with influence, money, or assurance is elected apart from any special fitness he may have, for representing the true interests of the election. Take Sátára for instance ; it may be presumed that if 24 men were to be elected for any Public Body in the town or District of Sátára, 20 out of the 24 elected would be Bráhmins, although ¾ths of the electors would be of other castes. Is it to the interests of the Public that the local affairs of the District should be solely in the hands of Brahmins? Have they shown that they are always ready to sacrifice the interests of their own class for the good of the inferior and more numerous castes?

16. I am quite of the opinion of the Governor General in Council as expressed in para. 7 of the Resolution, and believe that if the intentions of the framer of our Local Fund Act are strictly and liberally carried out, that the wishes of the Government of India as detailed in para. 10 will be found to have been very fairly carried out.

17. We have Táluka Local Fund Committees. The number of members should be increased so that the wants of every village should be known to one or more members. These members I would at first elect by nomination ; not because I should have any particular choice, but because the new Department could be satisfactorily commenced without going through the trouble of enfranchising voters and making electoral circles. Any one who would volunteer, provided that he were an inhabitant of the quarter requiring representations, might be nominated a member.

18. This would make the Committees efficient as far as knowledge of the wants of the people and capability of administering to those wants. The Mámlatdár would be Chairman to see that their deliberations were wisely conducted, and if the Mámlatdár understands that he is not to exercise pressure as to the directions the votes are to go, I do not see why the deliberations of such a body should not be perfectly free and why any decision they may come to may not be taken as one that should demand serious attention at the hands of the District Local Fund Committee.

19. As I have said above the Táluka Local Fund Committee would elect a member to attend the sittings of the District Committee in the rainy season when the General Budget is proposed.

20. The members might hold office for two years and be eligible for renomination or re-election for members of Local Fund Committee, as the money they have to administer is chiefly paid from land. I should insist on the members being chiefly land-owners and cultivators, and the qualifications for an elector should be payment of a certain amount to Government as Land Revenue. Rs. 100 would be a good amount to be given with, a restriction also being made as to the number of any particular caste or occupation.

21. In regard to City Municipalities, I believe the power or control Government can exercise is not more than is necessary to the proper administration of the Municipal Funds, and I do not advocate its being lessened.

22. With regard to Town Municipalities, I think that the only change necessary is to constitute as many as are fit City Municipalities. With regard to the rest, they must remain as they are until it can be decided whether they should be abolished or raised also to City Municipalities. If the inhabitants of most small Municipalities were polled, nine-tenths of them would vote for the abolishing of the Municipality ; they would give up dispensaries, latrines, streets, and vaccination to save direct taxation, and direct taxation is the only legitimate method of taxation in this district, where the people living outside come in twice a week into the town to sell and buy.

23. With regard to para. 18 of the Resolution, I am of opinion that the Chairman of any Local Body, though an official, may possibly have the interests of the tax-payers at heart as much as any independent or energetic non-official member, the more especially if he has lived some twenty years amongst the rate-payers. If the Chairman, official though he be, is left unfettered by his superiors to pass whatever measure may seem good to him, the chances are that in nine cases out of ten he would not be antagonistic to the non-official members ; though I think Chairman of Local Boards should for the next year or two be, as a rule, official. There are exceptions, and it might be left to the Collector to propose a non-official in any case when a good man might be available.

24. With regard to para. 21, in addition to License Tax the whole of the Road Tolls should be handed over to the District in which they are collected, and not expended on roads in other collectorates.

25. With regard to para. 22—Control over Public Works. The system in force in this Presidency 4 or 5 years ago should be again introduced, and the construction of smaller works left in the hands of the Local Bodies. Municipalities construct their own works, and there is no reason why Local Bodies should not do likewise.

26. It often now happens that the Executive Engineer's existence is justified by the Local Fund money he has to spend: as soon as Local Fund expenditure is removed from the control of the Public Works Department, Native Executive Engineers could be appointed. My only doubt is as to the control the Local Bodies would possess over them, or how they would be able to ensure without some direct interference of Government Engineers, that the work they paid for was worth the money. But the question of doing away with Government Engineers and putting all Government buildings under Local Bodies and their Engineers, is a matter that can well stand over for a year or two. If the proceeds of the License Tax are given over to Local Bodies to expend, I presume some expenditure that is now met from Provincial or Imperial Funds will be handed over to Local Bodies to be paid for out of the increased receipts that will be at their disposal.

27. I think Local Bodies—so that a certain minimum total was insisted on—would be well able to assess and collect the License Tax. If no minimum sum to be collected was fixed they might let it dwindle down altogether: as soon as they have found that certain institutions must be kept up, and that funds for keeping them up must be provided, they may in time take kindly to taxing themselves.

28. I have not received the District Deputy Collector's opinion on the question of extension of local self-government, but do not like to delay longer in replying to this reference. If his report should contain any propositions or arguments which I think Government would be glad to have before them, I will send a copy of it on to you.

I have, &c.
W. R. Pratt,
Collector.

From W. Lee-Warner, Esquire, Assistant Collector, on Special Duty, to The Collector of Sa'ta'ra.

Sir, 25th June, Jirvadi.

I have the honour to reply to your No. 3659, dated June 21st, calling for report on the Government of India scheme of local self-government. Under the disadvantage of heavy work my reply must be briefer than I could wish, in consideration of the importance of the subject, to make it.

2. Although there is much in the Resolution as a matter of policy to challenge criticism, and though it would be permissible to vindicate the success of efforts made in this Presidency and Sind which are so depreciated in paragraphs 5—7 of the Resolution, still I do not consider that I should be justified in wasting time on expressing my own views as to the policy of the manifesto. I understand that my opinion is called for on the best measures for giving effect to the Resolution of Government, and I divide my remarks between—

Municipal Committees.
Local Fund Committees.

3. Municipalities, from the political training which they have had, are the best fitted for exercising the large measure of power which the Government of India wish to confer on them. As regards their funds and duties, very little alteration need be made in the existing law. In November last, I submitted to you my opinion as to the additional duties and funds which might, I thought, be assigned to them; and I have nothing to add to that opinion, except it be to emphasize my opinion that all except collegiate education ought to be provided for at municipal expense. The important question is what control should be exercised by officials over municipal self-government. The Viceroy in Council considers that it should be confined to advice. To show how such advice would act, I trust on one side the unfair imputation made in paragraph 5 which would fling on the unsuccessful adviser the slur of "want of tact or directive energy." I am ready to incur that unjust retort, when I point out two directions in which sound advice unbacked by official power would signally fail. It would fail in the two important departments of taxation and sanitation. I have not forgotten the long failure to reform the system of octroi in Karáchi, and the terrible mortality from small-pox. The octroi rules were revised, and the law of compulsory vaccination introduced by the strong preponderance of official votes at the exercise of official influence in the Council of the Municipality. Transit duties are not condemned by Native public opinion. Their disastrous economic effects are not appreciated. Again, if India were polled to-morrow, the prohibition of the export of grain in time of famine would be carried without one dissentient voice in the majority of constituencies. Prices would be regulated by law. These are a few of the instances in which the voice of the official adviser, charm he never so wisely, would be drowned by the clamour of the tradition and Native sentiment. The first effect of non-interference save by advice would be to substitute transit dues for direct taxation, or for *boná fide* octroi, in ordinary seasons; and in times of draught to ensure a disaster by rules regulating the price and prohibiting the export of grain and food stuffs. In another direction official advice would be unheeded. After 8 months' persistent exercise of what tact and directive energy I could command, I induced in April last the Wai municipality to issue an order prohibiting washing and fouling the water of the Krishna. I wish that proceedings of one of those meetings could have been published as an appendix to this Resolution. The bulk of the Committee are Bráhmans, and they felt no shame in arguing that although Wái contained several thousands who were not Bráhmans, and who drew their water-supply from the Krishna, although cholera was not only hanging about Wái itself but was multiplying the list of victims to insanitation all down the stream at Bhunij, and Limb and elsewhere, yet the Bráhmans had a religious duty to wash themselves and their clothes in the sacred river *above the point* which I urged them to fix as the limit. No sooner was this very order of the Government of India published than they all turned round and cancelled their rules. In Karáchi I can call to mind the Native prejudice against any precautions against small-pox as likely to bring down the wrath of the goddess. These are not school boys' stories of ancient India. They are facts within the experience of every district officer. In matters of sanitation the Native mind is so prejudiced by ignorance and superstition that nothing but official control will save the lives of the voiceless multitudes, whom no scheme of local self-government can reach until they have learnt the 3 R's. One word more about taxation. I have spoken of octroi. But no one can read through schedule of municipal taxation or carefully study the receipts under it without being aware that even in indirect taxation the rich escape their fair burden of taxation. Luxuries ascape when firewood and coarse grains are taxed. What was the Native opinion on Major Baring's last budget? It was that the License Tax which falls on the hundreds should be taken off, and the salt tax which falls on the millions retained. If the masses were prepared to assert their rights I should gladly welcome in its entirety the present scheme: but, until they are educated, the abandonment of official control will throw back their emancipation indefinitely. I admit the official control partakes of the nature of autocracy, but it is an impartial autocracy. If it is withdrawn, are we sure that we shall substitute self-government and not rather another autocracy, *viz.*, the autocracy of Bráhmanical influence (or it may be of any other caste), which in the particular locality commands the power and organization to fill up the vacuum of our withdrawal? These seem to me very possible dangers. The Viceroy in Council depreciates the advance made. The history of free India dates from the suppression of the mutiny. What are 20 years in the life of Asiatic peoples (I avoid the word nationality deliberately) who measure time by cycles of hundreds of years? When the history of

Hinduism is considered, few people will deny that the advance towards freedom made in the last 20 years exceeds the progress of any previous 2,000 years in the history of India. My humble opinion therefore is that if the withdrawal of official control, as contemplated in the Resolution, is literally carried out, the political future of the country will be sacrificed. I anticipate that the retrogression would immediately commence in matters of taxation and sanitation. Public works would follow next. The road to a temple or ghát would be preferred to the road which opened out a district. Money would be wasted, and contracts given out to personal friends. The withdrawal of official control is in my opinion premature.

4. I am entirely in favour of the elective system; but here again, if the scheme is to be made "consonant to the feelings and habits of the people" (paragraph 14) it will end in the substitution of the irresponsible despotism of the predominant case in the place of responsible control of unprejudiced officials. Every large caste should be represented, and the principle which is most opposed to the habits of the people—*divide et imperia*—should be adopted. Were the Resolution of the Government of India applied to-morrow to Great Britain, where I believe its application is much wanted, the experiment would doubtless succeed. But if the sheep of India are to be turned adrift in the fields of experimental administration without their official shepherds, I believe the work of the last 20 years will be undone. To prevent this, precautions must be taken. I entirely concur in the abolition of official selection, but in its place there should be election by castes so that representation of all large interests should be secured. It should be a rule for instance that not more than ¼ of the Committee should belong to one caste in this part of India. There should also be certain disabilities for service on the Committee. No one who has been convicted under any section of the Penal Code should be qualified to serve.

5. It would be quite possible to frame rules in each municipality which would regulate the system of election, but any attempt to lay down a universal system would fail. Once elected, the members as a body should have larger powers than are now conferred on the President of the Municipality. At present the Commissioner of the Division, the Local Government, and still more the Government of India, are perpetually issuing orders which interfere with their exercise of authority. Provided their taxation is not scandalous it should not be subjected to revision every 12 months; any attempt to force direct taxation down their throats should be rendered impossible, and any petty expenditure calculated to enhance the importance and dignity of the Committee should not be checked as at present. The Lord Mayor of Totnes, smallest of English boroughs, wears a gold collar when he goes to church, and regales his friends on a dinner which I believe is paid for by the citizens. Yet in India I have known of reasonable expenses incurred by members of Municipal Commissions with the sanction of the Committee which have been disallowed by higher authority. I have known many orders of the Government of India disallowing the expenditure of municipal funds as voted by Sind Municipalities. I think official control should be maintained, sanitation and taxation regulated by rules of Government; but the powers of the whole body of municipality, with its official President and other official members, should not be liable to any control by the Local Supreme Government, as far as that control exercised outside the municipality and without its consent is concerned. I cordially agree with the Government of India that "attempts at local self-government have been often over-ridden and crushed by direct official interference." I do not for an instant wish to imply that the interference of this higher authority has been wrong in the abstract. But I mean that it is outside the self-governing body and destroys its sense of independence. The official President is a part of the body, and his interference is not resented as that of a distant authority which cannot feel the pulse of the municipality.

6. As regards Local Committees I earnestly trust that the Táluka Committees may be resuscitated. The centralization effected by General Kennedy followed by 5 years forecasts, and the abolition of Local Fund Engineers destroyed their vitality. Except Rs. 199 per annum for repairs of chávdis they have no funds to spend. I think every Táluka Committee should have a fixed discretionary grant, and more solid authority over the schools and minor public works' expenditure in this district.

7. I am aware that I have not gone deeply into detail but my details must be postponed until principles are settled. The continuance of official control as part of the Municipal and Local Committee constitution, their independence of outside control, the adoption of an elective system by castes in every case, and finally the recognition of the old Táluka Committees, are the principles which I venture to think should be established. On their establishment the details can easily be worked out.

I have, &c.

W. LEE-WARNER,
First Assistant Collector.

No. 3816 of 1882.

General Department.

From E. J. EBDEN, Esquire, Acting Collector of Thána, to THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

SIR, Thána, Collector's Office, 27th July 1882.

WITH reference to Government Resolution No. 2100 of 7th ultimo I have the honor to apologise for not having submitted any report by the 1st instant. I am conscious of a want of experience which renders my opinion on the matter referred to in that Resolution of small value, and I was anxious to obtain the opinion of qualified members of the native community. Knowing that public meetings were being held in Thána to discuss the question of local self-government, and that it was under contemplation to submit the result of the discussion to Government, I intimated to some leading men a request that their memorial might be submitted through myself.

2. To this they kindly consented, and the result has been that I have been asked to forward the accompanying memorial, with my favourable opinion, to His Excellency the Governor in Council.

3. I have the honour, in forwarding the memorial, to express my disappointment at its having taken the form of a mere petition for the extension to the Thána Municipality of the powers of a City Municipality. The memorialists express approval of the idea of introducing the elective principle, but their remarks are not suggestive of the measures desirable for adoption in order to carry that principle into effect; and the general question of local self-government is not at all discussed.

4. I beg leave to briefly express my own opinion on the subject of the Government Resolution.

5. The Government of India have pointed out that their system is to be introduced as an instrument of political and popular education, and no with the hope of securing greater efficiency than at present exists.

6. The system is not new to the Bombay Presidency where District, Taluka, Dispensary and School Committees, as well as Municipal Committees, have been at work for years, so that the question here is not that of the introduction of a novel educational measure, but of the manner in which a system already existing may be improved so as to render it more effective.

7. The indicated methods of reform are :—

(1) The introduction of the elective principle.
(2) The extension of powers and responsibilities.

8. The first of these methods appears to be a very desirable one, as being likely to introduce amongst the mass of the people an interest in public affairs. I think that the system is one that readily commends itself to the native mind, and I dare say that many district officers can recall experiences of its successful adoption on a small scale in such matters as the election of a Patel by the villagers, or the like. And it would be a thing to be welcomed if in time to come the elections of Board Members or Municipal Commissioners became seasons of public tamasha and excitement.

9. But supposing the system to be introduced, experience only will show whether the men who will come forward to claim the confidence of the public will be of the same class as those who are now carrying on their duties as the nominees and having the confidence of Government. Also experience only will show whether any body will come forward at all to claim the privilege of serving the public. The latter contingency is perhaps not much to be feared, but the former is a subject for serious consideration in connection with the second head of proposed reform, *viz.*, the question of extension of powers and responsibilities.

10. Experience no doubt differs in different districts as to the qualifications of the members of the various existing Boards for the exercise of increased powers. The powers that they possess at present must be taken to be the measure of the confidence placed in them by Government after years of experience. But supposing the members themselves to be consulted, I strongly suspect that in the majority of instances it will be found that they have little or no desire for any extensive reforms in the direction of the 2nd head, and that in many cases, especially those of District and Taluka Committees, the present members are not the men who would spontaneously come forward and offer their services to the public. Their merit has been unearthed by District officers, and they serve because they are asked to do so as loyal servants of Government, and not for name and fame. They are undoubtedly as a rule the most respectable and trustworthy men of their neighbourhoods, and the chief risk to be anticipated from an elective system is that men of greater ambition and less character would replace them, whom it would not be desirable to invest with greater authority than it has hitherto been found expedient to bestow.

11. I think, therefore, that the elective system requires to be very cautiously introduced, and that in the first instance it should be confined to the Municipalities, and in their case should be extended to those only that spontaneously express a desire to adopt the measure.

12. I do not foresee any difficulty in bringing the system into effect in Municipal towns. I would not introduce an educational franchise, but would make the qualification of a voter residence as owner, or occupant for three years, of house property in the town, and the number of votes to which an individual should be entitled would be proportioned to the class occupied by his house in the scale of Municipal taxation. It is possible that a measure of this kind would tend to popularise the house tax which at present is so repulsive to the native mind.

13. The qualifications for a seat on the Commission are more difficult to particularise but are probably comprised in property, residence, character and education. A Municipal Commissioner ought to be able to read and write.

14. I would leave the constitution of District and Local Boards as at present, the members being appointed by Government. The Municipal Boards should however be allowed to send delegates to attend meetings of the District and Local Boards, when questions arise regarding matters of interest common to both.

15. The question of even the future introduction of the elective system, in connection with District and Local Boards in a District like Thána, appears to be attended with insuperable difficulties. These have been very well described in a report from the First Assistant Collector, Mr. Loch, and in a paragraph of the Administration Report of the Assistant Collector, Mr. Atkins, of which I have the honor to attach copies to this letter. I beg also to attach a letter from Ráo Sáheb Rámchandra Trimbak on the matter of Municipal elections.

16. I do not feel that I have sufficient aquaintance with the practical part of the matter to be able to discuss profitably the question of what powers should be extended to District and Local Boards, and on what points and to what extent control is desirable; but I have always been of opinion that the powers of Táluka Committees are too limited, and that the callousness, which they are often described as showing, is in a great measure due to the want of absolute control over some portion at least of the funds which they are supposed to administer. Even the placing of a small discretionary allowance at the disposal of each Committee would tend to rouse more interest in their work, and some step of this kind, I think, very desirable.

I have, &c.
E. J. EBDEN,
Acting Collector.

No. 470 of 1882.

From W. W. LOCH, Esquire, First Assistant Collector, Thána, to E. J. EBDEN, Esquire, Acting Collector of Thána.

SIR, Bándra, 21st June 1882.

WITH reference to your memorandum No. 2891 of the 5th instant, and No. 3091 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report on the extension of powers* of self-governmen in Municipalities and District Committees.

*S.O.

2. The Resolution of the Government of India shows that it is proposed eventually to free from all but the most general official supervision Municipalities and District Committees: bodies which up to the present time have worked either under a very close official control, or entirely through official machinery. I am not aware of any desire for increased power being generally felt in my districts, and those native gentlemen I have talked to do not think that the Municipal or District Committees can work without official supervision of a much closer character than that proposed by the Resolution. In the Municipalities, there are a few energetic members who are willing to give up their own time, but most of the Commissioners dislike the trouble of even attending the meetings, and never think of helping in the out-door or other work. I have got useful information as to the requirements of the district from members of Local Fund Committees, but the best of them are reluctant to go a few miles to inspect a work. The mass of the people, both in the Municipal towns and in the districts, are utterly indifferent to the local institutions; in fact, a Municipal Committee is energetic as it becomes the object of considerable hostility, while villagers never have an idea beyond getting a well or road made for their own village.

3. In the 3 northern tálukas of my district, the whole of the large towns and villages are on the coast; and inland, especially in Máhim and Dáhanu, the country is thinly populated mostly by Kolis and Warlis. The members of the Local Committees must come from the Bráhmans, Parbus, Pársis and Wánis who live on the coast, and the great additional power thus given to them will, I fear, not be used for the benefit of the inland villages. In a country where the lower classes are so unable to hold their own with the educated and money-lending classes the proposed system will, if fully carried out, result in the formation of a narrow and unsympathetic oligarchy, and the Warlis, Kolis and others will have no voice in the management of the funds; nor will they be able to make their wants known to the Committees as they now can to district Officers on tour.

4. I will now proceed to consider more in detail the measures necessary for carrying out the orders of the Government of India, and first as regards Municipalities.

5. Under the present Municipal law, Municipalities, especially city ones, can manage their own affairs with a good deal of freedom; though, on the other hand, large powers of control were reserved for the District officers, and in the smaller towns the working of the Act has sometimes to be entrusted to the Mámlatdár of the táluka, owing to want of interest on the part of the members. The variety of taxes to be found in different Municipalities shows that, to a considerable extent, local tastes have been consulted on that point.

6. The Government of India wishes that steps should be taken to introduce a system of election of Municipal members; that Government officers should not as a rule be chairmen, or apparently have any powers beyond those of ordinary members; that the powers of Committees should be increased by entrusting to them the management of more departments and fresh sources of revenue.

7. I doubt if the people will take any interest in municipal elections even in Bándra, which is the most advanced of my municipalities, and I think that for the present at least half the members should be nominated. We might try the experiment of electing one half. The members and electors would have of course to be rate-payers, and the standard of qualification would vary with the incidence of direct taxation in each Municipality. The towns would have to be divided into wards with a representative for each ward, the municipal officers would have to frame a register of qualified voters, and the voting should be carried out in the simplest way possible under the supervision of the Committee. The elected members should sit for three years as the nominated members at present do.

8. The powers at present given to the President and Vice President in town municipalities of hearing appeals from, and of vetoing the decisions of the Committee, might be taken away; the latter is a power which is very seldom exercised. Government would have to reserve to itself the right to enquire into any cases of mismanagement or injustice brought to its notice, and aggrieved persons could also have recourse to the Civil Courts. The provisions of the Act as to the audit and publication of accounts would have to be kept in force.

9. At present the Municipalities have the power of collecting and managing the purely municipal revenues.

The right to sanction all taxes would of course as at present be reserved by Government. They also manage the pound and dispensary funds. The control of the schools might be made over to them, but I think it would be better, at any rate where there are only town municipalities, to leave that duty to the Táluka Committees on which the Municipality would be represented.

The Government of India have suggested that the management of the license tax should be left t local bodies. I am afraid they could hardly be trusted with this work yet, and I see no reason why they should be given the additional revenue unless part of the cost of the Police was paid by them, and they are at present quite unfit to he trusted with the management of the Police in their limits.

10. The Local Fund Committees are at present much more purely official than the Municipal ones, owing to the introduction of the system of seven years' Budgets, even the District Committees have little power, and the Táluka Committees only decide what works are to be carried out with the small funds allotted to them. The process of centralization has been steadily carried on for some years past, with a view to greater economy and efficiency, and this object has, I think, been attained. The aim of the Government of India is to decentralize and to throw as much power as possible into the hands of a number of local Committees, each representing a comparatively small area.

11. The objects of the Government of India with regard to District Committees are much the same as those mentioned with regard to Municipalties, *viz.*, to try and introduce a system of election to efface as far as possible the official element; to increase the resources of the Committee and their control over those resources, and to form Committees for the smallest convenient areas.

12. The administrative unit under this system is to be the táluka and not the district, but I fear that it will not be found easy to get members to come ten or fifteen miles even to attend fortnightly or

monthly meetings, and that the tendency will be to allow the work to fall into the hands of those members who resided at the táluka town.

13. I see great difficulties in the way of introducing any system of election and would recommend nomination for the present, a larger number of members than at present exist being appointed to represent all parts of the táluka. The appointment should be for three years. If election is to be tried, the electors would have to be those local cess-payers whose names were on the revenue books as paying, say Rs. 3 local fund a year. This would represent a holding of Rs. 48 a year, and in many villages there would only be one or two electors. The táluka would have to be divided into sections according to population, with a representative for each section who should hold land in it. The voting would have to be carried out before the village officers. Each Municipality should be represented by one or two members on the Táluka Committee, and the holders of alienated villages should be allowed to elect representatives out of their own body in proportion to the number of alienated villages in the táluka, say one member to ten villages.

14. This body should, I think, be subordinate to a District Committee composed, besides officials of members elected by each Táluka Committee. To ensure public works being carried out on some system, and to have a proper account establishment, it would be necessary for the Táluka Committee to be under the general control of the District Committee and to have a general outline of the larger works to be undertaken for some years in advance settled for them, as is now done by the septennial budgets. The chairman of the District Committee would be the medium of communication with other District Committees and with Government.

15. The Táluka Local Fund Committees would be entrusted with the management of the Local Fund cess of their táluka, and with the revenues from tolls, ferries and pounds which have already been given to the Local Funds. The dispensaries, outside Municipal towns, would then as now, be under their management, and ultimately, I presume, the vernacular schools would be handed over to them. The amount of the Local Fund cess is fixed for the period of the survey, and I do not think the Committees could at present be given any powers to increase it. For the general convenience, it ought also to be collected as now by the Revenue officers; but the Committees might keep the accounts, though this would add to the cost of establishment. I do not see what other revenues could be made over to them unless they were entrusted with the management of the license tax, and I do not think it would be advisable to give them that.

16. In conclusion, I would strongly urge the necessity, for the present at any rate, of having official Chairmen for the Táluka and District Committees. The native gentlemen who would be members have not, as a rule, the habits of business necessary for official work, and they are quite inexperienced. It surely would be better first to enlarge the powers of the Committees and get the system into working order, and then when the unofficial members had learnt their duties and shown that they took an interest in them, as a final step to make them independent of all Local official control.

In the Municipalities we might at once try the experiment of unofficial Chairmen, the present official members retaining their seats on the Committee without special powers. Throughout the changes we are about to make, we must remember that it is better to keep back privileges for a time than to have to withdraw them after they have once been given.

I have, &c.,
W. W. LOCH,
First Assistant Collector.

EXTRACT Para. 24 A from the Administration Report of the Assistant Collector, Mr. Atkins, dated 3rd July, 1882.

IN view of the contemplated change in the constitution of Táluka Committees, I think it will not be considered inappropriate if I here make a few remarks on the class of members we have at present, on the class of members likely to be obtained by election, and on the mode of election likely to be a success in that part of the Thána Collectorate which is at present in my charge. The views I shall express on this latter head are not exclusively my own. They must rather be considered as the views of a number of intelligent native gentlemen with whom I have lost no opportunity of discussing the question. There are four tálukas in my charge, but these four tálukas belong to two distinct classes. On the one hand there are the comparatively civilized tálukas of Bhiwndi and Murbád, and on the other there are the wild and jungly tálukas of Kalvan, *viz.*, Vada and Sháhápur.

As the tálukas differ, so do the Committees resolve themselves into two classes. The Committee members of the former two tálukas are educated and intelligent men. They evince a considerable interest in Local Fund work, and they moreover almost all carry on business which takes them into every part of their respective tálukas. I believe them to be capable of carrying on the Committee business by themselves. I believe, too, that at a general election the majority of them would be the chosen representatives of the people. But it is very difficult in the Kalvan district. Here, as in most places, the present members are with hardly an exception Páudharpeshas. But in Sháhápur and Váda, only three or four villages, almost including the head station, contain natives of this class whose recommendation is that they can read and write, consequently the members have hitherto been selected from these three or four villages only.

Again the communications of these two tálukas in the shape of roads are exceedingly bad. Consequently these members are not in the habit of travelling about their tálukas to any considerable extent, and consequently also, when a Committee meeting is called, many of them fail to attend. Their knowledge of their táluka as a whole is limited; they take but little interest in Committee work; they possess some scant information as to what has been done; they possess no useful knowledge as to what is wanted. The Committee meeting resolves itself into a conversation between the Mámlatdár and the Assistant Collector, who compare notes about the results of their visits to the different villages: such are the men we have at present. I now turn to the men likely to be obtained under the new system.

In the tálukas of Bhiwndi and Murbád the future elected representatives may be expected to be much

the same as the present nominated members; and if this is the case we shall have reason to be satisfied. But in the jungly tálukas of Kalvan we shall get a very different set of men. In these tálukas we cannot, I believe, get Pándharpeshas with an intimate knowledge of their táluka as a whole. We must therefore be content to get Kalambis of the Patel class; and in order that every part of the táluka may be represented, we ought to have a large number of them. They will each certainly only have a knowledge of a limited part of the táluka, and will as certainly only look out for the wants of their own villages: but this is all that the present members know and do when they know and do any thing. In short, the present members are Vakíl's and Savkárs with a knowledge of the head station and one or two other villages. The future members will be less educated but will represent the local interests of every part of the táluka. Neither are the present members capable of carrying on Committee work by themselves, nor can the future members be expected to do so at first. I speak here solely of the Kalvan District, which I desire to distinguish widely in this respect from the tálukas of Bhiwndi and Murbád.

I now come to the mode of election: and the plan I am about to describe is that suggested or concurred in by a number of intelligent native gentlemen, with whom I have discussed the subject. In the first place in order to get members possessing local knowledge, we must have every part of the táluka represented in the Committee. Each group of villagers, say ten or fifteen, should elect a representative. Each village should be assigned a certain number of mukhtyár electors. The number varying according to the Local Fund assessment of the village. The villagers should be allowed to choose their mukhtyár electors as they like; and it is believed that there will be little difficulty about this, for, in every village besides the patel, there are a few respectable and respected men who form the "Punch," when one is called together, and who constitute themselves or are constituted by others as arbiters in any dispute which may arise in the village. The villagers should be quite satisfied to leave the election of members in the hands of some of these men who would on their part bear in mind the interests of their village when electing a member. The mukhtyár electors of all the villages of the Saza should meet together at the Assistant Collector's camp and there elect a member.

The advantages of this system of mukhtyár electors are three,—1st, every village is represented and its local fund assessment is also represented; 2nd, all difficulty in deciding on property qualification on the part of electors is avoided; and such inconsistencies, as one small village containing ten big Khátedárs having ten votes and another larger village containing no big Khátedárs though on the whole paying more assessment and having greater wants yet having no votes, cannot occur; 3rd, the election is left in the hands of the most respectable, respected, and intelligent men, which is the most that can be expected in districts where education is practically unknown.

Some educational or property qualification on the part of the candidates for election might perhaps be required; but it would probably be unnecessary, for where there is a candidate possessing these qualifications, we may trust the mukhtyár electors to elect him of their own accord, other things being equal. One qualification should certainly be insisted on, *viz.*, that the candidate should either reside in the "Saza" or petty borough he wishes to represent, should possess property in that "Saza," or that his business must be of such a nature as must necessarily take him frequently to that "Saza."

Owing to my want of experience it would of course be out of place for me to discuss the details of any system of Local Government. I have endeavoured above to draw attention to the very distinct classes of Committee members to be found even in adjacent tálukas, and moreover to give expression to the views of native gentlemen on a point on which they are capable of forming an intelligent opinion.

In conclusion, I would say that the present Táluka Committee members are almost enthusiastic in their praises of a system which they believe will enable them to finger the money at once, and to have a work executed as soon as it is decided on.

BRITISH BURMA.

(*Referred to at page* 117 *of Part I. of Return.*)

STATEMENT A.—Financial Position of Municipal Towns in Burma under existing arrangements and according to the Scheme for giving effect to the Government of India Orders for the Extension of Local Self-Government, on the Basis of the Budget Estimates for the Year 1882-83.

Serial Number.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	Name of Municipal Town.	Population.	Total Ordinary Income.	Income from Excise Licenses included in Total of the next foregoing Column.	Present Expenditure on			Proposed future Expenditure on			Total of next Three preceding Columns.	Amount by which the Liabilities of the Municipality will be increased after deducting the Relief caused by withdrawal of Police Charges.	Amount of Grant from Provincial Funds now made in aid of Municipalities on account of their New Burdens.
					Police.	Education.	Hospitals and Vaccination.	Education.	Hospitals and Vaccination.	Additional Roads or Works now to be made over.			
			Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1	Rangoon -	134,176	7,39,400	1,72,000	76,300	10,800	52,700	72,000	88,500	66,000	2,26,500	86,700	87,000
2	Moulmein	53,107	1,17,200	27,500	34,700	5,800	12,100	33,800	21,400	8,000	63,200	10,600	11,000
3	Akyab -	33,989	93,900	9,000	16,200	4,700	5,800	20,400	16,200	6,600	43,200	16,500	17,000
4	Bassein -	33,502	1,32,600	22,000	16,800	14,300	3,800	22,600	8,050	1,550	32,200	Surplus left for municipality	—
5	Henzada -	29,705	68,500	16,000	9,600	9,300	1,600	12,400	5,000	2,500	19,900		—
6	Prome -	47,913	1,16,400	9,000	13,200	12,300	3,000	13,900	6,200	10,700	30,800	2,300	5,000*
7	Toungoo	17,199	72,700	8,000	8,700	14,600	4,300	21,500	8,500	8,000	38,000	10,400	11,000
	Total -	349,591	13,40,700	2,63,500	1,75,500	71,800	83,300	1,96,600	1,53,850	1,03,350	4,53,800	1,26,500	1,31,000

* This Prome grant exceeds the deficit in order to provide for additional educational expenditure.

Detail of Items which make up the Figures in Columns 8—10 of Statement A.

The only schools retained as "provincial" in Rangoon Town are the "high" the "normal and practising," and the "technical" schools.

The "middle school" can remain in the preseent High School building for the present if if the Municipality wish; when they desire to transfer it to any other site, a provincial grant of money proportioned to the space surrendered will be made to aid the Municipality in erecting or buying a new schoolhouse. If the Municipality decide not to retain a Government middle school, but to leave to private or missionary enterprise the business of providing adequate middle schools for the town, then the money saved on the "middle school" allotment will be available for giving municipal grants, either under or outside the ordinary grant-in-aid rules to "middle schools." Fees realised in the Government middle school will be at the disposal of the Municipality.

Grants for aided schools will have to be made in accordance with the rules for the time being in force respecting "results grants" or other assistance to aided schools and for indigenous schools. The Municipality will decide for themselves how much they will allot for scholarships, but any scheme for scholarships must be approved by the Educational Syndicate of Burma before it is carried out.

RANGOON.	Rs.
Education—	
Middle Government school	22,800
All aided schools	39,800
(*) Fifteen per cent. on the above for scholarships, &c.	9,400
Total	72,000

(*) Certain school fees will be an asset of the Municipality and will be available for educational purposes.

	Rs.	
Medical—		
Vaccination	3,600	
Dispensaries—		
Items previously provincial	15,900	
Ditto municipal	52,700	
Lock hospital	16,300	
Total	88,500	
Public Works—		
Provincial road from Kemmendine to Monkey Point, estimated to cost for repairs and periodical renewal of metal	20,000	per annum.
Cantonment and station roads other than those maintained by the Cantonment Fund, namely,—		
Boundary road,		
Pagoda road		
Godwin's road,		
Prome road up to boundary of cantonments,		
Kemmendine road,		
Lake road,		
Halpin road,		
Cemetery road,		
West Pagoda road,		
Simpson road,		
Signal Pagoda road,		
Theatre road, E. I. lines,		
Theatre road,		
Godwin's road from Kemmendine,		
Old Magazine road,		
Church road,		
Garden road,		
Commissariat cattle-lines road,		
Church compound road,		
of which the estimated cost for repairs and for periodical renewal of metals is	35,000	
Total	55,000	
Twenty per cent. added for establishment	11,000	
Total	66,000	

N.B.—One incidental advantage of the Municipal Engineer taking over all these roads will be that he will have full claim to *all* the stone ballast that comes into the port, except such small portions as the Port Commissioners may legitimately require.

MOULMEIN.	Rs.
Education—	
Government high and middle schools	14,400
All aided schools	15,000
(*) Fifteen per cent. on the above for scholarships, &c.	4,400
Total	33,800

(*) School fees will form a new educational asset for the Municipality.

	Rs.
Medical—	
Vaccination	1,900
Dispensary—	
Items previously provincial	4,800
Ditto municipal	12,100
Lock hospital	2,600
Total	21,400

The "normal and practising" and the "survey" schools in Moulmein are retained as "provincial."

Grants-in-aid must be made and scholarships alloted according to the rules and sanction required in Rangoon.

BRITISH BURMA—*continued.*

DETAIL of Items which make up the Figures in Columns 8–10 of Statement A.—*continued.*

MOULMEIN—*cont.*

	Rs.	
Public Works—		
Upper main road, Court-house road, Nyoungbinzeik road, Toungwaing road, Estimated to cost for annual repairs, periodical renewals, and for supervision - - -	8,000	per annum.

AKYAB.

	Rs.	
Education—		
Government high and middle schools - -	13,800	
All aided schools - - - -	3,900	
(†) Fifteen per cent. on the above for scholarships, &c. -	2,700	
Total - -	20,400	

(†) School fees will form a new educational asset of the Municipality.

Medical—		
Vaccination - - - - - -	1,000	
Dispensary—		
Items previously provincial - - -	7,000	
Ditto municipal - - -	5,800	
Lock hospital - - - - -	2,400	
Total - -	16,200	
Public Works—		
Main road, Hopkinson's road, Morton's road, These roads are estimated to cost for repairs, periodical re-metalling, and supervision - -	6,000	
Travellers' bungalow, maintenance, repairs, and servants, less by the fee receipts - - -	600	
Total - -	6,600	

The "normal and practising" and the "survey" schools in Akyab are retained as "provincial."

Expenditure on aided schools and on scholarships will be subject to the rules for the time being in force respecting results-grants, &c., as in the case for Rangoon.

BASSEIN.

	Rs.	
Education—		
Government middle school - - - -	9,400	
All aided schools - - - - -	9,400	
Twenty per cent. on above to provide for scholarships, &c. - - - - - -	3,800	
Total - -	22,600	
Medical—		
Vaccination—		
Provincial - - - - - -	1,050	
Dispensaries—		
Items hitherto provincial - - - -	1,200	
Ditto municipal - - - -	3,800	
Lock hospital - - - - -	2,000	
Total - -	8,050	
Public Works—		
Roads inside the redoubt, Part of Kangyeedoung road, Meteorological shed, Boarding school building, Lock hospital, The estimated cost of repairs, renewal, and supervision of these roads and buildings is - - -	1,550	

No schools in Bassein Town are retained as "provincial."

Rules and conditions as to expenditure on grants-in-aid or on scholarships will be as in the case of Rangoon.

HENZADA.

	Rs.	
Education—		
Government primary school - - - -	4,000	
All aided schools - - - - -	6,300	
Twenty per cent. on the above for scholarships, &c. -	2,100	
Total - -	12,400	
Medical—		
Vaccination - - - - -	770	
Dispensary—		
Items previously provincial - - -	2,630	
Ditto municipal - - -	1,600	
Total - -	5,000	
Public Works—		
Strand road - - - - - -	2,500	

No schools in Henzada are retained as "provincial."

Rules and conditions as to expenditure on grants-in-aid or on scholarships will be as in the case of Rangoon.

PROME.

	Rs.	
Education—		
Government middle school - - - -	7,900	
All aided schools - - - -	3,700	
Twenty per cent. on the above for scholarships, &c. -	2,300	
Total - -	13,900	

No schools in Prome are retained as "provincial."

Conditions and rules as to grants-in-aid and as to scholarships will be the same as in Rangoon.

BRITISH BURMA—*continued.*

DETAIL of Items which make up the Figures in Columns 8–10 of Statement A.—*continued.*

PROME—*cont.*

Medical—	Rs.	
Vaccination—		
Provincial	600	
Dispensary—		
Items previously provincial	2,600	
Ditto municipal	3,000	
Total	6,200	
Public Works—		
Prome and Poungdeh road in municipal limits, Myaydeh road in municipal limits, Old Prome and Myaydeh road in municipal limits, Prome Hill and Myaydeh road in municipal limits, The maintenance, repairs, renewal, and supervision of these roads are estimated to cost	9,000	per annum.
The travellers' bungalow, estimated	700	ditto.
The steamer pontoon and its approaches, estimated	1,000	
Total	10,700	

TOUNGOO.

Education—	Rs.	
Government middle school	10,800	No schools in Toungoo are kept "provincial." Expenditure on aided schools and on scholarships will be subject to the same conditions and restrictions as in the case of Rangoon.
All aided schools	7,100	
Twenty per cent. for scholarships, &c.	3,600	
Total	21,500	
Medical—		
Vaccination	600	
Dispensary—		
Items previously provincial	2,000	
Ditto municipal	4,300	
Lock hospital	1,600	
Total	8,500	
Public Works—		
Sanitary Camp road in the municipal limits, All Cantonment roads and bridges, The estimated cost of repairs, renewals, and supervision of these roads is	8,000	per annum.

STATEMENT B. No 1.—STATISTICS for Twenty-four Town Funds in BRITISH BURMA on the Basis of the Estimates of 1882–83.

Serial Number.	Name of Town.	Estimated Total Income of 1882-83.	Excise Revenue Receipts of Town.	Amount now paid by Town for Police.	Present Educational Expenditure.	Present Medical and Vaccination Expenditure.	PROPOSED		Grant now to be made from Provincial Funds.
							Educational Expenditure.	Medical Expenditure.	
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs	Rs.	Rs.	
1	Pegu	36,000	9,200	1,960	2,210	750	2,960	750	
2	Ngathainggyoung	14,000	2,950	2,830	3,490	650	4,240	650	
3	Shwaydoung	26,500	1,000	6,700	4,090	1,200	5,040	1,200	
4	Myanoung	11,200	900	3,300	3,590	700	4,340	700	
5	Thayetmyo	27,500	6,000	5,790	2,300	1,800	3,800	5,173	
6	Allanmyo	18,500	1,100	70	2,410	960	2,960	960	
7	Maoobin	5,400	2,500	—	500	1,544	1,900	3,404	
8	Yandoon	24,100	5,000	8,400	3,990	1,000	5,444	1,000	
9	Kaukareik	3,500	—	—	300	—	600	—	
10	Thatone	12,700	3,000	1,350	2,210	450	2,960	450	
11	Shwaygyin	23,000	5,500	4,500	7,410	1,800	8,760	3,945	
12	Kyiketo	4,700	600	1,500	500	640	1,300	640	
13	Tavoy	15,300	—	3,900	1,000	1,040	9,145	2,320	
14	Mergui	11,000	300	2,560	500	940	8,645	2,240	
15	Kyoukpyo	8,000	550	—	500	930	8,620	2,030	
16	Sandoway	5,000	250	20	550	250	8,670	2,830	
17	Poungdeh	21,500	2,500	1,700	3,590	600	4,540	600	
18	Thonezeh	14,500	4,000	70	2,210	1,227	2,960	3,687	
19	Gyobingouk	20,500	6,400	70	600	—	900	—	
20	Laymyetha	7,800	—	2,100	500	—	800	—	
21	Zaloon	5,400	2,500	1,030	300	—	500	—	
22	Kyangin	7,400	—	1,500	600	—	900	—	
23	Pantanaw	15,500	3,200	1,500	3,590	700	4,540	700	
24	Donabyoo	6,000	1,000	1,050	2,780	—	3,780	—	
	Total	3,43,000	58,450	51,900	49,720	17,181	98,300	32,935	

In most towns the relief given by the withdrawal of police charges suffices to cover the additional educational and medical expenditure.

In some few towns however this will not be so; and for five years the following provincial grants will be made to towns, namely:—

	Rs.
Maoobin	3,000
Kawkareik	500
Tavoy	8,000
Mergui	8,000
Kyoukpyoo	9,500
Sandoway	11,000
Thonezeh	3,000
Total	43,000

BRITISH BURMA—*continued.*

No. 2.—DETAILS of the proposed Educational and Medical Expenditure now made over to Town Funds.

Serial Number.	Name of Town.	EDUCATIONAL.					MEDICAL.				
		Government Schools.	Aided Schools.	Indigenous Schools.	Grant for Scholarships, &c.	Total.	Pay of Hospital Establishment.	Other Hospital Charges.	Vaccination Charges.	Lock Hospital Charges.	Total.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1	Pegu - -	1,860	—	300	800	2,960	324	426	—	—	750
2	Ngathainggyoung	2,940	—	500	800	4,240	264	146	240	—	650
3	Shwyadoung -	2,940	—	1,100	1,000	5,040	564	336	300	—	1,200
4	Myanoung -	2,940	—	600	800	4,340	240	160	300	—	700
5	Thayetmyo -	—	2,000	300	1,500	3,800	1,134	1,756	825	1,458	5,173
6	Allanmyo -	1,860	—	500	600	2,960	250	350	360	—	960
7	Maoobin - -	—	800	500	600	1,900	1,326	714	1,020	—	3,060
8	Yandoon -	2,940	—	1,000	1,500	5,440	480	220	300	—	1,000
9	Kawkareik -	—	—	300	300	600	—	—	—	—	—
10	Thatone - -	1,860	—	300	800	2,960	288	162	—	—	450
11	Shwaygyin -	6,260	—	1,000	1,500	8,760	1,710	1,420	815	—	3,945
12	Kyiketo - -	—	—	500	800	1,300	300	100	240	—	640
13	Tavoy - -	6,345	—	1,000	1,800	9,145	924	686	710	—	2,320
14	Mergui - -	6,345	—	500	1,800	8,645	1,278	622	340	—	2,240
15	Kyoukpyoo -	6,320	—	500	1,800	8,620	810	690	530	—	2,030
16	Sandoway -	6,320	—	550	1,800	8,670	2,112	318	400	—	2,830
17	Poungdeh -	2,940	—	600	1,000	4,540	180	180	240	—	600
18	Thonezeh -	1,860	—	300	800	2,960	2,472	745	470	—	3,687
19	Gyobingouk -	—	—	600	300	900	—	—	—	—	—
20	Laymyethna -	—	—	550	300	800	—	—	—	—	—
21	Zaloon - -	—	—	300	200	500	—	—	—	—	—
22	Kyangin - -	—	—	600	300	900	—	—	—	—	—
23	Pantanaw -	2,940	—	600	1,000	4,540	216	184	300	—	700
24	Donabyoo -	2,280	—	500	1,000	3,780	—	—	—	—	—
	Total -	58,950	2,800	13,450	23,100	98,300	14,872	9,215	7,390	1,458	32,935

MADRAS.

(*Referred to at page* 126 *of Part I. of Return.*)

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Madras, in the Financial Department.—No. 216 (Financial), dated the 9th February 1882.

Read the following :—No. 4948, dated Fort St. George, the 16th December 1881.

From H. F. CLOGSTOUN, Esquire, Officiating Accountant General, Madras, to the CHIEF SECRETARY to the Government of Madras.

WITH reference to the proceedings of Government in the Financial Department, No. 2040, dated the 21st October 1881, I have the honor to forward herewith two statements showing, according to the proposed Provincial scheme, the receipts and charges in 1880–81, under certain major heads of account which seem most likely to contain items fit for transfer to the control of Local Committees.

STATEMENT showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Receipts in 1880–81 under those major heads which contain Items fit for transfer to Local Committees.

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			Remarks.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
RECEIPTS.				
XV. Minor Departments—	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Receipts on account of Model or Experimental Farms or Factories—				
Cinchona - - -	—	22,873	—	
Model Farms - - -	—	4,003	—	
Miscellaneous - - -	—	3,664	—	
Emigration Fees - - -	—	10,796	—	
Examination Fees - - -	—	62,294	—	
Botanical and other Public Garden Receipts—				
Receipts from Botanical Gardens	—	3,721	—	
Receipts from other Public Gardens.	—	2,706	—	
Total -	—	1,10,057	—	

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Receipts, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			Remarks.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
RECEIPTS—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
XVII. Police—				
Police supplied to Railways -	—	39	—	
Police supplied to Public Departments, Private Companies and Persons.	—	41,552	—	
Cash Receipts under Act 31 of 1860	—	175	—	
Fees, Fines, and Forfeitures—				
Police Receipts - - -	—	24,196	—	
Pound Fund Receipts - -	—	1,96,276	—	
Police Lodging Fund Receipts -	—	—	23,314	
Contribution from Municipalities -	—	1,41,560	—	
Miscellaneous—				
Police Receipts - - -	—	57,477	—	
Pound Fund Receipts - -	—	8,999	—	
Total -	—	4,70,274	23,314	
XIX. Education—				
Fees, Government Colleges - -	—	72,709	—	
Fees, Government Schools—				
High - - - -	—	32,310	—	
Middle - - - -	—	25,658	—	
Low - - -	—	877	25,952	
Girls' Schools - - -	—	864	—	
Government Normal Schools -	—	1,624	—	
Technical Schools - -	—	31,406	—	
Income from Endowments -	—	—	4	
Contributions - - -	—	—	1,857	
Sales Proceed of Books - -	—	6,033	46,016	
Miscellaneous—				
Teachers' Certificate Examination Fees.	—	774	—	
Upper Primary Examination Fees	—	2,099	—	
Miscellaneous - - -	—	4,613	1,140	
Total -	—	1,78,967	74,969	
XX. Medical—				
Medical College Fees - -	—	8,929	—	
Hospital Receipts - - -	—	7,502	—	
Lunatic Asylum Receipts - -	—	*16,139	—	*Includes recoveries from Local Fund and Municipal Boards for diet, &c. of lunatics.
Medicines sold - - -	—	604	1,571	
Contributions—				
Municipal Contribution for Medical College.	—	15,898	—	
Municipal Contribution for Vaccination and Sanitary Agency at the Presidency and for Midwife.	—	670	—	
Lump Contribution from Ootacamund & Coonoor Municipalities.	—	900	—	
Other Contributions - -	—	—	11,051	
Miscellaneous - - -	—	*52,086	1,932	*Contribution from Madras Municipality for 1879–80 - - Rs. 41,700 Adjustment on account of diet of famine patients paid in previous years - - 2,288 Miscellaneous - 8,098 Total - 52,086
Total -	—	1,02,728	14,554	
XXIV. Miscellaneous—				
Premium on Bills - - -	2,715	—	—	
Unclaimed Bills of Exchange of more than three years' standing.	85	—	—	
Premium on Money Orders - -	252	—	—	
Lapsed Money Orders - -	668	—	—	
Sale of Old Stores and Materials -	—	2,881	—	
Unclaimed Deposits - -	—	29,055	—	
Miscellaneous Fees, Fines, and Forfeitures—				
Marriage and Burial Fees -	—	77	—	
Fees for the Registry of Passports	—	8	—	
Fees for Stamping Weights and Measures.	—	15,390	—	

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Receipts, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			REMARKS.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
RECEIPTS—*cont.*				
XXI. Miscellaneous—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Fees for Registration of Copyrights.	—	22	—	
Other Fees - - -	—	277	1,04,764	
Fees on Government Audits -	—	2,754	—	
Rents - - - -	—	—	2,79,337	
Contributions - - -	—	—	1,41,579	
Miscellaneous Receipts—				
Cash Recoveries of Service Payments in previous years.	—	4,187	—	
Recoveries on account of Law Charges other than those in pauper suits.	—	,882	—	
Refunds of Gratuity - -	—	468	—	
Sale of Wild Animals, &c., destroyed.	—	1,650	—	
Other Items - - -	—	1,05,097	1,99,990	
Total -	3,720	1,64,748	7,25,670	
XXVII. Other Public Works—				
Public Works in charge of Public Works Officers.	—	1,97,786	98	
Public Works in charge of Civil Officers.				
Tolls - - - -	—	—	5,08,550	
Sales of Lands, Houses, &c. -	—	2,000	615	
Cemetry Receipts - - -	—	2,916	—	
Miscellaneous - - -	—	23	28,339	
Total -	—	2,02,725	5,37,602	
Adjusting Heads—				
Contributions from Local to Provincial—				
Contribution from Local Funds (Act IV. of 1871) on account of Medical College.	—	36,087	—	
Jungle Conservancy Fund—				
Departmental Jungles - -	—	—	87,414	
License Jungles - - -	—	—	44,882	
Plantations and Topes - -	—	—	49,953	
Miscellaneous Receipts - -	—	—	52,792	
Total Jungle Conservancy Fund	—	—	2,35,041	
Irrigation Cess Fund—				
Cess on Lands - - -	—	—	36,706	
Sundry Receipts - - -	—	—	1,908	
Total Irrigation Cess Fund -	—	—	38,614	

Fort St. George,
16th December 1881.

H. F. CLOGSTOUN,
Officiating Accountant General, Madras.

MADRAS—*continued.*

STATEMENT showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Charges in 1880-81 under those major heads which contain Items fit for transfer to Local Committees.

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880-81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			REMARKS.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
EXPENDITURE.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
XVII. Administration—				
Salary of Governor	—	1,26,409	—	
Staff and Household of Governor	—	1,22,782	—	
Tour Expenses	—	1,405	—	
Council	—	1,22,880	—	
Legislative Council	—	11,753	—	
Civil Secretariat	—	2,51,621	—	
Military Secretariat	—	70,756	—	
Board of Revenue Financial Commissioner and Establishment.	—	2,46,064	—	
Civil Offices of Account and Audit	1,99,893	—	—	
Currency Department	34,396	—	—	
Money Order Office	204	—	—	
Allowance to Presidency Banks	59,969	—	—	
Rents, Rates, and Taxes	—	762	—	
Local Fund Establishments in Imperial Offices.	—	—	37,611	
General Establishments of Local Funds.	—	—	45,933	
Total	2,94,462	9,54,432	83,544	
XVIII. Minor Departments—				
Meteorological Department	9,951	—	—	
Public Observatories	—	15,341	—	
Examinations (Covenanted and Uncovenanted).	—	78,235	—	
Emigration	—	24,561	—	
Cinchona Plantations	—	99,233	—	
Tea Nurseries and Plantations	—	—	—	
Census	51,208	—	—	
Donations to Scientific Societies, &c.	—	3,500	—	
Public Exhibitions and Fairs	—	2,841	—	
Government Bull and Stallion Charges.	—	3,803	—	
Gazetteer and Statistical Memoirs	2,000	—	—	
Exploration for Coal and Minerals	—	6,434	—	
Archæological Department	3,376	—	—	
Miscellaneous	—	355	—	
Model Farms, Provincial—				
Model Farms	—	24,003	—	
Share chargeable to Pound Fund Surpluses.	—	19,762	—	
Botanical and other Public Gardens—				
Botanical Gardens—				
Superintendent	—	3,600	—	
Establishment	—	2,085	—	
Miscellaneous	—	6,761	—	
Government Parks—				
Chepauk Park	—	3,654	—	
Sim's Park	—	1,497	—	
Upper Norwood Park	—	883	—	
Stonehouse Park	—	594	—	
Old College Park	—	17	—	
Provincial Statistics—				
Establishment, &c., Charges for the preparation of Trade Returns.	—	7,546	—	
Rain Guages	—	61	—	
Birth and Death Registration	—	10,741	—	Charges incurred by Collectors.
Provincial Museums	—	14,578	—	
Rents, Rates, and Taxes	—	1,698	—	
Petty Construction and Repairs	—	7	—	
Total	66,535	3,31,790	—	

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Charges, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			Remarks.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
EXPENDITURE—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
XX. Police—				
Guards for the Customs and Salt Departments.	3,13,431	—	—	
Presidency Police	—	1,87,178	—	
Superintendence	—	1,92,528	—	
District Executive Force	—	34,05,853	22,699	
Village Police	—	8,090	—	
Collection of Cattle Trespass Fines	—	1,14,571	—	
Total	3,13,431	39,08,220	22,699	
XXII. Education—				
Direction (Director of Public Instruction and Office).	—	41,208	—	
Inspection—				
Inspectors of Schools	—	66,159	—	
Allowance for Clerks and Contingent Expenses.	—	8,540	—	
Travelling Allowances	—	13,253	—	
Deputy Inspector of Schools	—	55,837	—	
Allowance for Clerks and Contingent Expenses.	—	11,422	—	
Travelling Allowances	—	28,050	—	
Inspector of Lower Class Schools	—	—	68,370	
Superintendent of Hill Schools	—	1,361	—	
Official Postage	—	2,959	—	
Miscellaneous	—	2,708	—	
Government Colleges—(General)—				
Principals	—	36,951	—	
Professors and Assistant Professors.	—	49,020	—	
Masters and Teachers	—	1,23,740	—	
Librarian	—	360	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	7,418	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	721	—	
Official Postage	—	122	—	
Value of Books, Scientific Instruments and Apparatus.	—	3,021	—	
Cost of European Stores	—	108	—	
Miscellaneous	—	7,874	—	
Government Colleges—Special (Civil Engineering College)—				
Principal	—	10,389	—	
Masters and Teachers	—	15,255	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	132	—	
Librarian	—	360	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	1,905	—	
Stipendiary Students	—	3,273	—	
Official Postage	—	47	—	
Books and Instruments	—	277	—	
Miscellaneous	—	1,437	—	
Government Schools (High)—				
Head Masters, Masters, and Teachers.	—	50,767	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	2,342	—	
Library Books and Maps	—	648	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	377	—	
House-rent	—	488	—	
Official Postage	—	58	—	
Miscellaneous	—	2,202	—	
Government Schools (Middle)—				
Head Masters, Masters, and Teachers.	—	61,785	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	3,229	—	
Library Books and Maps	—	1,423	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	254	—	
House-rent	—	1,134	—	
Official Postage	—	133	—	
Miscellaneous	—	3,404	—	

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Charges, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			Remarks.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
EXPENDITURE—*cont.*				
XXII. Education—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
* Government Schools (Low)—				*Provincial expenditure is now incurred in six districts.
Head Masters, Masters, and Teachers.	—	10,493	1,69,621	
Clerks and Servants	—	411	11,356	
Library Books and Maps	—	50	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	9	—	
House-rent	—	287	—	
Official Postage	—	11	—	
Miscellaneous	—	766	33,988	
Girls' Schools—				
Masters and Teachers	—	3,725	—	
Establishment	—	562	—	
Miscellaneous	—	343	—	
House-rent	—	226	—	
Normal School or Training College—				
Head Masters, Masters, and Teachers.	—	20,752	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	1,594	—	
Library Books and Maps	—	326	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	148	—	
Official Postage	—	29	—	
House-rent	—	122	—	
Cost of European Stores	—	8	—	
Miscellaneous	—	997	—	
Female Normal Schools	—	11,137	—	
Technical Schools (School of Industrial Arts and of Ordnance Artificers).	—	47,322	—	
Scholarships—				
In Colleges	—	6,328	—	
In Schools	—	13,154	—	
Prizes—				
In Colleges	—	40	—	
In Schools	—	355	—	
Government Book Depôt	—	5,553	14,692	
Grants-in-Aid—				
To Schools	—	1,32,923	14,159	
To Girls' Schools	—	29,786	—	
To Private Educational Buildings	—	643	—	
To Eleemosynary Schools	—	2,459	—	
To Municipal Funds	—	894	—	
Payments by Results	—	66,875	1,59,199	
Miscellaneous—				
Purchase and Collection of Oriental Manuscripts.	—	3,838	—	
Translators	—	1,000	—	
Gymnasium	—	299	—	
Contribution to Municipalities	—	—	1,000	
Miscellaneous	—	5,757	—	
Total	—	9,91,373	4,72,385	
XXIII. Ecclesiastical—				
Ecclesiastical Establishment	3,36,770	—	—	
Cemetery Establishment, Provincial	4,675	—	—	
Rents, Rates, and Taxes	848	—	—	
Total	3,42,293	—	—	
XXIV. Medical Services—				
Medical Establishment	—	4,22,690	—	*The Provincial expenditure is incurred on account of the Office of the Inspector of Vaccination at Madras and on account of the Hill Tracts of Ganjam, Jeypore, Gudem, Bhadrachalam, and the Cantonments of Bangalore and Secunderabad.
* Vaccination—				
Superintendent	—	10,637	—	
Deputy Superintendents	—	2,274	1,19,090	
Vaccinators and Assistants	—	2,870		
Clerks and Servants	—	660		
Travelling Allowances	—	3,305		
Official Postage	—	217		
Miscellaneous	—	831		

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Charges, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			REMARKS.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
EXPENDITURE—*cont.*				
XXIV. Medical services—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
* Medical School and College	—	57,115	—	*This charge is recovered from Local Fund Boards and Municipalities and shown on the receipt side.
† Hospitals and Dispensaries—				†These charges are incurred chiefly on account of the General Hospital for Women and Children, and Leper Hospital at Madras, and on account of portion of pay of medical subordinates of the hospitals in the districts which is not borne by Local Fund Boards or Municipalities.
Surgeons and Physicians	—	74,093	2,117	
Apothecaries	—	34,249	—	
Hospital Assistants	—	30,243	75,940	
Native Medical Pupils	—	1,652	2,505	
Female Pupils and Midwives	—	—	—	
Matrons and Nurses	—	12,264	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	19,591	35,396	
Travelling Allowance	—	1,448	—	
Diet of Patients, Clothing, &c.	—	58,133	22,578	
Rent of Buildings	—	2,520	—	
Medicines and Supplies	—	48,759	44,795	
Petty Construction and Repairs	—	1,200	—	
Official Postage	—	232	—	
Service Telegrams	—	9	—	
Rampa Charges	—	1,753	—	
Miscellaneous	—	15,911	44,493	
Deduct amount recovered from Municipalities.	—	57,848	—	
Lying-in Hospital—				
Surgeons and Physicians	—	16,631	—	
Apothecaries	—	3,046	—	
Hospital Assistants	—	795	—	
Female Pupils and Midwives	—	3,604	—	
Matrons and Nurses	—	2,247	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	2,097	—	
Travelling allowance	—	—	—	
Diet of Patients, Clothing, &c.	—	10,640	—	
Official Postage	—	7	—	
Miscellaneous	—	3,672	—	
Eye Infirmary—				
Surgeons and Physicians	—	13,800	—	
Apothecaries	—	1,940	—	
Hospital Assistants	—	220	—	
Matrons and Nurses	—	142	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	1,320	—	
Travelling Allowance	—	—	—	
Diet of Patients	—	5,143	—	
Rent of Buildings	—	2,583	—	
Official Postage	—	5	—	
Miscellaneous	—	1,040	—	
‡ Lunatic Asylums	—	61,507	—	‡The charges are incurred at Madras, Vizagapatam, and Calicut, and portion of them is recovered from Local Fund Boards and Municipalities and shown on the receipt side.
Lock Hospitals	—	13,146	—	
Sanitary Commissioner and Health Officer's Department.	—	45,585	—	
Chemical Examiner—				
Chemical Examiner	—	8,880	—	
Clerks and Servants	—	1,896	—	
Miscellaneous	—	320	—	
Grants for Medical Purposes—				
Grants to Hospitals and Dispensaries supported from private resources.	—	2,494	5,898	
Miscellaneous	—	398	—	
Contributions to Municipalities, &c.	—	—	64,811	
Contributions to Local Fund Circles.	—	—	1,000	
Total	—	9,48,016	4,18,623	

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement showing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Charges, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880-81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			Remarks.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
EXPENDITURE—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
XXX. Miscellaneous—				
Travelling Allowances to Covenanted and Uncovenanted Officers attending examinations.	—	447	—	
Rewards for Proficiency in Oriental Languages and Allowance to Language Examination Committee.	—	6,900	—	
Charges for Remittance of Treasure -	40,171	—	—	
Discount on Supply Bills - -	3,106	—	—	
Special Commission of Enquiry -	—	33,862	—	
Allowances to Civil Servants out of employ.	—	785	—	
Donations for Charitable Purposes—				
Maintenance of strangers and indigent persons.	—	4,693	—	
Batta to paupers in Criminal Courts.	—	96	—	
Lungerkhanas at Madras, Vellore, Arcot, and Kurnool.	—	17,742	—	
Foundling Hospital - -	—	492	—	
Friend-in-Need Society - -	—	7,286	—	
Sailors' Home - - -	—	1,200	—	
Native Choultries and their Contingencies.	—	11,254	—	
Native Poor Asylum - -	—	9,387	—	
Civil Orphan Asylums, Black Town.	—	1,200	—	
Orphan Asylum, Ganjam - -	—	766	—	
Ditto Vizagapatam -	—	3,382	—	
Roman Catholic Orphanage, Vellore, Madras, and Parcherry Poor School.	—	5,095	—	
Roman Catholic and Protestant Orphanage, Bellary.	—	4,091	—	
Roman Catholic Orphanage, Vizagapatam.	—	625	—	
Charges on account of Native crews of vessels sailing under British colours shipwrecked.	—	578	—	
Grants-in-aid to Bangalore Cantonment Orphanage.	—	300	—	
Allowance for Roman Catholic Chapels in Maisur.	—	300		
Bangalore Pensioners', Widows' and Orphans' Fund.	—	300	—	
Gordon Refuge, Saint Thomé -	—	1,200	—	
Burial of Paupers - -	—	1,524	—	
Subsistence allowance of a released convict.	—	72	—	
Grants-in-aid for the support of famine orphans.	—	5,500	—	
Miscellaneous - - -	—	695	—	
Rewards for the destruction of wild animals.	—	18,256	—	
Cost of Books and Publications -	—	10,496	—	
Charges on account of European vagrants.	—	29,634	—	
Rents, Rates, and Taxes - -	—	26,338	—	
Petty Establishments - -	—	17,199	4,70,259	
Miscellaneous and Unforseen Charges—				
Loss on Specie Remittances -	—	1,351	—	
Loss of public money - -	—	7,105	—	
Miscellaneous - - -	—	14,312	26,156	
Rampa charges - - -	—	252	—	
Contribution from Pound Fund to Municipal Funds.	—	1,695	—	
Contribution from Pound Fund to Municipalities, &c.	—	—	2,608	

MADRAS—*continued.*

Statement shewing according to proposed Provincial Scheme the Charges, &c.—*continued.*

ITEMS.	Actuals of 1880–81 recast according to proposed Provincial Scheme.			Remarks.
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	
EXPENDITURE—*cont.*				
XXX. Miscellaneous—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Contribution from Pound Fund to Local Fund Circles.	—	—	2,000	
Contribution from Canal and Ferry Fund.	—	—	82,938	
Petty Construction and Repairs—				
Village Chavadies (Rest-houses) and Ghat huts.	—	—	2,646	
Roads at Bhadrachalam and Rekapalle.	—	—	500	
Total -	43,277	2,46,410	5,87,107	
XXXIV. Other Public Works—				
Public Works in charge of Civil Officers—				
Provincial Services, Proper -	—	62,586	—	
Cattle Pound Fund - -	—	2,538	—	
Convict Labour Fund - -	—	9,143	—	
Local Funds Act IV. of 1871 -	—	—	29,67,874	
Jungle Conservancy Fund -	—	—	95	
Canal and Ferry Fund - -	—	—	8,509	
Public Works in charge of Public Works Officers—				
Provincial Service, Proper -	—	14,84,913	—	
Cattle Pound Fund - -	—	16,112	—	
Convict Labour Fund - -	—	12,438	—	
Local Funds Act IV. of 1871 -	—	—	2,64,546	
Jungle Conservancy Fund -	—	—	185	
Canal and Ferry Fund - -	—	—	40,004	
Total -	—	15,87,730	32,81,213	
Jungle Conservancy Fund—				
Formation, &c., of Jungles, Plantations, and Topes.	—	—	80,864	
Superintendent, Watchers and Peons and Permanent Gardeners.	—	—	83,100	
Establishment in Collector's Office on account of Jungle Conservancy.	—	—	685	
Establishment of the Board of Revenue on account of Jungle Conservancy.	—	—	2,132	
Public Works in charge of Public Works Officers.	—	—	185	
Public Works in Charge of Civil Officers.	—	—	95	
Contribution from Local to Provincial.	—	—	97	
Total -	—	—	1,67,158	
Irrigation Cess Fund—				
Irrigation Establishments and charges.	—	—	33,106	
Total -	—	—	33,106	
Village Service Fund—				
Refunds of Village Fees, &c. -	—	—	115	
Village servants - - -	—	—	29,02,730	
Village Chavadee houses and Ghat huts.	—	—	2,646	
Total -	—	—	29,05,491	

Fort St. George,
16th December 1881.

H. F. CLOGSTOUN,
Offg. Accountant General, Madras.

MADRAS—*continued.*

Read—

The following Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, dated February 1882, No. 338.

Read again—

The following Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, dated 5th December 1881, No. 3051:—

ABSTRACT.—Submitting remarks on the Decentralization scheme.

Read also the following letter :—

No. 164, dated Fort St. George, the 18th January 1882.

From—H. F. Clogstoun, Esq., Offg. Accountant General, Madras.

To—The Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Madras.

ABSTRACT.—Forwards a copy of a letter, with enclosures, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Financial Department, forwarding two statements shewing, according to the proposed Provincial scheme, the receipts and charges for 1880-81 under certain major heads of Account which seem most likely to contain items fit for transfer to the control of local Committees.

ENCLOSURES Nos. 1 and 2.—STATEMENTS.

RESOLUTION.—In continuation of the Proceedings quoted above on the proposed decentralization scheme, the Board resolve to submit their opinion on the cognate question of the further extension of local self-government, as called for in G.O., dated 21st October 1881, No. 2040.

2. This question is dealt with in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 30th December last, No. 3353, and in their letter, dated 10th October, No. 3515. The Local Governments are directed to scrutinize Provincial, Local, and Municipal Accounts with the view of ascertaining, 1st, what items of receipt and charge can be transferred from Provincial to Local heads for administration by Committees comprising non-official, and, wherever possible, elected members; 2nd, what re-distribution of items is desirable in order to lay on local and municipal bodies those which are best understood and appreciated by the people; 3rd, what measures, legislative or otherwise, are necessary to ensure more local self-government; 4th, how local and municipal taxation throughout the Empire can best be equalized. The Government of India indicate Medical, Education, and Public Works as the heads of account under which Provincial expenditure can probably be transferred with greatest advantage to local control, and suggest that municipalities should be relieved altogether from contribution towards the cost of the police, as they practically exercise no control over the force, an equivalent charge on account of Education, Medical, or Public Works of local interest being substituted. It is explained that it is not the intention that the transfer of control of expenditure should involve any addition to existing local burdens, and that a simultaneous transfer of receipts sufficient to meet any net balance of additional expenditure which may arise must be made. Receipts connected with any head of expenditure transferred to local control must be transferred at the same time, and if additional funds must be found, it is suggested that this may be arranged by assigning to local bodies the receipts from pounds, or a share of the assessed taxes collected within the area of their jurisdiction. Advantage is to be taken, as far as possible, of the existing local bodies, and where no such agency is available Committees are to be constituted. The question of the sufficiency of the existing legislative enactments for the administration of the funds is at the same time to be considered.

3. As regards Madras in particular, the Government of India remark that the municipal organization appears to be fairly complete, but that it is desirable to substitute some other charge for that now imposed on account of police; that as regards local funds, expenditure on Education and Medical appears capable of augmentation; and that a portion of the Provincial outlay on Public Works might be transferred to local control.

4. The Board have not the detailed information which would enable them to institute a comparison with other provinces, but they believe that it would be found that in regard to local self-government Madras is in advance of other parts of India. The municipal bodies in the mofussil in this Presidency are unfettered by official control, save such as is exercised by the Collectors and Divisional Officers in their capacities of Presidents and Vice-Presidents, and such influence is, as a rule, admitted by the people to be beneficial. As regards the administration of Local Funds, the Board are confident that Madras will bear comparison with any other Province both as to the amount and variety of work done and with reference to the organization of the local Boards and the manner in which they carry out their duties, but they do not think it would be in the interests of the local tax-payers to emancipate them wholly from official control. They are still in their infancy, and a certain amount of restraint is necessary to prevent them from becoming involved in difficulties to extricate them from which the aid of the State would have to be invoked. Little by little, as the masses begin to apprehend the aim and object of the institutions, the people outside the narrow circle of the members of the Board will make their voice heard and urge their requirements, and when the local Boards begin to feel the pressure of public opinion, official control may perhaps be gradually relaxed, though the time must still be distant.

5. The Board do not consider that the constitution of these bodies requires any modification at present. The Acts which regulate the administration of the funds require that at least half of the members shall be non-officials, and in their selection care is taken that, as far as possible, the different sub-divisions and interests of the district are represented. Section 33, Act IV. of 1871. Government are empowered to appoint Sub-Committees for the management of local institutions in subordination to the Local Fund Board, but it is necessary that the general administration should be in the hands of one Committee for each district, and the formation of Sub-Committees cannot be carried farther than it is at present. In the first place, men of education and intelligence, with leisure to devote to the public interests, are not available in the rural tracts; even for Central Committees it is sometimes difficult to secure sufficient non-official members of the class required; and, secondly, such a plan of operations would tend to disconnected action and patch-work, entailing a waste of funds. The chief lines of communication connecting the centres of trade which benefit the majority demand attention before improvements can be carried out to any large extent in

the more remote tracts. It would retard progress materially if, before these important objects were attained, available resources were frittered away in petty village works, and the relative importance of the various projects brought forward can only be properly estimated by a central body. The divisional officers, who are well acquainted with the wants of their respective charges, are members of the Local Boards, and Tahsildars and occasionally non-official members bring to notice local requirements, so that the interests of all parts of the district are equally considered. The rules, moreover, require that a certain proportion* of the land cess raised in each taluk should be expended on the communications within that area, and this principle might be extended to the appropriation of the available funds to other objects, such as Education, Sanitation, &c.; without any rule it is in practice so applied by the Boards themselves when weighing the claims of several departments representing each their own interests, and it is not desirable to fetter their discretion.

* Not less than 25 per cent. of the portion of the cess applicable to roads, *i. e.*, the two-thirds credited to the Road Fund.

6. As regards the question of legislation, the Board consider that the existing enactments suffice for efficient working. The powers of Government and the local bodies, respectively, are clearly defined, and no misunderstanding on this point has occurred. As already observed, a greater measure of independence of State control cannot safely be accorded at present.

7. Before considering the advisability of transferring additional responsibilities, the share in the administration now devolving on local bodies may briefly be noticed. The accompanying statements shew the receipts and charges of Local and Municipal Funds for 1879-80, the latest year for which details are readily available, and 1871-72, the first year of working. The vigorous condition of those bodies, and the aid they afford to the administration of the country, may be inferred from the large proportion in which they contribute to, and manage the expenditure under the important heads of, Public Works, Educational, Medical, and Sanitation. It must be remembered that the responsibility of meeting this expenditure up to eleven years ago devolved on the Imperial Government, and that in so far as it was met the Imperial Exechequer has been relieved. The greatest assistance afforded to Imperial resources was in the item of Public Works. All roads and communications, except the Buckingham Canal, a few roads in wild tracts maintained for political purposes, some cantonment roads and ghat lines, are now the care of the Local Fund Boards, and in the early days of their existence the obligations of the State were acknowledged by liberal grants-in-aid, which, owing to the inadequacy of Imperial assignments to Provincial Funds (*vide* paragraph 6, Board's Proceedings, dated 5th December last, No. 3051), have dwindled to a mere nothing. The natural consequence is that the sphere of action of the Local Boards has been much restricted, but it may be restored to its former limits if the Board's proposals in regard to decentralization are accepted, and it becomes possible to revive the grants formerly made.

The receipts under all heads (Local and Municipal) aggregated no less than 70 lakhs, of which an inappreciable portion was contributed from Provincial funds. The expenditure on Public Works, including establishment charges, was no less than 28 lakhs; 4½ lakhs were devoted to Education, 5¾ lakhs to Medical, and 5¼ lakhs to Sanitation. Charitable endowments to a large amount were also administered by these bodies, and liberal contributions made to medical and charitable institutions not under their management. The expenditure on Public Works would have been much higher but for the restrictive orders of Government in consequence of the financial pressure.

8. The Board will now proceed to consider the different heads of Provincial expenditure in the order in which they appear in the budget estimates, in view to the determination of the question whether the transfer to local management of any of the charges is expedient.

Refunds.—The transfer of charges under this head can only be carried out to the extent of the transfer of the services to which the refunds relate.

Registration, Printing, Marine, Stationery, Office Rent, and Taxes must remain Provincial.

Jails.—It would be manifestly inexpedient to transfer to local bodies the control of the Central and Presidency Jail. As regard district jails and lock-ups, the Board are not in favour of any change. It is not likely that convict labour would be utilized more profitably than it is at present, whereas discipline would certainly suffer, and there would be no uniformity of treatment which is secured by placing all jails under one authority. Supervision would be practically in the hands of the President, whose time is fully occupied already, whilst his occasional inspection is secured by his position as official visitor in his capacity of District Magistrate. Any interference on the part of the different members of the Board with the internal management would prove mischievous, and the control must necessarily be vested in one person.

Police.—The Government of India have already decided that this is not a proper charge on Local Funds. Any relief which may be afforded in this direction will enable municipalities to promote the objects which more appropriately fall to their management.

Education.—The Government of India desire that in the case of the education and Medical Services, each minor head of Provincial expenditure should be separately considered, the reasons for or against transfer being stated. The budget sub-heads are marginally noted. It will doubtless be admitted that the transfer of primary education must precede that of higher education, and it will be best to take the seventh sub-head first.

1. University.
2. Direction.
3. Inspection.
4. Government Colleges, General.
5. Civil Engineering College.
6. Government Schools, Higher Class.
7. Do. do., Lower do.
8. Girls' Schools.
9. Norman Schools.
10. Technical Schools.
11. Scholarships.
12. Prizes.
13. Government Book Depôt.
14. Grants-in-aid.
15. Payments by Results.
16. Miscellaneous.

Appended is a statement obtained from the Director of Public Instruction shewing the position of primary education at the close of 1880-81. The total number of schools to be dealt with is over 11,000; only about 1,000 are under the direct management of the local bodies, but about two lakhs of rupees were expended during the year in grants-in-aid to private schools; the number so aided is not given. More than 5,000 schools at present unaided are waiting to pass into the aided list. The total expenditure on the Government and aided private schools was 11¾ lakhs. The question is whether local bodies can undertake this increase of responsibility and work; the Board are

of opinion that they cannot. The members of the Boards could not personally do much in the way of inspection and management, and as there would be no longer necessity for maintaining the present staff of Government Inspectors, a reduction must be made, and inferior agency would have to be substituted in each district. By degrees the sphere of action of the local bodies may possibly be widened, but at present the sole control of primary education even seems in excess of their powers. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider separately the sub-heads relating to higher education.

Medical.—The sub-heads are marginally noted. The statement furnished by the Accountant General shews that under Vaccination the only expenditure at present treated as Provincial is incurred on account of the office of Inspector of Vaccination at Madras and on account of certain hill tracts and cantonments. Local bodies already contribute towards the costs of the medical schools and college, and all hospitals and dispensaries, except those at the Presidency Town which must remain Provincial, are supported from Local and Municipal Funds and locally managed. The pay of the civil medical subordinates employed in such institutions is also debited to Local, except a certain proportion contributed in consideration of services rendered to the State. A portion of the charges on account of lunatic asylums is also borne by local bodies, the cost of maintenance of lunatics being recovered from the Committee of the district or town to which the lunatic belongs. The charges on account of the Surgeon General, Sanitary Commissioner, and Chemical Examiner must remain Provincial. Thus it does not appear that any further transfer of control is possible under this head.

1. Medical Establishments.
2. Sanitary do.
3. Vaccination.
4. Hospitals and Dispensaries.
5. Lock Hospitals.
6. Medical Colleges.
7. Lunatic Asylums.
8. Chemical Examiner.
9. Grants for medical purposes.
10. Office of Surgeon General, Madras.

Minor Establishments.—The Board do not think any of the items under this head are suitable for transfer. The District Post Establishments, which are the Collector's means of communication with his officials, are placed under the administration of the Postmaster General, because experience shewed that the supervision of one central authority was advantageous, and as lines become self-supporting they are absorbed into the Imperial system. The Local Boards are not in a position to manage the District Post as efficiently as the Postmaster-General, and the Board do not recommend any change. Cemeteries, Model Farms, and Botanical Gardens are not suitable for transfer.

Miscellaneous.—Under this head the only items which the Board see no objection to making over to local management is the stamping of weights and measures. The expenditure under this head is, however, inconsiderable. Native Choultries entered in the Accountant General's list under Provincial have already been made local.

Public Works.—As already remarked, all the communications throughout the country, with the exception of the Buckingham Canal and a few special roads, have already been handed over to Local Fund Boards, as well as most works under Miscellaneous Public Improvement. Civil buildings cannot be transferred to local bodies; there is, therefore, no room for extension in this direction.

Considerable addition might, however, be made to the powers of Local Fund Boards in respect of sanctioning outlay, a vast amount of reference to this Board might thereby be saved, and the time seems to have arrived for this enlargement of powers. This can, however, be done under the existing Act by a simple recasting of the rules promulgated by Government. The Board propose, therefore, to address the Government separately on these details.

9. To sum up—the scrutiny shews that a very large proportion of the expenditure under the heads indicated by the Government of India as suitable for transfer is already controlled by local bodies, the remainder being incurred in connection with the supervision which the State must maintain for the exercise of the necessary regulation of the action of such bodies or on objects in which local interest are not concerned. The ratio of expenditure locally controlled to Provincial according to the statements furnished by the Accountant-General is as follows :—

——	Provincial.	Local.	Proportion.
	Rs.	Rs.	
Education - - -	9,91,373	4,72,385	32 per cent.
Medical - - - -	9,48,016	4,18,623	30 do.
Public Works - - -	15,87,730	32,81,213	67 do.
Miscellaneous - - -	2,46,410	5,87,107	69 do.

In brief the views of the Government of India have, except as regards the Police, been for some time anticipated in this Presidency.

C. A. GALTON,
Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Madras.

APPENDIX I.

STATEMENT showing the Receipts and Charges of Local Funds for the Years 1871–72 and 1879–80.

Items.	1871–72.	1879–80.	Items.	1871–72.	1879–80.
Receipts.	Rs.	Rs.	*Expenditure.*	Rs.	Rs.
1. Contributions from Provincial Funds.	9,50,893	72,497	1. Outlay on Works -	*31,99,746	*20,75,041
2. Contributions from Special Funds.	3,45,536	3,00,370	2. Public Works Establishments and Contingencies.	6,95,798*	5,29,861
3. Land Cess - -	23,45,721	43,72,295	3. Education - -	1,69,891	3,87,059
4. Tolls - - -	1,03,804	3,36,177	4. Medical - -	23,639	2,34,980
5. Endowments - -	45,520	3,38,752	5. Vaccination - -	47,887	1,17,671
6. Miscellaneous - -	53,692	2,30,935	6. Sanitation - -	43,916	2,18,381
			7. Choultries - -	25,317	2,20,182
			8. Contributions to Medical and Charitable Institutions.	21,113	80,662
			9. Administration - -	27,558	71,219
			10. Miscellaneous - -	517	81,624
Total -	38,45,166	56,51,026	Total -	42,55,382	40,16,680

* The difference is under New Works, the outlay thereon in 1871–72 being Rs. 12,94,000 against Rs. 2,74,000 in 1879–80, owing to the orders of Government restricting expenditure on Public Works and prohibiting any outlay on New Works (G. O., dated 29th November 1878, No. 2128, Financial Department).

APPENDIX II.

STATEMENT showing the Receipts and Expenditure of the Municipalities in the Madras Presidency for the Years 1872–73 and 1879–80.

Items.	1872–73.	1879–80.	Items.	1872–73.	1879–80.
Receipts.	Rs.	Rs.	*Expenditure.*	Rs.	Rs.
1. Tax on Houses and Lands	2,60,514	4,76,288	1. Public Works - -	3,95,324	2,29,348
2. Licenses and Trades -	1,96,946	2,97,124	2. Education - -	45,024	64,585
3. Tax on vehicles and Animals.	80,974	1,01,150	3. Medical - -	1,13,722	2,24,891
4. Tolls and Ferries -	3,27,152	2,52,148	4. Vaccination - -	8,546	
5. Miscellaneous - -	1,75,730	1,73,530	5. Registration of Births and Deaths.	9,739	9,387
6. Contributions from Local and Provincial Funds.	71,620	1,01,347	6. Conservancy - -	2,88,363	2,93,414
			7. Lighting - -	49,130	52,372
			8. Supervision - -	1,08,120	1,00,276
			9. Miscellaneous - -	75,394	1,28,220
			10. Contribution to Local and Provincial Funds.	—	1,67,692
			11. Police - - -	—	84,115
Total -	11,12,936	14,01,587	Total -	10,93,362	13,54,300

APPENDIX III.

STATEMENT showing the Number, Attendance, and Cost of Primary Schools, including the Primary Department, on 31st March 1881.

Classification of Schools.	Number on 31st March 1881.	Attendance on 31st March 1881.	Expenditure from Provincial Funds.	Expenditure from Local Funds.	Expenditure from Municipal Funds.	Expenditure from other Sources, Fines, &c.	Total Expenditure.
			Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Government Schools under the direct management of the Educational Department.	117	5,157	40,593	—	93	16,783	57,469
Government Schools under the management of the Local Fund Boards.	933	31,753	2,016	1,53,394	136	21,870	1,77,416
Government Schools under the management of the Municipal Commissioners.	121	6,328	1,190	—	27,456	13,015	41,661
Private Schools aided from Provincial, Local, and Municipal Funds.	5,846	166,056	1,07,885	1,78,148	34,368	5,82,528	9,02,929
Unaided Private Schools -	5,215	94,827	—	—	—	2,34,269	2,34,269

MADRAS MUNICIPAL ELECTION RULES.

RULES for regulating the Election of Non-official Municipal Commissioners in the Towns of Trichinoply, Madura, Bellary, Ootacamund, Tanjore, Calicut, Negapatam, Kumbakonam, and Salem, framed under Section 9 of Madras Act III. of 1871 with reference to G.Os., dated 28th June 1878, No. 1130; 7th April 1879, No. 668; 30th April 1880, No. 882; and 12th May 1880, No. 967.

Electoral Divisions not permitted.

1. For Electoral purposes the town may not be divided into sections, but each elector shall be entitled to vote for each Commissioner, and each Commissioner elected shall be deemed a representative of the whole body of electors, and not of any section of the community or division of the town. This rule shall not be held to prevent the President from appointing more than one place for recording votes, should he consider more than one place necessary for the convenience of the electors.

Number of Official and Non-official Commissioners to be elected.

2. The Commission, exclusive of ex-officio members, shall consist of not more than twenty members, of whom one-half shall be elected. The Governor in Council shall fix the number of elective Commissioners for each town, and may, from time to time, vary the number. When any vacancy shall occur, it shall be the duty of the President to report the fact to Government, within thirty days, of the occurrence of such vacancy. In the case of an official vacancy a new member should be nominated, if the maximum number of the elective members be complete. In the case of an elective vacancy, the President should at once proceed to the election of a new member in accordance with the rules in force for the election of Commissioners.

Qualification of Electors.

3. Every rate-payer, *i.e.*, a payer of rates on houses or lands, situate within the limits of the Municipality, the same being in his or her *bonâ fide* possession, as owner or occupier, shall be entitled to vote, provided he or she is *twenty-one* years of age, and has paid in the year preceding that in which he votes a house or land-rate, or aggregate house and land-rates amounting to Rupees $3\frac{3}{4}$ if the house and land-rates be fixed at $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum or proportionately lower, if these rates be levied at a lower percentage on rental.

Qualification of Elective Commissioners.

4. Each owner of land or buildings, situate within Municipal limits, or each person carrying on business therein, or residing within Municipal limits, shall be eligible for election, provided he has attained the age of twenty-five years, and pays a house or land-rate, or aggregate house and land-rate, for house or land situate within Municipal limits, amounting to not less than Rupees $7\frac{1}{2}$ if the rate be fixed at $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. or proportionately lower, if the rate be fixed at a lower per-centage; or pays a rental for house or land, or for houses and lands, amounting to not less than Rupees 100 per annum. Provided further that no person of unsound mind, or person who has been convicted of an offence punishable under Chapter XVII. of the Criminal Procedure Code, or who shall have applied to the Insolvent Court for relief as an insolvent debtor, or who shall have been removed from office under Section 7 or 9 of Act III. of 1871, shall be eligible for election.

Disqualification after Election.

5. Any elected Commissioner being guilty of misconduct or neglect of duty, or who may have applied for relief under the Isolvent Debtors' Act as an insolvent, may be removed by Government from the Commission.

Time of Election.

6. The President shall appoint and notify the day of the election, and the hour during which votes may be given, provided always that such day shall not be less than thirty days or more than sixty days, from the date on which the notification shall have appeared in the local Gazette, and that the hours for voting shall not be fixed earlier than 7 a.m., or later than 5 p.m. The hours shall be duly notified in the local Gazette and at the Municipal Office.

Place of Election.

7. The President shall fix the place or places at which the election shall be held, provided the place elected be not the Collector's Court, or the office of the Municipal Commissioners.

Polling Officers.

8. The President shall appoint such and as many polling officers as he may consider necessary, and may fix a reasonable remuneration for their services.

List of Voters.

9. A list of voters shall be prepared by the President and published in the local Gazette, at least thirty days before the date fixed for the election. It shall be the duty of the President to revise the list of voters from time to time.

Challenging the right of a Voter to vote.

10. Any one claiming to vote or objecting to the right of any voter named in this list to vote, shall present his petition or objection in writing to the President on or before the seventh day preceding that fixed for the election. The President's decision shall be final.

Objections on the day of Election.

11. On the day of election no objection to any intending voter shall be admitted, except in respect of the identity of the voter, and if any such objection be made the polling officer shall transmit the name of the objector and a statement of the grounds of his objection to the President, and shall direct the objector to appear before the President within three days from the date of the election. The President's decision on the objection shall be final.

Mode of voting.

12. The voting shall be by voting papers, which shall be prepared by the President or Vice-President of the Municipal Commission and distributed by him to the electors in such manner as he may think advisable. On these papers shall be printed the number of vacancies to be filled and the name or names of the

MADRAS Municipal Election Rules—*continued.*

candidates for election. The elector shall be instructed to score out the names of candidates for whom he does not vote, retaining the name or names of candidates for whom he votes.

Number of Candidates for whom an Elector may vote.

13. If there be but one vacancy, an elector may vote for one candidate only, but if there be more than one vacancy, he may vote for one candidate to fill each vacancy.

Polling.

14. On the day and at the hour fixed by the President for the election the polling shall commence, after the polling officer shall have read aloud the names of the candidates, and the notification of election to be held. Each voter shall present himself to the polling officer, and, after stating that it is his intention to vote, shall answer any question put to him by such officer regarding his identity and the number of candidates whose names are retained in the voting paper, and then, provided no objection is admitted against him, place his voting paper in the ballot-box.

Duties of Polling Officer.

15. It shall be the duty of the polling officer to advise candidates as to the proper course of procedure, if asked, not otherwise; but he shall carefully abstain from inspecting voting papers or inquiring the name or names of the candidates for whom an elector is voting, or acting in any way likely to influence his decision. He shall have a list of the electors, and shall enter therein, opposite the elector's name, the hour at which he voted, and shall then and there sign the entry. At the close of the poll he shall deliver, duly secured under his seal, this list together with the ballot-box to the President. He shall further remit to the President at the same time a list of objections to voters made to, or admitted by, him during the day.

Attendance at the Poll.

16. A voter shall ordinarily attend in person at the polling place and himself deposit his voting paper in the ballot-box, but if he be unable to attend, he shall apply to the President, not less than three days prior to the polling day, for permission to send his voting paper under seal to the polling officer on the day of polling, stating the reasons for seeking exemption from personal attendance. If the President see fit he shall grant the permission sought, and furnish the polling officer on or before the day of polling with the names of such privileged persons.

Scrutiny of Votes.

17. On receipt of the ballot-box from the polling officer the President shall then and there open the box and count the votes, checking the same by the register of electors, and record the result under his signature. All objections shall, if possible, be forthwith inquired into and disposed of.

Declaration of the Poll.

18. So soon as the objections made have been inquired into and disposed of, the President shall cause a notification to be drawn up under his signature, declaring the number of votes recorded for each candidate, and the names of the person or persons elected. This notification shall be posted at the Municipal Office and ultimately published in District Gazette.

Destruction of Voting Papers.

19. After the result of the poll is notified the voting papers shall be destroyed in the presence of the Presidents.

Election how decided.

20. Candidates for whom the greatest number of votes shall have been recorded, shall be deemed elected. In the case of an equality of votes for any two or more candidates the candidates concerned shall cast lots in the presence of the President, provided that if one candidate pay to the Municipality a greater amount of taxes than the other, he shall be preferred, unless he elect to leave the matter to be decided by lot.

When Election shall take place.

21. Elections shall take place as vacancies occur until the number of elected Commissioners have reached the maximum number of elective Commissioners fixed for the Municipality. Thereafter vacancies shall be filled in the manner laid down in Rule 2.

Nomination.

22. Every candidate shall be nominated by at least two competent electors, not less than fifteen days before the day fixed for the election. Nomination shall be by letter or petition to the President, which shall be signed by the candidate and his nominators.

Publication of Names of Candidates.

23. It shall be the duty of the President on the 14th day prior to the election to publish the names of the candidates and of their proposers and seconders.

Failure of Candidates for election.

24. In the event of there being no candidate or an insufficient number of candidates for any vacancy or vacancies, the President may postpone the election for such time as he may deem necessary, provided that if no candidate be forthcoming within three months from the date of the postponement the vacancy shall be filled by a Government nominee.

25. The first elections shall be held in September 1879; provided there is a vacancy or vacancies existing in the commission on the first of that month. It is not intended to disturb the existing personnel except gradually as vacancies occur from termination of period of service, death or resignation.

Note.— The Governor in Council has fixed for the present, under Rule 2, the number of Commissioners, half of whom shall be elective on the following basis:—

(1.) In a town having a population of not less than 75,000 souls, the maximum Commissioners shall be 20, the minimum 16.
(2.) In a town with a population of less than 75,000, but over 50,000 souls, maximum 16, minimum 12.
(3.) In a town with a population of less than 50,000, but over 25,000 souls, maximum 12, minimum 8.
(4.) In a town with a population of less than 25,000, maximum 8, minimum 6.

These limits will not apply to Ootacamund, the maximum for which is fixed at 10, the minimum at 8.

RULES for the conduct of Elections of Municipal Commissioners for Madras, sanctioned in G.O., 24th March 1879, No. 549, F. D.

RULE 1.—The first election of Municipal Commissioners shall be held on the 29th April 1879 and all subsequent elections on such dates as shall, from time to time, be notified in the *Fort St. George Gazette*.

RULE 2.—One Commissioner shall be elected for each of the eight Municipal Divisions in accordance with the requirements of Section 14 of the Municipal Act, and the remaining eight Elective Commissioners shall be elected for the several Divisions in accordance with the orders of Government from time to time notified in the *Fort St. George Gazette*.

RULE 3.—No person shall be qualified to vote at an election or to be elected as a Commissioner unless his name shall have been inserted in the lists prepared by the President, under Section 19 of the Act.

RULE 4.—The election shall be held at the places hereinafter appointed for the respective Divisions; that is to say:—

First	Division.	—	Police Station, Coombal Amman Covil Street.
Second	do.	—	Municipal Office.
Third	do.	—	
Fourth	do.	—	Police Station, Grantz Road.
Fifth	do.	—	Police Commissioner's Office.
Sixth	do.	—	College Hall.
Seventh	do.	—	Deputy Collector's Office, Mount Road.
Eighth	do.	—	Office of the Inspector-General of Police.

RULE 5.—The President of the Municipal Commission shall appoint one or more polling officers to preside at each station, and shall pay them reasonable compensation for their services.

RULE 6.—Each polling officer shall be supplied by the President of the Municipal Commission with a list or lists of voters for the Division or Divisions for which such polling officer is appointed to take votes, and also with a list of the persons qualified to be elected as Municipal Commissioners. A copy of the latter shall also be exhibited in a conspicuous position at the polling station.

RULE 7.—Voting papers in the form appended shall be prepared by the President of the Municipal Commission and furnished by him free of charge to the voters on application; and all persons desiring to vote must make use of such voting papers and conform precisely to the directions for the use thereof.

RULE 8.—Voters entitled to vote in any Division shall have as many votes as there are Commissioners to be elected for such Division and may give all their votes to one person provided a separate voting paper shall be used for each vote given.

RULE 9.—Polling Officers shall make a mark on the list of voters against the name of each person placing voting papers in the ballot-box and shall add the number of voting papers so placed by each such person. They shall exercise every reasonable precaution consistent with the maintenance of the secrecy of voting for the prevention of more than the authorized number of papers being placed in the ballot-box by each voter.

RULE 10.—On the day fixed for the election the polling shall commence at 6 a.m. and shall close at 6 p.m. precisely. Each voter shall present himself to the polling officers, and after stating that it is his intention to vote, shall answer any questions put to him by such officers, and then, provided no objections are admitted against him, place his voting paper or papers in the ballot-box. The polling officer shall at the close of the poll send the ballot-box duly sealed and secured to the President of the Municipal Commission.

RULE 11.—At the polling no objection to any intending voter shall be admitted, except on the following three grounds:—

1st.—That his name is not on the list of voters of the Division, in respect of which the election is being held.

2nd.—That he is not the person intended under the name which appears on such list.

3rd.—That he has already voted.

RULE 12.—On being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for any of the above objections polling officers shall prevent such intending voter from placing his voting paper in the ballot-box, shall record his name and address, the objection admitted against him, and the grounds of such objection, and shall direct him to appear before the President of the Municipal Commission within three days from the day of the election; and the decision of the President made after due inquiries shall be final.

RULE 13.—The polling officer shall, at the close of the day, transmit to the President of the Municipal Commission a list of the objections to voters admitted by him during the day; and the President of the Municipal Commission shall, after hearing and deciding upon all such objections, make lists of the votes given in each Division, and shall record the same in his office, and shall within ten days after the election publish in the Government Gazette and at his office the names of the candidates for each Division and the number of votes given for them respectively. And the candidates for whom the greatest number of votes shall have been given in each Division shall, in the proportion assigned to the respective Divisions, be deemed to have been elected Municipal Commissioners for the said Divisions accordingly, subject to the provisions contained in Section 13 of the Madras Municipal Act of 1878.

FORM OF VOTING PAPER REFERRED TO IN RULE 7.

VOTING PAPER—FRONT.

Madras Municipal Election, 1879.

1. Name of person voted for.
2. Number of person on the list.

BACK.

Directions.

1. In order to avoid ambiguity enter the name of the person for whom you intend to vote precisely as it is given in the list published by the Municipality which can be seen at the voting station on the day of the election, and copies of which can be obtained on application at the Municipal Office.

2. The addition of the number of the person intended to be voted for is merely allowed for the purpose of giving greater certainty to the vote. It is not compulsory. If, however, you add the number be careful to enter it correctly, as any discrepancy between the name and the number will invalidate the vote.

3. In filling up this paper do not affix signature, date, or any word or mark whatsoever beyond the name and number of the person intended to be voted for.

BOMBAY CORPORATION ELECTION RULES.

Bombay Castle, 26th August 1880.

UNDER Section 9 B of the same Acts, His Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to make the following rules for the conduct of elections of Members of the Corporation of the City of Bombay :—

RULE 1.—For the purpose of the election of Members of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, the said City shall be divided into the Wards hereinafter specified, and such Wards shall be respectively taken to be those shown in the lists of qualified voters to be framed by the Municipal Commissioner; and each such Ward shall be entitled to return the number of Members herein assigned to it, that is to say:—

Ward No. 1	The Fort Colába Esplanade	5 Members.
Ward No. 2	Market Mándvi Chuckla	6 Members.
Ward No. 3	Dhobi Taláv Phunuswari Bhuleshvar	4 Members.
Ward No. 4	Umarkhadi Dongri	3 Members.
Ward No. 5	Khára Taláv Khumbarwara Kámáthípur Byculla	4 Members.
Ward No. 6	Khetwari Girgaon Chaupáti	3 Members.
Ward No. 7	Wálkheshwar Mahálakshmi	3 Members.
Ward No. 8	Mázgaon Tarwari	2 Members.
Ward No. 9	Siwri Parel Sion	1 Member.
Ward No. 10	Máhím Warli	1 Member.

RULE 2.—Each person qualified to vote, whether as a rate-payer or as a Fellow of the University of Bombay, or in both those capacities, may vote for one member only and only in the ward, or in one of the wards, in which he resides.

"Persons qualified to vote shall be deemed to reside in the ward, or in each of the wards in which they are respectively entered as residents in the list last published by the Municipal Commissioner under Section 9 D of the Acts, and also, in the case of persons qualified to vote as Fellows of the University, in the ward in which the University is situated.

"When a person is thus deemed to reside in more wards than one, he shall, at least seven days before the date of the first election at which he intends to vote, intimate to the Municipal Commissioner in writing which of the said wards he purposes to vote in, and so long as he continues to be qualified to vote in the same wards his vote shall not be received at any election in any ward other than the one so selected by him. Whenever a change occurs as to the wards in which any such person is deemed to reside, he shall, if he is still deemed to reside in more wards than one, make a fresh section in accordance with foregoing provisions."

Rule 3.—The election shall be held, on the day appointed by proclamation of the Governor in Council, at the places hereinafter appointed for the respective wards, that is to say,—

Wards No. 1 and No. 7—At the Municipal Commissioner's Office.
Wards No. 3, No. 5, and No. 6—At Girgáon Police Court.
Wards No. 2 and No. 4—At the Arthur Crawford Market.
Ward No. 8—At the Mázgaon Police Court.
Ward No. 9—At the Police Station at Parel.
Ward No. 10—At the Custom House at Máhim.

Rule 4.—The Municipal Commissioner may appoint such and so many polling officers as he may consider necessary, and may pay them reasonable remuneration for their services.

Rule 5.—Voting papers in the forms appended are propared by the Municipal Commissioner, and furnished to the electors on application at his Office.

Rule 6.—On the day fixed for the election, the polling shall commence at 9 a.m., and shall close at 6 p.m., precisely, and each voter shall present to the polling officer his voting paper with the name of the person for whom he desires to vote written legibly therein in the English language, and with all particulars duly filled in, and shall answer any questions put to him by such officer, and shall sign the voting paper in his presence ; and such officer shall attest each such signature, and shall attach consecutive numbers to all such voting papers, and shall, at the close of the poll, send them in a packet duly sealed and secured to the Municipal Commissioner.

Rule 7.—On the day of election no objection to any intending voter shall be admitted, except in respect of identity or of not being on the List of Voters for the Ward ; and if any such authorized objection shall be made to any voter, the polling officer shall transmit his voting paper separately to the Municipal Commissioner, and shall direct the parties to appear before the said Commissioner within three days from the day of the election ; and the decision of the Commissioner, made after due inquiry into such objection, shall be final.

Rule 8.—The polling officer shall, at the close of the day, transmit a list of the objections to voters admitted by him during the day to the Commissioner, who shall, after hearing and deciding upon all such objections, make lists of the votes given in each Ward and shall record the same in his office, and shall within ten days after the election publish in the *Bombay Government Gazette*, and at his office, the names of the candidates for each Ward and the number of votes given for them respectively. And the candidates for whom the greatest number of votes shall have been given in each Ward shall, in the proportion hereinbefore assigned to the respective Wards, be deemed to have been elected members of the Corporation for the said Wards accordingly.

Rule. 9.—No person shall be returned for more than one Ward, and in case of any person or persons being found to be elected in more than one Ward, he or they shall be permitted to elect for which Ward or Wards, respectively, he or they will serve as member or members of the Corporation, and the votes which the said person or persons shall have obtained in any other Wards shall be cancelled, and the nominee or nominees in succession who shall have obtained the next largest number of votes in such Ward or Wards shall be returned in the place of the said person or persons ; and if, in any such cases, there shall have been no other nominee for whom any votes have been recorded, then the Governor in Council shall fix a time for holding an election in respect of any Ward or Wards which may thus be left without due representation.

Rule 10.—In case of any two or more nominees receiving an equal number of votes in the same Wards, the choice shall, if necessary, be decided by lot, to be drawn in the presence of the Commissioner, who shall publish the name of the person to whom the lot has fallen.

These Rules shall apply to any interim election held after the general election to be held in 1880, and shall remain in force until further notice.

Counterfoil No.

Receipt.

Ward No.

Name of Elector

Residence

Person voted for

Signature of Officer receiving Vote

This is to be filled up and returned by the Officer receiving the Vote.

Bombay, 1880.

Ward No.

No.

Name Father's Name Surname

Name of Elector

Residence

Name Father's Name Surname

Person voted for

I do hereby declare that I am the Elector whose name is entered above; that my residence is as above stated; that I have completed my 21st year; and that I have been assessed under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Acts of 1872 and 1878, for the half-year ending 30th June 1880, at a rate of not less than Rs. 30 per annum.

Further declare that I have not exercised my right as a voter in any other ward at this election.

And I do hereby declare that I have chosen the person named above to be a Member of the Corporation of the City of Bombay.

* (Signed)

* Signature to be made on presentation of the voting paper to the Polling Officer.

N.B.—False declaration punishable under Section 199, Indian Penal Code.

Bombay, 1880.

Counterfoil No.

Receipt.

Ward No.

Name of Elector

Residence

Person voted for

Signature of Officer receiving Vote

This is to be filled up and returned by the Officer receiving the Vote.

Ward No.

No.

Name Father's Name Surname

Name of Elector

Residence

Name Father's Name Surname

Person voted for

I do hereby declare that I am the Elector whose name is entered above, that my Residence is as above stated.

And I do hereby declare that I have chosen the person named above to be a Member of the Corporation of the City of Bombay, and that I have not exercised my right as a voter in any other ward.

(Signed)

Fellow of the Bombay University.

* Signature to be made on presentation of the voting paper to the Polling Officer.

N.B.—False declaration punishable under Section 199, Indian Penal Code.

By order of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council,

(Signed) J. Nugent,
Acting Secretary to Government.

BENGAL MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS' ELECTION RULES.

Dated Calcutta, the 2nd June 1875.

NOTIFICATION by the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department (Municipal).

THE following Rules for the election of Municipal Commissioners for the Town of Burdwan, sanctioned by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal on 2nd June 1875, under section 1 of Bengal Act II of 1873, are hereby published for general information. They will come into effect from the 1st January 1876.

Number of elective Commissioners.

There shall be eighteen Municipal Commissioners, of whom twelve shall be elected by the rate-payers, and six shall be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor.

Qualifications of candidates.

2. Any man of full age, who is a resident within municipal limits, or within three miles thereof, who is himself a rate-payer, who can read and write, and who has never been convicted of a non-bailable offence, may be proposed for election.

3. The municipal jurisdiction of Burdwan shall be divided into four quarters or wards, which shall each return three members, viz. :—

Ward A.

Raneegunge, Nuskurdighee, Bajiprotappore, Shadhinpore, Doobraj, Rusickpore, Bahirsorbomongola, Baboorbag, Keshubgunge, Bhobaneetakoor, Mutapokoor, Boyratolah, Nareekelbagan, Mohajuntoolee, Paikmarapara, Gooroodasir Pahar, Boheelapara, Radhanuggur, Pratappore, Burhatta, Kallybazar, Hafeezoolarber, Toilmarooe, Peelkhanah, Nawabdustkiam, Teecapara, Borobazar, Mungolapara, Naree, Mooruthmohulla, Peeritpara, Shambazar, Peerbaharam, Poorutunchuck, Mungletoolee, Shahachetun, Ghorashabid, Aheerpara, Bhobaparah, Hajeedangah, Komulnuggur, and Khararpahar.

Ward B.

Borehaut, Chelloputty, Kajeerhaut, Godah, Teerkarhat, Kajeerher, Lacoordee, Paharpore, Karrapotta, Bhoobunessur, Rajgunge, Kotalhaut, Dhograsohid, Nootungunge Chuck, and Dungaparah.

Ward C.

Ichlabazar, Sealdangah, Kanienutshal, Gopalnuggur, Boro and Chota Nilpore, Aishhatta Becherhaut, Meerchopah, Nootungram, Jugutber, Mearber, Buldungah, Dhamrye, Sankareepokur, Parburhatta, Golahat, Bhatchala, Bungpore, Aheermohal, Khojanorber, and Niskinbazar.

Ward D.

Tarini Mohulla, Alumgunge, Allygunge, Kustoghorah, Rugoonathpore, Mohunbag, Tejgunge, Bulamhaut, Fookeerpore, Idilpore, Mateebag, Rampore, Meerjapore, Khurgesseer, Shadewool, and Kanchunuggur.

Notice of candidature.

4. Notices of vacancies on the Committee will be issued each year in January. Any two rate-payers may nominate a candidate, and may inform the Magistrate of his candidature on any date not later than the last day of February. The Magistrate shall ascertain if the candidate accepts the nomination and is qualified under the rules; and if so, he shall notify such candidature at the cutcherry and at one or more police-stations in the town, as he may see fit. Such notification shall state the name, residence, and qualification of the candidate.

Objection against candidates.

5. If any rate-payer object to the eligibility of any candidate, he may on some date, not later than the 6th March, notify such objection in writing to the Magistrate, who shall hear and finally decide any question of eligibility. On the 10th March the final list of candidates shall be notified at the cutcherry and in at least one conspicuous place in each quarter.

Election of Sub-Committee of Commissioners.

6. The Municipal Commissioners shall appoint a Sub-Committee of three of their number to assist the Magistrate in carrying out the following rules regarding election.

Time and place of polling.

The Magistrate shall decide on what day, not later than the 25th March, the election shall be held, and he shall notify such decision at the cutcherry and in at least one place in each quarter.

List of electors.

7. As soon as possible after the publication of these rules, the Magistrate shall prepare a list of all the persons who paid any rate on houses or lands in each ward during the year ending on the 31st December next preceding. A copy of the list shall be exposed to view at the Magistrate's and at the Municipal office; and a copy of so much of the list as relates to each quarter shall be affixed at some police-station or other accessible public place in each quarter of the town. All persons mentioned in the list who have paid the rates due from them up to the 31st December preceding shall be entitled to a vote in the election of Municipal Commissioners for the wards.

Number of votes.

8. No rate-payer shall have a vote for more than one person or in more than one ward.

Recording of votes.

9. Votes shall be recorded by such polling clerks as may be appointed by the Chairman of the Commissioners. There shall be at least one polling clerk for each polling place, who shall stay at the polling place for such hours as the Magistrate may fix on the day of the poll. Each rate-payer who desires to record his vote shall attend at the polling place, and shall state his name and residence. The polling clerk shall verify from the list of voters of the quarter whether the intending voter is entitled to a vote for that quarter; and

if he is so entitled, he shall record his vote against the rate-payer's name in the list of electors for the ward. The Election Sub-Committee of the Commissioners shall, acting under the Magistrate's instructions, make such arrangements as they see fit for identifying voters in cases of doubt; and in any case of doubt as to the validity of a vote, or as to the identity of a voter, the decision of the Sub-Committee and the Magistrate shall be final.

Identification of voters.

10. At sunset of the day of the poll, the poll shall be closed and the registers of the polling clerks shall be scrutinized by the Magistrate and the Election Sub-Committee, whose decision upon any doubtful point shall be final. The candidates who may stand highest on the poll of their quarter shall be declared to be duly elected.

Scrutiny of poll registers.

11. The result of the poll shall be notified throughout the municipality, and shall be reported to Government for publication in the Gazette. The candidates declared to be duly elected shall hold office from the 1st April next succeeding the day of their election.

Membership to commence.

12. All costs incurred in carrying out the arrangements for the election shall be paid from municipal funds.

Cost of municipal elections.

Dated Calcutta, the 7th December 1875.

Notification by the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department (Municipal).

The following Rules for the election of Municipal Commissioners for the Town of Kishnaghur, sanctioned by the Lieutenant-Governor under section 1, Act II. (B.C.) of 1873, are published for general information. They will come into effect at once.

1. There shall be 18 Municipal Commissioners for Kishnaghur, of whom 15 shall be elected by the rate-payers, and three appointed by Government.

2. Any man of full age, who is a resident within municipal limits, who is himself a rate-payer, who can read and write, and who has never been convicted of a non-bailable offence, may be proposed for election.

3. The municipal jurisdiction of Kishnaghur shall be divided into six wards which are bounded as below, and which shall return numbers as follow :—

Limits of the six Wards of the Kishnaghur Town.

Division No. 1.—Is bounded on the north by the Jellinghee; west by the municipal limits; south by the Nuddea road up to the Pal Pookur, and a line thence to the southern end of the Chandsuruk road; east by the Chandsuruk road up to the Somnath road, the Somnath road the northern boundary of the Rajgur to its junction with the High street; the High street up to the Judge's road; the Judge's road up to the south-western corner of Rani Shurno Moye's tank; the Christian road and a line thence by east of the camping ground and Mr. Ricketts' house to the river.

Division No. 2.—Is bounded on the north by the Jellinghee; south, Christian road to its junction with Judge's road and by Judge's road to its junction with High street; west, line from the river running east of Mr. Rickett's house to the church; east, Katooria road and part of the High street from the junction of the Katooria to the junction of the Judge's road.

Division No. 3.—North, river and municipal limits; west, High street and Katooria road; south, Kishengunge road, east, municipal limits.

Division No. 4.—North, Jail and Kishengunge road; west, High street from its junction with the Jail road to Bugoola road; south, Bugoola road; east, municipal limits.

Division No. 5.—North, Somnath road and the northern edge of the Rajah's Gurh; west, Chandsuruk road from its junction with the Somnath road to its southern end, a line thence to the south-western corner of the Pal Pookur, and thence by the south-western limits of the municipality; south, the municipal limits from their most south-western point to the Aujunnah khal; east, Aujunnah khal up to the Rajah's road, a portion of the Rajah's road up to its Junction with the High street, and the High street from that point to the Gurh road.

Division No. 6.—North, Bugoola road; west, a portion of the High street, Rajah's road, and the Aujunnah khal; south, municipal limits; east, municipal limits.

Number of Ward.	Name of Commissioner now in charge.	Population.	Quarterly tax payable.	Total number of houses assessed.	Number of Municipal Commissioners in future, returnable by wards.
			Rs. a. p.		
1	Baboo Umesh Chunder Dutt -	4,250	894 13 9	1,438	2
2	„ Prosono Coomar Bose -	4,728	913 13 3	1,612	3
3	„ Mritunjoy Roy - -	5,556	477 6 9	1,404	3
4	„ Poresh Nath Sukul - -	6,195	691 2 6	2,339	3
5	Rai Jodoo Nath Roy, Bahadoor -	2,233	378 6 3	850	2
6	Baboo Kally Churn Lahury - -	3,784	405 10 6	1,650	2
	Total -	26,746	3,761 5 0	9,293	15

BENGAL Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

4. Any three rate-payers may nominate a candidate, and may inform the Municipal Vice-Chairman of his candidature not later than the 20th February. The candidate shall at the same time certify to the Vice-Chairman his consent to such nomination. The Vice-Chairman shall notify such candidature in the manner provided for in Rule 14; such notification shall state the name, residence, and qualification of the candidate.

5. If any rate-payer object to the eligibility of any candidate, he or she may, on some date not later than the 1st March, notify such objection in writing to the Vice-Chairman, who shall hear and finally decide any question of eligibility. On the 10th March the final list of candidates shall be notified in the manner provided for in Rule 14.

6. The Municipal Commissioners shall appoint three of their number to form, with the Vice-Chairman, a sub-committee for the purpose of conducting the elections; the Vice-Chairman shall be Chairman of the sub-committee.

The sub-committee shall decide on what day, not later than the 25th March, and at what places in the town, the poll shall be held; and they shall notify such decision in the manner provided for in Rule 14.

7. As soon as possible after the close of the calendar year, immediately preceding that in which the election is to be held, the Vice-Chairman shall prepare a list of all the persons who paid any rate on houses or lands in each ward for such year. A copy of the list shall be exposed to view at the Municipal office, and a copy of so much of it as relates to each ward in some conspicuous place in the ward to which such portion relates. Every rate-payer shall be entitled to a vote in the election of Municipal Commissioners for the ward, who shall have paid up the taxes due from him for the preceding year. In the case of joint proprietors the vote shall rest with the proprietor whose name is entered as the rate-payer in the municipal registers.

8. Each rate-payer shall have as many votes as there are Commissioners to be elected in each ward, in which he or she may have rateable property; provided that no rate-payer shall register more than one vote for any one candidate.

9. Votes shall be recorded by such polling clerks as may be appointed by the Chairman. There shall be at least one polling clerk for each polling place, who shall obey such orders as may be given from time to time by the Vice-Chairman. Each rate-payer, who desires to record his vote, shall attend at the polling place, and shall state his name and residence; the polling clerk shall verify from the list of voters of the quarter whether the intending voter is entitled to a vote for that quarter; and if he is so entitled, he shall record his vote against the rate-payer's name in the list of electors for the ward.

10. The election sub-committee shall appoint one of their own number, or some respectable person, to preside at each polling booth for the purpose of recording any objection raised to any vote tendered; such objection to be decided by the sub-committee at the subsequent scrutiny. Each candidate may authorize one representative to watch proceedings at the polling booth.

11. The poll shall be open for at least six hours between sunrise and sunset; such hours need not be consecutive, but must be notified by the sub-committee in the notification provided for in Rule 6. When the poll is closed, the registers of the polling clerks shall be scrutinized by the election sub-committee, whose decision upon any doubtful point shall be final. The candidates who may stand highest on the poll of their quarter shall be declared to be duly elected.

12. The result of the poll shall be notified in the manner provided for in Rule 14, and shall be reported to Government for publication in the Gazette. The candidates declared to be duly elected shall hold office from the 1st April next succeeding the day of their election.

13. The cost of erecting temporary sheds, of paying polling clerks; or taking any other necessary action under these rules, shall be paid by the Commissioners out of the Municipal Fund.

14. Each notification under these rules shall be published by exposing copies thereof to view at the Municipal office and in some conspicuous place in each ward.

15. Should the Vice-Chairman be unable from any cause to perform the duties imposed on him by the rules, the Chairman shall have power to appoint some other Municipal Commissioner to take his place.

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ELECTION RULES.

NOTIFICATION.

The 23rd September 1879.—It is hereby notified for general information that the Lieutenant-Governor has, unde the power vested in him by section 17, Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876, prescribed the following revised rules for the election of Commissioners for the Town of Calcutta:—

RULE 1.—The next election of members of the Municipal Corporation of the Town of Calcutta under the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act, Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876, shall be held on such dates as shall be notified by the Government of Bengal in the *Calcutta Gazette.*

RULE 2.—Under section 18 of the Act, any person qualified to vote at an election, or to be elected as a Commissioner, may at any time, not being less than six weeks or more than three months before the election takes place, apply personally or by letter to the Chairman of the Commissioners for the registration of his name as such voter or person qualified for election, and shall at the same time name the ward or wards of the town in which he is entitled to vote. After the receipt and examination of all such applications, and at a date not less than one month before the election, a printed list of all persons qualified to vote or to be elected will be prepared and affixed by the Chairman of the Commissioners in some conspicuous place in or near his office, and at the police-station of each of the wards of the town, for general information, and such lists will be open to public inspection for fifteen days after the date of publication. In virtue of the authority conferred on the Chairman by the second paragraph of section 19, Act IV. of 1876, "the Chairman shall be at liberty at any time to revise the said list for the purpose of removing therefrom the name of any person not duly qualified and erroneously entered therein, or of recording the name of any person duly qualified and erroneously omitted therefrom.

CALCUTTA Municipal Corporation Election Rules—*continued.*

RULE 3.—No person shall be qualified to vote at an election, or to be elected as a Commissioner, unless his name shall be registered as prescribed by section 18 of the Act.

RULE 4.—The election shall be held at the stations hereinafter appointed for the respective wards, which are numbered and defined in the first schedule of the Act, that is to say—

Wards 1, 2, 3, at the Burtollah Police Section.
Wards 4, 5, 6, at the Jorasanko ditto.
Wards 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, at the Town Hall.
Wards 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, at the Municipal Office.
Ward 18, at Hastings Police Section.

RULE 5.—The Municipal Commissioners shall appoint a polling officer to preside at each station, and may pay to each officer so appointed such reasonable remuneration for his services as they may think fit. Each polling officer so appointed shall keep order at his station, shall regulate the number of voters to be admitted at a time, and may exclude all other persons, except the clerks, the agents of the candidates, and the constables on duty.

RULE 6.—Each polling officer shall be supplied by the Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners with a copy of so much of the register of the persons entitled to vote as may relate to the ward or wards for which such polling officer is appointed to take votes, and also with a copy of the register of persons qualified to be elected as Municipal Commissioners.

RULE 7.—Voting papers in the form appended shall be prepared by the Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners, and furnished by him free of charge to the electors on application at his office ; and all persons desiring to vote must make use of voting papers in the form appended, and must give all the information therein required.

RULE 8.—On the day fixed for the election, the polling shall commence at 9 a.m., and shall close at 6 p.m. precisely, and each voter shall present or forward in a sealed cover to the polling officer his voting paper, with the name of the person, or names of the persons, for whom he desires to vote, written legibly thereon in the English language, and with all particulars duly filled in.

RULE 9.—On the presentation of each voting paper, the polling officer shall forthwith note on the back of each voting paper whether it was presented by the elector in person, and, if not, name in full and residence of person presenting it.

RULE 10.—The polling officer shall satisfy himself that the voter is qualified to vote under Rule 3, and that the person for whom he votes is qualified, under Rule 3, to be elected a Municipal Commissioner. Should the polling officer be of opinion that the voter is not qualified to vote, or that the person for whom he votes is not qualified, under Rule 3, to be elected a Municipal Commissioner, he shall record his objection on the back of the voting paper in the manner prescribed by Rule 13, and the objection shall be dealt with in the manner prescribed by the said rule. Should the polling officer be of opinion that neither of these two objections applies, he shall, in the register of qualified electors furnished to him under Rule 6, note off against the elector's name the fact of the vote or votes, and the person or persons for whom the vote or votes have been given. In case the polling officer on coming afterwards to note off a later vote or votes from the same elector find that the two sets of votes are naturally inconsistent, or that they more than exhaust the elector's voting power, then the polling officer shall record on the back of all the voting papers from the elector that they are invalidated under clause 2 of Rule 12, subject, however, to the proviso in the clause. Any votes thus objected to, and not subsequently validated under the proviso of clause 2, Rule 12, shall be dealt with according to Rule 13.

RULE 11.—After noting the above information, the polling officer shall attach a consecutive number to each voting paper, and shall, under the said number, affix his signature. The polling officer shall then read out in a loud voice three times the name and residence of the elector, and the names and residences of the person or persons for whom he votes.

RULE 12.—Up to the close of the poll, as provided for in Rule 14, any person present at the polling station shall be at liberty to object to any voter or intending voter on one or other or both of the following grounds, but no other grounds :—

1st—That his name is not on the register of voters prescribed by section 18 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act, Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876 ;

2nd—That he has already voted or had previously voted at this election to the full extent of his voting power : provided, however, that a voter or intending voter may appear in person before the polling officer and declare which of any inconsistent votes shall be valid and which shall be cancelled.

RULE 13.—If any objection authorized by the next preceding rule shall be made to any voter, the polling officer shall, on the back of the voting paper, record the name and residence of objector and the nature of objection, and shall direct, verbally or by letter, the objector and the voter to appear within three days from the day of the election before the Chairman of the Commissioners, and the decision of the Chairman of the Commissioners, made after due enquiry into the objection, shall be final.

RULE 14.—At the close of the poll, the polling officer shall forward all the voting papers, arranged according to their consecutive numbers, in a packet duly sealed and secured, to the Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners.

RULE 15.—The polling officer shall, at the close of the day, transmit to the Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners a list of the objections taken by him under Rule 10, or admitted by him under Rules 12 and 13, and the said Chairman shall, after hearing and deciding upon all such objections, make lists of the votes given in each ward, and shall record the same in his office.

RULE 16.—The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners shall, within ten days after the election, publish in the *Calcutta Gazette*, and at the Municipal Office, the names of the persons in whose behalf

CALCUTTA Municipal Corporation Election Rules—*continued.*

votes have been recorded, and the number of votes given for them respectively; and the candidates for whom the greatest number of votes shall have been given in each ward shall, in the proportion assigned by Act IV. (B.C.) 1876 to the respective wards, be deemed to have been elected members of the Corporation for the said wards accordingly.

Counterfoil No. *No.*

WARD No._____POLICE SECTION.

RECEIPT. *N.B.*—Poll for this Ward will take place at _____on _____187 ,

and this voting paper must be delivered there on that date between the hours of 9 a.m. and 6 p.m.

Ward No. *Name of Elector*_____

*Residence*_____

Name of Elector *Place of Business (if any)*_____

NAME IN FULL OF CANDIDATE VOTED FOR. RESIDENCE. * NUMBER OF VOTES GIVEN TO CANDIDATE VOTED FOR.

Residence

Candidate voted for

Signature of polling officer.

* Municipal Commissioners are to be elected for this Ward. Each Elector has votes, and may give all his votes to one candidate or may divide his votes amongst the candidates. A separate voting paper must be used for each candidate voted for.

I do hereby declare that I, the undersigned, am the Elector whose name is entered above; that my Residence is as above stated; that I have completed my 21st year; that I am qualified to vote; and that my name has been registered as an Elector under section 18 of Act IV. (B.C.) of 1876.

☞ This is to be signed by polling officer, and returned to Elector or his Messenger.

And I do hereby declare that I have chosen the candidate named above to be a Member of the Corporation of the Town of Calcutta for Ward No.

† Signed,

Witness to Signature *Residence of witness.*

† Signature to be made on presentation by Elector of the voting paper to the polling officer, or if voting paper is not presented in person, the signature must be attested by one respectable witness.

N.B.—False declaration punishable under section 199, Indian Penal Code.

H. L. HARRISON,
Offg. Secy. to the Govt. of Bengal.

BENGAL Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

NOTIFICATION.

The 26th April 1880.—The following revised rules for the election of Municipal Commissioners in the town of Serampore, sanctioned by the Lieutenant-Governor under Section 16 of Bengal Act V. of 1876, are published for general information. They will come into effect from 1st January next :—

1. There shall be eighteen Municipal Commissioners for Serampore, of whom twelve shall be elected by the rate-payers, and six appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor.

2. The qualification of a voter will be as follows :—

He must be a male rate-payer of full age, and must have paid house-rate on his own account to the amount of Rs. 4 for the year ending the 31st December next preceding the election.

3. The qualification of a candidate for election shall be as follows :—

He must be a registered male rate-payer of full age, resident within the municipal limits, or within three miles thereof, who can read and write, and has never been convicted of a non-bailable offence. He must have paid house-rate on his own account to the amount of Rs. 10 for the year ending the 31st December next preceding the election.

4. The jurisdiction of the Serampore Municipality shall be divided into three quarters or wards, which shall return members as follows :—

Serampore with Chattra and Bullubpore - - -	7
Mahesh and Rishra - - - - - -	3
Connaghur - - - - - - -	2
Total	12

5. Any two rate-payers qualified to vote may nominate a candidate, and may inform the sub-divisional officer of his candidature on any day not later than the last day of February. The sub-divisional officer shall ascertain if the candidate accepts the candidature, and is qualified under the rules; and if so, he shall notify such candidature at the sub-divisional cutcherry, and at one or more police stations and school-houses in the town as he may see fit. Such notifications shall state the name, residence, and qualifications of the candidate.

6. If any rate-payer objects to the eligibility of any candidate, he may on some day not later than the 6th March notify such objection in writing to the sub-divisional officer, who shall hear and finally decide any question of eligibility. On the 10th March the final list of candidates shall be notified at

the sub-divisional cutcherry, and in at least one conspicuons place in each quarter. The candidates named in this list, and no others, shall be eligible for election.

7. The Municipal Commissioners shall appoint a sub-committee of three of their number to assist the sub-divisional officer in carrying out the following rules regarding elections.

The sub-divisional officer shall decide on what day, not later than 25th March, and at what places in the town, the poll shall be held, and he shall notify such decision at the sub-divisional cutcherry, and in at least one place in each quarter.

8. As soon as possible after the publication of these rules, the sub-divisional officer shall prepare a list of all persons qualified under Rule 2 as voters for each ward. A copy of this list shall be exposed at the sub-divisional cutcherry and municipal office, and a copy of so much of the list as relates to each quarter in some police stations, school-houses, or other accessible public place in each quarter of the town. All persons mentioned in the list shall be entitled to a vote in the election of Municipal Commissioners for the ward.

9. No rate-payer shall be entitled to vote for more than one person, or in more than one ward.

10. Votes shall be recorded by such polling clerks as may be appointed by the Chairman of the Commissioners. There shall be at least one polling clerk for each polling place, who shall stay at the polling place for such hours as a sub-divisional officer may fix on the day of the poll. During those hours fixed for the polling, and at no other time, votes shall be recorded. The poll shall not under any circumstances be closed before 6 p.m.

11. Each rate-payer who desires to record his vote may do so in one of the following ways :—

I.—He may attend in person at the polling place, when he shall state his name and residence, and the candidate being one of the candidates named in the published list for whom he votes.

I.—He may forward in a sealed cover to the polling officer, to be delivered during the hours for polling, a paper on which the name of the candidate voted for, and his own name and address, are recorded in a legible hand, with a declaration signed by him that he intends to vote for such candidate.

The election sub-committee shall, acting under the sub-divisional officer's instructions, make such arrangements as they may see fit for identifying voters in case of doubt.

The polling clerk, on a vote being tendered in either of the two ways mentioned above, shall verify from the list of voters of the quarter whether the intending voter is entitled to a vote for that quarter. If he is so entitled, the vote shall be recorded opposite the elector's name in the list for the ward.

12. Within three days of the close of the poll, the sub-divisional officer and election sub-committee shall scrutinize the registers of the polling clerks, and their decisions of any doubtful points shall be final. The candidates who may stand highest on the poll of their quarter shall be declared to be duly elected.

13. The result of the poll shall be notified at the sub-divisional cutcherry and in each ward, and shall be reported to the Government for publication in the *Gazette*. The candidates declared to be duly elected shall hold office from the 1st April next succeeding the day of their elections.

14. The cost of erecting temporary sheds, of paying polling clerks, or taking any other necessary action under these rules, shall be paid by the Commissioner out of the municipal funds.

A. Mackenzie,
Sec. to the Govt. of Bengal.

N.-W. PROVINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS' ELECTION RULES.

Rules for Regulating the Appointment of the Municipal Committee of Meerut, under Section 6 of Act VI. of 1868.

I.—The committee shall consist of fifteen members, of whom five shall be *ex-officio*.

II.—The *ex-officio* members shall be the Magistrate of the district, the senior subordinate Magistrate (or the Magistrate in charge of the city), the Civil Surgeon, the District Superintendent of Police, and the Tahsíldár.

III.—The appointment of the non-official members shall be by election according to the following rules.

IV.—The municipality is divided into ten wards as follows:—

(1) Balákot, (2) Kanúngoes, (3) Burhana Gate, (4) Khairagarh, (5) Kambohs, (6) Delhi Gate, (7) Chunár, (8) Lhisari Gate, (9) Sohráb Gate, (10) Sháhpur.

Each ward is entitled to elect a member to represent it on the committee.

V.—Of the members first appointed, one-half shall hold office for one year, the other half and members appointed in future will hold office for two years: five members will thus be elected annually. The elections shall be held every year in the first week of June, and the new members shall enter upon their duties on the 1st of July following.

VI.—Every person shall be qualified to vote at the election of a member for his ward, who at the date of election shall be twenty-one years of age, and shall own or occupy a house in the said ward, rentable at Rs. 2 per mensem or upwards, or who shall be in possession of an annual income of not less than Rs. 200.

VII.—Any person shall be qualified to become a member of the committee who shall possess the qualification mentioned in Rule VI., and in addition shall be of respectable family, able to read and write, and possessed of an income of not less than Rs. 40 per mensem.

VIII.—At least one month previous to the election the existing committee shall furnish to the Magistrate a list of all persons qualified to hold the office of member, and separate lists of all persons qualified to vote in each ward. The Magistrate shall forthwith publish the said lists at each police-station in the city, and call on all persons whose names may have been omitted to appear within a certain time and furnish proof of their claim to have their names entered. No applications for entry in the said lists shall be entertained after the 15th May preceding the election.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

IX.—The Magistrate shall fix the date and place of election, and shall publish a notice of the same within the ward for at least a week previous to the election.

X.—Every election shall take place within the ward in respect of which it is held, and all votes shall be recorded between the hours of 8 a.m. and noon.

XI.—The Magistrate shall appoint some respectable persons to take the votes in each ward: a sum not exceeding Rs. 16 shall be paid to each enumerator.

XII.—At the time of election the Magistrate shall deliver to each recorder of votes a list of the electors in his ward, and also a list of the candidates for election. The list of candidates shall also be publicly displayed at the place of election. The recorder of votes shall write against the name of each elector on the list the name of the person for whom such elector gives his vote. At 12 o'clock all the lists shall be sealed up and transmitted at once to the committee's office, where they shall be opened by the president or vice-president in the presence of the committee, and the result shall then be declared. The lists shall remain in the committee's office open to inspection for one month, after which time they shall be destroyed.

XIII.—If any member so elected shall resign or become unable to retain his office before the expiry of the term for which he was appointed, the remaining members shall nominate any properly qualified person to take his place, and shall publish their nomination within ward for one week. If during that time no opposition to the person nominated be made, he shall be considered to have been duly elected by the ward. The person who shall be elected shall hold office until the expiry of the term for which his predecessor was appointed.

XIV.—Nothing contained in Rule I. shall be held to prevent the appointment on the committee of any person holding office under Government, who may have been duly elected according to the foregoing rules.

XV.—Any member wishing to resign his appointment shall give notice in writing of his intention to the committee.

XVI.—Any member who, without due cause to be notified to the committee, shall absent himself from the meetings for three consecutive months, shall be held to have resigned his appointment.

XVII.—The duties ascribed in Rules VIII., IX., XI., and XII. to the Magistrate, may be entrusted by him to any of his subordinates possessed of the full powers of a Magistrate.

Bye-laws under Section 20 of Act XV. of 1873 for the Appointment of the Bareilly Municipal Committee.

I.—The municipal committee for the city of Bareilly shall consist of sixteen ordinary and eight *ex-officio* members.

II.—The ordinary members shall be appointed by election.

III.—For the purpose of electing the ordinary members the municipality shall be divided into four wards, as detailed below, each ward returning four members:—

(1.) North-west ward, bounded by the main bazár road on the south, the Golaganj and Pilibhít road on the east, and by the municipal boundary on the west and north.

(2.) The old city ward, bounded by the Golaganj and Pilibhít road on the west, the Sháhjahánpur road on the south, and by the municipal boundary on the north and east.

(3.) The south-west ward, bounded by the main bazár road on the north, the Nekpur road on the east, and by the municipal boundary on the west and south.

(4.) The south-east ward, bounded by the main bazár road and Sháhjahánpur road on the north, the Nekpur road on the west, and by the municipal boundary on the south and east.

IV.—All candidates for appointment must possess an income of at least Rs. 500 per annum.

V.—All inhabitants of the municipality who occupy houses worth not less than Re. 1 per mensem are entitled to vote at the election of the members for the ward in which they reside.

VI.—An election shall be held every year during first 15 days of February, at a time and place appointed by the committee, and it shall be presided over by some officer to be appointed by the President of the committee.

VII.—All candidates must be notified to the presiding officer in writing before the time fixed for the commencement of the election.

VIII.—The votes of the electors shall be publicly recorded, and the voting place shall remain open for six hours.

IX.—Each elector may vote for as many candidates as there are vacancies in his ward or for any less number.

X.—If any question shall arise regarding the qualification of an elector, the presiding officer shall decide the question summarily, and his decision shall not be open to appeal to any authority.

XI.—At the first election under these rules, to be held in February 1874, four members shall be elected for each ward.

XII.—In each ward the names of the four candidates who receive the greatest number of votes shall be submitted to Government, and they shall be entitled to be appointed members of the committee. Provided that the Local Government may annul the election of any candidate who has been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not less than six months, or who has been required to find security for his good behaviour.

XIII.—Of the four members to be appointed in each ward, the two who obtain the highest number of votes shall be appointed for two years and the other two for one year.

XIV.—In every succeeding year after 1874 two members shall be elected in each ward to fill the places of those whose terms of office have expired, subject to the provisions contained in Rule XII.; these two members shall be appointed for two years.

XV.—New members shall enter on the duties of their office on the 1st of April.

XVI.—Vacancies occurring between the times at which the elections are held shall be filled up by Government on the nomination of the remaining members of the committee.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

XVII.—In addition to the ordinary members, the following officers shall be *ex-officio* members of the committee:—

(1) The Magistrate of the district.
(2) The senior Joint or Assistant Magistrate.
(3) Another covenanted officer to be nominated by the Magistrate of the district.
(4) The senior Native Deputy Collector.
(5) The Tahsíldár.
(6) The Civil Surgeon.
(7) The District Superintendent of Police.
(8) The District Engineer.

XVIII.—The Magistrate of the district shall be the President of the committee.

Revised Bye-laws for Regulating the Appointment of the Municipal Committee of Allahabad, under Section 6, Act XV. of 1873.

I.—The committee shall consist of twenty-five members.

II.—Eight members shall be nominated by Government, of whom the following seven shall be *ex-officio*:—

(1) The Magistrate of the district.
(2) The senior Joint-Magistrate.
(3) The Joint or Assistant Magistrate in charge of the city.
(4) The Cantonment Magistrate.
(5) The Civil Surgeon.
(6) The District Superintendent of Police.
(7) The District Engineer.

III.—Four shall be selected, for recommendation to Government, as members for the civil station of Allahabad, from among and by the votes of those whose names shall at the time of the election be borne upon a register to be maintained for this purpose, as hereinafter set forth.

IV.—Twelve shall be selected, for recommendation to Government, as members for the city and suburbs of Allahabad, from among and by the votes of those whose names shall at the time of the election be borne upon one of certain registers to be maintained for this purpose, as hereinafter provided, in the following proportions for each ward as defined in Section XI.:—

Kotwáli	4
Daráganj	2
Kydganj	2
Muthiganj	1
Colonelganj	3

V.—One member shall be nominated for the approval of Government by the Board of Agency of the East Indian Railway Company.

VI.—The Magistrate of the district shall be *ex-officio* the president of the committee.

VII.—The committee shall elect a vice-president from among their number, and report their choice for the sanction of Government.

VIII.—An English register shall be maintained in the office of the Magistrate of the district wherein shall be entered—

(1) The names and addresses of all house and site proprietors in the old and new civil stations of Allahabad, together with the distinctive letter or number of each house or site owned, and the date of registry of ownership in the municipal books.
(2) The names and addresses of all occupants of houses in the said civil stations paying a rent of Rs. 50 per mensem.

IX.—An Urdu register shall be prepared, under the orders of the president, and maintained in the office of the Superintendent of Octroi, for each of the following wards of the city and suburbs separately—

Kotwáli,	Kydganj,
Muthiganj,	Daráganj,

wherein shall be entered the name, parentage, caste, designation, and address of—

(1) All proprietors of lands or houses:
(2) All occupants of houses renting or rentable at a monthly rent of Rs. 6 or over:
(3) All persons not mentioned in the registers hereinbefore mentioned, who have been assessed or are liable to be assessed under the Income or License-Tax Act for the time being; or, if there be no such Act in force for the time being, who would have been liable to assessment under the Act next theretofore antecedent.

X.—A similar Urdu register shall be prepared and maintained by the Tahsíldár of Chail containing similar information for the ward of Colonelganj.

XI.—The area of each of the above wards shall be that of its respective thána.

XII.—All of the above registers shall be, during authorised office hours, open to the inspection of the public free of charge.

XIII.—Any person may apply to the president to have his name added to or struck out of the above registers, and no alteration shall be made in any of the said registers save by the order of the said president.

XIV.—All the above registers shall be revised annually, under the orders of the president, at least two months before the date fixed for the annual elections; and proclamations shall be then issued and affixed in conspicuous places in each municipal ward and in the civil stations, calling on qualified persons

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

to register their names, if not already registered, and warning all concerned that only those so registered shall be entitled to vote or be elected at the forthcoming elections.

XV.—No house or site proprietor in the old or new civil stations shall be entitled to entry in the register mentioned in section VIII., or to vote or be elected at any municipal election, whose proprietorship shall not have been duly registered in the municipal books.

XVI.—No house or site proprietor as aforesaid shall be entitled to vote or be elected at any municipal election who shall at the time of such election be in arrear in regard to house or site-tax or ground-rent.

XVII.—No proxies shall be allowed at any municipal election.

XVIII.—Members retiring by rotation shall be eligible for re-election.

XIX.—A meeting of the persons entered in the civil station register (section VIII. *supra*) shall be called by the president, at a place and hour to be appointed by him, on the first Tuesday in April in each year, for the purpose of electing municipal members, representatives for the civil station, to fill vacancies caused by retirement of members by rotation, or such other vacancies as may be at the time unfilled.

XX.—Meetings of the persons entered in the several ward registers (sections IX. and X. *supra*) shall be summoned at the chief police-station of each ward for that ward on the first Thursday and following days, as may be necessary, in April in each year, to elect municipal representatives for each ward, to supply vacancies caused by retirement of members by rotation, or such other vacancies as may be at the time unfilled.

XXI.—The persons elected as representatives by the majorities at these several meetings shall be reported by the president for the sanction of Government.

XXII.—If any vacancy occur among the sixteen elected members of the committee between the receipt of Government sanction to the elections and the expiry of the term for which the election was made, the remaining elected members shall nominate a person from among the names contained in the register for the sub-division of the municipality in the representation of which the vacancy has occurred; and such nominee shall be reported to Government for confirmation as a member of the committee for such sub-division until the next annual election.

XXIII.—Non-attendance of any member, other than *ex-officio* members, at three consecutive meetings, without good and sufficient reason (to be stated to the president in writing), shall, with the sanction of Government, be held to be a disqualification for office as a member of the committee, and as *ipso facto* creating a vacancy.

Rules for Regulating the Appointment of the Municipal Committee of Benares, under Section 6 of Act VI. of 1868.

I.—The committee shall consist of not less than twenty or more than twenty-five members. The following shall be members *ex-officio* :—

The Magistrate of the district.
The Joint or Assistant Magistrate.
The Superintendent of Police.
The Civil Surgeon.
The Divisional or Executive Engineer.
The Tahsíldár of the Sudder Tahsíl.

II.—The principal officer of His Highness the Mahárája of Benares shall also be a member *ex-officio*.

III.—The city will be divided into six wards, each ward to be represented in the committee by two elected members.

IV.—The limits of the wards shall correspond with those of the police circles, viz. :—

(1) Sikrole and Chetganj.
(2) Adampura and Jaitpura.
(3) Kotwáli.
(4) Kalbhyron.
(5) Bhelupura.
(6) Dussassomedh.

V.—The members appointed under rules I.—IV. may associate with themselves not more than five additional members, whose co-operation they may consider desirable, to hold office for one year only.

VI.—*Qualification of Members.*—No person shall be deemed qualified to be elected as a member who has been convicted of an offence punishable with more than six months' imprisonment under the Penal Code.

Subject to this restriction, persons residing within the municipal limits, who pay a yearly Government land-revenue of not less than Rs. 1,000, or who carry on any trade or business or own any property yielding a profit of not less than Rs. 5,000, shall be qualified to be elected.

VII.—*Qualification of Electors.*—All persons paying a monthly rent of Rs. 4 for their premises, or occupying their own premises the rack-rent of which may be estimated at that rate, and all persons carrying on any trade or business, or owning any property yielding a net profit of not less than Rs. 200 a year, shall be entitled to a vote in the ward in which they reside or hold the qualifying property. It shall be at the option of the electors to vote for one or two members, provided that no elector shall give more than one vote to the same candidate in any one ward.

The same property shall not give a vote to more than one person.

VIII.—Any person holding property to the qualifying amount in more than one ward shall be entitled to a vote in each ward.

IX.—A list of persons qualified to serve as members shall be drawn up each year, at least one month before the day fixed for the commencement of the elections, and their willingness to serve if elected ascertained. This list will then be published in each ward.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

X.—A list of qualified electors will be drawn up yearly separately for each ward, at least one month before the day fixed for the commencement of the elections.

XI.—Any objection to these lists, or claim that any name should be included in or excluded from the same, must be brought within fifteen days from the date of publication of the list, and shall be finally disposed of by the committee.

XII.—To prevent the same person being elected for more than one ward, different days will be fixed for the elections in each.

XIII.—The elections will commence on the first Tuesday in April of each year, and the new committee enter on office on the first Tuesday in June.

XIV.—At least one-fourth of the electors in each ward must have been polled, otherwise the election shall be null and void, and the committee shall nominate the members. Members so nominated shall hold office for one year only.

XV.—Half of the members elected at the first election shall hold office for one year only. The other half and those elected on subsequent election will be appointed ordinarily for two years.

XVI.—All objections as to the legality of any election must be brought forward within fifteen days from date of publication.

XVII.—Any vacancy in the committee occurring before term of office shall have expired will be filled up by Government on the recommendation of the other members of the committee.

XVIII.—The Magistrate of the district will be president *ex-officio.*

XIX.—The vice-president and secretary shall be nominated by the committee for the sanction of Government.

Rules for the Appointment and Election of Members of the Jaunpur Municipal Committee.

I.—The committee shall consist of eighteen members, of whom the following shall be members *ex-officio*:—

(1) The Magistrate of the district, *president ex-officio.*
(2) The senior subordinate Magistrate.
(3) The Deputy Collector in charge of the Treasury.
(4) The Civil Surgeon.
(5) The District Superintendent of Police.
(6) The Tahsíldár at head-quarters.

II.—The remaining twelve members shall be elected under the following rules.

III.—The municipality shall be divided into six wards, *viz.*,—

Nokhás.	Sipah.
Tikli Tola.	Shakkar Mandavi.
Puráni Bazár.	Bhandari.

Each ward is entitled to be represented on the committee by two members.

IV.—An election shall be held annually within each ward in the month of April, on a day to be fixed by the Magistrate of the district. At each election one member shall be chosen for each ward, who shall hold office for two years from 1st of June following.

V.—No person shall be qualified to vote at any election who has been convicted of any offence punishable by whipping or by imprisonment without the option of fine, or who within seven years of the date of election shall have undergone a sentence of imprisonment for six months or more, or who shall have been convicted of defrauding the public revenues, or who is of unsound mind.

VI.—Subject to rule V., every person aged eighteen years or upwards, who owns as proprietor or mortgagee immovable property within the ward valued at Rs. 100, or who occupies a house or other property within the ward at a yearly rent of not less than Rs. 6, shall be entitled to vote at the election for that ward.

VII.—Lists of persons entitled to vote in each ward shall be kept up in the municipal committee's office, and annually revised as hereafter provided.

VIII.—Any person entered in the list of electors shall be qualified to be elected as a member for any ward, who at the date of election shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, shall possess an income at his own disposal of not less than Rs. 500 per annum, shall be able to read and write, and shall not have been disqualified under Act XIX. of 1873 from the management of his own property.

IX.—On the 1st of March in each year the municipal committee shall furnish the Magistrate of the district with duplicate lists of persons entitled to vote in each ward, and a list of persons qualified to be elected as members. The Magistrate shall forthwith publish the lists, and shall call on all persons whose names may have been omitted to appear and establish their right to be entered, and may make such alterations in the list as may be authorised by rules V., VI., and VIII.

X.—The Magistrate shall fix the date and places of election, and shall publish the same within each ward for one fortnight previous to the election.

XI.—Every election shall be held within the ward to which it refers, and all votes shall be recorded between the hours of 7 and 10 a.m.

XII.—The Magistrate shall appoint a sufficient number of residents, not being candidates, to record the votes. Out of these the Magistrate, or such officer as he may depute for the purpose, shall immediately before the election select by lot one person to record the votes in each ward. A fee of Rs. 5 shall be paid from the municipal fund to each recorder of votes.

XIII.—At the time of election the Magistrate, or such officer as he may depute, shall deliver to each recorder of votes a list of the electors in the ward for which he is selected. The recorder, having proceeded to the place of election, shall write against each elector's name the name of the person for whom such elector votes.

At 10 a.m. all the lists shall be sealed up and forwarded direct to the Magistrate.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

XIV.—The Magistrate shall publish the result of the election in the following form :—

1	2	3	4	5	6
Name of Ward.	Population of Ward.	Number of Electors.	Number of electors who voted.	Number of votes obtained by successful candidates.	Name of successful candidate.

and shall report the names of the duly elected members to Government for confirmation, through the Commissioner of the Division.

XV.—The voting lists shall be retained in the Magistrate's office, and shall be open to inspection for one month, after which they shall be destroyed.

XVI.—If on complaint being duly preferred within one week by not less than ten residents of the ward, and after such inquiry as he may deem necessary, it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that the votes in any ward have not been properly recorded, or that any deceit, intimidation or bribery have been practised on the electors, or for any other sufficient cause, he may direct a fresh election to be held under his immediate superintendence, reporting the fact to the Commissioner.

XVII.—If any member, elected according to the foregoing rules, resign or become incapable of retaining office, before the expiry of the term for which he was appointed, the remaining members shall nominate any person qualified under rule VIII. to take his place, and recommend his appointment by the Local Government under section 8, Act XV. of 1873.

XVIII.—The Magistrate of the district for the time being shall be president. The vice-president shall be elected by the committee with the sanction of Government.

REPORTS ON WORKING OF ELECTIVE SYSTEM IN N.-W. PROVINCES AND OUDH.

No. 524, dated Binsár, the 13th June 1881.

From Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir H. Ramsay, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner, Kumaun Division, to Secretary to Government, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge your No. 315, dated 4th instant, calling for report on the working of the elective system in municipalities where it has been in force.

2. In Almora no interest whatever is taken in municipal government, and it is on so small a scale that nothing can be done in the way of improvements.

3. At Naini Tal proprietors have usually taken a fair, and latterly a keen, interest in the election of representatives. Non-proprietors have shown little interest in the matter. The committee in this station is no longer elected.

4. In Káshipur, though the elective system has not been in force, the only eligible men being nominated and re-appointed periodically, the people are interested in the improvement of their town. A great deal has been done and remains to be done, but the people would as soon leave the whole direction in the hands of the magistrate.

No. 1603, dated the 15th June 1881.

From Colonel J. Perkins, B.S.C., Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division, to Secretary to Government, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

I have the honor to reply to your letter No. 315, dated 4th June, relating to municipal elections.

2. The Fyzabad municipality is the only one in which the elective system has been adopted. The subjoined copy of a letter from the Deputy Commissioner will explain what has been done.

3. There is no good reason why the elective system should not be introduced into the municipalities of Gonda and Bahraich. A little pressure is needed : masses do not move until the impulse is given.

4. Mr. Woodburn remarks that little real interest is felt in the matter. I would suggest that re-elections be limited. The office tends to become hereditary, and this deadens the growth of an independent public spirit.

No. 184, dated the 11th June 1881.

From President, Municipal Committee, Fyzabad, to Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular Letter No. $\frac{122}{1510}$, dated 6th instant, calling for a brief report on the elective system in municipalities in this district.

Of the two municipalities, Fyzabad is the only one in which the elective system is in force. It was introduced in 1865 ; but from all I can find in the municipal records, it was only rarely used, the

members being in fact ordinarily nominated by the committee until 1877. In that year election was for the first time effectively introduced by yourself as Deputy Commissioner. Lists of voters were properly prepared, and their votes taken. Elections have since been yearly held in the wards which came in rotation. On an average about half the votes on the registers actually came to the poll ; but I am afraid there is not much real interest taken in the election. It is not frequent that there is more than one real candidate for a single ward ; and in the absence of candidature, there cannot be much excitement in voting. As the city progresses, however, more interest will be taken in its concerns.

No. $\frac{4280}{\text{XXII.-100}}$, dated Agra, the 22nd July 1881.

From C. J. Robertson, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Agra Division, to Secretary to Government, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

In reply to your No. 315, dated 4th June 1881, I have the honor to submit a statement showing for each municipality of this division, in which the elective system is in force, the number of qualified voters, and the number who voted at the last election ; but would remark that, except in the Muttra, Agra, and Etah districts, the list of voters does not appear to have been scrutinised since 1873, and in some cases since 1868. I have now directed this to be done in all municipalities.

2. Agra is the only municipality in which there appears of late to have been anything approaching to a canvas before an election, and a list of voters (whose qualification is an income of Rs. 200 per annum) being hung up, 35 persons claimed to be entered, while 16 requested that their names might be removed from the list ; this probably being caused by fear of some alteration in the license-tax, which would render incomes over Rs. 200 liable to payment of that tax.

3. The election is sometimes by wards, and in smaller towns for the whole city ; but there is a consensus of opinion (except in Agra to which I have referred above) that while candidates readily come forward for election, the electors do not show much interest in the matter, and are content to as a rule let outgoing members be re-elected, it being understood that they having once performed the duties of members are still capable of doing so. There was, however, an exception at the last election in Agra, where only two outgoing members were re-elected.

4. The above opinion is I think borne out by the figures in the accompanying statement, from which it will be seen that only a small portion of the electors availed themselves of the privilege, except in Muttra, of which the return is doubtful ; and my own experience as Magistrate was to the same effect, and that a man once elected had every chance of being re-elected. It must also be remembered that in some instances it is stated that electors are sent for to attend and record their votes, which practice should be discontinued, as it affords no test of what interest electors really take in the matter.

5. In conclusion, it is satisfactory to find that Magistrates concur in considering that the persons elected are what may be called representative men.

Municipal Elections.

Municipality.	Number of Qualified Voters.	Number who voted at the last elections.	Remarks.
Muttra	958 (Tested in 1881)	505	By wards : number not given.
Brindaban	548 (Tested in 1881)	548	Ditto : ditto.
Kosi	270 (Tested in 1881)	193	Whole city.
Agra	1,361 (Tested in 1880)	386	By wards (of which there are seven) since this year.
Firozabad	283 (Tested in 1881)	32	Whole city
Tarukhabad	1,455 (Number not checked since 1873)	194	By wards, of which there are nine.
Mainpuri	170 (Number not checked since 1868)	55	By wards, of which there are two ; but this is not regarded in practice, voting being for the city as a whole.
Etáwah	350 (Number not checked since 1873)	60	Whole city.
Etah	326 (Tested in 1881)	200	
Kásganj	814 (Tested in 1881)	281	
Jalesar	146 (Tested in 1881)	48	
Soron	908 (Tested in 1881)	129	
Aliganj	142 (Tested in 1881)	142	
Marehra	102 (Tested in 1881)	70	

REPORTS on Working of Elective System in N.-W. Provinces and Oudh—*continued.*

No. $\frac{\text{MIC.}}{\text{XIX}}$, dated Mussooree, the 30th July 1881.

From E. COLVIN, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to forward the report called for in your No. 315, dated 4th June 1881.

2. *Dehra Dún.*—The municipal committee and electors of the two municipalities in this district consist chiefly of English people, and therefore no judgment can be based on their past history and working. It may be mentioned that in Dehra there is occasionally a warm contest arising from the personal rivalry of two Native gentlemen.

3. *Saháranpur.*—In the town of Saháranpur itself so little interest was shown in elections, that an application was made to Government to abolish the system in 1880, and nomination was introduced.

4. In Deoband and Jwálápur, according to the figures, it would appear that considerable interest is taken. These are:—

	Year.	Electors.		Votes.	
		Deoband.	Jwálápur.	Deoband.	Jwálápur.
Deoband and Jwálápur	1877–78 - -	251	211	251	65
	1878–79 - -	251	207	251	91
	1879–80 - -	251	207	251	62
	1880–81 - -	252	207	252	119
	1881–82 - -	854	207	238	129

But the Magistrate points out that the number of electors recorded is far below that of persons who are qualified, but who have not even taken the trouble to have themselves registered.

5. The qualification here is an annual income of Rs. 150, and it is quite possible that license and income-taxes have something to do with this reluctance.

6. The Magistrate advocates abolition of the election system.

7. *Muzaffarnagar.*—The figures given by the Magistrate here are forwarded in original. The Magistrate writes :—

" The return speaks for itself, and leaves in my opinion little room to doubt that the voting is a mere form ; and that the voters, whatever interest they may take in the election of municipal commissioners, are either unable or unwilling to show it."

8. The municipalities are all small, and each circle or muhalla returns its leading or representative man.

9. *Meerut.*—The Magistrate gives no figures : he thinks the people do not as yet care at all about the privilege of voting for their municipal representatives.

10. Within the last three years only on one occasion has more than one candidate stood for one ward; and the Magistrate thinks that unless called on to vote by the tahsíldárs, most of the electors would not exercise their privilege in uncontested elections.

11. Two of the tahsíldárs in this district report that the people do appreciate the system, but they do not state the facts on which they base this opinion.

12. *Bulandshahr.*—Here again no figures are given, but the Magistrate states that in Bulandshahr, Anápshahr, and Sikandarabad only the very mildest interest is taken in the elections. The nominees think it *infradig* to solicit votes, and the people as a body are quite indifferent as to who is appointed.

13. At Khúrja there exists unfortunately a strong party and religious spirit, which results in the election being hotly contested; indeed, I had the honor to address you on this subject after this year's election.

14. All qualified and many unqualified electors voted. The circumstances show that when interest is aroused, the people are ready enough to exercise their privileges.

15. The Magistrate is of opinion that every one concerned would prefer the nomination system.

16. *Aligarh.*—Here the Magistrate has given figures for the last ten years.

17. They show a very languid interest in the subject: the variations in different years are probably more due to the interest taken by tahsíldárs than the people.

18. The Magistrate thinks that no interest is shown by the people in the appointment of the committee, but sometimes candidates take the trouble to canvass for votes.

19. It will be seen from this summary that, except when personal rivalry or party spirit exists, little or no interest is taken in the subject by the people. There has been no improvement, and there is no history.

20. The general consensus of opinion is that a nomination system would be more popular, and doubtless this is true; for as yet a Native considers an office to which he is nominated by Government much more honorable than one to which he is elected by his fellow-citizens ; while electors have not learnt to appreciate their privileges.

21. At the same time the system has worked smoothly enough. It contains the germ from which popular representation may eventually spring, when the people improve in intelligence; and I therefore do not advocate a return to the nomination system generally.

REPORTS on Working of Elective System in N.-W. Provinces and Oudh—*continued.*

RETURN showing the Manner in which the Voters of the Municipalities of this District availed themselves of their privilege.

Name of Municipality.	1 How many Qualified Voters are in each Municipality.	2 How many voted last time.	3 How many Vacancies were to be filled.	4 How many Candidates obtained Votes.	Remarks.
Muzaffarnagar -	139	92	4	4	This municipality has four electoral circles. For circle No. 1, known as Amír Singh— Number of qualified voters - - 28 Deduct absent - - - - 11 Voted for Amír Singh - - - 17 For circle No. 2, of Uday Rám— Qualified voters - - - - 28 Deduct absent - - - - 7 Voted for Uday Rám - - - 21 For circle No. 3, of Behari Lál— Qualified voters - - - - 41 Absent - - - - - 19 Voted for Behari Lál - - - 22 For circle No. 4, of Ajáz Husain— Qualified voters - - - - Absent - - - - - 10 Voted for Ajáz Husain, 31; for Behari Lál, 1 - - - - - 32
Shámli - -	84	57	4	4	This municipality has eight circles: 2, 4, 6, and 8 retained old members. For circle No. 1— Qualified voters - - - - 20 Absent - - - - - 5 Voted for Kázi Ali Husain - - 15 For circle No. 3— Qualified voters - - - - 21 Absent - - - - 5 Voted for Mathura Dás - - - 16 For circle No. 5— Qualified voters - - - - 24 Absent - - - - - 10 Voted for Nand Lál - - - 14 For circle No. 7— Qualified voters - - - - 19 Voted for Panna Lál - - - 12 Absent - - - - - 7
Kairána - -	131	68 Add - 7 Total, 75	6	6	This municipality has 12 circles: six circles retained old members, viz., Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11. For circle No. 2— Qualified voters - - - - 18 Absent - - - - - 8 Voted for Hasham Ali - - - 10 For circle No. 5— Qualified voters - - - - 22 Absent - - - - - 11 Voted for Imdád Ali - - - 11 For circle No. 6— Qualified voters - - - - 19 Absent - - - - - 4 Voted for Kishori Lál - - - 15 For circle No. 10— Qualified voters - - - - 30 Absent - - - - - 18 Voted for Niádar Mal - - - 12 For circle No. 12— Qualified voters - - - - 31 Absent - - - - - 11 Voted for Kásim Ali - - - 20 For circle No. 1— Qualified voters - - - - 11 Absent - - - - - 4 Voted for Najaf Ali - - - 7

REPORTS on Working of Elective System in N.-W. Provinces and Oudh—*continued*

RETURN showing the Manner in which the Voters of the Municipalities, &c.—*continued*.

Name of Municipality.	1 How many Qualified Voters are in each Municipality.	2 How many voted last time.	3 How many Vacancies were to be filled.	4 How many Candidates obtained Votes.	Remarks.
Kándhla - -	133	122	5	9	This municipality has 10 circles or muhallás: 5 retained old members. For muhalla Shaikhzádgán— Qualified voters - - - - 30 Voted for Maulvi Zia-ul Hasan - - 27 Voted for Muhammad Ismail and Kázi Shaikh Mumammad - - - 1 Absent - - - - 2 For muhalla Khet— Qualified voters - - - - 42 Voted for Sharáfat Beg - - - 37 Voted for Shamsher Beg - - - 1 Absent - - - - 4 For muhalla Guzrán— Qualified voters - - - 34 Voted for Iláhi Bakhsh - - - 30 Absent - - - - 4 For muhalla Mirdha— Qualified voters - - - - 12 Voted for Imám Khán - - - 10 Voted for Fateh Khán - - - 1 Absent - - - - 1 For muhalla Mullana— Qualified voters - - - - 15 Voted for Hafiz-ud-din - - - 15

J. M. PEARS, Magistrate.

No. $\frac{3438}{270}$, dated Allahabad, the 1st August 1881.

From J. SIMSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Allahabad Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. 315, dated 4th of June last, regarding the working of the elective system in the municipalities of this division, I have the honor to subjoin the opinions of the presidents of the municipal committees on the subject.

2. *Cawnpore.*—Mr. Barstow observes that the members of this municipality, appointed under the elective system, seem as a class to take no more interest in municipal government than did their predecessors ; though he does not mean to imply that they are inferior in any way.

The elections have now been held for five years, the qualification for a vote consisting in the payment of Rs. 20 annually, either on account of the municipal license-tax, or on account of site-tax.

Though a considerable diminution in the number of votes registered occurred after the two first years, Mr. Barstow observes that a large number of votes have been annually recorded, sufficient to show that considerable importance is attached to the elections. The figures given, however, hardly support this inference, for we find that while 34 per cent. of the qualified electors of the city recorded their votes in 1876-77, the percentage fell to 13 per cent. in 1878-79, and did not exceed 20 per cent. in each of the years 1879-80 and 1880-81 ; and in the civil station the percentage has fallen from 50 per cent. to 25 per cent. In fact, at the last election only 10 electors were polled out of 39.

The detailed figures were as follows :—

Year.	Number of Electors.			
	City.		Civil Station.	
	Qualified to vote.	Persons actually voted.	Qualified to vote.	Persons actually voted.
1876–77 - -	907	310=34 per cent.	46	23=50 per cent.
1877–78 - -	958	233=24 per cent.	58	22=38 per cent.
1878–79 - -	983	129=13 per cent.	35	18=50 per cent.
1879–80 - -	956	187=20 per cent.	43	19=44 per cent.
1880–81 - -	894	175=20 per cent.	39	10=25 per cent.
Average of each year	5)4,698 939	5)1,034 207=22 per cent.	5)221 44	5)92 18=40 per cent.

REPORTS on Working of Elective System in N.-W. Provinces and Oudh—*continued.*

3. *Fatehpur.*—The president of the municipality reports that the people take little or no interest in the elections. When a candidate is approved by one voter, the rest follow like sheep, and vote for him to the exclusion of others, without any reference to his business capacity. The people seem, Mr. Cornwall thinks, to be too low in the scale of civilisation to appreciate their electoral privileges, and are indifferent as to who represent them on the committee. A revised set of rules, for the conduct of business in this municipality, has recently been submitted to Government. On the introduction of these rules the electors may possibly be induced to take a warmer interest in municipal matters.

4. *Banda.*—Here also the president reports the people take little or no interest in the annual election of members to serve on the committee. They do not attend the meetings of their free will, but are collected by the tahsíldár. The same members are re-elected each year, and no elector has ever proposed a new member. The average number of persons entitled to vote during the last four years was 491 per year, of whom 71 on an average attended and voted each year. The electors who attended were nearly all persons attached to the Collector's and Magistrate's offices as Government servants, or were revenue agents.

5. *Allahabad.*—In the president's opinion it can hardly be said that the elective system in the Allahabad municipality has been a success.

During the years 1875-80 (there has been no election this year, there having been no vacancies) there have been 16 vacancies among the members of the civil station of Allahabad. As a rule, there are only as many *bonâ fide* candidates as there are vacancies. On one occasion (1879-80), there not being sufficient qualified European or Eurasian candidates for the vacancies, a Bengali pleader was elected one of the civil station members. The average number of voters who exercised the right of election, and who voted for the member at the head of the poll, has been 58 per election, out of a constituency of about 1,000.

At the elections in the above period for city members, there has always been a sufficiency of candidates, but the average of the highest number of votes polled per election has been 59 out of a constituency of 2,173.

6. *Jaunpur.*—Much interest is not apparently taken by the people in the election of municipal commissioners, as the attendance of electors has been small on almost all occasions when elections have been held.

A revised set of rules for the conduct of business has been sanctioned by Government, which it is believed may lead to some improvement. Out of an average number of electors on the list, amounting to 710 per year, only 251 attended for the purpose of voting.

7. My own opinion is that there has been practically no improvement in the working of the elective system since its introduction into the municipalities of these provinces, and that no increased interest is shown by the people in electing members to represent them on municipalities.

8. The people as a body are in fact quite apathetic. Exceptional cases undoubtedly occasionally occur, when a particular candidate, anxious to improve his social postion, institutes an active canvass among his friends: but as a rule little interest has hitherto been shown in these elections.

No. $\frac{294}{XIX.-146}$, dated Bareilly, the 4th August 1881.

From R. M. EDWARDS, Esquire, Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of G. O. No. 315, dated 4th June 1881, Municipal Department, requesting a brief report on the working of elective system in municipalities.

2. In reply I beg to state that there is a general consensus of opinion that the elective system is not appreciated by those entitled to the franchise, or understood by the people. So far from there being any improvement in the working of the system, the elective bodies display an apathy which increases as the years roll on and the charm of novelty disappears.

3. The returns from the several municipalities of this division show that those entitled to vote fail to value the privilege, and that next to no interest is shown in the election of municipal commissioners.

4. My experience, which extends from the birth of municipalities in these provinces, is that the elective system is a failure, and as at present worked a sham; that where the attendance of voters is even moderately good, it is the result of official pressure, and that the sooner nomination is reverted to the better.

5. In some instances the present system is mischievous, *e.g.*, a person in every respect unfitted for membership may get himself nominated, and in the absence of other candidates a few votes would elect him, although he might be not merely an unfit person, but one who could not in any sense be regarded as a representative of any section of the community.

Again, respectable men, who would prove valuable members of committee, are deterred from coming forward as candidates on account of their considering it derogatory to go about asking for votes.

6. Appended is an abstract showing briefly the facts for each district. I have not thought it necessary to give the numbers of those entitled to vote, and those who exercised the right. They form no true guage of the feeling of the people with reference to the elective system, as the voters are usually brought up by tahsíl chaprasis.

ABSTRACT referred to in Para. 6 of Commissioner's Report to Government, No. $\frac{294}{XIX.-146}$ dated 4th August 1881.

Pilibhít.—The voters who appear vote out of complaisance, and are quite indifferent to the result.

Budaun.—The vast majority of the inhabitants of the municipalities take no interest whatever in the election of the committee, and the attendance of most of those who have voted is obtained by official pressure.

At last election 111 who were induced to attend voted unanimously for the re-election of the out-going members; not that they cared in the least who were elected, but were anxious to get over a troublesome affair as soon as possible.

REPORTS on Working of Elective System in N.-W. Provinces and Oudh—*continued.*

Bareilly.—The elections are managed by the tahsíldár, and there does not appear to be much interest taken in them.

Sháhjahánpur.—No great interest appears to be felt in the election of members of committee. In no year has the number of candidates exceeded the number of vacancies, so that the recording of the votes was entirely formal. During the last two years no election has been held.

Bijnor.—Magistrate reports that it has been the custom to allow the tahsíldár to send for the voters and conduct the elections: they would not otherwise have come. No one desires to exercise the right of voting, so no one makes an effort to get his name brought on the register: quite the contrary. Magistrate has found the system either a sham bolstered up by fiction or else a failure. No interest in the subject whatever is felt by the people.

Moradabad.—The election statistics do not encourage the idea that the system is appreciated or even understood by the people. The office of municipal commissioner is not generally regarded as an object of ambition, and the privilege of voting is held very cheap indeed. Even on the rare occasion of a contested election, it is seldom that more than an inconsiderable fraction of the electors can be induced to vote.

R. M. EDWARDS,
Commissioner.

No. $\frac{1757}{\text{XIX.-43}}$, dated the 8th August 1881.

From W. KAYE, Esquire, Offg. Commissioner, Jhánsi Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N. W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN reply to G. O. No. 315, dated 4th June 1881, in the Municipal Department, I have the honor to report as follows:—

2. The elective system in one form or another prevails in the following municipalities in this Division:

Kálpi, Kúnch, Orai	Pargana Jalaun.
Mau-Ránipur	Pargana Jhánsi.

3. At Kálpi and Mau-Ránipur representatives of each muhalla or trade of the town alone vote at the election of municipal commissioners.

4. At Orai and Kúnch regular lists of qualified voters are maintained. All persons carrying on any trade or business, and all Government servants drawing more than Rs. 10 a month, are held to be qualified to vote.

5. The number of electors on the roll at Orai for the present year is 694: the numbers who actually voted during the three past years were 69, 52, and 59. The electoral privilege would seem to be not greatly prized at Orai.

6. The number of electors on the roll at Kúnch is 900. The numbers who actually voted in the past three years were 502, 491, and 579; the greater interest apparently shown at Kúnch is due chiefly to the presence of a resident native Magistrate, under whose supervision the elections are held.

7. As to the question whether there has been any improvement in the working of the elective system since its introduction, I can give no very favourable opinion. Bundelkhand is a backward country, and the real truth is that the electors as a rule take little interest in the matter, and only come to vote when they are sent for. On the whole, I am of opinion that the system of appointing representative of muhallas and trades is the best for this part of the world, for men so appointed are likely to take an interest in electing a member who will really represent their views.

8. It is unquestionable that the office of municipal commissioner is much more sought after than it was, though chiefly for the social position it confers. At Kálpi of late years the condidates for election have averaged three for every vacancy.

No. 255, dated Benares, the 6th September 1881.

From J. SLADEN, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Benares Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. 315 of 4th June last and subsequent reminder, having at length received reports on the subjects from all the municipalities in the division, I have the honor to state as follows:—

2. I submit a statement drawn up from the information given in the district reports, showing the number of qualified voters, number who voted, and per-centage of latter to former, from the year 1873–74 upwards. It is clear, however, from many of the district reports that the list of qualified voters has not been properly kept up from year to year; and this may at once be assumed to be the case in those districts where it will be seen that the number of qualified voters remains unchanged from year to year. That such is the case is in itself a proof that no great store is set by the fact of possessing a vote to elect a municipal member.

3. I will now proceed to quote the gist of the reports and opinions expressed by the various Magistrates in regard to the maintenance of the election system.

4. The Magistrate of Gorakhpur says that he is on the whole in favour of it, because the members elected generally form a good consultative body; but as regards the electors, he can only say that they vote because a candidate asks them, or because they are assembled by chaprásis.

5. The Magistrate of Azamgarh says that his experience at Azamgarh and elsewhere is that the people in general take but the faintest possible interest in the election of municipal members, and think

it a nuisance to be called on to exercise their franchise; and that until this feeling passes away, he does not see how improvement is possible. He points out too, that the committee now consist of the same members as it did in 1873, save where changes have occurred through deaths or resignations, and which fact speaks for itself.

6. The Magistrate of Benares thinks that the results on the whole are not unsatisfactory as regards the Benares municipality, and show that some interest is taken by the voters in the constitution of the committee. He complains, however, that some of the members, after having been elected, are often very apathetic; simply care to become members for the social status it gives them, and hardly ever care to attend a municipal meeting.

7. The Magistrate of Gházipur writes that but little interest is shown in the matter, but nevertheless recommends that the election system be retained in hopes that it may develope as time goes on.

8. The Magistrate of Ballia remarks that he does not think that a single voice of remonstrance would be raised if the privilege of electing members were done away with and nomination substituted. At the same time, however, he does not recommend its abrogation, inasmuch as election is a convenient way ofseeing that the members appointed are not obnoxious to the people.

Extract of Magistrate's para. 9, I submit for the information of Government, containing as it does a graphic and amusing description of a certain municipal election.

9. The Magistrate of Mirzapur writes that the system of election in the Mirzapur municipality is clearly a farce at present; but one reason of this he thinks is that the city is not divided into wards; consequently, the electors vote *en bloc* for all the members, instead of the voters of each ward electing their own member.

10. As regards the Chunar municipality, the Magistrate writes that the elections have been a less complete farce than at Mirzapur; and this he attributes in some measure to the comparative smallness of the town, which renders the assemblage of the electors at one place not very inconvenient. Here too, as in Mirzapur, he recommends the division of the city into wards. This is a matter, however, which rests in the hands of the Magistrate to propose separately, and need not further be discussed here.

11. My own opinion is that municipal elections of Native members by Native electors have been in most cases but a mere farce; and I cannot say that, so far, I see much sign of improvement in the degree of interest that attaches to the privilege of possessing a vote.

In the case of most municipalities, I believe there would be no remonstrance were it announced that the system of electing members was done away with, and that of nomination by the Magistrate substituted.

EXTRACT Para. 9 from a Letter No. 44, dated the 4th August 1881, from the President, Municipal Committee of Ballia, to the Commissioner of Benares Division.

9. MUNICIPALITIES were started in 1868, the year I came to India; and one of my earliest duties was to act as secretary to the Gházipur municipal committee. I well recollect the amusing nature of the first elections under the Act. I was determined that it should be a free and open election, and that the householders should be enabled to vote without fear or favour, and without exposure to undue influences. Accordingly, on the election day I deposited a sort of ballot-box at a suitable place in the centre of the city—a locked box with a slit in the lid to receive votes; and I had previously proclaimed through every ward and street that householders should vote by dropping into the box a list of the members they desired, and bills giving the necessary instructions were posted here and there for general information. I was gratified to observe that a good many papers were deposited in the box; and when I went down next morning, accompanied by the chief Native officials of the place, the box seemed almost full. We carried the box down to kutcherry, where it was publicly unlocked and the papers taken out. There was not a single voting paper in it. The papers were all petitions of objection to the recent house-tax assessment. After this ludicrous failure the members were elected by the Magistrate reading the names of those he proposed to an assemblage of people collected at kutcherry for the purpose, who were asked if they elected these, and who answered "certainly."

STATEMENT showing the Number of qualified Voters, Number who Voted, and Percentage of latter to former from 1873–74 to 1881–82, in the Municipalities of the Benares Division.

Municipality.	1873–74.			1874–75.			1875–76.			1876–77.			1877–78.			1878–79.			1879–80.			1880–81.			1881–82.		
	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.	No. of qualified Voters.	No. who voted.	Percentage.
Gorakhpur -	240	128	53	746	626	84	438	158	36	644	284	44	596	294	49	971	247	25	566	189	33	1,071	346	32	640	274	43
Azamgarh -	294	119	40	294	91	30	294	91	30	294	106	36	294	112	38	294	115	39	294	116	39	294	122	41	294	138	47
Benares -	2,087	860	41	548	352	64	2,785	1,249	45	2,653	985	37	3,001	1,440	47	3,551	1,119	31	3,209	1,205	37	3,379	993	29	2,252	905	40
Ghazipur -	Not known.			531	133	25	531	75	14	907	67	·73	907	110	12	907	22	24	907	60	·66	907	66	·72	907	57	·62
Ballia -	Not known.			664	204	31	644	433	67	644	282	43	644	270	41	644	271	42	644	102	15	644	93	14	644	215	33
Mirzapur -	2,174	72	·33	2,174	1	—	2,227	11	·04	2,220	26	·11	2,198	20	·09	2,200	14	·06	2,199	20	·09	2,200	32	·15	2,192	16	·07
Chunar -	73	72	98	73	25	34	73	25	34	73	28	38	73	39	53	73	30	41	73	30	41	73	30	41	73	22	30

Benares Commissionership :
Dated 6th September 1881.

S. SLADEN,
Offg. Commissioner.

PUNJAB MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS' ELECTION RULES.

Rules for the Election of Members of Municipal Committee, Murree.

1. The Committee shall consist of 10 members.
2. Of these, four shall be official, *viz.*,—

Deputy Commissioner,
Civil Surgeon,
Executive Engineer,
Officer Commanding Depôt,

and six non-officials.

3. Of the six non-official members, four shall be elected by public vote in the following manner:—
   (*a*) A general meeting of registered householders shall be held on the first Saturday of May in every year.
   (*b*) Notice of such meeting to be published by notice affixed outside the court-house at Murree, and by advertisement in the *Punjab Gazette*, and in one or more of the public newspapers.
   (*c*) The meeting shall proceed to elect from among the registered house proprietors in Murree those whom they recommend to be Municipal Commissioners for the ensuing year.
   (*d*) No person shall be entitled to vote at any such meeting unless he shall possess house property in Murree of an estimated yearly rental of Rs. 120, or upwards, and shall have paid up all assessments thereon.
   (*e*) Each voter shall be permitted to record a vote for each one of the candidates, but he shall not plump for any one of them.
   (*f*) The means of those persons elected shall be forwarded for publication in the *Punjab Gazette*.

4. The two remaining members shall be appointed by Government for one season, and with this view the Deputy Commissioner shall submit before 15th May each year the names of four persons able and willing to represent the visitors for selection and appointment by Government.
5. The four elected members shall hold office for two years only; but shall be eligible for re-election.

Dalhousie Municipal Rules.

I.— * * * * * *

II.—Constitution of Committee.

2. The Municipal Committee shall consist of official and non-official members. The ex-officio members shall be those specified in Punjab Government Circular No. 16 of 1867, *viz.*,—

The Deputy Commissioner of Gurdaspore, President.
The Assistant Commissioner, Dalhousie, Vice-President and Secretary.
The Civil Surgeon of Gurdaspore and Dalhousie.
The Executive Engineer of Dalhousie.
The District Superintendent of Police.

3. The officers specified in paragraph 5 of this office circular No. 16 of 1867 will be extraordinary members of the Committee.
4. The non-official members shall be six in number, of whom four will be appointed by the votes of the householders in the manner hereinafter specified, and the remaining two members shall be annually nominated by Government on the recommendation of the President of the Committee and Commissioner of the Division to represent the interests of visitors to the sanitorium. Of the four elected members two will go out by rotation each year, but will be eligible for re-election.

Mode of Election of the two Proprietary Members.

5. A general meeting of registered proprietors shall be held some time in the last week of May in every year. Six weeks' notice of the meeting shall be given in the Local Government Gazette, and in one or more of the public papers.
6. The meeting shall proceed to elect from among the house proprietors two persons to be recommended to the Lieutenant-Governor for appointment as members of the Municipal Committee.
7. The names of the house proprietors so elected, together with the names of the two persons who are to represent the interests of visitors, shall be submitted by the President of the Committee, through the usual channel, to the Local Government, with a view to their appointment as members of the Municipal Committee and the publication of their names as such in the Government Gazette.
8. A vacancy in the number of proprietary members occurring between the annual meetings shall be filled up by the votes at a meeting of proprietors specially convened for the purpose. Absence of such members from two consecutive monthly meetings without satisfactory explanation shall constitute a vacancy.

Persons Entitled to Attend and Vote at General Meetings of House Proprietors.

9. No person shall be entitled to vote at any meeting unless he shall possess house property within the limits of the Municipality duly registered in the Secretary's Office, of an estimated yearly rental of Rs. 250, or upwards, and shall have paid up all assessments thereon.
10. Every house proprietor qualified as above, whether European or Native, shall be entitled to a vote or votes according to the following scale :—
11. The proprietor of a house or houses of the estimated rental of Rs. 250 or upwards and less than Rs. 750, 1 vote.

The proprietor of a house or houses of the estimated rental of Rs. 750 and less than Rs. 1,200, 2 votes.

The proprietor of a house or houses of the estimated rental of Rs. 1,200 and less than Rs. 2,000, 3 votes.

PUNJAB Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

The proprietor of a house or houses of the estimated rental of Rs. 2,000 and upwards, 4 votes.

12. Votes may be given by proxy, special or general; provided that no person shall hold more than three general proxies, and provided also that the general proxies have previously been registered in the Secretary's Office.

RULES for the Election of Members of Municipal Committee, DHARMSALA.

1, 2. * * * * * * * *

3. The six non-official members will be elected by vote from among registered house and land proprietors at Dharmsala in the manner hereinafter prescribed.

4. On the first Saturday of April in each year, a meeting of registered house and land proprietors shall be held for the purpose of electing non-official members of the Committee for the current year. Six week's notice of this meeting shall be given by advertisement in the *Punjab Gazette.* A list of the persons elected shall be submitted for the approval of Government, and until their nomination is confirmed, the Committee of the previous year shall continue to exercise all the functions of the Committee.

5. At the aforesaid annual meetings of proprietors, as well as at all general meetings of the proprietors that may be held, every registered house proprietor and every proprietor of land within bazar limits shall have votes as follows :—

6. The payment of annual local taxes to the amount of Rs. 25 or less shall entitle to one vote; between Rs. 26 and Rs. 50 to two votes; and above Rs. 50 to three votes. No proprietor shall have more than three votes.

7. Every registered proprietor shall be entitled to vote at all annual and general meetings of proprietors either in person or by written proxy, special or general, but no person shall hold more than three general proxies.

8. No proprietor shall be allowed to vote at the general meetings, unless his property shall have been duly registered; nor shall a registered proprietor be allowed to vote unless all arrears of assessments due on his property shall have been paid.

9. If a vacancy shall occur in the number of members, a new member shall be elected by a majority of votes of the registered proprietors then in Dharmsala, such nomination shall be reported through the Commissioner of the Jullunder Division for the sanction of Government. A continuous absence of six months from Dharmsala shall constitute a vacancy.

AMRITSAR Election Rules.

1. Franchise qualifications :—

i.—All persons exercising any learned profession, such as—
Pundits and mullahs, in charge of shrines or other religious institution.
Doctors and hakims.
Pleaders.
Editors.
School-masters, &c., &c.

ii.—All persons carrying on any trade or business on their own account or as agents for others, at certain fixed premises the rental value of which is not less than Rs. 24 per annum.

iii.—All persons in Government or other employ in receipt of monthly salaries of not less than Rs. 15, and all persons drawing pensions from Government of a similar value.

iv.—All persons owning land paying revenue to Government, or specially exempted from payment of revenue, residing within municipal limits.

v.—All persons in fixed occupancy of premises rented at Rs. 24 per annum or more.

2. Candidates must have the same qualifications as the electors, and must reside or own property either in land or houses, within city limits.

3. The right of all persons claiming to vote under paragraph 1 (ii) and (v) may be verified by a reference to the registered house property in the Municipal Office.

4. A register of all persons mentioned in paragraph 1 (i), (iii) and (iv) who claim the right to vote shall be prepared in the Municipal Office as soon as possible after the passing of these rules.

5. The register of votes shall be revised by the Secretary to the Municipal Committee. Notice of such revision shall be given three months before the date fixed for the following election, so as to admit of applications from persons claiming the right to vote being received and considered. No application shall be rejected, except by the President, whose order shall be final.

6. All persons qualified to vote under these Rules shall be furnished with a ticket containing the following particulars :—

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No.	Name.	Parentage.	Caste.	Trade or Profession.	Residence.	No. of Division.

These tickets shall not be transferable, and shall only be used at the next election after issue.

7. Election shall be held every second year, on such dates as the President may fix, between the 15th October and 15th November.

PUNJAB Municipal Commissioners' Election Rules—*continued.*

8. Members returned by election shall hold their seats for two years, and shall be eligible for re-election on the expiry of that period.

9. The twelve divisions of the city shall, for the purposes of election, be grouped into four divisions, each of which group will have voting tickets of a colour different from the others. The President shall fix the day or days on which tickets of a particular colour or colours will be taken at the polling station.

10. The President shall fix the locality for the polling station, the manner in which the votes are to be taken and recorded, and appoint officers to everlook, receive, and record the votes.

11. Immediately after the close of the poll, a return shall be prepared by the officers appointed to record the votes, and submitted to the President. In this list the names of candidates will be placed according to the number of votes recorded, the candidate with the highest number standing first.

12. No election of a candidate to be considered valid, unless a minimum of 200 votes be recorded.

13. On proof that any candidate has purchased tickets, intimidated voters, or disobeyed any order issued by the President, relating to the election, whether before or after the election, his name shall be struck off the list of candidates.

ELECTION of European Members of the LAHORE Municipal Committee.

THE following rules have received the sanction of Government, and are published for general information :—

I. Those only to be entitled to vote who are—

1st.—Europeans or Eurasians resident during the previous six months within the Municipal bounds, excluding the city.

2nd.—Who are of age.

3rd.—Who either pay land-tax to the municipality, or not less than Rs. 20 a month house-rent, or receive ex-officio gratis quarters of that value, or are in the receipt of not less than Rs. 75 a month salary.

II. The qualifications of candidates to be the same.

III. Everyone wishing to vote is required to register his name and address in a book to be kept by the Secretary to the Municipal Committee, not less than ten days before the date of election. Candidates will send in their names by the same date, and these will be published for general information not less than a week before that date.

IV. Voting papers giving the names of the Candidates will be issued to such names and addresses three days before, and must be returned to Secretary, Municipal Committee, by 4 p.m. on the day of election.

V. In the event of an equal number of votes being given for two candidates, President of Municipal Committee to have a casting vote.

VI. The same officer will decide all questions as to qualifications of voters or candidates, subject to an appeal to Commissioner, whose orders will be final.

The election under the above rules will take place on Monday the 6th November 1876, when two members will be elected. Parties wishing to vote should communicate with the undersigned either in person or by letter before 25th October 1876, on which date the register of votes will be closed. Applications should contain the grounds upon which persons make their claim to be entitled to vote. The names of candidates should be sent in by the same date either by the candidates themselves or by any two qualified voters. In the latter case the proposers will be required to state that they have ascertained from the candidate his willingness to be put to nomination.

Further instructions will be issued with the voting papers.

CONDITIONS of Qualifications for Native Members of the LAHORE Municipal Committee.

THE members for the city wards and extra-mural bazars are appointed by election, the electors being—

(1) All persons exercising any learned professions.

(2) All persons carrying on any trade or business on their own account, or as agents for others at certain fixed premises the rental value of which is not less than Rs. 24 per annum.

(3) All persons in the service of Government or in the receipt of salaries or pensions of more than Rs. 7 per mensem from Government.

(4) All persons owning land paying revenue to Government, or especially exempted from payment of revenue, residing within the city.

(5) All persons in fixed occupation of premises rented at Rs. 24 per annum or more.

The candidates must have the same qualifications as the electors, and must reside or own property either in land or houses within the wards they represent.

STATEMENTS referred to in Resolution of Government of N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, dated 13th April 1882, No. 36, printed at page 189 of Part I. of Return.

STATEMENT No. I.

I.	II.	III.							IV.	V.					VI.	VII.
		Deductions on account of General Establishment, &c.								Expenditure under Local Control.						
		a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.			a.	b.		c.			
											Medical Charges.					
District.	Balance of Local Cess available for Local Expenditure after deducting further Rate and Percentage for Canals and Railways.	District Dák.	Lunatic asylums.	Inspection of Schools.	Training Schools.	District Sanitation.	Department of Agriculture and Commerce.	Total.	Balance available for Expenditure under Local Control.	Education.	(1) Hospitals and Dispensaries.	(2) Vaccination.	Village Watchmen.	Total.	Surplus available for Local Public Works.	Remarks.
N.-W. PROVINCES.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
1 Dehra Dún	6,570	240	80	180	20	20	80	620	5,950	3,090	4,240	1,430	3,850	12,610	−6,660	1.
2 Saháranpur	1,10,070	4,220	1,370	3,070	270	270	1,080	10,280	99,790	17,780	6,950	1,320	62,390	88,440	11,350	2.
3 Muzaffarnagar	1,18,260	4,530	1,470	3,290	290	290	1,160	11,030	1,07,230	20,590	3,200	1,180	44,470	69,440	37,790	3.
4 Meerut	2,03,220	7,800	2,540	5,700	500	510	2,040	19,090	1,84,130	31,820	10,580	1,760	82,800	1,26,960	57,170	4.
5 Bulandshahr	1,16,910	4,480	1,450	3,250	290	290	1,160	10,920	1,05,990	21,649	8,540	1,170	71,530	1,02,880	3,110	5.
6 Aligarh	1,98,540	7,620	2,460	4,520	480	500	2,000	18,580	1,79,960	33,400	5,820	1,730	72,650	1,13,600	66,360	6.
7 Muttra	1,56,960	6,030	1,950	4,370	980	390	1,560	15,280	1,41,680	26,390	5,260	1,610	58,240	91,500	50,180	7.
8 Agra	1,69,920	6,520	2,130	4,780	1,060	430	1,720	16,640	1,53,280	45,040	17,370	1,470	82,020	1,45,900	7,380	8.
9 Furukhabad	1,19,520	4,580	1,500	3,340	740	300	1,200	11,660	1,07,860	22,590	6,370	940	74,930	1,04,830	3,030	9.
10 Mainpuri	1,15,020	4,410	1,430	3,200	720	290	1,160	11,210	1,03,810	17,960	2,280	830	66,720	87,790	16,020	10.
11 Etáwah	1,22,940	4,710	1,500	3,360	760	300	1,200	11,830	1,11,110	27,660	4,370	820	52,740	85,590	25,520	11.
12 Etah	1,10,890	4,250	1,380	3,090	690	270	1,080	10,760	1,00,120	18,370	7,870	720	55,760	82,720	17,400	12.
13 Bareilly	1,24,470	4,770	1,550	3,470	340	310	1,240	11,680	1,12,790	38,590	7,090	2,260	71,820	1,19,760	−6,970	13.
14 Bijnor	1,13,400	4,350	1,410	3,160	310	280	1,120	10,630	1,02,770	17,940	6,510	1,460	65,250	91,160	11,610	14.
15 Budaun	97,650	3,740	1,210	2,720	270	240	960	9,140	88,510	18,130	9,490	1,360	73,360	1,02,340	−13,830	15.
16 Moradabad	1,58,310	6,080	1,980	4,430	440	400	1,600	14,930	1,43,380	26,150	7,710	1,680	82,180	1,17,520	25,860	16.
17 Pilibhít	70,560	2,710	180	1,970	190	180	720	6,650	63,910	8,130	3,170	210	37,440	48,950	14,960	17.
18 Sháhjahánpur	1,08,450	4,160	1,350	3,020	300	270	1,080	10,180	98,270	21,000	6,800	1,230	74,960	1,03,990	−5,720	18.
19 Cawnpore	1,96,470	7,540	2,440	5,470	4,280	490	1,960	19,180	1,77,290	34,360	8,840	2,340	1,03,570	1,49,110	28,180	19.
20 Fatehpur	1,19,160	4,570	1,480	3,320	780	290	1,160	11,500	1,07,560	18,910	2,870	1,600	67,640	91,020	16,540	20.
21 Hamírpur	99,990	3,830	1,240	2,780	650	250	1,000	9,750	90,240	15,960	4,450	1,630	44,780	66,820	23,420	21.
22 Bánda	1,03,860	3,980	1,300	2,890	680	260	1,040	10,150	93,710	23,620	4,970	2,040	62,500	93,130	580	22.
23 Allahabad	2,19,420	8,420	2,730	6,130	1,440	550	2,200	21,470	1,97,950	37,000	*17,860	2,120	1,24,200	1,81,180	16,770	23.
24 Jaunpur	1,10,700	4,240	1,380	3,090	720	260	1,040	10,730	99,970	19,830	3,250	1,420	70,670	95,170	4,800	24.
25 Benares	83,250	3,190	1,040	2,330	540	210	840	8,150	75,100	25,440	†11,110	1,380	52,910	90,840	−15,740	25.
26 Basti	1,25,010	4,800	1,560	3,490	820	310	1,240	12,220	1,12,790	16,010	8,460	1,530	72,480	98,480	14,310	26.
27 Azamgarh	1,57,320	6,040	1,970	4,410	1,030	400	1,600	15,450	1,41,870	19,690	3,070	1,540	80,470	1,04,770	37,100	27.
28 Gházipur	98,460	3,770	1,230	2,750	640	250	1,000	9,640	88,820	14,200	3,890	1,860	64,190	84,140	4,680	28.
29 Gorakhpur	1,57,230	6,040	1,970	4,410	1,030	390	1,560	15,400	1,41,830	23,750	9,340	2,300	83,420	1,18,810	23,020	29.
30 Ballia	73,440	2,820	910	2,040	480	180	720	7,150	66,290	10,670	4,070	210	46,040	61,650	4,640	30.

* Excluding expenditure on Civil Hospital.

† Excluding grant to Native Hospital.

Statement No. I.—*continued.*

I.	II.	III.							IV.	V.					VI.	VII.
		Deductions on account of General Establishment, &c.								Expenditure under Local Control.						
		a.	*b.*	*c.*	*d.*	*e.*	*f.*			*a.*	*b.*		*c.*			
											Medical Charges.					
District.	Balance of Local Cess available for Local Expenditure after deducting further Rate and Percentage for Canals and Railways.	District Dak.	Lunatic Asylums.	Inspection of Schools.	Training Schools.	District Sanitation.	Department of Agriculture and Commerce.	Total.	Balance available for Expenditure under Local Control.	Education.	(1) Hospitals and Dispensaries.	(2) Vaccination.	Village Watchmen.	Total.	Surplus available for Local Public Works.	Remarks.
N.-W. P.—*concl.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
31 Mirzapur - -	63,450	2,420	790	1,770	420	160	640	6,200	57,250	21,770	9,320	1,150	49,440	81,680	*—24,430	31.
32 Jhánsi - -	42,570	1,620	530	1,190	1,520	110	440	5,410	37,160	10,020	3,150	850	28,130	42,150	—4,990	32.
33 Jalaun - -	86,400	3,310	1,070	2,390	3,070	210	840	10,890	75,510	14,460	7,190	1,360	45,020	68,030	7,480	33.
34 Lalitpur - -	17,010	640	210	470	600	40	160	2,120	14,890	5,750	1,540	540	17,510	25,340	—10,450	34.
35 Kumaun - -	22,950	870	280	630	3,100	60	240	5,180	17,770	9,920	5,330	1,400	10,100	26,750	—8,980	35.
36 Garhwál - -	9,900	370	120	270	1,340	20	80	2,200	7,700	4,580	8,930	1,280	4,660	19,450	—11,750	36.
37 Tarái - -	9,000	330	110	250	1,210	20	80	2,000	7,000	1,650	4,870	1,060	1,790	9,370	—2,370	37.
Total -	40,17,240	1,54,000	50,000	1,12,000	30,000	10,000	40,000	3,96,000	36,21,240	7,43,860	2,46,590	50,790	21,62,630	32,03,870	4,17,370	
Oudh.																
38 Lucknow - -	35,470	1,970	630	1,610	500	270	1,080	6,060	29,410	18,090	9,110	1,060	—	28,260	1,150	38.
39 Unao - -	61,420	3,420	1,100	2,800	870	460	1,840	10,490	50,930	25,730	7,560	930	—	34,220	16,710	39.
40 Bara Banki -	72,210	4,010	1,290	3,300	1,020	550	2,200	12,370	59,840	28,710	8,840	630	—	38,180	21,660	40.
41 Sitapur - -	59,930	3,330	1,070	2,740	850	450	1,800	10,240	49,690	23,240	5,110	790	—	29,140	20,550	41.
42 Hardoi - -	61,620	3,420	1,110	2,810	890	470	1,880	10,580	51,040	28,570	8,040	580	—	37,190	13,850	42.
43 Kheri - -	36,950	2,050	660	1,730	520	280	1,120	6,360	30,690	16,230	7,120	540	—	23,890	6,700	43.
44 Fyzabad -	52,410	2,910	920	2,390	720	390	1,560	8,890	43,520	30,450	7,910	800	—	39,250	4,270	44.
45 Gonda - -	71,260	3,960	1,270	3,250	1,010	540	2,160	12,190	59,070	20,580	7,770	520	—	28,870	3,020	45.
46 Bahraich - -	48,500	2,700	870	2,220	690	370	1,480	8,330	40,170	26,510	12,060	560	—	39,130	1,040	46.
47 Rae Bareli - -	58,020	3,220	1,040	2,650	830	440	1,760	9,940	48,080	24,140	7,490	940	—	32,570	15,510	47.
48 Suttanpur - -	54,110	3,010	1,040	2,470	820	440	1,760	9,540	44,570	20,230	5,640	680	—	26,550	18,020	48.
49 Partabgarh -	44,580	2,480	800	2,030	630	340	1,360	7,640	36,940	16,080	6,020	500	—	22,600	14,340	49.
Total -	6,56,480	A36,480	11,800	30,000	9,350	5,000	20,000	1,12,630	5,43,850	2,78,650	92,670	8,530	—	3,79,850	1,64,000	
Grand Total, N.-W.P. and Oudh - -	46,73,720	1,90,480	61,800	1,42,000	39,350	15,000	60,000	5,08,630	41,65,090	10,22,510	3,39,260	59,320	21,62,630	35,83,720	5,81,730	

* Exclusive of the Government grant from Provincial Revenues for roads in the Family Domains of the Mahárája of Benares.

Note.—The amount shown in column II. comprises the local rates (exclusive of further rate and percentage for canals and railways) and the road, dák and school cesses, and commuted jágirs in the permanently-settled districts of the North-Western Provinces: in Oudh it includes local rates, road, school and dák cesses and excludes further rate, margin cess, and percentage for canals and railways.

(Signed) R. SMEATON,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

STATEMENT No. II.

Public Works.

(As per Resolution No. 22, dated 31st March 1882, printed on 183 of Part I. of Return.)

I.		II.	III.				IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.
			Normal Items (Local Control).									
	District.	Surplus available for Local Public Works (as per Statement I., Column VI.)	*a.* Maintenance of Local Civil Buildings, Roads, and Bridges.	*b.* Allotment for Petty Works.*	*c.* District Establishment made over.†	*d.* Total.	Condition of Local Rates at this Stage.	Original Works and Special Repairs (figures for 1882-83), Variable Item (Local Control).	Arboriculture Grant (figures for 1882-83), Variable Item (Local Control).	Condition of Local Rates at this Stage.	Total Public Works (Local) Expenditure under Local Control.	Remarks.
	N.-W. Provinces.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
1	Dehra Dún	−6,660	11,120	3,000	9,100	23,220	−29,880	—	140	−30,020	23,360	1.
2	Sahránpur	11,350	29,760	5,000	9,960	44,720	−33,370	1,680	1,220	−36,270	47,620	2.
3	Muzaffarnagar	37,790	22,260	3,000	5,560	30,820	6,970	4,420	2,800	−250	38,040	3.
4	Meerut	57,170	44,020	5,000	14,320	63,340	−6,170	13,210	1,240	−20,620	77,790	3.
5	Bulandshahr	3,110	27,590	3,000	5,560	36,150	−33,040	—	1,190	−34,230	37,340	5.
6	Aligarh	66,360	15,480	5,000	14,260	34,740	31,620	3,560	3,050	25,010	41,350	6.
7	Muttra	50,180	31,280	3,000	8,350	42,630	7,550	300	1,500	5,750	44,430	7.
8	Agra	7,380	32,860	5,000	16,550	54,410	−47,030	3,840	2,700	−53,570	60,950	8.
9	Farukhabad	3,030	20,870	5,000	12,770	38,640	−35,610	6,050	1,000	−42,660	45,690	9.
10	Mainpuri	16,020	23,040	5,000	7,060	35,100	−19,080	100	590	−19,770	35,790	10.
11	Etáwah	25,520	26,470	5,000	10,030	41,500	−15,980	12,880	1,490	−30,350	55,870	11.
12	Etah	17,400	12,030	3,000	6,860	21,890	−4,490	5,470	1,140	−11,100	28,500	12.
13	Bareilly	−6,970	‡27,670	5,000	7,780	40,450	−47,420	2,830	2,010	−52,260	45,290	13.
14	Bijnor	11,610	21,970	3,000	7,640	32,610	−21,000	10,000	810	−31,810	43,420	14.
15	Budaun	−13,830	16,460	5,000	7,650	29,110	−42,940	—	540	−43,480	29,650	15.
16	Moradabad	25,860	38,540	5,000	12,890	56,430	−30,570	5,120	620	−36,310	62,170	16.
17	Pilibhít	14,960	§	3,000	4,490	7,490	‖ 7,470	1,340	180	‖ 5,950	9,010	17.
18	Sháhjahanpur	−5,720	15,840	5,000	9,220	30,060	−35,780	4,050	880	−40,710	34,990	18.
19	Cawnpore	28,180	20,330	5,000	10,050	35,380	−7,200	4,540	800	−12,540	40,720	19.
20	Fatehpur	16,540	30,770	3,000	5,680	39,450	−22,910	3,040	650	−26,600	43,140	20.
21	Hamírpur	23,420	9,740	3,000	16,940	29,680	−6,260	4,150	1,750	−12,160	35,580	21.
22	Bánda	580	18,000	5,000	11,450	34,450	−33,870	24,150	3,350	−61,370	61,950	22.
23	Allahabad	16,770	29,800	5,000	14,320	49,120	−32,350	7,420	950	−40,720	57,490	23.
24	Jaunpur	4,800	22,640	5,000	9,160	36,800	−32,000	2,000	1,750	−35,750	40,550	24.
25	Benares	−15,740	19,360	5,000	9,160	35,520	−49,260	6,500	900	−56,660	40,920	25.

* This grant is for the present to cover the cost of maintenance of *sarais*, which have heretofore been included in *nazúl*.

† The figures under "District establishment made over" are actuals; but though included under "normal items," they are liable to variation in cases of transfer or promotion of staff.

‡ Includes the allotment for the Pilibhít district.

§ Included in the allotment to the Bareilly district.

‖ This is really a debit balance, as the amount opposite Bareilly in column III. *a.* includes a sum of about Rs. 9,500 on account of the Pilibhít district. The Bareilly balance will be modified accordingly when exact details are available for Pilibhít.

Statement No. II.—Public Works.—*continued.*

I.		II.	III.				IV.	V.	VI.	VII.	VIII.	IX.
	District.	Surplus available for Local Public Works (as per Statement I., Column VI.).	Normal Items (Local Control). *a.* Maintenance of Local Civil Buildings, Roads, and Bridges.	*b.* Allotment for Petty Works.*	*c.* District Establishment made over.†	*d.* Total.	Condition of Local Rates at this Stage.	Original Works and Special Repairs (figures for 1882-83), Variable Item (Local Control).	Arboriculture Grant (figures for 1882-83), Variable Item (Local Control).	Condition of Local Rates at this Stage.	Total Public Works (Local) Expenditure under Local Control.	Remarks.
	N.W.-Provinces—*cont.*	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
26	Basti	14,310	8,780	3,000	7,650	19,430	−5,120	−6,000	420	−11,540	25,850	26.
27	Azamgarh	37,100	18,390	5,000	14,320	37,710	−610	−6,140	500	−7,250	44,350	27.
28	Gházipur	4,680	28,140	5,000	7,000	40,140	−35,460	−11,040	500	−46,970	51,650	28.
29	Gorakhpur	23,020	11,040	5,000	14,200	30,240	−7,220	7,460	1,400	−16,080	39,100	29.
30	Ballia	4,640	1,980	3,000	5,200	10,180	−5,540	−4,400	250	−10,190	14,830	30.
31	Mirzapur	−24,430	23,930	5,000	9,160	38,090	−62,520	−6,000	1,050	−69,570	45,140	31.
32	Jhánsi	−4,990	28,760	3,000	8,760	40,520	−45,510	−5,710	2,210	−53,430	48,440	32.
33	Jaiaun	7,480	23,670	3,000	6,940	33,610	−26,130	−10,000	1,920	−38,050	45,530	33.
34	Lalitpur	−10,450	6,760	3,000	5,500	15,260	−25,710	−3,000	4,700	−33,410	22,960	34.
35	Kumaun	−8,980	29,860	3,000	9,570	42,430	−51,410	−4,450	250	−56,110	47,130	35.
36	Garhwál	−11,750	11,110	3,000	7,010	21,120	−32,870	−5,800	250	−38,920	27,170	36.
37	Tarái	−2,370	5,300	3,000	8,170	16,470	−18,840	−20,050	—	−38,890	36,520	37.
	Total	4,17,373	7,65,620	1,51,000	3,50,290	12,66,910	−8,49,540	−2,16,670	46,700	−11,12,910	15,30,280	
	Oudh.											
38	Lucknow	1,150	23,340	3,000	7,690	34,030	−32,880	2,000	2,330	−37,210	38,360	38.
39	Unao	16,710	9,020	3,000	9,730	21,750	−5,040	6,950	500	−12,490	29,200	39.
40	Bara Banki	21,660	14,490	3,000	7,700	25,190	−3,530	9,110	650	−13,290	34,950	40.
41	Sitapur	20,550	10,460	3,000	9,960	23,420	−2,870	9,450	850	−13,170	33,720	41.
42	Hardoi	13,850	13,920	3,000	9,100	26,020	−13,170	16,100	1,150	−30,420	44,270	42.
43	Kheri	6,700	8,610	3,000	10,540	22,150	−15,450	22,530	50	−38,230	44,930	43.
44	Fyzabad	4,270	13,880	3,000	6,940	23,820	−18,550	6,730	00	−25,780	30,050	44.
45	Gonda	30,200	29,430	3,000	10,780	43,210	−13,010	6,800	500	−20,310	50,510	45.
46	Bahraich	1,040	14,670	3,000	9,160	26,830	−25,790	7,980	850	−34,620	35,660	46.
47	Rae Bareli	15,510	23,090	3,000	8,800	34,890	−19,380	8,140	550	−28,070	43,580	47.
48	Sultanpur	18,020	8,380	3,000	8,290	19,670	−1,650	6,180	470	−8,300	26,320	48.
49	Partabgarh	14,340	7,420	3,090	8,290	18,710	−4,370	10,310	600	−15,280	29,620	49.
	Total	1,64,000	1,76,710	36,000	1,06,980	3,19,690	−1,55,690	1,12,280	9,900	−2,77,170	4,41,170	
	Grand Total, N.-W. P. and Oudh	5,81,370	9,42,330	1,87,000	4,57,270	15,86,600	−10,05,230	3,28,950	55,900	−13,90,080	19,71,450	

* This grant is for the present to cover the cost of maintenance of *sarais*, which have heretofore been included in *nazúl*.

† The figures under "District establishment made over" are actuals; but though included under "normal items," they are liable to variation in cases of transfer or promotion of staff.

(Signed) R. SMEATON,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh: Statement—*continued.*

STATEMENT No. III.

Public Works.

As per Resolution No. 22, dated 31st March 1882.

Districts.	Provincial Debit, under Local Control (1882-83).					Remarks.
	Maintenance (normal).		Repairs (normal).	Original Works.	Total.	
	Boat Bridges and Ferries.	Accommodation for Travellers.				
North-Western Provinces.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Dehra Dún	—	860	—	—	860	
Saháranpur	—	630	—	—	630	
Muzaffarnagar	120	250	—	—	370	
Meerut	50	370	—	—	420	
Bulandshahr	40	440	—	—	480	
Aligarh	—	750	—	—	750	
Muttra	—	60	—	—	60	
Agra	—	620	—	—	620	
Farukhabád	—	890	—	—	890	
Mainpuri	—	680	—	—	680	
Etáwah	700	80	—	—	780	
Etah	—	140	—	—	140	
Bareilly	—	570	—	—	570	
Bijnor	1,000	330	—	—	1,330	
Budaun	1,150	370	—	—	1,520	
Moradabad	7,800	530	—	—	8,330	
Pilibhít	—	—	4,000	—	4,000	
Sháhjahánpur	650	320	700	—	1,670	
Cawnpore	1,700	380	—	—	2,080	
Fatehpur	—	570	—	—	570	
Hamírpur	230	770	1,400	—	2,400	
Bánda	2,630	390	—	—	3,020	
Allahabad	—	420	—	—	420	
Jaunpur	—	740	—	—	740	
Benares	50	240	—	—	290	
Basti	200	140	—	—	340	
Azamgarh	—	400	—	—	400	
Gházipur	—	30	—	—	30	
Gorakhpur	8,000	220	—	—	8,220	
Ballia	—	—	—	—	—	
Mirzapur	—	200	—	—	200	
Jhansi	1,000	810	—	—	1,810	
Jalaun	—	720	—	—	720	
Lalitpur	400	600	—	—	1,000	
Kumaun	—	2,370	9,000	—	11,370	
Garhwál	—	—	1,230	—	1,230	
Tarái	—	30	—	—	30	
Total	25,720	16,920	16,330	—	58,970	
Oudh.						
Lucknow	—	—	—	—	—	
Unao	—	70	—	—	70	
Bara Banki	20,000	490	—	—	20,490	
Sibapur	500	240	—	300	1,040	
Hardoi	1,000	200	—	—	1,200	
Kheri	2,000	120	—	—	2,120	
Fyzabad	—	150	—	—	150	
Gonda	1,000	100	—	—	1,100	
Bahraich	1,500	—	—	—	1,500	
Rae Bareli	—	220	—	—	220	
Sultanpur	—	250	—	—	250	
Partabgarh	—	220	—	—	220	
Total	26,000	2,060	—	300	28,360	

R. Smeaton,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

N.-W. PROVINCES AND OUDH GOVERNMENT TO COMMISSIONERS OF DIVISIONS.

No. 145 of 1882.

FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT (DECENTRALISATION).

From THE OFFG. SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, To ALL COMMISSIONERS OF DIVISIONS, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR, Dated Naini Tal, the 21st June 1882.

IN continuation of correspondence on the general subject of local self-government, ending with my Circular No. 12, dated 29th May last, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner to forward copy of Resolution by the Government of India, in the Home Department, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, dated the 18th May last, communicating the wishes of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council as to the carrying out of the measure. The following remarks apply to district arrangements only; you will be separately addressed regarding municipalities.

2. The principle of local boards whose jurisdiction shall be conterminous with tahsíls, has now been authoritatively prescribed; and the result will be that the series of general orders issued by this Government will require modification in certain details, as to which communication will be made in due course. Meantime, I am to invite your special attention to the following points.

3. Paragraph 10 of the Resolution quoted above deals with the areas (in these provinces conterminous with tahsíl jurisdictions) for which local boards may be appointed. The question as to the constitution of these boards and their relations with the district committees remains for consideration: whether the local (tahsíli) boards should act independently in immediate communication with the officers of Government, or should be separate boards under the general supervision of a district board; or whether the district board should include members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their circle and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board. It will probably be found that under present circumstances the third of these plans is the preferable one, being simpler and more easily developed out of the existing system than either of the others, and being also in accordance with the existing law, which only contemplates one committee in each district. In regard to the relations between the central and the local boards, it might be arranged that one of the members of the district committee at head-quarters should hold charge of a department (Education, for instance) in correspondence with the various tahsíli boards, so as to maintain unity of action and to secure a uniform policy. Each tahsíl board might thus be placed in charge, within its own jurisdiction, of the several matters (Education, Sanitation, Medical Charity, and Public Works) transferred to local control by previous orders, under the general direction and control of the central board, which would be responsible for the local administration of the whole district.

4. At first, and in order that the local boards may be placed at the outset in competent hands, it may be advisable that Commissioners should submit, in consultation with the District Officers of their division and with the leading Native gentlemen of each district, detailed proposals showing, *inter alia*, the number of resident members of committee that might be able and willing to serve on the local board of each tahsíl, and the system under which the local boards would manage their business and correspond with the central board. It is expedient that the proportion of non-official members to official—namely, two-thirds to one-third—suggested by the Government of India shall, wherever possible, be maintained both in the local and in the central district boards. It may be that in some districts the central board already contains the names of a sufficient number of gentlemen who are eligible, as residents within the several tahsíl sub-divisions, for the local boards; while elsewhere the district committee may need to be enlarged by the addition of members to serve on the tahsíl boards.

5. Where the institution of the tahsíl boards necessitates the appointment of additional members to the district board, the nomination would ordinarily be made after consulting the principal persons of each tahsíl, and ascertaining what gentlemen would in their opinion be most acceptable to the inhabitants of the territorial area, and would best represent its various interests and requirements. The law, as it now stands, does not permit of the election of members to district committees; but the question of introducing this method is prominently noticed in the Resolution of the Government of India, and I am to request that your careful consideration may be given to this part of the subject, and that you will discuss with the existing committees and other classes concerned the practicability of taking early steps in the direction indicated by paragraphs 13-15 of the Resolution.

6. Adverting to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Resolution, I am to say that the nomination of Chairmen will, in future, be placed in the hands of the members of district and local boards, subject in each case to the approval of Government. In many districts of these provinces there will probably be found non-official members qualified for such a position, and capable, after a short experience, of discharging its responsible duties satisfactorily; but it cannot be expected that all the committees, as at present constituted, will be found to contain persons possessing the knowledge of business, the leisure, and the influence requisite for presiding effectively over the collective discharge of new and important functions. The Lieutenant-Governor would wish you to report, after proper enquiry, in what districts it is possible to make speedy arrangements for placing the committees under non-official Chairmen, and to explain in cases where you cannot at once recommend this to be done, the reasons upon which the exceptions are made. It is to be borne in mind that the preservation of the continuity of the existing system of local administration and its efficiency is a matter of importance, although the immediate directing authority is now to be transferred from the hands of the District Officers to the hands of those most interested in local concerns. But the initial difficulties inseparable from any change of system can be surmounted if the officers of Government use diligence and judgment in carrying out details, and give the committees and their Chairmen the benefit in every possible way of their advice and guidance in the beginning.

7. These changes in system may possibly involve the entertainment of a separate establishment, in connection especially with the tahsíl boards. It may further be desirable that the offices and committee-rooms of the different boards should be premises appropriated for the purpose, and not merely, as at present they usually are, rooms in the public offices, which are utilised, among other purposes, for the service of local committees. To these points also I am to invite your attention and to request report on them; though detailed estimates of establishments and cost are not at present necessary.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Government to Commissioners of Divisions—*continued.*

8. His Honor trusts that you will be able to submit your opinion on the points discussed above by the 15th August; and I am to ask that you will do all that lies in your power to facilitate the speedy submission of the required information.

I have, &c.
J. R. Reid,
Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

No. 146.

Copy forwarded direct to all District Officers, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

R. Smeaton,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

No. 147 of 1882.

Financial Department (Decentralisation).

From The Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, to All Commissioners of Divisions, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir, Dated Naini Tal, the 21st June 1882.

In continuation of my letter of this day's date, communicating the orders of Government on the changes to be introduced in district boards, I am directed to address you in regard to municipal boards, in so far as these are affected by the Resolution of 18th May last.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner desires to be informed whether, and in what form, the elective system can be extended to all municipalities which have not yet introduced it. It must first be ascertained, however, to what extent election is at present possible, in view of the existing appointments of members by nomination and of their legal position as such for a definite period under the Act; and moreover there may be towns to which the immediate extension of the system of electing members may be open to special drawbacks or difficulties. I am to request that you will make the necessary enquiries, and report upon the whole subject after careful deliberation. It is hoped that you may soon be able to submit, for such municipalities as do not at present possess the privilege of election, detailed proposals under clause 3, section 6, Act XV. of 1873, as to time and manner of election, qualifications of electors and candidates, and other such matters. These proposals should be drawn up in consultation with the municipal members now in office, and with the leading citizens generally; and they should be so framed as to secure a fair representation, by persons of local influence and of education, of the principal sections of the community. Final orders on this subject will then be issued in the Municipal Department.

3. Under section 10 of the Act His Honor sanctions the election by all municipal boards of one of their members as President. In connection with this subject, I am to invite your attention to paras. 18 and 19 of the Resolution of the 18th May, and to say that the views there expressed by the Government of India should be laid as soon as may be possible before each municipal board; and that the members should be moved to proceed to the election of a Chairman, who should be a non-official member, wherever a suitable person can be found able and willing to undertake the duties. Wherever it may be really necessary, for the proper transaction of business, that one of the district officers should retain for the present the office of President, the Vice-President should be a non-official, and should be entrusted with the conduct of ordinary business; while in all cases the District Officer will of course give the Chairman and the board generally the full advantage of his advice and experience in the management of current business, and will take special care that any transfer of functions may be managed in the most convenient time and manner.

4. The questions of the relation of municipal to district boards, of the debit (municipal or local funds) of intra-municipal educational and medical expenditure, and of the transfer of municipal police charges, are under separate consideration.

I have, &c.
J. R. Reid,
Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

No. 148.

Copy forwarded direct to all District Officers, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

R. Smeaton,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

No. 160 of 1882.

Financial Department (Decentralisation).

From The Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, to All Commissioners of Divisions, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir, Dated Naini Tal, the 29th June 1882.

In continuation of my letter No. 145, dated 21st June, on the subject of local self-government, and with special advertence to para. 5, I am directed to request that, besides referring to the principal persons of each tahsíl, you will be good enough also to consult the existing district committees as to the gentlemen who would in their opinion be most acceptable to the inhabitants of the territorial area, and would best represent their interests as additional members of the district boards.

N.-W. Provinces and Oudh Government to Commissioners of Divisions—*continued.*

2. I am also to request that you will carefully consider and discuss with the existing committees and other classes concerned, the practicability of forming some kind of elective body, to whom the nomination of members might in future be entrusted.

3. And I am further to request that you will, after consulting district officers and other persons, official and non-official, who are competent to form an opinion and give advice, consider and report whether it would be practicable, and in accordance with the general wishes of the community, that tahsíldárs should cease to be members of central and tahsíl local boards.

I have, &c.
J. R. Reid,
Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

No. 161.

Copies forwarded to all District Officers, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

R. Smeaton,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

No. 162 of 1882.

Financial Department (Decentralisation).

From The Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, to All Commissioners of Divisions, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir, Dated Naini Tal, the 29th June 1882.

In continuation of my letter No. 147, dated 21st June, regarding municipal boards as affected by the Resolution of the Government of India of the 18th May last, I am directed to request that the opportunity be taken to examine and review the arrangements and working of the system of election already in force in the municipalities within your division. The result will probably throw much useful light upon the question of the proper mode of extending the system; but I am to say that your report should not be unnecessarily delayed with the object of completing this review.

I have, &c.
J. R. Reid,
Offg. Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

No. 163.

Copies forwarded to all Districts Officers, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, for information and guidance.

R. Smeaton,
Junior Secy. to Govt., N.-W. P. and Oudh.

REPLIES OF DISTRICT OFFICERS IN N.-W. PROVINCES AND OUDH AS TO DISTRICT BOARDS.

No. $\frac{43C.}{XXIII.}$, dated Mussooree, the 9th August 1882.

From Elliot Colvin, Esquire, Offg. Commissioner, Meerut Division, to The Officiating Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

I have the honor to submit the answer of Collectors submitted in reply to your Nos. 145 and 160, dated 21st and 29th June last, Financial (Decentralisation) Department.

2. It will be seen that there is a general consensus of opinion in favour of local boards consisting of members residing within the tahsíl, who would be members of the district committee.

3. The district committee so constituted would include all local members. This body would be administrative; it would frame the budgets, lay down the principles on which work was to be done, and would make allotments and supervise generally.

4. The local boards would be executive, and look after the income and expenditure within their respective areas.

5. It is proposed that either a member or sub-committee should be appointed for each department to secure uniformity, and through this medium the district committee would communicate with local boards.

6. The number of resident members to serve on local boards must vary. Collectors generally suggest four or five, but I think it would be sufficient at present to say that the number shall not be less than three for each board, and may be more.

7. Some Collectors have submitted names, but it will be sufficient to consider the fitness of nominees, when the character of the constitution of committees is decided on. All Collectors are unanimous in considering that for the present the Tahsíldár must be a member of the local board.

8. As regards the proportion of the non-official and official members, I think it would be sufficient to lay down the rule that the proportion of non-official to official members should not be less than two-thirds to one-third, but may be more. It must be remembered that two *ex-officio* members, *i.e.*, the Executive Engineer and Inspector of Schools, are, to all intents and purposes, dummies, and are not working members at all.

9. As regards the election of chairmen, I would allow the committee to select their own, but I have little doubt that in nearly all cases Collectors will be nominated.

10. It will be seen that the Dhera committee, which consists chiefly of Englishmen, elected the Superintendent of the Dún. Saháranpur has no leading man likely to be selected; nor has Muzaffarnagar. Both of these district committees, like Meerut, would select the Magistrate. So would Bulandshahr. Aligarh has, I believe, nominated Lutuf Ali Khan, a gentleman who does not know

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

English. Until the many Resolutions and Circulars on the subject are translated into Urdu, it is obvious that in Aligarh the chairman's work will have to be done by the Magistrate practically.

11. When decentralisation is put on its true basis, *i.e.*, when the principles are applied to it which governed the decentralisation of the Local from the Imperial Government, it is probable that the Collector will be able to give over the direction to a non-official chairman in most districts gradually; but this cannot be when every step is directed by a Circular or a Resolution from head-quarters; when every detail of expenditure and allotment, &c., is jealously watched by, and subject to interference from departments; it can only be when a certain income is given to local committees, within which their expenditure must be confined; and when they are, like municipalities, left to direct their own expenditure subject only to general conditions, rules, and supervision.

12. With regard to the non-official chairmen, I enclose letter No. 101 from the Magistrate of Bulandshahr. When an experienced officer finds himself forced to remonstrate, it is easy to imagine how perplexed a non-official chairman would be under the circumstances.

13. When committees feel that they have powers and responsibilities and reasonable freedom of action; when they know their own resources, and learn that they must work by developing and economising these, and not by scrambling for allotments, I have no doubt that the keenest interest will be taken by the members, and the policy of self-government will bear good fruit.

14. The question of election is one which requires great consideration. The proposals made vary considerably. Knowing how the appointments of lambardárs and patwáris are often hotly contested, when they rest on election, I threw out to district committees a suggestion regarding its applicability.

15. There can be no doubt that nomination—and not election—is, as far as we can judge Native opinion, as yet the popular method. But of course the opinion of Muhammad Saiyid Ahmad Bahadur, quoted by the Collector of Aligarh, is the correct one; and though present circumstances are discouraging, the principle must be applied, as a measure of policy, to train the people in habits of independence and self-government.

16. My own idea is that to apply one system to all districts would be a great mistake.

17. I would allow districts to adopt any form of election least unacceptable to the people, provided it was in itself unobjectionable on general grounds.

18. I believe the question of election will be much more easily solved, and the dislike to it will disappear when it is seen that the committees are a living power, possessing the power and responsibility of managing their own local affairs.

19. There is at present no need for separate buildings and establishments.

20. Some of the Collectors have gone into the question of income, but I have not touched on it, as it is one which I do not think within the scope inquiry contained in your letter.

No. $\frac{670}{\text{XXIII. 14}}$, dated Dehra Dun, the 27th July 1882.

From W. T. Church, Esquire, Superintendent of Dehra Dun, to Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division.

Sir,

With reference to your No. $\frac{10}{\text{XXIII}}$, dated 5th July, 1882, I have the honour to reply as follows:—

2. In this district there are only two tahsíls, one consisting of the Dún, the other of the hill tract of Jaunsár Báwar.

3. With regard to the Dún, the persons who would be eligible under a restricted franchise to be elected members of a district committee are extremely few. The list of non-official members already sanctioned, and the subsequent list submitted for sanction, contain the name of almost every non-official Native or European who could possibly receive election at the hands of a body of electors.

4. It must be remembered that a very large part of the Dún is held by European tea-planters, on whose estates reside no persons of a higher class than beldárs or coolies. The latter would not obtain the franchise, and the result would probably follow that the tea-planters would not be elected.

5. The class of electors in the Dún would be numerically small; and for the reasons already mentioned, I recommend that the system of election should not be introduced, as under the system of nomination it is probable that almost every land owner, who would be eligible to election, will be placed on the district committee.

6. In the list of members who were nominated by the committee, but whose appointments have not yet been sanctioned, two leading Natives of Jaunsár Báwar were nominated expressly to deal with the affairs of that pargana. It may be mentioned, however, that the affairs which would come within the scope of a local committee for Jaunsár are limited. There is no dispensary, there are only five schools, and there is only one sanctioned road, that which lies between Mussooree and Chakráta and from thence towards Simla, and this road must be maintained through the District Engineer.

7. There are however several roads connecting the villages of the hilly parts, which are made and maintained at the expense of the community. The *syanas* of the various *khatts* have great power within their jurisdiction; and under their unwritten constitution form a local board of their own, with power to deal with all matters affecting local custom, disputes, &c. But the affairs which under the Resolution would fall under the control of a local board scarcely exist in Jaunsár, and therefore for all practical purposes the appointment of two leading Native *syanas* of Jaunsár on the district committee is sufficient. For the present I would propose that they should remain on the district committee. If hereafter it should be found convenient for them to hold local meetings apart from the general committee, this could be arranged.

8. The committee were fully informed of the wishes of Government with respect to the election of a non-official chairman, but they unanimously have elected me as chairman, and Mr. R. M. Anderson, a tea-planter, as vice-chairman. Almost all the members of the committee, certainly the Europeans, are quite able to undertake the post of chairman, but they cannot afford the time and leisure.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

9. With every wish to carry out the intentions of Government, I have not been able to recommend the introduction of the elective system into the Dún. The circumstances of this district, with its scanty population, the paucity of a land-owning middle class, and its comparatively large number of European planters, differ greatly from the plains districts with their large agricultural populations.

10. In my own opinion and that of the members of the district committee it is necessary that the Tahsildár should remain on the committee, as his local knowledge is often appealed to at discussions in the committee.

No. $\frac{155}{XXIII.}$G, dated Saháranpur, the 2nd August 1882.

From A. H. HARINGTON, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Saháranpur, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit the information and opinions called for in your Circulars No. $\frac{10}{XXIII.}$, dated 5th, and No. $\frac{18}{XXIII.}$, dated 10th July.

(*a*) Constitution of tahsíl boards.
(*b*) Relation of such boards to the district committee.
(*c*) Number of resident members able and willing to serve on the local boards of each tahsíl.
(*d*) The practicability of taking early steps in the direction of forming an elective body.
(*e*) The necessity of entertaining separate establishments.
(*f*) The necessity of separate offices and committee-rooms.

2. The points noticed in paras. 2 to 7 and in para. 9 of your letter have been discussed in the meeting of the district committee held on 17th July. The enclosed copy of the proceedings contains — arranged under the six heads noted in the margin—the views of the committee.

3. I was specially careful in the discussion of these points, and particularly of point (*d*), to abstain from leading the committee, and did my best to get at their real independent views. The conclusion arrived at as to the formation of an elective body, by the nomination of 25 electors in each tahsíl, was wholly the work of the Native members. I believe it to be a sensible conclusion, and well suited to present circumstances.

4. As the existing body of members can furnish only two resident members for each of the three tahsíls of Roorkee, Deoband, and Nakúr, I have consulted these members and other persons as to the most suitable persons to be appointed as additional members for the boards of these tahsíls. Their names will be submitted for approval as soon as it is known whether the tahsíl boards are to consist, as proposed, of four non-official members and of the tahsíldár.

4*a*. With reference to para. 3 of Government letter No. 160, dated 29th June, I have the honor to state that if tahsíl boards are established, it will neither be practicable nor in accordance with the general wishes of the community that Tahsíldárs should cease to be members of central and local boards. If there was a central board only, it would not be necessary for the Tahsíldárs to be members of it. By the 1868 rules they were not members of the district committees.

5. With reference to your para. 8, I am of opinion that it is quite impossible to place the Saháranpur district committee under a non-official chairman. The grounds of this opinion are as follows :—

6. The district is very unfortunately constituted for purposes of self-government, being exceptionally destitute of men of leading. Aristocracy is conspicuous by its absence. "As a rule, the soil is owned by the village communities ; the old assignees of the Government revenue and Talukdárs have disappeared. Besides the money-lenders, there are hardly any men of note amongst the proprietary body at present existing. As Mr. Wynne says, — 'The list begins and ends with Raja Raghubir Singh of Landhaura, the Messrs. Powell and Hamid-ullah Khan of Kailaspur.' "—(*Gazetteer*, page 193.)

Of these persons, the Rája is dead, and his successor is a minor. The Messrs. Powell are chiefly distinguished for their passion for litigation,—one brother against the other. The successor of Hamid-ulla Khan of Kailaspur, Muhammad Naim Khan, is a member of the committee.

7. This exceptional absence of natural leaders of the people is further illustrated by an analysis of the revenue-paying body. Of 33,115 proprietors, 32,496, or 98 per cent., pay less than Rs. 200 of revenue ; only five pay from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000 ; only four from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 25,000 ; only one from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 50,000 (Rs. 28,883). Only one, the Raja of Landhaura, pays as much as Rs. 28,883.

8. As a result of this and of other causes, the distance between the European officers and the people appears to me to be much greater than it is,—for instance, in Oudh, and the help to be at present got from the selected representatives of the people much less. The only class that is adequately represented is the money-lending class, whose range of ideas centres in their own money-bags, and does not comprise the wants of the rural population.

In fitness for self-government a district thus situated is generations behind the more fortunate tracts, where the Hindu *ráj* has survived the shock of Muhammadan conquest and the steady undermining force of British administration. In Rae Bareli one might advance along the lines sketched out by the Government of India to an extent that would be out of the question in Saháranpur.

9. Another point in which this district differentiates unfavourably from many others is the absence of a knowledge of English among the leading Natives. No non-official Native member of any of the committees, district or municipal, has this knowledge.

10. This fact alone is in my opinion an absolute bar to the appointment of a non-official member to the chairmanship of the district committee. The post, among other qualifications, requires a knowledge of English good enough to enable the chairman to master readily the stream of Resolutions that pours incessantly from the Secretariats, to communicate them accurately to the members, to refer rapidly to standing orders, to supervise the working in English of the ordinary and Public Works branches of the local funds office, to satisfy in English the constant demand for reports, explanations, and opinions.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

FURTHER Proceedings of the Saháranpur District Committee on 17th July 1882—General Department.

PRESENT :

A. H. Harington, Esq., President.
R. S. Whiteway, Esq., Secretary.
Munshi Narayan Singh, Tahsildar, Saháranpur.
Shaikh Ahmad Hasan, Tahsildar, Nakur.
Shaikh Najaf Ali, Tahsildar, Deoband.
Muhammad Hamid-u-Zaffar Khan, Tahsildar, Roorkee.

Hakim Muzaffar Husain
Lala Paras Das -
Shaikh Nihal Ahmad
Muhammad Naim Khan
Chaudhri Shib Sahai
Misr Bhagwan Singh
Abid Husain -
Rao Muhammad Ali Khan
Rao Sahib Singh
Qazi Fazl-ul-Rahman
Saiyad Zamin Ali
Muhammad Sadiq Husain

} Ordinary Members.

1. The president explained to the committee the orders conveyed in Government (Decentralisation) No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, regarding—

(*a*) Constitution of tahsíl boards :
(*b*) Relation of such boards to the district committee :
(*c*) Number of resident members able and willing to serve on the local boards of each tahsíl :
(*d*) The practicability of taking early steps in the direction of forming an elective body :
(*e*) The necessity of entertaining separate establishments :
(*f*) The necessity of separate offices and committee-rooms.

2. The following decisions were unanimously arrived at :—

3. (*a*)—*Constitution of tahsíl boards*—

Resolved, that each of the four tahsíl boards of this district should consist of the Tahsíldár and four non-official members ; and that the aggregate of these non-official members of the tahsíl boards should be the non-official members of the district committee.

4. (*b*)—*Relation of the tahsíl boards with the district committee*—

Resolved, that actual experiment and experience can alone decide the precise distribution of business and mode of disposing of it by the two committees which may be best. That, broadly, all *local* work, such as inspection and the making known of local wants, should be done by the tahsíl boards, who should report for the information and approval of the district committee.

That questions of leave of schoolmasters may be finally decided by the tahsíl boards. That the district committee should continue to meet once a month, and the tahsíl committee should also meet once a month : these meetings preceding those of the district committee.

5. (*c*)—*Number of resident members able and willing to serve on each tahsíl board*—

With the exception of Hakim Saiyid Muzaffar Husain, all the members present expressed their willingness to serve, if required, on the Local Boards of the tahsíl in which they reside (see margin). Hakim Saiyid Muzaffar Husain asked to be excused on the ground of want of leisure from the work of medical practice.

Tahsíl Saháranpur.
Lala Paras Das.
Muhammad Naim Khan.
Chaudhri Shib Sahai.
Shaikh Abid Husain.
Qazi Fazl-ul Rahman.
Lala Mittar Sain.

Tahsíl Roorkee.
Rao Muhammad Ali Khan.
Rao Sahib Singh.

Tahsíl Deoband
Shaikh Nihal Ahmad.
Misr Bhagwan Singh.

Tahsíl Nakur.
Saiyid Zamin Ali.
Muhammad Sadiq Husain.

6. (*d*)—*The practicability of taking early steps in the direction of forming an elective body*—

The committee (that is, the Native members, for the European members abstained from indicating an opinion) were at first inclined to confine the power of electing to vacancies to the members of the committee. Ultimately, after discussing and rejecting the plan sketched in paras. 6 and 7 of Commissioner's No. $\frac{10}{XXIII}$, dated 5th July, they unanimously resolved that in each tahsíl an elective body of 25 persons should be nominated by the District Officer in consultation with the Tahsíldar, to consist of the most trustworthy and respectable residents of the tahsíl, without any special property qualification.

Vacancies in a tahsíl board to be filled up by the votes of this elective body in it. The members of the district committee to be empowered to vote for the exclusion of a member so elected, the grounds of each vote for the exclusion being stated and recorded. A majority of such votes to exclude.

7. (*e*)—*The necessity of entertaining separate establishments*—

It was resolved that for the present it seemed undesirable and unnecessary to have separate establishments.

8. (*f*)—*The necessity of having separate offices and committee-rooms*—

Resolved, that for the present it seems unnecessary and undesirable to have separate offices and committee-rooms.

A. H. HARINGTON,
President.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{171}{XXIII.}$, dated the 31st July 1882.

From W. M. TIDY, Esquire, Magistrate and President, District Committee, Muzaffarnagar, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt your No. $\frac{10}{XXIII.}$ (Circular), dated 5th July, and No. $\frac{13}{XXIII.}$ (Circular), dated 10th July, calling attention to Government Nos. 145, dated 21st June, and 160, dated 29th June, on the subject of Local Committees; and to state that the points now under consideration were discussed at the last meeting of the district committee, and that I have also asked several Native gentlemen of the district to favour me with their opinions.

2. The first question is as to the best way of carrying out the orders of the Government of India, which has decided that, in every district of these provinces, there shall be Local Boards conterminous with tahsíls.

3. The unanimous opinion both of the district committee and of the Native gentlemen (official and non-official) whom I have consulted, is that the preferable (not to say the only practicable) plan is that suggested by the Local Government in the following words:—"The district board shall include members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board." They also approve of the second suggestion that a member of the district committee at head-quarters should hold charge of a department in correspondence with the tahsili board. As I observe that you concur in this view of the matter, I pass on to other points.

4. At present there are ten non-official members of the district committee, but the Muzaffarnagar (sudder) tahsíl is much more fully represented than the other sub-divisions, as the following statement will show. I should perhaps add that when speaking of a member representing a particular sub-division, I mean that his property lies either entirely or mainly in that sub-division:—

(1) *Muzaffarnagar (sudder) tahsíl.*

The Nawáb of Karnál.
Lala Ganeshi Lal.
Lala Udai Ram.
Lala Nihal Chand.
Chaudhri Ghasi Ram.

(2) *Jánsath tahsíl.*

Husain Ali Khan.
Rae Sukh Lal.

(3) *Burhana tahsíl.*

Rao Amar Singh.
Niamat Ilahi Khan.

(4) *Shámli tahsíl*

Ganeshi Lal.

5. The matter having been fully discussed at the meeting of the district committee, it was resolved that the names of the following gentlemen should be submitted to Government for appointment as members of the tahsíl and district committees:—

(1) *Muzaffarnagar.*

The Nawáb of Karnál.
Lala Ganeshi Lal.
Lala Udai Ram.
Lala Nihal Chand.
Chaudhri Ghasi Ram.

(2) *Jánsath.*

Husain Ali Khan.
Rae Sukh Lal.
Nisar Ali, of Sambalhera.
Mír Wilaiyat Ali, of Jánsath.
Fatteh Singh, of Talra.

(3) *Burhana.*

Rao Amar Singh.
Niamat Ilahi Khan.
Baijnath, of Kándhla.
Muhammad Ismail, of Kándhla.
Jawala Singh, of Baral

(4) *Shámli.*

Ganeshi Lal, of Kairána.
Imam Ali Khan, of Garhi.
Lala Sarup Lal, of Jhanjhána.
Muhammad Sultan, of Raipur.
Saiyid Muhammad, of Bidauli.

6. Now that it has been decided that there are to be sub-divisional committees, I do not see how it is possible to maintain the proportion (two-thirds to one-third) of non-official to official members suggested by the Government of India. In the local committees it is clearly out of the question in sub-divisions like Jánsath and Burhana, for the Tahsíldár is really the only official whose social standing is sufficiently high. In Shámli and Muzaffarnagar the Munsifs, if willing to serve on the committees, might be added.

7. It may perhaps be thought that the number of members nominated is too large. Some allowance, however, must be made for the contingency that the attendance of some of the members is likely to be infrequent.

8. All the Native gentlemen in this district whose opinion I have asked agree that the time has not yet come for the introduction of any system of election; and seeing as I do how little the privilege is valued in municipalities, I agree with them.

9. It is possible, however, that this view of the matter may not commend itself to Government; and it is true, as your remarks suggest, that election by the votes of communities is by no means an unheard of novelty in the villages of these provinces. Settlement Officers may have introduced their phrases—"*kasrat rai* and *kasrat hakiyat*," but every village proprietor knows now what they mean, and the contests for lambardárships are often keen and prolonged.

10. On my explaining the purport of para. 7 of your No. $\frac{10}{XXIII.}$, and remarking that the Government of India appeared to lay great stress on the introduction, as soon as practicable, of a system of electing members of district and local committees, it was proposed that the franchise (if I may so call it) should be conferred on (1) lambardars having landed property of their own paying an annual revenue of not less than Rs. 200 per annum, (2) traders paying not less than Rs. 75 per annum under the License Tax Act.

11. The qualifications for membership would, of course, be of the same kind but higher in degree.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

12. With regard to the still more difficult questions as to the advisability of placing the district committee under a non-official chairman, and of excluding Tahsíldárs from central and tahsíl local boards, or, in other words, of leaving the local committees free from official control, I must state, in the first place, that all the members expressed themselves as altogether opposed to any such change. It is difficult, however, to say how far the opinions thus expressed are the result of a wise conservatism, or how far they may have originated in a feeling of deference to the District Officer seeking to elicit their views, and a fear that the expression of any other opinion might be displeasing to him.

13. Speaking as a District Officer, I would say that I should be glad to be relieved of the duties which as president of district and municipal committees I am obliged to perform. I should have so much more time at my disposal for work of no less importance which at present has too often to be done in a perfunctory manner. One question, however, cannot but suggest itself—"If the committee breaks down, or if the members quarrel among themselves, or if the people rebel against their authority, shall I still be held answerable?" If so, I think I shall have a right to object that I have been deprived of my power without being relieved of my responsibility.

14. A Native gentleman to whom I was talking on this subject put the matter thus—"It is better that a European officer should be president. The Natives of the country do not believe in our impartiality, and living as we do among our own people, and influenced as we are by their opinions, it is difficult for us to be impartial, when the question is between a man of our caste or creed and another who is not."

15. My own opinion is that it would be better, at any rate in districts like Muzaffarnagar, that for the present the District Officer should continue to hold the office of president. My reasons are as follows:—

(1) It is desirable that the chairman of the committee should have a practical knowledge of office work. I very much doubt whether any of the non-official members of the committee possess such knowledge.

(2) It is desirable that the chairman should know English. I only know one of the non-official members who is acquainted with English, and I do not at all know whether he would desire the post, or whether, if willing to accept it, he would be elected.

(3) I fear from what I have seen, that in the absence of a European officer as chairman, somewhat unseemly altercations might arise. I had to interfere once or twice at the last meeting, and I specially noticed that one effect of recent orders has been to divide the committee into official and non-official parties. A suggestion of a member of the committee that a certain branch of work might be made over to the Tahsildars was at once resented by those officials as a body, on the ground that they were in no way subordinate to the committee of which they were members.

(4) In many districts, Muzaffarnagar among them, the District Engineer is a European, and for some years this will no doubt frequently be the case. Difficulties will be certain to arise; but in most instances, a little tact on the part of the president (if a European officer) will be sufficient to remove them. If the president be a non-official member of the committee, one of two things will probably happen: either the District Engineer will become master of the situation, or the committee-room will be the scene of unedifying disputes.

16. I might write more on this subject, but I think that I have said enough. I only wish to add, with respect to the third and fourth reasons which I have given, that as yet there have only been two meetings of the district committee; but that what occurred at these, and notably what happened at the second, was sufficient to satisfy me that the time has not yet come for leaving the committee altogether free from official control; and that the success of the system of local self-administration would be endangered by the experiment.

17. To a certain extent these remarks apply to the removal of the Tahsildars from the sub-divisional boards. There can be no doubt that at present the Tahsildars have far too much to do; and one result of this is that they are compelled to make over to subordinates work which they should do themselves. So far then it is a wise policy to relieve them of duties which can be performed by other persons. This, however, is only one side of the question, and it is not, I imagine, the side at which the Tahsildars would look. They would certainly consider that an important part of district administration was being taken altogether out of their hands, and that their authority in their sub-divisions was being lessened thereby. The people, too, I think, would look at it in the same light; and regarding the matter from the point of view of a District Officer, I venture to express the opinion that it would be unwise to weaken the influence of an official on whom, under our present system, so much depends. Nor is this all. A sub-divisional committee, consisting of four or five non-official members only, would be all but powerless. With the assistance of the Tahsildar, they might do much: without it, it is almost certain that they could do nothing. I think then that the committee is right, and that for the present at any rate, the Tahsildar should be *ex-officio* a member of the sub-divisional committees. When district and tahsili committees have got into working order, and have come to be recognised by the people as a part of the administrative system, it is probable that they will be able to dispense with the assistance of Government officials. That time has not yet come.

No. $\frac{161G.}{XXII.}$, dated the 28th July 1882.

From F. N. WRIGHT, Esquire, Magistrate of Meerut, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to Government No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, and your No. $\frac{10}{XXIII.}$, I have the honor to report as follows:—

2. I have in obedience to the instructions of Government, constantly been in consultation, since the receipt of orders, with the leading members of Native society; and on the 18th July I called a public meeting of the same, which was very largely attended. I then endeavoured to bring before the minds of my audience, as far as shape appears to have been given to them, the wishes of the Government of

India, and to elicit their views on the several points which are more particularly noted in your letter under reply. But the time had been too short, between the receipt of your instructions and the necessity for report, for the ideas involved in the Government scheme to thoroughly soak down into the minds of my hearers and produce a crop of suggestions. Had the Government Resolutions been translated, and hundreds of copies distributed (amongst others to the Native newspapers), some thoughts might have been bestowed upon them ; but there are no funds for a District Officer to draw upon for such a purpose, and the office is too heavily worked for me to do more than send out some few copies to each tahsil.

3. The speeches made at the public meeting contained therefore little but generalities ; but I have since received in writing the opinions of several leading members of Native society, to which I will refer in their proper order in the following report, and one of which I submit herewith.

4. The first point to which you invite my attention is the constitution of the local or tahsíli boards, and their relations with the district committee. The opinions of a large number of influential Natives, and the one in which I mostly agree, has been given in favor of local committees of five members, all of whom should be members of the district committee; the sudder tahsil should have 15 representatives, so that in this district we should have 40 members in all : two-thirds of the members to be non-official, one-third official. The Tahsíldár would be the only official member of the local committees, even if his retention were considered advisable (but no one has had the courage to suggest he should not be retained). We have six Tahsíldárs, and there should then be seven other official members. At present we have five *ex-officio* and four "official but not *ex-officio*" members. I do not think the committee could dispense with the services of any one of these gentlemen as at present constituted ; but it is open to question whether it is necessary for either the Executive Engineer, the Inspector of Schools, or the Civil Surgeon to be a member of a committee of which it would seem that eventually even the Magistrate is not to be a member, when in the two former cases the officers will very rarely be present at the committee meetings ; and any suggestions they may have to make would come with far greater weight, and be received and considered with greater attention, when given from their independent professional standpoint, rather than as only one member of a large committee. By the removal of their names we reduce the official element in the committee to the proportions required by the proposed members.

5. But I do not hesitate to say that in my opinion no half-measures should be adopted : if the Natives of India are to learn to govern for themselves (I by no means say they are ready to do so yet), they must be freed from all official interference from within. If the Magistrate is not to be chairman and the directing and instructing influence of the committee, he has no place on it, *á fortiori* his senior assistant is even more out of place. Therefore the only legitimate conclusion is to have entirely non-official committees, with the exception of such "official but not *ex-officio* members" as may be elected, by whatever form of election is decided upon hereafter. The entirely non-official committee would elect its chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary from amongst its own members in the ordinary way.

6. But so far as public opinion has got in this district, it is not in favour of an absolutely non-official committee. Opinions may differ as to the number of members to be on the local committees and the district committee: some advocate not less than seven and not more than nine (but have not said what if any members of the local committee) should be members of the district committee; but no one has yet gone so far as to say that the Tahsíldár shall not be a member, and indeed the guiding spirit of the local board, and the Magistrate of the district board. Whether this hesitation at freeing themselves from the shackles of official control arises on the part of the Natives of this district from a consciousness of their own inability to work without it ; from a preference to having things done for them, done well, and without trouble, instead of doing them for themselves at considerable personal inconvenience and unwonted self-sacrifice, with very inefficient results ; or from a still inherent fear of displeasing the officers who are in their opinion so powerful for good and ill,—it is difficult to say. I have not been in this district many months, but I have during that time been in constant intercourse with leading Natives, and indeed every one who came to see me; and I am able to say that there are not half a dozen, if there are indeed two men in it, who I could depend upon to manage public affairs in accordance with the principles which our English Government has been endeavouring to inculcate for the past 50 years. A supply will be forthcoming no doubt in time to meet the demand, but it does not exist. The intelligence of the district is centred in the heads of certain leading banking firms and a large body of legal practitioners. If it is intended to hand over the local affairs of the country to the Government of a body composed of such members, I do not consider the result will be satisfactory, nor is it one that recommends itself to Native opinion, as I will show later on.

7. The constitution proposed for this district at present, then is as follows :—

(*a*) Local Boards for each mufassil tahsíl, consisting of five members each, one of whom shall be the Tahsíldar, who shall be secretary, the members choosing from amongst the other members a chairman.

(It is a question whether Local Boards should not be appointed for smaller areas than a tahsíl, *e.g.*, it might be right to have two committees in pargana Bághpat which stretches some 32 miles from north to south.)

(*b*) The board of the head-quarters tahsíl to consist of 15 members, of which five shall be *ex-officio* or "official but not *ex-officio*." There must be ten non-official members to maintain the proper proportion to official members, who cannot be less in the head-quarters.

(*c*) The district committee to comprise all the members of the Local Boards and the head-quarters board. The Magistrate being president, and the chairmen of the several local boards *ex-officio* vice-presidents of the district committee, and acting in that capacity at each meeting in rotation. The district committee would elect its own secretary.

(*d*) Sub-committees would be appointed from the members of the head-quarters board (who by virtue of the above arrangements are also members of the district committee) for the consideration and control of the several matters now entrusted to Local Government—Education, Sanitation, Dispensaries, and Public Works, of which the member particularly

connected with that branch would be a member necessarily, *e.g.*, of the educational branch, the Inspector of Schools, &c., if it is considered desirable to retain them as members of the committee at all.

(*e*) These sub-committees would correspond with the local boards through one of their members.

(*f*) These sub-committees I would in time have consist of non-official members only. By these means alone would Native members learn the duties and responsibilities of self-government.

(*g*) These sub-committees would report to the district committee the work of the month at the monthly meetings. But further rules for the transaction of business would be drawn up by the district committee, as now done in the case of municipalities.

(*h*) The local boards would meet weekly and transact local business, reporting to the district committee, through their secretary, to the several sub-committees connected with each head of administration.

(*i*) The budget for the local areas would be drawn up by the local boards and submitted in time to the district committee, which after consideration would forward them to the proper authorities: and on receipt of sanction distribute the funds in such proportions as might be determined upon.

[At present this preparation of budget and distribution of allotments is not called for, the whole financial portion of the scheme of local self-government being limited by such Procustean rules, that there is absolutely no scope for the exercise of individual judgment. It is presumed that these restrictions will be gradually removed, and greater if not entire freedom given to the local boards to raise and expend their income.]

8. The non-official element of the existing committee consists of 12 members, of whom six are practically head-quarters members. Of these the appointment of two seems to me to have been unnecessary, namely, Gulab Sinha Simlawala and Nanak Chand, vakil: they are not men of large property or special intelligence, and in no way to be considered representative men. The remaining members are distributed as follows over the several tahsíls:—

Gháziabad - - - -	Hira Lal.
Sardhana - - - -	Saiyid Ahmad Shah.
Bághpat - - - -	Jawahir Singh.
Mawána - - - -	Kunwar Nihal Singh.
Hapur - - - -	Muhammad Ahsan. Chaudhri Debi Singh. Abdul Karim Khan Sahib.

The appointments of additional members to constitute the local boards, as proposed, is called for. In Sardhana alone would there appear to be any difficulty in obtaining Native gentlemen of the proper stamp to act, as the tahsíl contains an unusual proportion of *bhaíáchára* villages. I have no doubt the difficulty would be got over; but I am obliged to repeat that, so far, I have not come across 20 men from the district who are yet fit to manage public affairs, as we have been taught to think they should be managed: the intelligence of the district is centred in Meerut, and in its banking, trading, and professional classes, and is not found in any conspicuous degree amongst the landed proprietary. Nor does the agitation for local self-government (if indeed any exists) come from the latter body of men, but rather (as experience shows to have been equally the case in all European countries) from the professional and particularly the legal classes; and these, as I have said before, are not the kind of persons to which I imagine Government intends to hand over the administration of local affairs.

9. I now proceed to the question of election of members of local boards: and on this I am not able to say I have obtained much assistance from those whom I have consulted as noted above. All are agreed that the members should be men of good family and intelligent; some say that these qualifications secured, wealth should not be made a test of fitness: notably, Ahmad-ullah Khan, the vice-chairman of the municipal committee and a member of the district committee, and one of the very few gentlemen of independence and intelligence to be found in the district, but not properly speaking wealthy, and who would therefore be probably excluded by any test of income. Others suggest that bodily health and proficiency in riding should be necessary qualifications. Few, if any, thoroughly grasp or approve the adoption of an elective system, preferring, at least for the present, a system of nomination, which they probably suppose affords them a better chance of appointment, when it depends on the good opinion of one man, the District Officer, rather than on the unintelligent or biassed votes of an illiterate proprietary.

10. Judging by the experience of election by voting for municipal committees as at present exercised, the prospect is not encouraging, though no doubt the people could be educated to adopt and appreciate this system of selection by degrees. Meanwhile, the only suggestions made are—by some that the qualifications for a vote shall be personal payment of Rs. 300 a year Government revenue or Rs. 10 license tax; by others, that it shall go as low as Rs. 50, to include the large pattidárí proprietary bodies. I am myself so little inclined to believe the system of election adapted to the present stage of Native civilization, or at least to the conditions of the Meerut district as far as I know them, that I hesitate to propose any scheme which must be purely hypothetical; whilst I am prepared to do my best to ensure the success of any to which I may be ordered to give a trial.

11. As regards the question of whether the committee should be presided over by an official or a non-official chairman, referred to in the 8th para. of your letter under reply, I am of opinion that for the present at least the president of the district committee should be the Magistrate of the district. In the first place, the people of this district are not ready for, even if desirous of, managing such affairs as it seems are to be mede over to them. They admit so themselves. If the proposed duties are handed over to them bodily, without any period of transition, they will be absolutely unable to carry on business from ignorance of details—both of receipts, establishment, and other charges—and want of authority. They would not know how to set about repairing roads, extending schools, and building dispensaries. Of course they will in time, and possibly a very short time. As in the case of the Meerut municipality, it is for the Magistrate to instruct (as I am instructing) the members in their duties and responsibilities.

But left to themselves for the present, work would come to a standstill (as the sanitation of the city threatened to); with the Magistrate of the district at the head of the committee to advise, direct, and suggest, work will go on with the marvellous regularity which is a feature of English rule. In the Magistrate is centred the experience (not necessarily self-acquired, but inherited by him from his predecessors) and the authority of the district as the representative of the prestige of the English Government. With a good Magistrate at the head of affairs, every branch of the administration is worked at the highest standard of efficiency: with a Magistrate inexperienced and lacking authority at the head of affairs, discipline becomes lax, useful projects stop or are not originated, the good work of a long series of efficient officers is rendered valueless. Still more so would it be with a district committee unguided by such a president as shall contain in himself the experience and authority absolutely necessary to ensure all branches of local administration being worked with homogeneity of purpose and a general broad view of affairs undisturbed by private or personal interest. It is of course open to the Government of India to argue that this view is dictated by the official instincts from which the Magistrate cannot dissociate himself. But I would submit that no officer of Government can conscientiously commit himself to an opinion which he believes will involve most unfortunate results. If the Magistrate is to be absolutely relieved of all responsibility, well and good; he will be saved a great deal of work: but if he is to guide, direct, advise, and finally be held responsible to Government (as he undoubtedly will be) for the results of the new system, he must be placed in such a position as to ensure his being able to exercise an efficient control. In my opinion that will be best obtained by retaining him as president, by associating him with the committee as one of its members, rather than placing him outside of it, to criticise and probably interfere. I believe there is less chance of friction between the members of a district committee and Magistrate when he is a member himself, than under circumstances when the committee wish to assert the *quasi*-independence now proposed to give them, and the Magistrate exercises the right—which must be given him if he is to be in any way responsible for the administration of his district—of vetoing the proposals of the committee. This power of veto would necessarily be sparingly used, and any occasion of its use must be immediately reported, with reasons in full; but the power must be there, or the Magistrate will lose prestige and degenerate into a mere post-office between the committee and Government.

12. There remains the question of the funds to be placed at the disposal of the local boards for the purposes indicated in the Government Resolution. The original 10 per cent. cess forms the basis of the credit on which the local boards will be allowed to draw for those objects for which it was originally raised. In nearly every district it has been shown to be insufficient to meet all the expenditure that it has been considered proper to debit to it. The existing establishment, and the necessary charges, the repairs and maintenance in fact, exhaust the credit of the local boards. It is not probable that economy in those heads will be favourably considered by Government, especially as the tendency has of late years been directed towards reducing establishment to the lowest standard consistent with efficiency, and there is little if any room left for further reductions: whilst in the case of schoolmasters an increase of pay is by many looked upon as the only possible means of securing such a class of teachers as shall make primary education more popular and affective then it is now. To what sources of income then are local boards to look to supplement the deficiencies of the 10 per cent. cess, and afford means for further expansion of operations? All are in favour of the license-tax being handed over to the local boards, both its assessment and expenditure.

13. It is possible that with the greater accuracy in assessment, which may be expected when it is made by persons really cognisant with the circumstances of the assessed, the license-tax may be raised on a more extended basis and again applied to a lower standard of income, the objections to which course, *viz.*, the inequality of assessment and the oppression in collection, would now be removed. I know of no more desirable arrangement than that of making over the license-tax to the local boards.

14. The receipts from pounds are small, but may fairly form part of the income of the local boards: those also from ferries and encamping-grounds and surplus receipts from fairs outside municipal boundaries. In all these careful supervision, based on personal interest, might secure an increased income.

15. A proposal has been made to hand over the surplus receipts from registration fees and from the sale of non-judicial stamps, on the ground that they are not properly debitable with charges for law and justice, and possess somewhat of a local character, which they share with the license-tax. A proposal to credit receipts from arms and other licenses need not be seriously considered, as in any case they are very trifling.

16. The approximate income from all these sources would be as follows for this district:

	Rs.
Ten per cent. cess, as per column IV., Statement I., of Government Resolution No. 36, dated 13th April 1882	1,84,130
License-tax	68,500
Pounds	1,660
Ferries	21,100
Registration fees	8,700
Sale of non-judicial stamps	39,500
Total	3,23,590

The sanctioned budget expenditure of the present year is as follows:—

	Rs.
Public Works	77,790
Education	31,820
Village watchmen	82,800
Dispensaries and vaccination	12,340
Total	2,04,750

Leaving, therefore, a balance of Rs. 1,08,840 at the actual disposal of the district committee, to be distributed proportionately between the local boards according to their requirements, as decided upon after full consideration of the case by the full district committee.

17. Questions of establishment and committee-rooms are of such minor importance compared with the serious problem that is before us for solution, that I hesitate to prolong this already too long report for their discussion. Such a scheme as that it is now proposed to initiate, and which is to replace the centralised administration of the District Magistrate, cannot start into being like Minerva from Jove's head, fully armed and prepared for action: it must grow gradually, be fostered carefully, be watched, corrected, and improved: and it will be fully five years—even with a Magistrate fully determined to carry out the policy of Government, and yet save the administration from coming to a dead-lock during the transition stage—before the scheme of local self-government will be fully launched and able to weather the storms of conflicting interest, as well when commanded and manned by Natives only, as when its helm is in the hand of one strong energetic District Officer, firm of purpose, and by the very fact of his official position isolated from all the private and personal jealousies which may go near to shipwreck committees and boards composed of a heterogeneous body of men, new to the duties they have to undertake, and without, possibly, the public spirit to supply the place of the conscientious performance of work for duty's sake which actuates the Magistrate of a district.

Memorandum of Suggestions.

EVERY tahsíl must have a separate local board; and wherever the annual income and the area are large enough to admit of the formation of more than one board, the matter is different.

2. The broad principle must be borne in mind that the area of the jurisdiction of a board should not be too unwieldy, so that the members cannot satisfactorily manage the affairs thereof. For instance, I would propose two local boards for the Bághpat tahsíl, one at Bághpat and the other at Kutána. For the above-said reasons and all the local circumstances taken into consideration, one local board would not do for the Bághpat tahsíl.

3. Towns, as it is all over the world, cannot boast of so many enlightened men as are found in cities. We cannot expect that towns and cities advance equally in civilization: wherefore it becomes desirable that every tahsíli board should be subordinate to the one established at the head-quarters of a district. Tahsíl or pargana boards will have to work under the supervision and direction of the district board, which will frame rules for their guidance; of course every pargana or tahsíl will annually submit a budget to the district board for sanction.

4. The pargana board will be held disqualified to undertake Public Works involving an expenditure above Rs. 100. The district committee will have an unlimited control over the disposal of the district provincial funds: pargana or tahsíl boards will have a complete independence in choosing their president, vice-president, and secretary: no undue influence in such small petty matters from the head-quarters will fetter the hands of a pargana board: in certain cases the district committee will interfere if improper persons are selected as president, &c.

Members will be elected by votes, and the blessings of an elective franchise will be in full swing as far as the election of the members is concerned: voters shall be those personages who pay annually Rs. 50 to Government as land-revenue, or those who pay Rs. 10 as license tax per annum. A little acquaintance with the people of the district will convince any sensible man that, with a few exceptions, the land tenure of this district is composed of peasant proprietors, technically called *bhaiáchara*. India in general (I can assert without the fear of contradiction) is a poor country; and even in England and in other European countries the voters are of no better standard than what I have proposed for them.

5. A tahsíl or a pargana board will send their proceedings periodically to the district board, in accordance with the rules which will be framed for their guidance. I am perfectly against the interference of a member in an arbitrary way. No member of the district board will exercise any influence or control the proceedings of the pargana board without the constitutional consultation of the district board.

6. Efficient men certainly should be elected as members, but the word "efficiency" should not only mean opulence. Riches and ignorance go hand in hand in this country, though there are a few honorable exceptions to the general rule. Every member should be literate, experienced, intelligent, and able to understand completely his own duties and responsibilities which the Government and the country expect him to do. It is very reasonable and desirable that the district authorities should interfere in case a good-for-nothing member is elected, otherwise the good intentions of His Excellency the Viceroy will be attended with disastrous results: hence great care should be taken in the selection of members: the time is fast approaching when we will have to trust completely the voters in this country. At the same time I am confident that it is not very difficult to select fourteen non-official members out of 13 lakhs of souls inhabiting the district of Meerut. The number of members for the district board should not exceed 21, and the local board for parganas will be composed of nine members.

7. I do not consider it worth while that a man who is otherwise eminently qualified for the membership of a board should be held disqualified merely because he does not pay Rs. 2,000 as Government revenue, for in the district there is a considerable class of men who do not possess such large landed estates, still they are an ornament to the society, and yield in no way to the best enlightened people we can think of: zamíndars paying Rs. 10,000 or Rs. 12,000 or even more as Government revenue can never be compared to those able men. Unfortunately in this country riches and abilities are not inseparable companions; but on the other hand ignorance and opulence are invariably very intimate friends; therefore the test of being a large landholder is no recommendation whatever.

The eighty year's English rule of the North-Western Provinces has created a large class of men whose knowledge of politics and their general qualification are such as to enable them to form opinions which will be respected by all, and carry weight in the eyes of our rulers; therefore it does not

stand to reasons that local boards should be deprived of the wise counsels of the educated class above referred to.

8. At present every town and city is not in a position to lay out money in the erection of a town hall: it appears desirable to rent suitable houses; but economy and decency should be our guiding principles when hiring places for the accommodation of the offices of the local boards. Certainly the calling of the meetings in Government buildings is objectionable for very many reasons.

9. His Excellency the Viceroy's Resolution on self-government, with appropriate comments and illustrations, be translated into Urdu, and distributed gratis to the public at large throughout the district, for nothing save the publicity of the above referred to Resolution will facilitate the selection of the members and carrying out Government intentions successfully. The vernacular papers might with advantage be asked to co-operate.

Meerut, the 18th July 1882. AHMAD-ULLAH KHAN.

No. 85, dated Bulandshahr, the 11th July 1882.

From F. S. GROWSE, Esquire, C.I.E., Magistrate of Bulandshahr, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to G. O. No. 145 of the 21st June, and in reply to your Circular No. $\frac{10}{XXIII.}$ of the 5th July, I have the honor to state as follows:—

1. It is in every way preferable, if tahsíli boards are established, that they should together constitute the district committee. They would severally consist of all such members of the larger body as reside within the limits of the particular tahsíli, and they would have the Tahsíldar for their secretary.

2. The committee for this district, as notified on the 11th May, consists of only ten non-official members. In order to secure a sub-committee of six for each tahsíli, it will be necessary to increase the number to 24, and I would submit the names of the following gentlemen as likely to be generally acceptable. Those marked with an asterisk are the present members:—

Anúpshar tahsíl.	*Khurja tahsíl.*
*Muhammad Ali Khau, of Janángirabad.	*Raja Bakar Ali Khan, of Pandrawal.
*Kunwar Abdul Ghafur, of Dharmpur.	*Kunwar Azam Ali Khan, of Khúrja.
Kunwar Tara Singh, of Jahángirabad.	*Kunwar Faiyaz Ali Khan, of Pahasu.
Kunwar Mashuk Ali Khan, of Danpur.	*Kunwar Abdul Ali Khan, of Chatári.
Sayyid Muhammad Khan, of Daulatpur.	Chaudhri Har Sahai, of Jewar.
Pir-ji Muhabbat Ali, of Kadri Bagh.	Lala Ram Dayal, of Thora.
Bulandshahr tahsíl.	*Sikandarabad tahsíl.*
*Munshi Mehrban Ali, of Gulaothi.	*Munshi Lachhman Sarup, of Sikandarabad.
*Rao Umrao Singh, of Kuchesar.	Abdul Karim Khan, of Kanarsi.
*Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh, of Chaprawat.	Kesri Singh, of Dhum.
Sayyid Hasan Shah, of Bulandshahr.	Ghulam Haider Khan, of Chanderu.
Chaudhri Lachman Singh, of Shikárpur.	Ismail Khan, of Jhajhar.
Saiyid Jiwan Ali, of Aurangabad.	Munshi Harideo Sahai, of Sikandarabad.

3. A committee, constituted as above, would be unexceptionable; but as it exhausts all the leading people in the district, it would either have to be permanent, or could only be succeeded by a body of much less weight and capacity, and yet a sub-committee could scarcely consist of fewer than six members, and thus arises a difficulty.

4. Again, if each sub-committee meets at its own tahsíli town, it must have a separate chairman. But personal and family jealousies run so high, that in three out of the four tahsíls the members would probably each vote for himself, and decline to assemble on the summons of any one of their own number. I have spoken to most of the leading people in the district, and this is what they have all most distinctly given me to understand. In the Sikandarabad tahsíl the circumstances are different, and I imagine that none of the other five members of that sub-committee would object to work together with Munshi Lachman Sarup as their chairman. He is the only Honorary Magistrate in that neighbourhood, and altogether the person of highest consideration. But even here the objection remains that the arrangement, once made, would have to be permanent, there being no other possible chairman.

5. By means of a property qualification it would be still possible, even without the co-operation of the *Raises*, to make up a committee for each tahsíli, the members of which would be of respectable character and position, but taken from rather a low social level, where the title of Rai Bahadur or Khan Bahadur would act as an attraction, and such committees might be subordinated to the district committee, which would then consist, as hitherto, solely of *Raises*. But such an arrangement would greatly complicate procedure; the real power would also rest in the lower boards, who would have all the management of details, and the control of the upper house would be little more than nominal.

6. Sufficient attention, as it seems to me, has not been paid to the very low standard of education among the independent middle classes. An inquiry such as the present reveals the fatal defect of our school system. Government schools, from the lowest to the highest, are attended only by those boys whose parents hope to secure for them some Government employment. What primary education is imparted is incomplete in itself, and is regarded only as a preparation for higher studies, not as a possible end in itself. Little or no thought is given to the few practical requirements of the agricultural labourer, the artisan, the shopkeeper, and all the respectable independent middle classes, which latter are the proper element out of which to form good working municipal committees, or such tahsíli committees as I have contemplated in the preceding para. About one half of the municipal members, even in this Muhammadanised district, can read and write only in the real vernacular charater of the country, *i.e.*, in Nágri, and therefore are quite unable to follow and check complicated accounts which are kept in English and Persian. The result is that if the committees are no longer to be directed by the District Officer and the Tahsíldar, they will be almost absolutely at the mercy of their paid clerk.

7. * * * * * * * *

8. The Resolutions of the Local Government were issued so rapidly, that probably there was no time to consider my special proposals for this district. I still adhere to those views, and am convinced that they are best calculated to satisfy local requirements. They are as follows :—

9. This district being bounded on the west by the Jumna, and on the east by the Ganges, is very compact and self-contained, and is further divided into two almost equal halves by the Kalinder river. I would therefore have only two sub-committees, the one for the Jumna, and the other for the Ganges side, each to consist of eight non-official members. The divisions and tahsíls are purely artificial, and great inconvenience, especially as regards the construction and maintenance of roads, would be occasioned by placing each tahsíli under a separate committee. The river, on the other hand, forms a natural boundary, more especially as at present it is crossed only by one permanent bridge. This is at the town of Bulandshahr, which is almost exactly in the centre of the district; and thus the Bulandshahr town hall, when completed, would form the natural and most convenient place of meeting for both committees. It would be far more convenient for the members than any of the outlying tahsílis, for almost everyone of the *Raises*, in addition to his country residence, has a town house in Bulandshahr, where he comes and stays occasionally for a few days at a time.

10. Each sub-committee would meet as a rule once a month : the one on the third Monday, the other on the third Tuesday, The full committee of both branches combined would not as a rule assemble more frequently than three times a year, to prepare—(1stly) the budget, (2ndly) the annual report, and (3rdly) to nominate new members. But it might be called at any other time, whenever there was business to bring forward affecting the whole district, or for ceremonial purposes, such as the reception of a distinguished visitor.

11. The official members would be seven in number, *viz.*, the Collector, president; the Deputy-Collector, Secretary; the Civil Surgeon, as a referee on dispensary questions; and the four Tasíldars. I do not include the Assistant Collector, because in this district he seldom stays long enough to acquire much local knowledge (there has been a succession of eight during the four years of my Collectorate), nor the Executive Engineer, nor the Inspector of Schools, because neither of these officers is ever in the district for more than a few days in the course of the year.

12. The 16 non-official members would on approval by Government be gazetted, four from each side for three and the remaining eight for two years. Towards the close of the second year there would be a full meeting to nominate eight persons to take the places of the outgoing members, who would not be eligible for immediate re-election, but would be so at the end of the third year, when the other eight of the original members went out of office. In this way after three years the committee would become strictly elective, but would also have a character of permanency, and at the same time enjoy all the prestige arising from Government appointment.

13. The scheme, as above sketched, would secure the cordial adhesion of the upper classes, would work easily, would be a great advance on any previous attempt in the same direction, and would give non-official members more independence than they would really have under the Government system. As the leaders of Native society object to serve on tahsíli committees, their places would have to be supplied by men drawn from lower class, who, in consequence of their defective education, would, if left to themselves, be either unable to carry on the work at all, or would be entirely under the influence of their office clerk. If, to prevent these evils, the Tahsíldar were given them as secretary, then the entire direction of affairs would fall into his hands. He again would take his instructions from the Collector, and thus the latter officer, though less seen in open action, would virtually rule more despotically than he could as chairman of a large and influential committee.

14. Having thus expressed my ideas with regard to the constitution of the committee, I venture now to offer some suggestions as to its sources of income and its powers of administration.

15. As will be seen from the detailed statement appended to my report of the proceedings of the first meeting of the new committee, held on the 3rd July, the sum at disposal during the current year is as much as Rs. 62,724. But it consists almost entirely of fixed allotments, a most unsatisfactory style of income, which gives no reward to success, and therefore supplies no stimulus to exertion.

16. I would therefore substitute for these allotments certain definite sources of income, over which the committee would have full control, and which it would be to their immediate advantage to develope : such are :—

	Rs.
(1) The road cess - - - - - -	12,877
(2) Clipping and fellings of roadside avenues - -	2,500
(3) Bridges and ferries - - - - -	11,130
(4) Extra municipal sárais - - - - -	291
(5) Ditto pounds - - - - -	2,318
(6) Ditto nazúl property - - - -	788
(7) Dâk bungalow - - - - -	100
(8) Sudder dispensary—endowment and subscriptions -	3,477
(9) Zila school—endowment and subscriptions - -	1,954
(10) Halkabandi school cess - - - - -	12,877
Total -	48,322

To the above might be added, if the Government so willed, the proceeds of the license-tax Rs. 48,860, making a total of Rs. 97,182, which would cover all charges as at present contemplated, and leave Rs. 34,458 over for original works, for which no provision has as yet been made.

17. I should however be quite satisfied with the smaller sum, *viz.*, Rs. 48,322, if the committee were relieved of the first class metalled roads the allotment for which is Rs. 19,752. There would then be a balance of Rs. 5,350 for major original works, after expending Rs. 42,927 under the different sanctioned heads.

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

18. By existing arrangements the first class roads are only nominally under the committee. They are maintained and repaired, according to regular departmental rules, by the District Engineer, and his work is supervised by his immediate official superior, the Executive Engineer. Beyond the formal signing of bills, there is no room left for any committee action. If relieved of these roads, the committee might fairly claim to be altogether free of the Department Public Works, neither employing its Engineers nor contributing to their payment. If good work is all that is required, and not a display on paper of estimates and designs elaborated with the highest technical finish, then two intelligent Native mistries, on Rs. 30 or Rs. 40 a month, would be able to carry out all the committee's undertakings both in roads and buildings.

19. The committee should not be burdened, as is at present the case, with the incongruous task of superintending the construction and repairs of purely departmental buildings, such as the district law courts, or with the maintenance of the *bardashtkhanas* and camping grounds, which are intended solely for the convenience of Imperial troops on march.

20. The system of accounts should be the same as in municipalities, where, when once a budget has been sanctioned, the committee can draw and expend money as soon as realised, without reference to any external authority whatever, and without any tedious and perplexing formalities.

21. The committee would act in the capacity of visitors to the zila school and sudder dispensary, and would be at liberty to purchase surgical instruments and medicines and prize books wherever and whenever they liked (within the limit of their funds), without reference to the heads of departments.

22. The income of the zila school, the sudder dispensary, and the halkabandi schools would each be debited with an annual charge, to be determined hereafter, which would be remitted to the heads of the departments concerned, and there credited to provincial pension funds for the benefit of such persons on the several establishments as would be entitled to pension on retirement.

23. A full report of the proceedings of every meeting would be submitted to the Commissioner, and no action taken on my new proposal until his sanction had been received. With this proviso the committee would be entirely free and at liberty to employ any agency it might prefer in carrying out its operations. It would not however interfere in tuitional or medical matters, except by way of representation to the officers of the departments concerned.

24. A committee thus organised, and with these powers and resources, would be an influential, an independent, and a self-supporting body, with every inducement to study economy and to promote local improvements. It would thus satisfy entirely the spirit of the Resolution of the Government of India, though in some points it may appear to differ from it in the letter. I therefore beg that my views may be submitted for consideration: they at least have the advantage of being based on local experience. Familiar as I am with the untidiness and discomfort in which even the richest of the Native gentry live, the miserable squaler of the villages immediately outside their gates, and the terrible muddle in which they are almost all involved as regards pecuniary affairs, I cannot imagine what ground there is for concluding that they will be found able of themselves to initiate and conduct a large scheme of local administration. For the next 50 years, an infinitesimally brief period in the history of a people of immemorial antiquity, their position must be that of assistants and learners, not of independent directors.

25. As regards election by popular vote, I have already mentioned that the people of this district are thoroughly averse to it, so much so that it is difficult to extract from them an opinion as to whether any particular mode of election would be rather more or less objectionable than any other. The license-tax and málguzari assessments would give the necessary materials for the preparation of tahsíli lists of electors, under the heads of land-owners, traders, artisans, and occupancy-tenants. The amount of income entitling to a vote, it would be better to fix at a latter stage of the proceedings. It would probably have to vary in different tahsíls, according as the village tenure was mainly *samindari* or *bhaiáchari*. The qualification for candidates would of course be higher.

No. 101, dated Bulandshahr, the 31st July 1882.

From F. S. Growse, Esquire, C.I.E., Magistrate of Bulandshahr, to Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division.

Sir,

I have the honour to represent that my daily office dâk now almost invariably comprises several bulky packets addressed to the president, local committee. These are either objection statements and instructions for the adjustment of accounts from the Examiner's office, or still more frequently elaborate sets of rules and regulations issued by the Chief Engineer. Among those which I received this morning, is one which bears the heading "Rules for dealing with matters affecting members of the Provincial Public Works establishment employed on local works under district committees." The document is of considerable length, being divided into four chapters; but voluminous as it is, it is not complete in itself, but implies an intimate acquaintance with the Public Works Code, to which several references are made.

2. I beg the favour of your enquiring what I am supposed to do with all this mass of papers. I certainly cannot undertake to communicate all their provisions orally to the Native members of the committee; and if they are to be translated and copied, a separate establishment must be entertained for the purpose. Even then I cannot believe that a single member would take the trouble to master their contents; for they are so full of departmental technicalities, that for an outsider they require long and patient study.

On the other hand, if they are not translated, the whole conduct of affairs is removed absolutely out of the power of the committee.

3. I therefore venture to remonstrate against the introduction of all this terribly elaborate machinery. It utterly defeats the entire object of the Government for India. The result is not decentralisation at all; but, on the contrary, is the concentration of all authority in the hands of the Chief Engineer. The committee is simply obliterated; and the Collector, who has the misfortune to be called its president,

occupies the position of an apprentice, who has been admitted into the Department Public Works at the very tail of the ordinary establishment ; or, still more correctly, is simply a machine to be wound up and set going by the District Engineer, whenever the latter requires a batch of official signatures.

No. $\frac{71}{XXIII.}$ dated Aligarh, the 4th August 1882.

From W. Lambe, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Aligarh, to Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division.

Sir,

In answer to your Nos. $\frac{10}{XXIII.}$, of 5th ultimo, and $\frac{13}{XXIII.}$ of 10th ultimo, asking certain questions as to future constitution of local committees, I have the honor to report as follows, adding that the reason I have not submitted my report earlier is owing to the delay attending the receipt of the opinions of the Native gentlemen consulted.

2. I have taken the sense of all gentlemen of light and leading in the district, and in what I now have to state I may be considered to express the epitome of their opinions.

3. The questions as to which information is sought virtually group themselves under four heads:—

I.—How should members of the local committee be chosen? Should they be nominated by the Magistrate of the district or elected by voters? In the latter case, under what conditions? Should votes recorded count by heads or by amount of málguzari?

II.—Should the tahsíli committees be separate from the sudder committee, or form part and parcel of the latter? How should the work be carried on? Is there accommodation sufficient for the committee at each tahsíl?

III.—Of how many members should each tahsíl committee consist?

IV.—Should the Tahsíldárs remain members of the tahsíli committees?

I.—On the first question the opinions given are in the majority decidedly averse from the principle of election, and the general desire is that the power of nomination rest in the hands of the Magistrate of the district, on the grounds that the voters would be too apathetic to exercise their privilege, and that the Magistrate would be the most likely person to make a fair choice.

There is a consensus of opinion that if election be resolved on by Government, there should be a standard of málguzari both for voters and members. The former has been pitched from Rs. 100 to Rs. 2,000 a year, and the latter from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000. I consider the opinion of the Hon'ble Saiyid Ahmad Kahn worth recording.

It is to the effect that although present circumstances are discouraging to the success of election, the principle should be applied as a measure of policy to train the people up in habits of independence and self-government, and that half the members should be elected, the other half being nominated by the Magistrate. On the bearings of the whole question, I am of opinion that for the present the best way to ensure success will be to adopt the dual scheme,—half the members being elected and half nominated. If it is found that any success attends the elections, nomination can be done away with. I think the minimum standard of pecuniary qualification should be Rs. 500 of málguzari for the voters per annum, and Rs. 5,000 for the members to be elected.

My reason for taking these standards, specially the former, is that when the qualification is fairly high, a basis of respectability is introduced, and the privileges being shared by few will, by being envied, become a kind of social status. Lists of both classes of persons should be made out and kept in each tahsíl.

I quite concur in the consensus of opinion that the votes given should count in favour of any particular candidate-member, and not the amount of málguzari of those voting for him. The effect of the latter system would be to cause an idea of inequality, highly detrimental to the development of independence and of self-government, which is based upon it.

II.—On the second question, public opinion is unanimous that tahsíli boards should form integral parts of that at the sudder, the duties of the former being executive, that of the latter administrative. The reason whereby separate tahsíli boards are looked on as impracticable is not far to seek. It is based on social jealousy ; the sudder members would, as workers in the tahsíli board, possess a title of honor not enjoyed by the others, who in consequence would not care to accept a position involving them in a social inequality almost amounting to a stigma. It may be taken for granted in the present state of things that the only way in which tahsíli boards could be worked would be to have the members of them belong also to the sudder committee. The functions of the two boards would then be clearly laid down and defined : the sudder committee would be the body, the tahsíli boards its legs and arms. The members in each tahsíl would, as blonging to the sub-committee of the tahsíl, keep a vigorous look-out on all expenditure under every head, and acquire such a knowledge of everything tending to the prosperity and advancement of their sub-division in everything executive, as to enable the general committee to decide with promptitude and certainty all administrative questions placed before it. I agree in the general opinion that no accommodation not now existing will be necessary for tahsíli boards, as in every tahsíl there are bungalows of sorts which might well be used for this purpose.

III.—In regard to the number of members of which each tahsíli board should consist, there is a considerable diversity of opinion : some gentlemen considering that there ought to be as many as ten, others restricting the number to three. As the best way to manage the executive duties of each member would be by territorial division, it is necessary that the members be not too few, as these members would have too large a jurisdiction to superintend properly. On the other hand, as all tahsíli boards will also form part of the general committee, it is necessary that the latter be not made too numerous. Were each tahsíli divided into four parts, and each member to receive charge of a part, the range of the duties of each would not be too extended, and the number of non-official members in the central committee would be only 24, a number not too large for business, especially as the attendance of all of them at any one committee is highly improbable.

IV.—There is a general consensus of opinion, amounting to unanimity, that the Tahsíldars should be members of the tahsíli boards, for reasons apparent on the surface. I heartily concur in this opinion.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards--*continued.*

In conclusion, therefore, to précis what has been written above—

(1) Nomination would be preferred to election :
(2) If election, however, is decided on, the qualification for voters should be Rs. 500 of málguzari yearly, for persons to be voted for Rs. 5,000 per annum :
(3) Votes should count individually, and not according to málguzari of voters :
(4) Half the members to be elected and half chosen by nomination :
(5) Tahsíli boards should form part and parcel of the central committee, the members of the former belonging also to the latter :
(6) The duties of the tahsíli boards should be executive, those of the central committee administrative :
(7 The present tahsíli buildings will suffice to accommodate local boards :
(8) Tahsíli boards should consist of four non-official members,—two chosen by election, and two nominated by the Magistrate :
(9) The Tahsíldárs should be members of the local boards.

No. $\frac{6808}{\text{XII.-19}}$, dated Agra, the 29th July 1882.

From J. C. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Agra Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. 145, dated the 21st June 1882, Financial Department (Decentralisation), I have the honor to remark that the subjects on which my opinion is asked appear to resolve themselves into the following points :—

(*a*) Whether it would be practicable, in accordance with the general welfare of the community, that Tahsíldars should cease to be members of central and tahsíli local boards.
(*b*) Whether proceedings of Tahsíli local boards should be final, or subject to control of central committee.
(*c*) Whether the appointment of a non-official chairman was desirable ; and, if so, what person was qualified for and willing to accept the appointment in any particular district.
(*d*) Whether some other buildings than local public offices could not be utilised for meetings of central and tahsíli boards.
(*e*) What should the qualification of voters to elect members of central committee and tahsíli local boards.

2. As it appeared to me the best way of obtaining at all reliable opinions on these points was by actual contact with the persons concerned, I personally visited the head-quarters of each district, having previously invited all non-official members of the district committee to meet me ; and after requesting all of the official members, with the exception of the Collector, to withdraw, I proceeded to explain to the non-official members there present the contents of the Government Order to which I am now replying, and the wishes of the Government of India in the matter of self-government, carefully abstaining from expressing an opinion on any single point, and asking them to state frankly their opinions on the several points noted above. I also asked them to state what persons they considered to be best qualified to sit upon the respective tahsíli local boards in their districts, and to state who among themselves was prepared to sit upon such boards, it being understood that a member of the central committee was qualified to sit upon a tahsíli local board, but that a member of the latter board was not necessarily qualified to sit upon the central committee.

3. I considered this last an essential condition, for I could see that in several instances the gentlemen there present appreciated the privilege of acting on central committees, but were not prepared to meet on terms of equality persons whom they considered fitted to give an opinion regarding local matters such as are likely to be discussed at tahsíli local boards ; and I am convinced that very strong objection would be taken if the members of both boards were held to be on perfect equality.

4. Taking up *seriatim* the points referred to in para. 1, I found as regards (*a*) that opinions were unanimous as to the necessity of retaining Tahsíldars on the local tahsíli boards, at any rate for the present : *e.g.*, Muttra expressed an opinion that they should be retained experimentally for one year, while Agra and other districts considered that they should be retained altogether ; and in only one individual instance was there a dissentient voice,—Munshi Nand Kishore of Fatehgarh stating that their retention was in his opinion not advisable.

5. As regards (*b*), there was a unanimous consensus of opinion that it was essential that the proceedings of tahsíli local boards should be subject to approval by the central committee : Fatehgarh, however, considered that, owing to the smallness of Aligarh Tahsíli, there was no necessity for having a tahsíli local board, but that it should be amalgamated with head-quarters under the central committee.

6. As regards (*c*), the election of a non-official chairman of the central committee, there was considerable difference of opinion, although I caused it to be understood that Government wished them to state who in their opinion was eligible. Muttra, after asking time to deliberate, has sent in the name of Seth Raghunath Das as president and Seth Narayan Das as vice-president. Agra proposed Rae Muttra Das, but on his declining to act on the score that he has already been selected by the municipal committee as their president, said they thought Nand Kishore fitted for the post. Fatehgarh was in favour of Babu Durga Parshad, but, on his declining to act, asked for time to consider whether any one else was qualified. Etáwah, after demurring as to the necessity of selecting any one, chose Mumtaz Ali Khan. Etah and Mainpuri absolutely refused to nominate any one ; and although I informed them that this was not an election, but simply an expression of opinion, adhered to their former statement that there was no person qualified or willing to take up such an appointment ; while all those present declined to act if nominated.

7. As regards (*d*), the general opinion was that where there is a municipal or town hall available, as at all head-quarters of districts, and at some tahsílis such as Firozabad and Fatehpur Síkri in Agra,

they should be used for meetings of committees and boards; and that at outlying tahsílis where no such buildings existed, the Government schools might be utilised.

8. As regards (*e*), opinions when expressed differed widely. Muttra was in favour of a property qualification of Rs. 120 rent per annum in urban, and Rs. 24 in rural parts, or annual payment of rent or revenue equal to Rs. 100; but they inserted a proviso that persons of common caste and ill report should be disqualified from voting. Agra considered that local tahsíli boards should decide as to what persons are qualified to vote as regards election of members in future. Mainpuri did not express any decided opinion; but one member, Krishna Gopal, wished that each outgoing member should nominate twenty voters, and that the accumulated votes of these men so nominated should decide as to who should be elected on the committee or local board. I should remark that he was so pleased with this idea, that he afterwards called on me and stated that in his opinion this was the one way of obtaining a system of free and independent election. Etah would give votes to all landholders paying Rs. 500 annual revenue, all payers of license-tax, all pensioned Government servants not below Rs. 20 per month, all Government servants with pay not less than Rs. 25 per month, all vakíls and mukhtárs. Fatehgarh and Etáwah wished for time to consider the question.

9. Several of the gentlemen present offered to sit on the tahsíli local boards, subject to the conditions referred to in para. 2; they also promised to submit the names of persons who were in their opinion qualified to sit upon those boards, but up to the present time I have only received a list from one district, *viz.*, Muttra; but the Collector remarks that the non-official members, finding themselves incompetent to furnish the names from their own knowledge, invoked the aid of the Tahsíldars.

10. I have entered into detail regarding the opinions expressed by the various persons consulted, as I wish it to be understood that every endeavour was made by me to obtain free and unbiassed opinion. I have already stated that I consider it necessary that tahsíli local boards should be subordinate to the central committee; and were any other proof required, the unanimous opinion of the persons consulted, as to the necessity of retaining Tahsíldárs on the local boards, shows that it would be a mistake to cause them to cease to be members of such boards: in fact, I have no hesitation in saying that, at any rate at present, it would not be practicable to work the local boards without their assistance.

11. The next question is that of a non-official chairman. I have shown that in some districts gentlemen have expressed their willingness to accept the appointment if nominated by Government, while in others they have persistently refused; but it would be a mistaken idea to suppose that the gentlemen who did consent did so at all readily; on the contrary, they signified their acceptance, grudingly and of necessity, under the impression that the orders of Government left no option in the matter, and that some one must be appointed: and from what was said in my presence at the several meetings which I have lately attended, I am convinced that they would, one and all, gladly see the work performed by the Collector, instead of undertaking it themselves; doubtless this objection will be removed in time, but it exists at present. Moreover, it must be remembered that the control of a central district committee and of five or six local boards is a very different matter to the control of a municipality. In the latter, the non-official chairman resides in the town, and can personally supervise the working of the system in every detail; whereas, in the former, his authority is spread over several hundreds of square miles, comprising localities which he has never seen and never is likely to see; while the Collector, as chief executive officer, is bound to visit and become acquainted with every part of his district. On the whole, so far as this division is concerned, I unhesitatingly say that the people themselves would prefer to have the Collectors as presidents of their respective committees, until the system has been further developed, for self-government is still in its infancy, and so to speak requires to learn to walk before it can run; and I am convinced that, with a little tact, these committees could be so worked as to fully understand their power, and to take interest in the working of the departments entrusted to them; and the manner in which Mr. Smith, when Magistrate of Etah, got the non-official members of the municipalities in his district to interest themselves in the management of those towns, is corroborative of this: while it would be understood that the fact of the Collector having no vote would considerably reduce his power of thwarting the wishes of the committee, supposing for the sake of argument, that he was inclined to do so. If, however, it should be determined that in some districts a non-official shall be appointed, I consider that Mumtaz Ali Khan and Seth Raghunath Das are the best selections which could, under the circumstances, have been made respectively for Etáwah and Muttra; while I do not believe Nand Kishore to be capable of working a large district such as Agra. I however think that, whether the president is or is not an official, the appointment of secretary should be left to the committee.

12. As regards election of members, it would be preferable to leave this matter optional to the persons qualified to vote, *viz.*, if two-thirds of such persons in any district or tahsíli circle voted for the introduction of the elective system for central or local boards, it might be introduced; but otherwise the members might be appointed by Government. The qualification for membership of a central committee should in my opinion be a payer of land-revenue or rent equal to Rs. 500 per annum, or a person assessed to income-tax under heading 2, class II., representing an income of Rs. 2,500.

For tahsíli boards, payment of land-revenue, or rent equal to Rs. 250 per annum, and assessment of license-tax under heading 3, class II., representing an income of Rs. 1,250. The qualification for a voter should be—

(*a*) Land-revenue or rent equal to Rs. 100 per annum.
(*b*) Any person assessed with license-tax.
(*c*) Government pensioners in receipt of not less than Rs. 20 per month.

I have purposely omitted Government servants, as, unless otherwise qualified, it is not advisable that they should be entitled to vote.

13. I am not aware whether it is under contemplation to make any change as regards *ex-officio* members, from that scale laid down in para. 12 of Resolution No. 393, dated 4th March 1882; but, even if it is thought advisable to dispense with the service of Tahsíldars as members of the central committee, on the plea that they already belong to the local tahsíli boards, supposing such boards to be constituted, I would deprecate any further change; for, in the interests of Government and the

public generally, it is essential that some officer should be to a certain extent responsible that money is not wasted on useless works, and the Executive Engineer appears to be the person best qualified to exercise a wholesome supervision in this respect; while in educational matters the Inspector of the Circle is a much more efficient adviser than the Deputy Inspector of Schools can possibly be, the latter being a servant of the committee, and as such not qualified to offer advice.

14. In para. 21 of the Resolution of Government of India, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, dated the 18th May 1882, appended to the Government Order under reply, it is suggested that license-tax assessments and collections might be made by the local boards or municipal and rural. I confess that after an enpression of opinion from such a quarter, I approach this subject with hesitation; but, speaking from my own personal experience, feel bound to record that, irrespective of the fact as to how far the interests of Government will be affected by the amount of tax likely to be levied, supposing assessments to be made by such boards, there cannot be the least doubt that such procedure would engender disputes among the persons concerned, and endless confusion; for, it would be asserted, rightly or wrongly, that certain members let off their friends lightly, and put the tax heavily on to persons against whom they had a grudge. I do not say that the members would do so, but am certain that such allegations would be made against them. Also, I cannot see any reason for abandoning the present simple system of collection, which is well understood by the people, in favour of one which to my mind does not possess these recommendations, and which would be more complicated than that hitherto in force.

15. It is evident that the orders now issued will necessitate some alterations in the rules of business issued under Government Order No. 111, dated 29th May 1882. Presumably, it is not essential that the minutes of proceedings shall be recorded in the English language; but wherever this is done, a vernacular translation should be supplied to the members not acquainted with the English language; and, similarly, when the original proceedings are recorded in the vernacular, an English translation should be made. With reference to para. 17 of Government of India's Resolution quoted above, it appears to me that section 28, Act. XV. of 1873, would give, *mutatis mutandis*, a controlling power to Government over the proceedings of district committees.

16. In conclusion I fear that I have gone beyond the points regarding which my opinion was originally asked; but the subject is such an important one that, as I am likely to be absent when final orders are passed, I felt bound to place on record my views on certain points; and can only say that, such as they are, they express my convictions derived from personal consultations with the persons most interested in developing a system of self-government.

No. $\frac{6906.}{XII.-19}$, dated Agra, the 4th August 1882.

From J. C. ROBERTSON, Esquire, Commissioner, Agra Division, To SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN continuation of my No. $\frac{6808}{XII-19}$, dated 29th July 1882, on the subject of decentralisation, I find that in para. 8 I made a slight mistake in saying that Etáwah did not express an opinion as to qualification of voters; for, on referring to the proceedings of the meeting held on 15th July, I find that the non-official members then present were of opinion that persons paying annual revenue of not less than Rs. 1,000, and all traders paying license-tax of not less than Rs. 75, *viz.*, heading 1, class II., representing Rs. 3,750 per annum, should be entitled to vote for election of members of committees and local boards.

No. $\frac{404}{XXIII-586}$, dated Bareilly, the 18th August 1882.

From R. M. EDWARDS, Esquire, Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, To OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to Government Resolutions Nos. 145 and 160, dated 21st and 29th June last, Financial Department, and to submit the replies of the several District Officers of this Division.

2. As the several points referred will so soon be discussed in the Committee shortly to assemble at Naini Tal, I will make my review as brief as is consistent with clearness.

(1) *The constitution of local tahsíli boards and their relations with the district committee.*

The third plan suggested in para. 3 of the Government Resolution No. 145 is that which has found most general favour among the Native gentlemen and those most capable of judging—indeed, the majority appear to regard it as the only practicable system.

It must be borne in mind that many of the ablest and most influential Natives who reside in the interior of the districts are already on the district committees. When these latter were organized the instructions for local tahsíli boards had not been promulgated, and the object then arrived at was so to regulate nominations of the central committee that all portions of a district should be fairly represented. In most tahsíls the present numbers are insufficient for efficient boards, and additional members either have been or will be appointed under section 6, Resolution I. These new members have so far been carefully selected, and are in my opinion the most suitable parties available. Lists of these additional members will be found annexed, but further additions will, I think, have to be made. The tahsíli boards should have executive charge of local works and institutions, but acting as branches of the district boards, subordinate to them and under their direction, the members of the tahsíli boards being also members of the district boards and entitled to attend the meetings of the latter. The attendance of all the members should not be insisted on; it would be sufficient if, as suggested by the Magistrate of Moradabad, one local member from each tahsíli attended the regular meetings of the district board, the duty being taken in rotation. This member or delegate might lay before the central board the proceedings of the branch committee together with the accounts for inspection and audit.

The meetings of the two classes of boards should not be too frequent. Native gentlemen would sooner throw up their membership than be often obliged to be present. The interference of the central with the tahsíli local board should be as light as is consistent with intelligent supervision.

As far as I have been able to ascertain—and I have talked the matter over with European and Native officials and with a large number of Native gentlemen—the above is the general view held by all parties, official and non-official.

The Collector and Magistrate of Bijnor would have tahsíli boards eventually separate and independent of a central committee's control; he would accept the tahsíl as the administrative unit and have no district committee at all. But for the present, until matters have more advanced, district committees should, he thinks, be retained, with members from each tahsíl meeting at the various tahsíli head-quarters in rotation.

(2) *The practicability of forming some kind of elective body to whom the nomination of members might in future be entrusted.*

Nothing struck me more forcibly during my late tour than the apparent inability of even the higher and better-educated classes to understand and, as it were, reason out the elective system. They do not absolutely object to the system—on the contrary many readily testify their approval of it; but discussion shows that they do not really understand it or what it leads to, nor will they under present circumstances take the trouble to work it.

With all deference to the Supreme Government, I must say that I think far too little account has been made of the wide difference in feelings and in mode of thought between the European and the Asiatic. To make these boards successful it is necessary that they should be composed of Native gentlemen of position and influence. The notion of canvassing people of inferior caste and social position, or of owing a post of influence to the votes of those beneath them, is utterly foreign and repugnant to men of this class; and I do not hesitate to say that if the elective system is hastily introduced, the result will be that the very men who would make local government successful and a real power in the land will abstain from taking any part in it.

As to the body of electors it is undeniable that in this part of the country they care little or nothing for the privilege. This apathy will continue until they see and feel that the members of the board have real power affecting them for good or for evil, and that they have in consequence a direct concern in choosing good men. This alone will in my opinion open their eyes and make them bestir themselves; but I fail to fee how this interest in election is to be arrived at save by entrusting the members with the imposition as well as the expenditure of local cesses and rates, and to this there are serious objections.

After many interviews and much discussion I am convinced that one party (the proposed representative) is decidedly averse to election and the other (the voter) quite indifferent to it; I am therefore unable to propose any system which is the least likely to answer. The people of this Division may be said to have given their verdict against election. My own belief is that for a time nomination must be retained, but only for a time. Commence with nomination, and when the committees are in full and successful working gradually substitute election.

(3) *Nomination of chairman: para.* 6 *of Government Resolution No.* 145, *dated* 21*st June* 1882.

There appears to be a general concensus of opinion that it is impracticable at present to place the central committees under non-official chairman in any of the six districts of this Division for the following reasons:—

Bareilly.—The long standing and bitter animosity which still exists between the Hindus and Muhammadans renders the appointment of a Native chairman not merely inexpedient but impracticable. The members themselves say so and beg that nothing tending to interfere with the balance of power may be introduced. I have known the residents of Bareilly for the last twenty years, and I have no hesitation in saying that the appointment of a non-official chairman, whether Hindu or Musalman, would lead to grave complications and prove anything but a kind act to the masses. In matters of this kind we are bound to give weight to the opinions and wishes of the people themselves who are most interested: well aware of what would result, there is not a Native gentleman willing to serve as chairman.

The committee unanimously elected the Magistrate of the district their chairman, and their selection should, in my opinion, be approved and confirmed.

Two vice-presidents have been elected—one a Hindu, Babu Ganga Parshad, a retired Deputy Collector; the other a Muhammadan, lately an Extra Assistant Commissioner in the Central Provinces. The election of those two gentlemen does credit to the Native members of the committee: they could not have made a better choice.

Moradabad.—The same bitter feelings between Hindus and Musalmans exist here as in Bareilly, and to an extent which in my opinion, as well as in that of the members themselves, makes it highly improbable, if not absolutely impossible, that the district committee would work in concert under a non-official chairman. Here also the Magistrate of the district was unanimously elected and should be confirmed.

Sháh'ahánpur.—It will be seen from the District Officer's report that both the members of the district committee and the leading Native gentlemen are unanimous in considering an official chairman to be at present indispensable for the district board, and that the Magistrate concurs in that opinion. I hold the same view.

Our object is to make the board a reality and a success. Put on one side the guiding hand of the official and utter confusion and failure is only a question of time. We can ere long educate and train members for the duties of chairman. We cannot find them ready made to our hand. In this district the majority consider that the tahsíl boards should elect their own chairman. This might be tried.

Budaun.—Both the members of committee and the raises and leading gentry of the district are strenuous in their opposition to a non-official chairman. They raise numerous objections and point out sundry difficulties which they declare would certainly result from such an appointment. They assert that a non-official chairman would be overbearing in his dealings with the members, and that this and the jealousy which would arise would cause the members to resign or absent themselves from the

meetings. Having very lately discussed the point with most of the leading men, I am convinced that they are thoroughly embued with these views, and would probably resign membership sooner than work with one of their number as chairman. Their attitude, though perfectly respectful, is firm. They say—We know ourselves, our weaknesses, petty jealousies and failings, a great deal better than Government or you do. We are ready at the expressed wish of Government to devote time and labour to Government work, even to some extent to the neglect of our own business ; but we decline to join in an arrangement which we are convinced will not answer and will only too surely bring us into disgrace with Government and into enmity with our fellow-men.

In my opinion we must agree to their wishes.

Bijnor.—Rája Jagat Singh of Tajpur was nominated chairman and pressed by the existing president and by all the members to accept the office; but he positively declined on the grounds of weak health, residence at a distance from headquarters, and want of leisure from his own business as a large landed proprietor. I greatly regret this refusal on the part of the Rája, who is in every respect save health well fitted for the post. Should his health continue to improve I hope to be able to persuade him to undertake the duties. He is very advanced in his views for a Native, sufficiently well acquainted with English to transact business in that language, and his more public spirit than any other man in the district or, I think I may say, in the Division. As no other member of committee was willing to take the office, the Magistrate of the district has for the present retained the position of president.

Pilibhít.—The committee consider that the appointment of a non-official chairman should remain in abeyance until the members have familiarized themselves with their new duties. Ere long the Magistrate of the district may be able to retire from that position ; but to secure proper working he must in my opinion discharge the duties of chairman until some non-official member acquires the necessary knowledge of the accounts and rules.

(4) *Is it practicable and in accordance with the general wishes of the community that Tahsíldárs should cease to be members of central and tahsíl local boards?*

With the exception of Moradabad, the feelings of the people consulted and of the district committees is in favour of the retention of tahsíldárs on both central and tahsíl boards. Their local knowledge and experience will be very valuable in the central committees, while their guidance and encouragement will be necessary for the tahsíl boards for some time to come.

The Moradabad opinion is, as above remarked, different. They came to the conclusion (*vide* Magistrate's report) that these officials should not be members of either board. I had long interviews with the chief men, but did not find they had any real objection to Tahsíldárs being on central committees, though they were strong on the point with regard to tahsíl boards ;—their chief allegation being that as long as the Tahsíldár is a member the raises or other Native gentlemen will leave all the work to him and do nothing ; that the non-official members would think it right or necessary always to concur in and support the Tahsíldár's views, and that in fact all would be done on his "*ishara*" or suggestion. There was another feeling urged by only a few, but, so far as I could judge, common to all, that if the Tahsíldár was a member, he, not they, would get all the credit of the work done. There is good deal of truth undoubtedly in the views held by these gentlemen, but I feel sure that during the introduction of the scheme the co-operation, guidance, and influence of the Tahsíldárs are absolutely necessary for success. As remarked by the Magistrate of Sháhjahánpur—"the members have so little idea of the transaction of public business that it would be courting certain failure to leave them to their own devices. They cannot at present walk alone."

Here I ought to mention the opinion of Jaffer Ali, Honorary Magistrate, perhaps the ablest man on the district committee. He is very averse to the scheme of self-government being hurriedly and generally introduced over the country. He urges that it should be commenced very gradually and in localities where it is likely to succeed, and that if this course is not followed many evils will result.

(5) *Accommodation for district or local committees.*

Bareilly.—The Town Hall will suffice for the district committee. For a time local boards can be accommodated at tahsíls, but separate and suitable buildings should be provided. Small establishments will be necessary.

Moradabad.—The Town Hall will suffice for the meetings of the district committee. The tahsíli boards will require a separate office and small establishment if they are to be quite separate from, and independent of, the Tahsíldár. The Magistrate considers that they should be provided with one or two clerks, an accountant and a road surveyor. I should think that one really efficient clerk, an accountant, and a couple of chaprasis would suffice.

Bijnor.—The views of the committee (*vide* extract from proceedings of 19th July) were opposed to separate tahsíl boards, but if such are organized separate buildings and office establishment would be necessary.

Sháhjahánpur.—Magistrate reports that sufficient accommodation is available in the public offices, and that the expense of separate establishments is at present uncalled for. This view will only answer as long as the Tahsíldár is a member of committee.

Pilibhit.—A separate establishment is pronounced necessary ; one muharrir for each local board. Apparently the committees are intended to meet in the tahsíl buildings as long as the Tahsíldár continues a member of the board. A separate building will be necessary for the district board at head-quarters.

Budaun.—A separate and commodious building will be necessary for the district committee with separate staff of subordinates employés. The details of the Magistrate's proposal as regards the size and character of the building will be found in his report. The tahsíl committees can for the present meet in one of the public buildings.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. 23, dated Pilibhít, the 24th July 1882.

From P. WHALLEY, Esquire, President, Local Committee, Pilibhít, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, received under cover of his No. $\frac{350}{XXIII.-586}$, dated 4th July 1882, I have the honour to enclose extract from the proceedings of the district committee meeting held on the 17th instant, and request that sanction of Government may be obtained to the appointments of Mungel Sen of Bisalpur and Muhammad Bakhsh of Dhang as additional members, to facilitate the formation of tahsíl boards.

2. The tahsíl boards having been constituted, a separate establishment for each of them is necessary; and the committee having resolved the entertainment for muharrirs on Rs. 10 a month, I beg to request your sanction to this at an early date, in order to bring the tahsíl boards in working order.

3. It will be seen that the committee desires that the Collector should, for the present, continue to discharge the duties of chairman, and the reason is that the rules governing the accounts to be kept by the committee and their relations with Government officers are somewhat elaborate, and until they are better understood it seems desirable that the correspondence of the committee should be under the direction of the member who has the greatest official experience.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the District Committee held on the 17th July, 1882.

Read G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June, and Commissioner's letter commenting on the above and asking for opinion on the points raised.

Resolved (1) that it is desirable that the tahsíl committees should not be separate from, but embodied in, the district committee.

Resolved (2) that there are six official members; there may be twelve non-official members, and considering that Pilibhít is a large city and that it is important that there should be three or four members of the committee resident at headquarters, the twelve non-official members should be drawn—

Six from Pilibhít, viz., three from city and three from villages.
Three from Bisalpur,
Three from Puranpur,

At present there were three members of Pilibhít,—

One member for Bisalpur,
Two members for Puranpur,

and one extra member for Bisalpur and one for Puranpur have been nominated for sanction, making in all—

Three for Pilibhít.
Two for Bisalpur.
Three for Puranpur.

The committee nominate Mangal Sen for Bisalpur, and for Pilibhít Muhammad Bakhsh of Dhang. This will make a good working committee; the other two places may be left vacant, to be filled afterwards by election, if election be resolved on by Government. The tahsíl committees will thus consist of the following members:—

Pilibhít.—Ahmad Yar Khan of Pilibhít	- - -	Medical.
Bala Dabi Parshad ditto	- - -	Education.
Naik Dalip Singh of Pandri	- - -	Roads.
Muhammad Bakhsh of Dhang.		
Bisalpur.—Wazir-ud-din, Tahsíldar	- - -	Education.
Thakur Lakhan Singh of Banroli	- - -	Roads.
Mangal Sen of Bisalpur	- - -	Medical.
Puranpur.—Mangal Khan of Sherpur	- - -	Roads.
Jang Bahadur Singh of Ghungchai	- - -	Education.
Hirde Narayan, Peshkar	- - -	Medical.

Resolved, further, that work be conducted as follows:—

Three members resident at Pilibhít or its immediate neighbourhood will each take charge of a department—Roads, Education, or Medical, and each member of a tahsíl committee will also have charge of a department.

* * * * * *

Resolved (3) that the appointment of a non-official chairman may remain in abeyance till the members have familiarised themselves with their new duties.

Resolved (4) that a muharrir on Rs. 10 a month is required for each tahsíl board, and no buildings are at present needed for tahsíl committees. The muharrirs will attend at the members' houses.

As regards the district office a building is absolutely necessary, as the room at present occupied by the District Engineer and his office will have to be vacated on the establishment of a treasury in the district, which is shortly expected.

No increase of establishment is at present required, the work connected with other departments than public works, as defined in Resolution No. 111, para. 47, being so insignificant that it can easily be carried on by the establishment allowed under Part I.

Suggested, also, that a great saving might be effected in the building required if the municipal committee of Pilibhít and the district committee had their offices under the same roof with a common hall in which to hold meetings.

* * * * * *

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Docket No. 25, dated Pilibhít, the 25th July 1882.

From P. WHALLEY, Esquire, President, Local Committee, Pilibhít, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

WITH reference to G. O. No. 160, dated 29th June, 1882, and Commissioner's No. $\frac{355}{XXIII.-586}$, calling for a report thereon, has the honour to enclose an extract from the proceedings of the district committee meeting held on the 17th instant, in which resolutions have been passed on the questions mooted. The opinion of other Native gentlemen of the district who are not on the committee appears generally to coincide with that expressed in the resolution, so for as the appointment of extra members and the exclusion of Tahsíldárs is concerned. It is impossible to give the general opinion on the introduction of the elective system, as the proposal is yet too unfamiliar to the residents of the district for their views on the subject to have obtained any definite form or consistency.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the District Committee meeting held on 17th July 1882.

* * * * * *

Read G. O. No. 16, dated 29th June 1882, and Commissioner's Circular, No. $\frac{355}{XXIII.-586}$, calling for report thereon.

Resolved (1) that the committee have already represented that the most eligible additional members of the committee in their opinion are—

Wazir-ud-din, Tahsíldar of Bisalpur.
Hirde Narayan, Peshkar of Puranpur,
Muhammad Bakhsh of Dhang.
Mangal Sen of Bisalpur.

With these additions suitable tahsíli boards can be formed and the work officially carried on.

Resolved (2) that the committee are not prepared to suggest any scheme for forming an elective body at present, but will consider the subject at the next meeting.

Resolved (3) by a majority that it will be eventually practicable for Tahsíldars to cease to be members of the committee; but for the present, until the scheme has begun to work fairly, it would be undesirable to dispense with the benefits of their assistance.

* * * * * *

No. $\frac{338}{XXIII.}$, dated Budaun, the 27th July 1882.

From G. ADAMS, Esq., Officiating Collector and Magistrate, Budaun, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. $\frac{370}{XXIII.-586}$, dated 4th instant, I have the honor to state that, besides verbally consulting a number of native gentlemen, I issued a circular letter to sixty of the principal persons in the district. Of these 44 sent replies. There was very little time for consultation with each other, so that the replies sent may be taken to be the fairly genuine expression of the writers' opinions.

2. Of these 44 gentlemen 10 are already members of the district committee. Of the others 9 excused themselves from serving, 16 agreed to serve on either the district or tahsíl committees, and 9 agreed to serve as members of tahsíl committees only.

3. Many of them gave the names of others who they considered would be acceptable to the public and fit to serve as members. I will refer later to the subject of the nomination or election of members.

4. Regarding sub-committees for tahsíls, 38 gave a distinct opinion and all were in favour of tahsíl committees in some form. Six were in favour of wholly independent tahsíl committees, while six others thought that they should exist only as sub-committees of the district committee. Twenty-six, however, were of opinion that there should be a separate sub-committee for each tahsíl, working in communication with, and in subordination to, the central district committee.

With this last I agree. It would be impossible to find country gentlemen at present who, even under the guidance of an official chairman, could at present be trusted to act altogether independently of the central committee. On the other hand, if the special tahsílwar work be done only by sub-committees of the district committee, we should lose the services of many men of fair position and much local knowledge, who would absolutely decline to be dragged at frequent intervals to the sudder station of the district.

So far as its own powers extend, the central committee might allot money for ordinary works not requiring skilled supervision to the several tahsíls, where the grants would be expended under the supervision of the tahsíl committee, who would, I presume, be left to divide the allotments for the several heads according to their own view of the necessities of their charge. The central committee should, I think, interfere so far only as to see that through lines of communication were properly maintained and that the general scheme of district administration was adhered to, unless it became obvious that the tahsíl committee wasted the money allotted to them. The question of charge of special departments by members of the central board appears to be one for which no rule can be laid down, but which must be worked out according to the composition of the several committees and the number of members qualified and available for such a charge.

5. Regarding election of members of the committees, the replies of the gentlemen I have consulted are not very clear, and it is tolerably evident that very few of them have any distinct ideas on the subject. Their replies may, however, be abstracted briefly as follows:—

1st.—In favour of plans in which the Collector is to select members	14
2nd.—In favour of plans by which the power of selection is given to the local committee	4
3rd.—In favour of plans by which members shall be elected by voters, who themselves will be nominated by the Collector	12
4th.—Open ballot	2

I propose a scheme which will fairly combine the views of most of those whom I have consulted, *viz.*, to frame lists of new members for the district and tahsíl committees, taken chiefly from among those whose names have been entered in the replies to my circular letter. I will publish these lists throughout the district and then lay them before the existing district committee, together with any objections which may be received from residents of the district to the appointment of any person whose name is entered in the lists.

6. The result of my enquiries regarding election of chairman and vice-chairman is that for which I was prepared by the views which had already been expressed verbally by those among the raises and Native officials to whom I had spoken on the subject. But in writing they do not use such free language regarding the difficulties which would accompany the appointment of a non-official Native president. By a large majority however, 39 out of 40, who express an opinion on the subject, they declare that the president, whether of the committee or sub-committee, must be an officer of Government. The principal reasons alleged for this is that the raises would be so jealous of this dignity being attained by one of their number that they would not work with him; while some allege that the non-official president would be too inflated with pride at his position to manage the committee meetings with tact.

Twenty-nine of the 40 either declare that both president and vice-president must be officials or ignore the question of the appointment of a vice-president. Several insist on the desirability of appointing a European officer; ten vote for an official president and non-official vice president.

One solitary individual, not a man of note or position, expresses his opinion that both vice-president and president may be non-officials.

By an overwhelming majority the principal men of the district declare the unfitness of any one of their number for the post of president, though a few hope that in time they may acquire habits of business. From what I have seen at the meetings of the several committees, I agree with them. Shaikh Sharf-ud-din is the only Native gentleman I have met in the district who has a sufficiently clear idea of public business to undertake the duties of president, and influential as he is, has not, I think, sufficient influence to maintain the necessary dignity of the post. I think, however, that he would do well as vice-president. It would seem that the president of the district committee must of necessity be the Collector of the district for at least a time.

In the tahsíl committees subordinate to the district committee the Tahsíldar again must for some time be chairman. There would be no chance in this district of finding a country gentleman, such as those who principally would serve in those committees, with anything like the requisite knowledge of public business; and all the objection to a non-official president which have been urged by the Natives themselves would apply more strongly to the case of a tahsíl than of a district committee.

7. A special meeting of the district committee will be called at an early date to decide on the appointment of president and vice-president and the selection of new members of the district and tahsíl committees.

8. At the last meeting of the local committee the gentlemen present unanimously expressed the opinion that a separate building for the sole use of the committee was absolutely necessary, and I fully agree with them. A committee constituted in accordance with the views of the Government of India will be a body entirely separate from the officials who conduct the judicial and revenue duties of Government, and they should certainly have a separate office and a separate staff of subordinate employés. At present the meetings of the committee are held in one of the court-rooms of the very over-crowded district kutcherry, which is the only place available; but it is obvious that this arrangement could not be continued both for the reason I have already given and on account of the inconvenience which would be caused to the regular staff of the district. It is certain that a committee composed of private individuals will not be able to dispose of their varied duties at a single monthly meeting, and the assembling at least of sub-committees at more frequent intervals will be necessary.

In my opinion the new building should contain a large hall for committee meetings, an office for the District Engineer and his staff, a room for the office of the general department (other than public works), and retiring rooms for the members of the committee who would often come from a distance to attend the meetings. Regarding the cost I can give no estimate at present, as it must depend upon a further expression of the views of Government as to the extent of expenditure which may be admissible.

I would, however, submit that considering the status which would be held by the committee and the fact that the building would not be for merely temporary accommodation, the said building should be substantial and handsome. I would suggest also that the style should be oriental and not that of a public works barrack. The establishment would, I presume, include the District Engineer and his subordinate staff. Some of these could be utilised for general work, receiving an addition to their pay, and for the rest probably one clerk and two chaprasis would be sufficient.

9. It seems clear that there will be no funds for the erection of committee-rooms at each tahsíl, nor does it as yet appear that there will be any necessity for them. For the present the tahsíl committees can meet in one of the public buildings.

10. The Government of India has expressed very distinctly its conviction that the system of local self-government which has been set forth cannot possibly fail, except by the fault of the District Officers.

I would submit that the opinion of the natives of this district is that they are utterly unfit for self-government, and that their opinion on such a subject is not to be set aside lightly. If the scheme does succeed, it will be only by the persistent driving of the District Officers. I submit also that if the scheme is to have any chance of success, the powers entrusted to the committees must be real. The raises of a district cannot possibly learn to govern when their administrative powers are confined only to the pettiest details in which it would be hopeless to expect them to take real interest.

I would further submit that the details of accounts and forms must be greatly simplified before they will be intelligible to the average member of the committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{145}{\text{XVII.-6}}$, dated Bijnor, the 28th July 1882.

From H. D'O. MOULE, Esquire, Magistrate of Bijnor, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge your Nos. 350 and 355, dated 4th and 11th instant. The questions raised therein and in the Government orders to which you refer were fully discussed at the meeting of the local district committee held on the 19th instant. An extract of the committee's proceedings is annexed.

2. For my own part I regret that Rája Jagat Singh could not be prevailed on to accept the presidency of the local committee. In his hands if in any one's the non-official experiment would have had a fair trial; but it is obvious that the acceptance of the office would have demanded considerable sacrifices of him, and we cannot be surprised that he declined it. I do not think any other non-official member of the committee is qualified for the presidency. To begin with no other can read English, and without a knowledge of that language how could he sign and countersign all the cheques, accounts, bills and forms that under the present rules require his approval and sanction? However, the question of fitness was not raised, as no member was found willing to accept the presidency on any terms.

It is therefore, I fear, impracticable to secure a non-official president for this district at present.

3. I am unable to offer any suggestions on the subject of elections. Of one thing I feel certain—namely, that the people will not take the trouble to vote unless compelled. If they will not walk a few hundred yards in the towns for municipal elections, is it likely that they will travel miles for the purpose of voting at tahsíli or pargana capitals? If elections must be held, I can only recommend that the property qualification be fixed high at first, so that it may seem if possible to have some sort of value; besides, it can always be lowered hereafter if necessary.

4. It will be difficult, if not impossible, at present for Tahsíldars to cease to be members of local boards; yet if these committees are to be a reality and not a sham, it will certainly be necessary for Tahsíldars, like their chief, the District Officers, to withdraw eventually from the management and control of them. But if this step were taken at once, the committees would be left in a state of helplessness which can hardly be conceived, except by those who know them and work with them. The general wish most certainly is that the Tahsíldars should continue to be members.

5. To the question of tahsíli boards or sub-committees I have given a great deal of time and consideration, and I must confess I am quite at a loss to understand how they are to be worked or of what use they can possibly be at present. When the time comes for committees to be invested with real powers in the sense of the Government of India's Resolution, there may doubtless be business for such boards to do; at present the work of passing monthly accounts and approving the submission of plans and estimates which very few of them understand supplies inadequate intellectual interest for even one committee collected and selected with difficulty from the entire district.

When these tahsíli boards are started, I should for my own part prefer to see them separate and independent of a superior committee's control—I mean that I would frankly accept the tahsíl as the administrative unit and not have a district committee at all. With both the district and tahsíli boards together, either one of them would be ignored entirely, or the extra fuss and doing of the same work two or three times over would be vexatious and wearisome to all concerned. Meantime, till matters have advanced somewhat I would recommend the retention of the district committee, with members from each tahsíl meeting at the various tahsíli head-quarters in rotation.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of Local Committee, dated 19th July 1882.

GENERAL.

THE president laid before the committee G. Os. Nos. 145 and 160 of June 1882, with Commissioner's letters Nos. 350 and 355, and their enclosures. After some general discussion the chief questions under reference were taken up and disposed of in the following order:—

(1.) *Election of president or chairman of local committee?*—The present president explained the desire of Government that the board should elect its own chairman, and expressed on his own part a strong hope that they would be able to meet the wishes of Government in this matter; at the same time, in reply to questions of some members, he explained that he declined absolutely to be himself elected as president. After some conversation Rája Jagat Singh was nominated and pressed by the president and members to accept the office, for which, indeed, he was well fitted by his public spirit, knowledge of English, and other qualifications. The Rája, however, positively declined on the grounds of weak health, residence at a distance from head-quarters, and want of leisure from his own business as a large landed proprietor. No other member of the committee was willing to take the office.

(2.) *Should members of local committee be appointed by Government or elected?* Rája Jagat Singh was of opinion that a system of popular election by parganas or tahsíls might be tried, a certain standard of income or property being taken as the qualification of a voter. No new method of election by guilds or castes, &c., seemed to be thought at all practicable. All other members were decidedly in favour of nomination by Government.

(3.) *Should tahsíldars be members of local committees or not?* All the members were decidedly of opinion that they must be; the president, however, was clearly of opinion that they, like the Magistrate of district, should be eventually withdrawn, if the object of Government, that local committees should be a reality and not a sham, was to be attained.

(4.) *As to separate local boards for each tahsíl,* it was observed that each tahsíl in the district was represented by several members on the present committee; and the committee was of opinion that if meetings were held at the various tahsíli towns in rotation, the wants of each division could be fully met by the committee as at present constituted. If separate tahsíli boards were to be appointed, not only might there be a difficulty in finding a sufficient number of qualified members, but it was not easy to understand what duties could be separately made over to them, and how they were to carry out those duties, unless a separate office establishment, with its records, &c., were to be allotted to each, and also separate public works and educational subordinates.

Note.—Rája Jagat Singh afterwards remarked that he had never seen an election, and had no idea how they worked.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. 52, dated Moradabad, the 4th August 1882.

From T. B. TRACY, Esquire, President of District Committee, Moradabad, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your circular No. $\frac{350}{XXIII.-586}$ of 1882, dated 4th July 1882, and No. $\frac{355}{XXIII.-586}$ of 1882, dated the 11th July 1882, I have the honour to submit the following report.

2. Of the three plans suggested in para. 3 of Government Circular No. 145 of 1882, dated 21st June, the third appears to be the most, if not the only, practicable system. The local (tahsíli) committee should be a branch of the district board, and should ordinarily have executive charge of local works and institutions. These local boards should be required to send one of their members in rotation to attend the meetings of the district board as the representative of local interests. It would of course be open to all the local members to attend the district board at their pleasure, but the attendance at the regular meetings of the district board of at least one local member from each tahsíli should be insisted on. The plan of sending a member in rotation would minimize the burden of attendance at the district board, which, if too frequently required, is likely to be unpopular with residents of remote parts of the district.

3. A meeting of the Moradabad district committee was held on the 22nd ultimo, at which the questions propounded in Government Circulars Nos. 145 and 160 of 1882 were considered. As at present constituted the district committee is made up of residents in the different tahsíls as follows :—

NON-OFFICIAL MEMBERS.

Moradabad - - - - - -	5
Bilari - - - - - - -	3
Sambhal - - - - - -	3
Hasanpur - - - - - -	2
Amroha - - - - - -	2
Thakurdwara - - - - - -	1
Total -	16

It will be necessary to appoint two or three gentlemen resident in each tahsíl as additional members of the district committee for service on the tahsíli boards. These local branch committees should submit the minutes of their proceedings and their accounts with their inspection reports to the central board. It would probably be the most convenient plan if the records of their proceedings were brought up by the local member specially delegated to attend the meeting of the district committee.

4. The committee and many native gentlemen whom I have consulted are strongly opposed to the elective system in any form.

The notion of canvassing people of inferior caste or social position is altogether repugnant to the feelings of native gentlemen of rank and family. They can comprehend the delegation of power or the conferment of honour by Government, but the idea of owing a position of influence and respect to the votes of their inferiors is utterly foreign to their minds. If this is, as I firmly believe, the prevalent feeling on the subject, it is safe to predict that one result of the unseasonable introduction of the elective system will be the abstention of gentlemen of respectability from taking part in local government.

5. If, however, the system were to be introduced, I would venture to suggest that the lambardars of villages would be the most appropriate electoral body for local boards. A tahsíl might for this purpose be divided into circles of (say) fifty or sixty villages, the lambardars of which might be required to elect a representative. In order to make the electors feel that they had a real and direct concern in choosing good men to represent them, it would probably be necessary to entrust the imposition, as well the expenditure, of local cesses and rates to the local boards.

6. The committee were unanimously of opinion that the appointment of a non-official chairman to the board in this district would not be expedient. They have resolved to nominate the District Officer as their president. For reasons which are sufficiently well known to you, and which it is unnecessary to discuss in detail, there is small probability that the Moradabad district committee would work in concern under a non-official chairman.

7. For the present I do not think that a separate committee-room or any additional establishment will be required for the district board. The town hall is available as a board-room.

The tahsíli boards should unquestionably have a separate office and a small establishment of a clerk or two, an accountant, and perhaps a road surveyor.

8. With reference to para. 1 of Government Circular No. 160 of 1882, dated the 29th June, I beg leave to append a list of gentlemen recommended by the district committee as eligible for appointment as additional members of the district board.

9. The committee, as I have already said, are decidedly of opinion that the formation of any kind of elective body would be, under existing circumstances, impracticable. They consider that the district boards as already constituted should be allowed to co-optate any additional members required for service on tahsíli boards.

10. The committee were further of opinion that Tahsíldars should cease to be members of central and tahsíli local boards. In this, as a general principle, I fully concur; but I think that for the first year or two, until the new boards shall have mastered their business, it will not be possible for them to dispense with the advice and guidance of an official member.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

LIST of Native Gentlemen recommended as eligible for service as Additional Members on Moradabad District Committee.

Tahsíl.	Names of Resident Gentleman.	Remarks.
Moradabad	1. Sahu Kesho Saran. 2. Maulvi Abdul Hasan, Pleader. 3. Har Sahai Pathak. 4. Munshi Mazhar Hasan. 5. Qazi Abrar Ahmad.	
Sambhal	1. Imam-ud-din Khan of Sarai Tarin. 2. Chaudhri Muhammad Khan of Chaudhri Sarai. 3. Misr Sital Parshad. 4. Munshi Hamid-ud-din of Tiwar Das Sarai. 5. Mazhar Ali Khan of Mian Sarai.	
Amroha	1. Sayyid Makbul Ahmad, Municipal Member. 2. Chaudhri Dhian Singh of Kant. 3. Sayyid Ali Muntazim Khan. 4. Chaudhri Bhagwat Das, Municipal Member. 5. Sayyid Ahmad-ud-din Khan.	
Bilari	1. Kuar Ganga Sahai. 2. Sahu Durga Parshad. 3. Chaudhri Kallian Singh of Chandaura. 4. Chaudhri Dhum Singh of Jargaon. 5. Mir Ghulam Ali zamindar of Chandpur Ganesh.	
Hasanpur	1. Muhammad Hasan Khan of Hasanpur. 2. Ghulam Muhammad Khan of ditto. 3. Muhammad Kifait-ul-lah Khan of do. 4. Maulvi Kutab-ud-din of Bachhraon. 5. Maulvi Nur-ul-haq of ditto.	
Thakurdwara	1. Sahu Puran Parshad. 2. Sahu Ram Rattan. 3. Najju Khan. 4. Chaudhri Girdhari Singh, zamindar of Surjanagar 5. Thakur Ishri Singh, zamindar of Sharifnagar.	

T. B. TRACY, Magistrate.

No. 50, dated Sháhjahánpur, the 12th August 1882.

From J. S. PORTER, Esquire, Collector of Sháhjahánpur, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to you, Nos. 350 and 355, dated 4th and 11th ultimo, respectively, on the subject of local self-government, I have the honour to report that I have conferred with the leading Native gentlemen of the district and with the existing district committee on the various points mooted in the G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June last.

2. It is generally agreed—

(1.) That the tahsíl board should be a branch of, and under the control of, the district committee; that its members should also be members of the district committee.

(2.) That for the present at least an official chairman and official secretary are indispensable to the district board.

(3.) That there is no objection to the tahsíl boards electing their own chairman.

(4.) That the Tahsíldar should be a member, but not the president or secretary of the tahsíl board.

(5.) That no elective system can be recommended.

With these views my own coincide. Nothing would better please the majority of the members of these committees than to be relieved from attendance at the meetings, and there must be some official member influential enough to be able to bring them together and form a quorum.

The members have so little idea of the transaction of public business that it would be courting certain failure to leave them to their own devices. They cannot at present walk alone.

I have already in my No. 4, dated 25th January 1882, reported at some length on the proposed introduction of some system for the appointment of members by election, to which I would beg to refer you. For the present the members should, I think, continue to be nominated.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

The following are the names I would propose for the tahsíl boards:—

Sháhjahánpur.

Mr. E. McAlister of Rosa.
Muhammad Tahir* of Sháhjahánpur.
Muhammad Mobin* ditto.
Dwarka Das ditto.
Barati Lal* ditto.
Rafat Ali* ditto.
Mohan Lal ditto.
Puran Singh of Bari.
Hargobind Banerji* of Sháhjahánpur.

Official.

The Tahsíldar.

Jalálabad.

Narain Singh* of Peraur.
Rup Singh of Khandhar.
Sawant Singh ditto.
Chitr Singh of Barua.
Imam Ali* of Jalálabad.
Saádat Ali* of ditto.

Official.

The Tahsíldar.

Tilhar.

Kalyan Singh of Gadhia.
Narain Sahai of Tilhar.
Yakud Ali ditto.
Zakir Ali* ditto.
Jhari Singh of Kakrowa.
Mr. E. Finch* of Meona.
Mr. J. Wright* of Katra.
Har Dayal of Khudaganj.

Official.

The Tahsíldar.

Pawáyan.

Raja Jegannath Singh.
Ajudhia Parshad* of Indalpur.
Bhajan Singh of Narainpur.
Nathu Singh of Gularia.
Mehrban Shah of Khotar.
Baldeo Singh of Jewan.
Dal Singh of Nahil.
Sardar Singh of Pawayan.

It will be found convenient to have eight or nine members at least on each tahsíl board, so that there may be no difficulty in forming a quorum, which might be fixed at three. I have marked with an asterisk such as are competent to act as secretaries. It seems unnecessary to lay down any hard-and-fast rules for the conduct of business, &c.: this had better be left to the discretion of the boards themselves; and it would certainly be premature to go to the expense of entertaining a separate establishment or building offices for the various committees. Sufficient accommodation is available in the public offices.

No. 300, dated Bareilly, the 14th August 1882.

From H. A. McCONAGHEY, Esquire, President, Local Committee, Bareilly, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your Nos. $\frac{350 \text{ and } 355}{\text{XXIII.—88}}$, dated respectively the 4th and 11th July 1882, and with reference to Government Resolutions Nos. 145 and 160, dated 21st and 29th June 1882, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:—

Constitution of local (tahsíli) boards and their relations with the district committee.—The general feeling amongst the native gentlemen whom I have consulted on the subject or have heard expressing their opinions at public meetings is that the tahsíli boards should be the executive of the district board within their local areas; that they should be under the direction and control of the district board, and that their members should also be members of the central board and should attend its meetings. On the 7th July 1882, the district committee, after full discussion at a crowded meeting, adopted a resolution to the above effect* and then proceeded, in conformity with the powers conferred on it under section 6 of Resolution I., to appoint from amongst the resident native gentlemen of each tahsíl a sufficient number of additional members to form with those already selected by Government workable boards for each sub-division. At the same meeting it was unanimously resolved to nominate the Magistrate and Collector of the district as chairman of the district committee for reasons well known to you. The bitter religious feelings which still undoubtedly exist and the balance of power which it is in consequence absolutely necessary to maintain both militate very strongly against the idea of appointing a native (who must perforce belong to either one or other of the predominant sects) to be president of the district committee: besides there is no native gentleman, amongst those willing to serve, of pre-eminence conspicuous enough to remove him beyond the jealousy of the other members.

* *Vide* copy of proceedings herewith forwarded.

* Lists of resident native gentlemen and persons of influence and respectability had been prepared, examined, and discussed before hand.

At the same meeting two vice-presidents—one a Hindu and the other a Muhammadan—were nominated. The election was by ballot, and it is instructive to find that the two gentlemen selected are both pensioned officers of Government and comparative outsiders; the one, Babu Ganga Parshad, being formerly one of our most trusted Deputy Collectors; and the other, Maulvi Ashfak Husain, being a fine specimen of a Central Province Extra Assistant Commissioner. These gentlemen were evidently selected—first, because they were less likely than others to be influenced by local cliques and prejudices; and second, because of their great experience in the kind of work which they would in their new position be called upon to undertake.

As far back as the 7th of June a non-official, Rai Kanhia Lal, an influential landlord and rais of the district, was chosen secretary.

We have therefore at the present moment a district committee consisting of 50 members, of whom only 12 are Government officials—the secretary (a good English scholar) and the two vice-presidents are non-officials—and each tahsíl is represented by at least six members, who can be formed into a local board when required. The meetings of the district committee are held in the Town Hall, to which

part of the local funds establishment and records have been removed. There will be no difficulty in future in preserving this arrangement.

The local boards can for a time be accommodated at the tahsíls, but they should as soon as possible be provided with suitable places to meet in. They will also require small separate establishments, and in the course of time records will accumulate.

Is it practicable that Tahsíldars should cease to be members of central and tahsíl local boards? The concensus of opinion is that it is neither practicable nor advantageous at present to exclude Tahsíldars from either board. In the central committee their removal would be a distinct loss without any compensating gain: the committee would be deprived of their local knowledge as well as their advice based on practical experience, whilst their removal could further the interests of the committee in no way that I can see. The non-official element is quite strong enough already. The local boards without their Tahsíldars would, I fear, be, for some years to come, as sheep without shepherd. It will be the Tahsíldar's duty to foster and encourage these boards at the commencement, and unless they are members themselves this cannot well be done.

The practicability of forming some kind of elective body to whom the nomination of members might in future be entrusted.—The educated and intelligent classes are no doubt greatly taken with the idea of election, and think it a panacea for many evils and abuses; and when they are pressed to explain how its principles can be applied, very little information of any practical use can be elicited. Election is in every one's mouth, but few or none can point out how the ordinary country zamindar or village money-lender can be taught to appreciate the privileges of being an elector and to sacrifice his time and ease by going perhaps a day's journey over a bad road to vote for some one he does not care two straws for.

My own fixed idea is that until the electors *are forced* to take an interest in the persons whom they elect, they will care little about the bare privileges of a vote; but let it once be brought home to them that the members of their local board are real powers over them for good or evil, and they will soon bestir themselves to attend at elections, and will soon also appreciate the value of a vote. Before, therefore, any system of election is elaborated, let events be awaited by us as well as by the community from whom the electors will have to be chosen. In the meantime the nomination system will answer reasonably well.

EXTRACT paras. XXVII. and XXVIII. from the Proceedings of a Meeting of the Local Committee held on the 7th July 1882.

XXVII.—G. O. No. 145, dated the 21st June 1882, was laid before the committee and explained to the members. After a long discussion about the appointment of a chairman, it was decided that in this city, owing to the wide differences in religion and reluctance of the native members for the present to accept the honour, the Collector and Magistrate be asked to retain the office of chairman until experience should enable them to act for themselves. The motion was unanimously carried. At the suggestion of the president that there should be two vice-presidents, one a Hindu and the other a Muhammadan, one of whom would act as chairman while the president was out in camp or could not otherwise attend the meeting, it was proposed that votes of the members be taken. This was done, and by a majority of votes Babu Ganga Parshad and Maulvi Ashfak Husain were elected vice-presidents.

XXVIII.—Read para. 3 of the above-quoted order.

The committee was unanimously of opinion that the third plan suggested therein is the most suitable for this district and approves of its adoption. The district committee already comprises a number of non-official native gentlemen resident in the interior of the district, but in several tahsíls the members at present are not sufficient to form efficient local boards. To ensure that such boards, when constituted, shall at once comprise a sufficient number of local representatives, the committee under the powers vested in them under section 6 of Resolution I. appoint the following additional members :—

Aonla Tahsíl.

Babu Girdhari Lal.
Pandit Ajudhia Parshad.
Maulvi Ashraf Ali Khan.

Mírganj Tahsíl.

Thakur Baldeo Singh (Oudh)
Maulvi Farid-ud-din (Lamkan).
Pande Kewal Sahai (Haldi).
Makaraj Mewa Ram (Narkhera).

Nawabganj Tahsíl.

Maulvi Vali Husain Khan (Atanga).
Lala Dori Lal (Nawabganj).
Maulvi Inamulla.
Sayyid Nadir Husain.

Faridpur Tahsíl.

Thakur Kewal Singh (Piparthara).
Pandit Jamnadin (Faridpur).

Baheri Tahsíl.

Sayyid Husain Ali.
Lala Behari Lal (Kicha).
Lala Dya Ram (Behar).
Lala Janki Ram (Sahora).

In the event of local board being sanctioned for the Bareilly tahsíl, the committee suggest that the following members from amongst their number be selected. These members have all been voted for :—

Munshi Nirotan Singh.
Balri Ram Sarup.
Munshi Jiwan Sahai.
Lala Damodar Das.
Maulvi Ashfak Husain.
Maulvi Tajamul Husain.
Malik Muhammad Vali Khan.
Maulvi Talib Husain.

RAMNARAIN,
Joint-Secretary.

KANHAYA LAL,
Secretary Local Committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{4162}{153}$, dated Allahabad, the 16th August 1882.

From J. W. QUINTON, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Allahabad Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to furnish the report called for in Government Orders Nos. 145 and 160 dated respectively the 21st and 29th of June last, together with the reports of District Officers.

2. The subjects on which report is required are—(*a*) the nomination of fit persons to serve on tahsíl boards: (*b*) the propriety of maintaining district and tahsíl boards together; and if they be so maintained, the manner in which each should be constituted, and the system under which the local boards should manage their business and correspond with the central board: (*c*) whether the Tahsíldár should be a member of tahsíl boards: (*d*) the possibility of making speedy arrangements for placing the district committees under non-official chairmen, and an explanation of the reasons why this cannot be done in places where an exception is made: and (*e*) the practicability of forming some sort of an elective body to whom the nomination of members might be in future entrusted.

3. On the first point, the qualifications for such persons were laid down to be—(1) in case of members of existing district boards ability and willingness to serve on tahsíl boards; and (2) in case of others, acceptability (in the opinion of the principal persons of each tahsíl and of the district committee) to the residents of the tahsíl, and fitness to represent its various interests and requirements.

4. In calling the attention of District Officers to the Government Orders, I directed that in case the district committees, as at present constituted, failed to furnish a sufficient supply of suitable members for tahsíl boards, the Collector himself, or one of his Assistants, should hold a meeting of the principal residents of each tahsíl at the tahsíli, and, in consultation with them, select the persons best suited according to the qualifications laid down by Government to sit on tahsíl boards.

5. This has been done in four out of the six districts. In Jaunpur Mr. Ward had no leisure to visit the tahsíls, and in Hamírpur Mr. Twigg was tied to head-quarters by the want of a European Assistant and the illness of his Treasury Officer.

6. My instructions for tahsíl meetings were issued in the beginning of July, and during the last fortnight I have presided over meetings at the headquarters of each district, at which the proposed nominations of members of tahsíl boards, and most of the other points referred to in para. 2, were discussed.

7. Generally, I may observe that there has been no difficulty in most districts in procuring five members for each tahsíl board, though I cannot say that in the backward districts, such as Bánda and Hamírpur, the intellectual and educational qualifications, contemplated by the Government of India in para. 10 of the Resolution of 18th May, are always attainable. It is not possible, however, to obtain these everywhere, in conjunction with that local knowledge and local interest which are equally insisted on. Any smaller number than five seemed likely to be of little use. The fact must be recognised by Government that throughout almost the whole division the scheme of tahsíl boards is looked on by the people most affected as an addition to their burdens rather than to their privileges; and that it is accepted because "it is the order," and not welcomed as a boon. The smaller the number of the members, the more irksome will be the obligation of attendance, from the necessity for forming a quorum; while at the same time the representative character of the board will be proportionately lessened, and the difficulty of securing both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members will be increased.

8. In the tahsíli and district meetings the attempt has been made as far as possible to secure representatives of the different classes of proprietors throughout the tahsíl, *e.g.*, Thákurs, Brahmins, Lodhis or Kurmis, and Muhammadans. The admission of low caste proprietors, such as Lodhis or Kurmis, is undoubtedly distasteful to high caste Hindus and respectable Musalmans. The Rája of Bára at once refused to serve on a committee with a Kurmi, a caste of which no member had ever sat down in the presence of him or his ancestors; and I observed the same feeling very thinly disguised by Muhammadan gentlemen at Hamírpur: but when one-third of the villages of a single pargana belonged to lodhi zamindárs, it was impossible to exclude them from what professed to be a representative body for that area.

9. In Jaunpur the large zamíndárs are all non-resident; and my suggestion that tenants-at-fixed-rates, who are practically headmen of these villages, should be represented on the tahsil boards, did not seem to commend itself to the meeting: but, as I have before stated, no tahsíl meetings had been held in this district, and the attendance at the headquarters meeting was scanty, there being only five non-official native gentlemen present. Mr. Ward, in para. 5 of his report, states that measures will now be taken to constitute the boards, by adding so many men to those already appointed for each tahsíl as will complete that number. I have not however up to date received any further communication from his *locum tenens* on the subject.

10. In Cawnpore, at the request of the Collector, I attended the district meeting before the tahsíli meetings had been held, and I issued supplementary instructions to him in accordance with what appeared to be the feeling which prevailed among the native gentlemen who met me there. Mr. Barstow in his second, third, and fourth paras. thus describes the action taken:—

"The instructions contained in the second para. of the latter letter have now been carried out, and each of the outlying tahsílies have been visited by one of the district staff for the purpose of consulting the principal persons resident there, as to the fittest persons to be elected members of the tahsíl boards.

"The procedure adopted was that indicated in the third para. of your letter above referred to. The principal lambardárs of the different classes holding land in the tahsíl were in attendance, and were called upon to nominate members of the proposed committee from among their own body. It occasionally happened that owing to the large numerical majority of a single caste being present, in order to adequately represent the population and landed interest in the tahsíl, that two nominations were allowed to one caste. On the other hand, only one nomination could be given to several castes, who had to be grouped together to form a sufficiently numerous body of electors. In no case was any want of harmony produced by this being done.

"Care was taken to make each election as free as possible from the influence of the Tahsíldar, who, as far as could be judged, seconded the efforts of the district staff in this direction."

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

11. In Fatehpur tahsíl meetings were held by Messrs. Mellor and Punnett, and on the 8th instant I presided over a very largely attended district meeting at head-quarters. The result was the selection of five suitable members for each tahsíli board, in case their services should be required. I explained here and elsewhere that the present proceedings were merely of a deliberative character, and that the ultimate shape they would take would depend on the decision of Government.

12. In Allahabad tahsíl meetings were held,—seven by Mr. Patterson, and two by Mr. Steel: and on the 28th ultimo I presided at a very large district meeting, where the nominations were discussed and some changes made in accordance with suggestions made by gentlemen present. The Collector writes that he thinks the proposed committees fairly representative and acceptable to the people generally.

13. The district meetings of Hamírpur and Bánda were held on the 7th and 11th instant.

In Hamírpur Mr. Twigg, as I explained, had been unable to hold tahsíl meetings, but the attendance at the district meeting was very large.

The members quite overflowed the dimensions of a large *shamiána* pitched in a grove on the banks of the Jumna. There was unbroken unanimity; in fact, the people of the Bundelkhand districts are in a more backward condition as regards education and mental activity than those of the older provinces, and the prevalent feeling was that they would do what they were told.

Mr. Twigg's report has not yet reached me, and I do not delay this letter, which is overdue, for it. I shall forward it in continuation.

14. In Bánda members for the boards had been selected at tahsíl meetings held by Mr. LaTouche and his Assistants, but the head-quarters meeting was largely attended, filling the large room known as the *Natchghar* in the late Nawab's palace.

The representatives here had been carefully selected, and passed the ordeal of the meeting's criticisms.

I am not sure whether I am at liberty to question the propriety of the orders issued by the Government of India in para. 16 of the Resolution of the 18th May, respecting the style of address to be used in all official correspondence with native members of local boards during their tenure of office. It appears to me, however, right to draw attention to the fact that these orders may have the effect of depreciating the value of the titles of "Rae" or "Rao Bahadur" or "Khan Bahadur" in popular estimation, by increasing enormously the number of persons so honored, and by the bestowal of these titles on persons who, however well qualified to sit on tahsíl boards as representative men, are yet of such low caste or humble station in society as to render the application to them of the titles objectionable in the eyes of their more respectable fellow-countrymen. Natives of India do not look on caste and social distinctions with the unprejudiced views which have gradually won their way in European States, and men of the higher orders of society in India are very jealous of what appears to them unauthorised intrusion on their privileges. At present, according to the list published in 1881, there are only 43 native gentlemen enjoying such titles in the North-Western Provinces; whereas if we allow five members to each tahsíl, this list will be swollen by an addition of 900 names.

The present holders of the titles are men to whom they have descended by inheritance, or who have received them in reward for conspicuous loyalty or other good service; whereas if these orders be acted on, every petty zamíndar called to sit on a tahsíl board, where his services may be confined to a silent vote once a month, will flourish as a Rae or Khan Bahadur for his term of office, to the discontent of others who already bear those titles, and of those who look forward to earning them in the way in which they have been hitherto won.

16. The next question for discussion is the relations that should subsist between the two committees, for it has generally been taken for granted that it is the wish of Government that the district committee should be maintained: and in connection with this the point had to be considered as to the work each committee had to do.

17. In most tahsíls the boards will have merely to look after the expenditure grants for education, medical charity, and repairs to unmetalled roads. When analysed, this resolves itself into something very small. Medical charity, *i.e.*, dispensaries, exists in only few tahsíls; the great bulk of the educational grant consists of fixed charges for establishments; and the allotments for repairs of unmetalled roads have been cut down to a very low figure. The duties of the tahsíl boards would thus be to look after the expenditure of grants for repairs to school-houses, dispensaries (where they exist), and roads, averaging throughout the division probably Rs. 700 or Rs. 800 per annum. They would also of course represent to the district committee the requirements of their jurisdictions to be borne in mind in drawing up the budgets.

18. Again the district committee is supposed theoretically to control the tahsíl boards: but how is such control to be exercised? The present rule requiring district committees to meet once a month was passed before receipt of the latest orders of the Government of India insisting on the appointment of tahsil boards, and already is giving rise for grumbling. The Collector of Allahabad writes:—"Certainly district committees should not meet oftener. Members living in distant tahsíls complain much of the expense of attending the meetings, which have been held monthly since April: and I have reason to believe that some of them have been obliged to spend not less than Rs. 300 on each visit to Allahabad. Already the attendance is falling off: the inevitable result of frequent meetings will be to throw all powers into the hands of a few members residing in Allahabad. I am not sure that it would not be sufficient if the district committee met half-yearly."

In Bánda and Hamírpur, where roads are impassable in the rains, and outlying tahsíls are far distant from headquarters, the same feeling was strongly expressed; and at Jaunpur the attendance was on the occasion of my visit very small. To require therefore monthly meetings of tahsíl boards, and frequent meetings of district committees for the purpose of controlling them, would soon result in no meetings being held at all, and all business coming to a standstill. If both committees co-exist, district committees can meet but seldom, and their functions must be of a very general nature, such as drawing up the budgets and apportioning allotments. The intermediate control of the proceedings of district boards must rest with the members at headquarters in charge of departments.

19. In the smaller districts, suct as Jaunpur and Hamírpur, the district committees may consist of an aggregate of the tahsíl boards; but in the others, containing a greater number of tahsíls, or where

distances are great and roads bad, the most acceptable proposal appeared to be that tahsíl boards should send two of their number as delegates to the district committees.

20. On the mode of transacting business, Mr. Ward makes the following observations, which seem to me deserving of serious attention :—

"The mode of transacting business to be adopted by the local boards and district committees can hardly be discussed with profit until it is known what business they are to transact. This business is connected with roads, schools, and dispensaries; but the powers and duties of the local boards and district committees in respect of these institutions have at best been very vaguely defined or understood. As I read the resolutions which have been issued on the subject, the position which the committees now occupy is that of executive agents to heads of departments. The latter allot funds, prescribe rules of business, detail instructions as to action, and audit accounts. In the Public Works Department especially, a system of account has been adopted which must completely bewilder any district committee, let alone a tahsíli board; and the entire control of the funds, with the exception of some formal sanctions in respect of petty works, is practically in the hands of the District Engineer. My ideal committees would hold a position in which the discharge of these functions would be inverted. The allotment of funds and the audit of accounts should be the business of the committee: their rules of business should surely, with the sanction of Government in the General Department, be made by themselves.

"On the other hand, for the *execution* of their works and the maintenance of their institutions, they should depend on their professional and skilled subordinates, regarding whose qualifications for the effective discharge of their duties, the head of their department should be best qualified to judge.

"If the object of the Government is to be realised, it appears to me that committees and local boards should be independent administrative (not executive) bodies, with fixed sources of income and defined objects of expenditure. In administrative action they should in fact supersede heads of departments within the area, and with reference to the objects for which they have been appointed. The relation which the heads of departments should bear to committees should be, I presume, something of the same nature as that held by Consulting Engineers to Railway Companies. I have made these remarks because it appears to me that if the present relative position of departments and committees is maintained, it will be simply impossible for tahsíli boards to transact any business at all."

21. There is no doubt that the amount of self-government conceded to the residents of a tahsíl is of an infinitesimal quantity, when the funds are in the first instance appropriated by a central Government, and the only task left to the people's representatives is to spend to the best advantage the small sums doled out to them for strictly defined objects. So far from this being regarded as a privilege, people not unnaturally look askance at it as an attempt on the part of Government to get work done gratis which should be paid for. The only result of the introduction of the system up to this time has been to overwhelm the Magistrate and Collector of the district, in his capacity as president of the district committee, with a mass of clerical work, in the shape of signatures to vouchers, bills, cheques, receipts, and the like, which were formerly signed by the departmental officers. Practically, the committee does not possess and cannot possess control over the great bulk of fixed charges; and the alteration of procedure in such matters of account was an useless addition to the duties of an overworked officer in order to keep up the fiction of decentralisation.

22. On the subject of the working of the two boards, Mr. Patterson writes :—

"With regard to clause (2), para. 2 of your letter, in my opinion it is absolutely essential, if there is to be any real training in self-government, that the tahsíl board, not the district committee, should be the unit of administration. The former alone possesses practical knowledge of the wants of each tract, and in it we have the only hope of obtaining real working bodies. The large district committees are chiefly talking bodies: in them the really representative men from the rural tracts do not venture to speak, while the men of advanced views but no local knowledge speak too much.

"No really sustained interest would be taken by unwieldy district committees in the details of administration, and eventually the whole direction would fall into the hands either of official members or of members residing near the headquarters.

"All initiative should come from the tahsíl committees. They should make all proposals with regard to dispensaries, roads, and schools. These would be considered by the district committee, who would allot funds and settle matters affecting the district as a whole, such as the alignment of roads running through more than one tahsíl, or the establishment of schools of more than local interest.

"The tahsíl committees should be placed in credit by the district committee to a certain amount, against which they should draw cheques payable at the tahsíl: but in regard to the expenditure of this money, and the supervision of the work entrusted to them, they should be independent of the district committee, although of course their accounts would be subject to the usual departmental checks. After all, they will at present have only *kucha* roads and a few schools and dispensaries to look after; and if they have not full control over them, they would soon cease to take any interest in their new duties. The more important metalled roads which would run through several tahsíls, and be in charge of the District Engineer, would naturally be supervised by the district committee.

"To sum up: the only hope of real local government is in small bodies managing small areas with really good local knowledge. Everything should be done to make these committees respectable; they should never meet in a tahsíl, but have a building of their own, not in any way under the control of the Tahsíldar—a place where they could meet at any time, and where their papers and accounts should be kept. A small office establishment is essential. The members could not be expected to keep up accounts, copy reports, &c., themselves. We should try to make the position an honourable and independent one, and as little harassing as possible."

23. The views of Mr. Mellor, the Collector of Fatehpur, are given from the following paragraphs of his report :—

"The next question was—How the clerical work of the sub-committees was to be done? and the conclusion arrived at was that as the work would be very small, there would be no difficulty in utilising

for the purpose the local schoolmaster, who could be paid some small addition to his present salary for his services.

"The sense of the meeting was then taken as to whether the Tahsíldárs should continue to be members of the committee and sub-committees. By far the greater number of the native gentlemen present expressed their opinion that it was necessary to retain the Tahsíldárs as members to ensure the work being done. I will give my own opinion on this point furthor on.

"So far as regards the result of the meeting held on the 8th instant, there still remain one or two points on which I will state my opinion.

"Is it possible to appoint a non-official president? There is only one native gentleman in this district who would, by reason of his family and position, sufficiently command the respect of the other members of the committee. This is Rája Lachhman Singh of Asothar. He would, I know, accept the position of chairman of the committee if offered to him, and would also be willing to devote as much time to the work as could be expected of him, nor is he wanting in intelligence. It seems to me, however, quite impossible to have a president who does not understand English. The mass of Government orders, the accounts, cheques, and reports regarding the work performed through the committee, are and must be in English; and it would be impossible for any one, who does not understand English, to superintend the details of the office work.

"Next, as to how the sub-committees are to work, and their relations to the sudder committee. As soon as sub-committees are appointed for each tahsíl, it will be quite unnecessary for the sudder committee to meet once a month. They would have to meet in order—(1) to make out their annual budget, (2) to consider the sanctioned allotments under each head, (3) to apportion to each sub-committee the funds to be expended by it, and (4) to pass their annual accounts and report. I therefore take it that a meeting once a quarter will be quite enough. At each such meeting a short progress report for the past three months, with vouchers for all expenditure, might be submitted by each sub-committee, and any doubtful point settled.

"Para. 3 of Government No. 145 says that each sub-committee might be placed in charge of the matters transferred to local control (*viz.*, Education, Sanitation, Medical Charity, and Public Works) within the limits of its tahsíl. There is in this district no fund for sanitation; and as there is no dispensary except the sudder dispensary, all the sub-committee would have to do, as regards medical charity, so far as I can see, would be to try and get more subscriptions from the zamíndárs for the sudder dispensary; and in reality their functions will be exercised almost entirely in the Departments of Education and Public Works.

"*First*, with regard to Education. The great bulk of the allotments under this head is for fixed and practically unvarying charges, *viz.*, pay of teachers. The sub-committee should, I presume, have the power to reduce and promote teachers from one grade to another, as well as to punish, appoint, and dismiss them, and reduce or start halkabandi schools, provided the allotments for expenditure on these heads be not exceeded; but the changes they would make would be very trifling and infrequent. There would then remain for the sub-committees to manage the expenditure under the heads following,—*viz.*, rent, scholarships, construction and repair of halkabandi schools and contingencies; and the total annual amounts at the disposal of each sub-committee will be roughly, according to a statement I have had made out, as follows:—

"Kora, Rs. 305; Kaliánpur, Rs. 228; Fatehpur, Rs. 597; Gházipur, Rs. 323; Khakhreru, Rs. 187; and Khaga, Rs. 317.

"*Secondly*, as to Public Works. I take it for granted that all large works, such as building bridges, &c., and all works connected with *pucka* roads, will as hitherto be carried out, not by the sub-committees, but by the District Engineer directly, though of course the sub-committees would be entitled and required to superintend and, if necessary, report on the progress made. Works of this kind are not carried out by local labourers merely, but require the employment of contractors, and the application of different rates for different kinds of work, which, with other technical details, it would be hopeless to expect the sub-committees to understand. There would remain then virtually only the *kucha* roads; and according to a statement I have had made out, each sub-committee would have to spend as follows:—Kora, Rs. 432; Kaliánpur, Rs. 413; Fatehpur, Rs. 769; Gházipur, Rs. 924; Khakhreru, Rs. 866; and Khaga, Rs. 456. I should fancy that the sub-committee would have little or no difficulty in carrying out these works. They would probably find it simple and easy to fiud villagers in their own estates who would take contracts for different roads or portion of roads, and they would themselves and through their servants watch the progress of the works.

"The mode in which the sub-committee would obtain and pay money for works under their charge may present some little difficulty. It would, I think, be advisable that a personal ledger account should be opened with each sub-committee at the tahsíl treasury. At the commencement of each quarter, a sum, sufficient to meet the estimated expenditure during the quarter, might be credited to the sub-committee, who would draw on their account by cheques signed by any two members at a regular meeting, and recorded in the proceedings.

"The sub-committees should I think meet twice a month, or perhaps even once a month would suffice between March and October, as all work connected with *kucha* roads would be carried out in the cold weather, and during the rest of the year there would be little for them to do, except to attend to matters relating to education. It is certainly desirable to make their duties as little irksome as possible.

"As suggested by the Commissioner, it will be easy to arrange that the schoolmaster, at the place where the sub-committees meet, should do their clerical work for them; but it would of course be understood that he would have nothing to do with the custody of any money, however small in amount, or with the drawing out of cheques or the payment of workmen.

"In para. 3 of Government Order No. 145 it is suggested that one of the members of the district committee should hold charge of a department, so as to maintain unity of action, &c. This is not only practical, but as regards educational and medical matters is the only plan which will ensure the work being properly done. At the same time no one but the Civil Surgeon can properly superintend matters relating to dispensary and medical charity, and (in this district) no one but an Assistant or Deputy

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Collector can take charge of the Education Department. I should recommend that these two officers be retained as members of the district committee, but without the power of voting on any matters at the committee meetings, and solely for the purpose of superintending the working of the two departments mentioned, and to bring before the committee all matters requiring decision. They could of course, when bringing anything before the committee, make any suggestions and recommendations they think proper. All correspondence between sudder committee and the sub-committees might be conducted through the Assistant Collector in charge of the department for educational matters; through the Civil Surgeon for what relates to dispensary, sanitation, and medical charity; and through District Engineer, under president's countersignature, for Public Works."

24. Mr. Barstow writes from Cawnpore on the same subject :—

"In accordance with the lines suggested in para. 3 of G. O. No. 145, each member nominated for a tahsíl board should be gazetted a member of the district committee. Each tahsíl board should meet on the 3rd of each month, examine and report on the Public Works accounts and progress report, pass educational and dispensary establishment bills relating to the local area under their control, and record such resolutions or recommendations to the district committee as may appear to them advisable. These bills will then be paid in the prescribed manner, and the proceedings will be laid before the officers at head-quarters in charge of the Educational, Medical, and Public Works and General Departments, who will lay them before the general district committee, the monthly meeting of which should be held not later than the 10th of each month for such action as may appear desirable. The officers in charge of the departments at head-quarters of the district will be at present the general secretary appointed by the president, who in this district is the Covenanted Assistant Collector. The officer in charge of the Educational Department is also the Joint-Magistrate.

"There are no non-official members willing and able to undertake these duties. The Civil Surgeon will be in charge of the Medical, and the District Engineer in charge of the Public Works Departments of the committee.

"There should be a fixed date for the monthly meeting of the district committee not later than the 10th of each month, or if the day fixed be a holiday, on the next succeeding working day.

"It will be optional for members of tahsíli boards to attend any meeting of the district board, but it is not anticipated that in ordinary meetings many members from outlying tahsíls will be present. The only two exceptions to this general rule would be the meetings for the preparation of the budget and for the adoption of the annual report, to which all members will be invited to attend.

"The above are the only details which I can suggest regarding the inter-relation of tahsíli and district committees."

25. Mr. LaTouche, with reference to the special circumstances of Bánda, writes that—

"The members of the Karwi tahsíl boards represented the hardship to which they would be put if often obliged to attend district committees at Bánda, but did not object to come twice in the year to the head-quarters of the district. The meeting was of opinion that the district committee should not meet oftener than twice a year: one meeting for budget, and one for accounts. It was also decided that the three tahsíl boards in the Karwi sub-division ought to be under the control of the Joint-Magistrate at Karwi, and the five tahsíl boards at Bánda under the control of the Magistrate of the district."

26. The next point for discussion is the presence of the Tahsíldars on the tahsíl boards. On this point there was practical unanimity at all the meetings I attended. A few persons at Allahabad and Cawnpore, chiefly belonging to the English-speaking class, and one man at Fatehpur, objected: but the native members, as a rule, professed their belief that, for the present at least, the Tahsíldar must be a member of the board if any work whatever was to be done.

27. I summarise the opinions of the Collectors :—

Mr. Barstow considers that the advantage to the administration, which will be secured by the experience of the Tahsíldars, outweighs the danger of any diminution of the independence of the non-official members by the presence in the board of these officers.

Mr. Ward expresses the general feeling to be in favour of the Tahsíldárs.

Mr. Patterson observes—"The general wish is certainly that Tahsíldárs should be members of the tahsíl committees. Only one or two gentlemen of English education and ideas, and one large landholder who is on unfriendly terms with the Tahsíldár in whose jurisdiction he lives, expressed an opposite opinion. I am certain that it would be premature to form these committees without the Tahsíldárs at present. No doubt there is a danger that the Tahsíldárs will absorb an undue amount of the power of the committee. But, on the other hand, in most tahsíls there is a certainty that without the Tahsíldárs the committee will do no work at all: without the presence of the Tahsíldár on the committee, I believe that many of these bodies would not continue to meet at all, certainly not voluntarily; and it can hardly be intended to force the people to govern themselves. On the other hand, if the Tahsíldár be a member, he will gradually be brought under the influence of public opinion as expressed in the committee, and the members will learn by degrees that they are not dependent on him, and that they have really the direction of affairs in their hands. Surely it will be wiser to encourage progress in this way than to attempt at once to eliminate, from all share in local control, the officer who up to this time has been the visible representative of a purely personal Government, and whose influence over the people has been closer and more direct than that of any other agent of the administration."

At Bánda Mr. LaTouche writes that it was unanimously decided that the meeting should be held at the head-quarters of the tahsíl; and, with the exception of one speaker, all the native gentlemen present were strongly of opinion that, at least for a few years, the work would not progress at all unless the Tahsíldár sat on the tahsíl boards. Mr. LaTouche has in his own report not given his own opinion, which I believe inclined the other way. He will doubtless have an opportunity of urging it before the Naini Tal committee, of which he is a member.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

28. Mr. Mellor would exclude the Tahsíldár. I give his views in his own words:—

"Finally, I must record that I dissent entirely from the conclusion arrived at by the majority of the meeting at which you were present, as to the advisability of retaining the Tahsíldárs as members of the sub-committees. If you were to ask me to point out one of the 30 members nominated for the tahsíl sub-committees who was in my opinion actuated by anything like public spirit or a desire to have anything to do with local self-government for its own sake, I should be unable to name a single man. One and all accept the position because they know the Government wishes it, and they fancy their *izzat* is increased, but they have no wish to do any work. As I have shown above, the work the sub-committees will have to do will be light and simple. They require no help, and if they are only made to do the work, they will very likely before long take an interest in it. If, however, the Tahsíldár remains a member of the sub-committee, he will be the working partner in the concerns. The others will know that the Collector will hold the Tahsíldár responsible, and that the Tahsíldár will get the work done without their troubling themselves. They will also always fancy that the Tahsíldár is the mouthpiece of the Collector, and will never venture to differ from him in opinion. In short, it is my firm conviction that if the Tahsíldárs continue to be retained as members of the local committees, the wishes of the Government as to the development of local government will never be realised in anything but name."

29. No doubt there is risk of the evil consequences which Mr. Mellor forebodes from the presence of the Tahsíldár on the tahsíl boards; but on the other side is the indisputable fact that the people themselves wish for him, and will probably fail to act without him, and that most of the District Officers consider that for a time at least it is essential that the Tahsíldár be on the board. In this opinion, for the reasons given for it, I altogether concur. It is besides the most necessary to carry the people with us if the present scheme is to be made a reality; and to go right against their strongly expressed wishes in the first instance is not likely to enlist them in favour of what is to many an unintelligible novelty. If, for appearance sake, it be thought advisable to let the Tahsíldár, as was suggested at Bánda, be a member without a vote, I see no objection. I do not believe the possession of the vote would affect his influence one way or the other.

30. At most meetings discussions were raised as to the place of meetings of tahsíl boards, and the clerical aid they would require for the performance of their duties.

Generally speaking, the head-quarters of the tahsíl, where the tahsíl is conveniently situated, and in other cases any large town in the pargana more easily accessible to all the members, were selected. A school-house, when available, was thought to be the fittest building for the board to meet in; and the local schoolmaster, where qualified, the fittest clerk: a small addition to his pay would no doubt reconcile him to the extra duties.

In some districts, notably Bánda, where doubts were expressed as to finding qualified schoolmasters at the tahsíls, the clerical work must be done by the Tahsíldár himself.

This would probably lead to terseness of style and an avoidance of useless report—very desirable objects.

31. The question of the presidency of the district committee must, in my opinion, be similarly decided.

The qualities which according to Government must attach to a non-official chairman of a district committee are knowledge of business, leisure, and influence; and if a person combining these qualifications in a fair degree can be found willing to undertake the duties, I understand the orders of Government to be that it will sanction his election when he is chosen by the committee.

32. I may at once state my belief that such a person cannot be found in any district of this division; and that if he were found, he would have small chance of being elected. District committees made up of Europeans, Hindus, and Muhammadans, are composed of somewhat jarring elements which are more likely to come into collision in districts than in municipalities, where constant intercourse smooth such natural asperities. The only impartial representative of all parties is undoubtedly the District Officer, and he is the only one whose control will be patiently acquiesced in by all.

33. It is perhaps unnecessary to discuss how far self-government and decentralisation are really carried out by declaring, under a disqualification, the person whom nine committees out of ten would elect, and subjecting such committees to the direct pressure of highly centralised departments, against whose invasions the Collector has hitherto been the only though too often an ineffectual bulwark; for, as I stated before, I do not believe that any qualified non-official chairman is likely to be elected in the division, but I give the views of the following District Officers on the subject:—

34. Mr. Ward writes:—"In this district a very decided opinion has been expressed on all sides that for the present the Collector of the district is the only suitable president of the district committee, and the Tahsíldár of tahsíli boards. If committees be allowed to elect their own presidents, the result for some time to come will be the same as if the presidents were appointed by the Government. I would however most certainly allow both committees and tahsíli boards the power of electing their president with two provisos—first, that once elected the president be removable only by Government or on his own resignation; secondly, that the president have no vote but a casting vote.

"On this head I would venture to make the following remarks:—First in these provinces the Collector of a district has for years occupied a position between the Government and the people which is as nearly that of a popular representative as could have been devised under the circumstances. The orders just issued on the last Revenue Administration Report contain the words—'*The District Officers, to whom, as they are in immediate contact with the people, the Government looks primarily for inquiry, information, and advice.*' Could any English monarch have addressed words of stronger import to any of the people's burgesses sent to represent them in Parliament. Nor is there the slightest exaggeration in them. The Government has, in its care for the people's wants, accorded to its District Officers a liberty of speech and independence of judgment enjoyed probably by no other service in the world, and the majority of enactments which have been passed for the welfare of the people have resulted from the labours of men who have been Collectors. At this moment I am discharging the duty of a representative of the people in addressing to you this letter. If, then, the Collector be the true representative in these provinces of the interests of the people, why should there be any scruple as to

his holding his natural position in the deliberations of the people themselves for their own government? But, secondly, should English officials in India, who have debarred themselves from all effective political interest in the government of their own country, be also debarred from all political action in the country of their adoption? Must the energy of all the young men who come out to this country with high aims for its improvement be restricted in future to the judicial decision of cases and the collection of revenue and taxes? Are they in their leisure hours to have no objects of interest but their own amusements? In former days, before committees were overshadowed by departments, it was a proud day for an Assistant when he first took his seat with the other leading men of the district on the road and ferry fund or local agency committee. In helping to administer the local fund, he was constantly brought into contact with all classes of the people, and took, I believe, a far greater interest in his division of the district than it is possible to excite now. Surely by excluding officials from all share in the privileges and responsibilities of local self-government, injustice is likely to be done to a body of men who are already at a disadvantage with respect to the natives, in that they have no voice in the administration of their own country.

"In conclusion, I would respectfully submit that if the sources of income and objects of expenditure of committees and local boards be defined, and also their position with regard to heads of departments, all further details can be worked out in the district without difficulty. An Act, similar to the Municipal Committee's Act, is required to give them power over their funds. When that position has been secured, they will work of themselves: without it, no device can keep them going."

35. Mr. Mellor thinks that Rája Lachhman Singh of Asothar would, by reason of his family and position, command the respect of the other members of the committee, and would accept the chairmanship if it were offered to him; but the gentleman is unacquainted with English, and without the knowledge of English the office-work could not be supervised. All real power would fall into the hands of the English clerk.

Messrs. Barstow, La Touche, and Patterson do not notice the point, but the opinion of the latter I know to be in favour of the continuance of the present arrangement as to the chairmanship of the district committee; and at Bánda and Hamírpur persons possessing the requisite qualifications could certainly not be found.

36. I now approach the last question for report, *viz.*, the practicability of forming some sort of an elective body to whom the nomination of members might in future be entrusted—a subject the discussion of which, as might be supposed, took up by far the larger share of the time of the meetings, and, as on the other points, I give the views of the District Officers:—

37. *Allahabad.*—Mr. Patterson writes as follows:—

"With regard to election there is, I think, no doubt that the majority of the land-holding classes do not wish for it, and that the higher class of native gentlemen would object to present themselves as candidates, as they would look on it as an indignity to compete with men whom they would regard as their social inferiors.

"The more advanced classes who have learnt English, on the other hand, are in favour of election.

"This is unselfish on their part if they understand the position, for I am certain not one of them would obtain a seat if the rural classes really voted.

"The advanced English-speaking natives are clearly not representative men: they are placed on a district committee because District Officers naturally wish to have the assistance of the most intelligent men. Under a real elective system they would be for many a day excluded from district committees, though they would find room in municipal committees. But the great difficulty would be to make any elective system popular among a people who would take no interest in it and do not want it.

"The elective system has long been in force in the Allahabad Municipality, where there is comparatively a very intelligent constituency. Yet not one-fiftieth of those entitled to vote take the trouble to record their votes, and there is absolutely no competition for seats on the committee. What can be expected then among the zamindárs of a rural tract who are infinitely behind the townsmen in intelligence and comprehension of public affairs?

"It is right that I should point out the difficulties in the way of introducing election for tahsíl and district committees, and that I should inform you of the true state of the popular feeling.

"I do not by any means say that the difficulties are insuperable, and personally I should like to see the elective system introduced. I fear the results at first may be disappointing, but people only learn anything through repeated failures, and not much harm in this case can be done in the process.

"The great object is to introduce the system in such a way as not to harass the people.

"They fear that they will be forced to go to the tahsíli to record their votes, and they hate the trouble and expense of the journey on account of a business which they do not consider their own.

"This I found a very common feeling when I sounded the people about election.

"I think that zamindárs should be able to record their votes without leaving their own villages.

"I need not say to you that no suggestions of any value as to an elective system have been received from any native gentleman.

"This is not to be wondered at, as the whole subject is new to them.

"The general wish of the meeting, you will remember, was that only men of large property should vote. It was suggested with universal approval that a zamindar who paid a certain revenue (Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 5,000 was mentioned as the limit) should be entitled to vote, and that for each additional payment of this amount another vote should be conferred.

"I need not say that this idea is narrow and illiberal to a degree, and I only mention it to show the general standard of public feeling on such subjects.

"The very idea of giving votes to tenants was scouted as absurd.

"We have a ready-made elective body in the lambardárs of villages, an electorate at the same time representative and not unwieldy.

"I would make the constituency, not the tahsíl, but the division of the tahsíl known as the kanúngo's circle. This would furnish a much handier elective body than the tahsíl.

"In the nine tahsíls of this district there are 24 such divisions: one tahsíl has four, four have three, and four have two divisions.

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"Each division should return two members, but no tahsíl should be represented by more than two members in the district council, inasmuch as the arrangement of the circles is based to a great extent on area. There is no reason why a large, thinly-populated tahsíl like Khairágarh, with four kanúngos' circles, should have more influence than a smaller but more compact and populous tahsíl like Cháil with three circles. But instead of calling the people together and taking their votes individually, I would take their votes by patwáris circles.

"Each kanúngo's circle on an average contains roughly 50 patwáris' circles, and each such circle five villages.

"The lambardárs of each circle might be called together and asked to vote for two men to represent the sub-division. The circles are so compact that a certain amount of corporate spirit might be expected to develope in them after a short experience of the right of selecting representatives. The patwári could record the votes of the lambardárs, and, if necessary, they could afterwards be attested by the kanúngo, and officers on tour could easily ensure a correct record of votes.

"The men chosen by the majority of circles would represent the sub-division (the kanúngo's circle).

"It would not do to allow the votes to be taken by villages. Some villages have an area of two or three acres, and yet every village must have a lambardár. On the other hand, the patwáris' circles are tolerably equal. If each circle be allowed to make two nominations, the landed interest will be very fairly represented.

"Eventually tenants must be represented, but at starting I would not try this. The ruling classes would be suspicious and obstructive, and the tenants are two backward to take advantage of the power which would be conferred on them. After all, it is only since 1832 that tenants have had votes for English counties.

"The great object at first should be to introduce an elective system which shall be as simple and as little as possible opposed to the feelings of the classes, who in the absence of our Government would be the governing classes. Any attempt to introduce a system based on the advanced lines of modern liberalism would result in utter failure.

"There can be no doubt as to the abstract rights of cultivators to be represented as from the results of their labour the funds are obtained which will be disposed of by committees.

"I do not think that at present the trading classes should be represented on these committees, as they do not contribute to these funds. For the same reason I would have no educational or professional franchises for the districts, though I recommended them for municipalities.

"I would avoid all 'fancy franchises,' and go on the broad principle that those who contributed towards the local funds should have a voice in their disposal."

38. *Jaunpur.*—Mr. Ward in paras. 6, 7, and 8 of his letter quoted below gives the opinion of the meeting, which, however, I have before observed was by no means of a representative character; and while accepting the conclusions of the meeting with certain provisos, he would still give the preference to a scheme of election formerly recommended by himself in a letter to this office, the pertinent portions of which are also extracted:—

"At the meeting in question, the suggestion which seemed to secure most adherents as to the mode of election was that a number of electors for each tahsíl should be nominated in the first instance by the Tahsíldár. A property qualification was discussed, but two very pertinent objections were urged against it: First, the difficulty of fixing the amount at such a figure as would in each tahsíl secure an electorial body neither too large nor too small; secondly, that any qualification of this kind would be likely, in the present state of society, to exclude from the electorate persons who by their reputation for honesty, prudence, and good sense, are now in the position of leaders. I may add to the first objection a consideration which I had not the opportunity of bringing to the notice of the meeting, but which has often forced itself on my attention in dealing with the municipal system of election, *viz.*, the difficulty of ascertaining the property of individuals. In India, property as a rule belongs to families, and the greatest care is often necessary to prevent an individual from assuming to himself a qualification to which he is entitled only as a representative of a family. I remember an instance in the Meerut district of a member of the municipal committee, generally supposed to be of considerable wealth, who, as I afterwards discovered, had dissipated the whole of the income which he could claim from the family property, who was in debt, and who with the greatest difficulty, in order to prevent scandal, refunded a deficit of something under Rs. 10 from some money entrusted to him for relief.

"There can, I think, be no question that in introducing the system of election among the people with whose social customs we are so imperfectly acquainted, and who at present possess in so imperfect a degree the faculty of giving precise and accurate information on these points, the method which should be first tried should be of the most rudimentary kind.

"For this reason I still adhere to the recommendation I made in my No. $\frac{173}{XIII.-246}$, of a method of election still more informal and rudimentary than recording the votes of nominated electors; but I am willing to admit that the latter method is practicable and with certain provisions would be likely to answer well. These provisions are the following:—The number of nominated electors should be so large as to preclude all possibility of cliquism. Once nominated they should remain on the list for life. No area of any extent should be left without its elector. In this district there might be one in almost every square mile. Lastly, it should be expressly stipulated that the system of nomination is only temporary, and that persons or classes desirous of having a vote should be allowed to urge their qualifications.

"I think that it is very desirable that the non-official members of the committee should be appointed by election, if I may apply to that word its original meaning, free from the association of European thought. Englishmen are perhaps too apt to assume that a true election cannot take place without all the paraphernalia which centuries of practice have collected round the elective system in England. It is sometimes maintained that the principle of representation is unknown in India, and that election is impossible; yet over nearly the whole of the North-Western Provinces the lambardári system is election pure and simple. No difficulty is ever experienced in procuring representatives of castes or clans. Two or three hundred members of a *bhaiáchára* village will not keep a District Officer waiting two minutes while they agree who shall be their spokesman. It would of course be useless to attempt the

introduction at the outset of any precise and technical mode of election, to determine the qualifications of all the electors or to prescribe the method of taking the votes.

"Some rough proceeding of the following nature is all that is required. All its essential points could be provided in the Act. It would probably be convenient to divide the district into several electoral areas, and the most convenient unit would be the tahsíl.

"The Collector should be required to appoint some person, one of his Assistants or the Tahsíldár, or if he think fit some non-official gentlemen, to conduct the election. A notice should be circulated to every village, and posted up in every town within the area, that on a certain date and at a certain place such person will hold a meeting of all the principal inhabitants (*Raises*) for the purpose of electing members of the committee. Although the specification of electoral qualifications is unnecessary, disqualifications might be enumerated; certain qualifications also might be insisted on for members, as that they should be not less than 30 years old, possessed of a certain annual income, and not disqualified for the management of their own estates.

"The first business at the meeting would be to take the names of those present. The presiding officer would then read the Collector's *rubkarí* and proceed to take the opinion of the meeting. There would be a good deal of suggestion on the part of the president and a good deal of acquiesence on the part of the meeting; but the former would not suggest the name of any really ineligible or incompetent person, and the latter would not allow the selection of any person they really disliked.

"The presiding officer would be required to submit to the Collector a report stating what persons composed the meeting, and declaring upon his honor that the persons named as members were duly elected. Power should be reserved to the Collector, under certain exceptional circumstances, to annul the election and hold another in his own person.

"It would probably be advisable to adopt the practice generally in vogue in municipalities of each member being appointed for two years, but of half the number being relieved each year.

"I do not think there is any reason to apprehend that any serious complications would arise from such a system of election for many years to come.

"Defects would no doubt be noticed in time, and, as soon as they were found, the remedy would be provided.

"In course of time a system of election would perhaps be devised as elaborate in its details as that practiced in England.

"The great point now is to make a beginning, and such a procedure as I have described must have been the original form of most systems of election."

39. At Bánda the subject was discussed at some length, and the following plans, as stated by Mr. La Touche, commended themselves to the sense of the meeting:—

"On the subject of the election of members and the elective body of the future, it was suggested that a day be fixed, and that all the recorded lambardárs of the tahsíl be directed to attend at the tahsíl and bring with them the principal men of their villages; that this body, perhaps of 300 or 400 in each tahsíl, should then proceed to select fifty chief men, and that these fifty chief men should then from their own body elect five members of the committee. As an alternate it was suggested that the elective body should consist of recorded lambardárs and all persons who pay license-tax: that this body should meet on a fixed day at each tahsíl and proceed immediately to the election of five members for the tahsíl board.

"The meeting was of opinion that members should be elected annually. Opinion seemed to be divided as to whether members should be capable of re-election."

40. In Cawnpore the members at present nominated were selected after a rough sort of election by the different classes of lambardárs, thus described by Mr. Barstow:

"Care was taken to make each election as free as possible from the influence of the Tahsíldárs, who, as far as could be judged, seconded the efforts of the district staff in this direction."

41. At Fatehpur Mr. Mellor gives the conclusions of the meeting in the following words:—

"The constitution of a body of electors, by whose votes members should in future be elected, was next discussed. It was proposed that the lambardárs of the district would form a suitable body of electors. Lala Anand Sahai proposed that to those should be added all inhabitants of the district who had passed the entrance examination of the Calcutta University. This proposal fell very flat and met with no approval. It was suggested that the members of the *panchayats* of Act XX. of 1856 towns might be added as representatives of the mahajan class and urban population. This too was not approved of. It was finally agreed that the lambardárs alone should form the electing body; but as there were nearly 3,000 lambardárs in the district, and it would be a work of difficulty to collect the votes of so large a body, it was agreed that some limit, with reference to the amount of Government revenue paid by the body of zamíndárs whom a lambardár represented, should be fixed in order to qualify him for a vote."

For Hamírpur I must refer to Mr. Twigg's report, which will follow this.

42. It will be observed that all districts propose to avail themselves of the system of representation which exists for certain purposes already among the landholding classes, and this proposal is undoubtedly based on a sound and intelligible principle. The landholding classes are those who contribute the funds, the administration of which is now to be entrusted to tahsíl boards, and the lambardárs are their chosen representatives.

Should it be determined to make over to the boards the administration also of the license tax, it will not be difficult to give the tax-payers in each tahsíl the opportunity of choosing a member from among themselves. Personally I am opposed to this measure for reasons stated in a report to the Board of Revenue, which need not here be recapitulated. In Bánda it was recommended that the lambardárs should bring with them the headmen (*mukhias*) of their villages, and the Native members asserted that there was no fear of a lambardár bringing the wrong men.

The difference between the schemes proposed is as to the way such an unwieldy body of electors might be managed.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

43. The scheme of electing two members for every kanúngo's circle, suggested from Allahabad, could not at present be applied in the permanently-settled districts; but there seems no reason why some such plan should not be adopted where the circles are well-known and well-defined. Electoral areas must be small if we are to have the local knowledge and local interest which Government wish to secure. I think this plan on the whole preferable to that of the double election recommended at Bánda with the same object. This latter proposal looks well on paper, but I fear that in practice it would prove too complicated and create a distaste to the scheme at first starting.

This might, however, be tried where the kanúngo's circles are not clearly defined or are unsuitable for the purposes of election.

44. The other plans suggested seem to me inferior to these two.

45. In any system of election I would reserve a veto for the Collector to exercise in case of any obviously unsuitable candidate. I do not think reading and writing should be insisted on universally as qualifications for membership, but it would be manifestly impossible to work a board on which none of the members could read or write. A man declared to be disqualified to manage his own estate under Act XIX. of 1873 should obviously not be allowed to manage the communal affairs, and yet such men from their rank and local influence would no doubt frequently be elected.

46. In conclusion, I would briefly draw the attention of Government to the present very unsatisfactory arrangements for public works. A hard-and-fast line has been drawn between provincial and local works, and separate establishments are maintained for each, with the object of leaving the District Engineer under the sole control of the district committee.

This purely theoretical advantage is secured at the expense of bad administration and waste of money.

47. Under the system just abolished the Collector was responsible for all public works in his district, and the District Engineer was his professional assistant for the execution of such works.

48. Now what are called provincial works are entirely withdrawn from the Collector and District Engineer and placed under the charge of an Executive Engineer, who resides at the head-quarters of the division and has a mass of office-work which chains him to a desk most of his time.

The most important metalled roads in each district, which are most essential to the convenience and prosperity of the inhabitants, are withdrawn entirely from the charge of the local officers, who have no power to interfere, though they see repairs neglected and bridges breaking down. On the other hand, the local committees are saddled with the full charges of District Engineers and their establishment, who have now about half the work to do which they had formerly, and work of a much less important character.

49. It is not to be expected that local committees, when they are in full working order, will acquiesce in this state of things, or consent to the appropriation of a very large proportion of their funds to the payment of establishments which are not wanted.

The Government of India have expressly exempted local committees from the restrictions to which even Local Governments are subject in the creation of new appointments, and it is not likely to fetter them in abolishing appointments which are found to be useless.

50. I am strongly of opinion that the old system should be reverted to, and that the charges for District Engineers be devided rateably between provincial and local funds. The details I need not go into here. They could easily be settled by a committee of Department of Public Works and local officers.

P. S.—Since the above was drafted, Mr. Twigg's report has been received and accompanies this letter.

No. $\frac{743}{\text{XII.-258}}$, dated Jaunpur, the 3rd August 1882.

From G. E. WARD, Esquire, Collector of Jaunpur, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Allahabad Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to reply to your note No. $\frac{3172}{153}$, dated 30th June and No. $\frac{3234}{153}$, dated 5th July 1882.

2. I may, I think, take credit to myself for having in my letters No. $\frac{173}{\text{XII.-240}}$, dated 24th November 1881, and No. $\frac{295}{\text{XII.-240}}$, dated 26th January 1882, recommended a policy almost identical with that prescribed by Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, dated 18th May 1882.

3. It follows that I have but few additional remarks to make on the general principles involved, and may confine myself to the points of detail in respect of this district, of which your letter No. $\frac{3234}{153}$ treats.

4. The local commmittee as at present constituted contains :—

Four members	living in the	Jaunpur tahsíl.
Three	ditto	Khutáhan.
Two	ditto	Mariáhu.
Two	ditto	Machhlishahr.
Two	ditto	Kerákat.

The members were especially selected by me as representing the largest number of interests possible in all parts of the district.

5. At a meeting held on the occasion of your visit here on the 31st July, however, it was considered advisible that the number of non-official members on the tahsíli boards should not be less than five, and measures will now be taken to constitute these boards by adding so many of men to those already appointed for each tahsíl as shall complete that number. In carrying this out, it will be borne in mind that you objected to the appointment of Kazi Khalil-ullan for the Jaunpur tahsíl, on the ground that, although he habitually resides within the area, his landed property is contained in another tahsil.

6. At the meeting in question, the suggestion which seemed to secure most adherents, as to the mode of election, was that a number of electors for each tahsíl should be nominated in the first instance by

the Tahsíldár. A property qualification was discussed, but two very pertinent objections were urged against it. First, the difficulty of fixing the amount at such a figure as would in each tahsíl secure an electoral body neither too large nor too small. Secondly, that any qualification of this kind would be likely, in the present state of society, to exclude from the electorate persons who by their reputation for honesty, prudence, and good sense are now in the position of leaders. I may add to the first objection a consideration which I had not the opportunity of bringing to the notice of the meeting, but which has often forced itself on my attention in dealing with the municipal system of election, *viz.*, the difficulty of ascertaining the property of individuals. In India, the property as a rule belongs to families, and the greatest care is often necessary to prevent an individual from assuming to himself a qualification to which he is entitled only as a representative of a family. I remember an instance in the Meerut district of a member of a municipal committee, generally supposed to be of considerable wealth, who, as I afterwards discovered, had dissipated the whole of the income which he could claim from the family property, who was in debt, and who with the greatest difficulty, in order to prevent a scandal, refunded a deficit of something under Rs. 10 from some money entrusted to him for relief.

7. There can I think be no question that in introducing the system of election among a people with whose social customs we are so imperfectly acquainted, and who at present possess in so imperfect a degree the faculty of giving precise and accurate information on these points, the methods which should be first tried should be of the most rudimentary kind.

8. For this reason I still adhere to the recommendation I made in my No. $\frac{173}{XII.-240}$, of a method of election still more informal and rudimentary than recording the votes of nominated electors; but I am willing to admit that the latter method is practicable, and with certain provisions would be likely to answer well. These provisions are the folllowing: the number of nominated electors should be so large as to preclude all possibility of cliquism. Once nominated they should remain on the list for life. No area of any extent should be left without its elector. In this district there might be one in almost every square mile. Lastly, it should be expressly stipulated that the system of nomination is only temporary, and that persons or classes desirous of having a vote should be allowed to urge their qualifications.

9. The mode of transacting business to be adopted by the local boards and district committees can hardly be discussed with profit until it is known what business they are to transact. This business is connected with roads, schools, and dispensaries; but the powers and duties of the local boards and district committees in respect of these institutions have at best been very vaguely defined or understood.

10. As I read the Resolutions which have been issued on the subject, the position which the committees now occupy is that of executive agents to the heads of departments. The latter allot funds, prescribe rules of business, detail instructions as to action, and audit accounts. In the Public Works Department especially a system of account has been adopted which must completely bewilder any district committee, let alone a tahsíli board; and the entire control of the funds, with the exception of some formal sanctions in respect of petty works, is practically in the hands of the District Engineer. My ideal committees would hold a position in which the discharge of these functions would be inverted. The allotment of funds and the audit of accounts should be the business of the committee: their rules of business should surely, with the sanction of Government in the General Department, be made by themselves. On the other hand, for the *execution* of their works and the maintenance of their institutions, they should depend on their professional and skilled subordinates, regarding whose qualifications for the effective discharge of their duties the head of their department should be best qualified to judge.

11. If the object of the Government is to be realised, it appears to me that committees and local boards should be independent administrative (not executive) bodies with fixed sources of income and defined objects of expenditure. In administrative action they should in fact supersede heads of departments within the area and with reference to the objects for which they have been appointed. The relation which the heads of departments should bear to committees should be, I presume, something of the same nature as that held by Consulting Engineers to the Railway Companies.

12. I have made these remarks because it appears to me that if the present relative position of departments and committees is maintained, it will be simply impossible for tahsíli boards to transact any business at all.

13. Under a revised system it would seem at first sight more advantageous for this district that the local boards should be component parts of the district committee. But a new consideration at once obtrudes itself. If tahsíli boards and district committees are left to frame their own rules of business, we must abide by the result of their deliberations. If they are not allowed to frame their own rules of business, the departmental system will remain in force, and committees will be as great shams as they have been for the last twelve years.

14. In this district a very decided opinion has been expressed on all sides that for the present the Collector of the district is the only suitable president of district committee and the Tahsíldárs of tahsíl boards. If committees be allowed to elect their own presidents, the result for some time to come will be the same as if the presidents were appointed by the Government. It would, however, most certainly allow both committees and tahsíli boards the power of electing their president with two provisos—*first*, that once elected, the president be removeable only by Government or on his own resignation; *secondly*, that the president have no vote but a casting vote.

15. On this head I would venture to make the following remarks:—*First*, in these provinces the Collector of a district has for years occupied a position between the Government and the people which is as nearly that of a popular representative as could have been devised under the circumstances. The orders just issued on the last Revenue Administration Report contains the words—*The District Officers, to whom, as they are in immediate contact with the people, the Government looks primarily for inquiry, information, and advice.*" Could any English Monarch have addressed words of stronger import to any of the people's burgesses sent to represent them in Parliament? Nor is there the slightest exaggeration in them. The Government has in its care for the people's wants accorded to its District officers a liberty of speech and independence of judgment enjoyed probably by no other service in the world, and the majority of enactments which have been passed for the welfare of the people have resulted from the labours of men who have been Collectors. At this moment I am discharging the duty of a

representative of the people in addressing to you this letter. If, then, the Collector be the true representative in these provinces of the interests of the people, why should there be any scruple as to his holding his natural position in the deliberations of the people themselves for their own government? But, *secondly*, should English officials in India, who have debarred themselves from all effective political interest in the government of their own conntry, be also debarred from all political action in the country of their adoption? Must the energy of all the young men who come out to this country with high aims for its improvement be restricted in future to the judicial decision of cases and the collection of revenue and taxes? Are they in their leisure hours to have no objects of interest but their own amusements? In former days, before committees were overshadowed by departments, it was a proud day for an Assistant when he first took his seat with the other leading men of the district on the road and ferry fund or local agency committee. In helping to administer the local funds he was constantly brought into contact with all classes of the people, and took, I believe, a far greater interest in his division of the district than it is possible to excite now. Surely by excluding officials from all share in the privileges and responsibilities of local self-government injustice is likely to be done to a body of men who are already at a disadvantage with respect to the Natives in that they have no voice in the administration of their own country.

16. In conclusion, I would respectfully submit that, if the sources of income and objects of expenditure of committees and local boards be defined, and also their position with the regard to the heads of departments, all further details can be worked out in the district without difficulty. An Act, similar to the Municipal Committee's Act, is required to give them power over their funds. When that position has been secured, they will work of themselves; without it no device can keep them going.

No. $\frac{182}{G\text{-}138}$, dated Cawnpore, the 5th August 1882.

From H. C. BASTOW, Esquire, President, Local Committee, Cawnpore, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Allahabad Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters No. 3234, dated 5th July 1882, and No. $\frac{8582}{363}$, dated 20th July last, on the subject of the formation of tahsíl committees.

2. The instructions contained in the second para. of the latter letter have now been carried out, and each of the outlying tahsílis have been visited by one of the district staff for the purpose of consulting the principal persons resident there as to the fittest persons to be elected members of the tahsíl board.

3. The procedure adopted was that indicated in the third para. of your letter above referred to. The principal lambardárs of the different classes holding land in the tahsíl were in attendance, and were called upon to nominate members of the proposed committee from among their own body. It occasionally happened that owing to the large numerical majority of a single caste being present, in order to adequately represent the population and landed interests in the tahsíl, that two nominations were allowed to one caste. On the other hand, only one nomination could be given to several castes, who had to be grouped together to form a sufficiently numerous body of electors. In no case was any want of harmony produced by this being done.

4. Care was taken to make each election as free as possible from the influence of the Tahsildárs, who, as far as could be judged, seconded the efforts of the district staff in this direction.

5. In accordance with the suggestions contained in your para. 5, the minimum number of persons nominated was fixed at five. This number has been risen to six and seven for such tahsíls as are large and in which business is expected to be heavy. The accompanying list shows the members nominated and the number of inhabitants of each pargana.

6. It is my belief that the two requisites of acceptability to the residents and fitness (as far as such is obtainable) to represent their various interests has been attained.

7. The place of meeting might in each case be the tahsili school-house in each of the out-tahsils. These are all at the same place as the tahsili, with the exception of Shiurajpur and Bhognipur. The meetings of the committees of these tahsíls might be held at the school-houses at Shiuli and Pukhrain respectively.

8. The representatives of the former tahsíl agreed to this proposition; but those of the latter would prefer to meet in the Bhognipur tahsili building, which is about three miles distant from Pukhrain and on the same road. For the Jájmau committee the meetings might be held in the high school until the municipal hall is finished.

9. The masters of the tahsíl schools can be employed as secretaries. An allowance of Rs. 2 a month and Rs. 2 a year for stationery would be sufficient payment for the work. One of the under-masters of the high school could be secretary for the Jámau committee.

10. There remain for consideration three questions—*viz.*, whether the Tahsíldárs should be members of the committees; the relations between the tahsíl and district committees; and the arrangements for the conduct of business of the tahsíl committees.

11. As matters stand at present, the Tahsíldárs are members of the district committee; and if tahsíl committees and district committees are to exist side by side, it would be an anomaly for the Tahsíldárs to be a member of one and not a member of the other committee. It is not clear in your letter whether you favour the plan of having independent tahsíli boards or no. The second para. is apparently framed in accordance with the Government recommendation that the tahsíli members should all belong to one district board, performing locally the duties connected with their own tahsíl and meeting occasionally for the transaction of the general business of the district. On the other hand, the minimum for each tahsíli recommended in your fourth para. suggests that the forming of separate and independent tahsíl boards was in your mind. If the numbers of members nominated for each tahsíl are to belong to the district committee in addition to the present members, the committee will be of unweildy dimensions; and it will, on the other hand, be a slight to some of the present members, who are each in their way representative men, if they are to be eliminated, because not elected by the lambardárs of some tahsíl, in order to reduce the committee to more manageable dimensions. As

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

it appears to have been understood that re-election was not necessary, four only of the members of the present board have been nominated by the lambardárs. The arguments against the presence of Tahsíldárs on the committee are that the independence of the non-official members will be thereby diminished ; but it seems to me that the advantage to the administration, which will be secured by their experience, outweighs the former consideration, and I would therefore recommend that they should continue to form part of the committee,

12. In accordance with the lines suggested in para. 3 of G.O. No. 145, each member nominated for a tahsíl board should be gazetted a member of the district committee. Each tahsíl board should meet on the 3rd of each month, examine and report on the public works accounts and progress report, pass educational and dispensary establishment bills relating to the local area under their control, and record such resolutions or recommendations to the district committee as may appear to them advisable. These bills will then be paid in the prescribed manner, and the proceedings will be laid before the officers at head-quarters in charge of the Educational, Medical, and Public Works and General Departments, who will lay them before the general district committee, the monthly meeting of which should be held not later than the 10th of each month, for such action as may appear desirable.

The officers in charge of the departments at head-quarters of the district will be at present the general secretary appointed by the president, who in this district is the covenanted Assistant Collector. The officer in charge of the Educational Department is also the Joint-Magistrate. There are no non-official members willing and able to undertake these duties. The Civil Surgeon will be in charge of the Medical, and the District Engineer in charge of the Public Works Departments of the committee.

There should be a fixed date for the monthly meeting of the district committee not later than the 10th of each month, or, if the day fixed be a holiday, on the next succeeding working day.

It will be optional for members of tahsíli boards to attend any meeting of the district board, but it is not anticipated that in ordinary meetings many members from outlying tahsíls will be present. The only two exceptions to this general rule would be the meetings for the preparation of the budget and for the adoption of the annual report, to which all members will be invited to attend.

The above are the only details which I can suggest regarding the inter-relation of tahsíli and district committees.

LIST OF MEMBERS proposed to be appointed for Tahsíl Boards in the Cawnpore District.

No.	Pargana.	Population.	Name.	Caste.	Occupation.
1	Jájmau, exclusive of city.	137,889	Lala Bishen Dyal	Kayasth	Lambardár.
2			Debi Charn	Brahman	Ditto.
3			Gaya Prasad	Ditto	Ditto.
4			Ganga Singh	Rájput	Ditto.
5			Sirdar Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
1	Bilhaur	100,654	Sidh Gopal	Brahman	Ditto.
2			Khushwakt Rae	Kayasth	Ditto.
3			Girand Singh	Rájput	Ditto.
4			Durgar Parshad	Kurmi	Ditto.
5			Mír Raza Ali	Muhammadan	Ditto.
1	Shiurajpur	150,728	Chaube Sadhari Lal	Brahman	Ditto.
2			Ganesh Parsad	Ditto	Ditto.
3			Durga Parshad	Ditto	Ditto.
4			Sunder Singh	Thákur	Ditto.
5			Beni Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
6			Chiranju Lal	Kurmi	Ditto.
7			Shaikh Ali Hasan	Muhammadan	Ditto.
1	Sárh Salímpúr	101,830	Bharat Singh	Rájput	Ditto.
2			Gopal Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
3			Dalip Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
4			Jagan Nath	Brahman	Ditto.
5			Ram Karan	Ditto	Ditto.
1	Akbarpur	109,910	Bhagwan Singh	Thákur	Ditto.
2			Baldeo Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
3			Badri Din	Brahman	Ditto.
4			Gaya Din	Bania	Ditto.
5			Saif Ali	Muhammadan	Contractor.
1	Derapur	124,746	Jia Lal	Brahman	Lambardár.
2			Bhagwan Din	Ditto	Ditto.
3			Dhaunkal Singh	Thákur	Ditto.
4			Khuman Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
5			Jelal-ud-din	Muhammadan	Ditto.
1	Rasúlabad	102,168	Makund Singh	Chhatri	Ditto.
2			Baiju Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
3			Narpat Singh	Ditto	Ditto.
4			Lala Tirbedi	Brahman	Ditto.
5			Mathura Parshad	Khatri	Zamíndár.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

LIST of Members proposed to be appointed, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Pargana.	Population.	Name.	Caste.	Occupation.
1	Ghatampur - -	113,946	Chaudhri Sri Kishen -	Kurmi - -	Lambardár.
2			Thákur Parshad - -	Brahman - -	Zamíndár.
3			Thákur Lachhman Singh -	Thákur - -	Ditto.
4			Bisheshar Parshad -	Brahman - -	Ditto.
5			Mír Bakar Ali - -	Muhammadan -	Ditto.
6			Durga Parshad - -	Kayasth - -	Ditto.
1	Bhognipur - -	88,081	Suraj Kumar - -	Brahman - -	Sarbarakár Sitla Parshad, Talúkdár.
2			Chand Shikhar - -	Ditto - -	Zamíndár.
3			Ghulam Husain Khan -	Muhammadan -	Ditto.
4			Manohar Lal - -	Khatri - -	Ditto.
5			Parshadi - - -	Kurmi - -	Ditto.
6			Chandi Prasad - -	Kayasth - -	Ditto.

Cawnpore,
5th August 1882.

H. C. BARSTOW,
President, Local Committee.

No. 240, dated Fatehpur, the 11th August 1882.

From C. W. MELLOR, Esquire, Collector of Fatehpur, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Allahabad Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to Government Rosolution No. 145, dated 21st June, Government Resolution No. 160, dated 29th June, and your No. $\frac{3234}{154}$. dated 5th July, I have the honor to report as follows :

(2) Mr. Punnett, Assistant Collector, held a meeting at Khajuha on the 28th July, to which the leading zamíndárs and other notables of the Kora and Kalianpur tahsíls were invited. I held a meeting at Khaga on the 3rd August, which was attended by the native gentlemen of the Khaga and Khakhreru tahsíls ; and on the 5th and 7th August similar meetings for the Fatehpur and Gházipur tahsíls were also convened by me. At all these meetings the wishes of the Government were fully explained ; suitable persons were selected for the proposed tahsíl sub-committees ; the places where the sub-committees would meet were fixed ; and the points for discussion at the meeting of the 8th August, at which you had promised to be present, were explained.

3. A meeting at which you presided was held on 8th August, and was attended by the members of the local committee, by the native gentlemen selected for the sub-committees, by several other respectable and representative zamindárs from each tahsíl, and by the Tahsildárs, the Civil Surgeon, Mr. Punnett, Assistant Collector, and myself.

4. The first point on which the sense of the meeting was taken was the selection of members to form the tahsíl sub-committees. It was agreed that five members for each tahsíl would be a proper number. The non-official members of the present local committee are distributed as noted in the margin. The following native gentlemen (who are the same as were selected at the different tahsíl meetings) were accordingly named in order to make up the required number for each tahsíl :—For Fatehpur, Muhammad Taki of Haswa and Shankar Singh of Sataun. For Khaga, Debi Din Kayath of Kishanpur and Hanuman Singh of Akhri. For Khakhreru, Fakir Muhammad Khan of Kot, Imtiaz Ali Khan of Kot, Sheombar Lal Brahman of Kewat Mai, and Binda Parshad Kurmi of Bilain. For Gházipur, Matadin Misr of Kundar, Gajadhar Singh of Boha, and Din Dyal Thakur of Gamhri. For Kora, Babu Mahipat Narayan Singh of Argal, Chandar Shikhar Misr of Bentah, and Panthnath of Basphara. For Kaliánpur, Kanhaiya Lal of Bindki, Gobind Ram of Bindki, Muhammad Ali Khan of Behta, Man Singh of Kutia, and Rachhpal Singh of Mohar. These gentlemen all agreed to serve on the sub-committees, and their nomination was unanimously approved.

Fatehpur	3
Khaga	3
Khakhreru	1
Gházipur	2
Kora	2
Kaliánpur	*Nil.*

5. The question was then raised whether the whole of the 30 members of the sub-committees were to be members of the sudder committee, or only a selected few of them. Some of the members of the present local committee expressed the opinion that the new members to be appointed should not be members of the district committee ; but on being put this proposal obviously did not meet the approval of the majority of the meeting and was therefore rejected ; and it was resolved that all members of the sub-committees should be members of the district committee. It would not be necessary for all the members to attend all the meetings of the district committee at the sudder.

6. It was then agreed that the sub-committees should hold their meetings at Fatehpur, Hathgaon (for Khaga), Khakhreru, Gházipur, Kora, and Bindki (for Kalianpur), respectively.

7. The next question was how the clerical work of the sub-committees was to be done, and the conclusion arrived at was that as the work would be very small, there would be no difficulty in utilising for the purpose the local schoolmaster, who could be paid some small addition to his present salary for his services.

8. The sense of the meeting was then taken as to whether the Tahsildárs should continue to be members of the committee and sub-committees. By far the greater number of the native gentlemen present expressed their opinion that it was necessary to retain the Tahsildárs as members to ensure the work being done. I will give my own opinion on this point further on.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

9. The constitution of a body of electors by whose votes members should in future be elected was next discussed. It was proposed that the lambardárs of the district would form a suitable body of electors. Lala Anand Sahai proposed that to those should be added all inhabitants of the district who had passed the entrance examination of the Calcutta University. This proposal fell very flat and met with no approval. It was suggested that the members of the panchayats of Act XX. of 1856 towns might be added as representatives of the mahájan class and urban population. This too was not approved of. It was finally agreed that the lambardárs alone should form the electing body ; but as there were nearly 3,000 lambardárs in the district, and it would be a work of difficulty to collect the votes of so large a body, it was agreed that some limit, with reference to the amount of Government revenue paid by the body of zamíndárs whom a lambardár represented, should be fixed in order to qualify him for a vote.

10. So far as regards the result of the meeting held on 8th instant, there still remain one or two points on which I will state my opinion.

11. Is it possible to appoint a non-official president? There is only one native gentleman in this district who would, by reason of his family and position, sufficiently command the respect of the other members of the committee: this is Rája Lachhman Singh of Asothar. He would, I know, accept the position of chairman of the committee if offered to him, and would also be willing to devote as much time to the work as could be expected of him, nor is he wanting in intelligence. It seems to me, however, quite impossible to have a president who does not understand English. The mass of Government orders, the accounts, cheques, and reports regarding the work performed through the committee are and must be in English, and it would be impossible for any one who does not understand English to superintend the details of the office work.

12. Next as to how the sub-committees are to work and their relations to the sudder committee. As soon as sub-committees are appointed for each tahsíl, it will be quite unnecessary for the sudder committee to meet once a month. They would have to meet in order—(1) to make out their annual budget, (2) to consider the sanctioned allotments under each head, (3) to apportion to each sub-committee the funds to be expended by it, and (4) to pass their annual accounts and report. I therefore take it that a meeting once a quarter will be quite enough. At each such meeting a short progress report for the past three months, with vouchers for all expenditure, might be submitted by each sub-committee, and any doubtful point settled.

13. Para. 3 of Government No. 145 says that each sub-committee might be placed in charge of the matters transferred to local control (*viz.*, Education, Sanitation, Medical Charity, and Public Works) within the limits of its tahsíl. There is in this district no fund for sanitation; and as there is no dispensary except the sudder dispensary, all the sub-committee would have to do as regards medical charity, so far as I can see, would be to try and get more subscriptions from the zamíndárs for the sudder dispensary ; and in reality their functions will be exercised almost entirely in the departments of Education and Public Works.

14. *First*, with regard to education. The great bulk of the allotments under this head is for fixed and practically unvarying charges, *viz.*, pay of teachers. The sub-committee should, I presume, have the power to reduce and promote teachers from one grade to another, as well as to punish, appoint, and dismiss them, and reduce or start halkabandi schools, provided the allotments for expenditure on these heads be not exceeded; but the changes they would make would be very trifling and infrequent. There would then remain for the sub-committees to manage the expenditure under the heads following,—*viz.*, rent, scholarships, construction and repair of halkabandi schools, and contingencies; and the total annual amounts at the disposal of each sub-committee will be roughly, according to a statement I have had made out, as follows:—Kora, Rs. 305 ; Kaliánpur, Rs. 228 ; Fatehpur, Rs. 597 ; Gházipur, Rs. 323 ; Khakhreru, Rs. 187 ; and Khaga, Rs. 317.

15. *Secondly*, as to Public Works. I take it for granted that all large works, such as building bridges, &c., and all works connected with *pucka* roads, will as hitherto be carried out, not by the sub-committees, but by the District Engineer directly, though of course the sub-committees would be entitled and required to superintend and, if necessary, report on the progress made. Works of this kind are not carried out by local labourers merely, but require the employment of contractors and the application of different rates for different kinds of work, which, with other technical details, it would be hopeless to expect the sub-committees to understand. There would remain then virtually only the *kucha* roads ; and according to a statement I have had made out, each sub-committee would have to spend as follows:—Kora, Rs. 432 ; Kaliánpur, Rs. 413 ; Fatehpur, Rs. 769 ; Gházipur, Rs. 924 ; Khakhreru, Rs. 166 ; and Khaga, Rs. 456. I should fancy that the sub-committees would have little or no difficulty in carrying out these works. They would probably find it simple and easy to find villagers in their own estate who would take contracts for different roads or portions of roads, and they would themselves and through their servants watch the progress of the works.

16. The mode in which the sub-committees would obtain and pay money for works under their charge may present some little difficulty. It would I think be advisable that a personal ledger account should be opened with each sub-committee at the tahsíl treasury. At the commencement of each quarter, a sum, sufficient to meet the estimated expenditure during quarter, might be credited to the sub-committee, who would draw on their account by cheques signed by any two members at a regular meeting, and recorded in the proceedings.

17. The sub-committees should I think meet twice a month, or perhaps even once a month would suffice between March and October, as all works connected with *kucha* roads would be carried out in the cold weather, and during the rest of the year there would be little for them to do except to attend to matters relating to education. It is certainly desirable to make their duties as little irksome as possible.

18. As suggested by the Commissioner, it will be easy to arrange that the schoolmaster, at the place where the sub-committee meet, should do their clerical work for them ; but it would of course be understood that he would have nothing to do with the custody of any money, however small in amount, or with the drawing out of cheques, or the payment of workmen.

19. In para. 3 of Government Order No. 145 it is suggested that one of the members of the district committee should hold charge of a department, so as to maintain unity of action, &c. This is not only practical, but as regards educational and medical matters is the only plan which will ensure the work being properly done. At the same time no one but the Civil Surgeon can properly superintend matters relating to dispensary and medical charity, and (in this district) no one but an Assistant or Deputy Collector can take charge of the Education Department. I should recommend that these two officers be retained as members of the district committee, but without the power of voting on any matters at the committee meetings, and solely for the purpose of superintending the working of the two departments mentioned, and to bring before the committee all matters requiring decision. They could, of course, when bringing anything before the committee, make any suggestions and recommendations they think proper. All correspondence between sudder committee and the sub-committee might be conducted through the Assistant Collector in charge of the department for educational matters, through the Civil Surgeon for what relates to dispensary, sanitation, and medical charity; and through District Engineer, under president's countersignature, for Public Works.

20. Finally, I must record that I dissent entirely from the conclusion arrived at by the majority of the meeting at which you were present, as to the advisability of retaining the Tahsíldárs as members of the sub-committees. If you were to ask me to point out one of the 30 members nominated for the tahsíl sub-committees who was in my opinion actuated by anything like public spirit or a desire to have anything to do with local self-government for its own sake, I should be unable to name a single man. One and all accept the position because they know the Government wishes it, and they fancy their *izzat* is increased, but they have no wish to do any work. As I have shown above, the work the sub-committees will have to do will be light and simple. They require no help, and if they are only made to do the work, they will very likely before long take an interest in it. If, however, the Tahsíldár remains a member of the sub-committee, he will be the working partner in the concerns. The others will know that the Collector will hold the Tahsíldár responsible, and that Tahsíldár will get the work done without their troubling themselves. They will also always fancy that the Tahsíldár is the mouth-piece of the Collector, and will never venture to differ from him in opinion. In short, it is my firm conviction that if the Tahsíldárs continue to be retained as members of the local committees, the wishes of the Government as to the development of local self-government will never be realised in anything but name.

No. 222, dated Bánda, the 11th August 1882.

From J. J. D. LaTouche, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Bánda, to Officiating Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward the proceedings of the district committee of Bánda, which met at Bánda on the 10th August. Notice had been received that you would be present to ascertain the views of the leading men of each tahsíl on the subject of local self-government, and there was a large attendance not only of the gazetted members of the district committee, but of the principal landholders from all parts of the district. The eight Tahsíldárs of the district attended and assisted in the deliberations.

2. The names of the principal men in each tahsíl who had been selected by the District Officer and his Assistants as the fittest persons to serve on tahsíl boards were read out and approved. The following is the list:—

Tahsíl Bánda.

Seth Sham Karam.
Chandi Din Dube, Brahman.
Jeorakhan Lal, Thákur.
Madho Parshad, Brahman.
Maheshri Parshad, Thákur.

Tahsíl Pailáni.

Jagannath Parshad Dichit, Brahman.
Gokul Parshad, Bania.
Sultan Khan of Subhada.
Imdad Ali Khan of Chilla.
Tulsi Ram of Sindhan Kalan, Brahman.

Tahsíl Augási.

Sheo Charan Singh, Thákur.
Matagir Goshain.
Lachhman Parshad Rostogi, Bania.
Manbadhan Dube, Brahman.
Ikram Husain Khan.

Tahsíl Badausa.

Mansur Ali.
Ramjiawan Chaube.
Newal Kishor, Kayath.
Bans Gopal, Brahman.
Bhola, Thákur.

Taksíl Sihonda.

Thákur Din Pathak, Brahman.
Sadullah Khan.
Kampta Parshad, Brahman.
Lachman Singh, Thákur.
Ram Parshad of Kanai, Brahman.

Tahsíl Tirohan.

Rao Balwant Rao.
Ramaji Seth, Bania.
Mír Sajjad Husain.
Kunj Behari Das, Mahant.
Ganesh Datt, Kurmi.

Tahsíl Darsenda.

Muhammad Ali Khan.
Bhim Singh, Chandel.
Thakur Din, Thákur.
Nand Kishor, Brahman.
Indrajit Singh, Thákur.

Tahsíl Chibu.

Ishri Parshad, Brahman.
Ramadin Gir, Goshain.
Ragunath Parshad, Brahman.
Bijaya Bahadur, Kayath.
Ramdeo, Kurmi.

3. The question of the composition of the district committee was then discussed. Each tahsíl board, as shown above, consists of five members; and the suggestion that each tahsíl board should send two

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

delegates to the meetings of the district committee was approved. The district committee will thus consist of 16 members, being two delegates from each tahsíl board.

4. The members of the Karwi tahsíl boards represented the hardship to which they would be put if often obliged to attend district committees at Bánda, but did not object to come twice in the year to the head-quarters of the district. The meeting was of opinion that the district committee should not meet oftener than twice a year: one meeting for budget, and one for accounts. It was also decided that the three tahsíl boards in the Karwi sub-division ought to be under the control of the Joint-Magistrate at Karwi, and the five tahsíl boards at Bánda under the control of the Magistrate of the District.

5. The question was then discussed as to whether the Tahsíldár should be a member of the tahsíl board, and as to where the meetings of the tahsíl boards should be held. It was unanimously decided that the meetings should be held at the head-quarters of each tahsíl; and, with the exception of one speaker, all the Native gentlemen present were strongly of opinion that, at least for a few years, the work would not progress at all unless the Tahsíldár sat on the tahsíl boards. It was suggested that the schoolmaster of the tahsíli town or village might write the minutes of the proceedings: but, on the other hand, it was shown that the tahsíls in Bánda are for the most part in small villages, in some of which there is no Government school, that none of the schoolmasters are acquainted with Urdu, and that to exercise proper control over proceedings written by an ignorant person in Hindi would be very difficult. On the whole it seemed best that the Tahsíldár should be the person to draw up the minutes, whether called by the name of chairman or not. A further suggestion was made that the Tahsíldár might preside at the meetings without a vote.

6. On the subject of the election of members and the elective body of the future it was suggested that a day be fixed, and that all recorded lambardárs of the tahsíl be directed to attend at the tahsíl, and bring with them the principal men of their villages: that this body, perhaps of 300 or 400 in each tahsíl, should then proceed to select fifty chiefmen, and that these fifty chiefmen should then from their own body elect five members of the committee.

As an alternative, it was suggested that the elective body should consist of recorded lambardars and all persons who pay license-tax: that this body should meet on a fixed day at each tahsíl, and proceed immediately to the election of five members for the tahsíl board.

7. The meeting was of opinion that members should be elected annually. Opinion seemed to be divided as to whether members should be capable of re-election.

No. $\frac{306}{\text{L. F. 180}}$, dated Allahabad, the 12th August 1882.

From A. B. Patterson, Esquire, Officiating Collector of Allahabad, to Officiating Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. $\frac{2224}{183}$, dated 5th July, I have the honour to state that I have held consultation with the leading inhabitants of seven tahsíls on the subject indicated in your letter, and Mr. Steel, Assistant Collector, visited the two other tahsíls for the same purpose.

2. In every tahsíl it was necessary, for the information of the new tahsíl committees, to appoint new members, as the present local committee is too limited in number to supply efficient committees in each sub-division. There are 19 members in the present committee; and as there should be minimum of five on each tahsíl committee, and there are nine tahsíls, it is clear that it was necessary to make a large number of new selections. This has been done after consultation with the members of the old committee representing each tahsíl, and after ascertaining from the leading inhabitants what appointments would be popular.

At the large district meeting presided over by you on the 28th ultimo, these names were submitted for approval, and you will remember that the subject was intelligently discussed, and that some changes were made in several tahsíls in accordance with suggestions made by gentlemen present.

I think the proposed committees are fairly representative and acceptable to the people generally. My object has certainly been to secure this, and I have in every way tried to ascertain public opinion.

I append a list of old members of the district committee, with the proposed new members for the tahsíl committees.

3. It would clearly be undesirable that all the gentlemen on the tahsíl committees should also be members of the district committee. There are nine tahsíls in this district, and allowing only five members for each tahsíl, there would thus be 45 on the district committee, in addition to some *ex-officio* members. This would be an unwieldy council.

The general feeling was that each tahsíl committee should appoint two representatives for each meeting of the district committee, not necessary to be always the same men. They might arrange among themselves who would attend each meeting either with reference to sharing the expense and trouble, or with reference to the special capabilities or knowledge of each member in regard to the subjects to come under discussion.

4. The general wish expressed was that tahsíl committees should meet monthly, and district committee quarterly.

Certainly district committees should not meet oftener. Members living in distant tahsíl complain much of the expense of attending the meetings, which have been held monthly since April: and I have reason to believe that some of them have been obliged to spend not less than Rs. 300 on each visit to Allahabad. Already the attendance is falling off: the inevitable result of frequent meetings will be to throw all powers into the hands of a few members residing in Allahabad. I am not sure that it would not be sufficient if the district committee met half-yearly.

5. The general wish is certainly that Tahsíldárs should be members of the tahsíl committees. Only one or two gentlemen of English education and ideas, and one large landholder who is on unfriendly terms with the Tahsíldár in whose jurisdiction he lives, expressed an opposite opinion.

I am certain that it would be premature to form these committees without the Tahsíldár at present.

No doubt there is a danger that the Tahsíldárs will absorb an undue amount of the power of the committee. But, on the other hand, in most tahsíls there is a certainty that without the Tahsíldárs the committee will do no work at all: without the presence of the Tahsíldár on the committee, I believe that many of these bodies would not continue to meet at all, certainly not voluntarily; and it can hardly be intended to force the people to govern themselves. On the other hand, if the Tahsíldár be a member, he will gradually be brought under the influence of public opinion as expressed in the committee, and the members will learn by degrees that they are not dependent on him, and that they have really the direction of affairs in their hands.

Surely it will be wiser to encourage progress in this way than to attempt at once to eliminate, from all share in local control, the officer who up to this time has been the visible representative of a purely personal Government, and whose influence over the people has been closer and more direct than that of any other agent of the administration.

6. With regard to election there is I think no doubt that the majority of the landholding classes do not wish for it, and that the higher class of Native gentlemen would object to present themselves as candidates, as they would look on it as an indignity to compete with men whom they would regard as their social inferiors.

The more advanced classes who have learnt English, on the other hand, are in favour of election.

This is unselfish on their part if they understand the position, for I am certain not one of them would obtain a seat if the rural classes really voted.

The advanced English-speaking natives are clearly not representative men: they are placed on a district committee because District Officers naturally wish to have the assistance of the most intelligent men. Under a real elective system they would be for many a day excluded from district committees, though they would find room in municipal committees. But the great difficulty would be to make any elective system popular among a people who would take no interest in it and do not want it.

The elective system has long been in force in the Allahabad municipality, where there is comparatively a very intelligent constituency. Yet not one-fiftieth of those entitled to vote take the trouble to record their votes, and there is absolutely no competition for seats on the committee.

What can be expected then among the zamindars of a rural tract who are infinitely behind the townsmen in intelligence and comprehension of public affairs?

7. It is right that I should point out the difficulties in the way of introducing election for tahsíl and district committees, and that I should inform you of the true state of the popular feeling.

I do not by any means say that the difficulties are insuperable, and personally I should like to see the elective system introduced. I fear the results at first may be disappointing, but people only learn anything through repeated failures, and not much harm in this case can be done in the process.

The great object is to introduce the system in such a way as not to harass the people.

They fear that they will be forced to go to the tahsíli to record their votes, and they hate the trouble and expense of the journey on account of a business which they do not consider their own.

This I found a very common feeling when I sounded the people about election.

I think that zamindars should be able to record their votes without leaving their own villages.

I need not say to you that no suggestion of any value as to an elective system have been received from any Native gentleman. This is not to be wondered at, as the whole subject is new to them.

The general wish of the meeting you will remember was that only men of large property should vote. It was suggested with universal approval that a zamindar who paid a certain revenue (Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 5,000 was mentioned as the limit) should be entitled to vote, and that for each additional payment of this amount another vote should be conferred.

I need not say that this idea is narrow and illiberal to a degree, and I only mention it to show the general standard of public feeling on such subjects.

The very idea of giving votes to tenants was scouted as absurd.

8. We have a ready-made elective body in the lambardárs of villages—an electorate at the same time representative and not unwieldy.

I would make the constituency, not the tahsíl, but the division of the tahsíl known as the kanúngo's circle. This would furnish a much handier elective body than the tahsíl.

In the nine tahsíls of this district there are 24 such divisions: one tahsíl has 4, four have three, and four have two divisions.

Each division should return two members, but no tahsíl should be represented by more than two members in the district council, inasmuch as the arrangement of the circles is based to a great extent on area. There is no reason why a large, thinly populated tahsíl like Khairágarh, with four kanúngos' circles, should have more influence than a smaller but more compact and populous tahsíl like Chail with three circles. But instead of calling the people together and taking their votes individually, I would take their votes by patwáris' circles.

Each kanúngo's circle on an average contains roughly 50 patwáris' circles, and each such circle five villages.

The lambardars of each circle might be called together and asked to vote for two men to represent the sub-division. The circles are so compact that a certain amount of corporate spirit might be expected to develop in them after a short experience of the right of selecting representatives. The patwári could record the votes of the lambardárs, and, if necessary, they could afterwards be attested by the kanúngo, and officers on tour could easily ensure a correct record of votes.

The men chosen by the majority of circles would represent the sub-division (the kanúngo's circle).

It would not do to allow the votes to be taken by villages. Some villages have an area of two or three acres, and yet every village must have a lambardár. On the other hand, the patwári circle are tolerably equal. If such circle be allowed to make two nominations, the landed interest will be very fairly represented.

Eventually tenants must be represented. But at starting I would not try this. The ruling classes would be suspicious and obstructive, and the tenants are too backward to take advantage of the power which would be conferred on them. After all it is only since 1832 that tenants have had votes for English counties.

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

The great object a first should be to introduce an elective system which shall be as simple and as little as possible opposed to the feelings of the classes who, in the absence of our Government, would be the governing classes. Any attempt to introduce a system based on the advanced lines of modern Liberalism would result in utter failure.

There can be no doubt as to the abstract rights of cultivators to be represented, as from the results of their labour the funds are obtained which will be disposed of by committees.

I do not think at present that the trading classes should be represented on these committees, as they do not contribute to these funds. For the same reason I would have no educational or professional franchises for the districts, though I recommended them for municipalities.

I would avoid all "fancy franchises," and go on the broad principle that those who contributed towards the local funds should have a voice in their disposal.

9. With regard to clause (2), para. 2 of your letter, in my opinion it is absolutely essential, if there is to be any real training in self-government, that the tahsíl board, not the district committee, should be the unit of administration. The former also possesses practical knowledge of the wants of each tract, and in it we have the only hope of obtaining real working bodies. The large district committees are chiefly talking bodies : in them the really representative men from the rural tracts do not venture to speak, while the men of advanced views but no local knowledge speak too much.

No really sustained interest would be taken by unwieldy district committees in the details of administration, and eventually the whole direction would fall into the hands either of official members or of members residing near the head-quarters.

All initiative should come from the tahsíl committees. They should make all proposals with regard to roads, dispensaries, and schools. These would be considered by the district committee, who would allot funds and settle matters affecting the district as a whole, such as the alignment of roads running through more than one tahsíl, or the establishment of schools of more than local interest.

The tahsíl committees should be placed in credit by the district committee to a certain amount, against which they should draw cheques payable at the tahsíl; but in regard to the expenditure of this money, and the supervision of the work entrusted to them, they should be independent of the district committee, although of course their accounts would be subject to the usual departmental checks.

After all, they will at present have only *kucha* roads and a few schools and dispensaries to look after ; and if they have not full control over them, they would soon cease to take any interest in their new duties.

The more important metalled roads, which would run through several tahsíls and be in charge of the District Engineer, would naturally be supervised by the district committee.

To sum up : the only hope of real local government is in small bodies managing small areas with really good local knowledge.

Everything should be done to make these committees respectable: they should never meet in a tahsíl, but have a building of their own, not in any way under the control of the Tahsíldár—a place where they could meet at any time, and where their papers and accounts should be kept. A small office establishment is essential. The members could not be expected to keep up accounts, copy reports, &c., themselves. We should try to make the position an honourable and independent one, and as little harassing as possible.

No. 53, dated the 15th August 1882.

From J. H. Twigg, Esquire, Collector and Magistrate of Hamírpur, to Officiating Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your No. $\frac{3234}{153}$, dated 5th ultimo, on the subject of local government boards, I have the honour to report as follows: the conclusions at which I have arrived in personal consultation with yourself, and many persons representing various interests—public and private—in the district.

2. *First*, as regards the constitution and election of a governing body. The existing committee must be largely increased if it is to fulfil the requirements of Government. Less than five or six members in a tahsil cannot, without undertaking unreasonable burdens, manage to share the work of supervising schools, vaccination and Public Works, though these duties are comparatively light in this district. The accompanying list of members has been made, after considerable discussion, to constitute the new committee. It could not be much larger without including individuals to whom the members now proposed might object upon social grounds, though objections of this kind must not always be accepted as reasonably. For instance, there are a considerable number of Lodhis in the district, who are everywhere prosperous cultivators, and own many villages, particularly in the Maskura tahsíl. Members of the present committee, nevertheless, dislike to be associated with them ; but no considerable objection will, I am sure, be raised as it was fully explained in your presence, and seemed to be understood, that as the Lodhís owned a large part of more than one tahsíl, and were accepted by European officers as associates in the committee, no one could claim a position so much higher as to refuse to meet them officially. A Lodhí has accordingly been chosen among the proposed members for tahsil Maskura. The other members are all considerably landowners residents of the tahsíls for which they are proposed, and can read and write at least in the Nagri character.

3. The next point for consideration is the arrangement for disposal of business, especially the relations between district and local boards. I was inclined to think that the Civil Surgeon, who in small stations has comparatively very little to do, might with advantage be president of the district committee, as there is no native member who knows English. The committee, however, seems to prefer that the District Officer as at present should preside.

This arrangement may be the most suitable at first, but it cannot conveniently continue, as a great deal of routine work is thereby thrown on that officer, and he cannot delegate it except to the head-clerk, who at present is secretary.

4. There is a unanimous opinion, in which I concur, that Tahsíldár must preside in local boards.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

This district is chiefly agricultural, without wealthy or highly educated landowners, and the members are necessarily either unqualified for systematic work or diffident of their powers. As suggested by the Government of India, the Tahsíldárs should abstain from voting.

5. I am very much disinclined to fix rule for the conduct of business, or the relative position of the district and local boards, except in a general way, so as to secure a wide discretion to the latter. I would not prescribe the times or frequency of meetings, beyond recommending that the district committee should meet three or four times a year, and the local committees about once a month, the president determining dates. Any member of a local board would be entitled to attend the district committee; and certain members selected by each local board for each occasion would be specially bound to attend the district committee. The head-quarters of each tahsíli is in this district a proper and convenient place of meeting.

6. The clerical work of local boards need not be much more than the proceedings recorded in each committee's book, and can probably be accomplished by the tahsíli schoolmaster, though in one or two tahsíls he can write only Nagri. There is at least no objection to holding the local meetings in school-houses.

7. The district committee would have authority in all matters not especially assigned by it to the local committees, and would obviously make an annual allotment of funds to each tahsíli, and determine the propriety of any new works costing say more than Rs. 500, besides reserving final decision on the dismissal or reduction of the higher officials. The local committees—working in general subordination to the district committee—would direct expenditure, and have absolute control over the appointment and dismissal or other punishment of village schoolmasters and vaccinators. All accounts and papers not required for use in tahsílis should be sent to head-quarters.

Various other arrangements will suggest themselves by experience, and I would greatly deprecate any attempt to impose minute regulations on the committees at first.

8. For the appointment of future members, no very great harm can be done by introducing a form of election. It was at first thought that all "lambardárs," responsible for more than Rs. 1,000, would be fair representatives. They however would number only about 40 for each tahsíl, and would not be uniformly distributed throughout it. On this account it seems better to suggest that one lambardár—the one responsible for most land-revenue—be recorded as the elector-representative of each mauza. If there were more than one lambardár in a mauza, and any of them were responsible for equal amounts of revenue, then the longest appointed would be taken. Lambardárs seem in every way best qualified to be electors, though they are commonly hereditary. If this district were not of such a thoroughly agricultural character, it might have been advisable to bring the chief license-tax-payers as well as lambardárs on the electors' register. It would be inadvisable, with the present paucity of eligible persons, to have electoral sub-divisions in a tahsíl area.

9. I assume that members of the committee now to be chosen will hold office for life. On the retirement or death of any, it would be necessary for the local committee to issue a notice to each elector, stating the vacancy, and notifying that the list of persons eligible for membership is always open for inspection at the school-house, also that electors should appear to record their votes on any of certain dates fixed in the notice. These dates should not be within a month, and not beyond two months, of issue of the notice. Voters should get a certificate of their vote from the schoolmaster.

10. The list of persons eligible for election should be made in the tahsíli, and might comprise all persons paying Rs. 500 or more of land-revenue, excluding taxes. There would be about 100 persons so qualified in each tahsíl. From the list so prepared in the tahsíli, the district committee might strike out by annual revision any names open to special objection.

There will be no means of ascertaining before election under the above procedure whether the person elected would accept office. A refusal would necessitate a fresh election.

11. I do not think that electors or elect would refuse their office. They would view such a course as contumacy, and perhaps in time they may take an interest in the work, though I recollect the difficulty of procuring both candidates and voters some years ago in the most enlightened city of these provinces. On that occasion the attendance of voters was peremptorily secured by chaprassis, otherwise there could have been no elections.

So far as I could understand, the voters were afraid of offending unsuccessful candidates.

LIST of proposed Members of District and Local Committees.

Members not sitting on Tahsíli Boards.

No.	Name.	Caste.	Residence.	Remarks.
1	J. H. Twigg, Esq., Collector and Magistrate, *President, district committee.*			
2	W. J. Ellis, Esq., Civil Surgeon -			
3	C. Dodd, Esq., Inspector of Schools -			*Ex-officio Members, district committee.*
4	J. Heinig, Esq., Executive Engineer -			
5	Maulvi Fazl Azim, Senior Assistant Collector, *Vice-president, district committee.*			
	Members of Tahsíli Board for Hamírpur Tahsíl.			
1	Abdul Wahid, Tahsíldár, president, at present *ex-officio* member of district committee.			
2	Muhammad Ismail Maghrabi.	Saiyid - -	Hamírpur - -	At present non-official members of district committee.
3	Baldeo - - -	Marwári - -	Pandhari - -	
4	Gaya Din - -	Thákur - -	Sumairpur - -	
5	Kali Din - - -	Ditto - -	Karara - -	New members proposed.
6	Kali Din - - -	Ditto - -	Patara - -	
7	Kampta - - -	Ditto - -	Chhani - -	

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

LIST of proposed Members of District and Local Committees.—*continued.*

Members not sitting on Tahsíli Boards.—*continued.*

No.	Name.	Caste.	Residence.	Remarks.
	Members of Tahsíli Board for Maskura Tahsíl.			
1	Ram Parkash, Tahsíldár, president, at present *ex-officio* member of district committee.			
2	Prag Datt	Brahman	Jalàlpur	Existing non-official members of district committee.
3	Bhoj Ráj	Marwári	Imilia	
4	Sone Singh	Thákur	Newada	New members proposed.
5	Jagan Nath	Chaube	Indarpura	
6	Sheo Parshad	Lodhi	Maskura	
	Members of Tahsíli Board for Maudha Tahsíl.			
1	Siddik Ahmad, Tahsíldár, president, existing *ex-officio* member of district committee.			
2	Gopal Das	Tewari	Sisolar	Existing non-official member of district committee.
3	Ujagar Singh	Thákur	Sayar	New members proposed.
4	Sheodyal Singh	Ditto	Chandi Kalán	
5	Beni Parshad	Bania	Maudha	
6	Binda Din	Brahman	Neoria	
7	Abdul Karim	Shaikh	Narayach	
	Members of Tahsíli Board for Kulpahár Tahsíl.			
1	Saiyid Husain, Tahsíldàr, president, existing *ex-officio* member of district committee.			
2	Thákur Das	Brahman	Kulpahár	Existing non-official member of district committee.
3	Rajdhar	Ditto	Benda	New members proposed.
4	Chatur Bhoj	Ditto	Baghaura	
5	Sobha Singh	Thákur	Kulpahár	
6	Balwant Singh	Káyath	Panwári	
7	Kampta	Brahman	Purwa	
8	Ajudhiya Parshad	Parihar	Baura	
	Members of Tahsíli Board for Ráth Tahsíl.			
1	Kunwar Hidayat Ali, Tahsíldár, president, existing *ex-officio* member of district committee.			
2	Baldeo Singh	Thákur	Malehta	Existing non-official members.
3	Sher Singh	Ditto	Magrant	
4	Kunwar Narayan Singh	Ditto	Malehta	New members proposed.
5	Kunwar Manohar Singh	Ditto	Majhgawan	
6	Mangnu Ram	Bania	Gohand	
7	Bhole	Tiwari	Ráth	
8	Bahar Khan, Hospital Assistant		Ráth	
9	Bhawani	Lodhi	Kulhainda	
	Members of Tahsíli Board for Mahoba Tahsíl.			
1	Musharraf Husain, Tahsíldár, president, existing *ex-officio* member of district committee.			
2	Mahadeo	Tiwari	Mahoba	Existing non-official members of district committee.
3	Tilok Singh	Thákur	Atrar	
4	Himmat Khan	Pathán	Bhattipura	New members proposed.
5	Makrand Singh	Thákur	Utian	
6	Debi Singh	Ditto	Urwara	
7	Bhagwan Das	Bania	Mahoba	
8	Girdhari	Thákur	Pahra	
9	Amir Beg, Hospital Assistant		Mahoba	

J. H. TWIGG,
Collector and Magistrate.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

LIST of Members of old District Committee from each Tahsíl, with new Members added to form Tahsíl Committees.

Name of Members.		Remarks.
Tahsíl Cháil.		
Thákur Jagan Nath Singh	Old members.	A considerable number of members of the old committee are leading residents of Allahabad, with little local knowledge of the tahsíl, three of them being mercantile men without landed property. It has therefore been necessary to add three members, so that the total number is nine, more than in any other tahsíl.
Chaudhhri Kamal-ud-din	Old members.	
Babu Gaya Parshad	Old members.	
Lala Ram Charan Lal	Old members.	
Maulvi Saiyid Muhammad Taki	Old members.	
Babu Charu Chandra Mitter	Old members.	
Maulvi Sher Ali	New members.	
Thakur Jagjit Singh	New members.	
Muhammad Hadi	New members.	
Tahsíl Siráthu.		
Sheo Sahai Singh	Old members.	Three Muhammadans and two Hindus make a fairly representative committee.
Maulvi Shaikh Abdul Majid	Old members.	
Saiyid Asghar Ali Shah	Old members.	
Lala Kashi Parshad	New members.	
Saiyid Ali Husain	New members.	
Tahsíl Manjhanpur.		
Chaudhri Saiyid Ali Abbas	Old members.	Same remark applies. Munna Singh is a large landowner and money-lender.
Chaudhri Karim Bakhsh	Old members.	
Jagpal Singh	New members.	
Munna Singh	New members.	
Saiyid Aga Usuf Hasan	New members.	
Tahsíl Soraon.		
Captain Chapman	Old member.	Here only Captain Chapman was on old committee. Shaikh Asad-ullah is the son of Shaikh Nasir-ud-din, lately convicted of forgery. But the family is the most influential in the tahsíl and noted for loyalty; and as Shaikh Asad-ullah is willing to serve on the committee, there is no reason why, as practically the present head of the family, he should not be appointed.
Saiyid Tajammul Husain	New members.	
Shaikh Mumtaz-ud-din	New members.	
Mata Bhik Singh	New members.	
Shaikh Asad-ullah	New members.	
Tahsíl Handia.		
Thákur Sheo Mangal Singh	Old members.	Four members are sufficient. Suitable men are scarce in the tahsíl.
Saiyid Muhammad Amir Husain Khan	Old members.	
Thákur Harmangal	New members.	
Shaikh Muhammad Bakar	New members.	
Tahsíl Phúlpur.		
Thákur Sheopal Singh	Old member.	Three Hindus and two Muhammadans are here fairly representative.
Thákur Sukh Mangal Singh	New members.	
Mir Kasim Husain	New members.	
Shaikh Inayat Husain	New members.	
Bijai Bahadur Singh	New members.	
Táhsíl Karchhana.		
Mahabir Parshad Singh	Old members.	Nearly all the zamíndárs are Hindus.
Beni Parshad Singh	Old members.	
Lala Mahesh Parshad	New members.	
Bhagwant Singh	New members.	
Thakur Rao Bahadur Singh	New members.	
Asaballi Khan	New members.	
Tahsíl Bára.		
Rája of Bára	Old member.	There are practically no Muhammadan zamíndárs here. The Rája of Bara owns the greater part of the tahsíl, and it is right that his son, Kunwar Ram Singh, a very intelligent gentleman, should also be a member. I would have selected one zamíndár of a lower caste, but the Rája and his son objected to sit on the committee with him, and this was the feeling of the Thákurs who form a majority in the tract, and I felt bound to act in accordance with the popular feeling.
Kunwar Ram Singh	New members.	
Ram Partab Singh	New members.	
Chandra Sikhar	New members.	
Sangram Singh	New members.	
Tahsíl Khirágarh.		
The Rája of Daiya	Old member.	There are no Muhammadan zamíndárs. The Rája of Manda declines to act on plea of bad health.
Lal Narhar Singh	New members.	
Krishna Ram Pande	New members.	
Thákur Ram Bakhsh Singh	New members.	
Raghunath Singh	New members.	
Ishri Singh	New members.	

A. B. PATTERSON,
Officiating Collector.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{4240}{153}$, dated the 21st August 1882.

From J. W. QUINTON, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Allahabad Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

WITH reference to para. 48 of my No. $\frac{4162}{153}$, dated 16th instant, and in continuation of that letter, I have the honour to furnish a statement showing the allotments for works, including repairs, and for establishments, in the Local Incorporated Funds and Provincial Department Public Works Budgets of the current year; and to draw attention to the fact that while the cost of establishments imposed on local boards is in some districts, *e.g.*, Cawnpore and Jaunpur, 33 per cent. of the allotment for works, and in the aggregate exceeds 23 per cent., the cost of the establishment in the Provincial Budget is only 6 per cent. of the total grant for works.

Provincial works are probably the more important of the two, and the obvious inference is, either that Local Fund works are saddled with a needlessly extravagant establishment, or that the establishment maintained for Provincial Works is altogether inadequate.

ALLAHABAD DIVISION.

STATEMENT showing the Total Grants for Works and Establishment in the Local Incorporated Funds and Provincial Budgets for 1882-83.

District.	Local Incorporated Funds Budget.		Provincial Budget.		Total of Columns 2 and 4.	Total of Columns 3 and 5.	Remarks.
	Total Grants for Works, Repairs, Tools and Plant.	Total Grants for Establishment.	Total Grants for Works, Repairs, excluding tools and Plant.	Total Grants for Establishment.			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Cawnpore -	30,094	10,026	2,02,444		2,32,538		
Fatehpur -	37,089	5,671	26,844		63,933		
Bánda - -	47,500	11,433	49,977	35,475	97,477	92,955	
Hamírpur -	17,015	6,931	53,239		70,254		
Allahabad -	42,530	14,283	1,78,274		2,20,804		
Jaunpur - -	29,863	9,136	30,396		60,259		
Grand Total -	2,04,091	57,480	5,41,174	35,475	7,45,265	92,955	

Dated the 21st August 1882.

J. W. QUINTON,
Officiating Commissioner.

No. $\frac{4649}{XIV}$, dated Benares, the 15th August 1882.

From C. A. DANIELL, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit my reply to Government letter No. 145, dated 21st June, and No. 160, dated 29th June 1882 (Financial Department Decentralisation).

2. Immediately on receipt of letter No. 145, I issued instructions to Magistrates to ascertain from as many zamíndárs throughout their districts as could be asked what persons from among their numbers would be acceptable as representatives; to bring together a certain number of such representatives; to make it clearly known what the intention and orders of Government are on the subject; and to be prepared to collect by the time of my visit the members of the existing committees and a convenient number of representative persons.

I gave the Magistrates as much time as I could for the above purpose, and then proceeded on tour to visit the districts.

3. I found it necessary to collate a set of questions for discussion and opinion, so that the subjects necessary for opinion would be put clearly before the persons concerned, and that so far as was practicable some clear conclusions might be secured.

4. The questions were as follows:—

I.—What will be the number of members for each tahsíli or local committee?

II.—What is to be the qualification for membership—

(*a*) Of zamíndárs?

(*b*) Shall tenants be eligible, and, if so, under what qualifications?

(*c*) Shall others, such as license-tax payers, be eligible, and, if so, under what qualifications?

III.—Shall members be all non-official? Can you now or hereafter elect a non-official chairman?

IV. and V.—How shall members be appointed—(*a*) If by selection, to what extent or number? (*b*) or by general vote?

What shall be the qualification for voters—(*a*) Of zamíndárs? (*b*) of tenants? (*c*) of others?

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

VI.—If members be appointed by vote, how shall eligible persons be ascertained and made known to voters?

VII.—Suggest a way in which votes can be recorded.

VIII.—Shall there be a tahsíli or local committee for the sudder tahsíli as well as for outside tahsíls?

(*a*) Shall the tahsíli or local committees be separate and distinct, each one to correspond direct with the Government officers without any districts, or central board?

(*b*) Shall the tahsíli or local committees be under the supervision of the district board? and, if so, shall some or all the members of the tahsíli or local committee also be members of the district board?

(*c*) Shall the district board include or be formed of members resident in the tahsíli areas, who would ordinarily perform the work of their local circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board?

5. I have now the honour to submit an enclosure which gives on separate sheets each question with a summary of the replies of the several district assemblies.

This is the most convenient form of shewing the general opinion, and a perusal of the answers will show what the general opinions are.

6. I consider that the persons who attended at the several district head-quarters were persons who may be accepted as fairly representing the intelligence and wishes of the persons concerned, so far as a few can represent the state of many.

7. Including members of existing district committees who are all more or less representatives of the several tahsíls in which their properties lay, the following were the number of persons who appeared for consultation:—

Ballia - - - -	49
Gházipur - - -	65
Azamgarh - - -	44
Gorakhpur - - -	60
Basti - - - -	62
Benares - - - -	54
Mirzapur - - - -	54

In most instances, tahsíli zamíndárs were represented in fair equality.

8. From three tahsílis the representatives numbered less than eight, *i.e.*, Hata in Gorakhpur sent four, Deogaon in Azamgarh sent five, and Robertsganj in Mirzapur sent six. In the remaining 25 tahsílis the numbers ran from 8 to 30 representatives. I have included the future tahsili of Bandsdih in Ballia as one, besides the figures stated above. In Basti there was an attendance of upwards of 100 zamíndárs. In other districts also a sprinkling of other zamíndárs attended the meetings.

9. Throughout the proceedings there seemed to me to be a decided desire on the part of persons present to learn what they could of the proposed scheme. They seemed to be willing to undertake the charge of such affairs as might be made over to them. They, however, urged with much reasonableness that the Government should afford the local committees all needful assistance in instruction and for the proper conduct of business from the hands of official members or Government nominees.

10. In placing the questions before the persons assembled, I found it best to lead up from the more simple questions to the final conclusion, which concerned the construction of the local committees and the connection between the local committees, the central board, and the Government officers. I will here begin with this subject, which is the most important.

11. The general opinion is in favour of the local committees being formed by *tahsíls*. There was no other suggestion made, nor is there any other local area so practicable as that of tahsíls, if we require a smaller area than that of a district.

In the district of Mirzapur, however, it is proposed that the Family Domains pargana of Bhadohi shall have its own local committee distinct from any regular tahsíli committee. This is desirable and feasible. With this exception, the proposed local committees are distinctly tahsíl committees.

I may also notice here that the Collector of Mirzapur was of opinion that the tract south of the Soane should not be included in any local committee's area. It was also suggested by both the Collector and the Deputy Superintendent, Family Domains, that the Mahárája's Family Domains pargana of Kera Mangror should not be included in any committee area. In both of these suggestions I concur.

There is the expectation that each tahsili will be able to form its separate committee.

12. There seems no doubt that if the scheme local, *i.e.*, tahsíli committee is to be introduced, the local or tahsíli committee should have as much individuality and be able to act with as much independence as may be practicable.

13. It was invariably decided that each tahsíl committee should, however, be in connection with a central board at the district head-quarters. In five out of the seven districts it was agreed that the central board should be formed or composed of the members of the tahsíli committees; while in Azamgarh the wish was that the district or central committee should attend to the business of the Hazúr (or head-quarters) tahsíli, and that the outside tahsíli committees should be subordinate to the district committee; while in Gorakhpur the wish was that there should be six tahsíli committees for the six tahsíls, all subordinate to a separate district committee formed of persons other than members of the tahsíl committees. I do not consider that either the Azamgarh or Gorakhpur proposals are so good as that proposed elsewhere. The central board should be used as a board of control, and as the means of communication with the Government, and as a board of reference from the tahsíli committees.

14. It is desirable that the central board be formed by members of the tahsíl or local committees. There will be a certain amount of dignity attaching to a membership of a central board; and the plan by which the tahsíl committees will be controlled by a central board, of which their own members have the right of membership, coincides more completely with the principles of autonomy than would be the case were the central board to be altogether distinct from the tahsíl committee, and be formed of other non-official members.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

The Government will be obliged I think to nominate a certain number of persons as Government representatives to the central board, who would act in concert with the local members of the central boards.

15. The next point for report is whether the Tahsíldárs shall be members of the tahsíli committees. The appended replies show that in every district the wish is that the Tahsíldár (or other Government official) shall be a member of the local committee, at all events until the local committee has learnt its business.

Some of the districts wish the Tahsíldár to be chairman, others do not do so. The result may be accepted that where a fitting person can be found who will accept the post, a non-official member will be chairman, otherwise a Government official must be appointed to the chair. But in any case a Government official will be a member until the ordinary members find themselves qualified to conduct the business without Government assistance.

16. Next as regards the number of members: the figures vary from 7 to 15; the majority seem to think 12 ordinary members to be the most desirable number, where so many can be found. I should say that any number from 8 to 12 will be suitable: this concerns ordinary or non-official members only.

17. As regards qualification for membership. The first view taken in every district assembly was that the members should be men of good position, good family, good character, and good intelligence.

The persons present were persons having proprietary interest in land; these are the chief local cess-payers.

The persons present in most instances agreed that tenants should be eligible as members, if intelligent and respectable men could be found. They also all agreed that persons other than agriculturists should be eligible for membership. The first wish being that such persons should be respectable and of good position.

18. When the discussion was brought to the subject of election by votes, then the need for a property qualification became apparent. The general result is that for zamíndárs jama from Rs. 200 to Rs. 500.

The majority is in favour of Rs. 200 or Rs. 300.

For tenants rent of Rs. 50 or of Rs. 100.

For other persons license-tax of Rs. 25 or Rs. 50, or an income on a par with the above.

While on this subject I may state that out of 50,000 revenue-payers in Gorakhpur, little more than 1,400 pay Rs. 200 and upwards; and out of 46,000 revenue-payers in Azamgarh, less than 1,000 pay Rs. 200 and upwards.

19. In fixing the property qualification for voters, the major result is in favour of the voter-qualification being about half the value of that for a member.

20. As regards a scheme for election, there seems an idea that a certain number of persons, who are eligible by property qualification, should be selected by Government officers or by the existing committee (as a commencement), and that from those persons thus selected the members should be elected by votes. The Mirzapur assembly, however, came to the conclusion that the selection would be properly accomplished by the voting of the electors, who would be in a position to know whether or no the persons who were willing to become members were proper persons for the post.

21. As regards the method of collecting votes, there was no decided conclusion come to. It was suggested that the number of electors should not be excessive, so that each elector would have information as to the names of the persons for election; also that voting places should be sufficiently approachable.

It seems doubtful how far persons will come forward as candidates for membership.

In Basti and in Mirzapur there seems to be an idea that eligible persons, when informed that applications to fill vacancies were required, would send in applications notifying their readiness to serve. If these persons act up to this, one difficulty in starting a scheme for electing by votes will be overcome. There is of course the doubt whether voters will be forthcoming in sufficient numbers to elect members from among the candidates.

22. The subject of election is one which is difficult to deal with in a brief report. I understand that the whole subject of local committees, election, &c., is to be dealt with by a committee to be convened for the purpose. I am myself of opinion that with careful and wise treatment to start with, we may find some practicable scheme for election. I am myself of opinion that if any scheme for tahsíli or local committees is to be successful, we must have persons presenting themselves as candidates, or at least accepting the position of candidates for membership, and we must have the members elected by votes of a reasonable number of the people.

23. The qualification bounds may be relaxed after a time, if it be found that any thing like popular candidateship and popular voting are likely to succeed. The people would themselves be apparently quite pleased that the members of committee should be chosen from among a number selected by Government officers or by some select committee. Some such method may be necessary to start with. Thereafter a wider choice should be given, and more popular voting be demanded to fill up future vacancies. The subject of having members for parganas or for rural towns will have to be considered when the time comes.

24. I have one more subject to broach, one which has not come into the questions. I am much inclined to think that the Government should decide that persons who, after being chosen or elected, do work with a will and become useful members of committee, may become entitled to some benefit. The most acceptable reward would be exemption from the Arm's Act: another would be a place in the Darbar list. I notice that the Government of India has ordered that courtesy titles are to be given to members. The subject is therefore now beyond the line of discussion. I consider it to be reasonable that a tangible benefit should be acquired by men who prove themselves public-spirited and useful members of a local or central committee. Such benefit would be earned after some few years of industry.

25. I have not recorded any results regarding the chairmanship of the central boards. At this moment the business of a district committee is not altogether thoroughly well-defined. The recent changes in the Public Works and other departments have not settled down into regular working order;

when everything is properly cut and dried, then the proposal for a non-official chairman of a central board may be discussed.

26. I may here state my opinion that I see no need to attach the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, or the Inspector of Schools, as official members of a district committee. The district committee meetings must be held at almost identical dates in the seven districts. I do not see how either the Executive Engineer or Inspector of Schools can possibly attend, except on very rare occasions. Both these officers can give their opinions when asked by the president of a committee. Their connection with a district committee can only be nominal.

27. I do not attempt to send up a nominal roll of members for local committees. It must be determined how many persons should be appointed to each local committee, and the method by which they are to be selected for the purpose.

LOCAL COMMITTEES.

Questions.	*Answers.*
I.—What will be the number of members for each tahsíli or local committee?	*Ballia.* — The meeting was unanimous in holding that the minimum number in a tahsíl committee should be 15 : that there should be three committees of 15 each, one for each tahsíli. *Gházipur.*—One tahsíl proposed 10 members, another tahsíl 12, and two tahsíls 15 members for each committee. There are four tahsíls in the district. *Azamgarh.*—That each tahsíli committee be composed of 12 members. The central board would however transact the business of the sudder tahsíl. *Gorakhpur.*—For the sudder tahsíl 12 members: for mufassil tahsíls from 7 to 10 members: in tahsíls Háta and Maháráj ganj it being difficult to find more than 7 members. *Basti.*—Two tahsíls proposed 10 members for each committee, and three tahsíls from 7 to 10. *Benares.* — That each tahsíl committee be composed of 12 members. Three or five to form a quorum in the Benares tahsíl. *Mirzapur.*—General opinion that each committee should consist of 12 to 15 members.
II.—What is to be the qualification for membership— (*a*) Of zamíndárs—shall there be any limit or minimum of jama or cess paid? (*b*) Shall tenants be eligible, and, if so, under what qualifications? (*c*) Shall others, such as license-tax-payers, be eligible, and, if so, under what qualifications?	*Ballia.* — Some persons were in favour of excluding non-agriculturists, and some were in favour of excluding cultivators. The majority were at first in favour of not requiring a property qualification from zamíndárs ; but at a later meeting they suggested a property qualification of not less than Rs. 200: some said Rs. 500 jama. They would require from cultivators a property qualification of Rs. 100, some said Rs. 200 rent ; and from non-agriculturists the majority were in favour of those who paid license-tax of not less than Rs. 50. No desire was expressed to exclude non-agriculturists, but a caste qualification was strongly advocated in preference to a property one. *Ghájipur.*— The majority were in favour of Rs. 500 being the minimum jama qualifying zamíndárs for membership : others proposed Rs. 200 and Rs. 300. As regards tenants, the representatives were almost unanimous in favour of their being members. The majority appeared to think that no property qualification was necessary in their case, but that careful selection should be made. Other persons would be eligible who pay license-tax of not less than Rs. 50. *Azamgarh.*—Some persons were in favour of zamíndárs being eligible to serve without any reference to property qualification. Mr. Dodsworth expressed an opinion that only zamíndárs paying a jama of Rs. 500 should be allowed to serve. This proposal was subsequently re-considered, and several considered a property qualification to be needed. As regards tenants, it was agreed that they should be eligible to serve on tahsíli committees, provided they pay a rent of not less than Rs. 200: a few said Rs. 100 rent. The meeting was unanimous that members of all professions and trades, and other residents in the tahsíl who are fit, should be eligible to serve as members. *Gorakhpur.*—For zamíndárs—general capability, good family, and general good reputation. No limit practically necessary, provided good family and capacity are ensured. Where property qualification was named, jama from Rs. 200 to Rs. 500. Tenants should be eligible if of good family, but doubt expressed as to any being fit. Other persons of respectability and good character should be eligible. If property qualification is required, license-taxpayers of not less than Rs. 50. *Basti.*—Qualification of zamíndárs—men of respectable family and good character ; or if property qualification be necessary, jama Rs. 100 to Rs. 300.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Questions.

Answers.

As regards tenants, general objection expressed for tenants to become members, unless tenant be known to be of good family and of the same class as zamíndárs.

Other persons would be eligible who pay license-tax of not less than Rs. 25.

Benares.—Qualification for zamíndárs — men of intelligence, character, and respectability, and paying jama from Rs. 200 to Rs. 500.

Tenants, if otherwise fit, can be on committee, provided they pay rent of not less than Rs. 100 per annum.

Any other person, with income of Rs. 500 per annum, can be on committee.

Mirzapur. — Large majority in favour of Rs. 300 jama for zamíndárs.

If tenants be admitted, qualification of Rs. 100 rental was generally proposed: some few said Rs. 50: all agreed that tenant must be an occupancy-tenant.

Other persons, not being zamíndárs or tenants, should be license-tax-payers of not less than Rs. 25, or earning a professional livelihood of equivalent standard.

III. — Shall members be all non-official? Can you now or hereafter elect a non-official chairman?

Ballia.—They were unanimous in holding that the Tahsíldár should be a member of the tahsíl committee, but subsequently agreed that he should remain for a time only until the members had learnt the work. That the chairman should be official (Tahsíldár), subject to the limit or time as above stated.

Gházipur.—Meeting unanimous in holding that the Tahsíldár should be a member of the tahsíl committee for the first year, and that he should be president; doubt being expressed that qualified non-official chairmen could be found.

Azamgarh.—The Tahsíldár to be on the tahsíl committee for the first year, but the chairman to be non-official.

Gorakhpur.—An official member to be on tahsíl committee for the first year, or till the members learn the work. The chairman to be non-official, if any can be found fit to do the work; but at present an official would be necessary in some of the tahsíls.

Basti—Wish for Tahsíldár to be on committee until members learn the work.

At first stated that Tahsíldárs should be chairmen; but when urged to select their own chairmen, all the representatives of the five tahsíls in the course of a few minutes nominated their chairmen, and presented each chairman to the Commissioner.

Benares.—Benares tahsíl. — General opinion in favour of the chairman being non-official, but an official to be on the committee.

For Chandauli tahsíl.—It may be difficult to find non-official, residing outside the city of Benares, qualified to be chairman, although a Chandauli zamíndár residing in Benares might be found. If Chandauli resident be needed, the Tahsíldár will probably have to be chairman in Chandauli.

Mirzapur.—General unanimous opinion, after much discussion, that local committees would elect their own chairmen on the understanding that Government would give such assistance as might be necessary by appointing an official member for a term. That without official aid for some time business could not be properly carried on.

IV. and V.—How shall members be appointed — (*a*) If by selection, to what extent or number? (*b*) or by general vote?

Ballia.—Rather more than half of those present were against election in any form: the remainder would require from zamíndárs much the same as for membership. From cultivators a qualification of Rs. 25 annual rent, and from non-agriculturists Rs. 10 to Rs. 50 license-tax. There was no desire to exclude non-agriculturists who do not pay cess.

What shall be the qualifications for voters — (*a*) Of zamíndárs? (*b*) of tenants? (*c*) of others.

Gházipur.—All zamíndárs without reserve, all tenants paying not less than Rs. 50 annual rent, and all traders paying not less than Rs. 10 as license-tax can vote.

Azamgarh.—Qualification for electors should be the same as for electees.

Gorakhpur.—General wish much the same as for membership, whose property qualification was named. Zamíndárs, Rs. 100 to Rs. 200; tenants, Rs. 50 to Rs. 100; others, Rs. 25 to Rs. 50 license-tax.

Basti.—Government officers may nominate a certain number from each tahsíli from whom election may be made, or under property qualifications members may be elected. All agree more or less to the following qualifications for voters:—

	Rs.
Zamíndárs—jama - - - -	100
Tenants—rent - - - -	50
Other persons—license-tax - -	10

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Questions.

Answers.

Benares.—Suggested that the members of the present district committee, Benares, should scrutinise the list of persons eligible for membership, and register names of those they find qualified. That notice be sent to these persons; and on a certain fixed day they should meet and proceed to elect the committee from their number. Hereafter voting by qualified voters may be found practicable, but no scheme at present suggested.

The property qualification for voters should not be less than half that for members.

Mirzapur.—There was a general expression of opinion that the members for each tahsíli committee should be elected by parganas, in proportion to the size of pargana. The present committee would decide on the number of members for each pargana.

As regards selections, after some discussion the meeting came to the general conclusion that election by vote, without any preliminary selection, would be practicable if numbers are not too large, and proclamation be properly given.

Qualification for Voters.

Zamíndárs, jama Rs. 100. Right-of-occupancy-tenants paying Rs. 50 rent.

For other people, license-tax-payers of Rs. 10, or other persons earning an equivalent livelihood.

Note by Commissioner.

The people for the most part preferred nomination or selection by Government officers or by the present committees. But when pressed to come to give opinion regarding voting, they more or less agreed that if numbers of eligible persons were not too great, and numbers of voters not too great, and proper notice be given of the names of candidates or of eligible persons for membership, voters might in time come to the poll.

VI.—If members be appointed by votes, how shall eligible persons be ascertained and made known to voters?

Ballia.—This will be done by proclamation.

Ghazipur.—List of persons eligible for election, according to qualifications decided upon, should be drawn up, from which members should be elected after proclamation.

Azamgarh.—For membership a certain number should be selected by the members of the present district committee under the guidance of the Collector, and from them members should be elected by vote.

When it became necessary to consider any scheme for taking votes, then the necessity for reducing the number of votes became apparent, and it was thought advisable to adopt Mr. Dodsworth's suggestion to property qualification. The general impression was that choice by nomination should be made without qualification, but that some limits as to qualification should be made in case choice was made by election.

Gorakhpur.—A list should be drawn up for each tahsíli by the Collector and Tahsíldár of eligible members, and from this list election should be made if possible. No system of general election suggested.

Basti.—This question was discussed for a long time. Eventually, a number of the more prominent and intelligible men expressed an opinion that persons who wish to become members should present their applications at a fixed time and place, after which the election of candidates will take place. The subject of persons willing to come forward as candidates was much discussed. Basti members thought candidates would appear. Representatives of other tahsíls were doubtful whether persons would themselves seek election; otherwise notice would have to be given, and voters be called upon to record their votes at a certain time and place to be settled hereafter.

Benares.—*Vide* answers to questions IV. and V.

Mirzapur.—Under system of property qualification numbers will not be large.

List should be published and proclaimed for all persons eligible for membership, who would state by a certain date their willingness te serve. Then, after proclamation, members would be elected from those willing to serve.

VII.—Suggest a way in which votes can be recorded?

Ballia.—General opinion was in favour of a tahsíli as the place for recording votes. No objection was made to a school, but a tahsíli was evidently preferred.

Ghazipur.—Disposed of by answer to question VI.

Azamgarh.—Disposed of by answer to question VI.

Gorakhpur.—Disposed of by answer to question VI.

Basti.—This subject was discussed, but no particular result come to beyond general opinion that election might be made by vote.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Questions.	*Answers.*
	Benares.—*Vide* answer to questions VI. and V.
	Mirzapur.—See answer to question VI. Suitable centrical places for recording votes would be selected. Committee adopted a suggestion that the post-office may be freely used for circulating notices and receiving votes.
VIII.—Shall there be a tahsíli or local committee for the sudder tahsíl as well as for outside tahsíls ?	*Ballia.*—The majority agreed that there should be three tahsíl committees, one for each tahsíli.
(*a*) Shall the tahsíli or local committees be separate and distinct, each one to correspond direct with the Government officers without any district or central board ?	After much discussion the general opinion was that it will not be possible that the tahsíli committee should be quite separate or should correspond direct with the Government officers, but that there must be a district or central board through which the local committees may correspond with Government officials.
(*b*) Shall the tahsíli or local committees be under the supervision of the district board ? and, if so, shall some or all the members of the tahsíli or local committee be also members of the district board ?	There was the general opinion that each tahsíl committee should be constituted separately, and that all members of tahsíl committees should also be members of the central committee.
(*c*) Shall the district board include or be formed of members resident in the tahsíli areas, who would ordinarily perform the work of their local circle, and who would meet periodically at headquarters as members of the district board ?	*Gházipur.*—The general opinion was that there should be a tahsíli committee for the sudder tahsíl to perform the same duties as the three outside tashíl committees. That there should be a central board through which all correspondence to and from tahsíl committees should pass. The central committee will be formed by three or four members from each tahsíli committee.
	Azamgarh.—The majority were of opinion that there should be a separate central board, as at present appointed, to control the various tahsíli committees. The central board also to do the work of the sudder tahsíl. The central board to consist of not less than 12 and not more than 15 members. Members of tahsíli committees for each outside tahsíli will not be members of the central board, but, when necessary, tahsíli committees will send representatives to attend the central board.
	Gorakhpur.—Meeting in favour of a tahsíl committee for the sudder tahsíl to perform the same duties as outside tahsíl committees. That tahsíli committees could not perform their work without the aid of a district or central board. That tahsíl committee should be subordinate to the district committee, but two or three representatives of the tahsíl committee should attend the district committee for the decision of special questions. Members of tahsíl committee would not be members of central committee. The central committee should be increased so as to consist of not less than 15 members. The Collector should remain president of the central board, and at present Tahsíldárs should remain as members on tahsíli committees. Election of members should not be frequent. Members should be appointed for three years at least.
	Basti.—On the constitution of committees, the result come to was as follows :— Each tahsíl shall have its own separate committee, which committee shall conduct all business for the tahsíl. All members of the tahsíl committee shall, *ipso facto*, be also members of the central board, that is to say, all members will be entitled to attend the central board if they wish to do so; but, generally speaking, a few members only will represent each tahsíli on the central board when necessary. The central board will be formed of the members of the tahsíli committees *plus* Government nominees. It will meet seldom and for such purposes as may be necessary for communication with the Government. It was also suggested that the central board should be used, if necessary, as a court of appeal or "sudder *panch*" in any case of importance in which members of a tahsíli committee may be at variance.
	Benares.—The construction of the central board is proposed as follows :— The members of the tahsíli committee shall be, *ipso facto*, members of the central board. There shall also be six members, to be appointed by Government, on the central board. When the central board meets for business, two or three or more members of each of the tahsíli boards will attend together with the Government members. The usual necessary monthly business connected with the accounts shall come before the central board. The central board will also collate the tahsíli budgets and such like work. The central board may also be convened and shall have powers to discuss and to decide on matters sent to it from a tahsíli committee. Committee generally approve that the central Board should have power of court of appeal as proposed for Basti.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Questions. *Answers.*

Mirzapur—There will be four local committees in this district,—one for Mirzapur, one for Chunar, one for Robertsganj, and one for pargana Bhadohi (Family Domains). All members of these committees will be *ex-officio* members of a central board: two, three or more members from each tahsíli committee, together with members nominated by Government, will transact business for central board when necessary. Committee generally approved the idea that the central board should have the power of a court of appeal or "sudder *panch*," as proposed in Basti and also approved in Benares.

C. A. DANIELS,
Commissioner.

No. $\frac{4676}{XIV.}$, dated Benares, the 18th August 1882.

From C. A. DANIELL, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN continuation of this office No. $\frac{4649}{XIV.}$, dated 15th August, I have the honour to submit reports by Mr. Powlett, Magistrate of Basti, and Mr. F. W. Porter, Magistrate of Benares, on the subject of local committees.

2. Mr. Powlett's letter conveys in an enlarged form much of the same opinion on certain points which I have given in my report. Mr. Powlett has taken great pains to consider the subject in all its bearings, and his opinions on the points he brings prominently forward are worthy of attention.

No. $\frac{18}{XII.}$, dated Basti, the 14th August 1882.

From C. J. POWLETT, Esquire, Collector and Magistrate, Basti, to COMMISSIONER, Benares Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Circular (demi-official), dated 9th August 1882, in which you call for a report on the subject of G. Os. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, and No. 160, dated 29th June 1882.

2. I think that the main object to be kept in view is to make local, *i.e.*, tahsíli boards, as strong and independent as possible. The nearer the administrative body is to the area and people subject to their administration, the better prospect there will be of an efficient board and a watchful and interested body of constituents. At the same time, in a district like Basti, it will not do to ignore the necessity of approaching the object in view by stages. I need not remind you that Basti is entirely destitute of the class of men whom residence in or near a great city trains in some appreciation of public affairs. There is not even a body of intelligent vakíls, for the Judge's court is at Gorakhpur. Many of the most substantial Hindus are unable to speak the ordinary Hindustani, and, except among the Musalmans, there are very few who can read or write the Persian character. The business which will be entrusted to local committees is at present by no means simple or easy. When all principal questions connected with the power, responsibility, procedure, and accounts of committees have been hammered out, it will be possible for committees to do without a good deal of assistance which is at present indispensable.

3. For these reasons I would not for some time to come denude the committees of Basti entirely of official members. I think that the District Officer and Tahsíldárs must have seats. But the object being merely to put non-official members in the way of doing business for themselves, I see no necessity for the presence of any more officials than those I have mentioned. It seems, for instance, quite unnecessary to give the Civil Surgeon a seat. In Basti the membership of the Executive Engineer and Inspector of Schools is inoperative. I have been connected with the district for nearly six years, and have never seen either official at a meeting.

4. I think, further, that for the present it is necessary to have a central board. If the District Officer is to train local boards to their work, he must either do so through a central board, or in his capacity of District Officer, independent of and superior to all local boards. It seems to me that the latter method is hostile to the policy which has conceived local boards; whilst the former, under certain restrictions, need not involve any breach of the principle of self-government.

5. Before dealing with those restrictions, I beg to express a strong opinion that the central board should contain no members who are not also members of local boards. The District Officer might be a member of every local board, so that his case would form no exception. If persons who are not members of a local board are admitted to the central board, the dignity of a seat in the latter will completely eclipse that of a seat in the former. It cannot be borne too constantly in mind that personal dignity and consideration is the principal object which native members of committee in a district like this will aim at. I would make every member of a local board *ipso facto* a member of the central board.

6. There will of course eventually be certain rules which every board must obey. There will also be certain limits within which every local board will be independent of all authority but that of the central board. It would, within these limits, closely restrict the power of the central board to interfere; if this is not done, local boards will exist in name only. It seems to me that the independence of each local board, within the limits imposed by general rules, would be sufficiently guaranteed by a rule that when local boards are unanimous, the central board shall have no power to interfere; but when local opinion is divided, and there is a large minority, say, one-third of the members present, against a proposal, the question shall be referred to the central board for final judgment.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

7. The members of the local board in question, being also members of the central board, would be able to attend and represent their views fully at the central meeting. But some arrangement is required to secure the attendance of a sufficient, and sufficiently representative, number of members at meetings of the central board held for the despatch of business which has not excited so much interest as in the case just supposed. I would here urge that central board meetings should be as few as possible, both because attention should centre in the local boards, and because journeys from a distance are to be avoided as discouraging activity in native non-official members.

There should be one meeting at the opening of the year to review the new budget (budgets, if they represent opinion at all, represent it as it stood six months before the year opened, and those six months often bring to light facts which considerably alter the relative importance of projects), and draw up a report on the work of the past year. There should be another meeting to draw up the budget for the coming year in September or October. I see no necessity for more ordinary meetings. Special meetings would be called on the occurrence of such difference of opinion in a local board as has been described in para. 6. I would call on each local board to elect, either for the year or for a particular meeting, say, two members to represent it at the central board. These members to be bound to go; and not, like other members, to be allowed to exercise their right of attending the meeting or not as they pleased.

8. The question whether a system can be devised of electing members of committee by vote comes logically after the question—Will persons of sufficient position and intelligence run the risk of being rejected, *i.e.*, will there be more candidates than vacant seats? The answer to this question depends altogether, I believe, on the steps taken to give dignity to the post of a member of committee, to save him from unnecessary trouble, and in some cases to remunerate him for actual expenses. I believe that few things would conduce more to enhance the position of a member of committee than exempting him from the operation of certain clauses of the Indian Arms Act. The restrictions of that Act are borne with much impatience, and exemption is a most substantial and welcome boon, besides being a mark of high consideration. I would exempt for life, not merely for his term of office, every man who obtains a seat and serves his time on a local board. Exemption from tolls at public ferries and bridges for himself and retinue, when going to or coming from a meeting, would be appreciated enough by a native member to make it worth while the trouble of altering the law. All members whose journey to and from a meeting covers ten miles, should be entitled to travelling expenses on Deputy Collector's scale. Many would refuse to draw the money, but many would find in the concession the solution of their chief difficulty in attending meetings. I have great doubts whether it would not be well worth while to attach a salary to the post of chairman. If the London School Board finds that it cannot insist on its chairman's really doing his work unless he has a salary, it is probably too much to expect better things of a native *rais*.

9. I believe it possible to make the post of member so attractive that men of influence will be willing to risk the failure of their candidateship. In that case, I think there will be no real difficulty in arranging a system of election. The electoral body should at first be small: it will be easy to enfranchise when the privilege comes to be understood. The lambardárs are the present representatives of the community, and I would exclude, in the zamíndár class of electors, all zamíndárs who are not lambardárs. I would further stipulate for such a qualification as would limit the number of zamíndár-electors in each tahsíl to 100 or 150. I cannot at present give the figure required: it may be Rs. 100 land-revenue, or Rs. 150 land-revenue, payable by the lambardár for himself and an undivided family: the actual figure I can ascertain hereafter. If more than 150 zamíndár-electors are created in each tahsíl, the electoral body will be too large to be taught the object of its existence. In the non-zamíndár class the lowest assessment to license-tax (Rs. 10), if a qualification, would in this district create a body of about 500 voters: the numbers, 100 per tahsíl, are not too large; and the mass not being men of any mark, very few would be induced to vote.

10. I have already said that boards here must have, for some time, the assistance of the District Officer and the Tahsíldárs. But it does not seem to me at all necessary that any official should be chairman of his board. His presence will enable him to give it all requisite assistance. His object should be to keep it from making egregious mistakes, and that done, leave it to settle matters itself. I do not think it necessary that the official member should ever have a vote.

No. $\frac{11}{IV.}$, dated Benares, the 14th August 1882.

From F. W. PORTER, Esquire, President, District Local Committee, Benares, to COMMISSIONER, Benares Division.

SIR,

IN accordance with your demi-official request, I have the honour to report briefly my views regarding the local committee scheme.

To be of any good, the tahsíl committees must be absolutely and entirely independent the one of the other. Unless this is so, I do not think the members will take any interest in their work. I would have the president a non-official, but I do not think the committees can, or perhaps that they now will, be able to dispense *entirely* with the official element. The Tahsíldár should I think always be on the committee.

Every member of the local committees should be *ex-officio* member of the district committee also, and to their number should be added a proportion of official members. As far as numbers are concerned, I agree with the conclusions arrived at in the committee on Thursday last. The Magistrate should, I think, be the president of the district committee, which as such should assemble only three or four times a year, when matters such as the budget-estimates, annual reports, or other important subjects affecting the whole district, are to be discussed. I would have a separate finance committee, composed chiefly of official members, to meet monthly, to pass the monthly accounts and overhaul estimates, in fact to control expenditure. With this check I should make the committees self-governing, the correspondence of each to be carried on through Magistrate as president of district committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

As regards the formation of committees, I would have a property qualification—

	Benares. Rs.	*Chandauli.* Rs.	
Zamíndárs -	500 revenue :	200 revenue :	would, I think, be a fair qualification.
Tenants -	100 rent :	100 rent :	
Others - -	50 tax or the equivalent income :		

I would have the same qualification for voters and members. In other words, I would call upon those qualified for membership to elect their own committee from among themselves, the committee thus formed should elect their own president and secretary.

On other points generally I agree with what was passed at Thursday meeting. I consider that, using the district committee as a kind of sudder *panchayat* in cases when tahsíl boards cannot agree, is decidedly a most valuable suggestion. It is a plan which is thoroughly consonant with the ideas of the natives themselves, and is sure to be favourably received.

No. $\frac{4804}{XIV.}$, dated the 24th August 1882.

From C. A. DANIELL, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN continuation of this office No. $\frac{5676}{XIV.}$, dated 18th August 1882, I have the honour to send reports by the Magistrates of Gorakhpur, Ballia, and Azamgarh. Those of Ballia and Azamgarh were written before I had held the consultations reported in my No. $\frac{4649}{XIV.}$, dated 15th August 1882. I send these up as in your demi-official, dated 1st August, the reports of District Officers are expected. These Magistrates have just replied that they have no further reports to make.

No. 119, dated Gorakhpur, the 18th August 1882.

From J. KENNEDY, Esquire, Officiating Collector and Magistrate of Gorakhpur, to COMMISSIONER, Benares Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. $\frac{4095}{XII.-D.}$, dated 14th July 1882, I have the honour to refer you to the results of a general meeting held by you at Gorakhpur on 4th August 1882, for the purpose of discussing the question of tahsíli committees, &c.

2. There can be little doubt, I think, that for all administrative purposes the tahsíli committees must be subordinate to the district committee, and that the District Officer must be the chairman of the latter. The district committee for Gorakhpur should consist of 15 members, and the number of members on the tahsíli committees should vary from five to ten according to the tahsíl. These tahsíl committees should be entitled to send two representative members to the district committees, but should not themselves be members. The Tahsíldár should be a member of the tahsíl committee, and should be chairman unless a fit non-official can be found. Members of the tahsíl committees should be appointed by election, but a high standard of qualification is requisite both for voters and for members. These propositions sum up the general consensus of native opinion on the subject.

EXTRACT from a letter No. $\frac{M.G.}{129}$, of 1882, dated 21st July 1882, from A. ROBINSON, Esquire, Officiating Collector and Magistrate of Ballia, to C. A. DANIELL, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division.

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7. The Government has expressed a preference for the following method of constituting local boards :—"The district board should include members resident within the tahsíl area to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board." I do not disagree with the principle that members of the local board should have seats at the district board, but I think their ordinary place of meeting should be the head-quarters of the tahsíl, and not the head-quarters of the district. Even if the local members could be induced to overcome the difficulties of travelling and attend regularly at the head-quarters of the district, it is unlikely that they would take the same part and interest in the management of the affairs entrusted to them as if they were obliged to meet separately and independently at the head-quarters of the tahsíl. In my opinion separate and independent meeting is a *sine qua non* of local administration.

8. The minimum number of members of local committee should be nine, of whom two-thirds should be non-official. Ordinarily, the official members would be the Tahsíldár, the Munsif, and the Inspector of Police. I would distribute the work territorially among the non-official members, and departmentally among the official members. Thus the Munsif might be responsible for education, the Inspector of Police for sanitation, and the Tahsíldár for public works. The whole area within the jurisdiction of the local committee should be divided into not less than six circles, each of which would be entrusted to one or more non-official members resident within the circle. The non-official members would be primarily responsible for the due inspection of schools, village sanitary arrangements, and public works within their circles; while the official members would co-operate with advice and assistance when called upon. I am disposed to recommend that there be no local committee at head-quarters, but that the work falling within the limits of the sudder tahsíl be distributed among the members of the district committee residing within that area.

9. The local boards should meet once every month or oftener if necessary. The ordinary monthly meeting should be held one week before the day fixed for the meeting of the district board, and any member absenting himself three times in succession from the ordinary monthly meetings should be

liable to have his name removed. The proceedings of the meeting should be submitted to the district board in time to be discussed at the ordinary monthly meeting of the district board.

10. For the present the local boards must be entirely under the control of the district board. There is no alternative to this system but complete independence. The Government may prescribe what funds are to be placed under the control of the local committees, and what powers they are to exercise with regard to those funds ; but all correspondence must be through the district committee, and all the accounts of the local committees must be incorporated with those of the district committee. The local committee must be subordinate to the district committee to the same extent that the Collector is to the Commissioner.

11. Though collectively the local board will be under the control of the district board, their members will have a certain amount of independence, to the extent that they take a part in the deliberations of the district board. In my opinion, instead of including all the local members in the district board, it would be better that only one official and two non-officials should be made members of the district board. Many persons serving on local boards might have no claim to the dignity of a seat on the district board, and their indiscriminate appointment might bring the office into disrepute. By limiting the number of seats accorded to members of local boards, the representation of local interests at head-quarters would come to be regarded as a distinction to be acquired by zeal and energy in the discharge of duty.

12. I cannot refrain from recording my opinion that no effective stimulus can be given to local government unless more liberal allotments of funds are made.

The communications of this district are in a very dilapidated condition, and until considerable improvement is made in this respect, the natives will not begin to believe in the reality of self-government. With a population of 924,763, paying a land-revenue amounting to Rs. 6,30,214, the funds allotted for the repairs of all the roads in the district in this the first year of decentralisation amount to under Rs. 2,000 ; while the Public Works Department have been debating for three years whether they will grant the small sum required for bridging and metalling the first six miles of the main road to Gházipur.

13. With reference to the concluding part of para. 3 of the G. O. under consideration, regarding the relations between the central and local boards, I ought to mention that the committee of this district has already nominated certain members, under section 10 of G. O. No. 393, dated 4th March 1882, to supervise the Education Department, and one of the education members has been authorised by the president to countersign salary and contingent bills. This supervision will no doubt be more effective when it is exercised with the aid and through the instrumentality of the local boards.

14. The appointment of members in this district should be at first made by nomination, vacancies among non-officials being filled up by the committee in the manner prescribed by para. 6 of G. O. No. 393, dated 4th March 1882. At the same time I would recommend the preparation of lists of voters, with a view to the system of election being subsequently introduced. The system of election generally adopted in municipalities, and which I have described in my report on the subject of municipal election, seems to be the most convenient. The electors divide themselves into three classes —zamindárs, cultivators, and non-agriculturists ; and from these classes the electoral franchise should be conferred upon the following :—

(1) All males of full age who pay license-tax.
(2) All zamindárs, being males of full age, who pay Government revenue amounting to Rs. 100 or upwards.
(3) All cultivators, being males of full age, who hold land 100 bighas in extent or upwards.

15. These lists could be easily prepared and would be of manageable size. Should any zamindár or cultivator hold jointly with other members of his family, the family should have one vote for every Rs. 100 of revenue paid or for every 100 bighas of land cultivated. The extent of land held by a cultivator is a better criterion of his status than the amount of rent payable by him. I do not think the qualifications of electors should be lower than above stated, both from the difficulty there would be in preparing and maintaining the lists, and from the fact that the privilege of voting might be under-valued if conferred too liberally at first.

16. There should be at least one polling place in each of the "circles" into which the area of the local board's jurisdiction would be divided, as recommended in para. 8 of this letter. The election should be annual and held in the beginning of February, as this time would be convenient for the people and for District Officers than later in.

17. With regard to the appointment of non-official members as chairmen of district and local boards, one or two of those whom I have consulted have expressed an opinion that there are non-officials qualified to hold the office, but that they are unknown to the *hakims*. I am afraid such men exist only in imagination. For the chairman of the district board, I should say a knowledge of English is indispensable. But even if a knowledge of English be dispensed with, I am quite convinced—and almost all those I have consulted share my conviction—that there is no non-official member, or possible member, of the committee who could discharge the duties of chairman of the district committee.

18. For the chairman of a local board, a knowledge of English, though desirable, is not indispensable ; but I do not know any non official person, residing within the limits of the Rasra or Bansdih tahsils, with the influence and intelligence necessary to carry on the duties. For the present I recommend that the Munsif be appointed chairman and the Tahsildár be held responsible for the regular attendance of the members.

19. In this district the time has not yet come for dispensing with the assistance of Tahsildárs at the district and local boards. The people are accustomed to look to the Tahsildár for advice and assistance, and I do not see how his place is to be filled. At the same time I recommend that only the sudder Tahsildár should have a seat at the district board.

20. I think the utmost additional establishment required for the local boards is a muharrir on Rs. 10 or Rs. 15 a month. For the present the local boards might meet in the Tahsildár's or Munsif's kutcherry.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

For the district committee separate offices are absolutely necessary. A suitable building should be constructed for the district and municipal committees not too distant from the kutcherry. Such a building would cost about Rs. 10,000, of which one-fourth should be contributed by the municipality.

21. In conclusion, I must repeat my opinion that the chief thing wanting to make local government a reality is a liberal grant of public money to be expended in the district, chiefly on roads and bridges. Nothing strikes the native imagination more powerfully than a good road; and as long as this district continues cut off from communication with surrounding and more civilised districts, so long will the inhabitants remain sunk in lethargy and refuse to take part or interest in public affairs. I have already recommended that travelling allowance should be given to members of district committees to enable them to attend the monthly meetings. In addressing members care should be taken to observe all the forms of respect to which their position entitles them. All letters to them should be written on English paper and enclosed in embossed envelopes. These are matters to which, though seemingly trivial, natives attach great importance.

EXTRACT from a Memo. by W. R. Burkitt, Esquire, Magistrate of Azamgarh, dated 1st August 1882, regarding District and Tahsíl Boards.

ON the general questions involved in the recent correspondence I have a few observations to make.

First, as to election. After no little consideration, and having consulted all the influential and best-educated men of the district, I confess myself unable to suggest any plan of direct election. I have given much thought to the matter, but have been unable to fix on any reasonable suggestions as to who the electors should be, what their qualifications should be, and how they should be assembled to give their votes.

All the native gentlemen with whom I have consulted are of opinion that the local committees should be appointed by *nomination*, with a vague suggestion that the names of the nominees should be generally made known, and that if objection were made by any parties to any particular name, such objection should be taken into consideration.

I am of opinion that nomination must for the present at least be adhered to. I do not see my way towards pointing out the means by which electoral machinery can be established and put in motion.

Secondly, as to the position of the Collector in the sudder committee. I have explained the wishes of Government in this matter to the native members of the committee. They are, however (I understand), of opinion that, for the present at least, it is indispensable that the Collector should be president. They will themselves lay their views on this matter before the Commissioner.

Thirdly, as to Tahsíldárs being members of the tahsili committees. On this point also the general feeling is that the Tahsíldár should be a member. And indeed, unless it be intended (as I do not think is the case) that these tahsíli committees are to be *wholly* non-official, it is necessary that the Tahsildár should be a member, he being the only official available for the purpose.

Fourthly, as to the relations between the local and *head-quarters' committees.* On this point, on account of legal difficulties, I must make suggestions with diffidence. At present by law there can be but one committee for the whole district, and legislation will be required before any real administrative power can be given to these local committees. It apparently is intended that *all* administrative work within a tahsíl is to be given over to the local committee. If so, what will remain for the sudder committee? Meanwhile, until these questions are in some way authoritatively settled, I would propose that the local committees be regarded as sub-committees of the sudder, entrusted as such by the latter with the execution of works, &c., within their local limits. I take it for granted that there will be nothing illegal in this method of evading the difficulty. With this view I have so framed the lists of the local (tahsil) committees, that at least two of their members shall at the same time be members of the sudder committee. These two members, with the Tahsíldár (an *ex-officio* member of the sudder committee), may be taken as the representatives of the sudder on the sub-committee, and as such empowered, with the assistance of the other local members, to carry on the duties entrusted to them by the sudder committee.

Docket No. $\frac{4824}{XIV.}$, dated Benares, the 30th August 1882.

From C. A. DANIELL, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

IN continuation of this office No. $\frac{4804}{XIV.}$, dated 24th August 1882, has the honour to submit in original Mr. Cadell, Magistrate of Mirzapur's report on the subject of district and local boards.

No. 120, dated Mirzapur, the 28th August 1882.

From A. CADELL, Esquire, Magistrate and Collector of Mirzapur, to COMMISSIONER, Benares Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to place on record my opinions with reference to the scheme of local self-government recently set forth by the Government of India. The way in which the scheme affects district and municipal boards differs very considerably, and except that the proposal to relieve municipalities of all charges for police and to throw upon them the responsibility for schools and hospitals within their limits was cordially welcomed, I do not think that recent proposals have excited any great enthusiasm in their favour. Municipalities have already their funds to a great extent in their own power, and in my opinion the real sentiment of the members of the committees is that safe and gradual progress is required rather than any radical change of constitution.

2. With regard to the district committee on the other hand, the feeling of dissatisfaction with the present system is very strong among the members, whether official or non-official, in what I may be

allowed to call neglected districts and tahsíls. Mirzapur may, I think, fairly be included among the neglected districts, and in this district there are several specially neglected tracts. In a district such as this, in which since the opening of the East Indian Railway eighteen years ago not a single mile of metalled road has been constructed to bring up the traffic from the south; and more especially in tahsíl Chunar, in which the important line which connects the country to the south with the railway has not, in spite of local efforts, been made practicable for carts, any scheme which held out a prospect of greater attention to the needs of the country and the wishes of the people was necessarily welcomed by the people as it was by the officials of the district. But I do not think that the public interest went much beyond the objects to be aimed at: the people would welcome any change which substituted good roads for bad, but they would prefer the system which gave them the best roads, not the system which gave them the largest share in the district administration. The fact seems to me that at present the committee desires independence not so much of the district officials, whom they recognize as holding similar aspirations with their own, but of their higher authorities which allot funds without any reference, as it seems to them, to the needs of the country or the wishes of the people. It has seemed to me that the people of Chunar have all along taken the greatest and most intelligent interest in the proposed changes, and this is precisely because in times past that tahsíl has been most neglected. The Chunar man thinks, and with reason, that however small his share of the sum placed at the disposal of the district or the province may be, that share, if steadily applied to the improvement of communications, would in the course of years have made the most important road in the district practicable for carts, and might even have metalled the road which connects the important market of Ahraura with the railway.

I have dwelt entirely on the interest of the people in the communications of the district, for, except in their anxiety for the introduction of Nagri character into official use, I have noticed no general interest in any subject connected with education.

3. If I have gauged the feelings of the people aright, the most important point in their eyes—as it is certainly one of the most important points from every point of view—is the allotment of funds or of sources of income. This is a point to which little attention was paid when the subject was first discussed; but it is in my opinion a most important one, for committees without funds to administer cannot be expected to excite that attention and interest which must form the chief elements in their vitality.

As it happens, the difficulty seems in this district to be less great than elsewhere, for the Stone Mehal is a peculiarly local source of income, which, derived as it is from a geological feature of the district which has largely influenced the amount of cesses, might suitably be assigned for district purposes. The net income from this source, which may be estimated at Rs. 42,000, along with the surplus of existing cesses after paying village police Rs. 29,000, pounds Rs. 2,810, and a suitable share of the ferry fund receipts, amounting in this district to Rs. 30,235, along with miscellaneous receipts in the form of subscriptions and school fees, would provide on a moderate standard for the wants of the districts with regard to communications, schools, and hospitals outside the limits of municipalities. The assignment of sources of revenue is, in my opinion, the most important matter of all, and must form the basis of the efficient working of district and tahsíl boards.

4. Regarding the various points with reference to which an attempt has been made to ascertain the views of members of the existing committee and other natives of position, it is difficult to be certain what the opinion of the people really is. Since my return from leave I have carefully noted down the opinions of different members and other residents of the district, and on the whole I am inclined to think that opinions elicited in this way are more to be trusted than those arrived at in a public meeting. As far as my experience of such meetings goes the process is somewhat as follows:—One of the persons present states his opinion, or it may be ventures a chance conjecture as to what he thinks may be an acceptable statement. If it is approved, the others follow; if it is, not random shots are made until an opinion which is thought more acceptable is arrived at, and then the whole meeting follows its leader like a flock of sheep. In some cases members who know English get an inkling of the opinion which they think most acceptable, and having expressed it, they find it received as a sudden inspiration and adopted without either hesitation or consideration. In this way I do not think that several of the conclusions arrived at on the occasion of the public meeting of the 12th August fairly represent the feelings of members and others present.

5. *Qualification for Members.*—With reference to this point the general impression was that no such qualification was required, and the tendency of the opinions of those who were first called upon to state their views when told that a qualification was required was, as at Chunar the day before, in favour of a very high one. For my own part I do not think the question a very important one, and the chief use of a qualification appears to me to be that it furnishes a list of persons to place before the people as a guide to possible representatives, but this end might be obtained equally well by an order for the publication of such a list.

In a district in which we have no accurate statistics on the subject it is difficult to form any useful opinion as to the suitability or otherwise of the qualification adopted—

The payment of Rs. 300 jama.
Rs. 50 to 100 rent.
Rs. 25 license tax.

The defects of the qualification appear to me to be—

(1) That in a district settled permanently and in the case of this district nowadays with extreme inequality revenue payments form no criterion of wealth or position. In the tracts which were highly cultivated at the time of the permanent settlement the net income of a zamindar paying Rs. 300 may not probably be Rs. 100 to Rs. 150, while in the country to the south the recipient of a rental counted by thousands may pay only a few rupees to the State. The receipt of Rs. 300 in the form of profits from land should, in my opinion, qualify for membership.

(2) That it excludes a most useful class—men who pay neither revenue, rent, nor license tax, but who may still be very useful members of committees, such as pensioned officials or members of influential but not wealthy families: Qazis for example.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

6. *Qualification for Electors.*—The qualification for voters arrived at—

the payment of Rs. 100 jama,
Rs. 50 rent,

or an income of Rs. 500—represents, I think, fairly enough the views of the community with regard to zamindárs and persons on receipt of income not derived from land. But in my opinion it in no way represents their opinion with regard to tenants. But here, too, provision should, in my opinion, be made for allowing persons in receipt of Rs. 100 profits from land to register themselves as voters. The privilege may not be claimed for many years, but we should aim at a fairly consistent standard. The qualification arrived at for tenants is opposed to the opinions frankly stated of all the members whom I ever spoke to on the subject, who, when they had any opinion at all, agreed in fixing the tenants qualification at a sum which in their opinion indicated an income about equal to that of the zamindar. In accordance with the general tendency of these opinions I noted at the time a set of qualifications which fairly expressed the views of the majority :—

Rs. 100 revenue or profits from land.
„ 125 rent of fixed-rate tenants.
„ 200 rent of occupancy tenants.
„ 1,000 rent of a lessee.
All persons paying license tax.

The best educated and most thoughtful and progressive member suggested as qualification—

Rs. 50 revenue,
„ 100 rent,

and the opinion of every member of the committee was in the same direction.

And whatever opinion may be held as to the necessity for admitting tenants to the constituency, there seems to be no sufficient reason for admitting tenants and excluding proprietors holding a better position. If tenants paying Rs. 50 rent are to be admitted proprietors paying that sum in the form of revenue or receiving that amount as profits from land should, in my opinion, be admitted too. In the Government of India Resolution of the 18th May it is contemplated that the qualification for the electorate "might at first be fairly high," and I think that in descending to the Rs. 50 tenant we are going too far, and I am of opinion that the Rs. 50 proprietor, the Rs. 60 tenant at fixed rates, and the Rs. 75 occupancy tenants would make a better qualification than that adopted at the meeting, and at first the substitution of the figures Rs. 100, Rs. 120, and Rs. 150 might be even better. It should be remembered that election is altogether new to the people, and that it is very desirable that the constituency should be of a manageable size. In every case I would make provision to allow the proprietor or fixed-rate tenant to have his name placed on the register on proof that his profits equalled the amount of revenue or rent fixed as a standard.

7. With regard to the constitution of the tahsíl and district committees, I cannot say that I agree in the conclusion which, as I understood it, was arrived at the meeting. I am distinctly of opinion that the tahsíl committees should be represented in the district committee by their best men, and I think that it is desirable that the president of the tahsil board and one or two elected members should represent the tahsil board at headquarters. This will tend to secure greater continuity in the proceedings of the district board than is likely to be attained under the system proposed, which is that each member should in turn represent his tahsíl at the district board. It is, in my opinion, not in any way necessary that all members of the tahsíl committee should also be members of the district committee. The larger the committees are made, the more certain is it that a considerable proportion of the members will be men of very moderate position, of little education, capacity or energy, and it is, I think, better that the tahsíl should be represented by its pushing intelligent men, who are likely to take an interest in business and to know what is required. It will be an advantage, rather than a disadvantage, if the district board is above the average tahsíl board.

In this district the Mirzapur tahsíl might be represented by its chairman and four elected members, and Chunar and Robertsganj each by a chairman and two elected members.

This system would be all the more necessary if a modification should be adopted which I would suggest on the lines, if I remember them rightly, of the Scotch county boards or committees of supply, and that is that all proprietors in receipt of a certain income from land or paying a certain revenue should as a right have seats at the tahsíl boards. If in this district Rs. 5,000 were adopted as the standard, some twelve persons would sit by right of property on the different tahsíl boards, one of them —the Raja of Kantit—on the board of each tahsíl. I think that men with so considerable a stake in the country might fairly be allowed as a matter of right to take a part in the administration of the localities with which they are connected.

8. *Presidency of the district board.*—With regard to the presidency of the district committee, the view is general that for a time at least the District Officer should remain chairman. Of late years the local committee has had little power and influence, and its proceedings have afforded its members no insight into business, not so much because the unofficial members have been overshadowed by the official members, but because the committees themselves have had little power. The present time too is an unfavourable one in this district for innovations in this respect. Of four families which combine wealth with old and assured position, the greatest is represented by a minor—two by ladies—while the representative of the fourth resides more than a hundred miles from head-quarters, in a part of the district which it is proposed to exclude from the scheme altogether. The general opinion therefore, and one in which I coincide, is that the presidency of the district committee should remain in the hands of the District Officer, while the tahsíl committees should be composed entirely of non-officials and be presided over by non-official chairmen elected by and from the board itself.

9. To the district board I would reserve the allotment of funds, the laying down of general rules, and the decision on particular points referred to it by minorities of (say) not less than two-fifths of the tahsíl committees. To the tahsíl committees I would leave the expenditure of the funds at their disposal, subject to a right of reference as above suggested.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

10. *Number and areas of boards.*—The area in acres and the population of the different divisions of this district are as follows :—

	Area. Sq. miles.	Acres.	Population.
Mirzapur tahsíl - - - - -	1,166	„ 497	377,195
Chunar tahsíl - - - - - -	558	„ 633	182,654
Robertsganj to the north of the Son - - -	947	„ 92	129,879
Robertsganj to the south of the Son - - -	1,684	„ 580	96,439
Mirzapur district, exclusive of Family Domains -	4,357	„ 522	786,167
Bhadohi - - - - - -	391	„ 429	283,027
Khera Mangror - - - - -	474	„ 371	67,451
Family Domains of Mahárája of Benares - -	549	„ 558	350,478
Total exclusive of Family Domains -	5,224	„ 42	1,136,645

It is recommended that there should be a tahsíl board for the Mirzapur and Chunar tahsíls, but that that for Robertsganj should be restricted to the country to the north of the Son. The country to the south is divided between the Rajas of Agori Barhar and Singrauli and Government, the proprietor of Dudhi, the extent of which is 514 square miles. In this extensive tract there is no cart-track. There are at present only four Government schools and one aided school. I think that for the present at all events the tract should be excluded from the control of the Robertsganj tahsíl board, which will have independently of it a very large area for which to provide roads, education, and hospital accommodation.

For Bhadohi a separate board subordinate to the district board is recommended. Khera Mangror contributes nothing to the district funds; nothing appears to be expended by the Deputy Superintendent on its roads, and for the present at all events it seems best to leave it to the Maharája, who holds the whole tract free of revenue, and to the Deputy Superintendent.

If these recommendations are adopted there will be four subordinate boards for Mirzapur, Chunar, North Robertsganj, and Bhadohi, while the exceptional tracts of South Robertsganj and Khera Mangror will be excluded from the scheme of self-government for the present.

11. *Municipalities.—Qualifications of members and voters.* With reference to the municipalities, the feelings of the people when left to themselves is, in my opinion, in favour of a very high qualification for membership, if a qualification be insisted on, and of reducing very considerably the number of electors. This tendency was shown very clearly both at Chunar and at Mirzapur. For my own part I do not think that there is any great necessity for a qualification for membership which is likely to do more harm than good, and that the existing voter's qualification of Rs. 12 annual rental in Chunar and Rs. 24 in Mirzapur, giving a constituency of about twenty-five for every thousand inhabitants, is suitable enough. But in both municipalities, if the unfettered opinion of the present committees were followed, the constituency would be reduced, by raising the qualification to an income of Rs. 500 or even Rs. 1,250 per annum, to a number not exceeding 5 or 6 per 1,000.

12. *The office of chairman.*—As regards the chairmanship the opinion of the committees of Chunar and Mirzapur is in accordance with what I understand to have been the decision in the more important towns to the east and to the west, Benares and Allahabad—that the change, if it is to be introduced, should be introduced gradually, and that time should be given to members to learn more of the business of the committee than they know at present. There is I think more reasonableness in this view than may strike some at first sight, and it is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reply to their objections to say that if members have not learned the work of the committee in ten, six, or four years, they are not likely to learn it in one or two. For this argument leaves out of sight the fact that the members may in future take more interest in the routine work of the committee than they have done in past years, and that when increased responsibility is placed before them in the near future, they are likely to make greater efforts to fit themselves for undertaking it. As Englishmen in India know, a man may make many sea voyages without acquiring much practical knowledge of navigation; but if a ship-load of passengers were convinced that after a sufficient time given in which to acquire the necessary knowledge they would have to navigate the ship themselves, they would, whatever the result might be, evince a deeper interest in what was going on around them than is usual under ordinary circumstances, and it is likely that some at all events best suited by previous training and by natural disposition would prove fairly efficient in an art of which they had previously little or no knowledge. This is I take it the view of members of municipal committees: they ask for time to learn duties which they never expected to be asked to undertake.

At both meetings the first answer to the question regarding the appointment of a non-official chairman was against it. It was only when the possibility of Government forbidding the official chairman to act was suggested that the people said they would do the best they could. Now that they have heard what decision has been arrived at in Benares and Allahabad, the members revert to their former opinion on the subject, and within a few days of the meeting on the 12th the two most influential residents of the town called together to state this view. Whatever the decision arrived at may be, I think that by the division of the towns into wards, not only for electoral but for administrative purposes, a good deal may be done to give not only the possible chairman or vice-chairman, but the members in general, a much larger share in the administration of the municipality. But I think that the greatest danger which besets the scheme of extended self-government is that it should be allowed to degenerate into a sham. It is easy enough to get appointed chairmen and vice-chairmen, but if these are mere puppets, nothing is gained in the present, and the ultimate usefulness of the whole scheme is endangered. The present member of the municipal committees are not as a rule highly educated, versed in public business, or actively engaged in conducting it, but in every respect improvement is taking place and may be expected to be more rapid as time goes on. And in a

district such as this I think that I am best serving the important ends which Government has in view by recommending that gradual introduction of a fuller system of self-government which is desired by the people themselves and which the circumstances of the district and its inhabitants seem to render expedient.

No. 1527, dated the 5th July 1882.

From W. Kaye, Esquire, Commissioner, Jhánsi Division, to Officiating Secretary to Government, N.W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge your No. 145 of 21st June 1882.

2. The required information has been called for, and the various questions treated of shall have my careful attention and shall be reported upon in due course. I venture, however, to suggest for the consideration of the Government, that the Government of India can hardly have intended their orders to apply to such a backward part of the country as the Jhánsi division. Para. 10 of the Resolution of the Government of India says that local boards are to be constituted in every district where intelligent non-official agency can be found. In my opinion such agency is not to be found in Jhánsi.

3. It must be remembered that the Jhánsi Division differs widely from the rest of the North-Western Provinces. It is included among the scheduled districts and excluded from the operation of the general Acts and Regulations. The greater part of it has been British territory for less than 30 years; education has made but little progress in the division; and the men who by their position are best fitted to serve on committees are often the least educated. Proper material for the formation of independent local boards is literally not to be had.

4. There is another way in which the country is far behind the long settled parts of the province, and that is in its want of means of communication. In districts traversed by metalled roads and railways it is an easy matter for committees to meet frequently. In Bundelkhand, especially during the rains, when the whole country is a sea of black mud, and no man willingly moves from his own village, it is a most difficult thing to get committees together. There have been as yet but two meetings of the Jhánsi district committee as newly constituted; and already one member has resigned, and two others have given me to understand that if they are required to attend constantly, they will have to do the same. This difficulty would of course be diminished if the local boards held their meetings entirely about tahsílis, but even then it would not be entirely removed, especially in Lalitpur, where parganas are 50 and 60 miles long.

5. I hope it will not be thought that I am without reason raising difficulties in the way of carrying out the new policy of Government. That policy is one the expediency of which I fully realise, and for the success of which I am most anxious. I think, however, that it should not be tried in every part of the province at once, without considering whether the locality is favourable or unfavourable for its introduction. The policy of local self-government, as it seems to me, will only be discredited by its introduction under circumstances so unfavourable that it must almost of necessity fail.

No. 198, dated Naini Tal, the 20th July 1882.

From R. Smeaton, Esquire, Junior Secretary to Government, N.-W. P. and Oudh, to Commissioner, Jhánsi Division.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge your letter No. 1527, dated 5th July 1882, representing that in your opinion the Jhánsi Division is not in a position for the full application of the system of local self-government sketched by the Government of India in the Resolution of 18th May last.

2. In reply I am to say that the detailed report promised will be awaited, and that the applicability to the Jhánsi Division of the extended measures will be duly considered when all the information called for is before the Government.

No. $\frac{1805A.}{XXIII.-46.}$, dated Jhánsi, the 12th August 1882.

From W. Kaye, Esquire, Commissioner, Jhánsi Division, to Officiating Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the report required by G. Os. No. 145, dated 21st June, and No. 160, dated 29th idem.

2. I forward herewith copies of a report by the Deputy Commissioner of Lalitpur, enclosing copy of proceedings of the Lalitpur district committee held on 20th July; copy of a report from Deputy Commissioner of Jhánsi, enclosing copy of proceedings of the Jhánsi district committee held on 27th July; and copy of paras. 1 and 2 of the proceedings of the Jalaun district committee held on 3rd August, together with copy of the memo. referred to in para. 2 thereof.

3. With reference to para. 3 of your letter under reply, I have to report that opinions are unanimous in favour of adopting the third of the plans for constituting tahsíl boards therein referred to. Upon this point the views put forward by the Deputy Commissioner of Jhánsi are the most practical. It would undoubtedly be feasible to constitute, out of the general committee, sub-committees for each tahsíl, such sub-committees meeting once a month, or oftener if necessary, and transacting local business in subordination to the district committee, within the limits laid down by the Deputy Commissioner. It might be arranged that the tahsíli committees should submit their proceedings in the Education Department to the member of the district committee at head-quarters in charge of that department, and so on in other departments. The member in charge of the particular department would lay the proceedings forwarded to him before the district committee

for sanction or final orders. One advantage of adopting this plan would be that it would obviate the present necessity for monthly meetings of the district committee, the burden of which upon members resident at a distance is so great, in Bundelkhand at any rate, that it is utterly impossible that the system should continue to work. If meetings were held quarterly, as two out of the three district committees propose, it might be found possible to procure the fairly regular attendance of outstation members.

4. It will be seen from the copies of the district committee's proceedings submitted herewith that a sufficient number of nominations of new members have been made to admit of the constitution of tahsíl boards with the proportion of non-official to official members desired by Government. These nominations have been made partly by district committees and partly by District Officers in consultation with the leading Native gentlemen of their districts. The new nominations made, to which I solicit the sanction of Government, are as follows:—

Jhánsi.

For pargana Jhánsi - - - (1) Hazari Lal. (2) Ram Kishen.

For pargana Mau - - - (1) Bindraban Chaudhri. (2) Gandharp Singh.

For pargana Garotha - - - (1) Thakur Senapat Singh. (2) Buddhu Modi.

For pargana Moth - - - (1) Dewan Achhe Lal. (2) Khub Chand. (3) Bhagirath.

Jalaun.

For pargana Jalaun - - - (1) Jetwar Singh Chaudhri, of Kukargaon.

For pargana Kálpi - - - (1) Parsram, Lambardár of Lohargaon. (2) Kali Charn Shukal, of Kálpi.

For pargana Madhogarh - - (1) Kuar Baldeo Singh, of Naoli. (2) Chaudhri Bhajbal Singh, of Kaksis.

For pargana Kúnch - - - (1) Dewan Sukh Sahib, of Baroda. (2) Dalip Singh, Lambardár of Sanaeya. (3) Hazari Mal Seth, of Kúnch.

Lalitpur.

For pargana Lalitpur - - (1) Kuar Narayanju, of Raura. (2) Mahant Daulat Gir, of Sirsi. (3) Kuar Randhir Singh, of Dehalwara.

5. With reference to the practicability of introducing some system of election of members of district committees, opinions are various. The Lalitpur committee and the Deputy Commissioner think that an elective body might be framed by preparing lists of all persons of known respectability, and the election held at darbars, to which electors should all be summoned. The Jalaun committee are of opinion that the district is not sufficiently advanced as yet for the introduction of any system of election. The Jhánsi committee propose a system of selected candidates; the elective body to consist of lambardárs, license-tax-payers, and other respectable persons selected by tahsíli committees; the votes to be collected by patwáris. The Deputy Commissioner of Jhánsi is of opinion that any system of election is at present impracticable. I was present at the meeting of the Jhánsi committee at which the subject was discussed. I saw that there was a really strong feeling against any uncontrolled system of election. Native gentlemen have such a horror of associating on equal terms with men whom they consider of lower status, that a system which admits of the election of any person, whatever his rank may be, will, I am sure, be bitterly opposed. What the committee evidently desired was that all candidates for election should be passed by the existing members of the district committee before their candidature was allowed. If this was done, they care little under what system the candidates are to be elected. The system of election through the agency of patwáris, proposed by the Jhánsi committee, is plainly objectionable. The Lalitpur plan is more feasible. It would undoubtedly be practicable to have a list of electors and of candidates framed by the Deputy Commissioner in consultation with the district committee, and to hold the election at darbars held by the District Officers in convenient localities.

6. With reference to the question of appointing non-official chairmen of district committees, I have to report that the committee generally received the idea with the profoundest astonishment. I can state with confidence not only that there is no one in the Jhánsi Division, not an official, who is qualified for the post of chairman of a district committee, but also that there is no such person who would accept the post.

7. It is the unanimous opinion of the local committees of the division that Tahsíldárs should continue to be members of the tahsíli committees. It is admitted on all hands, and it is nothing more than the truth, that if Tahsíldárs are not members of tahsíli committees, work will come to a dead-lock in a week.

8. It is the general opinion that no separate offices are required for tahsíli committees, and that a muharrir on Rs. 20 per mensem for each committee is all that is required.

9. I have stated above that the system of tahsíli boards subordinate to the district board can be worked. I should not be doing my duty to the Government if I refrained from stating, at the same time, that the reason why it can be worked is that practically all power will remain with the District Officer and his Tahsíldárs. That this will be so is quite plain to me from the manner in which members of the district committees speak of the idea of excluding District Officers and Tahsíldárs

from district and tahsíli committees. I repeat that if the system sketched above be introduced, it will work and work fairly well; but beyond the fact that members of tahsíli committees will have somewhat better opportunities than they now have for bringing to notice local wants, but little advance in the way of self-government will have been made. I have already put before the Government my view that the Jhánsi Division is not yet sufficiently advanced for local self-government, and I adhere to that opinion. I have been even more confirmed in that opinion since I attended the Jhánsi district committee, and heard men of position and local influence named as fit members for the local board, but passed over on the ground that they could not write their names.

No. 209, dated Jhánsi, the 8th August 1882.

From J. DEAS, Esquire, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Jhánsi, to COMMISSIONER, Jhánsi Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your Circular No. 113, dated 4th ultimo, I have the honour to state that the questions raised in G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, were discussed at a meeting of the district committee held on the 27th July 1882. The general opinion of the committee is recorded in the annexed minute of the proceedings.

2. I agree with the committee in being of opinion that of the various methods of constituting tahsíli boards, enumerated in para. 3 of G.O. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, the third should be adopted for this district. The existing district committee is composed of 11 non-official members, representing the four parganas of the district (three for Jhánsi, three for Mau, three for Garotha, and two for Moth). The remaining members of the committee are *ex-officio* and official. The pargana non-official members increased to five for each pargana, and the Tahsíldár as *ex-officio* member, would be constituted into sub-committees for their respective parganas or tahsíls. They would meet once a month (with the Tahsíldár as president) at the head-quarters of their respective parganas, for the transaction of ordinary business in the Education, Medical, Sanitation, and Public Works Departments. For the discussion and disposal of matters beyond the powers of the sub-committee a quarterly meeting of the central committee would be held. The central committee would thus be composed of the four tahsíl sub-committees, the Deputy Commissioner, the Civil Surgeon, the Inspector of Schools, the Executive Engineer of the Division, and existing official but not *ex-officio* members. The principles approved of by the committee (see para. 1 of the accompanying minute) might very well be followed in distributing the work between the central and the tahsíl committees. All correspondence with the tahsíl committees should be through the president of the central committee.

3. I believe that under this system work will be carried on just as well as under the present system of monthly meetings of the central committee. Under it the Native members, the majority of whom reside at a distance from head-quarters of the district, will be relieved of monthly attendance at the sudder; and there will be a far greater likelihood of their acquiring a knowledge of the work required of them, and therefore of their taking an interest in it.

4. The following is a statement showing the number of existing members of the district committee, official and non-official, resident in each tahsíl and qualified to act on the tahsíli board or sub-committee.

Pargana.	Official.	Non-official.
Jhánsi - - - -	1 (Tahsíldár)	3
Mau - - - -	1 (ditto)	3
Garotha - - - -	1 (ditto)	3
Moth - - - -	1 (ditto)	2
	4 (Tahsíldárs)	11

The proportion of non-official to official members is not in any pargana below the proportion fixed by Government (two-thirds to one-third). I agree, however, with the committee in thinking that the existing number of non-official members for each tahsíl is too few; and, supporting their recommendation, I propose that the following additional members be appointed :—

For pargana Jhánsi - - -	(1) Hazari Lal. (2) Ram Kishen.
For pargana Mau - - -	(1) Bindraban Chaudhri. (2) Gandharp Singh.
For pargana Garotha - - -	(1) Thakur Senapat Singh. (2) Buddhu Moui.
For pargana Moth - - -	(1) Dewan Achhe Lal. (2) Khub Chand. (3) Bhagirath.

5. Referring to para. 5 of G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, the committee were of opinion that a system of uncontrolled election was impracticable in this district. They proposed that a list of approved candidates should be prepared by each tahsíl sub-committee, and that from these candidates members should be chosen; that all lambardárs, all licensees under the License Tax Act, and in addition some leading persons not coming under these two heads, should form the body of electors; and that the votes should be recorded by patwáris, who would be furnished with the list of approved candidates.

6. My own opinion is that the appointment of members of tahsíl boards, and therefore of the central committee by popular election, even in the modified form proposed by the committee, is at present inexpedient and impracticable. The people of this district are essentially agricultural. The municipality of Mau-Ránipur being excluded, there are only six towns in the district in which Act XX. of 1856 is in force; in Barwa Sagar the population is under 7,000, and in Baragaon it is under 3,000.

Excepting some rich Márwári money-lenders, who have purchased zamíndári rights, there are few wealthy proprietors, the majority of the villages being owned by cultivating communities. The non-agricultural population consists mainly of small shop-keepers, traders, and money-lenders. The people are as a rule poor; the total assessment under the License Tax Act amounting to only Rs. 11,265 on a population of 333,227, or, excluding the Mau-Bánipur Municipality, Rs. 8,175 on a population of 317,246. Education is backward; very many of the lambardárs and proprietors being unable to read and write. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that no interest is taken in administrative matters, and that the principle of self-government is not understood, much less desired. The people at present would therefore take no interest in the appointment of representatives: without such interest an elective system would certainly fail. Some years hence, when the residents of a pargana realise the fact that questions affecting local matters—*e.g.*, schools, roads, ferries, arboriculture, and works of public improvement—are really settled by their representatives in consultation with the Tahsíldár, they may and probably will take some interest in local self-government, and therefore in the appointment of members to the tahsíli board. The elective system may then be tried. I recommend therefore that the appointment of members to tahsíl boards should rest with the central committee, a special meeting being convened for the purpose.

7. I have no hesitation in endorsing the opinion of the committee that there is in this district no non-official native gentlemen qualified and willing to act as chairman of the central or tahsíl board.

8. The committee are of opinion that Tahsíldárs should continue to be members of the tahsíli committees, and in this opinion I concur. The non-official members of the existing committee, although the most eligible persons of this district, have had no experience of administrative work, are not as yet well acquainted with the nature of the duties required of them, and cannot as yet be said to take any but the slightest interest in self-government.

Admitting, however, that the non-official members have the requisite knowledge of, and interest in, their duties, I still think it would be inexpedient to exclude Tahsíldárs from membership. Their local knowledge and experience will always be of the greatest assistance to the non-official members.

9. The introduction of tahsíl boards will involve the entertainment for each board of a muharrir, say, on Rs. 25 per mensem, and a chaprasi on Rs. 5 per mensem, who would also act as chaukidar of the tahsíl committee building, if special premises are to be constructed for the service of local committees. Separate offices are not, however, in my opinion required. So long as the Tahsíldár is a member of the tahsíl board, and the Magistrate chairman of the central committee, the meetings of the tahsíl and central committees may very well be held in the tahsíl and sudder kutchery buildings respectively.

At a Meeting of the District Committee of Jhánsi, held on the 27th July 1882.

Present:

J. Deas, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner, President	Official.
J. Sturt, Esq., Assistant Commissioner	
J. McLean, Esq., Assistant Commissioner	
Munshi Sohan Lal, Inspector of Schools	
Tahsíldár of Jhánsi	
Ditto of Moth	
Ditto of Mau	
Ditto of Garotha	
Rája Sirdar Singh, of Katehra	Non-official.
Govind Ram Seth	
Sheoram Apa	
Harlal Seth	
Kazi Imam-ud-din	
Muhammad Husain	

The Commissioner of the Division was present at the committee. The Commissioner's letter No. $\frac{113}{XXIII-45}$, dated 4th July 1882, was laid before the committee along with Government letters No. 145, dated 21st June, and No. 160, dated 29th June.

1. The committee were almost unanimously of opinion that the best system to adopt would be the third one alluded to in para. 3 of Government letter No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, *viz.*, that of tahsíl committees forming portions of the central committee, and which should meet periodically as a central committee at head-quarters,—one advantage of this arrangement being that the members will be relieved of the inconvenience of monthly attendance at head-quarters. The central committee should meet once a quarter, and the tahsíl committees once a month. As to distribution of work, it was considered that, in the Public Works Department, ordinary repairs to second, third, and fourth class roads, to ferries, to sarias, and *paraos*, &c., should be entrusted to tahsíl committees for their respective parganas.

The Jhánsi and Nowgong road will remain under the central committee. Proposals for the construction of original works (communications or buildings) must be sanctioned by the central committee. To each tahsíl committee funds will be allotted by the central committee at the commencement of each year, in accordance with the sanctioned budget-estimate prepared by the central committee.

Arboriculture in each pargana will be attended to by the tahsíl committee. The central committee will each year determine on the length of road to be planted in each pargana.

In the Department of Education, the institution of new schools and closing of existing schools, and the appointments, dismissals, and major punishments of teachers, and the transfer of teachers from one pargana to another, will remain with the central committee. Transfer of teachers within the pargana, minor punishments, and granting of leave and rewards to deserving teachers, will be undertaken by the tahsíl committee.

The central committee will allot funds for ordinary repairs to each pargana for schools.

Vaccination will be entrusted to the tahsíl committees; the dispensary will remain under the central committee. All correspondence with tahsíli committees shall be through the president of the

central committee. The committee were of opinion that each tahsíl committee should consist of five members in addition to the Tahsíldár; and to complete the numbers required for each pargana, the following persons were nominated:—

For Jhánsi—Hazari Lal and Ram Kishen.
For Moth—Dewan Achhe Lal, Khub Chand, and Bhagirath.
For Mau—Bindraban Chaudhri and Gandharp Singh.
For Garotha—Thakur Senapat Singh and Buddhu Modi.

2. The members were strongly of opinion that the appointment of members by a system of general election would not be practicable, and that uncontrolled candidature would be unadvisable, as it might lead to the election of members of an objectionable class. They therefore proposed that a list of approved candidates should be prepared by each tahsíl committee for its pargana, and circulated among the electors; that the roll of electors shall consist of all lambardars and of all persons assessed to license-tax, and in addition of some leading persons not coming under these two heads to whom it appears desirable to give the franchise. Such list to be prepared and approved of by the tahsíl committees. The patwáris will circulate the list, and record the votes of all electors within their circles, and forward the returns to the tahsíl committee. The candidates who have a majority of votes to be elected. The committee were unanimously of opinion that in this backward district non-official persons qualified to act as chairmen of either central or tahsíl committees cannot be found. They were also unanimously of opinion that Tahsíldárs must continue to be members of committees, and that the Tahsíldár should be president of the tahsíl committee of this pargana.

J. J. McLean,
Secretary, District Committee.

J. Deas,
President, District Committee.

Proceedings of the District Local Committee at an Ordinary Meeting held at Orai on 3rd August 1882.

Present:

Major T. J. Quin, Deputy Commissioner and *President.*
L. G. Evans, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, *Secretary.*
C. A. Campbell, Esq., Executive Engineer.
Dr. J. C. Ellis, Civil Surgeon.
G. D. Hodgkinson, Esq., District Superintendent of Police.
Maulvi Karim Baksh, Extra Assistant Commissioner.
Maulvi Nur-ul-Husain, Tahsíldár of Orai.
Maulvi Abdul Hamid, Tahsíldár of Jalaun.
Sayyid Mehndi Ali, Tahsíldár of Kalpi.
Pandit Ganga Parshad, Tahsíldár of Kúnch.
Sayyid Zamin Ali Khan, Tahsíldár of Madhogarh.
Munshi Kalka Parshad, pensioned Tahsíldár.
Kuar Phokar Singh, of Bangra.
Rao Bahadur Roshan Singh, of Bangra.
Khwaj Bakhsh Khan, of Orai.
Pandit Gopal Rao Ballar, of Orai.
Pandit Narayan Rao Kashi Nath, of Orai.
Bhau Mahte, of Ait.
Dewan Kirpal Singh, of Sarawan.
Kuar Zahir Singh, of Púr.
Chaudhri Puran Singh, of Bheyr.
Mathura Parshad, Vakil.

The committee assembled at 7 a.m.

The accounts for June and July were produced and laid on the table. The expenditure under different heads was as follow:—

		Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
	Public Works.						
June	- - -	1,380	3	8			
July	- - - -	2,361	10	0			
					3,741	13	8
	Dispensaries.						
June	- - - -	497	5	0			
July	- - - -	450	12	8			
					948	1	8
	Village Watchmen.						
June	- - - -	3,745	7	3			
July	- - - -	3,747	9	0			
					7,533	0	3
	Education.						
June	- - - -	1,339	9	0			
July	- - - -	1,184	10	1			
					2,524	3	1
	Total expenditure -				44,747	2	8

Full details of above expenditure are given in the account sheet, form E., and Public Works Progress report.

Resolved, that the above expenditure be passed.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

2. Read—Government letters Nos. 145 and 160, dated 21st and 29th June respectively, together with Government of India's Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, dated 18th May 1882, on the subject of the creation of local (tahsíli) boards in addition to the general district committee.

Secretary reports each pargana officer has been addressed on the matter, and requested to obtain the views and opinions of the more intelligent and influential inhabitants within his charge. This has been fully carried out, and the result is as follows :—

The unanimous opinion appears to be that the third course suggested by Government is the most workable and advisable in every way. The committee recommend that a sub-committee, so to speak, formed from the members of the district committee who may reside within limits of a tahsíl, be formed at each tahsíl, and transact the local work in their circle, under the general control and direction of the central board. Each tahsíl committee will meet once a month, and their proceedings will be submitted quarterly to the district committee. The number of members on each tahsíli board has been fixed at five (including Tahsíldár as president); and as in some of the parganas only two or three members have been elected to the district committee, additional members will have to be elected. The following additional gentlemen have been mentioned by the pargana officers, after consultation with the principal inhabitants of the tahsíl, and the committee unanimously approve of their nomination :—

JALAUN.

Jetwar Singh Chaudhri, of Kukargaon.

KÁLPI.

Parsram, Lambardár of Lohargaon.
Kali Charn Shukal, of Kálpi.

MADHOGARH.

Kuar Baldeo Singh, of Naoli.
Chaudhri Bhajbal Singh, of Kaksis.

ORAI.

Complete.

KUNCH.

Dewan Sukh Sahib, of Baroda.
Dalip Singh, Lambardár of Sanaeya.
Hazari Mal Seth, of Kúnch.

Under the above arrangements, the tahsíli boards will stand as under :—

ORAI.

Maulvi Nur-ul-Hussain, Tahsíldár.
Kuar Zahir Singh, of Púr.
Bhawani Pathak, of Orai.
Munshi Kalka Parshad, pensioned Tahsíldár.
Khwaj Bakhsh Khan, of Orai.

KUNCH.

Pandit Ganga Parshad, Tahsíldár.
Chaudhri Puran Singh, of Bheyr.
Dewan Sukh Sahib, of Baroda.
Dalip Singh Misr, Lambardár, of Sanaeya.
Hazari Mal Seth, of Kúnch.

KALPI.

Sayyid Mehndi Ali, Tahsíldár.
Thakur Das, Mahajan, of Kálpi.
Mathura Parshad, Vakil.
Parsram, Lambardár, of Lohargaon.
Kali Charan Shukal, of Kálpi.

MADHOGARH.

Sayyid Zamin Ali, Tahsíldár.
Kuar Pohkar Singh, of Bangra.
Rao Bahadur Roshan Singh, of Bangra.
Kuar Baldeo Singh, of Naoli.
Chaudhri Bhajbal Singh, of Kaksis.

JALAUN.

Maulvi Abdul Hamid, Tahsíldár.
Pandit Gopal Rao Harsey, of Jalaun.
Pandit Narayan Rao Kashi Nath, of Jalaun.
Dewan Kirpal Singh, of Sarawan.
Jetwar Singh Chaudhri, of Kukargaon.

The system for transaction of business between the district and local boards is given separately in a detailed memo. With regard to the relations between the sudder and mufassil boards, the following arrangements are made:—Dr. Ellis, or the Civil Surgeon for the time being, will be in charge of the Medical Department, including dispensaries, sanitation, vaccination, and medical charities of sorts.

The president will assume charge of public works in all its branches. Maulvi Karim Bakhsh, an officer of great experience in the Educational Department, will assume charge of education.

With reference to the wish of Government that the office of chairman should be filled by a non-official member, the committee are unanimously of opinion that, at present, at all events, there is no one qualified for such office in this district. Similarly, they venture to record their decided opinion as to the advisability and necessity of keeping on Tahsíldárs for the present as presidents and members of the local tahsíl committees. As to the practicability of forming an elective body for the election of members to the district committee, the committee are unanimously of opinion that nomination by District Officers, after consultation with the more influential persons in the district, is for the present by far the best plan for obtaining the best available materials, and recommend that this system be allowed to stand for some years to come at all events.

The Committee are of opinion that the present arrangements for the meeting of the various committees are satisfactory, and call for no change.

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L. G. EVANS,
Secretary, District Committee.

T. J. QUIN, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, and President,
District Committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{996}{XXIII}$, dated Camp Birdha, the 25th July 1882.

From R. H. STORY, Esquire, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Lalitpur, to COMMISSIONER, Jhánsi Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to your Circular letter No. $\frac{113}{XXIII-4}$, dated 4th instant, and G. Os. Nos. 145 and 160, dated respectively 21st and 29th of June 1882, on the subject of decentralisation and tahsíli boards, I have the honour to report as follows:—

2. The first matter upon which my opinion is asked is regarding the three methods of constituting tahsíli boards. I am of opinion that the third method would undoubtedly be the best for this district, and in this opinion others with whom I have consulted concur. Quoting G. O. No. 145, it is as follows :—"The district board should include members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board." If this method was adopted, there would be no necessity of having a separate tahsíli board. It would only be necessary to have representatives from all parts of the district as members of the district committee. To carry this out properly, I would suggest that each pargana, according to its size and importance, should have members on the district board. To each member would be allotted a portion of the district in the neighbourhood of his home, and he would be asked to look after the district work within his circle. At the monthly meeting of the district board the members might be requested to inform the board as to the progress of the district work entrusted to their supervision, and also to inform the board on all matters in which the district committee were concerned. By the introduction of such a system the members would have a personal interest in what was going on, and in time it is quite possible the office of member would be a coveted one. Being a representative body, the members would try to find out the wishes of the elective body, and bring them up before the board.

3. If I am wrong in my construction of the third method, and tahsíli boards are still necessary, then for this district one tahsíli board only would be required, *viz.*, tahsíli Mehroni. The other tahsíl, Lalitpur, could be managed by the district board direct.

The tahsíli board at Mehroni would consist of the members ef the district board residing within the tahsíl area, with power to add to their number up to the limit fixed of two-thirds non-official members to one-third official. The official members should be the District Officer, the Pargana Officer, and the Tahsíldár.

As far as possible, all the district work within the tahsíl area might be made over to the tahsíli board, the board submitting monthly a progress account.

The only extra establishment required would be a muharrir on Rs. 20 a month. A man with some knowledge of engineering, and capable of carrying on petty work, would be preferable.

As to the powers of the tahsíli board, they might be the same as those given to the district board, with this exception, that the district board can upset any orders passed by the tahsíli board they did not approve of.

4. On the question of an elective body, I have already said that I think the members of the district board should be chosen from the different parganas, the number being according to the size and importance of the pargana. Lists of all the respectable and well-to-do persons residing in the pargana should be prepared under the supervision and orders of the Deputy Commissioners.

In this list would be included all persons entitled to attend darbars and receive chairs, and also other persons of known respectability. They would comprise the elective body. On the occasion of an election, to add *éclat* to the business, the Deputy Commissioner should go to some centrical place in the pargana, convene the elective body to meet him in darbar, and then proceed to elect the member or members by ballot.

5. With reference to para. 5 of your letter, in my opinion there is not any one in the district whom I could recommend as being sufficiently qualified to be a non-official chairman of either the district or tahsíli board.

6. I have consulted with several persons, and all agree that it would be most inexpedient not having the Tahsíldárs as members of the district and tahsíli boards; indeed, in my opinion, if the Tahsíldars are not allowed to be members, or to in any way have anything to do with district work, I doubt whether the scheme will be successfully introduced into this district.

7. I beg to submit, with reference to para. 3 of your letter, the statement called for. At a meeting of the district committee, held on the 19th June 1882, the following gentlemen were elected as members, and their names were submitted for confirmation :—

Kuar Mangal Singh, of Jaklone, pargana and tahsíl Lalitpur.		
Kuar Narayanju, of Raura,	ditto	ditto.
Mahant Daulat Gir, of Sirsi,	ditto	ditto.
Kuar Randhir Singh, of Dehalwara,	ditto	ditto.

This will increase the number of non-official members up to 11.

To make up the full number, three more are required, and they will be nominated as soon as Colonel Liston returns from leave.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

STATEMENT showing the Names and Residence of Official and Non-official Members of the Lalitpur District Committee

Names.	Residence.	Pargana.	Tahsil.	Remarks.
OFFICIAL MEMBERS.				
The Deputy Commissioner -	Lalitpur -	Lalitpur -	Lalitpur.	
The Assistant Commissioner -	Do. -	Do. -	Do.	
The Civil Surgeon - -	Do. -	Do. -	Do.	
The Executive Engineer -	Jhánsi	—	—	
The Inspector of Schools -	Do.	—	—	
The Tahsíldár of Lalitpur -	Lalitpur -	Lalitpur -	Lalitpur.	
The Tahsíldár of Mehroni -	Mehroni -	Mehroni -	Mehroni.	
NON-OFFICIAL MEMBERS.				
Dewan Bije Bahadur Mazbuth Singh.	Jaklone -	Lalitpur -	Lalitpur -	All are qualified to act on the tahsíli board.
Chaube Janki Parshad -	Lalitpur -	Do. -	Do. -	
Rao Dube Singh - -	Rajwara -	Do. -	Do. -	
Dewan Umrao Singh -	Bijrotha -	Tálbehat -	Do. -	
Kuar Bakht Singh - -	Bhaloni -	Bánpur -	Mehroni -	
Rao Pahar Singh - -	Narhat - -	Maraura -	Do. -	
Dewan Hira Singh - -	Sindwaha -	Bánpur - -	Do. -	

Lalitpur,
26th July 1882.

R. H. STORY,
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

EXTRACT Para. VII. from the Proceedings of Lalitpur District Committee, held at Lalitpur on the 20th of July 1882.

Para. VII.—Read G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, and Commissioner's letter No. $\frac{113}{XXIII.-45}$, dated 4th July 1882, regarding the institution of local boards in each tahsíl.

After a good deal of discussion, the committee came to the following conclusions :—

(1.) Of the three systems proposed in para. 3 of G. O. No. 145, the third was the best. The members would look after the local works in their respective circles, and that a separate tahsíli board was not necessary.

(2.) On the question of election of members, the committee think it might be done by parganas, each pargana according to its size and wealth to have a certain number of members, who are to be elected by the chiefs and principal men living in the pargana.

(3.) The committee are of opinion that Tahsíldárs should continue to remain as members of the district committee.

No. 743, dated Naini Tal, the 10th August 1882.

From Lieut.-General the Honourable Sir H. RAMSAY, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner, Kumaun Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report, after consultation, on the subject of local boards and district committees, in reply to your Nos. 145 and 160, dated respectively 21st and 29th June 1882, and para. 3 of G. O. No. 167, dated 5th ultimo.

2. The first point requiring attention is the formation of tahsíli boards. As there is only one tahsíl in Garhwál with an area of over 5,000 square miles, and only one pargana of the Tarai is subject to the new system, these districts are not concerned. Kumaun covers about 7,000 square miles, the greater part of which is under one Tahsíldár, with head-quarters at Almora. The Kali Kumaun tahsíl comprises a long strip of the district from the snows to the Bhabar, the most populous part being Pithoragarh, 25 miles from the tahsíli at Champawat. The few persons who could, even in name, be put on the district committee, are too scattered in such difficult country, and so occupied with their own special interests, that if constituted a local board it could not meet or work as a body. The only hope of making use of members in outlying places is to consult each on the wants of his locality, and, as far as can be, use him in carrying out measures initiated by the district committee. Under these circumstances, I need not deal with the question—how such local boards could work in relation with the district committees elsewhere, where their formation may be possible; except to say that in the absence of anything like public spirit among the people, a petty local board, with its separate office and functions, would not conduce to the harmonious working of the district committee, and would only obstruct real business.

3. It seems to be assumed that it is possible to have a district committee so constituted that non-official members will always be available at head-quarters, who would have charge of departments. A glance at the hill districts will show that this is impossible. Besides the officers of Government, the only persons fit for such an office are tea-planters and missionaries; and from the nature of their duties, they are scattered over the interior, and could only occasionally attend a meeting of committee at great inconvenience. There is no class of independent landed gentry. The land is parcelled out among small cultivating proprietors and tenants in about 10,000 mauzas, and there are no towns, or even large villages, from which we could draw intelligent members of a district committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

4. I think the Government will admit that out of such materials the task of forming a really representative or working committee is more than difficult, it is insurmountable ; and the circumstances prove that while a committee scattered over the district may be formed, and give very useful advice, either when it is possible for its members to meet, or by correspondence—and I can assure His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that both myself and Assistants will make the fullest use of our materials in this respect—the real control of local affairs must continue to be in the hands of official members. I see no escape from this conclusion, and I consider it my duty, in the best interests of the people and of Government, to state my conviction without reserve.

5. It follows that any system of election in Kumaun is entirely premature. I write in this connection of this province only. I do not say that election may not be possible in some other parts of the country, or that even here the people may not in time be educated up to some capacity for self-government, but the time is not yet.

6. The same considerations entirely forbid the election or appointment of either a non-official chairman or secretary. Both these *must* reside at the head-quarters station, in order to work the comparatively elaborate system of routine prescribed, and there is not a single person in this division known to me who is qualified in the two essentials of ability and leisure. I will go further and state my honest conviction that even supposing persons could be found outside the official classes with time and capacity to master the mere routine of official business, it would be rare indeed to find any with the breadth of view, disinterestedness, and loyalty to public interests which the nature of the duties of these officials demands. The time has not come, and much more than superficial school education will be needed to educate men up to even a moderate capacity for faithful self-government. I recognise that a beginning must be made, but I see clearly that any wholesale transfer of important functions to an incompetent non-official class would carry with it certain failure ; and as it is an essential part of the new system to "preserve the continuity of the existing system of local administration" in reasonable efficiency, to watch and see that such shall be the outcome of an experiment, would be laying a burden upon District Officers too heavy to bear, if they are to continue efficient in other departments of the administration. I can only promise that we will do our best to make all possible use of the new committees, and, in a spirit of loyal adherence to the main object of Government, do what may be possible in the great work of educating the people to manage their own affairs.

7. Acting, therefore, as far as possible on the orders of Government, I now submit lists of the several district committees for Government sanction. I am of opinion that District officers will be more free to control and advise if they do not hold the office of chairman. Garhwál is an exception, there being no other than the District Officer eligible. I therefore propose that the Junior Assistant Commissioner of Kumaun, the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Garhwál, and the Assistant Superintendent of the Tarái district, be appointed chairmen of committees, and that each District Officer appoint the secretary. As we have no longer a Divisional Executive Engineer, such an officer cannot be placed on the hill committees. The officer so named in the Tarái list is the Executive Engineer, Rohilkhand Division, who is in charge of the provincial works of this division, all such being in Naini Tal and below it. Tahsíldárs are necessary on committees for the present, and can be made very useful. There being only a Peshkár in the Káshipur pargana, he has been entered as an official member, as he practically performs the duties of a Tahsíldár. Similarly, there being no Civil Surgeons in Garhwál or the Tarái, the Assistant Surgeons have been placed in that position on the lists. Finally, it is found impossible to have a two-thirds proportion of non-official members in Garhwál and the Tarái. More names might be added, but they would only be names, and District Officers have selected every man that would probably be of any use. Wherever that is found possible, the membership will be formed into sub-committees for special work.

8. I do not think that separate accommodation will be required for the offices or meetings of committees at present.

9. Reply will follow separately on the subject of expenditure from the local cess and other matters treated of in G. O. No. 36, dated 13th April last.

KUMAUN DIVISION.

LIST of Official and Non-official Members of District Local Committees.

KUMAUN DISTRICT.

Ex-Officio.

1. Senior Assistant Commissioner of Kumaun.
2. Junior Assistant Commissioner.
3. Extra Assistant Commissioner.
4. Inspector of Schools, Kumaun Circle.
5. Civil Surgeon, Almora.
6. Tahsíldár, Amora.
7. Tahsíldár, Champawat.
8. Assistant Commissioner, Naini Tal.
9. Cantonment Magistrate, Ranikhet.

Non-Official.

1. Pandit Badri Datt Joshi, of Danya.
2. Pandit Liladhar Shastri.
3. Pandit Hari Ram Pande, B.A.
4. Revd. R. Gray, M.D.
5. E. F. Oldham, Esquire.
6. N. F. T. Troup, Esquire.
7. General W. C. McGregor.
8. Rajwar Pushkar Pal, of Askot.
9. Kunwar Bhim Singh.
10. Lala Tula Ram Sah.
11. Lala Kishna Sah.
12. Lala Amar Nath Sah.
13. Lala Jewa Sah.
14. Munshi Ehtiman Ali.
15. Mani Boorka.
16. Sayana Khushal Singh Muneral.
17. Durabji Ranjibhai.
18. Thokdar Lokmani Bilwal.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

GARHWAL DISTRICT.

Ex-officio.	*Non-official.*
1. Senior Assistant Commissioner.	1. Mr. R. Cumberland.
2. Extra Assistant Commissioner.	2. Mr. P. C. Gibson.
3. Sudder Amin.	3. Revd. J. T. McMahan, or Missionary for time being.
4. Inspector of Schools, Kumaun Circle.	4. Revd. P. T. Wilson, M.D.
5. Assistant Surgeon, Srinagar.	5. Balgobind.
6. Tahsíldár.	6. Baldeb Dhaundyal.
	7. Tara Datt Joshi.
	8. Keshta Nand.
	9. Gokala Nand.
	10. Tara Datt Pande.
	11. Lachman Singh.
	12. Shobha Ram, pensioner.

TARÁI DISTRICT.

1. Superintendent, Tarái district.	1. Rája Sheoraj Singh, C.S.I.
2. Assistant Superintendent, Tarái district.	2. Kunwar Hariraj Singh.
3. Executive Engineer, Provincial Division.	3. Kunwar Kirat Singh.
4. Assistant Surgeon, Káshipur.	4. Kunwar Jagat Singh.
5. Inspector of Schools, Kumaun Circle.	5. General Azim-ud-din Khan.
6. Peshkar of Káshipur tahsíl.	6. Lala Puran Parshad.
	7. Chaube Bankey Lal.
	8. Shaikh Kadir Bakhsh.
	9. Revd. J. L. Humphrey, M.D.

Kumaun Commissionership, Naini Tal:
Dated the 11th August 1882.

H. RAMSAY,
Commissioner, Kamaun Division.

No. 2922, dated Lucknow, the 17th August 1882.

From Major W. E. FORBES, Officiating Commissioner, Lucknow Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Circulars Nos. 145 and 160, dated respectively the 21st and 29th June last, I have the honour to submit my report on the points therein mooted.

2. On the dates noted on the margin, I met the members of the different local committees in this division and discussed with them the subjects on which a consultative opinion has been asked for. I have also availed myself of opportunities of obtaining at private interviews the opinions not only of members of the local boards but of outsiders, both official and non-official, and, lastly, I have called for detailed reports from the Deputy Commissioners. Copies of the reports of the Deputy Commissioners, Lucknow and Bara Banki, are appended. The Deputy Commissioner, Unao, has not as yet furnished his report, but I cannot longer delay submission of the divisional report.

Unao, 22nd July.
Bara Banki, 29th July.
Lucknow, 2nd August.

3. As might be expected, the conflict of opinion is considerable. I proceed to take up and discuss each point in the order noted in the circulars.

4. The first question for consideration is the constitution of local (tahsíli) boards and their relations with the district or central committees. There is a general consensus of opinion that the central committee should include all the members of the local or tahsíli boards, to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their respective jurisdictions.

Circular No. 145, paras. 2 and 3.

Para. 3 lays down three alternatives, *viz.*:—

(1) Whether the local (tahsíli) boards should act independently in immediate communication with the officers of Government;
(2) or whether they should be separate boards under the general supervision of a district board;
(3) or whether the district board should include members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board.

Absolute independence of the tahsíl boards is generally regarded as impracticable at present, and in this view I concur.

5. While, however, the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, is of opinion that the third of the above proposals is by far the most feasible, the plan he goes on to elaborate is more in accordance with the second proposal; for he states (para. 4 of his report) "that all ordinary work could be disposed of by the tahsíl committees in their respective tahsíls; that this work would necessarily pass through the hands of the president of the central board, who would decide what matters should be laid before the central committee and what the tahsíl committees could dispose of at once;" and, further, that the proceedings of tahsíl committees should be "laid before the central committee at their half-yearly or quarterly meetings." This obviously amounts to making the tahsíl committees separate boards under the general supervision of the district board.

6. The Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, on the other hand, accepts in its entirety the third alternative and deprecates the formation of separate tahsíli boards. His plan is that the tahsíl representatives shall form local sub-committees of the district board; that they shall lay before the latter in its consultative capacity the wishes of the local committees they represent, and be charged with "the administrative duty of supervising the various works and institutions entrusted to local control

within their respective tahsíls. The principle advocated by Major Hastings is that the tahsíl members should make known to the board the requirements of their respective jurisdictions; that the board shall thereupon allot funds accordingly; and that the tahsíl committees shall be responsible for the proper administration of these funds. The departmental responsibility suggested in para. 3 of the circular is, in the Deputy Commissioner's opinion, quite feasible.

7. Under the scheme proposed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, the local boards would consist of not less than five non-official and two official members, or seven in all; and they would meet once a month for the disposal of business. Major Murray would have the official members represented by the District Engineer and the Deputy Inspector of Schools. The meetings of the central board he would limit to four times in the year, reserving to the president the power of calling a special meeting when necessary. The board would consist of all the non-official members of the tahsíl committees and of five official members, *viz.*:—

The Deputy Commissioner.
The Senior Assistant.
The Executive engineer.
The Inspector of Schools.
The Civil Surgeon.

The official members of the tahsíl committees would thus be excluded from the central board. In para. 6 of his report, Major Murray advocates the appointment of the tahsíldár as chairman of the local or tahsíl committee, and so doing, apparently overlooks the fact that he thus increases the number of official members of the tahsíl board to three—a figure in excess of the proportion between non-official and official members contemplated by the Government of India.

8. In Bara Banki, the district board consists of eight official and 14 non-official members, or 22 in all. Major Hastings writes that his short experience of the working of this board has led him to the conclusion that the members might, with advantage, be increased, and he proposes to appoint, in the manner indicated in para. 5 of the circular, seven additional non-official members. The board would then consist of 21 non-official and eight official members. There are 19 parganas and two large towns in the district, and the Deputy Commissioner's proposal would secure to each of these areas a representative on the board. According to this pargana distribution, the number of non-official members on each tahsíl committee would be as follows:—

Ramsanehighat - - - - -	5
Fatehpur - - - - -	6
Haidargarh - - - - -	3
Nawabganj - - - - -	5

According to Major Hastings' scheme, there would be no separate meetings of the tahsíl committees, but the central committee should, in his opinion, meet at least once a month.

9. I called upon Deputy Commissioners to communicate to me the names of resident members of committee who, as non-officials, were able and willing to serve on the local boards of each tahsíl. The reports of the Deputy Commissioners, Lucknow and Bara Banki, are silent upon this point, and they have been again addressed on the subject. The system under which the local boards would manage their business and correspond with the central board depends upon which of the proposals above detailed is adopted. The degree of independence which, under Major Murray's scheme, would be accorded to the auxiliary boards would necessitate the appointment of a secretary, through whom correspondence with the central board would be ordinarily carried on. The business relations of the tahsíl committees with the central board have already been described, and for the rest the system under which they would manage their own business would have to follow the lines of that upon which the business of the central board is conducted. The funds would be in charge of the tahsíldár and the accounts would be kept by the secretary.

Circular No. 145, para. 4.

10. According to the plan advocated by Major Hastings, the independence of the tahsíl committee is merged in the central board, and neither secretary nor system of business routine would be necessary, As the tahsíl committee would hold no separate meetings, but would simply act as an executive sub-committee of the central board, there would be obviously no necessity for either.

11. In none of the tahsíl or district boards in this division will it be requisite to exceed the proportion of official to non-official members suggested by the Government of India.

12. I have already stated that the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, proposes to appoint seven additional members to his district board. Whatever be the number ultimately determined on, the nomination will be made in the manner indicated in para. 5 of the Government circular, and should it be found necessary to increase the number of the members on the other district boards, the appointments will be made in the same manner.

Circular No. 145, para. 5, and Circular No. 160, para. 2.

13. I now proceed to a consideration of the question of the introduction of the elective system for the future appointments of members to serve on district and tahsíl boards. The Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, is of opinion that the formation of an elective constituency is an easy matter, but that difficulty will be found in inducing the electors to record their votes. The method he advocates is based upon a suggestion which I offered to the members of the Lucknow Municipal Committee for their consideration. According to this plan the elective body would consist of sadr málguzárs, including lámbardárs in under-proprietary estates, and of persons assessed to the license-tax. "The great majority of these," writes Major Murray, "have to attend at the tahsíl some time during the year, and the tahsíldár should open a register recording the votes of each elector attending the tahsíl, who should be called upon to nominate at least five persons." "Vacancies in the committee could be filled up from the nominations in each tahsíl by the committee themselves." This proposal meets the views of those members of the Lucknow committee and of the committee at large with whom I have had an opportunity of discussing the subject.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

14. The Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, reports that he has discussed the subject of election with the members of the committee and others, and that he has come to the conclusion that a simple system with a limited constituency would be quite practicable. Major Hastings writes :—

"The constituency might be formed of all sadr málguzárs, all persons assessed to the license tax, members of municipal committees, members of panchávats under Act XX. of 1856, and all pleaders and revenue agents."

A constituency being thus formed, on the occasion of a vacancy in any pargana or town having a representative, the Deputy Commissioner should nominate, in consultation with the principal inhabitants, three candidates from whom the electors of that pargana or town should make their choice."

15. There is a general concensus of opinion throughout the three districts of this division, that it is not at present either possible or expedient to place the district committees under non-official chairmen. The general opinion is also in favour of the retention of tahsíldárs as members both of central and tahsíl boards. These opinions are based on the feelings of the community at large ; that the functions which non-official members of these committees are now called upon to discharge are new to them, while in the majority of instances they are strangers alike to business habits and business routine, and that until they have acquired under the new system some experience in both they would, as chairmen, have neither influence nor authority. I concur with the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, that a knowledge of English is an indispensable qualification for the post of chairman of the central board. The Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, writes :—"There is an irreducible minimum of official labour devolving on the chairman which would necessitate if not his constant presence at any rate very frequent visits to the office, and although there are gentlemen of influence and ability on the board competent to perform the important duties of the post, the distance at which they live would prove an unsurmountable obstacle." I have no report from the Deputy Commissioner, Unao, as stated above; but from the information I obtained during my recent visit to that district, I can safely assert that there is no non-official member of the Unao board competent at present to fill the post of chairman.

Circular No. 145, para. 6.
Ditto No. 160, para. 3.

16. With reference, again, to the question as to whether the tahsíldár shall be the chairman of the tahsil board or a member only, the answer depends on the system adopted as to the relations which shall subsist between the tahsíl and district boards. Under Major Hastings' scheme no chairman would be necessary; but if effect be given to Major Murray's proposals a chairman will be indispensable, and it remains to be seen to what extent the post can be filled from amongst the existing non-official members of the central board residing within the tahsíl, or the non-official residents of the tahsíls at large.

A report on this point has been called for from each district in the division, and will be submitted as soon as possible. In all cases in which the tahsíldár must of necessity for the present be chairman, I am clearly of opinion that he should have no vote, but that he should confine himself to the conduct of the proceedings.

17. It will, I think, be readily conceded that in introducing into a recently acquired province like Oudh the policy of self-government, the necessary changes should be of a gradual rather than of a revolutionary character, and should be adapted, as far as possible, to the existing ideas and feelings of the native community. In this view, then, I proceed to offer my opinion on the proposals above recorded—an opinion formed after considerable thought and deliberation, and after due consideration of the views and opinions expressed by the native gentlemen and others whom I have consulted.

18. (i.)—The constitution of local and tahsíl boards.

Following the principle upon which the Government of India have resolved to increase the number of local boards throughout the country, the fair representation at these boards of the areas comprised within their respective jurisdictions appears a primary necessity. And I do not think we can improve upon the suggestion to adopt the pargana, the old fiscal division, as the basis for determining the number of members of which the tahsíl board shall be composed. In my opinion the number of members on the tahsíl board should not be less than seven, of which not more than two should be official. The official members should be the Tahsíldár and the Deputy Inspector of Schools. Ordinarily the tahsíl jurisdiction comprises about four or five parganas ; where the number is five or more, each pargana should furnish a representative. Where the number is less, the largest pargana or parganas should send up two representatives, so that the total number of non-official members shall not be less than *five*. Should there be any towns in the tashsíl with a population of five thousand and upwards, not administered under the Municipal Act, each of such towns should be represented on the board.

19. (ii.)—The relations of the tahsíl with the district boards.

With regard to this question, I have come to the conclusion that the *third* of the alternatives suggested in para. 3 of Circular no 145 is decidedly the preferable one. The district board should include all the members of the tahsíl boards, and to the latter should be delegated the local work of their respective circles. I would have no separate meetings, no separate office, and no separate establishment of the tahsíl committees.

Their deliberative business should be discussed and disposed of at the meetings of the central board. They would thus be, as Major Hastings has remarked, the executive sub-committees of the latter. According to the projects entertained sanctioned funds should be allotted by the central to the tahsíl committees. A system of departmental responsibility might be carried out by assigning to each member the supervision of work in one particular department ;—for instance, roads to one, bridges and culverts to another, education to a third, public buildings to a fourth, and so on. A competent overseer should be appointed to each tahsíl to act in subordination to the District Engineer as the servant of the tahsíl board. The accounts of the board should be kept for the present in the tahsíl.

20. With reference to the frequency of the meetings of the central or district boards, I am of opinion that, having regard to the fact that the majority of the members would be residents of localities at a distance from the head-quarters of the district, and to the nature of the business to be ordinarily

transacted, a meeting once in three months would be sufficient. The chairman should have power, however, to call a special meeting when requisite, and he and two members, of whom one shall be non-official, should meet once a month to pass the accounts. Travelling allowance according to a certain fixed scale should be passed to *all* members attending the central board meetings when residing at a greater distance than ten miles from the sadr station.

21. In addition to the members of the tahsíl boards and any other non-official members appointed to the district committees by Government Notification No. 80, dated the 11th May 1882, the following officers should be retained as ex-officio members as laid down by Resolution No. 393 of the 4th March 1882, *viz.* :—

The District Officer.
The Senior Assistant.
The Civil Surgeon.
The Executive Engineer, Provincial Division.
The Educational Inspector of the Circle.

The district officers should, for the present at all events, retain the office of chairman.

22. (iii.) The introduction of the elective system for the appointment of non-official members of district and tahsíl boards.

Ultimately the district board will be composed solely of the members of the several tahsil committees plus the official members specified in the preceding paragraph.

This will secure a large enough board for all practical purposes, the number of members being at least 30 according to the principle laid down in para. 18. The non-official members will all therefore be at the same time members of their respective tahsíl committees, and vacancies amongst them must be filled up from the tahsíl. It follows that each tahsíl jurisdiction must be regarded as a separate constituency for elective purposes.

23. I have already stated above that the *pargana* should, as far as possible, be the territorial unit on the basis of which the number of members to serve on the tahsíl board shall be determined, but I do not on that account propose, on the occasion of a vacancy, to limit the votes to the electors of the pargana. Such a restriction would in many instances practically place the election in the hands of one large and influential proprietor. The best men as well as the worst characters are well known throughout the limits of a tahsil, and the more extended the voting the better chance of securing one of the former. Having, then, determined that the tahsíl shall be the constituency, it remains to consider the principle on which the roll of electors shall be prepared. In most districts in India the agricultural is the prevailing interest to be represented, and it is the agricultural classes which contribute the most to the funds which will be administered by the local boards. The roll should therefore contain the names of all sadr málguzárs, and, in taluqas, of all lambardars of under-proprietary maháls, and of lessees holding under an unexpired lease of not less than three years, and paying a rent charge of not less than Rs. 500 per annum, and I would also include all muáfidars of 100 bighas and upwards.

The commercial and urban interest could be adequately represented by enrolling all persons assessed to a license tax of Rs. 25 and upwards, and all members of panchayats appointed under Act XX. of 1856 ; while law and education would find their representatives in vakils and revenue agents, the duly recognized agents of taluqdárs, and of other persons of wealth and distinction, Maulvis, Pandits, and Hakíms of recognized status, and village schoolmasters.

24. This register should be carefully kept up in the tahsíli, and should be open to inspection during office hours. On the occasion of a vacancy in the tahsil committee, printed notices in Hindi and Urdu should be issued in the name of the central board and signed by the tahsíldár, calling upon electors to record their votes in favour of the candidate they propose at the tahsíl on or before a certain date. The best method of taking the votes would be by the electors recording the name of their nominee on the reverse of the notice, and delivering up the latter when they went to the tahsíl.

On a subsequent date, to be fixed by the tahsíldár, the recorded votes should be scrutinised by the tahsíldár and the other members of the local committee, and the record should then be transmitted to the president of the central board, by whom it will be laid before the next meeting of the board, when the candidate polling the highest number of votes will be declared duly elected. A power of veto should be lodged in the president, to be exercised only in extreme cases, and with the concurrence of the Commissioner of the Division ; in which case either writs for a new election would issue or the candidate polling the next highest number of votes be declared to be elected. The more simple the procedure the better chance of familiarizing the minds of the people with the elective system and of ensuring its ultimate success, and the further we exclude official interference the stronger will be the hope of convincing the electors that in exercising their power of voting they are taking the first and most important step in the direction of self-government.

25. I have already referred at some length in this report to the question of chairmen both for the central and local boards. Under the scheme I have proposed there exists no necessity for a chairman of the latter. As regards the former, I entirely concur in the general opinion that, for the present at all events, it is expedient that the district officer should retain the post of chairman ; while the scheme is in its infancy, and the committees to a great extent in leading strings, the guidance of an experienced officer is an almost absolute necessity. As time goes on, and the non-official members of local boards and the Government acquire experience in the working of the system, the official element can be gradually withdrawn. To sever the connection at the very outset would be to court certain failure.

26. Lastly, with reference to separate establishments, office accommodation, and committee rooms, if the above proposals are adopted, extra requirements will be reduced to a minimum, and will be confined to meeting the necessities of the central boards at the head-quarters of each district. In the matter of *establishment* I would propose the following for the present, *viz* :—

An English clerk on Rs. 100 per mensem, an assistant clerk on Rs. 50 per mensem. The former would keep all the accounts, English correspondence, and records. The latter would assist the English clerk in the Vernacular Department and act as translator.

As regards committee rooms and office accommodation there will be no difficulty in Lucknow, as

under Major Murray's proposals the lal-baradari will furnish a suitable office room and the central hall will be available for the meetings both of the local and municipal committees. It is, in my opinion, highly desirable that the committee rooms and offices of the local boards should be separate from the existing public offices. In the Bara Banki and Unao districts it is not possible, with the limited accommodation in the Deputy Commissioner's kutcherries, to provide for the requirements of the boards in these buildings, and in both districts temporary accommodation has to be sought elsewhere. I am in favour of constructing suitable buildings both in Unao and Bara Banki, capable of furnishing a good sized committee room to be used by both the local and municipal boards, and separate rooms for the two offices.

P.S.—Since closing my report I have received the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Unao, a copy of which is herewith forwarded.

No. 1535, dated Bara Banki, the 19th July 1882.

From Major H. W. HASTINGS, Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Lucknow Division.

SIR,

AFTER consulting some of the most intelligent members of the native community, I have the honour to furnish the report called for by Government in the Officiating Secretary's letter, No. 145 of the 21st June to all Commissioners.

2. There is a consensus of opinion on their part, in which I entirely concur, that the immediate formation of independent or even separate tahsíl boards would be premature. The existing district board is composed of representatives from each tahsíl and town of importance, and it is thought that, for some time at least, the members should enjoy the opportunity of acquiring some experience of the conduct of business at the head-quarters of the district.

3. The present board consists of eight official and 14 non-official members. The short experience I have had of its working has led me to the conclusion that the members might with advantage be increased. The district contains 19 parganas and two towns of considerable importance, and I propose to give each of these towns and parganas a representative, necessitating an addition to the board of seven non-official members.

4. The additional members will be selected in the manner suggested in para. 5 of the Officiating Secretary's letter.

5. The four tahsíl and two principal towns of the district will then be represented non-officially as follows:—

Nawábganj tahsíl - - - - - -	5	Members.
Ramsanehighát - - - - - -	5	„
Fatehpur - - - - - - -	6	„
Haidargarh - - - - - - -	3	„
Newábganj Town - - - - - -	1	„
Rudauli - - - - - - -	1	„
Total -	21	„

6. The tahsíl representatives will thus form local sub-committees of the district committee. They will lay before the district committee, in its consultative capacity, the wishes of the local committee they represent, and to them will be entrusted the administrative duty of supervising the various works and institutions entrusted to local control within respective tahsíls.

7. With regard to the appointment of a chairman there is a general agreement that the district officer must fill the place. There is an irreducible minimum of official labour devolving on the chairman which would necessitate, if not his constant presence, at any rate very frequent visits to the office, and although there are gentlemen of influence and ability on the board competent to perform the important duties of the post, the distance at which they live would prove an unsurmountable obstacle.

8. Moreover, there is another fact affecting the question, and it would be dishonest to shut our eyes to it. Local self-government is an exotic which will require for some time to come very careful nursing. As long as the Deputy Commissioner takes the chair, the members will attend and feel some *izzat* in doing so, but with an equal in that position they will find it difficult to form a *quorum*.

9. In the event of the proposals indicated in para. 3 to 6 of this letter being approved of, no establishment or offices would be required for the tahsíli sub-committees. Some arrangement, however, is urgently required at the head-quarters. It is very desirable that the business of the committee should be conducted with some external appearance of decency and comfort. There should be a commodious board room, respectable furniture, and convenient offices ; at present by the kindness of the members of the Nawábganj Anjuman the committee sits in their club-room. The District Engineer has his office in the Executive Engineer's (Public Works Department) bungalow, but has received notice to quit, and the local funds office occupies a small room in my kutcherry. You are aware of the miserable accommodation in the kutcherry, which is probably the worst in Oudh, but when the proposed additions are carried out, some arrangement for the district board and its offices will be feasible.

10. I have discussed the subject of election with the members of the committee and others, and have come to the conclusion that a simple system with a limited constituency would be quite practicable. The constituency might be formed of all sadr málguzars, all persons assessed to the license tax, members of municipal committees, members of panchayats, under Act XX. of 1856, and all pleaders and revenue agents. A constituency being thus formed on the occasion of a vacancy in any pargana or town having a representative the Deputy Commissioner should nominate, in consultation with the principal inhabitants, three candidates from whom the election of that pargana or town should make their choice. A more elaborate system or a more extended franchise would probably meet the fate of most beginnings which are too ambitious.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. 1555, dated Bara Banki, the 22nd July 1882.

From Major H. W. HASTINGS, Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Lucknow Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your No. 153, dated 21st June 1882.

2. I have already in my No. 1535, dated 19th instant, expressed my preference for the third plan suggested by Mr. Reid, in his letter on the subject. I do not think there is any necessity for the tahsíl sub-committees or tahsíl local boards, it is immaterial what they are called, to hold monthly meeting. The general committee should meet once a month, and at each meeting the tahsíl boards should give an account of their stewardship. The principle of my proposal is that the tahsíl members should lay before the committee the requirements of their tahsíls ; the committee should in view of these requirements make allotments of funds, and that the tahsíl boards should be responsible for the administration of these funds. Absolute independence is quite impracticable with the various services—public works and others—on their present footing. The departmental responsibility suggested in para. 3 is quite feasible.

3. If my views are adopted, tahsíldárs need not be in the tahsíl boards, and there will be no occasion for paid secretaries or office accommodation. If, however, this last is required, the existing tahsíl buildings cannot supply it. Possibly room might be found in the school buildings, and if local secretaries are required hereafter, one of the schoolmasters might be appointed with a small addition to his salary.

4. The present members of the committee are both able and willing to serve on the tahsíl boards, being at the same time members of the general committee. I have already addressed you on the necessity of increasing their numbers, and suggested a mode of election.

5. The remaining subjects treated upon in your letter have been dealt with in my No. 1535 of the 17th instant. I regret that I did not receive earlier intimation of your contemplated visit. Had I done so, I would have postponed the regular meeting which was held last Monday, and at which there was a large attendance.

6. With regard to para. 12 of your letter, I do not consider my proposals inconsistent with the orders of the Government of India, unless that Government wishes each tahsíl board to be financially independent. This I can hardly conceive possible

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No. 4010, dated Lucknow, the 8th August 1882.

From Major A. MURRAY, Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, to COMMISSIONER, Lucknow Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your No. 135, dated 29th June, and your Circular No. 153-2559, dated 21st ultimo, calling for a report on the changes in the decentralization system proposed in Government Circulars No. 145, dated 21st June, and No. 160, dated 29th idem.

2. With reference to the constitution of local boards and the relation they should hold to the central board, I am of opinion that by far the most feasible plan is the third of those proposed in Circular No. 145. The district board should include the members of the tahsíl boards to whom would ordinarily be delegated the local work in their different tahsíls. The number of non-official members at present in the district committee is 14—5 for the Lucknow tahsíl, 5 representing the Mohanlálganj tahsíl, and 4 for the Malihabad tahsíl. I would propose that each tahsíl committee be composed of not less than five non-official and two official members. The official members would be the District Engineer and Deputy Inspector of Schools, and that they should meet once a month for the disposal of business. The central board, which would consist of all the non-official members of the tahsíl committees and of five official members* to meet twice or at most four times during the year. The president to have the power to call a special meeting when necessary.

*Deputy Commissioner, Senior Assistant, Executive Engineer, Inspector of Schools, Civil Surgeon.

3. I think it is most essential that the number of meetings of the central committee should be limited, otherwise the difficulty in securing the attendance of members of the outside tahsíl committees will be great. They would probably come at first, but as ordinarily the business to be transacted at monthly meetings is confined to passing the accounts and other matters of mere routine, their interest would soon flag and the attendance consequently fall off. All matters of importance could moreover be disposed of in two or three meetings during the year, and the rule that requires that the public works accounts should be passed monthly by the committee might well be modified. If, however, monthly meetings of the central committee are considered indispensable, I would suggest a rule that members not attending a certain proportion of committees' meetings during the year would cease to belong to the committee, and as they undoubtedly value the position which membership gives them, such a rule would probably have the desired effect.

4. I think that all ordinary work could be disposed of by the tahsíl committee in their respective tahsíls. It would necessarily pass through the hands of the president of the central board, who would decide what matters should be laid before the central committee, and what the tahsll committees could dispose of at once. The proceedings of tahsíl committees to be laid before the central committee at their half-yearly or quarterly meeting. The president of the central board, when it is possible to appoint a non-official to that post, should not be a member of any tahsíl committee ; but as there would be no separate central board, no departmental distribution of the work would be possible. The accounts should, I think, be kept in English at the head-quarters of the district. At each tahsíl an account would be kept only of such sums which it may be found necessary to place at the disposal of tahsíl committees. The tahsíldár whom it will, for the present, be necessary to retain on the tahsíl committees to conduct the proceedings, will correspond with the central committee, and as the meetings would be held in his kutcherry, no separate accommodation will be immediately required for a committee room and record office. At head-quarters I think it will be possible to make over to the central committee a

portion of the Lal Baradari, and the tahsíl committees would use the central committee room for their monthly meetings. Should accommodation be ultimately required at the head-quarters of the other tahsíls, it will be necessary to make some addition to the Mohanlálganj tahsíl, which by all accounts is barely large enough for the present requirements. At Malihabad it will be possible to provide the necessary accommodation.

5. It will, I think, be unnecessary to appoint more than one additional member to the committee. There are four members representing the Malihabad tahsíl, and a fifth member will be required, and for the appointment of this one member it would seem hardly necessary to apply any system of election. Every system must be more or less cumbrous, and I will give my suggestions for future appointments further on.

6. I am of opinion that, for the present, it will be necessary to appoint the tahsíldár to be a chairman of the local or tahsíl boards. It may hereafter be possible to appoint a chairman from among the members of the local committee, but until it has been ascertained what members really take an intelligent interest in the work, and show themselves capable to undertake the duties, there is great difficulty in making a selection. Moreover, till the system is in working order, and all the details have been mastered, it is highly desirable that the proceedings be conducted by somebody who has had an official training. I agree with you that the tahsíldár should confine himself to the conduct of the proceedings and should have no vote.

7. That the Deputy Commissioner should for the present be retained as president of the central committee is the opinion of the members of that committee generally; and there is no non-official now in this district who has the necessary qualification for the post. A knowledge of English is, in my opinion, indispensable ; and this knowledge is possessed by nobody in the committee. It is also necessary that the chairman should be a person of social position and influence, of some determination of character, and of business habits, and unfortunately in this district there is nobody who possesses the first qualification who has the others.

8. With regard to the future election of members, I think we must set aside all ordinary methods as at present impracticable. It is very easy to form a constituency ; the difficulty lies in inducing the constituent to record his vote. He certainly would not attend an election for that purpose, and I do not know of any agency which could be trusted to collect votes. In a meeting lately held by you, at which a certain number of the members of the municipal committee were present, it was proposed by you, and agreed to by them, that it would be a good plan to induce the electors of each division of the city to elect a certain number of persons as qualified to represent them on the municipal committee, and that when occasion arose the committee themselves should fill a vacancy from among the persons so nominated; and I am of opinion that some such method might be applied to the election of members to the local committees. The elective body to be composed of sadr malguzars, including lambardars in under-proprietary estates, and of persons assessed to the license tax. The great majority of these have to attend at the tahsíl some time during the year, and the tahsíldár should open a register recording the votes of each elector attending the tahsíl who should be called upon to nominate at least five persons. The tahsíldár should keep the register himself, and should not delegate the duty to anybody else except the peshkar in his absence. By this means a pretty accurate record of the wishes of the electors might in time be obtained, and vacancies in the committee could be filled up from the nominations in each tahsíl by the committee themselves.

9. I have given these suggestions in accordance with the orders contained in para. 5 of Government letter No. 155, dated 21st June, as the only practicable means of electing members, but I am of opinion that the introduction of any system of election is premature. The community generally does not appreciate the benefits of the elective franchise, and election by any means for the present will be a mere matter of form. It may be, in time, that the people will be led by experience to value the gift of self-government, and will then take an interest in this representation, and when that time comes it will be unnecessary to resort to special measures for the election of members. The ordinary system will answer every purpose

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No. 2096, dated Unao, the 14th August 1882.

From J. T. CRAWFORD, Esquire, C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Unao, to COMMISSIONER, Lucknow Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your No. 153, dated 21st July 1882, in regard to the questions regarding local committees raised in Government letters Nos. 145 and 160.

2. I propose to discuss the subject under the following seven heads :—

1. Appointment of president.
2. Constitutions of committee.
3. Selection of an elective body.
4. Method of election.
5. Relations with district committees.
6. Establishment.
7. Accommodation for office and records.

1.—*Appointment of President.*—I have consulted the members of the existing local fund committee and many native officers and gentlemen, and I find the opinion absolutely unanimous that the time has not yet arrived when it would be possible to do without an official president either in the district or the tahsíl committees.

I could not name a single non-official gentleman either qualified or willing to undertake the presidentship of the district committee, and there seems no other course than that the Deputy Commissioner should continue president.

I had hoped to have been able to report otherwise in regard to the tahsíl committees, and you may remember yourself that two names were suggested by some of the Native gentlemen whom you

interviewed some weeks ago. I have since had an opportunity of seeing both the gentlemen then suggested.

Sayyid Zain-ul-abdin is an estimable well-meaning old gentleman of inferior health, and altogether appeared so wanting in energy and other qualifications required in a president, that I did not deem it necessary to ascertain if he was willing to act. Shaikh Ali Bakhsh, pensioned Extra Assistant Commissioner and Honorary Magistrate, is well qualified in every way both by social status and by intelligence to assume such an office. I had a long and interesting conversation with him on the subject. I think he might be prevailed on to accept office, and I am inclined to think that the experiment of appointing him might with propriety be tried, but at present he is unwilling to accept the office. His feeling appears to be that, as a pensioned officer, he had not the necessary influence and authority to do so successfully. He used the word *hukumat*, which I have translated influence and authority, and seemed on the whole to doubt his ability to carry on the duties with credit to himself.

I should certainly however arrange on your next visit to Unao to ask him specially to meet you, as it would certainly be a step in the required direction if he could be prevailed on to accept office, and I think that the position thus given to him would give him the *hukumat*, the want of which he seems to dread. Of course, this could only be secured by insisting on the tahslídár's working with him cordially and co-operating with him in every way ; and with a tahsíldár of the intelligence of Pandit Shiu Nath, I doubt not this might easily be brought about.

In all the other tahsíl's there is absolutely no alternative but to allow tahsíldárs to become presidents of the tahsíl committees.

II.—*Constitution of Committees.*—There are in this district four tahsíls, *viz.* :—

Unao	with	4	parganas.
Purwa	„	10	ditto.
Safipur	„	3	ditto.
Mohan	„	4	ditto.

The district committee, as at present constituted, consists of four members of each tahsíl. The opinion of the Native gentlemen whom I consulted was that the representation should be parganawar, *i.e.*, one member for each pargana. I am, however, afraid this would give too few members, and it would be difficult to secure regular attendance at the monthly meetings of a sufficient number to form a *quorum.*

I would propose that in Unao and Mohan there should be two members for each pargana, and in Saffipur three members for each pargana, in Purwa one member for each pargana, and in Unao and Mohan one representative elected by the two municipalities existing in the district.

That the official members should be as a rule the tahsíldár, the munsif, and the thanadár. This would give the following constitutions :—

UNAO.

Eight non-official members.	Two for each pargana elected by the municipal committee. The tahsíldár, president.
One non-official member.	
Three official members.	Headmaster, zili school (there being no munsiff). The Thanadár of Unao.

PURWA.

*Ten non-official members.	One for each pargana.
Three official members.	Tahsíldár, president, munsiff.
	The thanadár.

*Possibly this might be increased to 14 by appointment of two members for each of the eight parganas.

SAFIPUR.

Nine non-official members.	Three for each pargana.
	Tahsíldár.
	Munsif.
	The thanadár.

MOHAN.

Eight non-official members.	Two for each.
One non-official member.	Elected by Municipality of Nawabganj.
Three official members.	Tahsíldár.
	Munsif.
	Thanadár.

In addition to this I would propose the Deputy Commissioner or officer in sub-divisional charge of the tahsíl, Civil Surgeon, Inspector of Schools, and the Executive Engineer should be entitled to sit in committee whenever they may find it advisable or convenient to attend, and should be entitled to address the committee and take part in any discussions that may arise, but should have no vote on any subject—should in fact be a species of honorary members.

The sadr committee consists at present of 16 non-official and 11 official members. In order to secure the proportion of two-thirds, I propose that the non-official element should be increased to 23. One member for each of the 21 parganas, and the two non-official members from Unao and Nawabganj municipality. The official members of the sadr committee remaining as at present, and the official member of tahsíl committee with exception of tahsíldár not being member of sadr committee. In Unao, Safipur, and Mohan, where I propose more than one member for each pargana, the senior member for the pargana might be a member of the district board, or it may be left to the sub-committee themselves to nominate a sadr member for each pargana.

I annex for your information a list marked (Appendix A) of gentlemen who appear eligible to act as members of the committee, and all of them would I understand be willing to accept the appointment. How far they might be willing really to perform the duties belonging to the appointment I can hardly be expected to say. I however do not mean this to be taken as an exhausted list.

III.—*Selection of an Elective Body.*—This does not seem a very difficult thing to do, for the selection must be for the present tentative. I would suggest as follows :—

A.—All persons paying revenue direct to Government.
B.—All persons assessed to license tax.
C.—All persons who hold the degrees of any recognized university.
D.—Any person not falling under above classes whom the committee might hold eligible, and whose entry in list of voters might be approved by the Deputy Commissioner.

IV.—*Method of Election.*—I have given this subject considerable attention. It appeared to be that it was essentially desirable to select some method with which the people were conversant, and I think that probably the procedure adopted in appointment of lambardars would meet this case. I propose to adopt it with some modification. I have endeavoured to indicate what I mean in the proposed draft of rules.

Rules for Appointment of Members of Local Tahsíl Committee.

1. On the occurrence of a vacancy in the committee, a notice *in form A* (a notice similar to form A· in Circular No. 23R. of 1878) shall be published by beat of drum or in such a way as the committee may direct in at least three of the principal places in the pargana, calling on all voters registered as qualified voters within fifteen days to nominate a fit and proper person to act as member of committee. A copy of such notice should also be served on the Deputy Commissioner of the district.

2. Any three qualified voters may within period specified in the notice file or cause to be filed through the village patwári or the recognized agent of any one of such voters a nomination of any individual whose name is in the list of qualified voters, and the secretary shall register such nomination in a book to be kept for the purpose. The Deputy Commissioner may, after such enquiry as he may see fit, nominate three individuals from the list of qualified voters aforesaid.

3. Immediately on the expiry of the fifteen days specified in rule, the secretary shall by registered letter enquire from the nominees if they are willing to serve. Failure of reply within 15 days shall be held equivalent to a refusal.

4. As soon as all answers have been received, or the fifteen days have expired, the secretary shall cause to be issued voting papers in such form as may be prescribed by the committee, inviting all entitled to vote to fill up the said form, and to file it within one month of the issue of the said notice in the manner prescribed in rule 2. Such voting papers to be distributed to each voter by such means as may be decided upon by committee.

5. The names of the above individuals in whose behalf the largest numbers of votes are received shall be submitted through Deputy Commissioner to Local Government, with an expression of opinion as to which of them appear the most eligible.

In reference to para. 3 of No. 160, I would here note that public opinion is unanimous that tasíldárs should be presidents of tahsíl boards and members of the sadr board.

V.—*Relation with District Board.*—I must frankly confess I have given much thought to this but cannot say I have succeeded in making up my mind at all definitely.

The committee have passed certain opinions which are forwarded to you separately as proceedings of the committee. I do not think that they fully grasped the subject, and this is not to be wondered at, as I am unable to furnish them with translations of Nos. 160 and 145, and other connected papers, &c.; it was very difficult to understand all the points raised by a more or less hasty reading of them. I have altogether failed in sketching out any detailed system of the nature of the relations between the committees.

I accept the third plan proposed by the Local Government as laid down in para. 3; but you will observe I do not propose that the munsif and the thanadár, who appear to be purely local members of the tahsíl board, should have a seat at the sadr board. I must say I was influenced in that mainly by the fact that the addition of these eight gentlemen would necessitate an addition of 16 non-official members, and would result in a monstrous committee: and similarly to keep numbers within due bounds, I propose when there are more than one member for each pargana, that one only should sit on the sadr board. I have myself, except for that reason, no objection to all the members of the tahsíl board being members of the sadr board. The effect of this would be, however, to raise the number of members to fifty seven, as there being already eleven official members the addition of eight other official would necessiate a total non-official membership of 38.

I must premise that the following remarks are crude, and that I simply feel unable to develop any clear line regulating the relations of the new committees.

It appears to me that it would be the duty of tahsíl committees to prepare a rough budget based on the one-fourth of the total amount at disposal of district committee. Communicating with the committee of the adjoining tahsíl if any of their projects involved co-operation with that of another tahsíl committee, *e.g.*, repair to Safipur and Unao road. If the one committee were improving the portions of the road in their sub-division, it would be well that the other committee should be made aware of this, in order to make corresponding and similar improvements in their portion of the road, if funds permitted. The different sets of budgets being collected, would be disposed of by the sadr committee.

Similarly, and this should perhaps have come with projects for administrative sanction, would also have to come through and be approved of by sadr committee.

This being done and sanction obtained and communicated to the tahsíl committees apparently, the duties of distributing the sanctioned amounts and making payments would be independent of the sadr committee as would also be practically the supervision to be exercised by the committee. If it be otherwise, then the tahsíl committee would be even simply a sub-committee, which it is not contemplated as I understand the matter.

What is the nature of the supervision to be exercised by the sadr committee I hardly understand, unless it be of the nature suggested in proceeding of the committee, *viz.*, that in case of difference of opinion a meeting of one-third or more of the members then present may insist that the whole question be referred to the sadr committee, and that in any re-appropriation of funds involving abandonment of projects too common to that and another tahsíl (*e.g.*, a road passing through two tahsíls), the sanction of sadr committee should be necessary.

Unless almost independent authority is given to tahsil boards, and the members are allowed to feel they have full power, the committee will become nonentities, and if that independent authority be given to the tahsíl committee, then the district committee has but little to do.

VI.—*Establishment.*—There can be no doubt that both for the local board and the tahsíl boards it will be necessary to have a paid secretary. If, as is the intention of Government, by degrees the whole of the direct control is to pass out of official hands, that official will need to be a responsible official probably at head-quarters of class of a munsarim or head clerk or even of an Extra Assistant Commissioner, with corresponding pay, and at tahsíl a qualified man could hardly be secured under Rs. 50 or 60. I would here remark that I do not see how with all these calls on it the resource of the committee will be able to bear the heavy expense of Public Works Department establishment located here : nor do I consider that the work requires such highly qualified officer or such an expensive establishment.

VII.—*Office.*—At the head-quarters there is a building lately erected by private subscription called the Unao Club. It contains a large hall which is used as a library. It would be quite within the function of the local (and also municipal committee) to make a grant for maintenance of the library ; in fact, in any case I would have proposed doing so, but it becomes more desirable to do so as the hall is, as you are aware, most excellently suited for a public meeting place, and the committee of this club would I know be very glad to allow it to be used for such a purpose.

Office for the establishment would have to be built, and might be built adjoining that building, so as to be entirely separate from the Government offices. They would require to be somewhat extensive, as the office of the Department Public Works has to be provided for. I do not think I could possibly put them down at less than Rs. 3,000 ; no accommodation of any kind is available at the tahsíls, and to the best of my knowledge will have to be erected. Probably Rs. 1,200 at each of the three tahsíls would suffice.

This report will, I regret, reach you a few days late. I have tried several times to develop a scheme regulating the relation of the tahsíl and district committees, but without success, and I was very unwilling to despatch the report without doing so.

I trust I have taken up all the essential points of the letter under reply.

APPENDIX A.

Unao.—Hindpal, zamindár of Bheta.
Chaudhri Fateh Bahadur, taluqdár of Sarasi.
Narain Parshad, mahajan, of Banthar.
Chaudhri Ramzan Ali.
Jodha Singh, lambardár of Thana.
Hamanchal Singh, lambardár of Pura.
Rajaram Tribedi of Muswasi.
Gurdial, mahajan, of Achalganj.
Raja Sheonath, taluqdár and mahajan, of Bethur.

Purwa.—Bhagwandin Chaudhri, zamindár of Purwa.
Bhagwandin Misr, zamindár of Purwa.
Prag Datt Sukal of Purwa.
Lala Bishesar Parshad of Maurawan.
Debidyal of Maurawan.
Mahipat Singh, taluqdár of Kantha.
Shiu Gobind, taluqdár of Aon.
Daya Shankar, Bajpayi of Kurdoha.
Karamat-ulla, lambardár of Nathe Khera.
Wazír Beg, lambardár of Bhaerora.

Safipur.—Niaz Ahmad, zamindár Safipur.
Sakhawat Hydar of Safipur.
Madho Singh, lambardár of Jamal-ud-dinpur.
Amir Singh, chaudhari of Bangarmau.
Muhammad Askari, zamindár of Safipur.
Lachman Singh, chaudhari of Ala-ud-dín.
Bahadur Singh, of Soosoomau.
Eshri Singh, of Mirzapur.

Mohan.—Rajá Daya Shankar.
Badri Tewari, mahajan, of Sarauli.
Lala Shiu Parshad, Kayath, of Hyderabad.
Adhar Singh, of Bhauli.
Kesho of Jea.
Fida Husain, of Neotani.
Iftkhar Muhammad, of Assiwan Rassulabad.
Ghulam Abbas of Neotani.

J. T. CRAWFORD,
Deputy Commissioner.

No. 2664, dated Sitapur, the 19th August 1882.

From Major G. E. ERSKINE, Commissioner, Sitapur Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to reply to your letters Nos. 145 and 160, dated respectively the 21st and 29th June last, and to submit the following observations on the various matters to which you have drawn attention.

2. I regret that my answer should not be in your hands by the date fixed, and trust I may be excused for the delay, which has been caused by the pressure of other duties, and the necessity for deliberating on the suggestions of Deputy Commissioners before laying my conclusions before Government.

3. So far as has been possible, I and the Deputy Commissioners have consulted the various persons—official and non-official, native and European—who were likely to be able to give an intelligent opinion on the great and important questions under consideration. But the subject is an unfamiliar one to nearly all of those called on to express opinions, and an entirely novel one to many; and this being the case, the time allowed for its discussion has been all too short. Further, the season of the year is that at which most of the landed gentry are more or less weather-bound at home, and reluctant to attend committees and conferences at district head-quarters.

4. I have, of course, seen a good many of the native gentlemen of the Sitapur district, but, unfortunately, the dealing non-official of the district (Raja Amir Hasan Khan) has not yet been able to comply with my invitation to come to Sitapur and discuss matters. He has, however, briefly informed me of his readiness to co-operate in every possible way in giving effect to the new policy, and, if assured as he most certainly may be, of the support of the Local Government officials, to undertake the office of president of the district committee.

5. I went to Hardoi last month, and met nearly all the members of the present district committee, besides some municipal commissioners and other native gentlemen. I endeavoured personally to explain to them the policy on which the Government has decided to embark, indicated the points on which their opinions were invited, ascertained so far as possible what the general feeling was, and asked them, after giving the subject further consideration, to communicate their more matured views to the Deputy Commissioner. I may here remark that matters would have been much facilitated if we had been furnished from the Secretariat with proper translations of the Resolutions and letters of which it was necessary to communicate the contents to those whose opinions were invited.

6. I have not been able to visit Kheri, or to confer personally with the native gentry on the points indicated in your letter; but Mr. Gibson has furnished me with full information.

7. You will hardly need to be informed that I find the greatest difficulty in devising measures which shall give practical effect to the wishes of the Government of India. At every turn some obstacle has had to be encountered; but it has been my earnest endeavour and that of my Deputy Commissioners to overcome or avoid these rather than give way to them.

8. *Tahsíl boards.*—My own opinion and that of most* of those I have consulted is that the tahsíl boards should be part and parcel of the general district committee, that is to say, members should be appointed or elected to represent a particular tahsíl† in the district committee, and those members of the district committee who represent the same tahsil should from the tahsíl board, which would be in fact a sub-committee of the district committee.

* *N. B.*—Mr. Wood says that in Hardoi the prevalent opinion is that the tahsíl boards should be distinct from the district committee, but this is not his own view, nor has it been generally expressed to me.

† This would not apply to nominations by Government to seats on the district committee only, *e.g.*, the Deputy Commissioner, the Executive Engineer, the Inspector of Schools, &c.

9. *President of district committee.*—One of the members of the district committee should be either elected by the body of members, or appointed by the Government to be president of the committee.

10. *Chairman of tahsíl board.*—One of the members of each tahsíl board should similarly be either elected by the members of the board, or appointed by Government, to the office of chairman of the board.

11. *District committee's functions.*—The district committee should exercise a general supervision and financial control, and to it should be reserved the power of taxation which it is intended—I gather from para. 10 of the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th May—to confer.

12. It would be necessary for the district committee to divide the general district budget into tahsíl budgets, allotting to each tahsíl board the sums sanctioned for works to be carried out within its jurisdiction, and apportioning to each its share in respect of a work which falls partly in one and partly in another tahsíl.

13. *Functions of tahsíl boards.*—The tahsíl board would then have power to pass all expenditure covered by its budget allotment.

14. *Their composition.*—I understand from Deputy Commissioners that all the non-official members of the present committees are willing to serve on the boards of their respective tahsíls. Their numbers in each district are at present:—

Sitapur - - - - -	12
Hardoi - - - - -	17
Kheri - - - - -	8

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

15. In the following table are given the number of non-official members which the Deputy Commissioners would allot to each tahsíl, and the number now taken from each tahsíl :—

		Proposed number.	Present number.
Sitapur.—			
	Sitapur - - - -	5	3
	Misrikh - - - -	5	3
	Sidhauli - - - -	6	3
	Biswán - - - -	5	3
	District total -	21	12
Hardoi.—			
	Hardoi - - - -	6	2
	Sandila - - - -	6	6
	Bilgram - - - -	6	3
	Shahabad - - - -	6	6
	District total -	24	17
Kheri.—			
	Lakhimpur- - - -	6	7
	Muhamdi - - - -	5	0
	Nighasan - - - -	5	1
	District total -	16	8

I concur in the proposed "distribution of seats," except that I think Sitapur, Misrikh, and Biswan should each have six members, or Sidhauli only five.

16. The Deputy Commissioner of Sitapur gives the names of those gentlemen whom he recommends for appointments to complete the proposed strength, and the Deputy Commissioners of Hardoi and Kheri are prepared to make nominations; but I propose to deal separately with this matter. It will suffice to say here that I advise that the appointments necessary to complete the establishment be at once made by Government on the Deputy Commissioner's recommendation as heretofore ; and that then, as soon as the necessary legislative authority has been obtained, and the preliminary arrangements, such as the preparation of lists of voters, &c., completed, it be declared that every vacancy in the establishment above proposed will in future be filled by election. Further on I shall offer suggestions as to the system of election.

17. *Official members.*—In addition to the members provided for above, there should be the official element of the district committee and the tahsíl boards, which, as decided by the Government, should never exceed one-third of the whole. I would retain this element even when the system of election is brought into play in respect of the non-official members, but it would be somewhat differently constituted from at present.

18. Heretofore, all members being nominated by Government, those only have been considered "official" who are in the service of Government. In future, every member, whether in the service of Government or not, nominated after the system of election is brought into play, should be considered an "official member ;" and it is "official members" in *this* sense who should not exceed in number more than a third of the whole.

19. Where the president of the district committee is a non-official, the Deputy Commissioner will hardly be expected to sit on the committee; but I do not understand that the Government at present proposes that none of the other *ex-officio* members are to continue to belong to it. However that may be, it is very desirable that the Government should reserve to itself the power of nominating a certain proportion of the members ; and I venture to think that that power may be very usefully exercised, not merely by the nomination of its own servants, but by the selection of private gentlemen—native or European—of influence, experience or ability, who are likely to be useful members of the committee and tahsíl boards, but who, owing to the whim of the electors or some other cause, would otherwise be excluded.

20. *Advisability of Tahsíldárs being members of the board.*—Every one whom I have consulted is of opinion that the Tahsíldár should be, for some time to come, a member of the tahsíl board. The prospect of being required to work without his aid and counsel is viewed with positive consternation. I certainly think that to sever the Tahsíldár's connection with the board would be to court disastrous failure.

21. The Deputy Commissioners of Sitapur and Kheri suggest (as a compromise apparently) that the Tahsíldár should be a member of, but should not vote at, the board. I had thought of this plan myself, but on consideration I am unable to support the proposal. It is not the effect of the Tahsíldár's one vote that is feared, but, I presume, of his influence over the votes of the other members. I do not apprehend that this influence will be disadvantageous ; but if I am wrong, the remedy is to exclude him from the board altogether. To make him a member, without giving him a vote, would be to place him in an anomalous position for no good reason.

22. *Non-official presidents of district committees.*—The appointment of non-official presidents of district committees will now be considered. All my Deputy Commissioners and every other person who has spoken to me on the subject consider the measure premature. This is also my own opinion.

23. The Deputy Commissioner of Sitapur bows to the strongly indicated wishes of the Government of India, and makes suggestions, to which I shall presently refer, for the conduct of business under the auspices of a non-official president.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

24. The Deputy Commissioner of Hardoi advocates arrangements of the kind described in para. 3 of your letter No. 147, dated 21st June, regarding municipal boards, whereby the Deputy Commissioner would remain president of the committee but without a vote, and act as dry-nurse to a non-official vice president.

25. The Deputy Commissioner of Kheri, after discussing the qualifications of each of the members, comes to the conclusion that one is fit for the office of president; but says that if this be desired, the committee will be desired to elect a non-official president.

26. Left to itself, I believe that each committee will elect the Deputy Commissioner its president. I presume, however, that Government does not intend that it should be left so entirely to its own discretion; but that it should be told, wherever strong reasons cannot be advanced for allowing the Deputy Commissioner to retain the post, that he will withdraw from the committee, and that it must elect one of its non-official members as its head.

27. The first question, then, is whether there is any one who possesses, or who may reasonably be expected to acquire after a short experience, the qualifications requisite to the efficient discharge of the duties of the president; and this cannot be properly answered until it is known what duties are expected of the president, what he is to do himself, and what he may delegate to others.

28. If the president of the future is himself to do all that the Deputy Commissioner now does in that capacity, I have no hesitation in saying that there is not in any district of the division a competent non-official who would be an acceptable president to the present members. There are no doubt men possessing the requisite ability and interested in public affairs, but they are wanting in other essential qualifications. Their homes are distant from the head-quarters of the district, or their time is much occupied with the management of their own estates, or they are deficient in business habits and unacquainted with many details of the work they will have to transact; or they lack the social pre-eminence without which the will certainly not be elected to the office of president by the other members, or, if appointed by Government, enjoy their active co-operation.

29. This last point cannot be overlooked, for I find all the members of these committees lay great stress on the question of precedence, and look on it as a matter of course that, if the president is not a Government official, he must be the man who stands highest on the darbar list. Thus in Sitapur, no other selection but Rája Amir Hasan Khan would be thought of, and in Hardoi Rája Tilak Singh. The former, as it happens, is the most competent man in the district for the post; the latter is a weak and illiterate old gentleman, who would never be more than a venerable dummy.

30. Mr. Dyson, in the following extracts from his report, furnishes some useful information regarding the duties which at present devolve on the Deputy Commissioner as president, and offers suggestions for their performance if a non-official president be elected:—

"The Government of India indicate their desire in unmistakeable language that the office shall be held by a non-official person. In order the better to understand what duties belong to the appointment, I called for a detail of the work which passed through the Deputy Commissioner's hands during the months of May and June as president of the committee.

"It will be better to give the memorandum *in extenso* furnished by the District Engineer:—

"'I have been over your office and mine in search of statistics; and as far as I can reach facts by figures, the following is the result obtained as representing the amount of work transacted by the president of district committee:—

	May.	*June.*
"'District Engineer's cash-book and copy of cash-book, with vouchers in duplicate, signed	28	32
"'Letters received by District Engineer for president	44	21
"'Despatched by District Engineer for president	57	37
"'Letters received in Deputy Commissioner's office for president	21	27
"'Letters despatched by Deputy Commissioner for president	11	15
"'Circulars, letters, bills, budgets, credit orders, &c., sent to District Engineer by Deputy Commissioner for president	19	27
"'Bills of the General Department, signed	5	7
"'Bills of the Educational Department, signed	12	10
"'Bills of the Medical Department, signed	3	3
	200	179

"'Beyond this there has been a considerable amount of business done by the Deputy Commissioner in his office of president of the district committee which cannot be reduced to figures. For instance, officers of the various departments under his control are obliged to make frequent reference to him for orders, &c., and these are effected either by personal interviews or by correspondence on slips of which no official record is retained.

"'Of course I cannot tell how much of this kind of work is done in other departments; but in the matter of Public Works I know that scarcely a day goes by without my having to send up at least half a dozen cases to Deputy Commissioner, either for reference or for orders, besides occupying on an average three hours per week of his time in personal interviews for the disposal of cases.

"'On reading over this letter I cannot help admitting that it accounts for but a portion of the work really done by the president: much of which remains cannot be satisfactorily accounted for even in writing.

"So far the District Engineer. The other departments to which he alludes are doubtless Education and Medical which will be placed under the committee.

"Of course the new order of things brings with it an unusual pressure of work. Two or three years hence, when matters have settled down, there will be less work of an emergent nature to do. But we are concerned with the immediate present. The problem to be solved is—How are the duties, which now fall, and for the next year or two must fall, to the president of the committee, to be carried on by a non-official member? The answer must be that, unaided, he will not and cannot be expected

to do them. It is true that part of the duty would under the system proposed devolve on the chairman of the tahsíl boards; but there would remain enough to compel the attendance at the sudder of the president for several hours at least twice a week. It would be a considerable time before he could acquire the technical knowledge to dispose of references quickly, and he would therefore either delay for an inordinate period to pass orders, or he would rely altogether upon the District Engineer. This would place the latter in a position of almost uncontrolled responsibility, which neither he nor the Government contemplates or could desire.

"It has been urged that a paid secretary of assured position and good salary, say Rs. 250 a month, should be appointed to carry on the routine work and advise the president. It seems to me that there are insuperable objections to such a measure. In the first place, it is very doubtful whether the Government of these provinces, which already under the new scheme has to supplement from provincial funds the resources of all but two districts, would make a further yearly grant of (Rs. 3,000 × 48=) Rs. 1,44,00 towards the object advocated. A secretary on Rs. 250 a month would require an assistant, and therefore there would be no saving by the abolition of the office of local fund clerk. Moreover, such an officer would soon be the master, not the servant of the committee. I do not forget the words of the Government of India which I quoted at starting, that with fuller trust there would be more rapid improvement; but the trust is to be reposed in a collective unpaid non-official agency, not necessarily in any one person employed under it. Most willingly would I give in my adhesion to this proposal, but I am convinced that it would not work, at least for some years, in the direction and in the manner desired by Government. There would at the best be an undue leaning upon the secretary, a desire to leave all to him, and thus in place of a spirit of independence which we desire to see fostered, in a short while all power would be placed in the paid official's hands without even the semblance of control.

"The only plan which suggests itself to me is the following. I offer it with some diffidence, certainly with regret, for if adopted it will replace upon the Deputy Commissioner much of the duty that he now has to perform:—

"(1) Where vouchers for work done have to be passed, the Deputy Commissioner or, in his absence and under his authority, the Treasury Officer to be empowered to sign on behalf of the central tahsíl committee concerned.

"(2) All letters for the president to be opened by the Deputy Commissioner in the absence of the former, and so much of the correspondence as relates to information required to be obtained through the local fund clerk, and submitted to the department concerned under the authority and responsibility of the Deputy Commissioner.

"(3) Inquiries from the Public Works Department in respect of professional matters to be answered by the District Engineer, and submitted through the Deputy Commissioner.

"(4) Urgent applications for leave backed up by a certificate from the Civil or Assistant Surgeon to be dealt with, and, where necessary, temporary substitntes appointed by the Deputy Commissioner, subject to the confirmation of the committee.

"In this way there would be no real interference with the initiative and independence of the committee.

"The District Officer would have a clearer insight into the intentions of Government; would have a stronger desire than could any paid secretary to give the experiment fair play, and I may add if too zealous or insatiate of power, he could be more easily checked and controlled than an official who would be responsible only to a virtually irresponsible body of men.

31. The idea that the committee should have a paid secretary or assistant secretary was put forward by myself, and I do not find in Mr. Dyson's arguments anything to make me think that his plan is as well calculated as my own to encourage the growth of independent political life.

32. I do not apprehend that all, or too much power will fall into the hands of the paid servant of the committee, *if the other arrangements for the constitution of the committee are carefully made.*

33. No doubt a paid secretary will cost a good deal of money, but it is not to be expected that the president or members of the committee will devote their time to the drudgery of constant office work or the mastery of its details; everywhere important public bodies composed of unpaid members employ skilled secretaries or chief clerks to perform these functions, and something of the same kind appears to me essential in the present case.

34. Moreover, close at hand I find in the arrangements of an important institution (the Talukdárs Association) and the way they work considerable justification for my proposals. There the president has been, for a long series of years, the senior Talukdár in the province; whilst the moving genius, under the title of vice-president or honorary secretary, has been the Talukdár whose energy or ability made him the virtual leader of the assembly, and the office-work has been done under the secretary's control by a paid assistant secretary. Thus the claims of precedence have been satisfied, scope has been afforded to the most able or at any rate the most influential and active for the time being of the body for the exercise of his talents, and business has been conducted with some method. The paid secretary has not become the master of the Association, or anything more than a servant, though no doubt a trusted one.

35. I never contemplated the appointment of a paid secretary as a matter of course, unless there be some one able to control him and keep him in his place; of course he may assume too much power. The arrangements should be made to suit the varying circumstances of districts.

36. To take the districts of this division—

In *Sitapur* the new departure would have some chance of success, with Raja Amir Hasan Khan at president, aided by a good paid secretary under his orders.

In *Hardoi* the arrangements of the Talukdárs Association might be more closely followed. Raja Tilak Singh might be the president, and Mír Danish Ali of Pihani (by universal consent the most able and competent gentleman in the district for administering public affairs) the "honorary secretary," aided by a "paid assistant secretary."

In *Kheri* if, as I fear, there is no competent man at once available to conduct, either as president or honorary secretary, the business of the committee, the Deputy Commissioner might continue to be

president without a vote ; and the committee he invited to elect a vice-president, who is ready to study the subject and to learn the work with the Deputy Commissioner's assistance.

37. *Non-official Chairmen of tahsíl boards.*—So long as Tahsíldárs continue to be members of the tahsíl boards and district committees, I see no reason why the tahsíl boards should not be invited to elect their chairman.

38. *A system of election is feasible.*—Turning now to the question of the creation of a body of electors and the election of representatives by this body to serve as members of district committees and tahsíl boards, I am happy to say that I believe that a system of election can be worked.

39. *Qualifications of electors.*—Adults* (male or female) of the following classes should enjoy the franchise :—

* *i.e.*, Persons of not less than 21 years of age.

Lambardars of all kinds defined in rule I., Circular No. 23R., dated 27th September 1878.
Muáfidárs and waste land holders paying cesses and rates direct to Government.
Persons assessed to the license-tax.
Members of municipal committees or of panchayats under Act XX. of 1856.
Government officials (European, Eurasian, or Native) receiving salaries of Rs. 25 and upwards per mesem.
Government pensioners receiving pensions of Rs. 10 and upwards per mensem.
Legal practitioners, that is to say, barristers and enrolled pleaders.
These classes would supply about the following number of electors to each tahsíl :—

Sitapur	-	861
Biswan	-	270
Sidhauli	-	252
Misrikh	-	594
Sitapur district	-	1,977
Hardoi	-	877
Shahabad	-	903
Sandila	-	578
Bilgram	-	1,116
Hardoi district	-	3,474
Lakhimpur	-	412
Muhamdi	-	660
Nighasan	-	189
Kheri district	-	1,261

40. The Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur, would add all persons possessing a "proprietary interest in land, whether as lambardár, pattidár, or maufidár." As later on he refers only to pattidárs (of which class he says there are some 6,194), I presume he does not intend under-proprietors—however considerable their holdings—to vote.

The Deputy Commissioner of Hardoi would enfranchise pattidárs whose quota of revenue is not less than Rs. 25, and cultivators who pay an annual rent of not less than Rs. 100; also Government servants whose salaries are not less than Rs. 10 per mensem. He would not allow a vote to licensees in class III. of the schedule to Act II. of 1878.

The Deputy Commissioner of Kheri would allow a vote to every person belonging to the professions of the law, medicine, the church (any religion), and education, whose annual income is not less than Rs. 500 ; and to persons other than those falling into any of the foregoing classes who possess a capital of Rs. 5,000 (this class is intended to include persons who derive their income from invested capital).

I think, however, that it will suffice to make a beginning with the classes enumerated in para. 39. When a system is in working order and understood by the people, it will be easy enough to extend the right of voting to other classes.

41. *Qualifications of candidates.*—It seems to me unnecessary to lay down any qualification for a candidate for membership, except that the candidate must be a male of full age, and neither an idiot nor a lunatic. The body of electors whom I would create are not likely to return members of less intelligence than themselves.

42. *Number of votes possessed by each elector.*—Each elector should have one vote for every vacancy to be filled in the electoral district or circle to which he belongs ; but he should not be allowed to give more than one vote to the same candidate.

43. *Formation of electoral circles.*—What kind of electoral circles should be formed is a question on which opinions—influenced no doubt by local circumstances—differ. Thus the Deputy Commissioners of Sitapur and Hardoi think that each tahsíl should be divided into a number of circles, and the electors within each of these circles empowered to return ordinarily one (but in some circles perhaps more than one) member to serve on the tahsíl board and district committee. Mr. Gibson, on the other hand, thinks that the plan better suited to Kheri is to treat each tahsíl as a single circle, and let every elector in the tahsíl have a voice in the election of every tahsíl member.

44. I append extracts from the reports of Mr. Gibson and Mr. Dyson, as the arguments advanced by each in favour of the plan he advocates are well worthy of consideration.

45. In the determination of the question local conditions must be carefully considered. Its solution also depends largely on the decision come to regarding the persons to be entrusted with a vote. If a fairly large and independent constituency were provided, I should prefer Mr. Dyson's plan (which indeed is based on the assumption that all pattidárs should vote); but with the small body of electors

whom I would in the first instance create, I think it will be advisable for the present to adopt *scrutin de liste* in all the districts of the division.

46. *Term of office.—Conduct of election.*—There might be a general election once in (say) three years. When this is about to occur, or a seat is vacant, due notice should be given of the number of vacancies, and candidates should be invited to come forward and register their names before a fixed date; after that date a list of the candidates should be furnished to every elector (of these there would of course be registers) with a brief notice informing him of the number of vacancies to be filled, and requiring him, before a date to be indicated in the notice, to signify in writing (to be handed personally to the tahsíldar or other returning officer) which of the candidates mentioned in the lists he nominates to fill the existing vacancies. These notices might for the most part be served through the patwaris.

47. *Special establishments and office accommodation for Committees and Boards.*—As regards special establishments, I have already expressed my opinion that there should be a paid secretary or assistant secretary, a man of respectability and education, with a salary of from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 per mensem. He would need one or two muharrirs or clerks.

48. If the connection of the tahsíldár with the tahsíl boards be severed, some establishment would be needed there; and it would, I think, be necessary for the board to provide itself with some sort of office accommodation: otherwise nothing would be needed.

49. At Sitapur the Government has granted the district committee an excellent meeting house: the Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, says some such place is much needed: the Deputy Commissioner of Kheri can give accommodation in his kutcherry.

50. There are many other details for which it would be necessary to provide, but it seems unnecessary to discuss these at the present stage.

EXTRACT, paras. 6 to 11, of Letter No. 1590, dated 5th August 1882, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kheri, to the Commissioner, Sitapur Division.

6. Area here is no guide to the number or character of population. For instance, in parganas Khairigarh and Palia the population is sparce, scattered, rustic, and purely agricultural.

7. Nor is the number of population a safe guide for the formation of an electoral circle. For instance, the inhabitants of pargana Khairigarh are almost exclusively the tenants of one estate: and this is more or less the characteristic of parganas Firozabad, Itwa Piparia, and Kukra.

8. All the evils existing in pocket boroughs would be conspicuous in circles made too minute. The illustration I have given shows that even a pargana, otherwise a convenient ready-made sub-division, will not answer for an electoral circle. And any smaller area, however arbitrarily formed, will not be free from similar defects. Their constituencies would not be independent. Power and not popularity would in such circles be the ground of a member's election. The talukdar-landlord of the whole or nearly the whole circle would, as in an election at Bute, be the only person attending the election meeting. He would take the chair, constitute the meeting, call over all the electors, answer to his own name, take the vote as to the *præses*, and elect himself; then move and second his own nomination, put the question to the vote, and be unanimously returned (*vide* page 139, Vol. I., Walpole's History of England).

9. In pargana Khairigarh there are one lambardar and 16 persons assessed to the license-tax. These two classes will comprise the main body of electors. The system of election would thus be reduced to an absurdity by having too small *arrondissements*. It would be impossible to find in them a qualified and an independent constituency. They would not return a thorough representation of the public interests.

10. In this district the non-agricultural population is insignificant as regards property and influence, but it is still desirable that it should be adequately represented. It would not have a smaller electoral circle than that already offered by a tahsíl. The area may be large, population considerable, but the number of qualified electors and representatives will still be few. To ensure a representation of every kind of public interest, and inspire a laudable spirit of competition among candidates for the representative board, a circle as large as that of a tahsíli would seem necessary.

11. The *scrutin de liste* applied in tahsíls, as electoral districts, is the best system I can think of for obtaining a thorough expression of the public will, and as also the most popular measure. It is undoubtedly desirable to have a system easy to work, and involving a minimum of inconvenience to electors. The tahsíli as the head-quarters of the sub-division of the district, and the source of official information, is visited constantly by all classes of people. And it is at the tahsíl they would prefer to record their votes.

EXTRACT of para. 21 of a Letter No. 2038, dated 7th August 1882, from the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur, to the Commissioner, Sitapur Division.

I HAVE already indicated my opinion that, for the present at least, election should be by what is termed *scrutin d'arrondissement*, and not *scrutin de liste*. The area of this district is over 2,000 square miles. By *scrutin de liste* five persons would be elected for 500 square miles, or say 25 miles by 20. Every elector would have the right of voting for each candidate, and it is certain that many would vote without any personal knowledge of several of the candidates. The Government of India itself remarks that members "who do attend have frequently no intimate acquaintance with the wants of outlying parts of the district." We are too apt to suppose that men who are known to us will be the elector's choice; and of a surety if the list of candidates is to be given out at the tahsíl, and the votes are to be registered in that building, the result would be as expected. But with smaller areas and polling carried on in four places at least, apart from the tahsíl, there would be far greater freedom and a far greater chance of our getting an expression of the true sentiments of the people.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. 2689, dated Sitapur, the 23rd August 1882.

From Major G. E. ERSKINE, Commissioner, Sitapur Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

WITH reference to paras. 4 and 5 of G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, para. 1 of G. O. No. 160, dated 29th June 1882, and para. 15, of my letter No. 2664, dated 19th instant, I have the honour to submit, for the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Commissioner, the following list prepared by the Deputy Commissioner in consultation with the district committee, of members of the various tahsíl boards proposed for the Sitapur district.

2. The first name on each tahsíl list indicates the gentleman who is likely to be elected chairman.

Sidhauli—
Rája Amir Hasan Khan.
Thakur Partab Rudr Singh.
Thakur Durga Bakhsh.
*Abbas Husain Khan, of Balapur.
*Babu Sitaram of Ajepur, &c.

Biswan—
Seth Raghubar Dyal.
Rája Maneshar Bakhsh Singh.
Sitaram Mehra.
*Chaudhri Muhammad Baksh.
*Thakur Hardeo Baksh.

Misrikh—
Rája Shamsher Bahadur.
Mirza Muhammad Ali Beg.
Maulvi Mazhar Ali.
*Chandika Baksh.
*Basti Singh.

Sitapur—
*Babu Baldeo Parshad, pleader.
Thakur Lalta Parshad.
Revd. J. E. Scott.
*Thakur Jawahir Singh.
*Munshi Niaz Ahmad.

3. The persons against whose names an asterisk is placed are not at present members of the district committee, but the Deputy Commissioner recommends their appointment by Government, and I support his nominations.

4. You will observe that one of the new members proposed for the Sitapur tahsíl is Thakur Jawahir Singh of Baissaidih. He is a clever, shrewd man, but I have already dissented from a proposal to let him be on the district committee, with reference to his having suffered rigorous imprisonment for a serious offence, and to his being excluded from the Lieutenant-Governor's darbar. I should still object, but that the Deputy Commissioner assures me that the man was spontaneously recommended by the members of the district committee; and if they have confidence in him, there seems no great reason for overruling them. There is no doubt of Jawahir Singh's ability and shrewdness, and I am aware that both Colonel MacAndrew and Mr. Anderson were inclined to take a lenient view of his conduct in the case in which he was convicted.

5. If His Honour decides that Jawahir Singh should not be appointed, I recommend, with the Deputy Commissioner's concurrence, that for his name be substituted that of Chaudhri Ram Narayan of Mobarikpur.

No. 2960, dated Sitapur, the 23rd August 1882.

From Major G. E. ERSKINE, Commissioner, Sitapur Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

WITH reference to para. 15 of my letter No. 2664, dated 19th instant, I have the honour to report that the Deputy Commissioner of Sitapur now proposes that the number of non-official members for the Sidhauli tahsíl board be five instead of six. This will secure the equal representation for each tahsíl which I thought should be provided.

2. I take this opportunity of noticing one matter to which I omitted to refer. When tahsíl boards have been properly established, I think half-yearly, or at most quarterly, *ordinary* meetings of the district committee will suffice: extraordinary meetings can always be convened as occasion requires. The tahsíl boards might meet ordinarily once a month.

No. 2298, dated Fyzabad, the 17th August 1882.

From J. QUINN, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division, to OFFCIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

WITH reference to G. O. No. 145, dated 21st June last, I have the honour to submit the reports * of the Deputy Commissioners of this division, and to remark as follows.

* No. 1463, dated 17th July 1882, from Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich.
No. 2160, dated 17th July 1882, from Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad.
No. 30, dated 15th August 1882, from Deputy Commissioner, Gonda.

2. In carrying out their scheme of provincial decentralization, the Government of India made over to the Local Governments special branches of revenue, in the expectation that these branches of revenue would, by more careful administration, be largely developed. This expectation has been most amply verified. An identical course cannot be followed in district decentralization. It is however at least as important to give local committees an adequate inducement to administer economically the services entrusted to them.

3. The scheme recently introduced in these provinces fails, I think, in this respect. For all practical purposes the sums of money placed at the disposal of local committees, for expenditure under Education, Medical, and Public Works, are unaffected by the amount realised in the district from local rates and cesses. The financial position of each district has no doubt been ascertained; but after deducting from gross assets the sums needed for provincial purposes, the balance in almost every instance falls short of the normal district expenditure on the three above-named services. This deficit is made good by a special grant to Public Works from the general funds at the disposal of Government.

4. There is another aspect of the case. The Government of India has rightly held that the preponderance of the official element in local committees has been injurious to the growth of self-government. Elective systems have been tried, but have necessarily failed, because no one cared to be elected, and no one cared who was elected. Now it is no doubt possible that the natives of India

are not capable of efficient self-government. It has, however, been determined to try the experiment. We should therefore look to England and the other few countries in which self-government has succeeded, in order to discover the vital principle. I do not think it is to be found in the absence of official control. That principle I believe to be that the community, through its elective representatives, taxes itself for certain specified purposes, and controls the expenditure of the money so collected.

5. What is needed to place local self-government on this footing is that the sum hitherto realised from local rates and cesses should henceforth be levied under a Provincial and Local Rates Act.

The provincial rate should be a fixed percentage on gross assets of land, and should represent provincial requirements for Railways, Direction, the Postal Department, &c. The local rate should be the surplus of existing rates after deducting the provincial rate, and should be entirely in the hands of the local committee.

6. In order to guard against any one of the three local services being starved for the benefit of the others, the Local Rates Act should provide a separate rate for each service. The rate specified in the Act should be a maximum rate. It should be in the power of local committees, when framing their budgets, to determine, within the maximum limit, what the rate should be for the year to which the budget related. Every committee-man and every elector would in this way be brought to feel that lavish expenditure meant heavy taxation, and that economical administration left their private purse the fuller.

7. No sanction of Government should be needed to local funds budgets, except say where allotment to any service varied 20 per cent. from that of the previous year or years. Government sanction, administrative or other, should only be needed in the case of projects for which a Government grant-in-aid was applied. I do not think that anything short of this will secure real self-government.

8. If the principle of self-taxation be admitted, it follows from the tax being a land-tax, that both members and electors must be strictly limited to the owners of land. The exclusion of the mercantile community is of the less consequence, as its members live for the most part in towns, take part in municipal government, and contribute to municipal taxes raised for pretty much the same purposes as the rural tax.

9. The qualification of electors and members is not a matter of first-class importance, and would probably vary in different districts. The right to vote might, perhaps, be limited to lambardars paying Rs. 100 jama, or with a rental of Rs. 200. The qualification for membership might be five times that for an elector.

10. It is most desirable that each tahsíl should be given complete independence as regards both taxation and expenditure. The smaller the administrative area, the more vividly can the people realise that they are taxed for their own benefit, and the better can they criticise expenditure. Where the area of administration is small, the committee members have a thorough local knowledge, can easily meet, and can easily arrange for the supervision of work.

11. There appears no reason why tahsíl administration should not be quite independent as regards Education and Medical. But there are, I think, serious difficulties as regards Public Works. The expenditure on roads, within the limits of each tahsíl, does not always fairly represent the proportion in which the tahsíl benefits by the total district expenditure. Very few roads lie within the limits of only one tahsíl, and it is not desirable that a liberal expenditure on one section of the road should be nullified by neglect in other sections. The District Engineer could not possibly serve five or six committees and attend their meetings. A district committee composed of representatives of the various tahsíl committees should frame the Public Works budget. They should assign to each tahsíl committee a sum for expenditure on third or fourth class roads, or other projects which the committee could undertake to complete without the aid of the District Engineer. They should appoint a standing committee at head-quarters to supervise the works left in the hands of the District Engineer, to receive the accounts of the local committees, &c. The District Engineer should be subordinate to the standing committee only. At first, at any rate, it would probably be desirable that the Deputy Commissioner or his nominee should be on this standing committee. In other respects I think it is most important that there should be no official members on the committees. The committees could always apply to the Deputy Commissioner for advice or assistance, and it would be his duty to carefully watch their administration, and bring to their notice—and if necessary to the notice of Government—all serious defects.

12. As regards Education, it is, I think, most important that Government should introduce a system of grants-in-aid to schools of every denomination, coming up to a certain standard. It is possible that the local rate will not be sufficient to meet the charges of the service for which it is levied. If this be the case, Government should, I think, allot to each district a permanent grant, being a fixed proportion of the revenue levied in it. Backward districts should be given special grants till brought up to the level of other districts.

13. To sum up, my proposals are:—

I.—That the committees should be empowered to tax those whom they represent, and to expend the sums so levied on the several purposes of Public Works, Education, and Medical.

II.—That for this purpose an Act should be passed, to be called the Local Rates Act.

III.—That to encourage economy the committees should be empowered from year to year, within a maximum limit, to vary the rates levied for each of the above services.

IV.—That tahsíl committees should be independent as regards Medical and Education.

V.—That as regards Public Works, a general district committee should frame the budget, decide what works can be efficiently carried out by the several tahsíl committees, and allot them money accordingly.

VI.—That the general district committee should also appoint a standing committee at head-quarters to supervise all works not made over to tahsíl committees, and to receive and adjust all Public Works accounts.

VII.—That the District Engineer should be subordinate to the standing committee only.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

VIII.—That Government should, as regards the expenditure of funds placed at the disposal of committee (other than special grants), abandon the system of departmental and administrative sanction.

IX.—That sanction of Government should not be needed to local budgets.

X.—That the committees should be representatives of the tax-payers only, and should include no official members.

XI.—That the committees should be bound to submit yearly statements explanatory of expenditure.

XII.—That Government should also maintain a staff of Inspectors in all three departments.

XIII.—That Government should subsidise all schools coming up to prescribed standards.

14. These proposals, if adopted, would, I think, secure true self-government, *i.e.*, that the people should, through their chosen representatives, tax themselves for special purposes, and expend the money so levied free from undue control. Government would, at the same time, without direct interference, exert through the district authorities and through its departmental Inspectors a thorough supervision, and be kept informed of all that was being done.

15. I quite agree with the Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, in the following remarks :—"The requisitions of the Public Works and Educational Departments must be greatly relaxed, if not entirely abolished, and the officers of these departments be rigorously confined to the functions of inspection, audit, and report." "No local committee could possibly cope, if not supported and directed by official guidance, with the benevolent but numbing influences of those great departments." "The whole of the procedure must be simplified. Local committees cannot be expected to distinguish between allotment and appropriation, between administrative and departmental sanction, and so on. Were the present official direction abolished, and the present procedure maintained, the net result would be that the Civil Surgeon would administer all questions connected with dispensaries, the Deputy Inspector of Schools would reign supreme in matters educational, and the District Engineer would be monarch of all he surveyed) or did not survey) in the Public Works Department. The committee men would be nowhere."

16. As regards native opinion—most natives look on the proposed change with complete indifference, and some of the most intelligent consider failure inevitable. No doubt, if the scheme is to have a chance of success, there must be a complete change of system: the official crutch on which native members have so long leant, must be withdrawn if they are ever to learn to stand on their own legs. The district never can be administered by a committee assembled at head-quarters, for the simple reason that it would never assemble. Each committee must have its separate staff of clerks. The proceedings should be in the vernacular. It is not necessary that the tahsíli town should be invariably selected as the place of meeting of the tahsíli committee. Municipalities should not, in my opinion, be represented in local committees. Confusion would be the inevitable result.

No. 1463, dated Bahraich, the 17th July 1882.

From M. L. FERRAR, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Fyzabad Division.

SIR,

ADVERTING to your Circular No. $\frac{140}{1772}$, dated 27th ultimo, calling for a report on Government Order No. 145, dated 21st idem, I have the honour to state that previous to the receipt of your Circular I had already taken action on the Government Order.

2. I circulated translations of it and of the principal parts of India Resolution of 18th May to certain selected representative persons of the district, including the members nominated and elected here on 18th March to serve on the district committee, and I asked them to either attend at a meeting to be held here on 15th instant, or to favour me with their opinions in writing on the points raised by Government.

3. Accordingly the meeting took place on the date fixed, and I annex hereto copy of the proceedings (special) of the same.

4. You will gather from a perusal of them the general sense of the Bahraich community, which is briefly as follows :—

I.—The formation of an electoral body is perfectly easy, and in every way is acceptable to the people.

II.—There should be two local (rural) boards, *viz.*, at Nánpára and Kaisarganj. The central committee would do the work of the Bahraich tahsíl, the committee being slightly enlarged so as to include members having local knowledge.

III.—That, for the present at least, the Deputy Commissioner should remain president of the central committee.

IV.—That there should be a non-official vice-president, and the members were unanimous in nominating the Rája of Bhinga to the post. His character and qualifications are well known to Government, and the district will be fortunate should he accept the appointment.

V.—That Tahsíldárs must certainly remain members of the local boards and central committee.

VI.—That for Nánpára the Rája of Nánpára be nominated as president. He has acted as such for some years of the Nánpára municipal committee without friction of any sort, as Government knows. He is a full power Magistrate and well acquainted with office routine, &c., &c.

VII.—That for Kaisarganj the Tahsíldár be for the present the president; and Talukdár Shaikh Newazish Ali, Honorary Magistrate, be vice president.

VIII.—That the honorary titles should be for life and not merely while in office. Of course for any misconduct the title would be liable to be taken away.

IX.—That the local boards should have the powers described in the proceedings (annexure).

X.—That the local boards should meet in the towns of Nánpára and Kaisarganj, as being most central and convenient in every way. In Nánpára the committee can meet in the sarái room lately

used by the Munsif as a court; and that for the present, until the committee construct a board-room, the Kaisarganj committee sit in the tahsíl building there.

XI. That each local board should consist of 15 members, including officers of Government; and that the central board comprise 30, six of whom would be specially concerned with the Bahraich tahsíl arrangements.

XII.—That for each local board a clerk, knowing both English and Urdu, on Rs. 25 per mensem, is necessary, a daftri-chaprassi on Rs. 5 per mensem, and a chaukidár on Rs. 4 per mensem, with Rs. 2 per mensem, for country stationery, and Rs. 100 to provide the necessary furniture at starting.

XIII.—That for the present the existing head-quarters establishment should suffice for the central committee, with the addition of a chaprassi-daftri on Rs. 5 per mensem, a chaukidár on Rs. 4, and Rs. 100 for board-room furniture when the office is removed to the town Anjumán belonging to the Talukdárs.

5. I agree generally with the above proposals of the committee. I think with the members and with all other persons whom I have consulted, that in this district it will be absolutely necessary for the Deputy Commissioner to be, for the present at least, the president of the committee, to guide its counsels and direct its proceedings. He need not actively interfere with the ordinary work, and he need not in any case have a vote.

6. The Tahsíldárs must also remain as members. This is the universal wish of the people, as gathered through the representative gentlemen whom I have consulted: and in tahsíl Kaisarganj I think that for the present the Tahsíldár must be president, without a vote. There is no non-official person there with sufficient qualifications for the post at present. But I would not have the Tahsíldárs of Nánpára and Kaisarganj members of the central committee. They will have plenty to occupy their time without being continually obliged to come into the central committee.

7. An electoral body might be constituted for each tahsíl of the following classes of the community:—

All proprietors of land.
All sub-proprietors of land.
All muafidars and jagirdars.
All persons with any rights in the soil above that of tenants-at-will.
All persons whose names are in the village khewát.
All Government servants drawing a monthly pay of Rs. 10 and upwards.
All pensioners of Rs. 5 and upwards.
All thikadars of entire villages.
All tenants-at-will cultivating not less than Rs. 100 (*dehi*).
All persons paying license-tax.
All persons whose income amounts to Rs. 1,000 per annum and upwards.
All mukhtars, karindas, and servants of the above classes of persons drawing a regular pay of not less than Rs. 10 per mensem.
All *mukaddams* of villages, all *mahtons* and other headmen of castes, trades, &c.
All head thikadars and head *sangatwallahs.*
All pleaders and revenue agents.
All regular teachers of indigenous schools.
All persons practising the profession of physic or surgery.

8. I think this would constitute a fairly representative electoral body, sufficiently handy in point of numbers to deal with, and quite enough for election purposes. The elections should take place at each tahsíl. If less than one-fourth of the registered electors voted, then Government should appoint the members. Details of election can be settled again. No female and no male under 18 years of age to have a vote.

9. I think it is useless writing more on the subject. I trust that the above, read along with the minutes of the committee's proceedings, will suffice to show that the people here are willing to second the wishes of Government to the utmost of their power. I myself am of course willing to accept the office of President, and to do my best towards training the members and their Vice-President to do good work, and to exert themselves for the benefit of the community at large.

10. I have not suggested here the persons whom I would nominate to the boards. But I have lists of such persons drawn up in consultation with the committee and other respectable persons; and I think that if the new system is to be put in force at an early date, these lists might be accepted (c.f., para. 1, G.O. No. 160), and the details of the electoral scheme elaborated at our leisure.

11. Each board as well as the central committee will require a secretary. For the present Pandil Mewa Ram, Extra Assistant Commissioner, will continue to act as secretary to the committee, and I would have one of the tahsíl officials (to be selected after sanction shall have been given to the scheme) to act as secretary to each local board.

COPY of Proceedings of a Special Meeting of the Bahraich District Committee held on 15th July 1882, to discuss G. O. No. 145 and connected Papers.

PRESENT:

Mr. M. L. Ferrar, Deputy Commissioner in the Chair	
Tahsildar, Nánpára	Members.
Lala Har Parshad	
Tahsildar, Kaisarganj	
Tahsildar, Bahraich	
Sirdar Hira Singh	
Sayyid Sirdar Ali	
Thakur Fateh Muhammad	

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Naib Manager for Kunwar Harnam Singh	Members (*cont.*)
Lala Salik Ram	
Sayyid Muhammad Taki	
Wazir Khan Deokullia	
Saiyyd Zafar Mehndi	
Pandit Mewa Ram	
Extra Assistant Commissioner Munshi Janki Parshad	
Extra Assistant Commissioner Aziz-ud-din	Non-members.
Siri Prakas Singh (for Hindu Pat Singh)	
Head-master, High School	
Deputy Inspector of Schools	

Resolution No. XI.—After conversation and expression of opinions, the members are of opinion that the system of election can be applied without difficulty.

They are also of opinion that, for the present at least, the Deputy Commissioner should remain the president of the central committee.

And the members present are unanimous in nominating the Raja of Bhinga as vice-president of the central committee.

Read opinions given in writing by the Tahsíldár of Nánpára (Munshi Baha-ud-din), Hakim Muhammad Taki of Nànpàra, the Raja of Nánpára, Sirdar Hira Singh ; apologies from Raja of Bhinga and Shaikh Nawazish Ali for absence ; also of Lala Muttra Prasad for absence ; also of Sirdar Hira Singh, saying that he is willing to be a member of the central committee, but will not be able to attend more than the meetings of three months in the year, for that he has to be absent in the Punjáb for three months, and in Bhartpur, 70 miles from Bahraich, for three or four, &c. He nominates his Karindá, Sher Khan, as a member of the tahsíl committee.

The Raja of Bhinga's opinion is read, and put with the other ones in English.

Lala Har Parshad's written opinion is observed.

The general opinion of the above is this briefly :—

(*a*) Deputy Commissioner should be president of district committee :

(*b*) Tahsíldárs should be members of local boards :

(*c*) The honorary titles should be for life unless misconduct should occur, when of course the title should be taken away :

(*d*) Election can be done easily and should be put in force.

Tahsíldárs have submitted lists of names who would be likely members, and who would be agreeable to the people.

One of them, when he received the translation of the Government Orders, and heard that he was nominated as a member, said he could not understand any part of the Government Order, and begged to be excused.

In Kaisarganj the opinion of the committee is that the Tahsildár must be president, with a non-official vice-president, whom the committee think should be Shaikh Newazish Ali, Talukdár.

In Nánpára the Raja, who is a full power Magistrate, and has presided for some years in the municipal committee (with the Tahsíldár a member of it), should be president of the local board, the Tahsíldár being a member of it.

In Bahraich tahsíl there is no necessity for a local board. The central committee sitting there will manage the local work.

As to the powers to be given to local boards and the system of work, &c., &c., the committee is of opinion that the local boards should have power, without reference, to grant leave up to 15 days to officers of the various departments; and to fine up to a certain limited extent, to be fixed again, or say one month's pay ; to transfer teachers in the village schools ; and generally to exercise the powers now exercised by the Deputy Inspector of Schools and the Civil Surgeon in their respective departments.

In the Public Works Department the Local Boards shall have no power to spend money without the sanction of the district committee. Their duties will be to submit proposals to the central committee, to see that the work sanctioned is done properly and the money not wasted ; to report on its progress, &c.

As to board offices, &c., for the present the Nánpárá committee-room and office will be in the spare corner of the *saráí*, formerly occupied by the Munsif. In Kaisarganj there is no building but the Government tahsíl and the most convenient and central place in the tahsíl for the committee to meet in is Kaisarganj. In Bahraich the committee will have their board-room and offices in the talukdári building now occupied, but to be at once left, by the Tahsíldár.

For the present the following new establishments will be necessary :—

In Kánpárá and Kaisarganj a clerk, knowing both English and Urdu, on Rs. 25 per mensem, and a daftri-chaprasi on Rs. 5 and a chaukidár on Rs. 4 per mensem. Also some simple furniture for the board-rooms and offices, of which the expense would probably be not more than Rs. 100, and Rs. 2 for country stationary per mensem.

As to the extra expenses likely to be incurred at the sudder, it is resolved that the present establishment remain as it is. If the work increases, the establishment can be increased.

The committee think that each Local Board should consist of about 15 members, including officials ; and that the sudder committee should consist of about 30, including officials.

Resolution No. XII.—Adverting to para. 10 of Government Order No. 22, dated 31st March, the committee are unanimous in thinking that the repairs and maintenance of both third and fourth class roads be entrusted to the District Engineer. The committee will depute certain members from time to time to see that the work is being done, and to afford assistance, if necessary, to the District Engineer.

M. L. FERRAR, President.

PANDIT MEWA RAM, Secretary.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

No. 2160, dated the 17th July 1882.

From H. S. BOYS, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Fyzabad Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. $\frac{140}{1772}$, dated 27th June 1882, giving cover to Government Order No. 145, dated 21st June 1882, I have the honour to report as follows:—

2. Native opinion on the points raised in the Government letters has been invited in the freest manner. Meetings have been held at each tahsíl, which were largely attended, and the Anjumán Tehzib in Fyzabad has been requested to give its opinion. The members of the existing committee have also been consulted in committee held to-day.

3. The results are as follows:—Gentlemen (as named in list A.) have been nominated by their compeers and fellow-tahsíl residents to form the first tahsíl boards under the new system.

Gentlemen (as per list B.) residents of the several tahsíls, have been nominated to serve on the central committee; and it will be desirable of course that these gentlemen should also be members of their respective tahsíl boards, but this is not absolutely necessary.

4. As regards the relation between these tahsíl boards and the central board, it is the general opinion that the business of the tahsíl boards should mainly consist in supervising the working of the schools and dispensaries within their boundaries, calling to notice any laxity on the part of the educational or medical officials, receiving and enquiring into complaints, suggesting new sites for schools or hospitals, &c., &c., and in proposing new public works for the tahsíl. Financial questions, allotment of funds, &c., should be disposed of by the central committee, to which each tahsíl committee should send at least two members.

5. The central committee should consist of at least of 16 non-official members besides the official members, who with the Tahsíldárs will number 8.

It is the universal opinion that Tahsíldárs should not be members of the tahsíl boards, but that they should remain members of the central committee. There appears to be but little argument in favour of their retention in the central committee, when once the principle of non-interference on the part of district officials has been admitted; but it is clearly the wish of the Native members that the Tahsíldárs should not be ousted from the central committee, and I therefore record their wish.

All who have been consulted are of opinion that it is desirable that the chairman should be a non-official; and I concur that if this is desirable or feasible in any district, it is certainly so in this. I do not say that it will be a success, but certainly if the policy of the Government is to be carried out, the chairman of the Fyzabad district committee should be a non-official.

6. As regards offices and committee-rooms the following suggestions are made:—

Fyzabad. — A room should be added to the building now occupied by the District Engineer and Deputy Inspector of schools for the accommodation of the general local fund office. This building is a local fund building, is very conveniently situated near the committee-room in the municipal hall, and the arrangement will admit of all the local fund offices being brought under one roof.

Tánda.—There is at present no accommodation suitable for an office and committee-room. I suggest that a committee-room and office be built here. There is a large surplus in the Tánda municipal fund, and some money might be given from this fund to assist in erecting a suitable building, which might be used both for local fund and municipal purposes.

Akbarpur.—There is no accommodation, but the school-house might be used as a committee-room, and an office might be built adjoining.

Bikapur.—There is no accommodation, and both a committee-room and an office would have to be built.

7. For establishment it is considered by all necessary that there should be a muharrir and a chaprasi for each tahsíl board, and that the sudder establishment must be strengthened by an extra clerk on good pay. I am of opinion myself that a first rate clerk will be essential to prevent under the new system office matters getting into bad confusion.

8. There remains the question of the expediency of introducing the system of election of members of district and tahsíl boards in place of nomination.

All Natives with whom I have consulted are in favour of the elective system. Whether they thoroughly appreciate the difficulties or have duly weighed the advantages and disadvantages, I am unable to say. I have done my best to put before them the question in as impartial a manner as possible, avoiding any signs of my personal opinion.

The scheme proposed is as follows:—One spokesman shall be elected by the owners of each group of 100 houses in the tahsíl; the list of spokesmen to be prepared by the members of the tahsíl board, who in the first instance will be those gentlemen whose names are entered in list A. The votes of the individuals of the "hundreds" will be taken on the spot by the members. The list of "spokesmen" having been thus prepared, they will be called upon once a year to elect three or four members of the tahsíl boards, the same number retiring in rotation. If any spokesman dies, a successor must be appointed in the same way by his "hundred."

If any elective system is to be adopted, I think that this will cause as little friction as possible, and will interfere but little into the ordinary avocation of the people.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

LIST A.

Tahsíl Fyzabad.

(1)	Durga Sah, Mahájan - - -	Young man, resident of Dhimoa; knows Hindi; clever man; relation of Hannuman Sah.
(2)	Ali Ahmad, lambardár, Raunahi - -	Gentleman; age more than 65 years; father of Kazim Ali, late názir.
(3)	Pandit Debi Parshad, pensioner, Tahsíldár	Director of Kashmiri Trading Company, and is somewhat deaf.
(4)	Pandit Thakur Parshad - - -	Grain dealer of Sahibganj.
(5)	Kanhaiya Lal - - - -	Son of Pandit Kishan Lal, Extra Assistant Commissioner; knows some English, Persian, and Hindi.
(6)	Munshi Ishri Parshad, Vakil - -	Old inhabitant of the city; pleader and zamindar.
(7)	Bandey Ahmad, muafidar, Bhadausa -	This gentleman is not at present in the committee, but the people are much in his favour.
(8)	Lala Khurram Rae, Mukhtár, Kapurthala	Has mortgage on the taluka of Samrathpur of Rs. 28,000, and one village in Haveli Oudh. He is a trader also.
(9)	Zabar Singh, zamindár, Pakrila - -	Old sirdar; a clever man, and knows Hindi.
(10)	Umanda Singh, zamindar and mahajan -	Knows Hindi; age 65 years.

Tahsíl Akbarpur.

(1)	Chaudhri Muhammad Uskari -	Landlords.
(2)	Ran Bahadur Singh - -	
(3)	Rambharosa Singh - - -	
(4)	Harbakhsh Singh - - -	
	and	
(1)	Ram Kishan - - -	Mahajans.
(2)	Kanhaiya Lal, Marwári - -	
(3)	Mansa Ram, ditto -	

Tahsíl Bikapur.

(1)	Babu Inderdat Singh, Talukdár -	Landlords.
(2)	Thakur Ram Autar Singh, lambardar	
(3)	Muhammad Afzal Khan, ditto -	
(4)	Zahir-ud-din *alias* Ghulam Músa -	
	and	
(1)	Debi Din Tiwári - - -	Mahajans.
(2)	Lachman Pandit - -	
(3)	Lachman Bhát - - -	

Tahsíl Tánda.

(1)	Babu Sudhist Narayan Singh -	Landlords.
(2)	Babu Lachhman Parshad Singh -	
(3)	Babu Gaya Din Singh - -	
(4)	Muhammad Nasir-ud-din - -	
	and	
(1)	Durga Parshad - - -	Mahajans.
(2)	Nand Kishor - - -	
(3)	Kampta Parshad - - -	

LIST B.

Tahsíl Fyzabad.

Babu Gokal Chand, pleader and zamindár.
Lala Kannu Mal, mahájan.

Tahsíl Bikapur.

Mir Safdar Ali, zamindár.
Ram Autar Singh, zamindár.

Tahsíl Akbarpur.

Sath Parshad, mahájan and zamindár.
Muhammad Uskari, zamindár.

Tahsíl Tánda.

Ali Husain, zamindár.
Gaya Parshad, mahájan.
Lachman Parshad, zamindár and former kánúngo.

Dated 17th July 1882.

H. S. BOYS,
Deputy Commissioner.

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

Docket No. 30, dated the 15th August 1882.

From James White, Esquire, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, to Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division.

In reply to his No. 2280, dated the 12th instant, has the honour to submit the reports called for in Government Order No. 145, dated 12th June 1882 ; and states that the delay was entirely caused by the difficulty in eliciting the wishes of the people on the subject.

Dated Gonda, the 15th August 1882.

From James White, Esquire, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, to Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division.

His Docket No. $\frac{140}{1772}$, dated the 27th June 1882, Decentralisation—Formation of District Committees and Local Boards, &c.

Sir,

In obedience to the above I have the honour to state that I propounded the following questions for the consideration of the different public committees and of independent Native gentlemen in this district.

See letter of Government No. 145, dated 21st June 1882.

See letter of Government No. 160, dated 29th June 1882.

See Commissioner's No. $\frac{140}{1772}$, dated 27th June 1882, also *passim* Resolution of the Government of India No. $\frac{17}{747-67}$, dated 18th May 1882.

Question I.—Should the members of a local tahsíl board all be members of the central committee ?

Question II.—Is it possible to introduce the principle of election ? If so, in what way ?

Question III.—In what way should the work be distributed ?

Question IV. — Would the present members of the local committee sufficiently represent the inhabitants of each tahsíli area on a local board, or should additional members be appointed ? If so, how many, and what capable and trustworthy persons can be found to undertake the duty ?

Question V.—Should Tahsíldárs be *ex-officio* members of the local boards, or of the district committee, or of both ?

Question VI.—What should be the head-quarters of the local board in each tahsíl ?

I have the honour to abstract the following answer :—

Question I.—The present district committee, which may be considered as standing in the position of a "constituent assembly," was attended by five official and four non-official members. The Talukdárs, who are members of the committee, never attend its meetings. The committee resolved that the tahsíl boards should consist of from 12 to 15 members. About five of these should be selected to sit as members of the central district committee. These 12 or 15 members should be in addition to the 12 non-official members who have seats at present—seats rarely occupied, but apparently valued. The Anjumán-i-Rifah is of opinion that all the members of the local tahsíl boards should be members of the district board. The Municipality of Utraula is of opinion that some—not all—should be members of the central committee. The Balrámpur committee thinks the same. No replies have been received on this point from the Gonda or Nawábganj committees. Rája Kishan Dat Ram thinks that all the members of the local tahsíl board should be members of the central committee, and Munshi Mathura Prasad agrees with him. But Babu Ram Mohan and Mir Muhammad Husain and the late Dewan Ram Shankar Lal were of the contrary opinion. Certain Talúkdárs have been asked for their opinions, but no answers have been sent in. They apparently take no interest whatever in the matter.

Question II.—The present district committee is of opinion that the principle of election should be introduced ; that no particular rules should be framed, but that in the first place Government officials of rank should assemble the notables of each pargana, and ascertain who among them may be nominated as representatives of the rest. The Anjumán-i-Rifah is of opinion that it is not advisable to introduce the system of election at present, but that members should be appointed by the Deputy Commissioner. On the contrary, the Utraula municipal committee is of opinion that the introduction of the elective system is possible and desirable ; and that the electors should be residents of the pargana, be worth at least Rs. 500, and that the candidates who get a majority of votes should be elected. No report from Gonda or Nawábganj municipal committees. Raja Kishan Dat Ram, the only Talukdár who has expressed any opinion at all, thinks that election is feasible, but gives no detailed suggestions. The Balrampur municipal committee report exactly to the same effect. The late Dewan Ram Shankar utterly refused to believe in the practicability of any such scheme. Both Babu Ram Mohan and Munshi Mathura Prasad practically agreed with him. Pandit Bishwa Nath recommended that each municipality shonld be duly represented on the district committee, and this proposal deserves consideration. If the municipalities are to pay a proportional share of the cost of schools and dispensaries within municipal limits, and the district committee to pay the rest and to administer the institutions in question, it is obvious that each municipality should be represented on the district board. I have already submitted detailed proposals on this subject in my No. 1375, dated 15th June 1882.

Question III.—The district committee is unable to answer this question.

The Anjumán-i-Rifah would divide the work into three branches, *viz.*, Educational, Medical, and Public Works ; and would place three members of each local board in charge of each one of these departments ; similarly, five members of the central committee would take over the special supervision of each branch of the work. No other proposals at all practical have been received, nor do I myself consider it possible to define beforehand what responsibilities and duties could be safely devolved on the local tahsíl boards. The central committee would have to proceed tentatively, giving its confidence freely where such confidence appeared to be merited. It is obvious that if any real administrative power is to be

relinquished by the central committee, the requisitions of the Public Works and Educational Departments must be greatly relaxed, if not entirely abolished, and the officers of those departments be rigorously confined to the functions of inspection, audit and report. No local committee could possibly cope, if not supported and directed by official guidance, with the benevolent but numbing influences of those great departments. The whole of the procedure must be simplified. Local committees cannot be expected to distinguish between allotment and appropriation, between administrative and departmental sanction, and so on. Were the present official direction abolished, and the present procedure maintained, the net result would be that the Civil Surgeon would administer all questions connected with dispensaries, the Deputy Inspector of Schools would reign supreme in matters educational, and the District Engineer would be monarch of all he surveyed (or did not survey) in the Public Works Department. The committeemen would be nowhere.

Questions IV. and V.—The present district committee thinks that the Tahsíldár should be *ex-officio* member of the tahsíl board, and the Deputy Commissioner member of the central committee ; and that both these bodies should elect their chairmen from time to time. The *Anjumán* thinks that the tahsíl boards should consist of at least nine members each, and the sub-divisional officers should point out those persons who are most fitted for nomination. Tahsíldárs should be *ex-officio* members of both the local board and the central committee. The Utraula municipality claims for the Utraula tahsíl at least six seats on the central committee, and thinks that the Tahsíldár should be *ex-officio* member of both local board and central committee. The Balrampur municipal committee thinks that the Tahsíldárs should be *ex-officio* members of both local boards and district committee. No report from Gonda or Nawabganj committees. Raja Kishan Dat Ram, Munshi Mathura Prasad, the late Dewan Ram Shankar, and Mir Muhammad Husain (of Balrampur), Babu Ram Mohan, Pandit Bishwa Nath, all agree in thinking that the Tahsíldár should be *ex-officio* member of both local board and central committee. There is a general consensus of opinion on this point. I may add that the present rule, which excludes Officiating Tahsíldárs, is illogical and inconvenient. If Tahsíldárs sit *ex-officio*, and are fit to officiate as Tahsíldárs, they are certainly fit to be members of committee.

Question VI.—The present district committee has not answered this question. The *Anjumán* proposes Gonda, Nawabgánj, and Utraula. The Utraula municipality recommends Utraula. The above proposal is obviously the only feasible one, and should be approved. The only doubt that can exist is whether Tarabganj or Begamganj should not be selected instead of Nawabganj, the latter place being quite at one end of the tahsíl and not at all central.

I have the honor to attach to this report the original replies I have received to the questions asked. I would draw your attention to the memo. of Munshi Gulab Rae, the munsarim of my court, which appears to me to be the best essay on the subject.

The net result of these answers is—

(1) That no system of election should at present be introduced, but should be left for the future.

(2) That the present committee should be maintained and its members increased by the deputation of two or three members from each local tahsíl board to each general meeting.

(3) That the Deputy Commissioner should continue to be president of the central committee, and that the Tahsíldárs should be *ex-officio* members of the local boards in their tahsíls.

(4) That in each tahsíl there should be a local board composed of representative men from each pargana to be nominated by the District Officer ; and that to these local boards the central committee should delegate such administrative and executive powers as might be found feasible. Two or three representatives for each pargana should be appointed to the local board, and this board would then elect its own chairman and delegate a certain proportion of its members to each general meeting of the central committee. It will probably be found necessary to grant travelling allowances to such delegates.

I am unable to proceed further with the matter until the orders of Government have been issued on the general principles which have been recognised here with almost no dissentient voice.

It is very desirable that the question should be settled at as early a date as possible. The present non-official members of the committee may be classified as follows:—

Six representatives of the Talukdár interest.
Two in service of Talukdárs (one since dead).
One Government Pensioner.
Two zamindárs and bankers.
One American Missionary.

No. 1339, dated Rae Bareli, the 12th August 1882.

From Major FENDALL CURRIE, Officiating Commissioner, Rae Bareili Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

AFTER consultation with the Deputy Commissioners of the districts of this division I have the honor to submit my opinion on the points discussed in Secretary to Government's letters Nos. 145, dated 21st June, and 160, dated 29th idem.

2. The Deputy Commissioners have consulted their district committees, their Assistants, Native Extra Assistant Commissioners, Tahsíldárs, and some of the leading Talúkdárs, vakíls, and revenue agents; and in Pantabgarh, Captain Chapman, Talúkdár of Shahpur, was good enough to furnish the Deputy Commissioner with a note stating his views on the subject.

3. For the sake of easy reference, I submit in a tabular form an epitome of the Deputy Commissioners' opinions on the points referred for discussion.

4. The letters under reply deal with the following points:—

I.—(*a*) Should the local tahsíli boards act independently in immediate communication with the officers of Government? or (*b*) should the local boards be separate under the general supervision of the district board? or (*c*) should the district board include members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to District Boards—*continued.*

be ordinarily delegated the local work in their circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board.

II.—The number of resident members of committee that might be able and willing to serve on the local board of each tahsíl.

III.—The system under which the local board would manage their business and correspond with the central board.

IV.—Can early steps be taken in the direction indicated by paras. 13 to 15 of Government Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$?

V.—Is it possible to make any speedy arrangements for placing the committee under a non-official chairman?

VI.—Is it practicable and in accordance with the general wishes of the community that Tahsíldárs should cease to be members of the central and tahsíl boards?

VII.—What separate establishments will be required in connection with tahsíl boards?

VIII.—Can premises be found for offices and committee-rooms of the different boards separate from the rooms that are at present utilised as public offices?

5. *Question I.*—For the sake of convenience, I will deal with the several points in the order in which they occur in your No. 145, dated 21st June last.

The Deputy Commissioners of Rae Bareli and Partabgarh are of opinion that the third plan suggested in para. 3 of your No. 145, dated 21st June, is the most feasible. The Sultanpur committee, which discussed the Government Resolution under the presidency of Kazi Hashim Ali, and in the absence of official members, inclined to the second course, *viz.*, that local tahsíli boards should be separate boards under the general supervision of a district board. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Harington, is of opinion that this view is a correct and sound one; but adds that if the third course is considered preferable, there will be no difficulty in making the members of tahsíli boards members of the district board. I think that at first, and until the system has been worked for some time and becomes understood, the district board should be responsible for the local administration of the district, and should have in its hands general direction and control over the ancillary committees. I agree with the Deputy Commissioners of Rae Bareli and Partabgarh that the third plan is the most practicable, being the simplest and most easily developed out of the existing state of things.

There should be one board for the whole district, comprised as far as possible of an equal number of representative members from each tahsíl. The district committee should at the first meeting in each year resolve itself into sub-committees for each tahsíl, comprised of members resident in the respective tahsíls, bound to carry out all matters collectively approved of by the district committee.

Each sub-committee should elect its own president and secretary. The sub-committee should hold monthly meetings, submitting a report of its proceedings to the president of the district committee. The president of the district committee should have power to sanction expenditure up to say Rs. 200 for any single work, to correct slight irregularities, and to call a special general meeting of the district committee at any time should any matter worthy of their collective consideration arise. The district committee should meet regularly once a quarter for the disposal of business.

As regards the relation between the central and local boards, or, in other words, the district and sub-committees, the plan of entrusting "Education," "Sanitation," "Medical Charity," and "Public Works" to the special care of non-official members of the district committee, did not commend itself to the Native gentlemen consulted; but I can see no objection to the adoption of this arrangement of separate portfolios by the official members of the district committee. Until the system of local self-government has had time to develop itself, one of the official members of the district committee should be specially charged with one or more portfolios and have associated with him one or more non-official members, who should be consulted in this branch of the administration, so that the latter might understand the procedure followed, and qualify for the charge of a portfolio himself in time. I see no better way by which "unity of action can be maintained and a uniform policy secured."

6. *Question II.*—The Deputy Commissioners have given the names of several gentlemen as resident members of committees who might be able to serve on local boards, but they do not appear to have taken sufficient pains to ascertain whether these gentlemen are willing to serve or not. I purpose addressing Deputy Commissioners further on this point.

7. *Question III.*—None of the Deputy Commissioners appear to have given this matter the full consideration it deserves. Mr. Markham was evidently in such bad health before he left, that he was unable to make a tour of his division and consult personally with his Deputy Commissioners and the leading Native gentlemen of each district. In submitting the present report, I regret that I labour under the disadvantage of having only taken over charge within the past week; and as this report must be submitted before the 15th instant, I have had no opportunity of personally consulting the Deputy Commissioners or making any local enquiry myself. I am therefore unable to submit at once the detailed proposals called for.

The tahsíli sub-committee should, I think, consist of not less than five non-official members; with less than five non-official members it would be almost impossible to get a quorum, for what with *pujas*, bathing days, &c., it would, as Deputy Commissioner of Rae Bareli remarks, "be too sanguine to calculate on a larger attendance than two or three members at a time."

Each district committee should frame rules on the following points:—

(1) Time and place of meeting of district and tahsíl committees:
(2) The conduct of business:
(3) The division of duties among members:
(4) Salaries, appointments, suspensions, and removal of officers and servants of the committee, and other smaller matters.

8. *Question IV.*—An epitome of the Deputy Commissioner's opinions is given in the statement annexed. All parties, Native gentlemen, non-officials, Europeans, and the officials consulted, are unanimously of opinion that at present the election of members to the district or tahsíl committees is impracticable. I am afraid that the idea of an elective system, as regards district and tahsíl committees,

is not feasible, and that any system of suffrage would be quite unworkable at present and for a long time to come. Even if representatives were forthcoming, they would have in the first instance to be nominated; but when we have got thus far, we are met with the apparently insurmountable difficulty of inducing a high caste member to sit at the same board with a low caste representative. I doubt if a Thakur or Brahmin Talukdár of this province could be found who would allow a Kurmi to seat himself in his presence, much less sit with him at the same board; and yet the Kurmis are by no means the lowest or most insignificant caste we have to deal with: and if representation is to be real and not a farce, all castes have a right to be represented. The difficulty to be surmounted is not only to ascertain how the people can be best got to manage their own local affairs intelligently, but to so change the feelings and sentiments of the masses that, setting aside all prejudices, they will unite together to act for the common weal.

9. Captain Chapman of Shahpur says :—" I feel certain no committee capable of working the districts in the way they should be worked, will be formed, and indeed in my opinion no such committees can be formed, until the principle is adopted of giving some payment in return for such service."

I think that there is some truth in this view, and that it is only by making representation honourable by titles such as "Sirdar" and "Khan Bahadur," &c., and by paying members sufficiently to make up for their time and labour, that we shall obtain fit candidates for membership. Honorary representation will, I am afraid, not only be found a failure, but may result in abuses and evils from which the system of non-representation is free.

10. *Question V.*—The native opinion on this point is unanimous.

In the districts of this division the proposal to have non-official presidents means practically the appointment of native presidents. On this point Captain Chapman, a non-official member, and one who has for many years lived amongst the Natives, says :—" I am aware some object to the Collector being in any active way associated with this work. I consider it impossible to at once cut away the principal centre from which all has been worked for the last hundred years. In fact, so strong do I feel upon this subject, and so certain am I that respectable natives share my feelings, that we should be extremely loath to act were the natural head of the district absent from our deliberations. After five or ten years this might be changed. The people must be gradually educated: any abrupt cutting adrift, as is here proposed, can by no possible means end in anything but disaster." The leading Talukdars in the Rae Bareli district told the Deputy Commissioner they would not serve if the Deputy Commissioner was not president. The reason is not far to seek. There is, I am afraid, too much natural jealousy among native gentlemen to allow one to hope that, setting aside all prejudices, all the memories of past feuds, all consideration of social superiority or inferiority, they would cordially combine, sinking every difference of caste and creed, to act under any one of themselves who might be elected president.

11. *Question VI.*—From the inquiries made by the Deputy Commissioners, and so far as in the last few days I have personally been able to ascertain from the native gentlemen I have met, it appears that it certainly would not be in accordance with the general wishes of the community that tahsíldárs should cease to be members of the central and tahsíl local boards. From my own experience I regretfully record that as a fact native gentlemen betray very little interest in local affairs of any sort or kind; and until they show some such interest, if the local administration is to be carried on at all, it is imperatively necessary to make a certainty of having on the tahsíl committee one member capable of transacting business in a businesslike way. It is only too true that the "task of administration is yearly becoming more onerous," and "that the annual reports tell of an ever increasing burden laid upon the shoulders of local officers;" and I for one as a District Officer would be only too glad to accept loyally and carry out fully any policy that would induce the people of the country to undertake a portion of this burden, if only some really practical way can be found for the achievement of this end.

12. *Question VII.*—Until Deputy Commissioners have gone more fully into the question of the system under which the local boards would manage their business and correspond with the central board, it is impossible to give any definite answer to this question. I am unable to keep back this report until I have further consulted Deputy Commissioners on this point, but I purpose calling for detailed proposals on the matter alluded to in para. 4 of your No. 145, dated 21st June last; and if it is considered necessary, will report the result of any inquiries hereafter.

13. *Question VIII.*—With the exception of some nazúl buildings in the sudder station at Rae Bareli, Deputy Commissioners report that there are no buildings or premises which could be appropriated for the purpose of the local boards' committee-rooms and offices. In the out-tahsíls the tahsíli, and at the sudder a room in the Deputy Commissioner's kutchery, might be used until such time as local boards built offices for themselves.

14. I must apologise for this report not being so full as I could have wished. My excuse is that I am labouring under the disadvantages of having only joined the division within the last few days, and of having to submit this report without having had any opportunity of locally consulting the Deputy Commissioners and the several district committees.

ACCOMPANIMENT OF COMMISSIONER'S No. 1339, dated 12th August 1882.

Vide G. O.'s No. 1 5, dated 21st June, 1882, and No. 160, dated 29th June, 1882.	DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS' ANSWERS.		
	Rae Bareli.	Sultanpur.	Partabgarh.
I.—(*a*) Should the local tahsíli boards act independently in immediate communication with the officers of Government? or (*b*) should the local boards be separate under the general supervision of the district board? or (*c*) should the district board include members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would be ordinarily delegated the local work in their circle, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district board?	I.—I would have one board for the whole district. It should be comprised of representative members from each tahsíl. These members should meet monthly for the transaction of business within their own local area at tahsíl, forwarding minutes of their proceedings to district president. There should be a general meeting at head-quarters every three months.	I.—The Sultanpur district committee incline to the second course, *viz.*, separate tahsíl boards under the general supervision of the district board, and Deputy Commissioner is of opinion that the committee's view is a correct one; at the same time he says if the third plan is considered preferable, it will be easy to make the members of the tahsíli boards members of the district committee. The tahsíli committee should meet monthly: the district committee quarterly.	I.—The Partabgarh committee was unanimously of opinion that the object of Government would best be attained by the central committee, including members resident within the tahsíl area, to whom would be delegated the local work, and who would meet periodically at head-quarters as members of the district committee.
II.—The number of resident members of committee that might be able and willing to serve on the local board of each tahsíl.	II.—*Tahsíl Rae Bareli, non-official.*—Sirdar Autar Singh, Thakur Bishnath Bakhsh, Mr. G. Roberts, Lala Parbhudyal, Namdar Khan, Fida Husain, Khudawand Khan. *Tahsíl Dalmau, non-official.*—Rana Sankar Bakhsh. *Tahsíl Digbijaiganj.*—Raja Jagmohan Singh. *Tahsíl Salone.*—Mr. G. P. Gartland, Shaikh Abdul Ghaffur. These gentlemen are able enough, but their willingness to serve depends entirely on who will be president. The Talukdárs decline to serve on any district committee unless Deputy Commisioner is president. They would, however, act locally as members of the general committee, the Tashíldárs being vice-presidents of the said local committees. As the present list does not contain sufficient names to form working boards in local areas, the Deputy Commissioner gives the following names from whom members might be chosen:— *Rae Bareli.*—Babu Ishri Parshad, Lala Ram Sewak, Maulvi Ulli-ullah. *Salone.*—Rae Harchand Singh, Babu Madho Singh, Munshi Raj Bahadur, Mir Mazhar Hussain, Sayid Ali Husain, Mir Usuf Husain, Rae Sudhist Narayan Singh, Rae Chauharja Bakhsh, Durga Bakhsh Singh, Bankey Behari Lal, Maulvi Abul Basit. *Tahsíl Digbijaiganj.*—Raja Bisheshar Bakhsh, Sukramad Sarbarakar, Thakur Jang Bahadur, Thakur Bakhtawar Singh, Mir Ahmad Jan, Muhammad Husain, Hyat Ali, Pandit Jagraj Parshad Shaikh Ilahi Bakhsh, Gurdin Tirbedi. *Tahsíl Dalmau.*—Thakurs Shankar Bakhsh, Jagmohan Singh, Maharaj Bakhsh, Taj-ud-din Husain, Thakur Ajudhiya Bakhsh, Hakim Muhammad Ali, Binda Parshad, Pandit Sheodat, Pandit Ramdat, Himmat Bahadur, Janki Parshad, Thakur Rudrpal Singh, Lala Sheo Sahai. All these men are in a measure fit to be members of the local committee and have local interests.	II.—*Sultanpur.*—List of members of tahsíli boards as proposed by native members of the committee:— *Tahsíl Sultanpur, district committee members.*—Raja Muhammad Ali Khan, Babu Bishnath Bakhsh, Lala Parsotam Das. *Tahsíl committee members.*—Saiyid Altaf Husain, Saiyid Wahid Ali, Saiyid Muhammad Razza. *Tahsíl Musafirkhana, district committee members.*—Babu Jagnath Bakhsh, Pandit Mahesh Sheoparshad, Ewaz Ali. *Tahsíl committee members.*—Saiyid Muhammad Ali, Lala Madan Gopal, Babu Ashraf Ali, Shaikh Lutf Ali, Thakur Pirthipal Singh. *Tahsíl Kadipur, district committee.*—Raja Rudr Partab Sah, Babu Lalu Sah, Babu Chadres Singh, Pandit Suraj Narayan. *Tahsíl members.*—Babu Bikramajit Singh, Karam Husain, Mir Irshad Ali. *Tahsíl Amethi, district members.*—Kazi Hashim Ali, Babu Bindeshri Bakhsh. *Tahsíl committee.*—Babu Ganga Bakhsh Singh, Pandit Kanhaiya Lal, Shaikh Karam Ali, Thakur Daswant Singh.	II.—*Tahsíl Partabgarh.*—Raja Ajit Singh, Bisheswardyal Shukal, Pandit Kishen Lal, Babu Bajrang Bahadur, Hakim Ghulam Ali. *Tahsíl Kunda.*—Lal Chittarpal Singh, Captain F. Chapman, Pandit Ram Ratan, Babu Mahesh Bakhsh. *Tahsíl Patti.*—Rae Madho Parshad, Rudr Partab Singh, Raghbar Singh. As this list does not contain sufficient names to form local boards, the following names are submitted by Deputy Commissioner:— *Tahsíl Partabgarh.*—Pandit Audh Behari, Asufah Khan, Ran Bahadur, Surajpal Singh, Srinath Shukal, Ganpat Singh, Sarapdawn Singh, Babu Hardat Singh. *Tahsíl Kunda.*—Babu Sheodarshan Singh, Ghulab Singh, Ahmad Husain Khan, Muhammad Ismail Khan, Sitla Bakhsh, Saiyid Abdul Husain. *Tahsíl Patti.*—Bindeshri Bankhsh, Sheobalak Lal, Gajadhar Singh, Jagmohan Singh, Mahesh Narayan. The Deputy Commissioner adds—"I regret not being in a position to state positively the feelings of the inhabitants of the territorial area in respect to the additional members proposed, as also to those already serving on the district board; but I believe they are a fairly representative board."

III.—The system under which the local board would manage their business and correspond with the central board.	III.—General broad lines of business should be laid down by the committee for all local boards. These should hold their meetings monthly, sending in their minutes to the president. They should also forward all expenditure passed by them, and the president should be authorised to sign cheques for all such expenditure; and at the quarterly meeting of the sudder all these papers should be produced and commented upon.	III.—For the adjustment of accounts it is suggested that they be sanctioned monthly by the tahsíl committees, and payments made under the signature of the president of the district committee at the next meeting, of which the vouchers should be produced. All English papers should be translated in vernacular and sent to each member not less than ten days before the committee assemble, so as to allow full opportunity for discussion. An English clerk on Rs. 25 per mensem be appointed at the sudder, and one on Rs. 15 each at each tahsíl.	III.—(*a*) The method suggested in concluding portion of the 3rd para. of letter No. 145, dated 21st June, be adopted where possible. (*b*) The local tahsíli boards meet once a month, submitting copy of proceedings to central board. (*c*) All correspondence pass through president, who will distribute it among members having charge of the several departments. (*d*) A tahsíl official has his salary supplemented by Rs. 5 per mensem to make copies of minutes, correspondence, &c. (*e*) No work be undertaken without sanction of central board, or, in urgent cases, of the president, pending sanction of the central committee. (*f*) When tahsíl buildings not available for committee meetings, the school-room at the tahsíl be utilised for this purpose.
IV.—Can early steps be taken in the direction indicated by paras. 13 to 15 of Government Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747}$?	IV.—Deputy Commissioner says:—I have spoken to the leading men in the district about the elective system. They don't quite understand it, and they certainly don't like it. They say what guarantee have we that some low caste man may not be elected, with whom we would not sit in committee. The general opinion is that representative men should be selected by Deputy Commissioner. Deputy Commissioner suggests nomination by the present members of the committee, and by the District Officers final selection for membership to the zamindárs, lambardárs, and license-tax assessees.	IV.—Election of members at present impossible; and that until system of self-government is established on a sound footing and brought into thorough working order, the services of Deputy Commissioner and Tahsildárs cannot be dispensed with. The native members were unanimously of opinion that the time had not arrived for any general system of election.	IV.—The committee was of opinion that the system of election was impracticable, as voters would not come forward, and there would be no candidates for votes.
V.—Is it possible to make any speedy arrangements for placing the committee under a non-official chairman?	V.—Deputy Commissioner says:—Every native gentleman I have consulted is dead against any chairman other than District Officer. In fact, the leading Talukdárs have openly said to me they would resign if Deputy Commissioner were not president. Considering their prejudices and jealousies, the feeling is not hard to understand: again, they all say they know nothing of budget accounts and the way we work; and if left to themselves, anticipate a very early and general collapse.	V.—The native members are particularly forcible in the expression of their opinion that they could not as yet dispense with an officer of Government as chairman.	V.—The committee held that without a Government official at the head of the board business could not proceed: that Deputy Commissioner retain the post of chairman of district committee, and Tahsíldár that of local committee.
VI.—Is it practicable and in accordance with the general wishes of the community that Tahsildárs should cease to be members of the central and tahsíl board?	VI.—The general desire is that the Tahsíldárs should be members of local boards, and as such of central boards. Every one says that it is essential that some official acquainted with our ways of working should be retained as monitor and guide. In fact, without the Tahsíldár as head of the local board, the members would be sheep without a shepherd.	VI.—Deputy Commissioner, Sultanpur, says that the result of his consultation with the non-official members of his district committee is that it would not be practicable, or in accordance with the general wishes of the committee, to remove Tahsíldárs from the membership of central or local boards.	VI.—Deputy Commissioner, Partabgarh, writes the opinion of the members was opposed to the exclusion of Tahsíldárs. It was believed that members would not assemble unless Tahsíldárs were on the local boards; and, secondly, if they did assemble, it was questionable whether they could be got to transact any business.
VII.—What separate establishments will be required in connection with tahsíl boards?	VII.—At each tahsíl will be required one extra clerk, a man who could translate into English all proceedings, and be able to keep accounts.	VII.—One English clerk on Rs. 25 per mensem at sudder, and one on Rs. 15 per mensem at each tahsíl.	VII. That a tahsíl official have his salary supplemented by a grant of Rs. 5 per mensem.
VIII.—Can premises be found for offices and committee-rooms of the different boards separate from the rooms that are at present utilised as public offices?	VIII.—At the tahsíl I know of no premises that could be acquired for business purposes. At the sudder in this district there are some nazúl buildings which might be utilised, but I do not see the necessity of this. The local boards, meeting once a month, could easily transact all their business in the Tahsíldar's office, and the general meeting could be held as now in the Deputy Commissioner's kutcherry.	VIII.—No building except Government buildings are available at any of the tahsíls.	VIII.—No buildings except Government buildings are available at any of the tahsíls.

REPLIES OF DISTRICT OFFICERS N.-W. PROVINCES AND OUDH AS TO MUNICIPAL BOARDS.

No. $\frac{47C.}{XXIII.}$, dated Mussoorie, the 14th August 1882.

From E. Colvin, Esquire, C.S., Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division, to Officiating Secretary to Government, N.-W. P. and Oudh.

Sir,

I have the honor to forward replies from all districts (except Saháranpur) to your No. 147, dated 21st June, 1882.

2. In all municipalities in these districts the system of election prevails. The privilege is, as a rule, not valued. In Khurja, where party feeling runs very high, nearly all the respectable inhabitants would like to see the privilege of election abolished.

3. The system of appointment by election has been in force for some years. I am afraid that the most that can be said is that it was formerly unpopular, and is now, as a rule, regarded with indifference.

4. Some of the Magistrates have given, and some have not, the rules and qualifications for elections and electors. However, I do not think it necessary to call for further returns, unless some scheme of election, which would be generally popular, can be devised. I think it would be a pity to disarrange the present system, with which people are growing accustomed.

5. I certainly read para. 3 of your letter to be consultative, but a direction to all committees to proceed to elect chairmen. All district officers and members of committees read it in the same light, and in every case, except Háthras, elected the Magistrate as President.

6. Dehra elected the Assistant Magistrate Vice-President. Mussoorie elected its present Vice-President. In Muzaffarnagar, one municipality elected a native Vice-President; two municipalities, apparently from religious jealousy, elected no Vice-President. The Meerut, Bulandshahr and Aligarh municipalities have elected non-official Vice-Chairmen.

7. When committees have so unanimously elected Magistrates, and this in the face of the expressed wishes of Government, I think, for the present at least, the decision must be accepted, and that the true policy is for the Magistrates to gradually throw more and more work on the committees and gradually to teach them to do their work without his assistance, except at special meeting.

No. $\frac{728G.}{XXIII.}$, dated Meerut, the 8th July 1882.

From F. N. Wright, Esquire, C. S., Officiating Magistrate of Meerut, to Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division.

Sir,

In reply to your Circular No. $\frac{11.}{XXIII.}$, dated 5th instant, I have the honor to report that the principle of election is in force in all the municipalities of this district, though I do not think it has been carried out to its full or legitimate extent. I had indeed already taken steps before the issue of the Government Resolution to give some reality to what had gradually (it seemed to me) become a dead-letter in the city of Meerut.

2. With regard to the 2nd para. of your letter under reply, I beg your instructions as to the position official members will hold on the committee, supposing a non-official to be elected chairman. If the principle of self-government is to be carried out in full, the entire absence of official members, *viz.*, the Magistrate of the district, the Senior Assistant Magistrate (or the Magistrate in charge of the city, according to existing rules) and the Tahsíldar from the committee would appear desirable. In this case, the Magistrate of the district and the Magistrate in charge of the city, would occupy a definite position of authority and be able to exercise a general superintendence similar to that at present existing, except that they would work through the committee, to whom the staff would be directly responsible, instead of, as is now practically the case, to the district authorities.

3. It would seem, in fact, necessary to define the district officer's responsibility more distinctly than has so far been done in the recent circulars and resolutions, not only to avoid a possible conflict of authority, but to protect the district officer from being held responsible for any unsatisfactory results that may follow on authority being placed completely in the hands of the committee.

4. The relation of the police to the municipal committee under the new régime urgently calls for some final orders: the municipality pays for the police, but all authority over it is, and will continue to be, exercised by the Magistrate of the district through the District Superintendent of Police.

Docket No. $\frac{632}{XXIII.-45.}$, dated Dehra Dún, the 12th July 1882.

From W. T. Church, Esquire, Superintendent, Dehra Dun, to Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division.

In reply to his Circular No. $\frac{11}{XIX.}$, dated 5th instant, begs to state that the elective system is in force in the two municipalities, Dehra and Mussoorie, of this district.

No. 33, dated Bulandshahr, the 17th July 1882.

From F. S. Growse, Esquire, C.I.E., Magistrate of Bulandshahr, to Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division.

Sir,

With reference to Government Nos. 147 and 162, dated respectively the 21st and 29th June, and in reply to your Circular No. $\frac{11}{XIX.}$, dated 5th instant, I have the honour to state as follows.

2. The system of election by popular vote already prevails in the four municipalities of this district, and lists are kept up of all such resident householders as possess the insignificant property qualification

which entitles them to the franchise. It can scarcely, however, be regarded as a success; the system is not really liked by the members of the committee, who would prefer direct nomination; while in three of the municipalities, the matter is one of complete indifference to the townspeople generally. The persons who were originally selected as the most fitting representatives of the community, having allowed themselves to be put forward as candidates, were duly returned, and they have been again re-elected year after year as their term of office expired, no one caring to oppose them.

3. In Khurja alone, owing to special circumstances, the annual election causes much unpleasant excitement. After the riot of 1876 among the members who were recommended to resign, was a Pathán possessed of much local influence, another Pathán was elected in his place, and between these two men, each of whom is backed by a faction of his own, the animosity that has sprung up is so violent that it would be dangerous to call any public meeting in the town which both would attend, for fear of a breach of the peace. The old member, whose retirement was not intended to have more than temporary effect, was re-elected last year. His rival, however, again offered himself as a candidate this April, on the occurrence of another vacancy, but again he failed.

4. On the day when the votes are taken the approaches to the Town Hall have to be guarded by a considerable body of police, to prevent a free fight among the Pathán, who are only too glad of an opportunity for gratifying their turbulent propensities. The whole thing is felt to be a nuisance and a scandal, and many of the most respectable inhabitants come into Bulandshahr, or go elsewhere, till it is all over, so that they may not be implicated in any disturbance. They have repeatedly asked me to represent the matter to Government with a view to the abolition of the elective system, and I have done so; though as the views of the Government of India are so strong the other way, I do not hold out to them any hope of their prayer being granted.

5. Possibly the ill-feeling that has been created will die out in course of time; but certainly in my opinion Khurja was one of the last places where it was politic to try the experiment of stimulating the masses by European nostrums. It had already in itself all the materials for a conflagration which the slightest spark might kindle; a large part of the population consists of needy, ignorant and fanatical Pathán, while the principal Muhammadan resident and Honorary Magistrate comes of a family of converted Hindus, who has no influence over them. The Hindus again are similarly divided; the wealth is all in the hands of a few firms, who belong to the small and unpopular sect of Saráogis, while the force of numbers is of course with the Vaishnavas. For a town afflicted with so much bad blood and so many feverish symptoms, a sedative would seem to be more required than an irritant.

6. Supposing the present system to be retained, the committees at Anupshahr, Bulandshahr and Sikandarabad, proposed no alteration in matters of detail; at Khurja it is wished that a definite rule should confirm the existing practice, that out of the six members three must be Muhammadans, two Vaishnavas and one a Saráogi. It is also thought better, and this is a new proposal, that these three classes of the community should vote only for their own representatives. Both these proposals I recommend for sanction.

7. All four committees express a desire that the Magistrate and Collector should remain their President, nor indeed do I see how any other arrangement is possible: for an English budget and report will, I presume, still have to be submitted, and English bills will continue to be made out and signed at head-quarters. The Vice-President, however, will take the chair at the ordinary monthly meeting, where the proceedings will be recorded in the vernacular by the Secretary (the Tahsíldar) in a book, which will simply be sent up to me for inspection and for the entry of any remarks I may wish to make. Unless some special reason renders my presence, desirable the only meetings I shall attend personally in the course of the year will be those in which the budget and annual report are taken into consideration. I shall, however, continue to direct the extensive series of local improvements now in progress.

8. The names of the several Vice-Presidents are as follows:—

Pandit Sri Gopal, for Bulandshahr.
Munshi Lachhman Sarup, for Sikandrabad.
Mulammad Abdul Rahman Khan, for Khurja.
Lala Durga Prasad, for Anupshahr.

In each case the members appear to me to have made a very judicious election, and I recommend that their choice be approved.

No. $\frac{765G}{XXIII}$, dated Meerut, the 22nd July 1882

From F. N. WRIGHT, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Meerut, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

IN continuation of my No. $\frac{728G}{XXIII}$, dated 8th instant, I have the honor to report that, in obedience to the orders contained in para. 2 of your No. $\frac{11}{—}$, dated 5th July 1882, I summoned a special meeting of the municipal committee of Meerut for the purpose of electing a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, having previously circulated to them translations of those paras. of the Government of India and North-Western Provinces' resolutions as were specially connected with the subject.

2. It appears that the members consulted much amongst themselves before the day fixed, and at the meeting itself passed the resolution of which the enclosed is a copy. I absented myself from the meeting in order that the deliberations might be as uninfluenced by the authority of an official as possible.

3. The resolution appoints me Chairman and Ahmad-ulla Khan Vice-Chairman for a year.

4. I cannot but think the arrangement is a good one. For, in the first place, this municipality has a code of rules which, with a few alterations to suit existing circumstances, are admirably adapted to encourage the growth of self-government. They have been, however, it would seem, a dead-letter for some years past. The whole authority, administrative and executive, being retained in the hands of the Magistrate, who worked through an Assistant Magistrate or the Tahsíldar.

5. The result is that the members of the committee have lost all interest in the proceedings and have met, not very regularly, only to register the Magistrate's opinions.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

6. I noticed an inclination to come forward and help on the part of the members, and was on the point of utilising them in every possible way, having already passed some orders in that direction, when the orders of Government came out.

7. Being particulary struck with the utter farce into which the election of members appeared to have degenerated, I called for the rules on the subject; and with much difficulty got out a draft manuscript set of rules, drawn up originally by Mr. Ward, and subsequently revised by Mr. Sladen, which appeared in reality to give members of the committee all the privileges of self-government. The official element being retained only as a directing and instructing influence.

8. These rules will be thoroughly overhauled and altered where necessary, to meet the existing state of things, and submitted for sanction in their revised form.

9. But the members of the committee having for so many years past degenerated into mere dummies, new arrangements for octroi collections, sanitation, and roads, &c., having grown up during the time, with the details of which they are not acquainted, I believe that the committee are right in electing me Chairman for at least a year, during which time it will be my duty to thoroughly instruct them in the duties they are now called upon to perform for themselves instead of having them done for them by the officials of the district free of cost and trouble.

10. Another point of some importance would appear to justify the committee's choice of the Magistrate as Chairman. The large contonment of Meerut is for the purposes of the collection of octroi included in the municipal boundaries; a large portion of the income of the cantonment fund being derived from a monthly contribution by the municipality out of the proceeds of the octroi; Colonel Plowden, Cantonment Magistrate, gave it as his opinion that "the change in the composition of the municipal committee will affect the joint working of the octroi, and he wishes to refer the papers with the committee's resolution for the orders of the military authorities, his position on the municipal committee being anomalous by the proposed change."

11 It would be a cause of much regret if by the action of the military authorities a system which is now working so profitably and easily should be upset.

12. This is not the place perhaps where I am called upon to express an opinion as to the probable working of the altered system. A public spirit may have still to be aroused and fostered, private jealousies may have to be softened down, and members taught that private interests must give way to the public good. A year's experience will enable me to speak with more authority on these points. I therefore solicit sanction to the arrangement proposed for one year. The proposals of the smaller municipalities will follow shortly. I find the members there still less inclined to take upon themselves the actual performance of the multifarious duties connected with the working of a muuicipality.

No. $\frac{765G.}{XXIII.}$, dated Meerut, the 22nd July 1882.

From F. N. WRIGHT, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Meerut, to COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

IN continuation of this office No. $\frac{728G}{XXIII.}$, dated 8th instant, reports regarding the election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman for the Meerut municipality.

PROCEEDINGS of a Special Meeting of the Meerut Municipal Committee, held at the Magistrate's Office, on Thursday, the 13th July 1882.

PRESENT.

G. Billings, Esq., *Dy. Magistrate* - - -	*Secretary.*
Dr. Robertson - - - - -	*Civil Surgeon.*
Col. G. C. Plowden - - - - -	*Cantt. Magte.*
Wazir Muhammad Khan - - - -	*Tahsíldár.*

Members.

Pandit Morari Lal.	Ahmad Ulla Khan, Sahib.
Lala Kalian Singh.	Muhammad Ali Khan.
Ulfat Husain Khan.	Lala Anand Sarup.
Chaudhri Partab Singh.	Lala Ram Saran Dass.
Lala Durga Parshad.	Lala Shibban Lal.

Election of Chairman and Vice-President.

READ Commissioner's Circular No. II. dated 5th July 1882, with translation thereof, and of para. 3 of No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, with Resolution of the Government of India, Home Department, No. 17, dated 18th May 1882.

The question of the election of a Chairman and Vice-President of the Meerut Municipal Committee having been laid before the meeting and fully discussed, they are unanimously of opinion that, in view of the numerous works in progress, and the necessity of efficient guidance and control, which they are convinced could not at present be exercised by any non-official member, they are absolutely unable to name any one of their number, or to agree to an election of one of them as President; there being, in fact, none able or willing to undertake the duties and responsibilities of the office. They therefore resolve that the Magistrate of the district shall, as heretofore, be Chairman of the Committee, until circumstances shall justify a change of arrangements.

At the same time the committee, in deference to the views of Government, are agreed that the election of a non-official member, as Vice-President, is a measure that can be advantageously carried into effect, and they accordingly nominate Ahmad Ulla Khan, Sahib, an influential and respected member of the committee, as Vice-Chairman; these elections to be submitted for Government confirmation.

G. BILLINGS, *Secretary.*

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{164}{XVII.}$, dated Muzaffarnagar, the 4th July 1882.

From W. M. TIDY, Esquire, Magistrate and President, Municipal Committee, zila Muzaffarnagar, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to the letters marginally noted on the subject of municipal committees, I have the honour to report as follows:—

No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, from Officiating Secretary to Government to all Commissioners, and No. 148, to all District Officers.
No. 162, dated 29th June 1882, from Officiating Secretary to Government to all Commissioners, and No. 163 to all District Officers
Commissioner's No. $\frac{11}{XXIII.}$, dated 5th July, to Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar.
Commissioner's No. $\frac{14}{XXIII.}$, dated 10th July, to Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar.

1. The election system is in force in all the municipalities of the district.

(*a.*) *Muzaffarnagar.*—The committee consists of four official members (the Magistrate of the District, the Magistrate in charge of the pargana, the Civil Surgeon, and the Tahsíldar) and eight non-official members who are elected by the residents of the town.

The town is divided into four electoral districts, each of which elects two members.

The qualifications for *voters and members* are these:—

They must be adult males.

They must be owners or occupants of a house of which the monthly rent is not less than Rs. 2 per month, or must be possessed of an annual income of not less than Rs. 120.

A register of all persons entitled to vote is kept up at the municipal office, and any person whose name is omitted may apply to the committee. The decision of the committee is final. An extract from the register is given to each person qualified to vote.

Notice is given of the time and place at which the election will be held. A fortnight beforehand votes are recorded by an officer or officers appointed by the Magistrate of the district.

The persons obtaining the greatest number of votes are considered elected, subject to confirmation by Government.

(*b.*) *Kairáná.*—The committee consists of fifteen members, of whom three are *ex-officio.* The non-official members are elected by the residents of the town.

Members and voters must possess the following qualifications:—

They must be 18 years of age, able to read and write, and must occupy a house let for or which could be let for Rs. 2 per month, or must have an annual income of not less than Rs. 100.

Three months before every election, lists of qualified persons are published by the committee. A separate list is made out for each mahalla. The 35 mahallas of the town are divided into 12 electoral circles for each of which one member is elected.

The President or Vice-President fixes the date and place of election. Notice is given a fortnight beforehand.

The President or Vice-President appoints a suitable person to record the votes. He is supplied with a list of persons qualified to vote and writes against each elector's name the name of the person for whom he votes. At the close of the proceedings he sends in the list in a sealed envelope to the President or Vice-President. The President or Vice-President publishes the result of the election without delay, and forwards the list of votes to the committee's office, where it remains on view for one month. Temporary vacancies are filled up on the nomination of the committee, with the sanction of the Local Government.

(*c.*) *Kandhlá.*—The committee consists of 14 members of whom four are official and ten non-official, elected by the votes of the residents of the town. The qualifications of members and voters and the rules for election are the same as those given in the case of Kairáná.

The town is divided into ten mahallas, each of which elects one member.

I think that these rules work well enough. It would be idle to pretend (whatever may be the case in the large cities of these provinces) that the residents of the small towns like Muzaffarnagar, Kairáná and Kandhla take any very keen interest in these elections, but still some progress has been made. If they do not come, and I am informed that they do not, to the place appointed, and if the votes have to be taken by persons going round from house to house, at any rate the fear which, as I well recollect, induced registered voters in a large town in this part of the province to conceal themselves at election time, appears to have died away.

With reference to para. 3 of Circular No. 147 of 1882, I beg to submit copies of the notice isssued by me as President of the three municipal committees (dated 29th June) and of the resolutions of the committees passed at the special meetings held on 8th July. A translation of the resolutions is appended. I should add that, for obvious reasons, I did not attend any of these meetings, and there were no official members present either at Muzaffarnagar or Kairáná. The Tahsíldar of Burhana was I believe present at the meeting of the Kandhla committee.

I may mention that at Kandhla party feeling runs very high, and I hear that the suggestion of one of the committee (a Muhammadan) that he should be elected President, led to a somewhat violent altercation, one result of which, apparently, was that a considerable number of the members of the committee sent in a written application asking for permission to resign their offices. I asked them to reconsider the matter, and I hoped before long to go to Kandhla myself and discuss the matter with them.

From all I can learn I am satisfied that the attempt to carry on municipal work under a non-official President in Kairáná and Kandhla at present could lead to nothing but confusion. The case of Muzaffarnagar is somewhat different, but here also I would recommend that the experiment should not be tried till the question of the continuance or discontinuance of the octroi has been decided and until the present drainage works have been completed. It will be seen that Lala Udai Ram has been elected Vice-President by the committee. If the resolutions of the committee are approved, I will as far as possible leave all ordinary business in the hands of the Vice-President and non-official members. By the commencement of the official year 1883–84 the committee will probably be able to decide whether they can take the management of municipal matters entirely into their own hands.

Notice is hereby given under section 13d, Act XV., 1873, that a special meeting of the Muzaffarnagar-Kairáná-Kandhla Municipal Committee will be held on Saturday, 8th July, at 8 a.m.

Translations of para. 3, Circular No. 147, dated 21st June, from the Officiating Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, and of paras. 18 and 19 of the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th May, are forwarded to the committee through the Secretary, for its consideration.

After such discussion as may be necessary, the committee should proceed to elect a President and Vice-President.

It will be seen that the committee is at liberty to elect either an official or non-official member of the committee as its President, but the Government of India is obviously desirous that a non-official member should be elected, *provided that a suitable person can be found able and willing to undertake the duties.*

Undersigned wishes to leave this matter in the hands of the committee. The members should carefully consider which course will be the more beneficial to the municipality.

If an official member is elected President, the Vice-President should be a non-official member.

The committee is requested to record at length its reasons for the course it may adopt, in order that they may be submitted to Government through the Commissioner of the Division.

By Muzaffarnagar Municipal Committee.

To-day the Magistrate's order dated 29th June 1882, accompanied by translation of para. 3 of Government, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, Circular No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, and of paras. 18 and 19 of Government of India Order No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, dated 18th May 1882, was laid before the meeting. After discussion, it was resolved that the supervision which the Municipal Committee of Muzaffarnagar exercises, and will have in the future to exercise, extends not only to receipts and expenditure but also to the work of officers and subordinates of various departments; that sundry matters come from time to time before the committee which require consultation with and guidance from experienced and intelligent European and Native officers; that the Collectors of districts are generally possessed of much experience, as they are acquainted with and have travelled in European countries and in India, and hence much benefit is expected to be derived by the committee from their knowledge of all matters. If the Collector remains President, the influence and dignity of the committee will be preserved as at present, and no trouble will arise in the management of the committee's affairs. The members will continue to give their votes freely and carry out their duties as to the improvement of the town with great zeal; many questions are decided at meetings of Sub-committees in which the Vice-President presides, and special matters only are laid before general committees, so that the President will not have to devote much time to this work. On the contrary, if the Collector ceases to be President, he will not pay attention any longer, as at present, and thus the committee's interests will suffer. Resolved, therefore, for the present, that Collector continue Chairman of the Committee, and that Lala Udai Ram be appointed Vice-President. The committee further desires that they may enjoy the power of electing their President and Vice-President every year. The committee requests that the above gentlemen may accept the positions offered by the committee. A copy of the proceedings with original papers to be submitted to Magistrate.

8th July 1882.

By Kairáná Municipal Committee.

To-day a special meeting was held and Magistrate's order dated 29th June 1882, was laid before the meeting, with translation of paras. 18 and 19 of Government of India's Order, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, dated 18th May 1882. After consideration and discussion, it was observed that the town is at a distance from the sadr station, and there is no influential person either among the members of the raises of the town who may be held responsible for all matters. The committee is of opinion that Magistrate should be President, and that the Magistrate should accept this proposal. As regards the post of Vice-President, none of the members appears to the committee to possess the experience or knowledge required for the performance of the duties of this office. Hence the committee is of opinion that the old practice should continue in force. Resolved that a copy of the proceedings be forwarded through Tahslídar of Shamli to Magistrate.

8th July 1882.

By Kandhla Municipal Committee.

Magistrate's robkar dated 29th June 1882, *in re* the proposal of appointment of one of the non-official members to perform the duty of President and Vice-President was laid before the meeting. All the members were unanimously of opinion that this duty cannot be performed by any one of the members. The inhabitants consist of two sections, one Hindu and the other Muhammadan. If out of these parties one is appointed President and one Vice-President no concurrence in opinion is to be expected, for the opinion of each party will be different. This being the case all sorts of impediments and inconveniences will be the result. Hence it is considered advisable that things should remain as they are. A copy of these proceedings will be sent to the President.

8th July 1882, at 8 a.m.

Docket No. $\frac{164}{\text{XXIII}}$, dated Muzaffarnagar, the 24th July 1882.

From W. M. Tidy, Esquire, President, Municipal Committee, Muzaffarnagar, to Commissioner, Meerut Division.

Submits a report regarding the decentralization scheme.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{669}{XXIII.-14}$, dated Dehra Dún, the 27th July 1882.

From W. T. CHURCH, Esquire, Superintendent of Dehra Dún, to COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to your Circular No. $\frac{11}{XXIII}$, dated 5th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Municipal Committees in both Mussoorie and Dehra have unanimously elected me as their Chairman. Mr. H. G. Scott, a non-official member, will remain as before the Vice-Chairman of the Mussoorie Committee. In Dehra the committee elected Mr. Davis, Assistant Superintendent, as Vice-Chairman.

2. In both committees there are several non-official gentlemen quite able to undertake the office of Chairman, but they are not disposed to give the time and trouble necessary for carrying on the duties. In Mussoorie, the most energetic non-official members have large businesses of their own.

3. In both municipalities the elective franchise is adequate. There is no need to extend it. In Mussoorie every European householder has a vote.

No. $\frac{68}{XXIII}$, dated Aligarh, the 27th July 1882.

From W. LAMBE, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Aligarh, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

IN obedience to the orders of Government contained in G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, I have the honour to state that committees have been held in all the four municipalities of this district for the purpose of electing Chairman and Vice-Chairman.

2. In one committee only, that of Háthras, would the members consent to have as Chairman any one but the Magistrate of the district, as they held that the work to be done could be better carried out by him than by any other person.

3. I may remark that the choice of the members may be regarded as spontaneous, as I was most careful that they should be allowed full liberty of opinion and that their wishes should be in no way interfered with.

4. For facility of reference I append a statement showing the different dates at which the committees were held, together with the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen elected by each committee :—

Number.	Name of Municipality.	Date of Committee.	Chairman chosen.	Vice-Chairman chosen.
1	Koil - - -	12th July 1882 -	Magistrate and Collector -	Dhiraj Lal.
2	Hathras - - -	18th ditto -	Raja Ghansham Singh -	Kundan Singh.
3	Atrauli - - -	23rd ditto -	Magistrate and Collector -	Nawab Khan.
4	Sikandra - - -	25th ditto -	Ditto Ditto -	Basdeo Sahai.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Hathras Municipal Committee, held at Hathras on the 18th July 1882.

PRESENT :

W. Lambe, Esquire - - - - - *President.*
Ghuilam Haidar Khan - - - - - *Secretary.*

Raja Ghansham Singh of Mursan.
Lala Beni Ram.
Kundan Singh.
Lala Jitmal.
Lala Salig Ram.

2. Put forward and read G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882.

Resolved unanimously that Raja of Mursan be appointed President and Kundan Singh Vice-President.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Koil Municipal Committee, held at Koil on the 12th July 1882.

PRESENT :

W. Lambe, Esquire - - - - - *President.*
Babu Chandu Lal - - - - - *Secretary.*

Maulvi Muhammad Karim, Deputy Collector.
F. W. Court, Esquire.
Munshi Dhiraj Lal.
Babu Tota Ram.
Babu Mahanarayan.
Lala Sham Behari Lal.
Pandit Ballab Shankar.
Jani Bijey Shankar.
Maulvi Muhammad Yusuf.
Kunwar Muhammad Lutf Ali Khan.

3. Read Government letter No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, regarding the municipal boards, and with reference to para. 3 thereof the committee was moved to proceed to the election of a President and a Vice-President from among the non-official members. It was unanimously agreed that it was absolutely necessary, at least for the present, that the Magistrate of the district should retain the office of President. As regards the Vice-President the majority of votes was in favour of Munshi Dhiraj Lal, who was accordingly appointed, he declaring his willingness to undertake the duties of the post.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

MEMORANDUM.

At the meetings both of the Atrauli and Sikandra Rao Municipal Committees, of the proceedings at which extracts in each case are sent, neither I nor the Tahsíldár in either case voted. The resolutions passed may thus be looked upon as the unbiassed expression of their opinion by the Native non-official members of the committee in each case.

In Atrauli the strong party feeling between the Hindu and Muhammadan sections of the community renders it advisable, in order to prevent dissensions in committee, that the Magistrate of the district be President.

The Muhammadans were stronger by one vote in committee, and so elected a Vice-President of their own persuasion.

Similarly, if the Magistrate of the district had not been chosen by the Committee to be President, another Muhammadan would have been selected in his stead. There were not wanting signs that if this had been done the Hindus would have resigned in disgust, and indeed no Hindu would under the circumstances have sat on the committee.

The good sense, however, of the committee prevailed in the matter, and matters will go as smoothly heretofore as up to the present.

In Sikandra the difficulty was to find a Native fit to be President of the committee. There is no one at present fit for the post, and this was the opinion of the committee.

(Signed) F. B. MULOCK,
Officiating Joint Magistrate.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Atrauli Municipal Committee, held at Atruli on the 23rd July 1882.

PRESENT:

1. F. B. Mulock, Esquire, *Vice-President.*
2. Nawab Khan.
3. Sheikh Ghazi-un-din.
4. Lala Kishen Lal.
5. Nathoo Lal.
6. Gange Porshad.
7. Sham Parshad (Tahsíldár).

G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, was read to the committee.

Resolved unanimously that the Collector of the district remain as at present ex-officio President of the Committee.

Resolved (by a majority of one vote) that Nawab Khan be elected Vice-President.

(Signed) F. B. MULOCK,
Vice-President.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Sikandra Rao Municipal Committee, held at Sikandra Rao on the 25th July 1882.

PRESENT:

F. B. Mulock, Esquire, *Vice-President.*
Mewa Ram.
Basdeo Sahai.
Sami-ud-din Khan.
Kamar-ud-din.
Ujagar Mal (Tahsíldár).

G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, was read to the committee.

Resolved unanimously that the Magistrate of the district remain as at present President of the Committee.

Resolved unanimously that Basdeo Sahai be appointed Vice-President.

(Signed) F. B. MULOCK,
Vice-President.

No. $\frac{795G.}{XXIII.}$, dated Meerut, the 3rd August 1882.

From F. N. WRIGHT, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Meerut, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to your Circular No. $\frac{11}{XXIII.}$, dated 5th ultimo, I have the honour to report that all the municipal committees in the district have now elected their Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Secretary as follows :—

Chairman	- - -	Magistrate.
Secretary	- - -	Tahsíldar.

Vice-Chairmen.

Gháziabad	- - -	Abdulla Khan.
Sháhdera	- - -	Nawal Singh.
Baghpat	- - -	Kazi Abdul Rahim.
Baraut	- - -	Jawahir Singh.
Hapur	- - -	Ganga Das.
Pilkhua	- - -	Pandit Debi Sahai.

2. The reasons they give for electing the Magistrate as President, for at least this year, are similar to those which influenced the committee of the Meerut Municipality.

3. As regards the office of Secretary, I should like, I own, to see it in other hands than those of the Tahsíldár's, but the members of the several committees are very averse to giving up more of their time than they now do to the transaction of public business.

4. I shall, however, make a point, when I go on tour in the cold weather, of endeavouring to get one of the non-official members to act as Secretary, should an efficient person be found.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

Docket No. $\frac{52C.}{XXIII.}$, dated Meerut, the 20th August 1882.

From E. COLVIN, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Meerut Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

IN continuation of letter No. $\frac{47C.}{XXIII.}$, dated 14th instant, submits, for the information of Government, Magistrate's letter No. 76, dated 17th idem, with copies of the proceedings of the Atrauli and Sikandra Rao committees, proposing the election of all the members in lieu of the present system under which half the members are elected and half nominated.

No. $\frac{76}{XIX.}$, dated Aligarh, the 17th August 1882.

From W. LAMBE, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate and Collector, Aligarh, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Meerut Division.

SIR,

IN continuation of this office No. $\frac{68}{XXIII.}$, dated 28th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that of the four municipalities in this district, half the members are elected and half nominated by Magistrate of the district in two of them—Atrauli and Sikandra. It is now proposed in these municipalities to elect all the members, the qualification for voting remaining the same as before. The minutes of committees are enclosed for information.

EXTRACT from Proceedings of a General Meeting of the Atrauli Municipal Committee, held on the 23rd July 1882.

PRESENT:

F. B. Mulock, Esquire, Vice-President.	Lala Nathu Lal.
Muhammad Nawab Khan.	Lala Ganga Parshad.
Shaikh Ghazi-ud-din.	Sham Parshad, Tahsíldár, Secretary.
Lala Kishen Lal.	

G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, was read to the committee.

Resolved unanimously that the Collector of the district remain as at present *ex-officio* president of the committee.

Resolved (by a majority of one vote) that Nawab Khan be elected Vice-President.

As regards the second para. of the G. O it was unanimously

Resolved that the qualification for the franchise remain the same as at present, *viz.*, occupation of a house yielding a monthly rent of eight annas ; and that a sub-committee, consisting of Nawab Khan, Kishen Lal, and Sham Parshad, Tahsíldar, be appointed to revise and prepare the register of voters.

PROCEEDINGS of an Ordinary Meeting of the Sikandra Municipal Committee, held on the 26th July 1882.

PRESENT:

F. B. Mulock, Esquire, Vice-President.
Ujagar Mal, Tahsíldár, Secretary.
Lala Basdeo Sahai.
Muhammad Sami-ud-din Khan.
Shaikh Kamar-ud-din.
Mewa Ram.

Read translation of G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, regarding the appointment of President and Vice-President from the non-official members, &c., &c.

Resolved unanimously that the office of President be retained by the Magistrate as hitherto, and the Basdeo Sashai be appointed Vice-President.

As regards the second para. of the G. O. it was unanimously *resolved* that the qualification for the franchise remain the same as at present, *viz.*, occupation of a house yielding a monthly rent of eight annas ; and that a sub-committee, consisting of Sami-ud-din Khan, Basdeo Sahai, and the Tahsíldar, be appointed to revise and prepare the register of voters.

(Signed) F. B. MULOCK,
Vice-President.

No. $\frac{7925}{XXII.-42}$, dated Agra, the 24th August 1882.

From G. LANG, Esquire, OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Agra Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of G. O. No. 147, dated the 21st June 1882, Financial Department (Decentralisation), and your two telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd August (received on Tuesday evening and Wednesday afternoon, respectively), in regard to municipal boards as they are affected by the Resolution of the 18th May 1882.

2. I regret to state that the file is incomplete, no report having yet been received from the Etah district, as explained hereinafter in para. 9 of this letter. Mr. Robertson has left behind him no memo. on the subject, having embodied, I presume, in his letter No. $\frac{6808}{XII.-39}$, dated the 29th July 1882, all the results of his local inquiries regarding decentralisation whilst on tour. I can therefore here only give such information as I find on record in the file.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

AGRA DISTRICT.

3. In Agra there are three municipalities, *viz.*, Agra, Firozabad, and Fatehpur Sikri.

Elective System.—In Agra and Firozabad the elective system already obtains, but in Fatehpur Sikri the committee is nominated by Government, and the Magistrate of Agra strongly deprecates, for the reasons given in paras. 2, 3, and 4 of his letter No. 204, dated 8th July 1882, any change being made.

Appointment of Presidents.—The following non-official members have been reported to Government, under Commissioner's letters marginally quoted, as President and Vice-President of the several municipalities of this district:—

No. $\frac{6950}{XXII.-42}$, dated 3rd August 1882.
No. $\frac{7210}{XXII.-42}$, dated 12th August 1882.
No. $\frac{7393}{XXII.-42}$, dated 18th August 1882.

Agra.—Rai Muthra Das.

Firozabad.—Chaube Radha Mohan.

Fatehpur Sikri.—Shaikh Tajammul Husain.

I would draw attention to Mr. Finlay's remarks in para. 6 of his letter above quoted, regarding the relation of the Magistrate to the non-official president of the committee, suggesting that the former (when not President) should not be an ordinary member of the committee, but a supervising officer to whom the proceedings should be submitted for review; and to his letter No. $\frac{191}{XXIII.-10}$, dated 11th July 1882 (a copy of which is enclosed), asking that the powers of the President to enforce his orders regarding sanitary matters, which have hitherto being supported by the Magistrate's authority, may be clearly defined by Government.

MUTTRA DIRTRICT.

4. There are three municipalities in the Muttra district, *viz.*, Muttra, Kosi, Bindraban, in all three of which the elective system obtains, and non-official Presidents and Vice-Presidents have been appointed, and their names submitted for sanction of Government under this office letters Nos. $\frac{6950}{XXII.-42}$ and $\frac{7150}{XII.-19}$, dated respectively the 3rd and 9th August 1882.

ETÁWAH DISTRICT.

5. There is only one municipality in this district, *viz.*, Etáwah itself.

The elective system already obtains here, and Mumtaz Ali Khan and Kunwar Bharat Singh, Assistant Collector, have been appointed President and Vice-President respectively, and reported for Government sanction under this office No. $\frac{7590}{XXII.-42}$, of date. The Vice-President herein nominated is an official; but as the President is unacquainted with English, Mr. Smith and the committee considered it advisable to have an English-speaking Vice-President, and Kunwar Bharat Singh was the only member with this qualification.

Mr. Smith wishes to remain a member of the municipal committee for the purpose of aiding and advising the committee. He proposes no change in the elective system, being satisfied with that which already obtains; but he does not explain what that system is.

FARUKHABAD DISTRICT.

6. There is here also only one municipality, *viz.*, Fatehgarh-cum-Farukhabad, and there the elective system prevails. Mr. Cornwall has called a special committee to revise the rules for election, but has hitherto submitted no report.

Pandat Lachmi Narayan has been nominated President of the municipal committee, as reported in this office No. $\frac{6950}{XXII.-42}$, dated 3rd August 1882.

MAINPURI DISTRICT.

7. The only municipality in this district is Mainpuri itself: the system is electoral. The Magistrate offers no suggestions of reform. The following non-official members have been nominated as President and Vice-President respectively, *viz.*, Muhammad Mohsin, vakil, and Churamal, headmaster, vila school.

ETAH DISTRICT.

8. In Etah there are six municipalities, *viz.*, Etah, Soron, Kásganj, Jalesar, Mahrehra, and Aliganj, in all of which the electoral system is in force; but no replies have been received regarding any of them. Mr. Williams, before going on leave, reported that he had not been able to convene municipal meetings or to supply the information required.

An extract from his letter is below given:—

"You have directed me to comply with the instructions laid down in G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June, at as early a date as possible. But that order requires that I should draw up my proposals in consultation with the municipal members now in office, and there are six municipalities in this district, and some are at a very great distance from others, *e. g.*, Aliganj is 65 miles from Jalesar. I don't see how I can reply to the Government letter until I have held meetings of the municipal committees in all the six towns. I contemplated visiting some of them this month, but the necessity of being here in Etah on the 9th and 10th July, on the occasion of your visit, interfered with this plan. I shall be glad to be told whether you consider it necessary for me to discuss the Government letter personally at meetings of the various municipal committees before I send in my proposals.

"3. Here I may be permitted to state that if the local Government are desirous that the great principles of policy laid down in the Government of India's Resolution of the 18th May be properly understood by the people, it is imperative that the Resolution should be translated, and that a large number of copies of the translation should be distributed to every district. The local Government's letter expressly states that the views expressed in that Resolution by the Government of India are to be laid before each municipal board. Those views extend over eight printed pages of foolscap, and it is quite obvious that these views cannot be properly explained to municipal committees except in their own language. I therefore have awaited the arrival of translations of the Resolution before taking any steps in the matter, but no translations have yet arrived."

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

Mr. Robertson's reply, dated the 3rd August, conveyed instsuctions and called a report with the least possible delay. Mr. Crooke (who has taken over charge of the district) replied on the 5th August that he had made arrangements for consulting the members and residents of the various municipalities, and would submit a report as soon as possible. But as the number of municipalities in the district is exceptionally large, it necessarily takes a long time to convene the meetings and ascertain the opinions of all the members.

9. The only district from which a reply to G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, is now awaited is Etah, and the Etah report shall be submitted directly it is received. A reminder has already been sent.

10. I find in the file another G. O. No. 162, dated 29th June, requesting that Commissioners will examine and review the system of election already in force in municipalities in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, on which no order appears to have been issued by the Commissioner, and to which no replies have been received from Collectors. I have to-day issued detailed instructions and called for a reply to that G. O. within fourteen days from date.

No. $\frac{191}{XXIII.-10}$, dated Agra, the 11th July 1882.

From MAGISTRATE of Agra, to COMMISSIONER, Agra Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in conformity with the orders contained in your No. $\frac{5966}{XII.-19}$, dated 28th June 1882, I attended a special meeting of the municipal commissioners of Agra and resigned the office of President. On this Rai Mathra Das was unanimously chosen as President in my room, and took the chair at the meeting.

The selection of the committee meets with my warm approval. Rai Mathra Das will bring to the office a high reputation for integrity, ability, and zeal,—qualities conspicuously displayed for many years while he was in Government employment, and I have no hesitation in requesting you to recommend to Government to sanction the appointment.

I am bound to add that the committee evinced a very intelligible anxiety that the duties, rights, and authority of the President should be clearly formulated and stated by Government. Numerous orders about sanitary and cognate matters emanated from me as President which were supported by my authority as Magistrate; and, under the present circumstances, this authority will be wanting to the new President. That he should have some authority with which to enforce orders is obvious, and it is for Government to define its limits.

No. 204, dated Agra, the 8th July 1882.

From H. B. FINLAY, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Agra, to COMMISSIONER, Agra Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your No. $\frac{5966}{XII.-19}$ of 1882, dated the 28th June 1882.

2. There are three municipalities in this district, in two of which the members of the committee are elected year by year. In one, *viz.*, Fatehpur Sikri, the system of nomination still obtains. In 1873–74 the question of introducing the system of election was mooted; and after careful consideration by the then Magistrate and Commissioner, it was decided to ask Government to continue the system of nomination, and to this Government agreed. I am not aware of any change in the circumstances of the municipality on account of which I could recommend that the system of election be substituted for that of nomination.

3. The township of Fatehpur Sikri is an agglomeration of three or four villages, nestling under the hill on which Akbar's palace was built, and the population is a poor one. There are three or four Muhammadan families who constitute, what might be called in complimentary language, the local aristocracy, being the descendants of those to whom Akbar committed the charge of the mosques and buildings on the hill. Of the Hindu population there are a few well-to-do zamindars; and under the nomination system three of the former and three of the latter are selected to serve as municipal commissioners, and hitherto this system has worked well in practice, and has met with the acceptance of the inhabitants of the town. There is not the slightest desire on their part for a change.

4. If election were substituted for nomination in Fatehpur Sikri, I consider it almost certain that the class of men who now serves on the committee would be excluded from the committee. In the first place, they would not canvass for votes among the low castes of Hindus and lower classes (*e.g.*, butchers, weavers, and the like) of Muhammadans to whom the franchise would need to be extended if anything like a numerically strong constituency were to be created. And if this constituency once asserted itself and elected a low caste or low class man, the other members would inevitably resign *en masse*. It was for these and similar reasons that the system of election was rejected before, and nothing has occurred in the meantime to weaken their cogency.

5. With reference to the second part of your letter, requiring conformity to the Government orders for the election of a non-official member as President, they will be laid before the meeting of this month for compliance, and you will be informed of the result.

6. I trust it will not be considered presumption on my part if I now lay before you, for consideration, some points in connection with the new system which I venture to think require attention. The Government of India in its Resolution No. $\frac{17}{747-57}$, dated 18th May 1882, has stated its wish that the supervision of the proceedings and action of the local and municipal committee should be exercised from without rather than from within; and I beg to urge on your consideration that this wish can only be carried out by the Magistrate ceasing to be a member of the committee at all, and becoming in the correct sense of the word a supervising officer, much in the same way as you supervised the proceedings of the former committees. So long as the Magistrate sits in the committee and raises his voice to influence its proceedings, so long will the committee fail to vote and act on its spontaneous motion, and

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

so long will the desire of both the Imperial and Local Governments—to give the experiment of self-government a fair trial—be unfulfilled. It is perfectly immaterial whether the Magistrate sits as President or as a Member: his authority as Magistrate will be in no way diminished; and the system of acquiescence in everything that he proposes or says, which Government so strongly deprecates, will prevail as before.

7. These remarks refer to those committees in which hitherto the voice of the Magistrate has been all .powerful. In them the mere transfer of the Magistrate to a seat as an ordinary member will not affect the tone of the meetings; and if the members did not exert themselves in local matters or speak out their real sentiments when the Magistrate was President, there is no reason to believe they will do so now.

8. There are doubtless many committees to which these remarks will not apply. I consider the municipal committee of Agra is one. The monthly meetings are numerously attended, and the discussions are prolonged often to what is to me an inconvenient length. We have representatives of all classes, castes, creeds, and trades on the committee, who are only too eager to speak; and the reports of the proceedings submitted to you show the wide and often minute interest taken in public matters by certain of the members. Of course we have some who do but little, and on the whole this is not to be regretted. In this committtee and in similar ones the reduction of the Magistrate to the position of an ordinary official member will have but little effect, except perhaps that the proceedings of the committee will be tediously and unnecessarily prolonged. There will, however, be this very grave inconvenience. The President is clearly the officer to whom the committee should look to authoritatively arrange its business and conduct its proceedings. The non-official Presidents now to be elected will have no weight whatsoever when opposed to the Magistrate, and their positions will be intensely disagreeable, and may in the hands of an injudicious Magistrate become quite intolerable. I refer in this to the innumerable little points which arise in every meeting requiring tact, patience, presence of mind, good temper, influence, and official weight which the Magistrate alone has. Putting aside and out of consideration the cases of injudicious and hasty-tempered Magistrates, and thinking only of judicious ones, it is inevitable that there will be continued appeals from the President to the Magistrate, in many of which the Magistrate must decide against the President, and it is hard to say under the circumstances which of these two officers has the most invidious position.

9. All this will be obviated if the Magistrate is removed from the committee and the members left alone. The President could then assert his authority and insist on it being respected: there would be no immediate and irritating appeal: the members in all committees could speak out their minds freely, and the experiment of self-government would have a fair trial. The Magistrate also, to whom the proceedings of the committee would be submitted, would have more leisure to review them carefully and he would be quite unbiassed by the heat of discussion and the innumerable little things which arise in debate which tend to warp his judgment. The supervision would be from without as the Government of India wishes, and not from within.

10. The position of a non-official President in the presence of a fussy, impatient, injudicious or jealous Magistrate will be perfectly intolerable, and no Native gentleman with any self-respect will endure it. May I ask you to be so good as to think over these remarks which your experience, I trust, will pronounce just; and if you think fit, will you represent the matter to Government in such a way as seems to you most expedient?

No. $\frac{7833}{XXII.-42}$, dated Agra, the 22nd September 1882.

From George Lang, Esquire, C.S., Officiating Commissioner, Agra Division, to Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. $\frac{7525}{XXII.-42}$, dated the 24th August, 1882, on the subject of municipal boards as they are affected by the Resolution of the Government of India, dated the 18th May, 1882, I have now the honour to submit letter No. $\frac{114}{XXII.-78}$, dated the 27th August 1882, from the Collector of Etah, submitting the information called for in G. O. No. 147, dated the 21st June 1882, Financial Department (Decentralization).

2. The proceedings of the several Municipal Committees are not submitted as the information contained in them has been abstracted by the Collector into his letter.

No. $\frac{114}{XXII.-78}$, dated Etah, the 27th August 1882.

From William Crooke, Esquire, Officiating Collector, Etah, to Commissioner, Agra Division.

Sir,

I have now the honour in continuation of correspondence ending with your No. $\frac{6933}{XII.-19}$, of 3rd August 1882, to submit a report on the questions raised in letter No. 147, from the Officiating Secretary to Government, dated 21st June 1882, on the constitution of municipal committees in this district.

2. There are six municipalities in this district—Etah, Kásganj, Soron, Aliganj, Marehra, and Jalesar. Three of these, Soron, Aliganj and Jalesar, are at a considerable distance from head-quarters. Owing to press of other work I was unable to visit these three towns in person, and as a reply to the circular was urgently required, I deputed Munshi Muhammad Zahur, Deputy Collector to Aliganj and Marehra, and Munshi Sana-ul-lah Khan, Deputy Collector to Jalesar, with instructions to convene a meeting of the municipal committee and respectable residents. The important portions of the Government letter were translated, and I fully explained to these officers the wishes and intentions of Government. I have now the honour to submit copies of the proceedings of the meetings held by these officers. I held meetings myself at Etah, Kásganj, and Soron. The proceedings are likewise submitted.

REPLIES of District-Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

3. The first question is the election of a suitable non-official member as chairman of the committee. On this I would remark at the outset that none of the municipalities in this district are large, and it is very difficult to find a non-official member of position, intelligence and education, competent to undertake the important and responsible duties of president of the committee.

4. Taking up the municipalities in order the result of the enquiries regarding the election of a non-official chairman is as follows:—

(*a.*) *Etah.*—The meeting was unanimously of opinion that until the members obtained more experience it was not possible to carry on the business under a non-official chairman, and they desired that for the present the Magistrate of the district continue to act as President of the Committee.

(*b.*) *Kasganj.*—The meeting was unanimous in voting for Lala Jhamman Lal as president. This gentleman has for some time acted as local secretary of the committee. He is a young man of considerable intelligence and influence in the town, and takes a great interest in the working of the Municipality. There is this much however to remark that after the meeting was over a deputation of the Muhammadan inhabitants of the town came before me and protested loudly against the appointment of a Hindu as president of the committee. The total population of the municipality is 16,535, of which 12,137 are Hindus and Saraogis, and 4,398 Muhammadans. Testing the position of the two creeds by their respective licenses-tax assessment, I find that 123 Hindus pay Rs. 3,030 and two Muhammadans pay Rs. 20 per annum. Thus as regards population the Hindus are in a majority of three to one, and the license-tax returns show that the whole trade of the town is in their hands. On this showing the Muhammadans have no valid claim to the appointment of one of their member as president, and as in the committee one out of eight members is a Muhammadan, they are not unfairly represented. At the same time it is worth considering whether the success of this new administrative experiment is not likely to be endangered by the ill-feeling which has been excited between the two sects. On the whole I am of opinion that it would be well for the present to leave the office of president in the hands of the Magistrate.

(*c.*) *Soron.*—Here at the meeting the room in which the committee met was thronged by a disorderly crowd of Brahmans who are very influential in the town. The members of the committee present voted as follows. Three for Hargobind Misr, the former *sarpanch* of the town and a member of the local district committee, one for Mithu and one for Ram Chandar, who is the head of a faction of Brahmans hostile to Hargobind. It was impossible to select from the crowd of persons present a number of really influential men whose wishes should be consulted. Accordingly I consulted only those who were assessed to license-tax. This appeared the only possible means of selecting a representative body. All the license-tax payers, 24 in number, voted for Hargobind Misr. Here again the election caused considerable popular excitement, and I received at the time protests against Hargobind's election. Written objections have since been presented. There can be no doubt but that there is intense ill-feeling between the two Brahman factions, and I do not think at present that a non-official should be elected.

(*d.*) *Aliganj.*—The meeting here was unanimously of opinion that there was no suitable person for the office of President, and that the duties should, as before, be performed by the Magistrate.

(*e.*) *Marehra.*—The resolution was to the same effect.

(*f.*) *Jalesar.*—The meeting unanimously voted for Pandit Raj Nath, Munsif, as president. He is undoubtedly well fitted for the post, and if Munsifs, who do not engage in district work be held to come under the class of "non-officials," he might be appointed.

5. As regards the post of vice-president in *Etah*—Raja Shankar Singh of Bilram was unanimously selected; in *Kásganj* Lala Har Diyal was selected by a majority of 39 to 9; in *Soron* of the committee 5 members voted for Irshad Ali, and 2 for the secretary Mithu Lal, and of the license-tax-payers 27 for Irshad Ali, and none for Mithu Lál; in *Marehra* Shaikh Ali Ahmad was unanimously selected; in *Jalesar* Ausáf Ali, a very active member of the committee, but a man of small property, was selected unanimously; in *Aliganj* the meeting could not find a suitable candidate.

6. My opinion regarding these selections is a follows:—If the Magistrate continues to be president of all these committees, in *Etah* the appointment of Raja Shankar Singh is a good one. In *Kásganj* if regard be paid to local feeling and no non-official member appointed as president, Lala Jhamman Lal, who was nominated as president, might be appointed vice-president. Similarly in *Soron* Misr Hargobind, nominated as president, might be appointed vice-president. In *Jalesar* if the nomination of Pandit Raj Nath, as president, be set aside he could be appointed vice-president, or if held disqualified for this post Ausáf Ali could take his place. The nomination of Ali Ahmad in *Marehra* seems unobjectionable, and in *Aliganj*, there seems no other course left but to allow the Tahsíldár as before to discharge the duties of vice-president until some member qualifies himself for the office.

7. Regarding the qualifications to be required in future for the post of president and vice president and membership as might have been expected opinions differed.

In *Etah* the qualifications were fixed as—

(1) President, landholder, paying not less than Rs. 500 annual revenue.
(2) Other residents paying not less than Rs. 10 per annum license-tax.
(3) Qualified Vakils and mukhtars.

In Kásganj.

(1) Resident, landowners, paying not less than Rs. 500 annual revenue.
(2) Residents assessed to license-tax not less than Rs. 25 per annum.
(3) Resident qualified Vakils and mukhtars.

In Soron.

(1) Resident, landowners, paying not less than Rs. 500 per annum.
(2) Residents paying not less than Rs. 10 license-tax per annum.

In Aliganj.

(1) Landowners paying not less Rs. 10 license-tax per annum.
(2) License-tax-payers of more than Rs. 10.
(3) Pensioners receiving more than Rs. 10 per mensem.
(4) Vakils, mukhtars and leading men *rais* in trades.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

In Marehra.

(1) Payers of more than Rs. 10 license-tax.
(2) Pensioners receiving more than Rs. 10 a month.
(3) Landowners paying not less than Rs. 500 a year Government revenue.
(4) Vakils and mukhtars.
(5) Leading men (*rais*) in trades and professions.

In Jalesar.

(1) Landowners paying Rs. 200 revenue.
(2) Vakils.
(3) Payers of not less than Rs. 10 license-tax.
(4) Other intelligent educated men and pensioners.

8. Probably if one general rule is to be enforced throughout the district, conflicting views might be best reconciled by selecting members from the following classes :—

(1) Payers of Rs. 200 and upwards Government revenue.
(2) Payers of Rs. 100 license-tax and upwards.
(3) Vakils and mukhtars duly qualified.
(4) Pensioners receiving at least Rs. 10 a month.

It is only in Soron that membership was left open to Government servants. There seems, however, no reason why they should not be members, and if so Rs. 25 per mensem might be fixed as the qualification.

9. Regarding the qualification for voters the opinions of the various meetings were as follows :—

In Etah.

(1) The following shopkeepers—bazáz, parchúni, pansári, sellers of metal vessels, halwáis, sellers of European articles, money-lenders and pawnbrokers.
(2) Government servants resident and receiving Rs. 20 per mensem or upwards.
(3) Persons otherwise qualified as members.
(4) Chaudhris of the following trades :—kasái, lohár, barhai, sunár, rangrez, kunjara, kumhár, mochi, manihár, chamár and bhatiára.

In Kásganj.

(1) Zamíndárs paying not less than Rs. 200 Government revenue per annum.
(2) License-tax-payers of not less than Rs. 10 per annum.
(3) Government servants receiving not less than Rs. 10 per mensem.
(4) Chaudhris of all inferior castes and trades.
(5) Persons otherwise qualified for membership.

In Soron.

(1) All payers of license-tax.
(2) Zamíndárs paying not less than Rs. 300 revenue per annum.
(3) Officials drawing not less than Rs. 10 per mensem.

In Aliganj.

That members be selected by the leading men of each class.

In Marehra. Ditto.

In Jalesar.

Baniyas, parchúnis, halwáis, bazzáz, perfume sellers, sharráfs, sunárs, owners of saltpetre, factories, vakils, mukhtars, iron sellers, metal vessel sellers, makers of vessels, dyers, shoe sellers, pedlars, chaudhris of butchers, weavers, kahárs, potters, manihárs, glass makers, bhátiaras, kunjaras, carpenters, káchhis, ghosís, ahírs, tamolis, telis, lohárs, masons, chamárs, owners of carts, mochis, respectable men of the city.

10. It would of course be very difficult to select a model constituency out of such materials. If a general rule be applied to all these towns, I would suggest that roughly the following persons should have the right to vote :—

(1) All persons otherwise qualified as members.
(2) All resident, landowners, paying upwards of Rs. 100 a year revenue.
(3) All payers of license-tax.
(4) Vakils and mukhtars.
(5) Government servants drawing Rs. 10 a month and upwards.
(6) Pensioners ditto ditto.
(7) Recognised chaudhris of all castes and trades.

11. At the same time I would venture to remark that the lists of voters framed at some of the meetings show clearly how utterly unacquainted even the most respectable residents are with the elementary principles of popular representation. It seems to me very doubtful how far a system of popular election is possible in a backward district like this when entrusted to ignorant people with little public spirit and wanting in knowledge of business of this kind. I fear that unless very carefully watched it may lead to trouble and make jobbery and the subordination of the interests of one class to another possible.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{8661}{XXII.-42}$, dated Agra, the 29th September 1882.

From GEORGE LANG, Esquire, C.S., Officiating Commissioner, Agra Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your letter No. 160, dated 29th June 1882, requesting that the system of election already in force in different Municipalities in the Province, may be reviewed, and a report thereon submitted.

2. The system of election (as already reported) is in force in almost every municipality in the Agra Division, but the procedure varies in different districts.

3. I called for a report, from all Collectors, on the following points:—

I.—The qualification for electors.
II.—Ditto for members of committee.
III.—The preparation and annual correction of the list of electors.
IV.—The means adopted to secure the attendance of voters on election day.
V.—The nomination of candidates for election.
VI.—The system of record of votes and preparation of registers.
VII.—The number of votes allowed to each elector, and whether plumping was permitted.

4. I will first give an abstract of the replies received from each district, and then make any suggestions that I have to offer.

I.—Qualifications for electors.

Agra district.

In the town of *Agra* all resident, landed or house-proprietors, with an income of Rs. 200 per annum, enjoy the franchise.

In *Firozabad* all residents occupying houses assessed at rent of eight annas per mensen, may vote.

In *Fatehpur Sikri* (for reasons given in former correspondence) the elective system is not in force. The Magistrate proposes no changes.

Farukhabad district.

In the Fatehgarh *cum* Farukhabad municipality (the only one in the district) the qualification for the franchise is—

(i.)—An annnal income of Rs. 150.
(ii.)—Occupation of a house assessed at a rent of Rs. 2 per mensem.
(iii.)—Appointment as muhalladar.

In *Etáwah* (where there is only one municipality of the same name) the persons entitled to vote are—

(*a.*)—All resident Zamíndárs.
(*b.*)—All occupants or owners of houses worth Rs. 2 rent per mensem.
(*c.*)—All persons in receipt of an income of Rs. 240 per annum.

In the *Muttra* district, the *Muttra and Bindraban* municipalities grant the franchise to persons paying Rs. 3 rent, or occupying their own premises of the same value; but *Kosi* extends the suffrage to persons assessed at Re. 1 house-rent.

In *Mainpuri* (where there is only one municipality) all persons assessed to license-tax, and all Government servants on Rs. 10 per mensem, have a vote.

In *Etah* (where there are six municipalities)—

(*a.*)—All persons paying license-tax.
(*b.*)—All Government servants on Rs. 10 per mensem.
(*c.*)—All house-houlders assessed to a rent of eight annas per mensen can vote.

The various committees have, however, recently held meetings, and revised the qualification for voters, their proposals differ slightly as to the amount of income that will entitle to a vote.

Mr. Crooke proposes one common rule for the whole district, and fixes the qualification, for franchise, as follows:—

1. All persons otherwise qualified as members.
2. All resident landowners paying upwards of Rs. 100 a year revenue.
3. All payers of license-tax.
4. Vakils and mukhtars.
5. Government servants drawing Rs. 10 a month and upwards.
6. Pensioners ditto.
7. Recognized chaudhris of all castes and trades.

His proposals appear to be well considered and suitable to the requirements of the district.

II.—Qualifications for membership of a Municipal Committee.

In the *Agra* district, all resident, landed or house-proprietors, with an income of Rs. 500, are eligible.

This applies to the municipalities both of Agra and Firozabad. In Fatehpur Sikri (as already explained (the members of the committee are nominated by Government.

In *Fatehgarh* all qualified voters can aspire to the municipal committee.

In *Muttra* and *Mainpuri* and *Etáwah* there is practically no qualification. Any respectable resident is eligible for election.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

In *Etah*, the persons eligible for the committees, have hitherto been of the following classes:—

Zamíndárs.	Traders.
Muáfidars.	Bankers.
Pensioners.	Mukhtars.

Leading men of the lower castes, without apparently any property qualification.

Recently, however, meetings were specially convened to consider the matter, and after weighing the proposals of all the committees, Mr. Crooke proposes that persons qualified for membership should be the following:—

(*a.*)—Zamíndárs paying Rs. 200 revenue.
(*b.*)—Payers of Rs. 10 license-tax.
(*c.*)—Duly qualified vakils and mukhtars.
(*d.*)—Pensioners in receipt of Rs. 10 per mensem.
(*e.*)—Government servants on Rs. 25 and upwards.

I notice that only one out of six committees proposed to admit Government servants, and I am inclined to doubt whether Government service in itself is a sufficient qualification for membership.

On all other points, Mr. Crooke's proposals appear quite unobjectionable and embody the wishes of the committees.

The only point on which the different committees appear to be at variance was the amount of revenue to be paid by a zamíndár to entitle him to become a candidate.

Most of the committees suggested Rs. 500; but I agree with Mr. Crooke that Rs. 200 is sufficient.

Kásganj voted for excluding licenses under Rs. 25; but the general feeling is in favour of a Rs. 10 qualification, and this appears to me high enough.

III.—The preparation and annual correction of the list of electors.

There is no pretence at any system except in *Agra* and *Muttra.*

In Agra, the lists are corrected annually.

The conservancy inspector goes round, and makes a house to house visitation and corrects the lists; these are laid before the committee, and are revised by the Assistant Secretary and Members, and are then open to inspection by the general public.

In *Firozabad*, this work is said to be done by the Tahsíldár.

In *Fatehpur Sikri*, there are no electors.

In the *Muttra* district, the Collector reports that the lists are annually revised and corrected by house to house visitation.

In *Etáwah*, the lists were prepared for the first time in 1882; but the method of preparation is not explained.

In *Mainpuri*, the lists were never once corrected from 1868 till this year, when new lists were prepared by the Superintendent, under the supervision of the President after examination of the license-tax registers and pay bills.

In *Fatehgarh*, the register of electors has only once been revised since 1873.

The town is divided into wards, and the head-constables appear to be the moving spirits; they and some of the committee went round their wards this year, and corrected the lists. A copy of this list is kept at each Police chauki, and a general list of electors is filed in the head Municipal office and the Collector's kutcherry.

In *Etah* the Tahsíldár has it all his own way; he selects a number of respectable persons and takes their votes. It does not appear that there is anything that deserves the name of a register of electors.

Thus it is very clear that, as a general rule, there is no proper arrangement for keeping of a correct list of electors in the municipalities of this division.

IV.—The means adopted to secure the attendance of voters on election day.

Agra publishes the time and place of voting in its three local newspapers and in the Delhi Gazette, and also parts of placards about the town.

Here, however, voting is allowed by proxy, and the candidates usually go round beforehand to the voters and collect proxy papers.

In a large town like Agra (as might be supposed) a certain amount of interest is taken in the elections, at all events by the candidates themselves, if not by electors.

In *Firozabad* the date of election is notified by tap of drum.

In *Fatehgarh* the head constables at the last election went round (with some of the committee) to the elector's houses andtook the votes.

In *Muttra* and *Bindraban* the Superintendent appears to go round the town and take the votes of the electors; but in *Kosi*, in this district, the electors are summoned to the municipal office to vote; but how their attendance is secured does not appear.

In *Etah*, *Mainpuri*, and *Etáwah* the townspeople are warned of the coming election by public crier, tap of drum or whatever the local system of proclamation may be.

There is evidently an entire want of system in notifying to electors the time and place of election.

V.—The nomination of candidates.

I gather that, practically, there is no system of nomination. *Fatehgarh*, it is true, professes to have a rule that every candidate must be nominated by two registered electors; but this rule is not attended to; moreover the retiring members of the Committee are assumed to be candidates for the new election.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

In *Etáwah* Government (represented, I presume, by the Collector) nominates the candidates. Nowhere else is any system of nomination said to prevail. I presume that all the retiring members and any new man who can collect a few votes, either by canvassing the electors at their houses or at the poll itself, are accepted as candidates for election.

VI.—Lastly we come to the election itself and the system of records of votes.

Agra.—Votes by Wards.—At each polling place, a list of qualified electors is published and the votes are taken and recorded by members of the committee who sit for that purpose. Votes can be given verbally or by proxy, and (as I have already explained) it is common for candidates to go round and collect proxy papers before the day of the election.

Plumping is not allowed, but each elector has one or two votes according, I presume, to the number of vacancies to be filled up.

In *Firozabad* the tahsíldár holds the election.

In *Fatehgarh* the voting is by wards; but at the last election, as I have already explained, the Head Constable of the ward went from house to house in company with some members of the old committee and recorded the votes; in almost every instance the electors giving their votes for the retiring members of the committee. As a matter of fact, the same members are re-elected over and over again, and this does not appear an unnatural result of the system above mentioned. Each elector has as many votes as there are members for his ward.

In *Muttra* and *Brindaban* a similar system seems to prevail. The Superintendent goes round from house to house and collects the votes.

In *Kosi* in this district, the electors record their votes at the Town Hall.

In *Etah*, *Etáwah* and *Mainpuri*, the electors came to the Town Hall to vote.

Registers, with separate columns or separate lists, are opened one for each candidate and the elector's names and signatures are recorded below the name of the candidate whom they support generally, the electors have one vote for each candidate and cannot plump; but the Collector of Etáwah reports that each elector has ten votes and can plump for any one candidate. This appears to me a somewhat extraordinary arrangement, and is at variance with the custom of all other districts.

I now proceed to the suggestions that I have to offer:—

I.—As regards the qualification of electors I have none to make, nor does there appear to be any necessity for Government interference.

There is no need to extend the suffrage, for there is no demand for it. Similarly there is no use in raising the property qualification as the right of voting does not appear to be abused; and as to a uniform scale for the division, that is impossible, as the circumstances of different municipalities are very different. Some are large towns, others mere villages.

II.—As regards the qualification for members of committees, the case is somewhat different. I find that no less than four districts in the division, require absolutely no qualification list; this I think is wrong.

Let the present committees determine what it is to be, but let them have *some* qualification, either determined by house or landed property, license tax or income; and it should of course be sufficiently high to exclude men with us and take in the municipality or ward which they aspire to represent.

III.—The preparation and annual correction of the register of electors is, I consider, of primary importance, if the electoral system is to have a fair trial; and it is evident that at present in many municipalities there are no registers worthy of the name.

Now there is no real difficulty in keeping up the registers, it only requires a little trouble.

The electors consist of zamíndárs, pensioners, Government servants, license-tax payers, vakils, mukhtars, and house-holders. Our offices supply the necessary information on most points, in the khewats, pension and pay lists, license-tax, registers, census returns, &c., and a tolerably correct list could even be prepared in the office.

The only trouble is to get a correct list of persons eligible to vote solely by virtue of the house-rent at which the house they occupy is assessed; but the Secretary should have no difficulty in preparing this list. He should first have a return made showing all houses rateable at the minimum rent fixed as a qualification for a voter; and this could be easily done with the assistance of the census-tax returns.

The Secretary could utilise the services of the Municipal Commissioners and the Superintendent is preparing this return.

This list could be revised every year (say three months before the election) and any changes in the tenancy recorded.

Lists of electors could then be compiled in the municipal office, and published in the manner most suitable to the circumstances of the municipality. Objections should be admitted within a specified time, say one month from the publication of the list.

When the register is finally completed and sanctioned, one copy should be kept at the kutcherry and another at the town hall and extracts for each separate ward or muhalla at the nearest police station.

IV.—To secure the attendance of the electors at the poll, it appears to me that the best way would be to serve a notice or summons on each individually; and in this there is really no difficulty.

The Secretary has at his disposal a large body of servants, chaprasis, and if needs be, of municipal chaukidars.

It is true that hereafter the chaukidars will no longer be municipal servants, but even then I see no particular objection to utilizing their services in this way; for the work would only take a few hands once in the year.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

To each server could be given an extract from the register of elector, and book of summonses with counterfoils.

A summons would be handed to each elector, and his signature or work taken on the counterfoil. Unless these municipal elections are to remain the force they are at present, I consider that no trouble should be spared to secure the attendance of the electors.

V.—The nomination of candidates appears to me unnecessary; but I am of opinion that every candidate should notify to the Secretary of the Municipality, his intention to stand for the town or ward, as the case may be, to enable the committee to determine before hand whether he is or is not qualified for the appointment.

VI.—The election itself should be held at the Town Hall or (where the voting is by wards, at polling places previously notified to the electors.

All voting, in my opinion, should be in person or by qualified agent. No proxies should be allowed; for with an ignorant community the system is liable to the greatest abuse.

Separate lists should be opened for each approved candidate, and the names of the voters inscribed below with their signatures when they are literate.

The Secretary should himself preside at the Town Hall and members of the committee at the branch polling places.

Under no circumstance should the Superintendent, committee, or any one else be allowed to go round and record the votes at the houses of electors (as is the practice in many places at present). Votes should be recorded at the polling places and at the polling places only.

VII.—The number of votes allowed should be the number of vacancies in the committee, and no plumping should be permitted.

But the real fact is, there is no use in framing rules only; the rules even now in force in many municipalities are very different from the *practice*; what we want to see, is the rules carried out.

In my experience, the only way to ensure this is to require a detailed report on the elections every year.

It is true that at present a report is submitted to Government; but that is only with the view to obtain the sanction of Government to the appointment of the new members elected, and that is insufficient; what is required is the addition of a few paragraphs giving information regarding the revision of the register of votes, the means taken to secure their attendance, the time and place of voting and the number of voters recorded as compared with past years.

I am no advocate for long reports; but the information I require could all be given on an extra half sheet of paper, and the fact that such a report has to be submitted will keep the committees up to the mark and make the collectors see that they do not neglect their duty.

No. $\frac{401}{\text{XXIII.-586}}$, dated Bareilly, the 16th August 1882.

From R. M. EDWARDS, Esquire, Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to state that on receipt of G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June, and No. 162, dated 29th idem, I forwarded them to District Officers with instructions to report at an early date on the points referred, *viz* :—

Firstly, the elective system, whether and in what form it should be extended; secondly, the election of a non-official chairman in accordance with the views of the Government of India, as expressed in the Resolution of 18th May, wherever a suitable person can be found able as well as willing to undertake the duties.

2. I now submit in original the reports received from the several District Officers, which only reached me yesterday. The report for the municipality of Pilibhít is still, I regret to say, wanting; but as its dispatch was notified, it would appear to have miscarried. It has been telegraphed for.

3. The elective system for the appointment of members of municipal committees is in force in every municipality in the division, with the exception of Nagína. Najíbabad and Bísalpur. In the two former, nomination alternates with election, that is to say, the outgoing members are replaced one year by election, and the next by nomination.

4. The following return shows the number of persons entitled to vote and the number who exercised the right in 1879 and 1881. For the years 1880 and 1882 members were nominated under the system above described :—

	1879.		1881.	
	Persons entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Persons entitled to Vote.	Voted.
Nagina - - - -	238	135	226	162
Najíbabad - - -	500	213	519	241

5. It must not, however, be supposed that these figures are of any real value, or show the feelings and wishes of the people with regard to the franchise. They show rather the result of domiciliary visits by chaprasis, not merely to remind them of their pivileges, but to bring them to the poll. In these towns, as elsewhere, the people show an utter want of interest in the matter; and, as remarked by the Magistrate, if you compel the electors to vote, the election is a farce; if you do not compel them, they will stop at home.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

6. In both these towns there can be no difficulty in eliminating the existing nomination system and substituting election in all cases. To change the apathy of the electors into interest it will be necessary that the members of committee be invested with real power affecting the voters, so that the latter may see and feel that it is to their direct and material advantage to elect the most trustworthy and capable representatives. At present those entitled to vote are indifferent, because they regard the candidates as mere Government agents for the administration of the octroi, with which they themselves have little or no concern.

7. In Bisalpur nomination is in force. The committee, while approving of a change to election, wish to inaugurate a system which would have the effect of making the committee a perpetual self-electing body. With the object *apprently* of keeping the whole power in their own hands, they would only permit votes in favour of their own nominees, indifferent to the wishes of the townspeople generally. It is, however, possible that such a view is erroneous; and that regarding the community as apathetic in the matter of representatives, they merely wish to save themselves trouble. Their proposal is of course inadmissible; but the amendment suggested by the Magistrate might be introduced in lieu of the existing system, *viz.*, that any five voters might nominate a candidate, and only in default of such nomination would the committee be empowered to nominate. In all the other municipalities in the division the elective system has been long in force.

8. As the several District Officers, whose reports accompany, have described the existing arrangement more or less in detail, it is unnecessary for me to do so also, especially as the committee to be convened by G. O. No. 230, dated 7th current, will commence its sittings in a few days, when I shall be prepared to ventilate my views on the subject. I have all the necessary information by me.

9. I proceed to para. 3 of No. 147, and here it will be necessary to give the results of the action taken by each municipality. I commence with Bareilly as the leading one of the division.

BAREILLY.

Population - -	101,688	Members - - -	25
Income - - -	Rs. 92,926	Elected - - -	17
		Officials - - -	8
		Natives - - -	20
		Europeans - - -	5

The elective system is in force, by muhallas or wards since 1873, but unsatisfactory.

At a meeting held on 25th July, 17 members were present, including Magistrate of district, Joint-Magistrate, and Tahsildar. G. O. No. 147 was considered, and the following resolution passed:—

"The committee are most strongly of opinion that it is absolutely necessary for the administration of the municipality that the Magistrate and Collector remain President of the committee. That owing to the state of parties, it is advisable that two Vice-Presidents be appointed—one a Hindu and one a Muhammadan—to take the chair alternately. That Lala Kanhaya Lal and Tajammul Husain be elected Vice-Presidents."

From my knowledge of the city of Bareilly and the state of feeling existing between the rival creeds, I am of opinion that the above arrangements are absolutely necessary at present for the proper and efficient administration of the municipality.

MORADABAD MUNICIPALITY.

Population - -	67,158	Members - - -	18
Income - -	Rs. 45,747	Elected - - -	12
		Officials - - -	6
		Natives - - -	13
		Europeans - - -	5

Elective system in force, but moribund.

It was unanimously resolved at a general meeting that the Collector and Magistrate must be amalgamated with the committee. That election is out of the question, having been proved impracticable, and that it is desirable that the Collector should nominate members. All the members joined in declaring that there was no Native of the city fit for the post of either President or Secretary; and they unanimously elected the Magistrate of the district President, and Mr. Thornton, Assistant Magistrate, their Secretary.

I would remind Government that the same bitter antagonism which prevails, as already remarked, in Bareilly between the followers of the two faiths, also exists in Moradabad; and that I am of opinion that the action by the Native members of the committee in electing the Magistrate as President is under existing circumstances advisable, indeed necessary for the proper administration of the municipality. The Vice-President will be a Native. I pointed out privately to the President the expediency of having, if possible, a Native Secretary. While admitting this view, he stated that it was found to be impracticable from the ignorance of English among the members, and the fact of all the able members of the committee being professional men, who could not give the necessary time to the duties which in these days are by no means light.

I would request attention to the Magistrate's views regarding the substitution of direct taxation in lieu of octroi as a means of making the electoral bodies take an interest in the election of members and municipal administration generally. It would certainly have that effect for a time at least, but the remedy would soon be found worse than the disease.

SHAHJAHANPUR MUNICIPALITY.

Population - -	77,533	Members - - -	22
Income - -	Rs. 70,972	Elected - - -	17
		Officials - - -	5
		Natives - - -	18
		Europeans - - -	4

The elective system is in force.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

All city residents, whose houses are of the annual value of Rs. 24 and upwards, have the right of voting, and any voter can be elected a member of committee. The constituency numbers 1,343 persons.

On the Government Resolution being laid before the committee, the members (Native) at first expressed themselves adverse to the new scheme; but eventually, in deference to the wishes of Government, elected by ballot Lala Barati Lal as President, and Mallik Kifayat-ullah as Vice-President. Both these men are Honorary Magistrates, wealthy, and influential; and the President, who knows a little English, is, though a miser, a good man of business.

The committee elected Sakahwat Hussain, a vakil of the Judge's court, as Secretary, a very good man, though unacquainted with English. He informed me at a private interview that his private business would not seriously interfere with his secretariat duties.

I interviewed all the leading members and discussed the new arrangements. Very different from those of the other headquarter municipalities, I found these Sháhjahánpur men proud and elated at their new position, and confident of success. I told them that in my opinion the city was scarcely sufficiently represented. This they admitted, saying that more members should be appointed, so that every muhalla or group of muhallas should have its representative.

I am of opinion that the appointments of President, Vice-President, and Secretary should be confirmed; that the official element hitherto in the committee should retire, and the non-official Native committee be allowed to try their hand at administration. I do not think that they have much idea of the difficulties before them, or of the amount of attention and labour the work will require; but it is well that here, where the leading Natives show a desire to adopt the Government proposals in their integrity, that the experiment should be made.

The above three municipalities are by far the largest and most important in the division. I proceed to the others.

BIJNOR MUNICIPALITY.

Population - - -	15,125	Members - - - -		14
Income for 1880-81 - Rs.	6,832	Elected - - - -		9
		Officials - - - -		5

The elective system in in force, but has hitherto failed, because of its being regarded with no interest whatever by the people, who only come to vote on compulsion.

Although the Magistrate of the district has not resigned his appointment of President, he has endeavoured to carry out the wishes of Government; and after full explanation and discussion, one Mehrban Ali was elected chairman; but this is looked upon as a tentative measure, pending the result of the committee at the Government headquarters. Sri Lal, a good English scholar and holding the position of Secretary to the Bijnor Agricultural Institution, was elected Secretary.

The following was the result of the voting in the last three years :—

1880.		1881.		1882.	
Entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Entitled to Vote.	Voted.
240	102	187	95	200	125

NAGÍNA.

Population - -	20,539	Members - - -		12
Income for 1880-81 - Rs.	9,925	Officials - - -		2
		Natives - - -		10

The system of alternating election and nomination in this municipality has already been described in para. 3 of this report. There remains the arrangement about a chairman. The Magistrate is of opinion that it will hereafter be possible to obtain a non-official chairman for this municipality, but no such appointment should be made immediately or until some man of influence and position has learnt the duties. For the present, the Magistrate considers that the Tahsíldár might fill the post of chairman or secretary, and eventually retire from the management altogether.

This proposal is no more or less than leaving matters in *statu quo* until the conclusions of the forthcoming committee are promulgated, as to all intents and purposes the Tahsíldár is at present President. If he were to retire from that position at once, I am of opinion that there would be much difficulty in getting any regular attendance at meetings, and that the management of the octroi would soon fall into the hands of the subordinate establishment, when many and serious evils would result. The only way of avoiding this, and complying with the wishes of Government, will be to introduce the new system very gradually, testing its efficiency at every step in advance.

NAJÍBABAD.

Population - -	17,750	Members - - -		13
Income for 1880-81 - Rs.	14,950	Officials - - -		3
		Natives - - -		12

The remarks regarded for Nagína apply equally to this municipality.

CHÁNDPÚR.

Population - -	11,238	Members - - -		11
Income for 1880-81 - Rs.	4,598	Officials - - -		2
		Natives - - -		10

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

The elective system is in force, and if we could only rely on the return given below as a real and tangible proof of its working, we might set it down as a success; but the Magistrate reports that the practice has been for chaprasis, deputed for the purpose, to bring up reluctant voters in batches of 20 or 30 at a time, when a few names of eligible candidates are read out, and their approval of the selection recorded. This objectionable practice has now been discontinued by order; it was resorted to as the only way of getting voters to the poll. The Magistrate of the district is of opinion that there is no member of the existing committee fit for the office of chairman, and recommends that arrangements for this and other outlying municipalities may be allowed to stand over for the present, their cases being taken up in the cold weather by the Magistrate when on tour. I concur in thinking that a suitable and efficient permanent chairman cannot be selected from the existing committee. The only resource would be to let the Tahsíldár carry out the duties at present, or the senior member present be considered chairman for the day.

1880.		1881.		1882.	
Entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Entitled to Vote.	Voted.
104	100	100	88	109	109

DHÁMPUR.

Population - -	5,708	Members - - -	10
Income - -	Rs. 4,382	Officials - - -	2
		Natives - - -	9

Here also the elective system is in force, but it has as yet proved a failure, owing to the apathy of the electors. The following is the result of the system of election on paper, but it is no real guide or index of the feelings of the people or voters :—

1880.		1881.		1882.	
Entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Entitled to Vote.	Voted.	Entitled to Vote.	Voted.
97	57	93	57	96	53

The same remarks apply here as in Chándpur. No member of the existing committee is considered fit for the post of chairman.

DHANAURA IN MORADABAD DISTRICT.

Population - -	4,812	Members - - -	9
Income - -	Rs. 3,206	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	7

Here a tax on circumstances and property is in force. Members are elected. At last election 93 persons voted out of 120 qualified voters; qualification, Rs. 100. The committee has elected the Magistrate of the district their chairman; a non-official Native member was elected Vice-President. This, if carefully worked upon, is by no means a bad arrangement, as it permits the gradual education of the Vice-President for the duties, and his eventually stepping into the post of chairman.

CHANDAUSI.

Population - -	27,500	Members - - -	9
Income - -	Rs. 11,210	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	7

Tax on circumstances and property in force. The Committee, after hearing the views of Government, unanimously elected the Magistrate of the district chairman, and a Native non-official member Vice-President.

The elective system is in force, and at last election out of 471 qualified voters 124 actually voted. This is an important test of the appreciation of the franchise by the people. The members assess the tax, so that those entitled to vote should display natural anxiety as to the individuals in whose hands for good or for evil the power of taxation rests.

But it is not so; general indifference prevails: and though Chanduasi is the largest and most important trading mart in the division, the townspeople and the members of committee are marvellously apathetic in everything relating to municipal administration.

The plan of having the Magistrate of the district President, and a non-official member Vice-President, may lead to good results.

AMROHA.

Population - -	36,146	Members - - -	9
Income - -	Rs. 14,167	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	8

Octroi in force.

Members are elected; 39 out of 607 voted at last election. This town is so essentially conservative, that as a matter of course it unanimously elected the Magistrate of the district as chairman.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

A competent non-official native member was elected Vice-President.

This arrangement is perhaps the best that could have been made. The chairman can gradually make the work over to the Vice-President, as the latter becomes more acquainted with the duties, eventually disappearing altogether in favour of the Vice-President.

SAMBHAL.

Octroi.

Population - -	35,202	Members - - -	9
Income - - Rs.	14,031	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	7

The elective system is in force: 42 out of 333 voted at last election.

The committee unanimously elected the Magistrate of the district to be their chairman.

No Vice-President has yet been elected, as each of the members considers himself best entitled to the post.

Until they can arrange their differences, the Tahsíldár had better assume the duties of Vice-President, but only as a temporary measure.

BUDAUN.

Octroi.

Population - -	33,688	Members - - -	12
Income - - Rs.	15,457	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	9

The elective system is in force.

The percentage of electors voting to number of voters on the register at last election was 19. The average for seven years is 16.

There has never been a contested election in this city. The election of retiring members has been the rule, or the heir of a deceased member. At a general meeting held on 13th July, at which only natives were present and no official, G. O. No. 147 were duly considered and discussed. At this meeting and subsequently at private interviews the members of committee declared themselves quite incompetent to carry on the work of the municipality without the aid of the District Officer as President. They assert that if a native President be appointed, two parties will spring up—one favouring and supporting him, the other continually trying to injure him. That if a European officer be made President, all the members will work willingly under his guidance, and there will be no bickering or cause of complaint; but it would not be so with a native President: these evils, which experience has shown to be real, would speedily arise. The resolution winds up with the query—"To what purpose should we then cast ourselves into such a troublesome and difficult position?"

My own impression, after consultation with all the members, is that they would sooner resign than submit to have a native President. I think they exaggerate the evils they dread; but when I said so to them, the reply was—There are numberless little matters amongst us natives which you European officials do not and cannot know, but which we feel assured will cause dissension and jealousy.

Shaikh Sharaf-ud-din, Honorary Magistrate, and the leading native at Budaun, and one who has always taken a prominent part in municipal matters, was elected Vice-President. There could not have been a better choice.

It is manifest that the principal men of Budaun city care little for a seat on the committee, or the electors for the privilege of voting.

BILSI.

A tax on circumstances and property.

Population - -	6,295	Members - - -	9
Income - - Rs.	2,650	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	7

The elective system is in force: average percentage of votes to number on register for last seven years 54; at last election 48.

At a meeting held on 20th July to consider G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June, Mr. C. Hamilton, a non-official member, was unanimously elected President, and Lala Nihal Singh, also a non-official member, Vice-President.

UJÁHNI.

A tax on circumstances and property.

Population - -	7,035	Members - - -	9
Income - - Rs.	2,928	Officials - - -	3
		Natives - - -	7

The elective system in force. Percentage of voters to votes on register was 58 at last election.

At a meeting held on 15th, at which no official was present, the members were unanimous that the Magistrate of the district or the Tansíldár should be president.

Lala Janki Parshad was unanimously elected Vice-President, but one of the members was of opinion that this appointment of Janki Parshad should only be for a limited period, "so that other members might have a chance, and no injustice be done."

The views of this committee regarding the appointment of a native president were almost identical with those of Budaun. They recorded their opinion that many difficulties would arise by the appointment of a native non-official member as president: his fellow-townsmen would not accept his authority; being chosen from among themselves, he would have no influence; and when action had to be taken in carrying out proceedings of the committee, complaints would spring up: whereas all would accept and comply with the orders of the District Officer.

I fear there is a great deal of truth in this. The people fear themselves and their petty jealousies. They have no reliance on the good intentions of their neighbours or so-called friends.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

SAHASWÁN.

Tax on circumstances and property.

Population	14,673	Members			9
Income Rs.	5,734	Officials			3
		Natives			7

The committee desires the appointment of the Magistrate of the district as chairman, and by a majority of three to two elected Lala Ulma Shankar as vice-president.

The elective system is in force. The percentage of voters who voted at last election in 1882 to number on register was 45.

BISALPUR.

Octroi.

Population	8,905	Members			8 nominated.
Income Rs.	2,650	Officials			2
		Natives			7

As already remarked in para. 7, the system of nomination has hitherto been in force. The proposals regarding election have been already recorded.

With reference to para. 3 of G. O. No. 147, the committee resolved that it was impossible to discharge the duties of president without a knowledge of English, which none of the members possess. and they therefore consider that the Magistrate of the district should continue to fill the office of president. They will, after due consideration, select a vice-president from among themselves. Jealousy similar to that displayed at Sambhal has, it is believed, delayed the appointment of a vice-president.

TILHAR.

Octroi.

Population	15,507	Members			12
Income Rs.	8,963	Officials			3
		Natives			10

The elective system is in force. The qualified voters number 195. The qualification is the same as in Sháhjahánpur, *viz.*, ownership of houses of annual value of Rs. 24 or upwards.

Unlike the head-quarters committee, the members were firm in their decision that the committee could not work without the assistance of the District Officer, and they desire to retain him as president

Sayyid Zakir Ali was elected Vice-President by a majority of votes over Ujagar Lal. The Vice-President is the leading man at Tilhar, and takes much interest in education. The appointment is a good one, and should be confirmed.

The committee were of opinion that the Tahsíldár should continue to be a member; it would otherwise be difficult to get the members to attend the meetings.

The municipality of Pilibhít is alone wanting to complete this report. It has been telegraphed for, and will be forwarded on receipt.

No. $\frac{383}{XXIII.}$, dated Budaun, the 27th July 1882.

From G. ADAMS, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate, and Collector of Budaun, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter No. $\frac{349}{XXIII.-386}$, dated 4th July 1882, I have the honour to report as follows on the points referred to in G. O. No. 147 of 21st June, and No. 162 of 29th June 1882.

2. A system of election is in force in all the municipal towns of this district, being the same I believe that is in force throughout the province for every town where the members of the committee are elected and not nominated.

3. I have already in my letter No. $\frac{198}{XIX.-302}$, dated 20th April 1882 expressed my opinion as to the existing municipal committees and their election.

4. The following figures, taken from the returns of seven years from 1876 to 1882, show the amount of interest which is taken in the objection of members:—

	Average Percentage of Electors Voting to the Number of Electors on the Register.	Percentage of Electors who Voted at the last Election in 1882.
Budaun city	16	19
Sahaswan	51	45
Bilsi	54	48
Ujháni	37	58

5. There has never been a contested election in Budaun city or in Ujháni or Sahaswán and only one in Bilsi. The election of retiring members has been the rule: and it is evident that in the popular mind the office of municipal commissioner tends to become personal and hereditary. Failing the heir of a resigning member, his partner in business is the popular candidate.

6. It is also noteworthy that while at the last election 58 per cent. of the electors (against an average of only 37 per cent.) came forward to vote at Ujháni for the one unopposed candidate, only 45 per cent. (against an average of 51 per cent.) voted at the last election at Sahaswán, when there was a serious effort made by his enemies to oust one member who had sat on the committee for years. It was a curious fact that though there was much enmity to this member, no candidate came forward to oppose him.

7. It seems clear, therefore, 1st, that the electors care extremely little for the use of their power; 2nd, that they are less ready than ever to exercise their power when they may thereby make a powerful enemy; and 3rd, that the principal men of the town have but little desire to obtain a seat in the committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

8. As to the last point, it may well be that an increase to the independent powers of the committee would make a seat in the committee an object of greater desire to the upper classes of the townsmen; and I have already stated my opinion as to the present insufficient representation of the people.

9. With more numerous representatives having greater power, it might be that the general interest in the committee would increase, and that the electors might exercise their right of voting more generally. I still have some faith in election by *panchayats* as being in accordance with popular custom; but if that be not adopted, it would be well to have more than one place where votes should be received, and to introduce the ballot instead of open voting.

10. I append to this letter copies of the proceedings of the municipal committees of Budaun city, Bilsi, and Ujháni, regarding the election of presidents and vice-presidents, in which the non-official members were left as much as possible to themselves. The Sahaswán committee have not held a meeting, and I cannot delay my report for them.

11. The Badaun city committee declare that they require an official president, giving reasons which, though far from complimentary to their own natural character, are I believe held in good faith by them. They however rather exaggerate their own failings in this matter, and for ordinary work may I think be left a good deal to themselves. I would note as a satisfactory sign of progress that the native non-official members of their own motives have now proposed the division of the city into wards, each of which will be supervised by one of the members, the vice-president exercising a general supervision.

12. The resolution of the Ujháni committee is almost identical in its sense with that of the Badaun meeting. They admit that jealousy of their fellows is so strong among the natives, that they will not trust or work with a non-official native president.

13. At Bilsi the committee promptly took Government at its word, and elected their non-official European compeer as president, thereby avoiding any possibility of jealousy among the native members.

14. The office of vice-president is evidently considered to be a very minor one, the committee not yet recognising the extent to which the vice-president may take the president's place; and at Budaun and Ujháni the members elected one of their fellows who had hitherto taken the most prominent part in municipal work. At Bilsi they chose a pensioned Inspector of Police, probably with regard to his standing as an ex-official of Government. That jealousy however, to which allusion has been made, seems to appear in the protest of Pandit Behari Lal of Ujháni against the continuance in office of Lala Janki Parshad.

15. Regarding this last point, I would note that Government has not yet stated the term for which the presidents and vice-presidents are to hold office.

PROCEEDINGS of a Meeting of the Budaun Municipal Committee, held on the 13th July 1882.

PRESENT:

Shaikh Muhammad Sharf-ud-din,
Maulvi Hamid Bakhsh,
Chaudhri Sher Ali,
Lala Ganga Ram,
Lala Dwarka Das,
Shaikh Mumtaz-ul-din,
Hakim Mumtazud-din,
} Members.

1. The committee are of opinion that the Magistrate of the district be appointed president, and Shaikh Muhammad Sharf-ud-din, vice-president.

2. With advertence to the Resolution noted in the margin, we are of opinion that there are a few natives who wish to devote their time to the management of Government affairs entrusted to them in preference to their own. It will certainly show our abilities and conduce to our authority and welfare if we administer the Government affairs in preference to our own; and this we should do in such a manner as shall not be open to suspicion. But the habits and the violent discussions of the natives are such as would generally wound the feelings of each other. They will try to prove a thing to be true which is actually false; and after all their actions will be open to suspicion, and the result would be nothing but disappointment and heart-burning of the members. The above is shown by experience, &c. Hence it is necessary that the District Officer should continue to be the president, so that the above evils may be done away with and there will be no enmity and heart-burning in future, and the work will be done as satisfactorily as usual. As the people derive much benefit from the municipality, it is probable that any native Government servant or other persons may bring forward groundless complaints. That if it is thought advisable that the office of president be transferred from one member to another, or that if any Government servant tries to get him removed from this office and to have him disgraced, the result will at the end be that one party of the members will try to defend him, and the other will try to do him injury. Under these circumstances, to what purpose then should we throw ourselves to such a troublesome task? If any European officer be appointed president, and every member works under his guidance, there will be no cause of complaint.

Government Resolution No. 147, dated 21st June 1882.

G. ADAMS, President.

PROCEEDINGS of a Meeting of the Ujháni Municipal Committee, held on the 15th July 1882.

PRESENT:

Lala Janki Parshad,
Chaube Narayan Das,
Mirza Haidar Husain,
Pandit Behari Lal,
Pandit Parshadi Lal,
Lala Sita Ram,
} Members.

In the opinion of the members of this committee, the Magistrate of the district or the Tahsíldár should be the president, and Lala Janki Parshad be appointed vice-president in order to conduct the ordinary business. At present there are many difficulties in the appointment of a native non-official member as president: firstly, because the people, being residents of the same place, would not for the present like to accept the authority or influence of a native chosen from among them; and when full proceedings of any action will be taken, it will give rise to complaints; and secondly, because natives are not in the habit of exercising such authority over their countrymen, but they would comply with orders of the District Officer.

Pandit Behari Lal, one of the members, is of opinion that the appointment of Lala Janki Parshad as vice-president should be made for a limited period only, so that the other members may have a chance of being elected as vice-president, and that no injustice may be done.

G. ADAMS, President.

PROCEEDINGS of a Meeting of the Bilsi Municipal Committee, dated 20th July 1882.

PRESENT:

Lala Nihal Singh.
Lala Bhairon Parshad.
Lala Thakur Das.
Lala Dodhraj.
Mr. C. Hamilton.

Meeting assembled to carry out Government Order No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, for the election of president and vice-president for the Bilsi committee.

1. Proposed by Nihal Singh, and carried unanimously, that Mr. Hamilton be elected president.

2. Proposed by Mr. Hamilton, and carried unanimously, that Nihal Singh be elected vice-president.

Read a petition from Kalyan Rae and Salig Ram, *thikadárs* of the *sabz-mandi*, to the effect that they have paid Rs. 215 for the *thika* of the *sabz-mundi* and *parao*, but the sellers of vegetables, &c., do not make use of the *sabz-mandi*, and that the petitioners are therefore unable to collect their dues; and they therefore pray that all sellers of vegetables and other articles included in the list on which the *thika* was given be forbidden to sell their wares otherwise than in the *sabz-mandi*.

Resolved, that all sellers of fruit, vegetables, and other articles included in the list be prohibited from selling their wares in the bazar and be compelled to make use of the *sabz-mandi*. Sellers of fruit, &c., who make use of hired shops in the bazar, and do not expose the things in the open street, are exempted. Sahibganj being a considerable distance from the *sabz-mandi*, sellers of fruits and vegetables will be allowed to sell their things there in the bazar as formerly, and the *thikadárs* will collect their dues from them.

Proposed by Kalyan Rae that the *thikádars* be prohibited from taking *parao*-toll from residents of Bilsi who load carts for the purpose of sending them to other markets, and who keeps such carts standing opposite their shops, but who do not make use of the *parao*.

Resolved that the *thikadárs* be called upon to produce their license for the inspection of the next meeting of the committee.

Read a petition from the girdawár to the effect that Tulsi Ram has, without permission of the committee, constructed a *pucka chabutra* opposite his house in the bazar.

Resolved that, as the *chabutra* does not interfere with public traffic, it be allowed to remain, but that Tulsi Ram be fined a rupee for making it without permission.

Read a petition from the girdawár to the effect that Subhan *kunjra* flings a lot of rubbish and refuse fruit down in the bazar.

Resolved, that Subhan *kunjra* be fined four annas and cautioned for the future.

Proposed by the president, and carried unanimously, that a meeting of the committee be held regularly every second Saturday, commencing from the 5th August.

KALYAN RAE, Member.	THAKUR DAS, Member.	C. HAMILTON, President.
DODHRAJ, Member.	BHAIRON PARSHAD, Member.	NIHAL SINGH, Member.

No. $\frac{349}{XXI.1.}$, dated Budaun, the 4th August 1882.

From R. G. HARDY, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate and Collector, Budaun, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN continuation of my predecessor's letter No. $\frac{383}{XXIII}$, dated 27th July 1882, I have the honour to report that the Sahaswan municipal committee, at a meeting held on 27th July 1882, desires the appointment of the Collector as president, and (by a majority of three to two) of Lala Uma Shankar as vice-president.

No. $\frac{277}{XXIV.d.-51}$, dated Bareilly, the 26th July 1882.

From M. A. MCCONACHEY, Esquire, Magistrate and President, Municipal Committee of Bareilly, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

WITH reference to your Circular No. $\frac{254}{XXIII.-38}$, dated the 11th July 1882, I have the honour to submit a copy of the proceedings of a full meeting of the Bareilly municipal committee held yesterday in the Town Hall, at which I, as head of the district, was unanimously elected president. The views

of the Government of India were fully explained to the members, and they were called upon to express their opinions freely and vote as their convictions dictated. They one and all felt and gave expression to the feeling that, owing to the state of parties in Bareilly, it was impossible for any *one* of them to satisfactorily undertake the duties of chairman ; and the feeling was so strong that neither party should have any advantage, that it was resolved that two vice-presidents—one a Hindu and the other a Muhammadan—should be elected. Both these gentlemen are good English scholars, and I am certain that they will be of great assistance to me in the conduct of business. It is my intention to gradually entrust them, as far as possible, with powers and responsibilities, and to accustom them to the exercise of authority. They will take the chair alternately whilst I am on tour in the district as well as on ordinary occasions.

The system of election was also brought forward and discussed ; but at the suggestion of one of the Native members, its final consideration was adjourned until the 4th August, to enable the question to be more thoroughly ventilated at a meeting of members of the Rohilkhand *Anjumán* to be held on Saturday next.

EXTRACT Para. 10 from the Proceedings of a Meeting of the Bareilly Municipal Commissioners, held on the 25th July 1882.

Para. 10, Circular No. 147 of 1882, laid before committee and read.

Resolved, at the suggestion of non-official members, that the consideration of the elective system be adjourned till the 4th, and the question be discussed in the *Anjumán* with a view of ascertaining the real opinion of the citizens. The committee are most strongly of opinion that it is absolutely necessary, for the administration of the municipality that the Magistrate and Collector remain president of the committee. That owing to the state of parties it is advisable to appoint two vice-presidents — one a Hindu and one a Musalman—to take the chair alternately when both present. That Lala Kanhaya Lal and Tajammul Husain be elected vice-presidents.

T. STOKER,
Secretary.

No. $\frac{295}{XXIVd.-51}$, dated Bareilly, the 10th August 1882.

From M. A. McCONAGHEY, Esquire, President, Local Committee, Bareilly, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN continuation of my No. $\frac{277}{XXIVd.-51}$, dated the 26th July, I have the honour to submit a brief account of the proceedings at a meeting of the Rohilkhand Institute held on the 1st August at the Town Hall to discuss the principles which should govern the election or selection of members of the municipal board. The meeting was a crowded and representative one, and was attended by numbers of citizens who were not members of the Institute, free entry being accorded to all comers for the occasion. The majority of the members of the Institute were also present, several speeches were made and free discussion was encouraged. The general feeling of the meeting was decidedly in favour of election as opposed to nomination. It was also the opinion of the great majority that election should be by wards or groups of muhallas, so as to localise the interest of the voters and give more individuality to the proceedings. Voting by ballot at the ward centres, presided over by special committees appointed for the purpose, was also approved of.

The following classes, it was thought, should be qualified for registration as electors :—

(*a*) Persons paying license-tax.
(*b*) Landholders paying Rs. 250 or more land-revenue.
(*c*) Servants on monthly pay of Rs. 20 or more.
(*d*) Pensioners on Rs. 10 per mensem or more.
(*e*) Legal practitioners.
(*f*) Graduates or under-graduates of Universities.
(*g*) Members of the Rohilkhand Institute.

Electors were only to be registered on application made by them to the committee or a registering officer appointed by the committee ; and no person under 20 years of age, or who had not lived for upwards of a year in the ward, should be entitled to registration. Persons convicted of a criminal offence of a heinous nature were also to be excluded from registration. Due notice to be given by public proclamation to electors to register their names, but no official pressure of any description to compel registration to be brought to bear on persons otherwise qualified to vote. No elector to be allowed to vote unless duly registered.

Some members were of opinion that certain qualifications over and above those already mentioned should be insisted on before a person could become a candidate for office ; but the opinion of the majority of those present was that any qualified voter could bring himself forward as a candidate for a seat on the municipal board.

Although the system of election by wards has been in force for many years in the Bareilly municipality, the results, I feel bound to say, are far from encouraging. Little or no interest has hitherto been taken by the inhabitants in these elections, which have justly been pronounced "farces,"* both by officials and non-officials. Out of 1,766 qualified and registered voters only 523 could be pursuaded to attend at the elections held in February 1882. In 1881, 840 persons voted out of 2,139 on the registers, and in 1880 only 483 electors put in an appearance.

* *Vide* Secretary's letter No. $\frac{179}{XIX.-40}$, dated 28th February 1882, to your address, and speeches of Babu Kali Krishen and Munshi Bishan Lal delivered at the Institute on 1st August.

Where then does the fault lie? Not in the principles governing election ; for the rules drawn up by Mr. Low † in 1873 do not contrast unfavourably with those adopted by the meeting of the 1st August 1882, nor (as far as I can ascertain) with the Government officials on whom devolved the task of carrying the rules into execution.

† See appendix A.

The logical conclusion therefore is that the failure of the elective system hitherto has arisen from the apathy of the electors, who very naturally care little or nothing about an election the result of which affects them personally not at all. Until the average elector is made to feel that it is for his interest that a certain person should be returned as member for his ward and certain other candidates excluded, then and not till then will he come forward and vote with a will. His self-interests must be touched before he can become a real voter, ready to sacrifice his time and ease in support of his favourite candidate. If municipal elections are therefore not to remain the farces they have hitherto been, real power for good or evil over the electors must, I hold, be given to members of committees.

To render election successful, the powers conferred on the persons elected must be real and substantial, not nominal and shadowy ; and until such powers are granted, it would be much more consistent to adhere to the principles of nomination. For so far we have actually only been playing at election. Whether it is advisable to confer such powers on the members of municipal boards is a question which Government alone can decide.

Appendix A.

Rules for the Appointment of the Bareilly Municipal Committee.

The municipal committee for the city of Bareilly shall consist of 16 ordinary and 8 *ex-officio* members.

2. The ordinary members shall be appointed by election.

3. For the purpose of electing the ordinary members, the municipality shall be divided into four wards, as detailed below, each ward returning four members:—

1st.—North-west ward, bounded by the main bazar road on the south, the Golganj and Pilibhít road on the east, and by the municipal boundary on the west and north.

2nd.—The old city ward, bounded by the Golganj and Pilibhít road on the west, the Sháhjahánpur road on the south, and by the municipal boundary on the north and east.

3rd.—The south-west ward, bounded by the main bazar road on the north, the Nekpur road on the east, and by the municipal boundary on the west and south.

4th.—The south-east ward, bounded by the main bazar road and Sháhjahánpur road on the north, the Nekpur road on the west, and by the municipal boundary on the south and east.

4. All candidates for appointment must possess an income of at least Rs. 500 per annum.

5. All male inhabitants of the municipality of full age, who occupy a house the monthly rental of which is not less than one rupee, are entitled to vote at the election of the members for the ward in which they reside ; and a register of persons so entitled to vote shall be prepared.

6. An election shall be held every year during the first 15 days of February at a time and place appointed by the committee, and it shall be presided over by some officer to be appointed by the president of the committee.

7. All candidatures must be notified to the presiding officer in writing before the time fixed for the commencement of the election.

8. The votes of the electors shall be publicly recorded and the voting-place shall remain open for six hours.

9. Each elector may poll for as many candidates as there are vacancies in his ward or for any less number.

10. If any question shall arise regarding the qualification of an elector, the presiding officer shall decide the question summarily, and his decision shall not be open to appeal to any authority.

11. At the first election under these rules, to be held in February 1874, four members shall be elected for each ward.

12. In each ward the names of the four candidates who receive the greatest number of votes shall be submitted to Government, and they shall be entitled to be appointed members of the committee.

Provided that the Local Government may annul the election of any candidate who has been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not less than six months, or who has been required to find security for his good behaviour.

13. Of the four members to be appointed in each ward, the two who obtain the largest number of votes shall be appointed for two years and the other two for one year.

14. In every succeeding year after 1874, two members shall be elected in each ward to fill the places of those whose terms of office have expired. Subject to the provisions contained in Rule 12, these two members shall be appointed for two years.

15. New members shall enter on the duties of their office on the 1st of April.

16. Vacancies occurring between the times at which the elections are held shall be filled up by Government on the nomination of the remaining members of the committee.

17. In addition to the ordinary members, the following officers shall be *ex-officio* members of the committee :—

(1) The Magistrate of the district.
(2) The Senior Joint or Assistant Magistrate.
(3) Another covenanted officer to be nominated by the Magistrate of the district.
(4) The Senior Native Deputy Collector.
(5) The Tahsíldár.
(6) The Civil Surgeon.
(7) The District Superintendent of Police.
(8) The District Engineer.

18. The Magistrate of the district shall be the president of the committee.

G. E. Low,
Secretary, Municipal Committee.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. 48, dated Moradabad, the 31st July 1882.

From T. B. TRACY, Esquire, Magistrate and President, Municipal Committee, Moradabad, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your Circular No. $\frac{354}{XXIII.-586}$ of 1882, dated 11th July 1882, I have the honour to state that the elective system has been in force in the five municipal towns in this district since 1870. A review of its working, with statistics of the elections, was submitted in my letter No. 87 of 1881, dated 13th July 1881. I do not think that I can add much to the information which has been already supplied.

2. The results of the recent municipal elections held during the current year are as follows:—

		Number of qualified voters.	Number of actual votes.
(1)	Moradabad - - - -	342	7
(2)	Sambhal - - - -	333	42
(3)	Amroha - - - -	607	39
(4)	Chandausi - - - -	471	124
(5)	Dhanaura - - - -	120	93

3. The property qualification of the electors is not uniform in these towns. It ranges from an income of Rs. 500 at Moradabad to one of Rs. 100 at Dhanaura.

4. The elective system has probably failed, mainly because municipal self-government in its existing form does not appeal very strongly either to the ambition of the few or to the self-interest of the many. The people at large take little interest in the objects of municipal administration, and the leading citizens set little value on the position of municipal commissioner. This want of public spirit is not likely to be cured by any modification of the franchise, or by any change in the mode of holding elections.

5. It is however a fact of some significance that the only places in the district where it is possible to detect a semblance of interest in the elections are Chandausi and Dhanaura, where there is no octroi taxation, but where the income is chiefly derived from a municipal license-tax on trades and callings, which is assessed by the municipal commissioners. Here, then, the tax-payers have a direct interest in selecting the most honest and capable representatives they can find, and the latter are entrusted with real power in the imposition of local taxation, instead of being, as elsewhere, merely an agency for the expenditure of funds with the raising of which they have no real concern.

6. The instances of these two towns are not of course a sufficient foundation for any generalisation, but it would be interesting to ascertain whether the elective system can be shown as a rule to have greater vitality in municipalities where the revenues are raised by direct taxation imposed by the representation of the tax-payers. It is *á priori* probable that the extension of this principle will be found essential to the ultimate success of local representative government.

No. 94, dated Moradabad, the 10th August 1882.

From T. B. TRACY, Esquire, Magistrate and Collector of Moradabad, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your Circular No. $\frac{349}{XXIII.-586}$ of 1882, dated the 4th July 1882, I have the honour to state that the elective system has been in existence in all the five municipalities in this district since 1870. But, as I have previously reported, there is little life in it; and if it is desired to make representative local government a reality, it will be essential to devise some means to induce the electoral bodies to take an interest in the efficiency of municipal administration.

2. To this end it is probable that no measure would be more effectual than the substitution for the present octroi taxation of municipal license and income-taxes, to be assessed by the representatives of the tax-payers. It may reasonably be expected that this would soon bring home to the electors that they had a direct and personal interest in the election of honest and capable municipal commissioners. At all events, if a measure of this kind does not overcome the apathy with which the objects of municipal administration are regarded by the people at large, it is difficult to conceive that anything else will.

3. Apart, moreover, from considerations of this kind, it is doubtful whether the municipal committees of the future will be competent to supervise octroi taxation on its present footing. The administration of the *octroi* of a large town has become intolerably complicated and burdensome. It would be a great relief to all concerned to get rid of apprehensions of interference with through trade, of octroi posts, and bonded warehouses, the expensive and sometimes dishonest collecting agency, and, above all, the ever-recurring task of attempting to explain variations from the standard of average consumption.

4. With reference to part. 3 of Government Circular No. 147 of 1882, dated 21st June, I have to report that the views expressed in paras. 18 and 19 of the Resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th May, have been laid before the municipal committees, who have been moved to elect a chairman.

All five committees have elected the Magistrate of the district as their chairman. Two of the municipal committees (Moradabad and Amroha) have elected competent non-official gentlemen as their vice-presidents. The Dhanaura and Chandausi committees have also elected non-official vice-presidents; but at Sambhal some difficulty has been occasioned by the fact that each of the members considers himself best entitled to the post.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{145}{XIX.-84}$, dated Bijnor, the 1st August 1882.

From H. D'O. MOULE, Esquire, Magistrate of Bijnor, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your Nos. 349 and 354 of 4th and 11th ultimo.

2 Of the five municipalities in this district, Bijnor, Dhámpur, and Chándpur enjoy the elective system pure and simple; in Nagína and Najíbabad nomination alternates with election, *i.e.*, the outgoing members are replaced one year by election and the next by nomination.

3. The following statement shows the number of persons entitled to vote and the number who exercised the right in each of the last four years:—

	1879.		1880.		1881.		1882.	
	Number of Persons entitled to Vote.	Number of Persons who Voted.	Number of Persons entitled to Vote.	Number of Persons who Voted.	Number of Persons entitled to Vote.	Number of Persons who Voted.	Number of Persons entitled to Vote.	Number of Persons who Voted.
Bijnor - - -	200	130	204	102	187	95	200	125
Chándpur - - -	100	94	105	100	100	88	109	109
Dhámpur - - -	84	73	97	57	93	57	96	53
Nágina - - -	238	135	This year members were nominated by Magistrate and not elected.		226	162	This year members were nominated by Magistrate and not elected.	
Najíbabad - - -	500	23	Ditto -		519	241	Ditto.	

4. At these elections it has been hitherto the custom in this district, as I believe in others, to remind the reluctant voter of his privileges by sending out chaprasis to bring him to the poll. On his arrival (in batches of 20 or 30) a list of eligible persons was read out to him, and his approval of the selection was recorded. This procedure could hardly be considered satisfactory, and I ordered that it should be discontinued. At the same time the only answer that I can give to your question—as to "where the present system mainly fails"—is that it fails simply in consequence of the utter want of interest with which it is regarded by the people. So far as I am aware, any amended or extended system will be exposed to precisely the same dilemma; namely, that if you compel the people to vote, the election is a sorry farce; and if you do not compel them, they will stop at home and attend to their own affairs. These remarks are of course not meant to apply to the larger and more advanced cities of which I have had no recent experience.

5. I may remind you that a report on the working of the elective system in municipalities was called for by Government last year, and submitted with my No. 45, dated 9th July 1881: it would be useless to repeat the views therein expressed, which were not those of the *vitrix causa.*

6. As to the election of chairmen by the committees, you are I think aware that, even before the recent orders were received, I caused the Bijnor municipal committee to elect a non-official chairman and secretary for themselves. I desired, in anticipation of reforms, to acquire some sort of experience how the new system would work; and Bijnor, being a small town and the head-quarters of the district, was a good subject for the experiment. The revised arrangement has so far not worked badly by any means; but of course it is still supervised and assisted by myself and the Tahsíldar to an extent which I could not ensure in an outlying town.

7. In Nagína and Najíbabad I think it will be possible to get non-official chairmen to work with a good deal of coaching; but in Dhámpur and Chándpur there is, I fear, no member who is at all fit to preside. I am myself going on privilege leave in a few days, and I would recommend that the reform of the outlying municipalities be allowed to stand over till the camping season, when each can be visited and taken up in turn.

8. Perhaps the best way would be to let the Tahsíldar be either chairman or at least secretary for a time, to break the change as gently as possible, of course only for a time; if the committees are to be a reality, the Tahsíldars must eventually retire from the management no less than the District Officers. Meantime I venture to think there can be no need for precipitate action, seeing that Government on its part has not yet initiated these reforms by the preliminary step of relieving the municipalities of police charges.

Docket No. $\frac{672}{XXIII}$, dated the 3rd August 1882.

From P. WHALLEY, Esquire, Magistrate of Pilibhít, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

IN reply to his No. $\frac{349}{XXIII.-82}$, dated 4th July 1882, submits copy of proceedings of a special meeting of the Bisalpur municipal committee, and observes that the rules of election proposed by the committee are designed rather to make them a perpetual self-electing body than to ascertain the wishes of the community. The committee desires to allow voting only in favour of candidates nominated by themselves, and the only concession to the freedom of election that they are disposed to make is to undertake to make twice as many nominations as vacancies. The result of this would be to throw the whole power into the hands of a clique, and this indeed appears to be the aim of the committee. If it were enacted that any five voters might nominate a candidate, and that the committee would only nominate in default of such nomination by voters, the scheme might be approved and introduced.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

PROCEEDINGS of a Special Meeting of the Bisalpur Municipal Committee, held on the 29th July 1882.

PRESENT:

Wazir-ud-din, *Tahsíldar.*	Chhadammi Lal.
Lalita Prasad.	Kazi Ewaz Ali.
Dwarika Prasad.	

P. Whalley, Esquire, *President*, in the Chair.

1. Read the Commissioner's No. $\frac{349}{XXIII.-586.}$, dated 4th July 1882, enquiring whether and in what form the elective system should be extended to the Bisalpur municipality.

Observed—There is no system of election in Bisalpur. The members have hitherto been nominated by Magistrate and appointed by Government. There are six members thus appointed—three every year, the appointment lasting for two years. Three members—Shib Narayan, Chhadammi Lal, and Lalita Prasad—were thus appointed from 1st May 1881 to 1st May 1883; and owing to the decease of another member, Chhote Lal, by G. O. No. 113A., dated 16th August 1881, Dwarika Prasad was also appointed for two years from that date. This apparently was by an oversight, for according to the usual rules he should have been appointed only for the period that remained until Chhote Lal's membership would have expired, *i.e.*, till 1st May 1882. The other members—Kazi Ewaz Ali and Mangal Sen—were re-appointed from 1st May 1882.

Resolved—That it is desirable to introduce the elective system; that the qualifications for membership should be three and have regard to age, property, and residence—

A candidate must not be less than 30 years of age.

A candidate must have his chief and permanent residence in the town of Bisalpur.

A candidate must have property to the value represented by an income of Rs. 500 a year, or derive that amount from trade profits.

2. The elections shall take place in the first week of May.

3. The qualification of voters shall be two—property and residence. Every man permanently resident in Bisalpur, in possession of property yielding an annual income of Rs. 200, shall be entitled to a vote. Permanent residence shall be assumed regarding any person who may have resided in the town for five years continuously.

4. A register of persons entitled to vote under the above rule shall be made out on the primary basis of the license-tax returns of 1880, and shall be revised by a special sub-committee of three members in March of each year. The register shall be divided muhallawár, and the portions relating to each muhalla shall be posted in that muhalla on or before 15th March, and all objections and applications connected therewith shall be lodged with the sub-committee before the end of the same month.

5. Candidates for election shall be nominated by those members of the committee who are to remain in office for another year, and by no one else.

6. The nominations shall always be twice as numerous as the vacancies.

7. The votes shall be registered on a notified day, between sunrise and midday, by the *chungi* muharrirs under the supervision of the vice-president.

8. The non-official members shall be six as hitherto, and the official members two, *viz.*, the Tahsíldár and Native Doctor. The rule requiring that one-third of the committee shall be *ex-officio* members should be relaxed in the case of Bisalpur.

9. Read G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882 respecting the selection of a non-official member as president or vice-president.

Resolved—That as it is impossible for a president of a municipality to discharge the duties of that office without being acquainted with the English language, the committee wish that the Magistrate of the district should continue to be president, and they will select a vice-president from among themselves after due consideration.

No. 493, dated Sháhjahánpur, the 10th August 1882.

From J. S. PORTER, Esquire, Magistrate and Collector, Sháhjahánpur, to COMMISSIONER, Rohilkhand Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report the manner in which the instructions contained in G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June, and your No. $\frac{349}{XXIII.-586.}$, dated 4th ultimo, have been carried out in this district.

2. There are two municipalities in this district—Sháhjahánpur and Tilhar. The elective system is in force in both. The towns are divided into wards, with a certain number of representatives to each. All persons whose houses are of the annual value of Rs. 24 or upwards have votes, and any voter may be elected a member of the committee. The constituency at Sháhjahánpur numbers 1,343, and at Tilhar 195 persons.

3. When the Government Orders were brought before the Sháhjahánpur committee, the Native members expressed themselves at first adverse to the new scheme; but they eventually, in deference to the wishes of Government, proceeded to the election by ballot of a president and vice-president, with the results that the following were chosen:—

President—Lala Barati Lal.
Vice-President—Mallik Kifayat-ullah.

The choice was entirely free and unfettered, and was perhaps as good a selection as could have been made. The president elect, though a great miser and sadly in want of public spirit, is a good man of business; and both he and the vice-president are members of the bench of Honorary Magistrates and men of standing and wealth. I really think that under their auspices the committee as re-constituted

will start with a very fair prospect of success, and I recommend that the election be confirmed. The only official member whom I think it would be advisable to retain on the committee is the Civil Surgeon.

4. In Talhar the members were firm in their decision that the committee could not work without the assistance of the District Officer, whom therefore they propose to retain as president. They however elected one of their members, Saiyid Zakar Ali, as vice-president by a majority of four votes to three recorded in favour of Ujagar Lal. Zakar Ali is an Honorary Magistrate and the ablest member of the committee, and he takes a great interest in education. I recommend that his election as vice-president be confirmed.

The committee were also of opinion that the Tahsíldar should continue to be a member of the committee. It is often difficult to get the members of this committee to attend the meetings, and some gentle official influence is required to get them together.

No. $\frac{4116}{153}$, dated Allahabad, the 14th August 1882.

From J. W. QUINTON, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Allahabad Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the reports from the different District Officers of this division on the subject of G. Os. Nos. 147 and 162, dated respectively 21st and 29th June of the present year, together with such remarks from myself as seem called for.

2. The subjects to be dealt with were:—

(1) The extension of an elective system to those municipalities where it has not yet been introduced:
(2) The election by all municipal boards of one of their members as president:
(3) The arrangement and working of the system of elections already in force in the municipalities of the division.

3. On the first point there is nothing to be said, as in all municipalities of this division the members are elected, not nominated.

4. On the second point I have to report that in pursuance of the instructions contained in para. 3 of G. O. No. 147, all committees were moved to elect a president, subject to the approbation of Government. In Bánda, Fatehpur, and Cawnpore non-officials were chosen; and in Allahabad and Jaunpur Messrs. Patterson and Ward were unanimously selected for the office.

5. *Bánda.*—From para. 6 of Mr. LaTouche's report it will be observed that a Native gentleman unacquainted with English was appointed, as being the best available candidate; but that this appointment was recommended only as a temporary measure, until the electoral arrangements should be put on an entirely new footing.

The Magistrate and Collector writes of the gentleman chosen as follows:—

"For my own part I consider the Seth the best selection that could be made. Though a good deal occupied by his private banking affairs and by religious exercises, he is a most regular attendant at committee, and his opinion is generally followed. He enjoys the respect of the town and people. I also agree with the committee that if the proposal of the committee as to ward representation be approved, a new committee should be at once elected and should proceed to the election of a chairman and secretary of its own."

6. In *Fatehpur* Mr. Mellor writes that Lala Anant Sahai was unanimously elected, and that that gentleman is able and willing to undertake the office.

These are both small municipalities, and the conditions are not as elsewhere complicated by an admixture of different nationalities, various sources of revenue, and the proximity of a large cantonment (at Bánda the question has been reduced to one or two companies of a Native Infantry Regiment); and it appears to me that there is no objection to the confirmation by Government of the choice of the committees.

7. At *Cawnpore* a non-official member, Mr. Foley, was elected president, and Lale Puran Chand, also a non-official member, vice-president of the committee.

8. Mr. Barstow reports that both nominations emanated from the non-official members; and as regards Mr. Foley, that if non-official members are to be selected for the office, the selection of Mr. Foley as president is the best that could be made under the circumstances. He gives no opinion in direct terms as to the propriety of appointing a non-official as president, but in para. 5 of his letter writes as follows:—

"No instructions have been received regarding the secretary in this municipality. One of the covenanted staff has always been elected. There is no member of the committee qualified to perform the duties of secretary; and in consideration of the president and vice-president both being non-official, and the fact that the present secretary has been duly re-elected, this arrangement had better remain undisturbed, as the business of the committee cannot be conducted in a satisfactory manner without the assistance of an official secretary. The general supervision of conservancy arrangements had better remain for the present in the hands of official members of the committee, in view of the importance of the subject, when the immediate proximity of a large cantonment is taken into consideration."

9. I am unable to recommend that the election of Mr. Foley should be confirmed. He is said to have been approved by all the non-official members; but it appears to me that such approval is rather indicative of a desire on the part of the Native members to escape the responsibility of the office than the legitimate outcome of an attempt to develope self-government. The great majority of the population of the municipality are Natives, and it cannot be for a moment supposed that a non-official European, such as Mr. Foley is described to be, has such an acquaintance with the wishes and requirements of the different classes of Natives resident in Cawnpore as to make him the fittest exponent of their wants and representative of their interests.

10. Mr. Foley is employed in the Elgin Mills, but does little work there. He is old and has seen better days. Whatever be his business habits and his intellectual capacity, vigorous administration could not thus be looked for from him; and the result of his appointment would be that the whole management of the business of the committee, except the ornamental function of presiding at the meetings, would devolve on the official secretary.

11. Independent, however, of the particular qualifications of Mr. Foley, I am strongly of opinion that both at Cawnpore and Allahabad the District Officer should continue to be chairman. The municipal committees of those towns have to collect incomes arising for various sources, as per appendix, of Rs. 1,22,036 and Rs. 2,55,013 respectively.

The promp realization of these incomes is a necessary condition of the usefulness of the committee, and for such realization effective control is essential. This duty at present taxes the powers of the District Officer, as I can testify from personal experience in my capacity as president of the municipal committee of Lucknow for many years, and subsequently of Allahabad. Any relaxation of vigilance is followed by short receipts and unrealisable arrears; and it cannot be supposed that any non-official member will be found, among the busy communities of the two towns, possessed of the requisite administrative experience and willing to give up the time that is required for the work; or if he be found, that his fellow members would concede to him that weight and influence which attach to the District Officer from his official position.

12. Again, in the larger stations, such as those of which I am writing, there is an admixture of races all more or less interested in efficient municipal administration. There is the Native city, and there is a civil station inhabited by Europeans and Eurasians. The advantages of good roads, good water, and good conservancy, especially the latter, are by no means universally appreciated by the Native population; and it requires occasionally the exertion of the influence which a District Officer alone possesses to give effect to measures distasteful to the great majority of the residents of the Native city, but of the utmost importance to the health and convenience of *all*.

13. This state of things is still more complicated when a large cantonment is the nearest neighbour of the municipality. The relations between the civil and military authorities become often strained when questions of octroi taxation, of lock hospitals, and of sanitary requirements crop up. I cannot think it advisable that Government should abandon *in toto* the direction of municipalities in such matters at present exercised by the District Officer as president, and content itself with offering advice which it is open to the committee to take or to reject.

14. At present the Government of India in the Military Department are urging the Allahabad municipality to expend large sums, amounting to lakhs of rupees, on a scheme for water-supply, as the new cantonment is badly provided with that essential requisite: and matter connected with the drainage of the city of Cawnpore have formed of late years the subject of frequent discussion between the military authorities and the president of the committee. For the decision of such questions, the presence and influence of the District Officer on the committee are in my opinion indispensable. He has to hold the balance between strong departments, insisting on sanitary and other improvements, and a committee composed mainly of Native members, who in their hearts care for none of such things.

15. *Allahabad.*—Here, in consequence of the unanimous election by ballot of Mr. Patterson, the present Collector, the interference of Government is not so urgently needed; but for the reasons given in the case of Cawnpore, and for those which are very forcibly put in the first four paras. of Mr. Patterson's report, I strongly recommend that no change be made in the existing rule which makes the District Officer president of this municipality.

Baba Charu Chandar, a non-official gentleman, has been elected vice-president.

16. In *Jaunpur* Mr. Ward has been elected president. That gentleman, however, who has an intimate acquaintance with popular feeling in the, owing to a residence there for the last five years, to constant intercourse with the people, and the liveliest interest in their welfare, writes as follows:—

"The residents of this municipality are I think unanimously of opinion that the Collector or some other official should be president. You will observe that at the conclusion of the meeting now reported, a petition was presented by a large number of persons against an appointment which it was understood the committee would make of a secretary. The reason of this was that the gentleman in question is a *Shiah*, the great majority of the members are also *Shiahs*, and the *Sunnis* were apprehensive, and I think not without cause, that a spirit of partisanship might rule in a committee so constituted. Their apprehensions would have been raised to a higher pitch if the appointment had been that of president.

"In a city like Jaunpur, where religious animosity is always but a short way below the surface, it certainly not advisable to exclude too rigorously the official element. I would also bring to your notice that the municipality contains the civil station as well as the city, and that the claims of residents in the former portion to representation on the committee should not be entirely ignored."

17. Under the peculiar circumstances stated, it would seem advisable that here also the rule, requiring that the District Officer be president of the committee, should not be altered. A non-official gentleman, Mír Sakhawat Ali, has been elected vice-president.

18. I now come to the third subject for report, *viz.*, the arrangement and working of the system of election already in force in the municipalities of the division.

19. The views of the District Officers and municipal committees are as follows:—

20. *Jaunpur.*—Mr. Ward writes that the rules for the election of members were framed with great care, and passed only in 1880. The committee are not prepared to propose any alteration. In writing of the last election he stated:—"Every means was adopted to give publicity to the election, and the result in the number of electors who voted is very disappointing. I hope, however, that in future years more interest will be taken, and I would not as yet recommend any radical alteration in the rules. I think however it would be well on a future occasion for some officer to convene a meeting of the electors at some place in each ward a fortnight before the election, in order to obtain a nomination of candidates, and to notify the date on which their votes would be taken. If this measure, which is not in any way opposed to the letter or spirit of the existing rules, should result in securing a greater interest in the elections, it might subsequently be incorporated in the rules."

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

21. *Fatehpur.*—The existing rules are given by the Collector as follows:—"The election system is already in force in this municipality. The rules at present in force are—(1) That every person shall be qualified to vote who shall be 20 years of age or over, and owner or occupier of a house rental of which is Rs. 2 per mensem: (2) a register to be kept of all persons qualified to vote in the municipal office, and revised from time to time; every registered person to be furnished with an extract of the entry in the register regarding himself: (3) place and date of election to be fixed by president, and notified a fortnight before: and (4) the electors to record personally their votes to the person appointed to receive them."

22. Mr. Mellor and the committee think no change called for, beyond an annual revision of the register of voters, and that due notice be given to each elector in the beginning of April of the date of the election to be held in that month. Fatehpur is little more than a large agricultural village, and I doubt very much whether the restriction of the franchise to owners or occupiers of houses of which the rental is Rs. 2 per mensem is not too high; I would give every householder a vote, and do away with the pecuniary qualification.

23. *Cawnpore.*—No change is recommended by the Collector and committee. It was proposed and generally held that the franchise should be narrowed and confined to persons paying Rs. 75 license-tax and upwards, instead of those who pay at least Rs. 20. No resolution was however carried to that effect, the president having apparently intimated that the proposal was not likely to find acceptance with Government. I am not satisfied that a sufficiently thorough review has been made of the existing system, and on this subject I shall submit a further report as permitted in G. O. No. 162, dated 29th June last.

24. *Allahabad.*—The committee think no change wanted in the existing rules. Mr. Patterson, however, after consultation with many of the members, makes the following recommendations, in which I concur.

25. The existing franchises are confined to householders paying a rental in the civil station of Rs. 50, and in the city of Rs. 6 per mensem.

He would alter the pecuniary qualifications to rentals of Rs. 30 for the civil station, and Rs. 4 for the city. He would also give a vote to all persons who pay the provincial license-tax, not of course otherwise qualified to vote; to all graduates of the University, and to all Government and bank employés with an income of Rs. 30 per mensem. Looking to the rental qualifications required from other classes, I think this goes rather low, and would fix the amount of the qualifying monthly salary at Rs. 50.

26. The president also objects to the present rule XX., which requires elections to be held at the chief police-station of each ward, and in my opinion with reason. The necessity for attending at a police station for the purpose may often deter respectable electors from exercising their right of voting.

27. *Banda.*—Mr. LaTouche has submitted a full report on the existing system of nomination, and of what he would substitute for it. He ascertained the feelings of the residents on the subject at the meeting of the committee, and again at a general meeting of all the citizens; and in accordance with the views then elicited, he makes the following proposals.

For his reasons in support of them I would refer to his report.

"In short, what is proposed for the management of the Bánda municipality is as follows:—

"(1) That the committee should henceforth consist only of non-official members:

"(2) That the members should be 17 in number—16 chosen by the different wards of the city, and one by the civil station:

"(3) That the new committee should be appointed before any changes are introduced, the present committee not feeling itself a sufficiently representative body:

"(4) That the qualification for an elector be the owning or occupying a house in the ward for which the election is made:

"(5) That all electors should be eligible for the committee, whether residing in the particular ward or not:

"(6) That the new committee should be appointed as soon as possible, the members of the present committee being willing to send in their resignation; and that the new committee should at once proceed to the election of a chairman and secretary from their body:

"(7) That all proceedings of the committee should be laid before the Magistrate on the day next succeeding that on which they are passed; and that any resolution objected to by him shall remain in abeyance till the orders of the Commissioner are received:

"(8) That the committee shall furnish any accounts which the Magistrate may desire to inspect."

28. In all these proposals, except the first, *viz.*, that henceforward there should be only non-official members on the committee, I fully concur.

With respect to the first, my hesitation arises from the consideration as to whether it would be well to leave the committee altogether without professional advice, as represented by the Civil Surgeon and the District Engineer. It is in questions of Public Works and sanitation that the initiative of a committee, consisting of non-official members, is likely to prove least effective; and it is on such questions that they would most require professional assistance. On the other hand, there would be greater risk of friction and unseemly conflict of opinion between those officers and non-official members, when the guiding hand of the District Officer no longer directs the committee's proceedings.

29. Looking at the arguments for and against, I think that the conditions of Bánda are as favourable as could anywhere be expected for the trial of the experiment, and I therefore after some hesitation support Mr. LaTouche's proposal. If the plant can thrive anywhere, it will certainly be here under his fostering care.

APPENDIX.

Statement of Receipts of Municipal Funds for the Year 1881–82.

Name of Municipality.	Head of Income.	Amount. Rs.	a.	p.
Cawnpore	Tax on professions and trades	78,195	0	3
	Tax on carriages, horses, &c.	760	8	0
	Rents	18,916	13	1
	Gardens	275	7	0
	Fines	1,784	9	0
	Pounds	778	13	0
	Miscellaneous	7,803	5	6
	Extraordinary	13,521	1	1
	Total	1,22,035	8	11
Allahabad	Octroi	1,70,384	0	0
	Tax on professions and trades	949	0	0
	Tax on carriages, horses, &c.	11,480	0	0
	Rents	36,403	0	0
	Fines	1,352	0	0
	Pounds	374	0	0
	Miscellaneous	15,045	0	0
	Extraordinary	16,866	0	0
	Contributions	2,160	0	0
	Total	2,55,013	0	0

No. $\frac{266}{\text{K.M.-319C.}}$, dated Cawnpore, the 21st July 1882.

From H. C. Barstow, Esquire, President, Municipal Committee, Cawnpore, to Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. $\frac{3171}{153}$, dated 30th June, and in reply thereto to forward a copy of the proceedings of a special meeting of the Cawnpore municipal committee, convened in accordance with the orders received in your second para.

2. With reference to the question of election, it will be seen that the present mode of appointment being by that method, no alteration has been made; but the native members on being asked whether any revision of the present rules was desirable, one and all were of opinion that the franchise should be narrowed, and that the qualification for voting should be confined to inhabitants taking out a municipal license under class I. This would have the effect of excluding the majority of license-holders by raising the standard from those who pay not less than Rs. 20 license to those who pay Rs. 75 and upwards: the reason given was that the return of the best class of persons as commissioners would be thereby ensured.

The above not being in consonance with the views of the Government of India, and being only an expression of opinion, was not formulated in a resolution; but that such an opinion should be so generally held is a fact worthy of notice.

3. A president and vice-president were elected in accordance with the orders contained in your letter; with reference to the former appointment, an amendment of rule XI., chapter I., of bye-laws is necessary. Both nominations emanated from the non-official members; if non-officials were to be selected for the office, the selection of Mr. Foley as president is the best that could be made under the circumstances.

4. The third resolution aims as far as possible at arranging for transfer of functions, but no steps will be taken to carry into effect the proposed distribution until your sanction has been received.

5. No instructions have been received regarding the secretary in this municipality: one of the covenanted staff has always been elected. There is no member of the committee qualified to perform the duties of secretary; and in consideration of the president and vice-president both being non-official, and the fact that the present secretary has been duly re-elected, this arrangement had better remain undisturbed, as the business of the committee cannot be conducted in a satisfactory manner without the assistance of an official secretary.

The general supervision of conservancy arrangements had better remain for the present in the hands of official members of the committee, in view of the importance of the subject, when the immediate proximity of a large cantonment is taken into consideration.

The wishes of Government will be carried out in so far as I am concerned. My advice and experience will be at the disposal of the committee in the management of current and other business.

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

Proceedings of a Special Meeting of the Cawnpore Municipality, held at 12 noon on the 6th July 1882.

Present:

H. C. Barstow, Esquire, *President.*	
R. Foley, Esquire, *Vice President.*	
H. F. Bartlett, Esquire, *Secretary.*	
L. H. L. Thomas, Esquire, Superintendent of Police	Ex-officio Members.
Shaikh Zamin Ali, Tahsíldár, Jájmau	Ex-officio Members.
Shaikh Bakar Ali	Members.
Lala Chatur Bhuj	Members.
Lala Ram Parshad, Munim	Members.
Lala Jugal Kishore	Members.
Lala Murlidhar	Members.
Lala Jadu Lal	Members.
Lala Puran Chand	Members.

1. Letter No. $\frac{3171}{153}$, dated 30th June, from the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, was read; and with reference to the first para., it was *resolved* that the system of appointment of members by election being in force, there was no necessity for drafting revised rules.

2. With reference to the second para. of the above letter, *resolved* that bye-law No. XI., chapter I., be amended: the words "the Magistrate shall be the president" shall be omitted; between "their" and "vice-president" insert the word "president;" and *resolved* that R. A. Foley be elected president, and Lala Puran Chand be elected vice-president of the committee.

3. With reference to para. 3 of the above letter, *resolved* that the task of immediately supervising (subject to the general orders of the committee to whom they will report) the following items of collection will be distributed among the members as follows:—

Name of Head of Collection.	Name of Supervising Member.
Collections of rent from nazúl lands	Ganga Narayan.
Collections from shops and houses	Puran Chand.
Collections—land-tax in civil station	Shaikh Bakar Ali.
Mooring tax	R. F. Foley, Esquire.
Collections from pounds	Lala Chatar Bhuj.
Collections from slaughter-house	Shaikh Bakar Ali.
Sale proceeds of manure and city sweepings	Ram Narayan, Tiwari.

For supervision of expenditure and of the proper performance of duties the commissioners in charge of the muhallas at present assigned to them will be responsible—

(1) For the due execution of the repairs of roads and drains within these limits:
(2) For the due performance of the work allotted to the conservancy staff within the above limits:
(3) That the charge of road-watering and lighting be made over to Lala Ajudhiya Parshad.

No. 770, dated Allahabad, the 24th July 1882.

From A. B. Patterson, Esquire, President, Municipal Committee, Allahabad, to Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your No. $\frac{3171}{153}$, of 30th June 1882, forwarding Government letter No. 147 of 21st June 1882, I have the honour to state that in compliance with your instructions, I laid the above-mentioned letter before a special meeting of the municipal committee of Allahabad, on the 13th instant, together with the Resolution of the Government of India of 18th June, paras. 18 and 19.

2. After reading para. 2 of the Government letter, I pointed out to the committee that it was now incumbent on them to elect a chairman, and stated to them as my opinion that in no place in India out of the presidency towns would it be easier to select a non-official chairman who would possess the business capacity, energy, and influence necessary for the post.

After some discussion, the committee proceeded to vote by ballot for a chairman. I was elected unanimously by name, not in my capacity as Magistrate: only one official member voted. I had, I may say, carefully abstained from talking over the matter privately with any of the committee, and had explained to them that it was undoubtedly the intention of Government that a non-official member should be appointed.

The feeling of the committee evidently was that no non-official member would be able to devote sufficient time or attention to the superintendence of municipal affairs.

Several of the members are well fitted for the post, but they are either hard-working lawyers or business men who could not possibly devote sufficient time to public business. Had any of the gentlemen referred to been willing to undertake the responsibility, I should most gladly have resigned the post of president to him, as I should then have been relieved of much work of a troublesome kind for which time can ill be spared.

3. In my opinion, however, the circumstances of the Allahabad municipality are peculiar, and it is desirable that the chairman should be an officer of Government. Allahabad is the seat of the Local Government, and owes much of its position and prosperity to the population attracted to the place by the presence of the Government offices and the High Court. Government directly contributes a large proportion of the municipal income, as it has made over to the committee the surplus rent of confiscated villages and other sources of profit which amounted last year altogether to no less than 16 per cent. of the revenue.

It is right, then, that Government should have a representative in a leading position on the committee, who would keep before them the fact that Allahabad is not only a large city and station, but also the capital of the North-Western Provinces.

Furthermore, there are two elements in the municipality,—the European members representing the large civil station, and the native members representing the city. Difference of opinion may easily arise as to the allotment of funds for the different quarters of the large area within municipal limits, and it is clearly advisable that the chairman should be unconnected in interest with either party, and able to give them disinterested advice.

4. You need have no fear that the committee should be too much under official influence. Non-official members form two-thirds of the whole, and always comprise far more than two-thirds of those present at every meeting. The members are perfectly independent and thoroughly understand the interests in their charge. They are of such a class that it is impossible that a president, even if he wished it, could exercise any undue pressure on them. No doubt his opinion on any subject would generally carry great weight from the fact that it is his duty to devote to public matters a more careful and sustained attention than is possible for any of the members. But I think you will agree with me that the influence thus exercised is a legitimate and useful one.

I may add that I have always acted on the view expressed by the Government of India, that the chairman of a board should not take an active part on either side when there is a difference of opinion among the members. In such cases I have never exercised my right of voting.

5. In compliance with para. 3 of the Government letter, the committee then proceeded to elect a non-official vice-president. Babu Charu Chander Mittra, son of Babu Nilcomal Mittra, was elected by a large majority.

6. Para. 2 of the Government letter was then considered, but it was decided that as all non-official members were already elected, it was unnecessary to propose any change at present: the members all agreed that very little interest was taken in the election, and that no cahnge in system would directly affect this apathetic public feeling. I have however talked over the matter with many of the members, and in accordance with their views I make a few suggestions.

At present the qualification for a vote in the civil station is either to be a house proprietor or the occupant of a house paying Rs. 50 rent or more. This seems too high a suffrage: Rs. 30 would be I think a fairer limit.

In the city the limit of rent is Rs. 6 monthly: I think the occupation of a house on Rs. 4 monthly should confer a vote.

In addition to those above mentioned, all persons assessed to the license-tax have a vote.

Considering the character of the Allahabad population, I think the large classes attracted by the courts and Government offices should be represented, even if they are lodgers only. All Government and bank employés with an income of Rs. 30 monthly should as such have a vote. An educational franchise too would be popular. I would give all graduates a vote.

At present the city election takes place at the chief police-station in each ward (rule XX., constitution of committee). This I find is a very unpopular system: a special returning officer should be appointed: the police should have nothing to do with elections, and a Magistrate of some standing should supervise the arrangements.

I do not think it necessary to lay down any qualification for membership of the committee: the representatives elected have always been men of a respectable class. The inquiry into the qualification of candidates would be an invidious and difficult task, and there would I think be no corresponding advantage.

No. 39, dated Bánda, the 10th July 1882.

From J. D. LaTouche, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Bánda, to Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

With reference to your Nos. $\frac{3771}{163}$, dated 30th June, and $\frac{3270}{163}$, dated 7th July, I have the honour to submit the required report on municipal management.

2. A special meeting of the municipal committee of Bánda, the only municipality in the district, was convened on 6th July. Seven non-official members were present: a general meeting of the citizens of Bánda was convened on 8th July; and the following report embodies the views of the non-official members and the citizens as ascertained at these two meetings.

3. The principle of election in the appointment of members of the municipal committee was introduced in Bánda by Notification No. 510A., dated 31st July 1868, and this Notification still guides the elections. Briefly, the present system is as follows: There were originally eight non-official members, who are selected by the votes of such of the inhabitants of the city as own or occupy a house of the monthly value of rent of Rs. 2; and there were four official members,—the Magistrate, the Joint-Magistrate, the Civil Surgeon, and the District Superintendent of Police. The District Engineer was added as a member by G. O. No. 196A., dated 30th November 1872, and since that time there have been ten non-official members. The term of service is two years: six members retire by rotation in one year, and four in the succeeding year. In the year 1882 six members retired. On the second Tuesday in April of each year the electors meet and choose members in the place of those who retire. As a matter of fact, the electors take little or no interest in the elections. Though there are 491 on the roll, yet few ever take the trouble to attend, and the outgoing members are almost uniformly re-elected. At the election in April 1882, only 31 electors attended, and the majority of these were men who had come to the Collector's office on other business.

4. The non-official members and the citizens generally are very strongly of opinion that the present mode of election does not secure a fair representation of the principal sections of the community. Representation of trades and castes was discussed, but disapproved of, a fear being generally expressed that the representatives of particular trades would strive for the upper hand and endeavour to direct the

communal action for their own advantage and not for the advantage of the community. Representation by wards or muhallas was finally agreed upon.

The following is a list of the muhallas in Bánda, with the number of houses according to last census :—

(1) Katra Náka - - - - - -	734
(2) Chabi Náka - - - - - -	331
(3) Balkhandi Náka - - - - -	518
(4) Colvinganj - - - - - -	713
(5) Mardan Náka - - - - -	395
(6) Khirni Náka *cum* Nimni Pár - - - -	502
(7) Maryan Náka - - - - -	204
(8) Khatta Bánda - - - - -	304
(9) Sudder Náka - - - - - -	956
(10) Gular Náka - - - - - -	655
(11) Aliganj - - - - - -	659
(12) Mewati Náka - - - - -	407
(13) Makbara Náka - - - - -	292

The citizens wish two members to be appointed for Sudder Náka, Colvinganj, and Katra Náka, and one for each of the others, and consider that the civil station should be represented by one member to be chosen by the European community. The total number of proposed members is thus 17.

5. As regards qualifications of electors, the citizens without hesitation expressed their opinion that the existing property clause should be abolished, and that all resident owners or occupiers of houses in a ward should elect a member or members for that ward. Any elector to be eligible for the committee. The present date of the second Tuesday in April is as convenient as any other for the elections : the period of service on the committee to be one year and not two. The citizens were also of opinion that there is no necessity to wait till next April, and that the work of the committee cannot proceed satisfactorily on the new basis till after an election in which each ward shall select its member.

6. The committee then proceeded to discuss the questions alluded to in para. 3 of G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882. They remarked that none of the non-official members were acquainted with English, that only one could read Urdu; and the remainder, though they could read Sarrafi character, were not in the habit of reading the Hindi character. In short, they thought that they had better make way for a fuller and more representative committee before appointing a chairman. After the present discussion no doubt the electors would be anxious to have the best men to manage their affairs, and there would be a larger scope for choice in a committee of 17 than in one of ten. In obedience to the Government Order, however, they proceeded to the election of a chairman, and by a considerable majority Seth Sham Karan was elected chairman. The Seth expressed his willingness to serve. For my own part I consider the Seth the best selection that could be made. Though a good deal occupied by his private banking affairs and by religious exercises, he is most regular attendant at committees, and his opinion is generally followed. He enjoys the respect of the town and people. I also agree with the committee that if the proposal of the committee as to ward representation be approved, a new committee should be at once elected, and should proceed to the election of a chairman and secretary of its own.

7. The effect of the orders of Government is to transfer the executive responsibility from the official to the non-official members. The non-official members have hitherto been a consultative body. The actual workers were the president and the secretary, both of the officials. To appoint a chairman from the non-official members, and to have an official in the post of secretary, would be simply to abolish the post of president, and to throw the whole work of the municipality on the secretary, except the chiefly ornamented work of presiding at meetings. This is not to educate the people in self-government ; clearly all official members must cease to sit on the committee.

The Magistrate of the district alone will have anything to do with the committee, and he will take the place of the present non-official members, that is, his functions will be limited to advising, and he will allow the non-official members to execute the resolutions of the committee, giving them assistance if necessary. The secretary, therefore, as well as the chairman, must be a non-official.

8. The committee also resolved that if their proposals are approved, the office of the committee should be removed to the so-called *nach-ghar* in the Nawab's palace, and that all servants of the committee should work there.

9. I was also desired to draw your attention to the fact that nearly all Government Orders come down in English, whereas not one of the members knows even the rudiments of that language. The committee would like an Urdu and Hindi translation of all Circulars and orders to accompany the English copy or original.

10. In short, what is proposed for the management of the Bánda municipality is as follows :—

(1) That the committee should henceforth consist only of non-official members :
(2) That the members should be 17 in number,—16 chosen by the different wards of the city, and one by the civil station :
(3) That the new committee should be appointed before changes are introduced, the present committee not feeling itself a sufficiently representative body :
(4) That the qualification for an elector be the owning or occupying a house in the ward for which the election is made.
(5) That all electors should be eligible for the committee, whether residing in the particular ward or not :
(6) That the new committee should be appointed as soon as psssible, the members of the present committee being willing to send in their resignations ; and that the new committee should at once proceed to the election of a chairman and secretary from their body.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

(7) That all proceedings of the Committee should be laid before the Magistrate on the day next succeeding that on which they are passed and that any resolution objected to by him shall remain in abeyance till the orders of the Commissioner are received :

(8). That the committee shall furnish any accounts which the Magistrate may desire to inspect.

REVISED RULES for the Constitution of the Bánda Municipal Committee (vide G. O. No. 510A., dated the 31st July 1868).

1. THE committee shall consist of 16 members of the different wards of the city, and one member for the civil station.

2. The members shall be elected from among the residents of the city by the votes of such of the inhabitants of each ward as own or occupy a house in that ward.

3. A list of all persons entitled to vote shall be prepared, and this list shall annually be revised between 1st and 31st March in each year. No one whose name is not on the list to be entitled to vote at the election of members, which shall be held on the second Tuesday in April.

A list of the members elected shall be forwarded for the infomation of the Commissioner.

4. The term of office shall be one year, but a member is eligible for re-election.

5. On the first meeting in each year the new committee shall proceed to the appointment of a chairman and secretary.

Dated 10th July 1882.

No. $\frac{138}{\text{XIX.-76}}$, dated the 3rd August 1882.

From G. E. WARD, Esquire, Magistrate of Jaunpur, to COMMISSIONER of Allahabad Division.

SIR,

IN reply to your No. $\frac{3270}{153}$, dated 7th July 1882, I have the honour to forward for your perusal a copy of the proceedings of a meeting of the municipal committee of Jaunpur, especially convened to take into consideration the question of the election of members and appointment of president.

2. Under para. (i), section 13, Act XV. of 1873, the chairman at the committee's meetings has a vote, and in case of equality a casting vote. If the chairman were restricted to a casting vote only, a practice to which I myself have always strictly conformed when presiding at committees, it would seem that all objection to an official being president would be removed.

3. The residents of this municipality are I think unanimously of opinion that the Collector or some other official should be president. You will observe that at the conclusion of the meeting now reported, a petition was presented by a large number of persons against an appointment which it was understood the committee would make of a secretary. The reason of this was that the gentleman in question is a *Shiah*, the great majority of the members are also *Shiahs*, and the *Sunnis* were apprehensive, and I think not without cause, that a spirit of partisanship might rule in a committee so constituted. Their apprehensions would have been raised to higher pitch if the appointment had been that of president.

4. In a city like Jaunpur, where religious animosity is always but a short way below the surface, it is certainly not advisable to exclude too rigorously the official element.

5. I would also bring to your notice that the municipality contains the civil station as the well as the city, and that the claims of residents in the former portion to representation on the committee should not be entirely ignored.

6. The rules for election of members were framed with great care and passed only in 1880. The committee are not prepared at present to propose any alteration. The one recommendation which I proposed in my letter No. $\frac{119}{\text{XIX.-63}}$, dated 4th May 1882, will be carried out at the next election, since it is not in any way contrary to the rules, and its effect will be considered before any alteration of the rules is proposed.

PROCEEDINGS of a Meeting of the Jaunpur Municipal Committee, held on the 27th July 1882.

PRESENT :

G. E. Ward, Esq., Collector and Magistrate, *President*	Ex-officio Members.
Doctor E. B. Ruttledge, Civil Surgeon	
D. F. Addis, Esq., Joint Magistrate	
J. D. Young, Esq., District Superintendent of Police	
Babu Harnam Chandra Sett, Deputy Collector in charge of Treasury	
Munshi Debi Parshad, Tahsíldár, Jaunpur	
Mir Sakhawat Ali	Non-official Members
Mir Mubarak Husain	
Shaikh Iltfat Husain	
Shaikh Muhammad Jawad	
Mirza Muhammad Amin	
Shaikh Muhammad Sadik	
Lala Damodar Das	
Lala Sarabjit Lal	
Lala Baldeo Parshad	
Shaikh Muhammad Husain	
Mirza Muhammad Raza	

This meeting was specially called to consider the Resolution of the Government of India, on the subject of local self-government; to elect a new president, vice-president, and (the post being vacant) a secretary; and to determine whether any addition or alteration to the rules now in force for election

of members is necessary. It was reported that the terms of Government Resolution No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, had been fully explained to the native members of the committee at an informal meeting.

The chairman then explained to the meeting that rule XVIII. of the rules for the appointment of members of the committee was cancelled by para. 3 of the Resolution above quoted. The magistrate of the district for the time being is no longer president; but the Lieutenant-Governor has sanctioned the election of a president by the members from among their body. Under this sanction the election of a president must now be made.

Votes were then taken for a president, and each member present voted for Mr. Ward.

The president then called on the members to elect a vice-president.

Mir Mubarak Husain proposed, and Lala Sarabjit Lal seconded, the election of Mir Sakhawat Ali.

Mirza Muhammad Amin proposed, and Mr. Addis seconded, the election of Mir Mubarak Husain.

On the votes being recorded, there were 11 for Mir Sakhawat Ali and 4 for Mir Mubarak Husain.

The president declared Mír Sakhawat Ali only elected as vice-president.

The president then called on the members to elect a secretary, and in doing so dwelt at some length on the important duties which, under the rules for the conduct of business, devolve upon this officer. He pointed out that under section 10, Act XV. of 1883, the committee were authorised to appoint either one of the members or any other person as a secretary, but recommended that in the latter case a sufficient salary should be provided. He particularly urged the necessity of the secretary being a man of active habits and possessed of a knowledge of English. No proposal was made by any member, but on the president proceeding to take the votes, it was found that nine members voted for Saiyid Ali Husain, Honorary Magistrate, and seven members for Babu Harnam Chandra.

The president declared Saiyid Ali Husain duly elected as secretary.

The president then tendered his resignation, and explained to the members that he did so because he considered that the gentleman they had elected as secretary was quite precluded from doing the work required of a secretary. It was not known whether he would accept the post. Saiyid Ali Husain is a gentleman who after a very long and honourable service under the Government has for some years retired on a pension. It is entirely unbenefitting his position that he should be the servant of a committee chiefly composed of members very much his juniors. The committee are quite unable to provide a salary suitable to his rank in life. On the other hand, he is unacquainted with English, and is quite unfitted by age for the arduous work which must fall on the secretary if any efficiency in the working of the rules is to be secured. Mr. Ward stated that in his opinion Saiyid Ali Husain's proper place was that of member of the committee, not that of the committee's servant.

Mr. Ward affirmed that as he could not expect any efficient discharge of the committee's duties after this instance, he declined to be their president.

The members asked Mr. Ward to withdraw his resignation, and elected Babu Harnam Chandra as secretary *nem con.* Mr. Ward then withdrew his resignation.

The present rules for election and appointment of members were taken into consideration, and it was resolved that no alteration in the system was necessary.

A petition was presented from several Muhammadan residents of the city, complaining that their interests were not sufficiently represented on the committee, and protesting against the appointment of Saiyid Ali Husain as secretary. The president informed them that Saiyid Ali Husain had not been appointed secretary, and recommended them to study the rules for the election of members, and be prepared at the next election to secure the return of members acceptable to them.

The proceedings then terminated.

No. 220, dated the 27th July 1882.

From President, Municipal Committee, Fatehpur, to Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your No. $\frac{3171}{153}$, dated 30th June 1882, I have the honour to report that at a special meeting of the municipal committee of Fatehpur held yesterday, Lala Anand Sahai was unanimously elected president of the committee, and it was agreed that he should take up the duties of the post from the 1st proximo.

2. The election system is already in force in this municipality. The rules at present in force are—(1) That every person shall be qualified to vote who shall be 20 years of age or over, and owner or occupier of a house rental of which is Rs. 2 per mensem: (2) a register to be kept of all persons qualified to vote in the municipal office, and revised from time to time; every registered person to be furnished with an extract of the entry in the register regarding himself: (3) place and date of election to be fixed by president, and notified a fortnight before: (4) the electors to record personally their votes to the person appointed to receive them.

3. The register has not been properly revised, and the person appointed to receive the votes has hitherto been the Táhsíldar. So far as I can ascertain, there is little interest taken in the election by the townspeople.

4. The subject was discussed at the meeting yesterday, and the conclusion arrived at was that the present rules were sufficient if properly carried out.

5. It appears to me that if a rule be made that the register of votes be revised every year in the months of February and March, and that the extract to be supplied to each registered voter be issued in the 1st week in April, and contain also a notice of the date of the next election (which will be held before the end of April), the rules cannot fail to be carried out properly, especially if one or more non-official members be appointed to receive the votes in place of the Tahsíldár.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. $\frac{4670}{XIV.}$, dated Benares, the 18th August 1882.

From C. A. DANIELL, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit my report in reply to your letters Nos. 147, dated 21st June, and 162, dated 29th June (Financial Department, Decentralisation), regarding the systems for election of members to municipal committees, and the election of a non-official president and vice-president to the committees.

2. Regarding the subject of election—

In the Benares municipality there are six wards, returning three members for each ward. The qualification for membership is the payment of Government jama of Rs. 1,000, or the receipt of annual profits from any business or profession of Rs. 5,000 per annum.

The qualification for electors is a business or profession yielding Rs. 200 annual profit, or owning or renting a house having a rent of Rs. 24 per annum.

Lists of electors are drawn up each year; voting papers are distributed, and at certain times and places the secretary receives the voting papers and records the votes. The numbers of electors on the register during the past nine years has averaged a little above 2,500, and the average number of voters has been about 1,000.

3. The subject of improvement of the system was discussed at a meeting convened by me on 10th August 1882. The places for receiving the vote-papers have hitherto not been well arranged. Proper places were pointed out. The numbers of persons who come forward as candidates for membership are comparatively few. There does not however seem the need to lower the standard of qualification for membership; but it is hoped that membership may become more popular than it is now.

4. In the Mírzapur city the system of election has not been well attended to. The electors were called on to record votes when needed, but voting has been really a dead letter. The qualification for electors was partly the same as at Benares, *viz.*, Rs. 24 annual house rental. The committee has recently voted that the qualification should be an income of Rs. 500. It is believed that this is a retrograde step. The committee was requested by me to re-consider the subject. Under the former plan there were about 2,000 qualified voters. The largest number of votes recorded in any year during the last seven years was 32. The general number was from 14 to 20. For the future, it is proposed to divide the town into eight wards, to have two members for each ward, and to adopt the plan of having suitable places in each ward for recording votes; also to use voting-papers as in Benares.

The qualification for membership is not fixed; but at a meeting convened by me on 12th August, the qualification suggested were jama of Rs. 500, income of Rs. 1,000 or property value of Rs. 5,000 (or some said of Rs. 8,000 or Rs. 10,000). It will be necessary to publish the names of candidates for membership for the information of voters, and efforts should be made to increase the popularity of membership.

5. In Chunár the number of recorded electors is stated now to be 297 The number reported last year was less than 100. The number of actual voters has averaged less than 40 during the past seven years. The elector's qualification is Rs. 12 house rental in the year. This seems fair for the place, which is small, and the people are not rich.

There is no qualification for membership. The opinions at the meeting held by me on the 11th August varied from an annual income of Rs. 200 to Rs. 500, and from a property value of Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 5,000.

It is proposed to have four wards with two members for each ward, and to adopt the use of vote-papers.

6. In the Gházipur municipality there are now 22 non-official members. At a meeting held by me on the 1st August, the subject of membership and election were fully discussed. The committee eventually asked to have time to consider these, and other subjects of a president. A special meeting was held on 8th August, and the committee has come to the conclusion that the number of non-official members should be 16. The majority decided that there should be a property qualification for membership. The candidate must either pay Rs. 25 license-tax, or earn an income of Rs. 1,000 per annum. One person out of 20 present voted against any property qualification for members. The qualifications for electors will be Rs. 24 house rental per annum. The town will be divided into four wards, with four members for each ward, and the system used in Benares voting will be adopted. During the past eight years the average number of voters has been 73 on a list of 800 electors. Voters were called together to vote for members: when the time came, retiring members were generally re-elected.

7. In Azamgarh the number of electors has averaged 300 during the past nine years, of whom about one-third are reported to vote each year. The subject was discussed by me at a meeting held on 3rd August, at which a number of townspeople as well as committee members were present. It was proposed then to raise the number of members from 12 to 15, to divide the town into wards, and generally to adopt the Benares system for election. The committee asked for time to consider the details. I have not yet received the result of the committee's further reflections. I expect the report daily.

8. In the municipality of Gorakhpur the elections have worked better than in any of the towns. The percentage of voters to electors has during the past eight years averaged 44 per cent. on the average of 700. The subject of improvement in election matters was discussed at meeting called by me on 5th August, at which several townspeople besides the committee were present. The committee asked for time to consider details. I have now received the committee's report. The number of members will be 15 instead of 12 as now. The present committee wishes to nominate the three new members. The city will be divided into five wards, having three members for each ward.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

The committee fix the following qualification for membership :

	Rs.
Government jama of - - -	500
License-tax of - - - -	50
Vakils and mukhtars' income of -	2,400
Other professional income of - -	1,200

The elector's qualification will be Rs. 24 house rental per annum.

The application for candidates will be presented before 1st April, and election will be made on 15th April. Membership of the municipal committee of Gorakhpur has for many years been rather popular.

9. In Ballia the voting has been a dead letter. The town is small, and the number of persons who are fit to serve as members is limited. I have taken the opinions of 24 persons, being past and present members of the committee.

They nearly all seem to think that the Magistrate should select a given number of people for membership, and that votes should be taken for the election of members from among those selected numbers. The elector's qualification is recommended to be the payment of Rs. 5 of town-tax. Magistrate thinks this too high. It is also by some suggested that new members should be elected by the existing members for the time being. I have no doubt the committee will be able to adopt a single scheme for election. I have recommended that the committee should do so.

10. I may remark here that, generally speaking, there is little or no competition for membership, and consequently but little interest in elections. If by any means the municipal committees obtain more responsibility and power, membership will be more sought after, and there may then be some competition, and elections may be more keenly contested. I am not sure however that this view is a popular one among the persons who have hitherto served on the committees. They are for the most part very conservative, and have a natural preference to be the nominees of Government, rather than to stand the result of a general election.

11. I now come to the second subject for report, *viz.*, the election by the members of a non-official president and vice-president. The subject of a non-official president has excited considerable interest and discussion. As regards the vice-president, there is no question ; the committees are of one mind on that point. In fact, when recent committee meetings have been held, and votes have been taken on the G. O. No. 147, non-official vice-presidents have been elected.

12. In Benares I had conversed for some time with several of the members and others. The commitee had come to a conclusion at a meeting held specially on the subject, and had proceeded to vote in fevour of the Magistrate as president. A meeting was held by me on the 10th August, and the subject was discussed at some length. Out of 18 ordinary members 16 were present. There were some 30 other residents of the city present, who joined more or less in the proceedings. Two of the members presented a memorandum to the following effect :—

"While heartily thanking Government for the confidence they repose in us, we would respectfully state that with the very important matter now under the consideration of the committee (such as the drainage scheme, other sanitary measures, &c.), and which will probably have to occupy our close attention for some time to come, we the non-official members do not feel that we are sufficiently strong in ourselves to carry out the desired measures, which are so essentially necessary for the welfare of the city. We therefore earnestly request that Government will kindly permit the Magistrate of the district to continue, as hitherto, to be president of our committee. At a future time, when further instructed in municipal duties and prepared to carry them out efficiently, we will ask the Government to allow us to exercise the privilege of electing a president from among our non-official members."

This view was supported by all the members present except one. The other persons interested in city affairs who were present also agreed to this paper. One member (Mr. Smyth) gave an opinion in favour of a non-official chairman.

13. There are of course persons in Benares in every way fit for the post. But I am aware that, with the committee as at present composed, it will be difficult for a non-official president to carry on the work satisfactorily. The committee is not sufficiently harmonious.

14. The remarks in the memorandum, with respect to the nature of work to be done, would probably have the same force several years hence as they have now, *i.e.*, until a drainage scheme is completed and important public improvements are no longer required. The present difficulty rests more on the constitution of the present committee than on any other ground. No doubt in Benares the chairman's duties would be onerous and responsible ; but I think that that very circumstance would probably be used as an argument to make it the more necessary that the Magistrate should be relieved of them. However, I have no reason to think that the present committee will change its mind.

15. If the District Officer remains as president, I am much inclined to recommend that there should be no other *ex-officio* member on the committee. The Government should reserve to itself the right to nominate a certain number of members. The number of Government nominees might range from three to six. The Civil Surgeon would be one, the rest would depend on the advisability of placing on the committee any other official or certain non-official residents. In this way the committee members will have more individual responsibility, and will the more readily learn the needful business ; and in the course of a year or two the committee will perhaps find it possible to elect a non-official chairman. The committee has elected Rája Shambuh Narayan Singh as vice-president.

16. Among other points raised, one of the members (Rája Siva Prasada) gave it as his opinion that if the president is to be non-official, he must be a native and not an European. It seem obvious that if Europeans are elected to be members, they must be eligible for the chair. Their election to the chair depends entirely on the votes of the members of the committee. In Benares there are 16 native and 2 European members.

17. In Mirzapur the committee and others present were in favour of the Magistrate being retained as president. When it was suggested that the Magistrate might be withdrawn by order, and the committee might be called on to elect one of its members, the general opinion was that the committee would be able to elect a president and vice-president from among the ordinary members. It was urged

that Government nominees or officials should be appointed to the committee to assist in carrying on the work.

18. There is no doubt that it is found here, as elsewhere, that the non-official members have not had the opportunity to learn the work. With the Magistrate at the head and an Assistant Magistrate as secretary, the real work has been out of the hands of the ordinary members. There will be no difficulty in the election of a non-official vice-president.

19. In Chunár there are but six non-official members. They propose to add two to the number. They wished the Magistrate to preside, but came to the conclusion that if the appointment of a non-official as president is insisted on, they would be able to elect one, but would require a non-official member to help in the work. There will be no difficulty in electing a non-official vice-president.

20. In Gházipur the reasoning and the result were much the same. The committee has represented that "if the Government declines to sanction the retention of the Magistrate as president, then Babu Sheo Nath Singh will be elected president; Babu Nil Madhub Roy, B.A., L.B., will be elected vice-president, and Babu Bhola Nath, B.A., will be secretary."

21. In Azamgarh, a few days before I arrived, the committee held a meeting, and decided that the Magistrate would be retained, and that Babu Bishen Chandra Mitra be vice-president. I held a meeting on 3rd August, at which 9 of the 12 non-official members were present, and 30 other city residents. The subject of the election of a non-official president was much discussed. The committee asked for time to re-consider the matter. As I have stated above, the result of their further decision has not yet reached me. The general opinion was much in favour of the Magistrate being president; the only question which remained was whether the committee (when brought up to 15 members) would be able to find a president fit and willing from among their number, if the Magistrate is withdrawn.

22. In Gorakhpur the committee and several other persons were present at a meeting held by me on the 5th August. The general sense of the meeting was in favour of the Magistrate as president, but there was no doubt that a non-official president would be forthcoming when necessary. In fact, there were two candidates for the post. The committee asked for time to consider the case. At a meeting held on the 9th August, the following conclusions were come to, *viz.*,—The committee reserved to ask the Government to increase the non-official members from 12 to 15; that these three additional members be named by committee, and that they shall hold office till 1883. The committee prepared to elect a non-official president, vice-president, and secretary after the Government has approved of the nomination of the three additional members.

23. In Ballia the members of the committee are of opinion that there is no non-official resident fit for the post of president. The committee has selected Maulvi Muhammad Sharíf (vakíl) as vice-president.

The Magistrate remarks as follows:—

"I am disposed to take the same view in the matter. Ballia is a municipality not in consequence of its intrinsic importance, or of the wealth, enterprise or intelligence of its inhabitants, but because it happens to be the head-quarters of the district. But for this fact it is doubtful whether the municipality would have continued to exist after the destruction of the town by the Ganges was completed (in 1876). Under these circumstances, it should be regarded as one of those places where the chief executive officer must for the present retain the duties of president."

24. I may here mention that a considerable portion of the municipal income is derived from the Ballia fair, and the fair expenses are defrayed wholly from municipal fund. This is a gathering which demands the direct action of the Magistrate as a magisterial and police functionary.

25. I have received the opinions of 24 residents of the town (9 members and 15 others); of these 22 decide that the president must be official; 2 approve of a non-official president. I quite agree with the majority and with the Magistrate that the Magistrate should retain the chair.

26. As the result of my inquiries and numerous discussions, I am of opinion that if committees are left entirely free to elect their president, the vote will fall on the Magistrate in every instance. If the Government should see fit to insist on the withdrawal of the Magistrate, I should say that the committees of Mirzapur, Gházipur, Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur will succeed in appointing a non-official president and vice-president: Chunar would perhaps find it difficult. The Benares committee would I think, represent its objection to the Government.

27. If the president and vice-president are non-official, the Government should appoint one or two official and two or three others as Government members on the nomination of the magistrate. But if the magistrate remains as president, it would be better that the Government members should not be district officers, excepting only perhaps the Civil Surgeon as sanitary officer.

28. I have one further point to notice, and that is with regard to the appointment of secretary. Under every circumstances, I would advise that the secretary be paid secretary where funds will admit, or where the funds will not admit of a paid servant, the secretary should be one of the non-official members.

I would accept Ballia, as there is no non-official person there who could do the work of secretary.

29. In Benares there is a paid secretary. In all other towns the secretary's work hitherto has been done by an Assistant or Joint-Magistrate; in Ballia by the Tahsíldár. In all the municipalities the secretary has been the chief executive, and has practically done all the work in the town. The object of the whole matter now under report is that the chief residents in the town should form a committee to manage the affairs of the town. Whether the president be official or non-official, the secretary should not be one of the district officers.

No. $\frac{4834}{XIV}$, dated the 25th August 1882.

From C. A. Daniell, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, to Officiating Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

In continuation of my No. $\frac{4670}{XIV}$, dated 18th August 1882, Financial Department (Decentralisation), regarding the final conclusion come to by the Azamgarh municipal committee concerning the election

of a non-official president and the improvement of elections (my paras. 7 and 8), I have the honour to submit the result as reported to me by the Magistrate.

Copy of Demi-official Letter from J. Laidman, Esquire, Officiating Collector of Azamgarh, to C. A. Daniell, Esquire, Commissioner, Benares Division, dated 23rd August 1882.

The municipal committee will have no one but the Magistrate at present for their president.

2. They have already elected one of their number as a vice-president.

3. They will elect Babu Mukhtesar Rae, Vakíl, as secretary. He is not a member, but it is not imperative that the secretary should be a member (*vide* section 10, Act XV. of 1873).

4. They think 12 members sufficient.

5. They propose six wards, so that each year one member might be chosen for each.

6. They would have a voting place in each ward.

7. Persons seeking election should send their names to the Magistrate on or before 15th February, to that they may be proclaimed a fortnight before election which takes place the first week in March, and have effect from 1st April.

8. On the date fixed for election, voting-cards should be given to voters at the central office.

No. $\frac{1838}{\text{XXIII.}-47}$, dated Jhánsi, the 21st August 1882.

From Lieut.-Colonel J. Liston, Officiating Commissioner, Jhánsi Division, to Officiating Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 147, dated 21st June, on the subject of extending the elective system to municipalities, I have the honour to report as follows.

2. The municipalities in this division are—

(1.) Jhánsi - - - - } in the Jhánsi district,
(2.) Mau-Ránipur - - - }
(3.) Orai - - - - }
(4.) Kunch - - - - } in the Jalaun district, and
(5.) Kálpi - - - - }
(6.) Lalitpur, in the Lalitpur district.

3. It will be well I think to take up each municipality separately.

Jhánsi.—The committee is comprised of four *ex-officio* members and eight non-official members; but of these eight, four are in reality in Government service. Of these eight, four were appointed for one year and four for two years. These appointments of all eight terminate on the 31st March 1883.

A special meeting to consider the question under report was held at Jhánsi on the 24th July 1882. There were present two official or *ex-officio* members, and six non-official members. Two members—one *ex-officio* and one non-official—were in favour of introducing the elective system; but the remainder held that, "owing to the small population of the municipality and the absence of any resident of intelligence or position beyond the ranks of Government officials, the system would be impracticable." Mr. Deas, Deputy Commissioner of Jhánsi, writes on the 14th instant as follows:—"As regards the Jhánsi municipality, I do not think the introduction of the elective system in any form practicable or desirable. The population of New Jhánsi, Talpura, Tukra Jhánsi, and civil lines, which were formed into the Jhánsi municipality, owing to the head-quarters of the district being at New Jhánsi, is under 2,500; and, excluding European and native officials, who number 475, is composed almost entirely of illiterate persons of the lower castes, to a great extent Ahírs, Chamars, and labourers.

"Of the non-official residents, therefore, very few are eligible or take any interest in municipal administration * * * * ; owing to the paucity of eligible non-officials, it was provided by Government that all persons, except the *ex-officio* members, should sit as non-official. Again, the municipality is not self-supporting. Against the income of Rs. 754 there is an expenditure of Rs. 1,037. The annual deficit of about Rs. 300 is met by grants from nazul and local improvement funds. Receipts from house and compound taxes are the main sources of income, and of these the greater portion is contributed by European owners and residents of bungalows.

"Lastly, the native members themselves are not in favour of any change in the present system of nomination by the Deputy Commissioner. They consider that the elective system is undesirable and would not succeed, partly because the people would take no interest in it, and partly because the number of non-official candidates is extremely limited."

I have spoken to some of the native gentlemen who are members of the committee on the subject, and they I find are strongly opposed to the elective system.

The quotation given above from Mr. Deas' report shows how the municipality of Jhánsi is made up; but I think it as well to mention that that there is no "town" within its limits, the city of Jhánsi being in the Gwalior State.

I quite coincide with Mr. Deas and the committee in the opinion that the elective system should not be extended to the Jhánsi municipal committee, but that the members thereof should, as heretofore, be nominated by the Deputy Commissioner.

Should, however, Government decide that the elective system is to be adopted, I enclose a draft of rules drawn up by the committee.

As regards the appointment of a non-official member to the office of president, I find that the committee were, on the 24th of July, of opinion that "it would be advisable that the District Officer should for the present retain the office of president."

The committee nominated Mr. Edulji Nowroji as vice-president. Mr. Nowroji is a respectable Pársi general merchant, originally I believe from Bombay.

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

4. *Mau-Ránipur.*—The committee at present consist of three *ex-officio* and twelve non-official members: the term of six of these non-official members will expire on the 31st March 1883, and of six on the 31st March 1884.

The committee held a special meeting on the 17th July 1882, and gave an opinion on the elective system, which I quote in full, premising however that an elective system does exist in this municipality, the population of which is 23,124: its income being Rs. 16,989 :—

"In reference to the first subject, the committee consider a general elective system impracticable and undesirable for this municipality. On this subject the committee have expressed their opinion more than once before, showing that the generality of the people not only take no interest in the appointment of members, but fail to give any vote even when they are asked for it at their own doors. The system now in force has been found to work satisfactorily, and that is, the election by voters nominated by the committee, and consisting of the headmen of the muhallas and chaudhris of different trades and professions. If an elective system is indispensable, the committee consider that, in addition to the above class of voters, franchise may be extended to all persons paying the income or license-tax.

"But as it is desirable to have persons of respectability and other qualifications as members, the committee would restrict the nomination to persons named in a list previously prepared by the committee, and notified to the voters at least ten days prior to the election.

"The eligible candidates to possess the following qualifications :—He should be a resident of the municipal town, literate, and possessed of tolerable means and social status amongst the people. The committee also consider that each muhalla of the two towns be represented by a member,—that is, seventeen members of Mau, and eight of Ránipur, instead of six for each as now. The elections should be held in the month of March, so that the new members may be present at the last meeting of the outgoing committee.

"The voting to be by ballot under the superintendence of the existing committee, held at some place within each town." * * * * * *

Regarding these resolutions, Mr. Deas, the Deputy Commissioner, writes on the 14th August :—

"Apart, however, from this general apathy and want of interest, there are no special difficulties rendering the introduction of the elective system impracticable. The rules proposed by the committee might well be adopted with the following additions and modifications :—

"(1) I would not confer on the committee the power of nominating headmen of muhallas and chaudhris of trades and professions. It will be sufficient to extend the suffrage to all persons resident within the municipal limits who are assessed under the municipal or imperial License Tax Act, or whose income from whatever source amounts to Rs. 100 or more per annum.

"(2) The qualifications of candidates should be—

"(*a*) Residence within municipal limits :

"(*b*) Ability to read or write :

"(*c*) Possession of house property worth Rs. 1,000 or of an income of Rs. 1,250 or more per annum.

"(3) For each muhalla a list of persons qualified to become candidates for election will be prepared by a sub-committee composed of two or more members of the municipal committee. This sub-committee will have the power of excluding from the list of persons who, though qualified under section 2, may for special reasons be considered unfit for municipal office. Any person whose name has been omitted from the list of persons qualified for candidates may appeal to the committee from the sub-committee's decision. The committee's decision will be final.

"(4) Each muhalla will be represented by one member, and each voter in the muhalla will have one vote. The list of voters will be prepared by a sub-committee of the municipal committee, their decisions being appealable to the committee."

It is evident that in the case of the municipality of Mau-Ránipur the elective system can be introduced with advantage, or rather that it can be extended, for it already exists.

I agree with Mr. Deas that the existing committee should not have the power to nominate headmen of muhallas ; but I go further and say that the existing committee should have no power of interference in the elections, as they certainly would have if, as proposed by Mr. Deas, "a sub-committee" of the existing committee be deputed to prepare a list of "persons qualified to become candidates for election."

The rules I would propose for this municipality are :—

(1) Every person resident within the municipal limits who is assessed under the municipal or imperial license-tax Act, or whose income from whatever source amounts to Rs. 100 or more per annum, shall have one vote at the election of members of the Mau-Ránipur municipal committee, provided that no person who has been convicted of an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment for a term of not less than six months shall be allowed to vote.

(2) That a list of persons competent to vote be prepared during the month of January in each year by the Assistant Commissioner of Mau-Ránipur.

(3) That this list be duly published, and that the Assistant Commissioner shall up to the last day of February hear any objection regarding omission or the entry of improper names, and dispose of the same.

(4) That a date be fixed during March of each year for election of members, the said election to be held at the municipal office in presence of the Assistant Commissioner.

(5) That those gentlemen obtaining most votes be declared members of the municipal committee.

(6) That there be 17 members, *i.e.*, one for each muhalla of Mau and Ránipur.

(7) That voters can only vote for the members of their own muhalla.

As to qualifications of members I consider the following sufficient :—

(1) Residence within the municipal limits.

(2) Ability to read and write.

(3) Possession of property as proposed by Mr. Deas.

(4) That there is no conviction, as laid down by section 7 of Act XV. of 1873, recorded against the member elected.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

As regards the question of electing a president or vice-president, the municipal committee and Mr. Deas are both strongly against the election of a non-official member as president, and I myself think for a few years to come it would be better to allow the Assistant Commissioner to remain as president. The non-official members are unfitted for the post from want of proper education, and work would undoubtedly come to a standstill.

As regards the post of vice-president, the committee are of opinion that the Tahsíldár is the proper man for the post, but allow that at least one of the members, one Seth Suraj Mall, is fitted for the appointment. Mr. Deas describes this gentleman as "a respectable and intelligent mahájan."

I am of opinion therefore that the vice-president might be a non-official.

5. *Orai.*—I now proceed to report on the municipalities of the Jalaun district.

The Orai committee consists of six *ex-officio* members and twelve non-official members: their appointments terminate on 31st May 1883, and 31st May 1884.

The population is 7,440, and the income Rs. 6,846.

The committee held a special meeting at Orai on the 4th August: their proceedings accompany this letter.

As regards the elective system, the committee contented themselves with accepting a memorandum on the subject prepared by the secretary.

From this memorandum it is evident that the elective system does exist already, but that the president draws up a list of gentlemen whom he considers fit to be members of the municipal committee: this is I think a mistake, and should be done away with.

I think that the rules I propose for Mau-Ránipur, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, substituting the words Deputy Commissioner for the words Assistant Commissioner, will suit the requirements of Orai, as also the "qualifications" I have given in the case of members of the committee. As regards the election of a president or vice-president, both the committee and the Deputy Commissioner, Major Quin, are averse to election, and it appears to me that there is no member fitted for either post for some time to come. I consider the present system of nomination should remain in force.

6. *Kúnch.*—On this committee there are two *ex-officio* members and six non-official members; these six non-official members will retire on the 31st May 1883.

The population of the municipality is 13,727, the income Rs. 10,233.

The elective system is in force, and the rules are appended. I do not see why the rules I propose for Orai should not be put in force in Kúnch.

The committee declare that there is no non-official member fitted for the post of president or vice-president. Major Quin is of the same opinion, and I am forced to coincide.

Kálpi.—This committee consists of two *ex-officio* members and six non-official members. Of the non-official members, three will retire on the 31st May 1883, and three on the 31st May 1884.

The population of the municipality is 14,320, the income is Rs. 10,416.

The elective system is in force, and is declared by Major Quin to be carried out in better form in Kálpi than in either Kúnch or Orai.

Each muhalla elects its two representatives, who elect from among themselves again the new members.

Mr. Evans, Assistant Commissioner and president of the Kálpi committee, and the committee assembled on the 18th July propose a modified system of election.

Their proposed rules have the same great objection to my mind that the rules proposed for Mau have. *i.e.*, they put too much power in the matter of elections into the hands of the existing committee. Why should the list of voters not be prepared by the Assistant Commissioner, who from the information procurable from his office, can prepare a more complete list than the members of the committee can?

I am of opinion that the rules 1, 2, 3, and 4 I propose for Mau may with advantage be applied to the case of the Kálpi municipality. As regards the question of the appointment of a president and vice-president from among the non-official members, the committee "resolve that it would be better that the present president and vice-president should hold their present offices; but in case a non-official vice-president was insisted on by Government, the members present nominated Lala Thakur Das."

I learn however from Mr. Evan's letter to Major Quin, written three days after the committee assembled, that in Mr. Evan's opinion Lala Thakur Das will not be able to carry on the work, and further that he does not wish to accept the appointment. I fear that the idea of appointing a non-official member as president or vice-president of any one of the Jalaun municipal committees must, for the present at least, be given up.

8. *Lalitpur.*—There only remains Lalitpur to be reported on. There are five *ex-officio* members and ten non-officials. Of these ten, the term of three expires on the 25th May 1883, and of the remainder on the 1st June 1884.

The system of election does not at present hold in Lalitpur, the members being nominated by the Deputy Commissioner.

The committee held a special meeting at Lalitpur on the 17th July, and resolved that the elective system be adopted in Lalitpur; the plan they proposed for election was—"That in each of the eight muhallas in Lalitpur two representatives be chosen by the principal people of the muhalla. That on a vacancy occurring, said representatives are to write down the name of the person they vote for on a slip of paper and then put the paper into a ballot-box. The name of the person getting largest number of votes to be sent up for appointment."

I think this simple rule really best suited to Lalitpur; the only difficulty is the selection of "principal people;" but a list can be made out by the Deputy Commissioner with the aid of the pargana officer and Tahsíldár, both of whom are well acquainted with the town: moreover a good guide will be the license-tax lists. The non-official members of the committee declined to elect either a president or vice-president, stating that none of them had either time or ability for the duties of the post

The Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Story, writing on the subject says:—"If there had been any person among the non-official members who in my opinion was sufficiently qualified to do the work of the post of president or vice-president, I would have exerted my influence to try and persuade him to

take office, but there is not one who I could correctly recommend and say was able to do the work properly."

There is no doubt that Mr. Story is right. I have been working with the non-official members of the Lalitpur municipality for years, and I know that not one of them could do the work, were he ever so willing, of either president or vice-president.

No. 780, dated Naini Tal, the 8th August 1882.

From Lieut.-General the Honourable Sir H. RAMSAY, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner, Kumaun Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your No. 147, dated 21st June, in regard to the election or appointment of municipal boards, and to report the conclusions reached after consultation.

2. There are three municipalities in this division,—Almora, Naini Tal, and Káshipur. At Almora an efficient system of election is available, but the people take so little interest in self-government, that for two years they have taken no steps to elect representatives, and these had to be nominated. Even when the people did elect, about half the members had to be chosen from officials, there being very few others who could or would act. On this committee there are three civil officers and the Civil Surgeon members *ex-officio*. They have filled the offices of president, vice-president, and secretary ; and but for them nothing would be done in the way of sanitary and other improvement.

3. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to abandon the town to the indifference of the people, I think *ex-officio* members must be retained, with the exception of the district officer, who would be more free to use his influence and power of control if relieved of the office of president. I would appoint the Junior Assistant Commissioner president, and the Extra Assistant Commissioner secretary, leaving the committee to elect a non-official vice-president. I do not see how work can be carried on otherwise. The secretary is the executive officer, and should know English; and from what I know of the people, I do not think any non-official member would take the trouble required in the office of secretary. The district officer having gone out, it will be necessary either to have seven or nine elected members ; and as the suburbs have lately been brought within municipal limits, I would add a non-official members, who might be elected at once. Thus five members would be elected one year and four the next. The alterations in the rules would be trifling, and could be notified without further reference.

4. Naini Tal is especially dealt with. The committee elected under the old rules voluntarily resigned their office on the occurrence of the landslip, and advocated the appointment of a committee by Government. This has been done, and works as well as any other system could. Under the old rules it was seldom indeed that those most interested took any interest in elections ; and as regards tenants, I believe they only came forward on one occasion for the election of a representative. I think the present system of nomination should continue till a better is called for. Any one having a grievance has ample relief provided in rule 4, chapter 3 of the bye-laws, quite as much so as under the old system.

5. Hitherto the Káshipur committee has been nominated. The people, as elsewhere, showed little interest in local affairs, and the field for selection of members was very narrow. Great improvements have been made in the town, a large part of the income is derived from indirect taxation, and the assessment of the remainder has been left to the Native members, who have now acquired some experience of municipal business. Probably the people also, seeing the palpable benefits of municipal rule for the past few years, under good management, are now better fitted to exercise the franchise, and the local officers consider that the experiment might be tried. But it would not do to have the first election now in the absence of English officers. The Superintendent thinks, and I agree with him, that it should not be held till March next, after rules have been adopted and the electors familiarised with the idea. Besides, the present membership hold office for two years or until next year, and I do not think they should be disturbed.

6. A good basis for election exists in the direct tax on circumstances and property paid by 1,249 persons; and the Superintendent suggests a property qualification for candidates of Rs. 1,000 income from land, house, property or trade. This seems fair. The population consists of 8,477 Hindus and 6,190 Muhammadans. Besides their numerical inferiority, it is doubtful if the latter could produce a relative number of representatives of the requisite qualification. In the interests of the town it is not desirable to make the qualification so low as to introduce inefficient men, and the arrangements proposed seem to me the best that can be adopted at this stage. Should Government approve them, rules can be framed and published before the time for election, which should be held under the supervision of one of the civil officers.

7. As regards a chairman, it would be simply impossible to find one suitable among the town-people, and I doubt whether anyone would be willing to accept the office ; and for the reasons given in the case of Almora, I think the district officer should not hold this position. The only officer who could hold it is the Assistant Superintendent, who should be so appointed by Government. A non-official vice-president might be elected by the committee. As regards a secretary there is a difficulty, there being no non-official in the town knowing English or capable of dealing with correspondence and accounts. We can only choose between the Assistant Superintendent and the Assistant Surgeon. If the latter is appointed, it might interfere with his duties, so that the appointment of the Assistant Superintendent as chairman and secretary seems unavoidable.

8. It seems necessary that Government should lay down the general principle on which the executive work of a municipality should be carried on. My own decided opinion is that, in the present backward state of things, an official president and secretary must be appointed. Time alone will show how the experiment of local government will succeed. It is perfectly clear to me that it cannot spring into reasonable efficiency at a bound. It has never done so in any other land, but has been a slow process. In the course of time non-official members of capacity may develop into chairmen and secretaries of municipalities by training in the subordinate positions of vice-president and assistant secretary, the latter office being created for the purpose.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

No. 2929, dated Lucknow, the 17th August 1882.

From Major W. E. FORBES, Officiating Commissioner, Lucknow Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Circulars Nos. 147 and 162, dated respectively the 21st and 29th June last, I have the honour to furnish the following report.

2. I have discussed the questions of the introduction of the elective system into municipalities and of the appointment of non-official chairmen with the members of the municipal committees of the districts of this division, with the District Officers, Officials, and other leading members of the native community. Reports have also been furnished by the Deputy Commissioners of Lucknow and Bara Banki, copies of which are appended. The Deputy Commissioner of Unao has not submitted a report, but has forwarded the proceedings of the Unao municipal committee at a special meeting held on the 27th ultimo, at which these matters were discussed and resolutions recorded, a copy of which is also appended.

Para. 2, Circular No. 147.

3. In none of the municipalities in this division is the system of election at present in force. It has been tried in Lucknow; and an account of its introduction and failure will be found in the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow.

4. With regard to Lucknow, the Deputy Commissioner takes a somewhat gloomy view of the propects of the elective system. Major Murray writes that he is not sanguine of its success, and that the community generally take no interest whatever in its representation.

5. On the 2nd instant I met and discussed the question with several of the members of the municipal committee of Lucknow. The following principle was unanimously agreed to as simple and practicable, and as likely to engender amongst the urban population a feeling in favour of the elective system.

Each representative member of a ward or division of the municipality to obtain from the registered voters of his ward the names of five persons, any one of whom the latter would like to sit on the board as their representative. These names should be supplemented by details as to the nominee's status, profession, and other particulars, and should be filed under the recording member's signature in the municipal office. On the occurrence of a vacancy on the municipal board, the list of recorded candidates for the ward, in which the vacancy has to be filled up, to be laid before a full meeting of the committee, who would thereupon proceed to the election of a member.

6. The appointments of the present members hold good until the 1st April next, when a general election could take place. Lists of the ward nominees should be filed by the end of December, and on a subsequent date, in the month of January, the committee should elect the new members.

7. The existing registers of persons deemed qualified to vote will form the basis of the new rolls of electors. They will be carefully scrutinised and amended with reference—

(i) To changes which have meanwhile occurred by deaths, removals, &c.:
(ii) To the register of persons in the different wards assessed to the license-tax:
(iii) To persons in enjoyment of wasikas of Rs. 10 per mensem and upwards:
(iv) To persons in receipt of ordinary pensions from Government of Rs. 10 per mensem and upwards:
(v) To house and landed proprietors according to a standard of minimum value, say Rs. 100: and
(vi) To tenants of not less than a twelve months' residence, and paying an annual rent of Rs. 100 and upwards.

8. The question of the qualifications of candidates is a somewhat knotty problem. I am in favour however of leaving the choice of the electors as unfettered as possible, and I would only impose the restrictions of rudimentary education and respectability.

9. In Bara Banki the muhalla or ward system of election is also proposed; but whereas in Lucknow the constituencies nominate the candidates for membership from whom the committee finally elect their member, in Bara Banki the committee selects the constituency by whom the final election for membership is made, subject to veto by the Deputy Commissioner. In conversation, however, with Major Hastings, he admits that the Lucknow system is the preferable one.

10. In the proceedings of the Unao committee of the 27th ultimo, the principle of ward or muhalla representation is not adopted. It is proposed to have one constituency, composed of—

(i) All license-tax payers:
(ii) All tenants paying not less than Rs. 100 per annum:
(iii) All pleaders and revenue agents:
(iv) All others possessing an annual income of not less than Rs. 100.

It is further proposed that from this register the electors be required "to make a general selection of candidates qualified to sit as their representatives," and that the principal qualifications of candidates be "ability, respectability, and affluence, or any two of them together."

In other words, the Unao committee would not object to a rich though thoroughly disreputable knave! The committee goes on to propose that from the selected candidates, on the occasion of a general or special election, the electors shall proceed to nominate, within 15 days from the issue of a notice calling upon them to do so, the candidate they prefer for appointment: each elector will be required to record his own and the name of the candidate he proposes on a slip of paper, which he is to place in a box kept in the municipal office. If no nominations are made within the time specified, or if the recorded votes are less than one-tenth of the number of the electors, the nomination to devolve on the committee.

11. It is needless to remark that under existing circumstances, and as an introduction of the elective system, such a scheme as that devised by the Unao committee has but little chance of success.

12. With regard to the appointment of a non-official to the office of chairman and vice-chairman, the views of Government of India have been laid before the several committees. At present the general feeling is in favour of the retention by the Deputy Commissioner of the post of chairman, although it is admitted that there are non-official members on each of the three boards competent to fill the office.

Para. 3, Circular No. 147.

In Lucknow the committee are prepared to put the question of both chairman and vice-chairman to the vote as soon as it may be deemed expedient to do so.

In Bara Banki both of the two members deemed qualified for the office of chairman decline the honour: a non-official vice-chairman has however been appointed.

In Unao the committee are unwilling that the Deputy Commissioner should withdraw from the office of president; but in case Government does not approve of the Deputy Commissioner retaining the chairmanship, they name three individuals for the post, and recommend that the Tahsíldár be appointed vice-chairman.

13. In Lucknow, in the event of the Deputy Commissioner being elected chairman, the vice-president will be elected from amongst the non-official members. The City Magistrate should always remain an *ex-officio* member, and as such should retain charge of the conservancy department and questions regarding the bye-laws. In this respect I anticipate no practical difficulty, as the intelligence of the members generally will lead them to see the importance of leaving these departments of municipal administration in competent and experienced hands.

14. In conclusion, I have the honour to state that except under circumstances of death or retirement, election of non-official members is not at present possible, as the existing members of the several boards are not liable to removal until the dates specified in the margin.

Lucknow, 31st March 1883.
Newalganj Maharájganj, 31st March 1883.
Unao, 31st March 1883.
Bara Banki, 31st March 1883.

No. 3849, dated Lucknow, the 30th July 1882.

From Major A. Murray, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, and President, Municipal Committee, Lucknow, to Officiating Commissioner, Lucknow Division.

Sir,

In reply to your Circular No. $\frac{152}{2568}$, dated 20th instant, I have the honour to state that the rules regarding the appointment of members of the Lucknow municipality are entered at page 253 of the Digest.

2. These rules were issued in Chief Commissioner's Circular No. 62 of 1874, and lists of qualified voters in each division of the city were prepared; and on the 8th of January 1875, notices were published in the local newspapers, English and vernacular, and posted up in Deputy Commissioner's office, the tahsíls, thanás, and public places in the city, calling upon all persons qualified to register their votes before the 15th February. This failed to induce voters to come forward; but Colonel Reid, the Commissioner of Lucknow, not satisfied that sufficient publicity had been given to the matter, ordered that "a further measure should be taken in one circle as an experiment." The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Quinton, then had 200 English handbills printed, and 500 vernacular, altering the date before which names were to be registered. The English bills were distributed from house to house in the civil lines in Ganeshganj where the residents speak English, and the others were left in the houses of respectable natives in all divisions. The notice proclaimed by beat of drum in each muhalla, copies were sent to the secretary of the Rafah-i-Am and publishers of local newspapers, to the Canning College, and municipal schools. I have given all three measures in detail to show that every means were taken to make the matter widely known. The result was that seven persons registered their names,—six in Ganeshganj, and one in Wazirganj: the names are given in margin.

Colonel Reid.
Mr. E. Morgan.
„ L. Manuel.
„ J. Manuel.
„ Turner.
Babu Ram Kumar Ghose.
Hanuman Singh.

3. The attempt to appoint members by election having thus so signally failed, members since that year have been nominated. The present members will hold office till the 1st April next, and there are at present no vacancies.

4. The question of election has been referred at the last meeting of the committee to a sub-committee, who have been requested to propose such modifications as they may consider proper of the present rule; and if the revised rules be approved, election will be tried again next April. But I am not sanguine of its success. The committee generally takes no interest whatever in its representation.

5. With reference to the appointment of a non-official president or vice-president, the opinion of the majority of the members is undoubtedly in favour of the present system, and there are many difficulties in appointing a non-official president in an important municipality like Lucknow. It is necessary that he should be of some social position, or the other members would not serve under him; and it is at the same time necessary that he should have a knowledge of English and a certain amount of business training. He must also be prepared to give up a very considerable portion of his time to the duties connected with the post. I am not at present prepared therefore to recommend that any member of the committee be appointed president; but I think that a vice-president might be appointed, who would relieve the City Magistrate (at present vice-president) of all work connected with the municipality, excepting the conservancy arrangements and questions regarding the bye-laws.

6. As the matter is one which might affect the position of the Deputy Commissioner as president, and as the Officiating City Magistrate and Major Newbery, who was consulted in the matter, are strongly against the proposition to relieve the City Magistrate of any portion of his present municipal work, I proposed, and the committee agreed, that the question should not be decided till the return of Major Currie, whose opinion on the subject should be of considerable value, and the matter will be brought before a special meeting of the committee, which will be held on Monday, the 7th August.

No. 1556, dated Bara Banki, the 22nd July 1882.

From Major H. W. Hastings, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, to Officiating Commissioner, Lucknow Division.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the report called for in letter No. 147, dated the 21st ultimo, from the Officiating Secretary to Government.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

2. The number of non-official members in the municipal committee is 12. Sanction to their appointment was received under cover of the Secretary's No. 117, dated 15th September 1881, and their tenure of office will not expire until 1883; any vacancies that may occur in the interim can be filled by election.

3. Of the 12 non-official members, eight are traders, two pleaders, one a small Talukdar, and one a sub-registrar. Out of these, the two pleaders alone are qualified for the post of chairman, but neither of them will undertake the task. The members of the committee are strongly opposed to the suggestion of Government, so that nothing further can be done at present than the appointment of a non-official vice-president.

4. With regard to the introduction of the elective system, the first point for decision is what is to be the unit ofrepresentation—trade, caste, or territorial. The unanimous opinion of the native gentlemen I have consulted is that the unit should be the muhalla.

5. The municipal area includes the following muhallas :—

No.	Name of Muhalla.	Number of Houses.	Population.
1.	Perbataon	618	3,027
2.	Faiz-ullah ganj	71	379
3.	Sarauki	444	1,987
4.	Rasulpur	315	1,719
5.	Lakpera	177	1,208
6.	Kanungos	407	1,980
7.	Gulariagarda	387	1,603
8.	Katra	269	1,225
9.	Paisar	48	308
		2,936	13,436

10. Civil lines.

It is proposed to include Faiz-ullah ganj in Perbataon, and Paisar in Katra, thus making with the civil lines eight electoral wards, Nos. 1 and 2, 3, 4, and 6 to retain two members each, and the rest one.

6. The next point is the qualification of the electors. The members consider, and I think rightly, that a household suffrage is too extended for a commencement, and a property qualification would necessitate an inquiry which, however little inquisitorial, might be looked on with distaste and tend to make the scheme unpopular. It is thought that the constituency should itself be selected by the committee; that the names of the electors should be published, and notice given that any one omitted from the list, who wished to be brought on the register, should apply to the secretary, when his claims would be considered.

7. On a vacancy occurring, proclamation would be issued inviting candidates to register their names in the municipal office. The Deputy Commissioner should have the power of striking off the list any candidate who in his opinion was unfitted to sit in the committee, and the names of the rest should be submitted to the votes of the muhalla electors.

8. Votes would be recorded at the municipal office in presence of an officer deputed by the Deputy Commissioner to receive them.

9. The principles I have proposed to adopt may be summarised thus :—

(1) The muhalla should be the unit to be represented.
(2) The constituency should be selected by the municipal committee.
(3) The Deputy Commissioner should have the power to strike off any name from the list of candidates on giving his reasons in writing and his order being subject to appeal.

If the soundness of these principles be conceded, the working out of the details will present no difficulty.

Since writing the above I have received your Circular No. 152 of the 20th instant. The elective system has never been tried in the municipality.

PROCEEDINGS of a Special Meeting of the Municipal Committee of Unao, held on Thursday, the 27th of July 1882.

PRESENT :

(1) Shaikh Abdul Hamid.
(2) Lala Ambay Sahai.
(3) Mír Mulazim Ali.
(4) Shaikh Muhammad Husain.
(5) Shaikh Muhammad Bakhsh.
(6) Kunj Behari Lal.
(7) Mannu Lal.
(8) Aziz-ud-din.
(9) Sheo Sahai.
(10) Chaudhari Ramzan Ali.
(11) Chandi Prasad, Tahsíldár.
(12) Mirza Khudadad Beg, Extra Assistant Commissioner, *Secretary.*
(13) Pandit Maharáj Narayan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, *Vice-President.*

1. The president on account of ill-health could not find himself in a position to attend the meeting, and the vice-president took the chair.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

2. The new scheme was generally discussed and three points were selected for the immediate consideration of the meeting, *viz.* :—

(1) The nature and extent of the constituency, the qualification of electors:
(2) The time, place and manner of election:
(3) The qualification of candidates.

(1) On the first point it was resolved that the municipal franchise should consist of;
(1) All license-tax-payers:
(2) All tenancy-holders of not less than 100 per annum:
(3) All pleaders and revenue-agents:
(4) All others not falling under any of the above three heads, but possessing an annual income of not less than Rs. 100.

All persons falling under any of the obove four heads shall have a right of voting.

(2 and 3) On the second point under consideration, it was proposed and resolved that a complete list of electors would be prepared by the committee. A general meeting of these electors would be convened on a certain day at a given place, and after explaining the object of their being called together they will be asked to make a general selection of candidates qualified to sit as their representatives. Ability, respectability, and affluence, or any two of them together, to constitute principal qualifications for nominations.

3. On the occasion both of a general and special election of members, a notice—with a list of qualified candidates—should be issued to the effect that within 25 days electors should vote nomination in favour of any candidate whose name may appear in the list, by putting in a box (like a letter-box), to be kept in the committee's office, a piece of paper bearing the names of the candidate and the elector; that if no nomination was made within the specified time, the committee, which must be vested with that power, would appoint one. The letter-box to be opened in the committee on the next committee day. Less votes than one-tenth of the whole elective body would not be taken into consideration, and the work of nomination would devolve on the committee.

4. Resolved, that it is not desirable for the present that the Deputy Commissioner should withdraw from the office of president; but in case Government do not approve of Deputy Commissioner continuing to be the president, either Babu Ram Sahai Chaudhari, Ramzan Ali, or Munshi Abdul Hamid be appointed president, and the Tahsíldár vice-president if not open to objection; but if open to objection, Abdul Hamid, in case he be not selected as president: Gya Parshad, pleader, to be the secretary of the committee.

MIRZA KHUDADAD BEG,
Extra Assistant Commissioner, Secretary.

No. 2668, dated Sitapur, the 21st August 1882.

From Major G. E. ERSKINE, Commissioner, Sitapur Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

I HAVE now the honour to reply to your letters Nos. 147 and 152, dated respectively the 21st and 29th of June last.

2. *Detail of Municipalities.*—In the Sitapur Division there are 13 municipalities. Their names and the populations of each are given below.

SITAPUR -	1. Sitapur - -	18,544
	2. Khairabad - -	14,270
	3. Biswán - -	8,148
HARDOI -	4. Hardoi - -	8,898
	5. Sandíla - -	14,865
	6. Shahábad - -	18,610
	7. Piháni - -	7,513
	8. Bilgrám - -	11,067
	9. Mallawán - -	10,970
	10. Sandí - -	9,810
KHERI - -	11. Lakhimpur - -	6,618
	12. Muhamdi - -	6,643
	13. Dhaurahra - -	5,765

3. *The system of election can be introduced.*—I have not yet received the necessary information regarding Muhamdi and Dhaurahra (Nos. 12 and 13), but in all the others I believe the elective system can be introduced so soon as the term of office of the present members expires, provided that by that time the necessary details are arranged. (The date of expiry is, I believe, in all the municipalities the 31st March 1883.) All three Deputy Commissioners consider the plan quite practicable: Natives generally say we are going too fast, and that those who are invested with the right to vote will in but few instances avail themselves of it; but they offer no strong objections, and seem content that the experiment be tried.

4. *Manner of election, qualifications of electors and candidates, &c.*—As to the manner of election, the qualifications of the electors and the candidates for office, and other cognate matters, we have no experience to guide us of the working of a system of election in any municipality within the division. The consequence is that the suggestions made by the different Deputy Commissioners vary in a remarkable degree; and that the information which they have placed at my disposal is not so complete on many points as I could wish it to be, to enable me to prepare detailed schemes for the approval of Government.

5. *Sitapur proposals—Qualifications of electors.*—The Sitapur municipal committee, of whose proceedings a copy is appended, is prepared to adopt at once household suffrage, that is to say (as the

Deputy Commissioner explains), "that the head male or female of an undivided family should be entitled to vote." This would give some 2,674 electors.

6. *Number of elected members.*—There are at present 10 non-official members: the committee would have 11 in future.

7. *Electoral districts.*—The municipality would be divided into six muhallas or rather electoral districts, and the 11 seats would be distributed amongst these according to their relative size and importance.

8. *Qualifications of candidates.*—Mr. Dyson would provide that candidates for office may be of any of the classes entitled to vote.

9. *Khairabad and Biswán.*—The Deputy Commissioner assumes that similar arrangements will be acceptable to the people of Khairabad and Biswán.

10. *Proposals from Hardoi municipalities.*—The Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, says that all the municipal committees in his district (except that of Sandíla) evaded the question as to what classes should have votes. Mr. Wood thinks the rules originally promulgated for Lucknow and Fyzabad (see page 253 of the Oudh Digest) will do very well as a basis to work upon. He accepts the rules in paras. 420, 421, 422, and 424 of the Digest.

11. *Qualifications of candidates.*—He also thinks that candidates for office may be of any of the classes entitled to vote.

12. *Qualifications of electors.*—The classes of persons to whom he would give votes, provided that in each case the voter must have attained the age of 21 years, are—

I.—Talúkdárs and grantees residing within municipal limits.

II.—Lambardárs and pattidárs residing within municipal limits whose quota of the Government revenue is not less than Rs. 50.

III.—Owners of house property of not less value than Rs. 50 and those who rent land or houses within municipal limits at an annual rent of not less than Rs. 10.

IV.—Persons paying Rs. 10 per annum and upwards as license-tax.

V.—Persons paying not less than Rs. 5 per annum on account of octroi,* house tax, or a tax on professions and trades.

* It is not said how it would be ascertained that a person had or had not contributed Rs. 5 to the revenue from octroi duties.

VI.—All Government servants drawing not less than Rs. 10 per mensem.

The Deputy Commissioner does not say what would be, approximately, the number of electors in each municipality were these qualifications prescribed.

13. *Number of members.*—The present and the proposed number of official and non-official members respectively are as follows:—

	Present.		Proposed.	
	Official.	Non-official.	Official.	Non-official.
Hardoi - - -	10	14	7	14
Sandíla - - -	5	11	4	8
Shahábad - - -	5	12	4	8
Pihání - - -	4	9	3	6
Bilgrám - - -	5	9	4	8
Mallawán - - -	4	8	3	6
Sandi - - -	4	7	3	6

14. *Electoral districts.*—The municipalities would be divided into electoral circles consisting of muhallas, or, where these are numerous, small and incompact, groups of muhallas, amongst which the non-official seats would be distributed.

15. *Kheri proposals.*—The Deputy Commissioner of Kheri forwards the proceedings of the Lakhimpur municipal committee (copy annexed), and expresses his concurrence generally in the views of the committee.

16. *Electoral districts and number of members.*—It is proposed to divide the municipality into two electoral circles, and to allot seven non-official seats on the committee to one of these, and five to the other.

17. *Qualifications of electors.*—Candidates to be elected to fill these seats by a majority of the votes of those residents who pay Re. 1-8-0 and upwards per annum towards the municipal tax. (This qualification is possessed, it is believed, by only 336 persons out of a population of 6,618.)

18. *Qualification of candidates.*—Only persons with an income of Rs. 600 per annum to be eligible as candidates for seats in the committee.

19. *The views of Government should be made known on certain points.* Some other details are touched on by Deputy Commissioners, but at the present stage it seems a waste of time to discuss these. There are certain main points to be first settled; and I venture to suggest that the views of Government regarding these be communicated before we are called on to prepare elaborate rules.

20. *Qualifications of electors.*—In the first place, as to the qualifications of electors, I am inclined to think that the Sitapur proposals go further than is advisable, that those from Hardoi can be simplified, and that those from Kheri are too conservative. Some such rule as the following would perhaps suffice for all the municipalities in this division:—

All persons, aged not less than 21 years, who own, and all inhabitants of the municipality who occupy, houses within the municipality worth a monthly rent of not less than twelve annas, shall be entitled to vote at the election of the members for the ward in which their property is situated, or in which they reside.

Provided that the same property shall not qualify more than one person to vote as a proprietor.

Provided also that, if several persons reside in one house, only one shall be registered as qualified to vote by reason of the occupation of the said house.

21. *Qualification of candidates.*—As regards the qualifications of candidates for membership, I would impose none except that the candidate must be not less than 21 years of age, and neither a female, a lunatic nor an idiot. Perhaps persons who have been convicted of heinous offences should be excluded. If anything beyond this is desired, it might be provided that the candidate should possess the qualifications required of an elector; but I do not think this is necessary.

22. *Preparation of registers.*—Registers of persons qualified to vote should be prepared. Every person whose name is entered should be informed of the fact; and opportunity should be given to persons to object to the entries and omissions in the original register, and for its periodical revision, correction, and completion.

23. *Notice of election to all electors.*—When an election is about to take place, each elector should for the present be served with an invitation to record his vote for the filling of the vacancy or vacancies, being furnished with a list of the candidates. Unless some encouragement of this kind be given until the electors realise the value of the votes which they possess, I fear few votes will be recorded.

24. *Term of office.*—The term of office might be three years.

25. *Official members.*—The Deputy Commissioner of Hardoi seems to think that one-third of the members *must* be official. This is of course a mistake; the Government has only said that the official element must not exceed one-third of the whole. I would not make any official an *ex-officio* member of the committee; but, for the reasons given in my letter on the subject of district committees, I would reserve to the Government the power to nominate as members persons either in the service of Government or not, not exceeding in number one-third of the whole committee; and I would advise that power being exercised at present by the nomination, amongst others, of the Tahsíldár.

26. *Formation of electoral circles.*—The manner in which the Deputy Commissioners propose to form electoral circles or wards within municipalities is just what is required.

27. It remains to report on the subject discussed in the third para. of your letter No. 147 of the 21st June.

(1) The *Sitapur* municipal committee has unamiously elected Babu Pitam Rae, a pleader, to be its president.

(2) The *Khairabad* committee decline to nominate a non-official president.

The Deputy Commissioner writes:—"They record that the president should be a well-informed person, with a knowledge of English, as otherwise he would not be able to manage the work well; and as none of their members have in their opinion the requisite knowledge, they decline to nominate a president. They have, however, got on hitherto tolerably well under the vice-presidentship of the Tahsíldár, who does not know English; and the wisdom of reconsidering the matter, to the extent at least of nominating a non-official vice-president, will be urged upon their attention."

(3) *Biswán.*—Seth Jai Dyal, the adopted son of Seth Sitaram, a Talúkdár, has been elected president. He knows English, and is considered otherwise competent.

(4) *Hardoi.*—The committee unanimously elected the Deputy Commissioner to be its president, and Pandit Ram Narayan its vice-president. It adhered to this resolution when the Deputy Commissioner counselled them to re-consider it.

(5) Eight out of the nine members of *Sandila* municipal committee elected the Tahsíldár to be their president. By a much norrower majority, five to four, they chose one Mazhar Ali to be their vice-president.

(6) *Shahábad.*—Haji Muhammad Husain has been elected president.

(7) *Piháni.*—The committee has elected Mír Danish Ali, a most competent man.

(8) *Bilgrám.*—The Tahsíldár has been elected president, and Saiyid Wasi Haidar, Talúkdar of Bagaitapur, vice-president.

(9) *Malawán.*—The committee has elected the Tahsíldár to be president, and Lala Ram Charn to be vice-president.

(10) *Sandi.*—Here also the Tahsíldár has been elected president, whilst Rae Gopal Behari has been chosen vice-president.

(11) *Lakhimpur.*—The committee has elected Thakur Balbhadr Singh, of Mahewa, to be its president, and Babu Bansi Lal, a pleader, its vice-president.

28. I solicit approval to the arrangements in Sitapur, Biswán, Hardoi, Shahábad, Piháni, and Lakhimpur

29. The Khairabad committee might be informed that the Government trusts that they follow the example of other similar bodies, and without further delay elect a non-official president, who may rely on receiving every aid from the Deputy Commissioner and Tahsíldár.

30. The committee at Sandílá, Bilgrám, Mallawán, and Sandi may be told that although the Government cannot confirm the election of the Tahsíldárs to the office of presidents of the committees, and desires them to appoint non-official presidents, it will allow the Tahsíldárs to continue to be members, in which capacity they will be able to afford every assistance to the presidents.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

COPY of Proceedings of a Special Meeting of Municipal Committee, Sitapur, held at Executive Engineers' Office on Wednesday, the 26th July 1882, at 7 a.m.

PRESENT:

J. Dyson, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, *President*	Ex-officio members.
H. C. Irwin, Esq., Assistant Commissioner	
H. W. Gilbert, Esq., District Engineer	
Maulvi Karamat Husain, Tahsíldár	Non-official members.
Babu Pitam Rae, Pleader	
Maulvi Muhammad Sadik, Pleader	
Thakur Mata Parshad	
Lala Jagan Nath	
Lala Lachhman Das	
Hakim Mehndi	
Misar Raghubar Dyal	
Hazi Akbar Ali	
Lala Ratan Lal	
Mula Seth	

A special meeting was convened for the duty to discuss the Resolution of the Government of India, No. $\frac{17}{747\text{-}57}$, of the 18th May 1882.

The committee are of opinion that the non-official members should be increased by one, and thus distributed—

Tarimpur Muhalla, containing	168 houses,	1	member.
Sitapur ditto	950 „	4	„
Thompsonganj ditto	725 „	3	„
Total	1,843 „	8	„
Naibasti Muhalla, containing	241 „	1	„
Police-ka-purwa, Golmandi, Bhalla-ka-purwa, Civil lines	275 „	1	„
Alamnagar	315 „	1	„
	2,674 „	11	„

This distribution gives an average of 243 houses to each member.

It is the unanimous opinion of the committee that the basis of the suffrage should be household, that is, that the head male or female of an undivided family should be entitled to vote. There should be a direction to the Tahsíldár to prepare lists by muhallas in accordance with the above opinion. Such lists to be affixed in some conspicuous part of muhallas concerned, with an intimation that if any person excluded should desire the entry of his name, he should apply with his proofs to the Tahsíldár, who will decide the matter. The committee also unanimously elected Babu Pitam Rae as the future chairman.

COPY of Proceedings of Lakhimpur Municipal Committee, held at 7 a.m., on the 2nd of August 1882, in the Deputy Commissioner's Kutchery.

PRESENT:

H. W. Gibson, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, *President*

Ex-officio Members.

Rája Chhitpal Singh, Assistant Commissioner.
Munshi Muhammad Yahia, Tahsíldár.

Non-official Members.

Thakur Balbhadr Singh, Talukdár of Mahewa.
Babu Bansi Lal Singh, Vakil.
Hafiz Nisar Husain, Pleader.
Seth Mathra Prashad, Banker.
Thakur Pitam Singh, Zamindár.
Thakur Jagat Singh, Zamindár.
Gauri Shankar Misr.
Tika Ram.
Lala Umrao Lal.
Baji Chaudhri.

No. 147 of 1882, Financial Department (Decentralization), North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government, and No. 162, of 1882, of the same department and Government, are again laid before the committee and discussed.

After further consideration the committee desire the Deputy Commissioner to submit the following proposals—on the subject of the appointments of a non-official chairman, vice-chairman, and Secretary, and the introduction of an elective system as a tentative measure—to Government.

I.—The committee propose that the president and vice-president be elected by the committee by a majority of three-fourths of the members.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

II.—The committee propose that the Tahsíldár of Lakhimpur be the Secretary. They consider that it is very desirable, if not indispensable, to have his aid and local knowledge at their service.

III.—The committee propose that the president and vice-president shall hold office two years, but they may continue in office on re-election.

IV.—The committee propose that the appointments of president and vice-president shall be subject to the approval of Government.

V.—The committee propose that the committee shall consist of 12 members, including the president and vice-president.

VI.—That the president shall have a casting vote.

VII.—That the Tahsíldár shall assist the committee as an executive officer, and not hold a vote.

VIII.—The committee propose that all the members shall be elected by a majority of votes.

IX.—They observe that 903 persons, out of a population within municipal limits of 6,618, contribute to municipal taxation. The annual amount assessed to the tax is Rs. 1,800. The tax ranges from three annas to Rs. 48 per annum. The committee propose to give franchise to citizens who pay Re. 1-8-0 and upwards yearly tax. They find that this qualification is possessed by 336 persons, including Government officials.

These are distributed as follows:—

First electoral circle	Naurangabad - - -	Population.
	Piyarepur - - -	
	Sikatiapurwa - - -	190—3,767.
	Thurburnganj - - -	
	Channi - - -	
Second electoral circle	Lakhimpur - - -	143—2,851.
	Hathipur - - -	

X.—They propose to make an annual income of Rs. 600 a qualification for election in candidates.

XI.—On a representation from Rája Chitpal Singh, Assistant Commissioner, expressing his desire as a tax-payer to be permitted to sit on the committee, the committee consider the question of the admission of Government servants as candidates for election. They see no objection to the admission of Government servants to this privilege, relying on the Deputy Commissioner to make an exception of such officers whose official position may give them an influence which would check a free expression of the sentiments of electors. The committee recommend that the election of officials be subject generally to the sanction of Government.

XII.—There will be two electoral circles as above specified. The first circle will furnish seven members and the second five members.

XIII.—The committee find that there are in the first circle at present 28 persons eligible to sit on the board, and 23 in the second circle.

XIV.—A register of candidates in each circle will be opened at the tahsíli, and two copies will be hung in conspicuous places in the two circles. The secretary will register the names of candidates and also votes.

XV.—A register will be opened of all persons qualified to be electors.

XVI.—These registers will be always open to public inspection.

XVII.—In the register of candidates sufficient space will be given for the signatures of electors.

XVIII.—The committee elect unanimously Thakur Balbhadar Singh, Talukdár of Mahewa, to be president, and Babu Bansi Lal vice-president.

XIX.—The committee propose to meet on the first day of the month, not being a Sunday. Notice of meeting to be given to each member at least ten days beforehand, specifying time and place. The place of meeting will be a place in Lakhimpur. The notice will specify the purpose of the meeting. A copy of the record of the committee's proceedings shall be sent to the Deputy Commissioner within one week of such meeting for submission to the Commissioner.

XX.—The committee propose that they shall be empowered to suspend a member for a period not exceeding three months by a majority of three-fourths of a full committee, and to remove a member from the board by a majority of nine-tenths of a full committee, with the confirmation of Government.

XXI.—Two months' notice will be given of the period of election. Seven days will be allowed for recording votes.

The committee have deliberately refrained from proposing any more elaborate or complicated measures and machinery, being of opinion that simplicity is indispensable to a fair trial of a system so novel as that of election.

Questions will be disposed of as they arise.

XXII.—The president should, the committee think, be permitted to delegate his functions to the vice-president whenever he thinks there is occasion to do so: and in the absence of both the committee will, *pro tem.*, elect a chairman.

Laid before committee notice from the editor of the *Amiru-l-Matba*, Agra, inviting subscriptions for his paper. The committee cannot at present afford to pay Rs. 20 a year for this paper.

No. 2404, dated the 25th August 1882.

From J. QUINN, Esquire, Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

WITH reference to G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June last, I have the honour to submit the reports* of the Deputy Commissioners of this Division, and to remark as follows.

* No. 127, dated 19th July 1882, from President, Municipal Committee, Fyzabad, and enclosure.
No. 2242, dated 15th August 1882, from Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Gonda.
No. 1454, dated 15th July 1882, from Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich, and enclosure.
No. 1522, dated 21st July 1882, from Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

2. Municipalities administered under Act XV. of 1873 are—

	Population.	Income. Rs.
Fyzabad District.		
Fyzabad - - - -	71,952	77,813
Tánda - - - - -	21,261	4,382
Gonda District.		
Gonda - - - - -	14,465	9,361
Newabganj - - - -	8,373	9,129
Balrampur - - - -	12,811	3,804
Utraula - - - - -	5,825	2,124
Bahraich District.		
Bahraich - - - -	21,998	19,812
Nánpára - - - -	7,351	4,468

3. The Fyzabad Municipality is made up of the towns of Fyzabad and Ajudhiya, the cantonments and the civil lines. The elective system has been in force since 1865, although, as appears from a former report, it was not thoroughly carried out till 1877. The elections have not hitherto excited much interest, only a small proportion of the voters coming to the poll. The rules hitherto in force are contained in Secretary to Chief Commissioner's No. 1991, dated 26th June 1865, and Circular No. $\frac{62}{6038}$, dated 13th November 1874. The whole question has been again thoroughly discussed at meetings held by the Deputy Commissioner, and new election rules have been drawn up. These rules are I think satisfactory. There should be no difficulty in securing the services of a competent president and vice-president, and the committee will be instructed to proceed to their election.

4. The Tánda Municipal Committee declare themselves unable to select a president, and wish that the Tahsíldár should fill that post. They have nominated a vice-president. The Deputy Commissioner is of opinion that there is nothing to prevent their appointing a president.

5. The Deputy Commissioner of Gonda has submitted a very full report of the result of his inquiries from municipal committees and from individual members of the native community. He gives the net result of the papers he received as follows:—

(i.)—That election may be introduced.

(ii.)—That the present committees should not be disturbed, but that new members should only be elected.

(iii.)—That no one is able to propose any practical scheme of election.

(iv.)—That voters' qualifications should be the payment of at least Rs. 5 municipal taxes per annum.

(v.)—That candidates' qualification should be the payment of at least Rs. 10 taxes, education, good character, and high caste.

(vi.)—That none of the committees of this district could possibly get on at all without official direction and management, at any rate at present.

(vii.)—That committees should be left to choose their own chairmen.

6. The Deputy Commissioner of Bahraich is of opinion that the elective system could be introduced without any difficulty in both municipalities. At Nánpára the Rája of Nánpára has always presided, and will make an excellent president. At Bahraich, however, there are difficulties, and the Deputy Commissioner desires to postpone the appointment of a non-official president till the close of the current year. On the whole question I would venture to remark as follows.

7. The failure of the elective system lies deeper than in any defect in the election rules. If, therefore, the system of municipal government was to remain unaltered, I would strongly deprecate the extension to small towns of a system which has failed in large towns. I think, however, that the exclusion, partial or complete, of official members cannot fail to have a very strong effect. The greater the power vested in the committee, the stronger will be the desire to obtain membership, and the greater will be the vitality of the elective system. I think that it will be sufficient for the present to introduce or maintain the elective system in the towns of Fyzabad, Bahraich, Gonda, and Nánpára. The experiment will thus be tried in each district of the division. I have included Nánpára because both the townspeople and the Deputy Commissioner appear to desire it.

8. I have been somewhat surprised that both at Fyzabad and Bahraich it is desired that the town should not be broken up into electoral wards, but that the whole municipality should form the electoral unit. In old days the Mír-muhalla, or muhalla mukhtár, exercised a degree of power and influence which has never been enjoyed by the non-official members of municipal committees. I think the committee should be an assemblage of Mír-muhallas, each member supervising and being responsible for the expenditure, sanitary arrangements, &c., of his own ward.

9. Many native gentlemen, whilst approving of the elective system, have laid great stress on the necessity that those elected should be of good caste, of education, of means, and of unimpeachable moral character. If these qualifications are to be secured, one of two courses must be followed—either the selection of electors must be made subject to confirmation, or else a register of persons qualified for membership must be opened, and the choice of electors must be limited to the persons whose names are in the register. The former alternative is, I think, open to grave objections, and the latter is preferable. The power to enter names in the register or to strike out names should be vested in the committee. It would, however, be necessary for obvious reasons to allow an appeal from the order of the committee to the Deputy Commissioner.

10. In all the towns of the Gonda disitrct, and in one town (Tánda) in the Fyzabad district, income is derived from a tax on circumstances and property. In the remaining municipal towns of the division the form of taxation is octroi. In towns of the former class the qualifications of electors and candidates can be based on the municipal tax. In towns of the latter class a more complex arrangement is needed. I consider it most important that each municipality should have an office in the centre of the town, removed from kutcherry and tahsíl ; and that all the municipal records, including correspondence with

Government, should be kept in the office. The proceedings should be in the vernacular. The Deputy Commissioner should be allowed to keep up a clerk, whose duty it would be to receive and translate the budgets, accounts, reports, &c., received from all the municipalities in the district. *Ex-officio* members should be all withdrawn by the end of the current year.

No. 127, dated Fyzabad, the 19th July 1882.

From H. S. Boys, Esquire, President, Municipal Committee, Fyzabad, to Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your Circular No. $\frac{139}{1771}$, dated 27th June 1882, calling for a report on the question raised in the Government letter No. 147, dated 21st idem, I have the honour to report as follows.

2. Great pains have been taken to get at the genuine opinion of the native residents of Fyzabad on the subject of election of the committee: a preliminary meeting of the present committee was held; this was followed by a meeting of the *Anjumán Tehzib*, and the subject was finally well threshed out at a public meeting which I called at the Golabbari on 10th July.

3. The following proposals have received the approval of these meetings:—

(1) That elections shall take place the last week in March.
(2) That candidates for election shall send in their applications before the end of January.
(3) That the following classes of persons should be entitled to vote:—
  (*a*) Pensioners or wasikadárs in receipt of Rs. 10 a month.
  (*b*) Persons whose income from immoveable property is Rs. 10 per month.
  (*c*) Persons whose income from trade or other sources is Rs. 20 a month.
  (*d*) Persons owning house property of the value of Rs. 300.
  (*e*) All persons who can read and write and who have resided in the city for six months before the election.
(4) That all voters of classes (*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*), whose income is double that prescribed as the property test for voters, be eligible as candidates.
(5) That all voters of class (*e*) who have resided in the city for five years be eligible as candidates.
(6) That the first list of voters be prepared by the members now in office.
(7) That half the members now in office retire in March 1883 and half in March 1884; and their places, and such additional places as may be vacant under the rules sanctioned, be filled by election.
(8) That the committee consist of 16 members, to be elected not by wards, but by the whole body of voters.
(9) That the member for cantonments shall be nominated as at present, and the member for civil lines shall be elected by the house occupiers of civil lines.

4. The accompanying table shows the dates at which the present members' tenure of office will cease under the present law:—

Statement showing the Date at which the present Members' tenure of Office will cease under the present Law.

No.	Names of Members.	Date of Election.	Date of Expiry of Term of Membership.	Remarks.
1	H. O. Budden, Esq. - -	1st April 1882 -	1st April 1884.	
2	Shaikh Kadir Bakhsh - -	Ditto -	Ditto.	
3	Babu Gokul Chand - -	Ditto -	Ditto.	
4	Lala Triloki Nath Singh - -	Ditto -	Ditto.	
5	Babu Narsingh Narayan Singh -	Ditto -	Ditto.	
6	Major A. F. Taylor, 16th Native Infantry.	1st April 1881 -	1st April 1883 -	*Vice* Captain Thomson.
7	Babu Kaccumal - - -	Ditto -	Ditto -	*Vice* Kassi Prosunno Ghatak.
8	Lala Sunder Lal - - -	Ditto -	Ditto.	
9	Mír Muhammad Taki - -	Ditto -	Ditto.	
10	Mír Muhammad Jafar - -	Ditto -	Ditto.	

Fyzabad, 19th July 1882.

H. S. Boys,
President, Municipal Committee.

No. 2242, dated Gonda, the 15th August 1882.

From J. White, Esquire, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, to Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your docket No. $\frac{139}{1771}$, dated 27th June 1882, on the subject of election of members of municipal committees, I have the honour to state that I propounded the following questions for the consideration of the different municipal committees, the Gonda Anjumán-i-Rifah, and independent native gentlemen:—

I.—Can the elective principle be introduced into any or all of the municipalities of this district?
II.—If so, in what form should it be developed? What should be the qualifications of electors and of candidates for election?

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

III.—What drawbacks and difficulties exist?

IV.—Can you name any non-official member of the present committees who is fitted for the office of chairman? If not, can you name any non-official resident of the municipality who would be fitted for and willing to undertake such an office? (See letter of Government, No. 147, dated 21st June 1882.)

To these questions I have received a number of answers, which I have the honour to enclose in original, and the substances of which I abstract as follows:—

Question I.—The municipality of Utraula reports that the elective principle should be introduced in that town. The Aujumán-i-Rifah of Gonda (at a meeting where 13 of those present were native officials and five non-official native gentlemen) resolved that the system of election should be introduced into all the four municipalities in the district. The municipality of Balrámpur is of opinion that the system of election may be introduced in all the municipalities of this district. No answers to my questions have been received from the Nawábganj Municipality. The Gonda Municipal Committee has not submitted a collective opinion, but individual opinions have been sent in. Babu Ram Mohan, headmaster of the zila school, an energetic member of the committee, recommends that election be tried, with the proviso that the Deputy Commissioner continue to preside for two years, in order to instruct a non-official vice-chairman in his duties and to keep the commissioners up to their work. Six other members—two official and four non-official—in a joint note think that there are a good many people in the town of Gonda who can be instructed to do their duty as electors, and recommend that the experiment be tried. Rája Kishan Datt Ram, Munshi Ali Gauhar, and Munshi Mathra Parshad, vakíl, expressed a similar opinion. The late Dewan Ram Shankar deprecated the introduction of any European system of election, which, he said, the people could not understand, and proposed that the present committees should choose a member to fill any vacancy among them, and should nominate a member having the same qualifications as the man whose place he was to fill. Mir Muhammad Hassn, assistant naib at Balrámpur, considers a system of election feasible. Pandit Bishwanath, headmaster of Balrámpur school, thinks some light is better than no light, and that a system of election is feasible. He laments that he has himself had no "political education."

Question II.—The municipality of Utraula reports that the right of voting should be limited to residents paying not less than Re. 1 town-tax, and that they should be of good caste and persons of intelligence and discretion. That the qualifications of candidates should be that they be well educated, of substantial means, and that they take a genuine interest in municipal business: they should be men of kindly character and mild temper. The Anjumán-i-Rifah resolved that the whole of the town (meaning, as I understand, the town of Gonda) should form one ward only: that the qualifications of electors should be as follows:—

(1) Electors must be of obvious good character.
(2) Must not be under 22 years of age.
(3) Must enjoy an income of not less than Rs. 120 per annum

The qualifications of candidates for election should be—

(1) That they be at least 25 years of age.
(2) That they be men of calm temper.
(3) That they enjoy an income of at least Rs. 300 a year.
(4) That they reside within municipal limits.
(5) That they be of high caste.

The society's resolution does not explain who is to be constituted *censor morum*. The phrase of "obvious good character" is one that might bear more than one construction. Of the Gonda municipal commissioners the following have recorded opinions:—Rája Kishan Datt Ram thinks that the people of each muhalla should be directed to choose in their own fashion one representative. Munshi Mathra Parshad would make the voter's qualification the payment of Rs. 5 municipal taxes. Babu Ram Mohan places voter's qualification at Rs. 5 and candidate's qualification at Rs. 10 taxes, and is anxious to see the principle of the cumulative franchise introduced. The six gentlemen who present the joint note propose a preliminary propaganda and deprecate the dispersion of the present committee, which should be left, they think, to instruct the people in the blessings of local self-government and make arrangements for an election when the instruction has become complete. Voter's qualification should be Rs. 250 annual income. The other opinions received are too vague to be worth anything. There is a general consensus that members should be of good caste, of education, of means, and of unimpeachable moral character.

Question III.—The municipality of Utraula is of opinion that the collection of taxes will be difficult unless the Deputy Commissioner be president, and hopes that the present system of deposit of moneys in the treasury under Government supervision and audit may be maintained. The Anjumán-i-Rifah considers that, although there will be difficulties to encounter in developing the new system, there is no reason why they should not be successfully dealt with. The Balrámpur Municipality does not anticipate any drawbacks or difficulties. The replies of the Gonda municipal councillors are rather vague. The six joint reporters think that the machine will not work if the supervision of Government officials be removed. The other gentlemen all agree that assistance must be given by the officers of Government, and that otherwise the benevolent scheme of Government must end in failure. The late Dewan Ram Shankar was positive that Government officials must be at the helm, and proposed two-thirds of the members should be non-official and the rest officials, and that the chairman should be official. Mír Muhammad Hasan thinks that a certain number of officials should be on the committee, and that the chairman should be chosen from time to time by the committee.

Pandit Bishwanath thinks that young India must still sit at the feet of his official instructor, and that being still in his political cradle, it would be unsafe to let him try and run alone. He would however leave it to each committee to choose its own chairman.

Question IV.—The Utraula Municipal Committee is of opinion that no member of the committee or other resident is fitted for the post of Chairman. The Anjumán-i-Rifah considers that the following gentlemen are well fitted to be appointed chairmen of the municipal committees of this district,—*viz.*,

at Gonda, Bhaya Tribhuwan Datt Ram ; at Balrámpur, Lala Ram Shankar, Dewan (since dead) ; at Nawábganj, Bhaiya Shimbhu Datt Ram ; and at Utraula, Bhawani Sahai Tewari. The proposal to appoint Bhaiya Shimbhu Datt Ram at Nawábganj is, I would note, opposed to the principle laid down above by the Society, that a candidate for election must be a resident of the place. The Balrámpur Municipality desires that the Deputy Commissioner remain president, and recommends Dewan Ram Shankar (since dead) as vice-president. From Gonda the joint report proposes Mír Muhammad Hasan (late Extra Assistant Commissioner in Oudh) for vice-president, to conduct the business of the committee according to the advice of the Deputy Commissioner. Rája Kishan Datt Ram records a blunt opinion that a good many members of the committee only attend the committee and simulate an interest in its work in order to please the District Officers, and abstains from naming any one. Munshi Ali Gauhar is not aware of any member being fit at present for the office of president. Munshi Mathra Parshad cannot propose any one. Babu Ram Mohan considers that there is no one in Gonda fit for the office of chairman.

Having thus reported the result of my efforts to elicit the wishes of the people, I endeavour to reply to the questions and suggestions of Government letter No. 147 of 21st June. I think the net result of the papers submitted herewith amounts to this :—

(1) That election may be introduced.
(2) That the present committees should not be disturbed, but that new members only should be elected.
(3) That no one is able to propose any practical scheme of election.
(4) That voter's qualification should be the payment of at least Rs. 5 municipal taxes per annum.
(5) That candidate's qualifications should be the payment of at least Rs. 10 taxes, education, good character, and high caste.
(6) That none of the committees of this district could possibly get on at all without official direction and management, at any rate at present.
(7) That committees should be left to choose their own chairmen.

If it be resolved that the official element be withdrawn from the municipalities of this district, with the exception of a general control and supervision by the president, I have no doubt that the Utraula committee will collapse altogether ; the Balrámpur committee will remain much what it has always been, a mere department of the Maháraja's estate office ; the Gonda committee, under the management of Mír Muhammad Hasan, will retain some vitality, at any rate for a time ; and the Nawábganj committee will degenerate into a mere bania's panchayat, who will arrange so that the whole of the taxation may fall on the transit trade.

I am anxious loyally to assist in carrying out the policy of the Government, but I cannot conceal from myself or from you the undoubted fact that, here at any rate, there is no stirring of political ambition in this direction, and that we are incurring by such changes a certain present loss for an uncertain future gain. If, however, the leading strings are to be cast off, I would earnestly recommend that it be done entirely, thoroughly, and at once. The interests involved are merely local and not of first rate importance. Separate reports for each municipality shall be drawn up on receiving further instructions.

No. 1454, dated Bahraich, the 15th July 1882.

From M. L. FERRAR, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich, to OFFICIATING COMMISSIONER, Fyzabad Division.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your Circular No. $\frac{139}{1771}$, dated 27th ultimo, as follows.

2. The secretary to the Bahraich Municipal Committee has forwarded to you a copy of the proceedings of the special meetings held on the 10th instant to discuss the questions raised. The committee was a full one, only two of the Native members being absent, prevented from attending by illness.

3. You will have learned from these proceedings the general sense of the members. They are altogether opposed to any of their number being appointed president, and in this I agree with them, much as I would like to be relieved from the work of the committee, which day by day is increasing. Look where I will, I have been unable to find a resident of Bahraich who would be in every way a suitable president. There is one gentleman, indeed, in whom are united all the qualifications for the appointment—namely, high social position, full acquaintance with office routine, great intelligence, a magistrate, an excellent English scholar, and of unblemished character—I mean Kuar Harnam Singh, manager of the Oudh Kapúrthala estates, and uncle and heir-presumptive to the present minor Rája of the Kapúrthala State. Against his accepting the office were the facts of his frequent absence from Bahraich. Last year he was six months at Simla : this year he is also there, and in other times of the year he is obliged to be on tour and absent from the town.

To elicit his wishes on the subject, I wrote to him, pointing out both the responsibilities and the social advantages of the post, and I annex to this a copy of his reply, which appears to me to be a very sensible one.

4. The committee's unanimous choice of a vice-president commends itself to me, for this year at least, or for two years, if that is to be the term of the office. Lala Har Parshad is an elderly man, of good position, and great influence here, and looked up to by every person, Musalman as well as Hindu.

5. I think with the committee that the number of electors should be limited. Bahraich is not ripe yet for a universal franchise. In the list of electors I have added two other classes of persons, *viz.*, all persons paying license-tax and all persons whose annual income is not less than Rs. 1,000. Details as to time, place, and manner of election would be settled by the president in committee, who should give intimation of the same at least one month before the elections come off to the Deputy Commissioner of the district.

6. I agree with the committee that the present members should not be ousted until their present terms of appointment shall have expired, *i.e.*, on 31st March next, when they can come in again if elected.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

7. As to the Tahsíldár of Bahraich being nominated a member of the committee, I do not think that there is any necessity for this. He should continue, as at present, to attend the meetings of the committee, to watch the proceedings on the part of the Deputy Commissioner, and to give the committee such information as he can afford on the points which come up for discussion.

8. The removal of the committee's office to the premises mentioned by them commends itself to me. The house is in the city, and is thus a more suitable place for the committee to meet at than the Deputy Commissioner's kutcherry. And no extra establishment would be required, save a chaukidár on Rs. 4 a month and a peon on Rs. 5, who should also do daftri's work.

9. In coming to the above conclusions I have consulted not only the members of the committee but also independent gentlemen.

10. Nánpára is being considered separately.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received your No. 1946 of 13th July, and in reply to it I have the honour to state that for the present I propose to keep the entire municipality as the electoral unit. When the inhabitants have come to realise the importance attaching to the office, with its responsibilities and privileges, the town might be split up into electoral units, each embracing one or more wards.

PROCEEDINGS of a Special Meeting of the Bahraich Municipal Committee, held on 10th July 1882

PRESENT :

M. L. Ferrar, Esq., C.S., Deputy Commissioner	President.
Munshi Janki Parshad, Extra Assistant Commissioner	Members.
Rae Dhakal Parshad, Sub-Judge	
Saiyid Sardar Ali	
Muhammad Askari	
Pandit Sheo Narayan Tewari	
Maulvi Akbar Ali	
Lala Sitaram	
Lala Saligram	
Lala Har Parshad	
Dr. Wright, Civil Surgeon	
R. Foster, Esq., District Superintendent of Police	
Naib Ram Rikka Mall, for Manager, Kapúrthala	
Tahsíldár of Bahraich	

Read and discussed G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882, with enclosures and correspondence.

Resolution No. 47.—After an animated conversation the committee was unanimous that there is no non-official person among the members at present possessing all the necessary qualifications for presidentship, and that therefore the Deputy Commissioner be asked to remain president.

The committee unanimously elect Lala Har Parshad, zamíndár and ex-sudder kanúngo, as vice-president. He is willing to accept all the responsibilities attaching to the office.

As to para. 2 of the Resolution, the committee is of opinion that election in a modified form is practicable here; in fact, members have hitherto been elected by a sort of modified election, the Tahsíldár having in the first instance found out by inquiry who would not be objected to by the residents.

They now propose to formulate this method of election as follows :—

The Deputy Commissioner will cause a list to be made of the—

Mír muhallas,
Chaudhris of trades,
Mahtons of trades and castes,
All zamíndárs of landed property within municipal bounds,
All resident owners and occupiers of immoveable property not less in value than Rs. 500,
All Government servants drawing pay of not less than Rs. 10 per mensem,
All pensioners drawing not less than Rs. 5 per mensem,
All jagírdárs and all muáfidárs,
Head takiadárs,
Head sangatwalas,

who are now declared by the committee to have the power of voting for members. Their names shall be registered in the municipal office, and the list shall be published in prominent places in the muhallas of the city.

The elections shall take place muhallawár on a date or dates and at places to be fixed by the president in committee.

If one-fifth of the registered members do not appear at the election, the election shall not take place; and the Deputy Commissioner on the part of Government should be requested to nominate the members.

The above scheme to be put in force in March next, when the term of the present members will expire. The opinion of the committee is that the present members having been appointed for two years from 1st April 1881, that term must be allowed to expire before their seats are declared vacant, unless for any special reason an individual's name be removed by Government.

In the meantime the committee is of unanimous opinion that the Tahsíldár of Bahraich should be a member of the committee.

With respect to office accommodation, the committee is of opinion that the building and premises now occupied by the Tahsíldár of Bahraich will be a suitable building. It is the property of the Talúkdárs

of the district, and they will be communicated with on the subject. No rent is at present paid for the building, nor is it expected that the committee will be asked to pay rent.

The present establishment will suffice for the work, with the addition of a chaukidár and a chaprasi. The latter should also do daftri's work.

The special meeting dissolved *sine die.*

Mewa Ram Pandit, Secretary. M. L. Ferrar, President.

10th July 1882.

No. 1522, dated Bahraich, the 21st July 1882.

From M. L. Ferrar, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich, to Officiating Commissioner, Fyzabad Division.

Sir,

In reply to your Circular No. $\frac{139}{1771}$, dated 27th ultimo, I have the honour to state as follows with reference to the Nánpára Municipal Committee.

2. I at once on receipt of G. O. No. 147 directed the committee to call a special meeting and discuss the various points raised by Government.

3. The meeting was held on the 12th instant, and attached to this is a translation of its proceedings.

4. I approve of the Rája of Nánpára being appointed president of the committee. He has for years been chairman at all meetings in his capacity of vice-president, the Deputy Commissioner, who was president, being unable to leave head-quarters to preside. As chairman the Rája has invariably conducted and regulated the proceedings and working of the committee in an admirable manner, as I have on more than one occasion reported. The Tahsíldár of the tahsíl will continue as member. There has never been any friction between him and the Rája. The Tahsíldár has hitherto acted as secretary to the committee, but I would relieve him from this, and would appoint the rsgistrar-kanúngo, who is always in the town, to be honorary secretary without being member.

5. The committee is of opinion that the election of members is quite feasible, and proposes a category of persons on whom the franchise might be conferred. The list resembles the list prepared for Bahraich, *vide* my letter No. 1454 of the 15th instant. I would add to the list the following classes of persons, namely :—

All persons paying license-tax.
All resident mukhtárs and revenue agents.
All stamp-vendors.
Regular teachers in any indigenous school which might now be in existence or might hereafter come into existence.
Any residents who are regular cultivators of not less than 100 bíghas (*dehi*) anywhere.

6. The Rája owns the whole of the town lands, and there are no other zamíndárs or persons with rights in the soil living in the town.

7. The scheme of election to take place in March next, when the present members' term will expire. This commends itself to me, for I do not think that, unless for misconduct, the present members can be ousted.

8. For the present the committee might sit as proposed, *viz.*, in the Rája's premises; but I do not see how it can get on satisfactorily without the entertainment of a clerk of some kind. Probably, when the local board is appointed and has its clerk, &c., the establishment could also undertake the municipal work, and thus both committees be saved something by sharing the expenses. Certainly none of the tahsíl establishment could be spared for this work.

9. I have no doubt as to the future success of these proposals, and I therefore now recommend them for sanction. The details concerning the elections can be worked out at leisure (*cf.* my Bahraich report).

Proceedings of a Special Meeting of the Nánpára Municipal Committee, held on 12th July 1882, at Rája Nánpára's Kothi, to discuss G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882.

Present :

Rája Jang Bahadur Khan, Talúkdár of Nánpára	-	Vice-President.
Sirdar Ali Khan, Naib, Riasat Nánpára -	-	Members.
Munshi Binda Prasad, headmaster, Nánpára school	-	
Sasti Din Shah - - - - -	-	
Bishan Shah - - - - -	-	
Munshi Baha-ud-din Haidar, Tahsíldár of Nánpára	-	Member and Secretary.

Resolution No. 36.—The committee unanimously elect Rája Jang Bahadur Khan as president of this committee, and the Rája accepts the post.

Adverting to para. 2 of Government Order, the committee is of opinion that the system of electing members in a modified form is practicable here. The Deputy Commissioner will cause a list to be made of the following classes of persons :—

All resident owners and all occupiers of immoveable property not less in value than Rs. 100.
Chaudhris of trades and castes.
Mahtons of castes.
All Government servants drawing pay of not less than Rs. 5 per mensem.
All pensioners drawing not less than Rs. 5 per mensem.
Head mahant, head takiadárs, and head sangatwalas.
Mír-muhallas.

The above-mentioned persons are now declared by the committee to have the power of voting for members. Their names shall be registered in the municipal office, and the list shall be published in prominent places in the muhallas of the town. The elections shall take place muhallawár, on a date or dates and at places to be fixed by the president in committee. If one-fifth of the registered members do not appear at the election, the election shall not take place; and the Deputy Commissioner on part of Government should be requested to nominate members. The above scheme to be put in force in March next, when the term of the present members will expire.

The members are of opinion that the committee's office may be held in the Rája's *kothi*, and the Rája allows one of the chambers of his *kothi* to be used for the purpose, and any box or almirah may be kept there: no rent will be demanded from the committee.

The present establishment will suffice for the work, and no extra establishment would be required, save a chaprasi, who should also do daftri's work.

BAHA-UD-DIN HAIDAR,
Tahsíldár of Nánpára, Secretary.

No. 1387, dated Rae Bareli, the 21st August 1882.

From Major FENDALL CURRIE, Officiating Commissioner, Rae Bareli Division, to OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh.

SIR,

IN continuation of my No. 1339, dated 12th instant, I have the honour to submit the following reply to your letters Nos. 147 and 162, dated 21st and 29th June respectively.

2. I give in a tabulated form an epitome of the replies received from the Deputy Commissioners of this division.

3. There are in this division the following municipalities:—

	Population.
Rae Bareli - - - -	16,288
Sultanpur - - - -	11,299
Partabgarh - - - -	5,852

Special meetings have been held in all three districts, and the Government letters Nos. 147 and 162, dated 21st and 29th June respectively, were laid before these meetings.

4. There are no municipalities within the division in which the system of election is already in force; but from the answers received from the several Deputy Commissioners, the elective system apparently can be extended to Sultanpur and Partabgarh, and in a modified form to Rae Bareli.

5. I would suggest that for the time the present municipal committees have been appointed under section 6, Act XV. of 1873, they be left undisturbed; as the removal of the present members, except at their own request or on account of incompetence or conviction of an offence under the Penal Code, would be an interference contrary to the provisions of section 7, Act XV. of 1873.

6. During the time that will elapse before the expiry of the present term of appointment, the presidents should have lists made out of the following classes of persons living within municipal boundaries:—

(*a*) Government officers, wasikadárs, talúkdárs, and pensioners in receipt of not less than Rs. 10 per mensem.
(*b* Muáfidárs, jagírdárs, zamindárs, and vakíls.
(*c*) Owners and occupiers of houses valued at not less than Rs. 100.

Such lists should at once be prepared, and all persons entered in them wishing to exercise their right of voting, should be called on to register their names at the municipal office. We shall then be able to see how far the people are themselves anxious to avail themselves of the right of offering themselves as candidates or of voting for their representatives. In the meantime, the experience gained in more forward municipalities where the elective system has been tried could be availed of and adopted for the working of such a system in these municipalities when the time arrives to make the trial.

7. Having only come to this division within the last fortnight, and being obliged to submit this report before I have had time to visit the several districts and consult with the officials and Native gentlemen, I am in a position to do little else than forward the opinions of the Deputy Commissioners on the points submitted for report. But if I have an opportunity in the cold weather of going round the districts of this division, I will, after making full inquiries, submit for each municipality detailed proposals under clause 3, section 6, Act XV. of 1873, as to the time and manner of election, qualifications of electors and candidates, and other such matters.

8. With reference to para. 3 of your No. 147, dated 21st June last, I have the honour to state that special meetings have been held, and that in every district the Deputy Commissioner was unanimously elected as president, and a Native non-official member as vice-president.

ACCOMPANIMENT OF COMMISSIONER'S No. 1387, dated 21st August 1882.

G. O. No. 147, dated 21st June 1882.	Rae Bareli.	Sultanpur.	Partabgarh.
I.—Whether the elective system can be extended to municipalities.	I.—A special meeting was held on the 10th of August 1882, and Government letter No. 147, dated 21st June, laid before it. The native non-official members were unanimously of opinion that the only form of elective system which could at present be introduced was to select from the residents of the town persons fit to serve as members, and to call on the residents within municipal limits to elect one of the candidates selected as above.	I.—The native members were very decidedly of opinion that the elective system could not at present be introduced. Out of seven members present at the special meeting on the 8th August 1882, one only was in favour and six against the elective system; but out of a meeting of 23 members of the Sultanpur Institute assembled on the 6th August to discuss the matter, 17 were in favour of election and 6 against it. The Deputy Commissioner records:—"My own opinion is that it would be highly desirable to introduce the system of election, if possible." "The time would be the occurrence of a vacancy, and for the whole body should recur once in every two years."	I.—The feeling of the committee and of the sub-committee appointed to report on the matter is in favour of the extension of election to the municipality of Partabgarh.
II.—Election of president and vice-president.	II.—At a meeting held on the 10th August 1882, it was unanimously resolved that the Deputy Commissioner be elected president, and Sirdar Autar Singh vice-president.	II.—Resolution No. 31, dated 2nd August 1882:— "The committee unanimously elected the Deputy Commissioner as president, and Babu Man Mohan Mitter, pleader, as vice-president.	II.—At its meeting on the 12th July 1882, by Resolution No. 50, the committee elected the Deputy Commissioner as president, and Pandit Kishen Lal as vice-president.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

APPENDIX I.

DISTRICT FUND BUDGET, 1882–83.

Receipts.

Receipts.	Lakhimpur.	Sibságar.	Nowgong.	Darrang.	Kámrúp.	Goálpára.	Sylhet.	Cachar.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
VI.—LOCAL RATE—									
Assam local rates	15,800	46,500	30,000	32,500	74,000	60,000	78,400	19,000	3,56,200
Dâk cess	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,000	—	4,000
Total	15,800	46,500	30,000	32,500	74,000	60,000	82,400	19,000	3,60,200
XIX.—EDUCATION—									
Miscellaneous	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS—									
Rents	660	1,250	830	562	750	2,575	1,000	1,180	8,807
Micellaneous	—	—	—	198	100	—	—	100	398
Total	660	1,250	830	760	850	2,565	1,000	1,280	9,205
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS—									
In charge of Civil Officers.									
Receipts from ferries	2,700	8,600	5,300	12,248	12,300	18,250	8,550	21,050	88,998
Miscellaneous	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	2,700	8,600	5,300	12,248	12,300	18,250	8,550	21,050	88,998
GRANTS FROM PROVINCIAL—									
From Provincial Services	1,87,241	1,82,651	70,356	77,786	60,631	44,021	1,06,263	22,087	7,51,036
Surplus pound receipts	1,950	5,000	2,200	5,700	2,000	900	7,500	600	25,850
Total	1,89,191	1,87,651	72,556	83,486	62,631	44,921	1,13,753	22,687	7,76,886
Total	2,08,351	2,44,001	1,08,686	1,28,994	1,49,781	1,25,746	2,05,713	64,017	12,35,289

Expenditure.

Expenditure.	Lakhimpur.	Sibságar.	Nowgong.	Darrang.	Kámrúp.	Goálpára.	Sylhet.	Cachar.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
3.—REFUNDS—									
Miscellaneous Refunds—									
Miscellaneous	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Public Works	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8.—LOCAL RATES—									
Collection of rates and cesses	200	1,000	650	700	1,500	200	1,550	200	6,000
15.—POST OFFICE—									
District Post	—	—	—	828	1,602	3,136	13,000	—	18,566
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS—									
Fairs	1,000	—	—	300	100	—	—	—	1,400
22.—EDUCATION—									
Normal Schools—									
Stipends to pupil teachers	456	780	—	1,200	1,200	948	1,200	—	5,784
Scholarships	432	864	648	864	1,400	864	1,440	864	7,376
Grants-in-aid—									
Primary	3,308	6,432	5,442	3,876	10,768	6,108	12,880	5,700	54,514
Lower	480	480	720	720	1,440	1,440	2,406	960	8,640
Middle	1,128	1,440	1,092	1,164	1,572	2,676	6,060	612	15,744
Special	66	66	114	114	228	228	456	114	1,386
Miscellaneous	240	68	30	180	552	640	600	200	2,510
Total	6,110	10,130	8,046	8,118	17,160	12,904	26,036	8,450	95,954

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

APPENDIX I.—District Fund Budget, 1882-83—*continued.*

Expenditure—*continued.*

Expenditure.	Lakhim-pur.	Sibságar.	Nowgong.	Darrang.	Kámrúp.	Goálpára.	Sylhet.	Cachar.	Total.
24.—MEDICAL SERVICES—	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Grants for medical purposes -	120	—	—	120	264	360	120	120	1,104
30.—MISCELLANEOUS—									
Rewards for destruction of wild beasts.	1,000	400	700	1,500	1,000	1,800	100	300	6,800
Petty Establishments—									
Committee's establishment -	—	470	—	—	1,240	1,344	2,100	540	5,694
Circuit-house „ -	96	96	84	84	96	192	84	108	840
Staging-bungalow - -	476	1,480	1,023	606	1,482	961	677	400	7,105
Contingencies - - -	—	10	120	100	—	308	—	185	723
Grants to Municipalities - -	5,500	5,800	2,000	2,500	5,500	—	—	—	21,300
Miscellaneous - - -	200	300	150	200	300	250	400	200	2,000
Total -	7,272	8,556	4,077	4,990	9,618	4,855	3,361	1,733	44,462
LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS—									
By Civil Officers—									
Old Local { Original Works -	—	16,600	2,080	23,097	31,352	19,505	42,099	8,782	1,43,515
Repairs - -	15,987	23,632	14,784	17,623	15,691	26,674	19,715	20,396	1,54,502
Establishment -	400	—	1,224	3,180	4,890	5,354	2,186	6,852	24,086
Miscellaneous -	1,150	500	—	—	396	550	4,900	204	7,700
Total -	17,537	40,732	18,088	43,900	52,329	52,083	68,900	36,234	3,29,803
New Local { Original Works -	1,08,500	1,00,100	38,900	45,000	31,000	13,700	18,800	6,300	3,62,300
Repairs - -	18,000	25,000	17,500	2,900	16,200	17,200	14,600	7,200	1,18,600
Establishment -	46,612	54,483	21,425	22,138	20,008	15,508	35,346	3,780	2,19,600
Miscellaneous -	3,000	4,000	—	—	—	5,500	25,000	—	37,500
Total -	1,76,112	1,83,583	77,825	70,038	67,208	52,208	93,746	17,280	7,38,000
Total Public Works -	1,93,649	2,24,315	95,913	1,13,938	1,19,537	1,04,291	1,62,646	53,514	10,67,803
GRAND TOTAL -	2,08,351	2,44,001	1,08,686	1,28,994	1,49,781	1,25,746	2,05,713	64,017	12,35,289

APPENDIX II.

RULES for Grants-in-aid to Middle-class English or Vernacular and Lower-class Vernacular Schools.

Grants-in-aid may be given to middle and lower-class schools, provided that the Sub-Committee are satisfied that there is a *bonâ fide* probability that the school will be kept up, that it meets a recognised want, and that the education provided is likely to be good.

2. The following are the conditions by which such grants-in-aid are limited :—

(*a*) Grants must be given on the principle of strict religious neutrality, and no preference may be shown to any school on the ground that any particular religious doctrines are taught or not taught therein.

(*b*) Grants-in-aid to middle and lower-class schools must be given to such schools only as require some fee from their scholars. Special exemption from this rule may be allowed in backward parts of a district to the children of the poor, subject to the orders of the Chief Commissioner. Each case in which it is proposed to allow pupils to read free should be submitted to the Chief Commissioner through the Inspector of Schools for orders.

(*c*) Grants to middle schools may in no case exceed in amount the sums to be expended from private sources, and grants to lower vernacular schools may in no case exceed Rs. 10 per mensem. Expenditure from school fees and from Municipal contributions are to be reckoned as expenditure from private sources.

3. Applications for grants-in-aid must be submitted in Form I. appended to these rules to the School Sub-Committee, through the Deputy-Inspector, who will see whether it is admissible under the rules ; if so, he will forward it to the Chairman of the School Sub-Committee, together with his opinion on the merits of the application, and his certificate of admissibility. The School Sub-Committee will thus dispose of the application.

4. If the School Sub-Committee sanction a grant-in-aid, the sanction should be conveyed in Form II., a copy being given to the Secretary, and a copy to the Deputy Inspector's office. Such grants should ordinarily commence from the beginning of the financial year.

5. The promoters or managers of any body by whom an application for a grant is made must appoint a Secretary to carry on their correspondence with the School Sub-Committee and Deputy-Inspector, and they must record the names of the managers.

6. The managers are responsible for the due application of the school funds in accordance with the conditions of the grant.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

7. Any school to which aid is given, together with all its accounts, books, and any other records, shall be at all times open to inspection and an examination by the Inspector, the Deputy and Sub-Deputy Inspectors, members of the District Committee, or any other officer, appointed by Government for the purpose, and to this end the records and accounts must be placed in such custody that they may be always accessible on the visit of an inspecting officer.

8. Grants should generally be sanctioned for a term of five years, and should terminate at the end of the financial year. On renewing a grant after the expiration of five years, the maximum grant under Clause (*c*) Rule 2, should not usually be given. The grant should grow smaller and smaller on the occasion of each renewal. In this way, money will from time to time be set free, and the School Sub-Committee will be able to aid new schools, even though their grant-in-aid allotment remains stationary.

9. Special grants may be given towards the cost of furnishing school-houses and providing maps and other school apparatus, in consideration of expenditure from private sources in the establishment and equipment of schools, on condition that the managers undertake to refund the amount of any such grant if the school obtaining it be abolished within three years.

10. Special grants may be given towards the cost of building school-houses, on the condition that the managers undertake to refund the amount of any such grant if the school obtaining it be abolished within three years, and also guarantee that the building shall be reserved for school purposes and for no other purpose whatever.

11. The following monthly accounts, the forms for which are attached to these rules, must be forwarded by the Secretary of the school to the Deputy-Inspector's Office:—

(1) Bill for grant-in-aid, Local Education Form III.
(2) Abstract account of Receipts and Disbursements, Local Education Form IV.
(3) Abstract of Register of attendance, Local Education Form V.

12. The School Sub-Committee must draw up at some meeting not later than the 1st October in each year a statement in Form VI. (to be embodied in the Local Fund Budget Form No. 5 for Education) showing the existing grants, and what grants they propose to give during the ensuing year. Ordinarily speaking, no grant-in-aid should be given except those for which application has been received before October, and which, having been approved administratively and provided for financially, have been included in the Budget and sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner. But in exceptional or urgent cases, the Committee can, provided they have funds in hand, make grants after the Budget has been settled, reporting the same to the Comptroller.

RULES for Grants-in-aid to Primary Schools.

1. Grants may be made in aid of primary schools or *pathsálas* (even though no fees be taken), provided that the Sub-Committee is satisfied that they meet a local want, and that the education provided is good. Such grants will be subject to the following conditions:—

The allowance to one guru shall not exceed Rs. 6 per mensem, except in the case of schools for hill tribes; and in that case the maximum allowance shall not exceed Rs. 10 per mensem; usually the allowance should in the first instance be less; and in every case of recommending any deduction from, or addition to, a guru's allowance, the Deputy or Sub-Deputy-Inspector, as the case may be, will send to the Chairman of the School Committee a translation of his remark made in the visitor's book, to show clearly the grounds upon which the recommendation is based.

2. In *pathsálas* where the number of pupils is too large to be efficiently taught by one guru, an allowance for a second guru may be sanctioned, but in no case should the total monthly allotment to a single *pathsála* exceed Rs. 10.

3. Payments to gurus shall be made by persons appointed by the School Sub-Committee. The payments should usually be made monthly at certain centres, where the neighbouring gurus are to assemble on a fixed day, to be notified from time to time, by the School Sub-Committee.

4. Provision should be made by the School Sub-Committee for giving rewards to gurus, (1) to those whose pupils have been successful at the primary scholarship examination, provided that no guru is eligible for a reward unless he produces a certificate from the Deputy or Sub-Deputy-Inspector, stating that the junior classes of his *pathsála* have not been neglected in order to push on the first class; (2) to those who show the largest number of girls who can read and write and work sums correctly in the four simple rules of Arithmetic.

5. The School Sub-Committee can, if they think proper, substitute for monthly salaries a system of payments by result. They may give the guru a very small or no monthly salary, but in lieu thereof may allow him a fixed sum per quarter, for every pupil from his school who qualifies at a certain examination. If this system is approved, the precise standard of the examination should be drawn up by the School Sub-Committee, and submitted to the Chief Commissioner through the Inspector of Schools for approval.

6. The School Sub-Committee should draw up at some meeting not later than the 1st October in each year a statement in Form VII. (to be embodied in the Local Fund Budget Form No. 5 for education), showing in detail the primary schools which receive grants from the current year's budget, and what schools they propose to add to or remove from the list during the ensuing year. This form should be submitted to the Chairman for the approval of the District Committee, but need not be forwarded to the Inspector. It will be sufficient if it is entered on the proceedings of the Committee.

[Local Education Form No. 1.]

APPLICATION FOR A GRANT-IN-AID FOR

No. The Class School at in Thana District

Dated

Proposed Constitution.

Classes.	Average Number of Pupils expected.	Proposed Rate of Fee.	Course of Instruction, and Books to be used in each Class.	Proposed Charges, or Rate of Expenditure Monthly.	Rs.	A.	P.	Estimated Receipts Monthly.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Remarks.
1st - -				1st Teacher - -				*From Private Sources.*							
2nd - -				2nd „ - -				Fees - - -							
3rd - -				3rd „ - -				Subscriptions and Donations.							
4th - -				4th „ - -				Endowment - -							
5th - -				5th „ - -											
6th - -				Prizes - - -				*From Government.*							
7th - -				Library - - -											
8th - -				Servants - - -				Grant-in-aid - - - -							
9th - -								Total from all sources -							
				Contingencies - -											
Total -				Total - -				The grant to be payable at the Treasury.							

Here to be inserted the names of the persons who will form the Committee of Management.

Names of Committee.	Residences.	Profession and social position.
} Members.		
Member and Secretary.		

Here to be inserted the certificate of admissibility and recommendations of the Deputy Inspector, including information about other schools within a distance of six miles, and the School Sub-Committee's final remarks.

Certificate of admissibility and recommendations of the Deputy Inspector.

Deputy Inspector of Schools.

Final remarks by the School Sub-Committee.

Chairman, School Sub-Committee, District.

Present State of the School.

To be filled up if the School has been in existence for Six Months and upwards.

Classes.	Average Number of Pupils during the last Six Months.	Existing Rate of Fees.	Course of Instruction and Books used in each Class.	Average Charges incurred Monthly for the last Six Months.	Rs.	As.	P.	Average Receipts Monthly for the last Six Months.	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.	Remarks.
1st -				1st Teacher - -				*From Private Sources.*							
2nd -				2nd „ - -				Fees - - -							
3rd -				3rd „ - -				Subscriptions and Donations.							
4th -				4th „ - -				Endowment - -							
5th -				5th „ - -				*From Government.*							
6th -				Prizes - - -				Grant-in-aid * - - - -							
7th -				Library - -				Total from all sources -							
8th -				Servants - -											
9th -				Contingencies -											
Total -				Total -											

* Here enter No. and date of order sanctioning existing grant, if any.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[Local Education Form No. 2.]

OFFICE Memorandum of the Chairman, School Sub-Committee.

(1) A grant of Rupees a month is sanctioned from the 18 , for the class school at in zilla on the following conditions:

a.—That Rupees a month at least be regularly contributed from private sources.

b.—That the following rates of fees be levied:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
1st class	-	-	-
2nd „	-	-	-
3rd „	-	-	-
4th „	-	-	-
5th „	-	-	-
6th „	-	-	-
7th „	-	-	-

c.—That the following rate of expenditure be maintained:—

Head-master	-	-	-
2nd „	-	-	-
3rd „	-	-	-
4th „	-	-	-
5th „	-	-	-
Head Pandit	-	-	-
2nd „	-	-	-
3rd „	-	-	-
Servants	-	-	-
Contingencies	-	-	-

Unless any alteration be sanctioned by the School Sub-Committee.

(2) A bill for the grant (in Form III. annexed) must be sent to the Chairman, School Sub-Committee, for countersignature at the expiration of each month, and must be accompanied by a certified abstract (in Form IV. annexed) of the receipts and disbursements of the school for the month preceding that for which the bill is drawn. After countersignature the bill will be paid at the treasury.

(3) The monthly bill and the certified abstract of the school accounts must be signed by the Secretary of the school.

(4) The Secretary will transmit to the Chairman, School Sub-Committee, the monthly accounts and bills, and if he should find that the conditions of the grant have not been complied with, he will make such retrenchments from subsequent bills as may be necessary to secure the due observance of the rules in force.

(5) The bill will only be countersigned on the understanding that the salaries and other charges certified by the Secretary to have been paid have actually been paid.

(6) Contingent charges are to be accounted for in detail.

(7) The surplus balances of the School Fund cannot be expended without the sanction of the Chairman, School Sub-Committee, previously obtained.

(8) Salaries for service in any month become due on the first day of the following month.

(9) The grant is liable to be reduced or withdrawn if the payment of any teacher's salary is delayed for more than one month after it has become due.

(10) The grant is liable to be reduced or withdrawn if the school is unfavourably reported on as regards the attendance or proficiency of the scholars.

(11) The grant is liable to be reduced or withdrawn if the managers employ ill-qualified masters, or if they keep their accounts in a negligent and untrustworthy manner, or if they send to the Chairman, School Sub-Committee, incorrect accounts, or if they fail to transmit punctually the periodical returns required by the Education Department, or if the school-house is unfit for the purposes of the school, or is untidy or dirty.

(12) The grant is liable to be reduced or withdrawn if the teachers keep untidy or untrustworthy registers, or if they are frequently absent from duty.

(13) Holidays are not to exceed sixty days in the year, exclusive of Sundays, except under peculiar circumstances, and with the sanction of the School Sub-Committee.

(14) The Committee of Management is constituted as follows:—

} Members.

Member and Secretary.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

(15) Every new election to the Committee of Management must be notified to the Chairman, School Sub-Committee, under the signatures of the Secretary and of the member or members elected.

(16) Every change of Secretary must be notified to the Chairman, School Sub-Committee, under the signatures of the new Secretary and the members of the Committee of the Management.

Chairman, School Sub-Committee, District.

[LOCAL EDUCATION FORM No. 3.]

Class School

at in District

Month ending 188 .

BILL FOR GRANT-IN-AID.

The District Committee - - - - - - - - - Dr.

	Rs.	As.	P.	
To				See orders of the
The Grant-in-aid for the month				
ending to the following school				No. dated the
				188 .
Countersigned				
Chairman.				
Payable at the Treasury.				
				Received payment.
				Secretary.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL EDUCATION FORM No. 4.]

_____ Class _____ School

at _____ in Zilla _____

_____ months ending _____ 188 .

ABSTRACT ACCOUNT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS.

		Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
RECEIPTS. (A)	Fees and Fines - - -						
(B)	Subscriptions, donations, &c. - -						
	Add (if necessary) from balance of previous account.						
	Grant-in-aid for the month - -	-	-	-			
	Balance of previous account - -						
	Deduct amount (if any) carried to (B) -						
	Total -						

DISBURSEMENTS. Names of Teachers.	Establishment.	I. Monthly charges specified in the grant.	II. Charges actually paid during the month.	Explanation of the differences, if any, between Columns I. and III.
		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	
	Head-Master -			
	2nd „ -			
	3rd „ -			
	4th „ -			
	5th „ -			
	6th „ -			
	7th „ -			
	8th „ -			
	Head-Pundit -			
	2nd „ -			
	3rd „ -			
	4th „ -			
	5th „ -			
	Servants -			
	Contingencies as detailed below* -			
	Total -			
	Balance in hand -			
* Detail of contingencies.	Total -			

I declare that I have actually paid the sums stated above in column II. and, in consideration thereof, I apply for the Government grant of Rupees.

Secretary of the School.

The 188

NOTES.—1. The account is for the months preceding that for which the accompanying Grant-in-Aid Bill is drawn.

2. In the abstract of Receipts must be credited against (A) the whole amount of fees and fines received during the month.

3. Against (A) and (B) together must be credited at least the amount guaranteed as the condition of the grant.

4. If the charges certified to have been actually paid are less than the charges specified in the grant, a proportionate reduction is to be made in the amount of the accompanying bill presented for countersignature.

5. The Secretary will send this account in duplicate, if required to do so by the School Sub-Committee.

6. Abstract Register of attendance (Form C.) must be sent with this account B.

7. If the declaration at the foot of this account is falsely signed, the Secretary is thereby rendered liable to all the penalties of Clause 415 of the Penal Code.

[LOCAL EDUCATION FORM No. 5.]

ABSTRACT OF REGISTER OF ATTENDANCE of the School for the month of 188

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13			14			15			16			17			18			19			20	21
Class.	STUDENTS ON THE ROLL.							Rate of fee in each class.	AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE.			AMOUNT OF FEES AND FINES DUE FOR THE MONTH.									Unrealized balance from last month.			Total due.			Amount actually collected.			Balance as yet unrealized.			Number of days (except Sundays) for which the School remained closed during the month.	REMARKS.
	Net Total of last month.	Admitted during the month.	Quitted during the month.	Net Total.	ANALYSIS OF COLUMN 5.				Number present.	Number absent on leave.	Number absent without leave.	Monthly fees.			Entrance and re-admission fees.			Fines.																
					Scholarship holders.	Free students not scholarship holders.	Pay students.					Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.		
Total																																		

This Return was forwarded on the 188 .

Secretary.

T 12

[LOCAL EDUCATION FORM No. 6.]

Sub-Committee's Budget of Grants-in-aid for the year 1883–84.

Description of School.	Name of School.	Sanctioned Grant in 1882–83.	Proposed Grant in 1883–84.	Special Grant.	Grants for Increase or Decrease in Proposed Grant or for Special Grant.
Middle English - - - -					
Total - -					
Middle Vernacular - - - -					
Total - -					
Lower Vernacular - - - -					
Total - -					
Grand Total - -					

[LOCAL EDUCATION FORM No. 7.]

Sub-Committee's Budget of Primary Schools for 1883–84.

Sub-division.	Number in District List.	Name of School.	Sanctioned for 1882–83.		Proposed for 1883–84.		Grounds for Increase or Decrease.
			Rate of Pay.	Total Grant.	Rate of Pay.	Total Grant.	

APPENDIX III.

BUDGET of the Public Works Department for 1882–83, showing Imperial, Provincial, and Local Expenditure and the Distribution of the Cost of Establishments.

—	Imperial.			Provincial.			New Local.		Old Local Works.	Total Local Works.	Grand Total Works for all Departments.	Establishment.								Total Expenditure.
	Military Works.	Other Services.	Total.	Irrigation and Navigation.	Other Services.	Total.	Original Works and miscellaneous Improvements.	Repairs.				Supervision.	Office and Contingencies.	Share of Direction and Accounts.	Total of late P.W. Establishment.	Deduct Percentage for Imperial and Navigation.	Balance.	District Establishment.	Grand Total Establishment.	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Lakimpur -	19,100	675	19,775	14,000	—	14,000	1,11,500	18,000	17,137	1,46,637	1,80,412	34,530	9,130	7,500	51,160	4,548	46,612	400	47,012	2,27,424
Sibságar - -	1,150	5,100	6,250	—	26,000	26,000	1,04,100	25,000	40,732	1,69,832	2,02,082	41,340	8,180	6,400	55,920	1,437	54,483	—	54,483	2,56,565
Nowgong - -	—	500	500	—	—	—	38,900	17,500	16,864	73,264	73,764	13,200	5,940	2,400	21,540	115	21,425	1,224	22,649	96,413
Darrang - -	550	200	750	6,000	—	6,000	45,000	2,900	40,720	88,620	95,370	14,610	4,300	3,400	22,310	172	22,138	3,180	25,318	1,20,688
Kámrúp - -	750	675	1,425	—	—	—	31,000	16,200	47,439	94,639	96,064	12,410	4,420	3,500	20,330	322	20,008	4,890	24,898	1,20,962
Goálpára - -	—	400	400	—	—	—	19,200	17,200	46,729	83,129	83,529	10,320	2,580	3,000	15,900	92	15,808	5,354	21,162	1,04,691
Sylhet - -	1,600	200	1,800	14,000	—	14,000	43,800	14,600	66,714	1,25,114	1,40,914	25,320	5,440	5,000	35,760	414	35,346	2,186	37,532	1,78,446
Cachar - -	13,690	350	14,040	—	—	—	6,300	7,200	29,382	42,882	56,840	2,220	2,780	2,000	7,000	3,220	3,780	6,852	10,632	67,472
Eight local districts	36,840	8,100	44,940	34,000	26,000	60,000	3,99,800	1,18,600	3,05,717	8,24,117	9,28,975	1,53,950	42,770	33,200	2,29,920	10,320	2,19,600	24,086	2,43,686	11,72,661
Gáro Hills -	—	25	25	—	46,570	46,570	—	—	—	—	46,595	9,330	2,270							
Khási „ -	2,710	6,175	8,885	30,000	1,80,160	2,10,160	—	—	—	—	2,19,045	40,740	9,700							
Nága „ -	1,49,950	8,100	1,58,050	—	40,050	40,050	—	—	—	—	2,98,100	38,850	9,970	44,400	1,55,260	51,592	1,03,668	—	1,03,668	7,21,525
Reserve -	10,400	10,032	20,432	50,000	48,552	98,552	—	—	—	—	1,18,984	—	—							
Tools and plant	2,998	485	3,483	525	30,000	30,525	—	—	—	—	34,008	—	—							
Barrack Department.	1,125	—	1,125	—	—	—	—		—	—	1,125	—	—							
	1,67,183	24,817	1,92,000	80,525	3,45,332	4,25,857	—	—	—	—	6,17,857	88,920	21,940	44,400	1,55,260	51,592	1,03,668	—	1,03,668	7,21,525
Grand Total	2,04,023	32,917	2,36,940	1,14,535	3,71,332	4,85,857	3,99,800	1,18,600	3,05,717	8,24,117	15,46,832	2,42,870	64,710	77,600	3,85,180	61,912	3,23,268	24,086	3,47,354	18,94,186

APPENDIX IV.

List of Original Works in each District.

LAKHIMPUR.

Original Works.

	Rs.
Buildings—	
School bungalow	12,000
Dispensary	5,000
Sud-divisional bungalow, Lakhimpur	5,000
Jail Ward	5,000
Total	27,000
Roads—	
Trunk Road, Lepatkotta to Sessa	6,500
,, Dumduma to Sadiya	15,000
Dangori bridge	5,000
Other bridges	20,000
Northern Trunk Road, Ranganadi to Lakhimpur	15,000
—— western section, Biparia to Katoria	4,000
Metalling station roads	16,000
Dibru bund, protection of Dibrugarh	3,000
Total	84,500
Grand Total	1,11,500

SIBSAGAR.

Original Works.

Buildings—	
Cemetery	3,000
Roads—	
Trunk Road from district border to Dhansiri	2,600
—— Dhansiri to Jorhát	25,000
—— Sibságar to Tamuli	4,500
Disangmukh road, Sibságar to Disangmukh	22,000
Bor Ali Sibságar to Dikhumukh	2,700
Metalling bridge	1,500
Other bridges on Trunk Road	20,000
Dikhu bund, protection of Sibságar	4,800
Nazira Telegraph Line	14,000
Ferry Mars (iron pontoons)	4,000
Total	1,01,100
Grand Total	1,04,100

DARRANG.

Original Works.

Buildings—	
Lunatic Asylum	2,000
Roads—	
Bishnath Road	20,000
Noa Nadi bridge	11,000
Reserve	12,000
Total	43,000
Grand Total	45,000

NOWGONG.

Original Works.

Roads—	
Trunk Road Deopani to eastern boundary	12,400
Trunk Road, Koliabar to Deopani	6,000
,, Roha to Dharamtool	7,000
,, bridges	10,000
Ferry mars (iron pontoons)	3,500
Grand Total	38,900

KAMRUP.

Original Works.

	Rs.
Buildings—	
Jail	10,000
School	2,800
Barpeta cutcherry	3,200
Gauháti dák-bungalow	3,500
Circuit-house	3,000
Total	22,500
Roads—	
Trunk Road bridges	8,500
Grand Total	31,000

GOALPARA.

Original Works.

Buildings—	
Dhubri Dispensary	2,000
Total	2,000
Roads—	
Trunk Road, Fakirgang end	6,700
,, bridges	5,000
Goálpára drainage	5,500
Total	17,200
Grand Total	19,200

SYLHET.

Original Works.

Buildings—	
Judge's Court-house	1,300
Collectorate roof	3,500
Jail	5,000
Total	9,800
Roads—	
Cachar Road	9,000
Kusiara channel clearings	25,000
Total	34,000
Grand Total	43,800

CACHAR.

Original Works.

Buildings—	
Jail	300
Roads—	
Sylhet Road	6,000
Grand Total	6,300

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

APPENDIX V.

Extract from a Letter No. 921½, from Colman Macaulay, Esquire, Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, dated Calcutta, the 8th April 1882.

(1) Constitution of Boards.

* * * * *

5. If any practical result is to be obtained from the extension of local self-government, it is essential that the unit of administration should be the *Local* or Sub-divisional Board, and not the *District* Board. The District Board should have the general control of the scheme of district work : it should have the allotment of funds, and it should direct the policy of the district as a whole. But the details of local self-government can only be performed by working local bodies with limited areas of jurisdiction. Where these cannot be formed, as much use as possible must be made of District Committees; but it is only to districts in which they can be formed that a detailed scheme such as is now under consideration can with any advantage be applied. It is quite impossible that the affairs of a district in many departments can be efficiently managed by a body of men meeting six or eight times in the year at the head-quarters station. The distances are too great, and the number of possible meetings would be too small, to admit of thorough control by the Board at large; and it would be hopeless to look for sustained interest on the part of the members in the details of business conducted on such a system. One of two evils would be inevitable—either meetings would be held at long intervals, when the work could not be properly done,—or meetings would be held at short intervals, when members from outlying places would be practically excluded, and the work of the Board would fall into the hands of the members who reside at or near the head-quarters station. * * * * *
These Sub-Committees must meet frequently, and only members residing at or near the head-quarters station—certainly in the head-quarters sub-division—could attend meetings frequently. A few members, therefore, from the head-quarters station and its neighbourhood would do all the executive work of the District Board, merely reporting to, or taking orders from, the general body six or eight times a year. The members from the interior of the district would be deprived of all concern in the working of the business of local self-government. Yet it is this concern, and not the privilege of voting or debating at meetings held a few times in the year, that we wish to secure to them in order that they may learn to administer their own public affairs. What is required is a Local Board for each sub-division, inclusive of the head-quarters, each Local Board doing the work of its own sub-division under the general control of the District Board, and periodically referring to it questions of district importance and applying to it for the allotment of district funds. * * * *

Local Boards.

6. The non-official section of each *Local* Board should consist of two members from each thannah, if possible, or, if this cannot be secured, of a number of members calculated on that proportion. The chairman should be, in the head-quarters sub-division, a Joint, Deputy, or Assistant Magistrate, nominated by the Magistrate of the district; in other sub-divisions the sub-divisional officer. * * * * * *
It is quite essential that the head of the Local Board should be an officer of Government accustomed to the transaction of public business. Without this, confusion and neglect would inevitably occur. The ample representation of non-official members on the Board would render it impossible for the Chairman to monopolize its powers. The only *ex-officio* member of the Local Board beside the Chairman would be the Deputy-Inspector of Schools.* Each Local Board should elect its own Vice-Chairman. The general proportion of Local Boards throughout the district should be not less than two non-official members to one official member. Endeavours should be made to secure this proportion on each Local Board; but there might be cases where this would be inconvenient, and it would be sufficient to ensure that in the aggregate of the members of Local Boards throughout the district the proportion of not less than two-thirds and one-third is observed.

Nomination.

7. As a general rule, appointment to Local Boards must be by nomination—by Government in the first instance, and by Government or the Board itself on the occasion of vacancies. * * * * * It might, however, be provided that in certain cases Local Boards might be authorised to nominate, for the approval of Government, members to fill vacancies, the votes being taken by ballot. The members first appointed should remain in office for three years. Afterwards, members should retire in rotation one-third every year, but retiring members should be eligible for re-appointment.

* * * * * *

District Boards.

9. The *District* Board should consist of two delegates elected by each Local Board, where the jurisdiction of the latter extends over not more than three thannahs, of three where it extends over four thannahs, and of four where it extends over more than five. As the District Board will have control over

* N.B.—This would not apply to any subdivision in Assam to which an Assistant Engineer is appointed, as he would naturally be an *ex officio* member of the Local Board or Subdivisional Branch Committee.

education in municipalities and over provincial and district roads passing through them, municipalities should be duly represented, two delegates being sent by each first-class municipality, and one by each second-class municipality with a population of 5,000 or more. The proportion of official to non-official members being observed in regard to the aggregate number of members of Local Boards, and the delegates being elected by their own Boards, it is unnecessary to insist on any fixed proportion being observed on the District Board. It would be inconvenient to secure this, and to attempt it would be at once to invade the right accorded to the Local Boards of electing their own delegates. The Chairman of the District Board should be the Magistrate of the district. The Chairman of all Local Boards, the District Superintendent of Police, the Civil Surgeon, and the Deputy Inspector of Schools should be the only other *ex-officio* members. The Sanitary Commissioner, the Inspector or Assistant or Joint Inspector of Schools, and the Divisional Superintendent of Work should be entitled to attend meetings of the District Board, but they should have no vote. An example of the application of these proposals is given in the margin. It will be seen that the District Board consists of 24 members, of whom only 8 hold their appointment *ex-officio*.

BURDWAN DISTRICT.

Local Board.	
Head-quarters Sub-division—	
Chairman - -	1
Members (2 each from 8 thannahs) - -	16
	17
Raneegunge—	
Chairman - -	1
Members (2 each from 3 thannahs) - -	6
	7
Cutwa—	
Chairman - -	1
Members (2 each from 3 thannahs) - -	6
	7
Culna—	
Chairman - -	1
Members (2 each from 3 thannahs) - -	6
	7

District Board.		
Ex-officio.	Chairman - -	1
	Four Chairmen of Local Boards, District Superintendent of Police, Civil Surgeon, and Deputy-Inspector of Schools - -	7
Delegates—		
Head-quarters (8 thannahs)		4
Raneegunge (3 „)		2
Cutwa (3 „)		2
Culna (3 „)		2
Burdwan Municipality (1st Class) - - -		2
Dainhat Municipality (2nd Class) - - -		1
Raneegunge Municipality (2nd Class) - -		1
Cutwa Municipality (2nd Class) - - -		1
Culna Municipality (2nd Class) - - -		1
Total -		24

10. The Lieutenant-Governor has said that the Chairman of the District Board should be the Magistrate of the district. This is an indispensable condition. The District Officer is the mainspring of the administration, and it is absolutely essential that his position should be upheld in its integrity. Experiments in local self-government will be very valuable as a means of educating the people in the conduct of affairs, but they must not be allowed to weaken the framework of Government. In the day of trouble, Government must look to its District Officers, and not to District Boards, to uphold its authority and carry out its orders. There is no reasonable doubt, moreover, that the great mass of the people would have no confidence in any system of management from which the head of the district was excluded, or in which he held a subordinate place, and that they would attach no prestige to a Board constituted under such a system. Any one who knows the country knows that the District Officers possess in a remarkable degree the confidence and respect of the people.

The District Boards should elect their own Vice-Chairman, subject to the approval of Government.

APPENDIX VI.

[Local Fund Budget Form No. 1.]

Receipts.	Actuals of 1881–82.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.	Committee's Estimate for 1883–84.	Estimate sanctioned by Chief Commissioner.
OPENING BALANCE.				
VI.—Local Rate—				
Assam Local Rate - - -				
XIX.—Education—				
Miscellaneous - - - -				
XXIV.—Miscellaneous—				
Rents - - - - -				
Miscellaneous - - -				
Total - -				
XXVII.—Other Public Works—				
Receipts from ferries - -				
Miscellaneous - - - -				
Total - -				
Grants from Provincial—				
From Provincial Services - -				
Surplus Pound Receipts - -				
Total - -				
Grand Total - -				

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 1.]—*continued.*

EXPENDITURE.	Actuals of 1881-82.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882-83.	Committee's Estimate for 1883-84.	Estimate sanctioned by Chief Commissioner.
3.—REFUNDS—				
Miscellaneous				
Public Works				
8.—LOCAL RATES—				
Collection of rates and cesses				
15.—POST-OFFICE—				
District Post				
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS—				
Fairs				
22.—EDUCATION—				
Sub-Inspectors				
Stipends to Pupil Teachers at Normal Schools				
Scholarships				
Grants-in-aid — Primary				
Grants-in-aid — Lower				
Grants-in-aid — Middle				
Grants-in-aid — Special				
Miscellaneous				
Total				
24.—MEDICAL SERVICES—				
Grants for Medical purposes				
30.—MISCELLANEOUS—				
Rewards for destruction of wild beasts				
Committee's establishments				
Circuit-house ditto				
Staging bungalow ditto				
Contingencies				
Grants to Municipalities				
Miscellaneous				
Total				
34.—LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS—				
Establishments				
Old Local Repairs				
„ Original Works				
New Local Repairs				
„ Original Works				
Miscellaneous Improvements				
Total				
CLOSING BALANCE OR UNALLOTTED REVENUE.				
Grand Total				

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 2.—RECEIPTS.]

Rents.

No.	Description.	Actuals of 1881–82.	Sanctioned Estimate of 1882–83.	Committee's Estimate for 1883–84.	Figures sanctioned by Chief Commissioner.
1	2	3	4	5	6

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No 3.—RECEIPTS.]

Ferries.

No.	Name of Ferry.	Actuals of 1881–82.	Sanctioned Estimate of 1882–83.	Committee's Estimate for 1883–84.	Figures sanctioned by Chief Commissioner.
1	2	3	4	5	6

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued*.

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 4.—EXPENDITURE.]

District Post.

Postal Line.		Designation of Employé.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.		Estimate for 1883–84.	
From	To		No.	Total Cost.	No.	Total Cost.

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 5.—EXPENDITURE.]

Education.

Sub-head.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.		Estimate for 1883–84.	
	No.	Cost.	No.	Cost.
Sub-Inspectors - - - - -				
Stipends at Normal Schools - - -				
Scholarships - - - - -				
Grants-in-aid—				
Primary Schools - - - -				
Lower - - - - -				
Middle - - - - -				
Special - - - -				
Rewards to teachers - - - -				
Charges for conducting examinations - -				
Repairs to buildings - - - -				
Total -				

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 6.—EXPENDITURE.]

Establishments other than Public Works.

Object of Establishment.	Designation of Employé.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882-83.		Estimate for 1883-84.	
		No.	Total Cost.	No.	Total Cost.
Collection of Local Rates -					
District Committee's Accounts and Correspondence - -					
Circuit-house - - -					
Dak-Bungalows - - -					

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 7.—EXPENDITURE.]

Establishments for Public Works.

Designation of Officer.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.		Estimate for 1883–84.	
	Number.	Total Cost.	Number.	Total Cost.
Superior Establishment.				
District Engineer - - - -				
Assistant Engineer - - - -				
Subordinate Establishment.				
Sub-Engineer - - - - -				
Supervisor - - - - -				
Overseer - - - - -				
Sub-Overseer - - - - -				
Road Overseer (old Local) - - -				
Sub-divisional Allowance - - -				
Travelling Allowance - - - -				
Office.				
Head Clerk - - - - -				
Draughtsman - - - - -				
Clerk and Storekeeper - - - -				
Clerk - - - - - -				
Menial.				
Duftri - - - - - -				
Chuprassi - - - - -				
Office peon - - - - -				
Treasure guard - - - -				
Chaukidar - - - - -				

N.B.—District Committees can, if they please, amalgamate the old district road establishment with the new (late provincial) establishment transferred from April 1882–83, and if they please can keep them distinct in this list.

Replies of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[Local Fund Budget Form No. 8.—Expenditure.]

Repairs (Old Local).

No.	Description.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.	Estimate for 1883–84.
	Civil buildings (name of building) - - -		
	Communications (name of road) - - - -		

[Local Fund Budget Form No. 9.—Expenditure.]

Original Works (Old Local).

No.	Name of Project or Road.	Amount of Estimate.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.	Estimate for 1883–84.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 10.—EXPENDITURE.]

Repairs (New Local).

No.	Description.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.	Estimate for 1883–84.	——
	Civil Buildings. (Name of building.) *N.B.*—Rest-houses, Circuit-houses, Dâk-bungalows, &c., to be entered under this head. Communications. (Name of road.)			

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 11.—EXPENDITURE.]

Original Works (New Local).

No.	Name of Project or Road.	Amount of Estimate.	Sanctioned Estimate for 1882–83.	Estimate for 1883–84.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND BUDGET FORM No. 12. EXPENDITURE.]

Miscellaneous Improvements.

No.	Nature of Object.	Sanctioned Estimate in 1882-83.	Estimate for 1883-84.	——

N.B.—Purchase of tools and plant from Provincial stock may be entered here.

APPENDIX VII.

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNTS FORM No. 1.]

Cash Book.

Date.	No. of Cheque or Bill.	Budget Heading.	Particulars.	Amount.	Daily Total.	Progressive Monthly Total from 1st April.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNTS FORM No. 2.]

Treasury Pass Book.

Date.	No. of Cheque or Bill.	Name of Payee.	Amount.	Signature of Treasury Officer.

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNTS FORM No. 3.]

Imprest Cash Book of

Date.	Transactions.	No. of Voucher.	Amount of Cash Payment.	Total.
			Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
1st	Balance in hand - - - - -		—	100 0 0
2nd	Paid for c. ft. earthwork repairs to - -		10 8 0	—
	Paid for grass for thatch for - - -		3 4 0	—
5th	Paid for—		7 8 0	21 4 0
	Balance - -			78 12 0
	Received from District Committee - - -			21 4 0
				100 0 0

(Overseer or District Engineer.)

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNTS FORM No. 4.]

Register of Advances to Contractors for Month

No.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Name of Contractor.	Balance due from previous Month.	Advanced during Month.	No. of Cheque.	Total.	Amount accounted for during Month.	Balance Due at end of Month.	Whether Security taken or not.

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNTS FORM No. 5.]

Progress Report of Works in Charge of for Month ending

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Locality and Name of Work.	Amount of sanctioned Estimate.	Expenditure.		Rate		Brief Statement of Progress during Month.	Present State of Work.	Remarks by District Committee.
		Total.	To Date.	Of Estimate.	At which Executed.			

The figures in columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are taken from the Register of Works.
In this statement every work in the budget should be entered, whether there has been any expenditure on it during the month or not.
Columns 5 and 6 are only to be filled up in the case of works of which the accounts of expenditure are ordered to be kept by sub-heads.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNTS FORM No. 6.]

Day Book.

N.B.—It is required that these Day Books shall be posted up daily, and that the full quantity of work measured and materials received, whether paid for or not, shall be shown in the column of "Charges;" the arrears unpaid at the end of the month being deducted at foot.

When daily labour is employed, the number of workmen should be shown on an inner sheet of Form No. 6, which should accompany this Day Book.

Month_____

Name of Work

Authority.

Date.	Payment.			Particulars.	Charges.								Number of Charge.	Sub-head of Estimate.
					Quantity.	Rate.			Per	Value.				
	Rs.	A.	P.			Rs.	A.	P.		Rs.	A.	P.		

N.B.—The charges should be numbered consecutively for the purpose of abstracting.

No. 6.—(*continued.*)

PROGRESS.

Particulars.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.	Quantity.
During this month - - -												
Total of this month - -												
Total to date - -												

CHARGES.

No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.	No. of Charge.	Amount. Rs.	A.	P.
Total -																																							

N.B.—When the total estimated value of labour does not exceed Rs. 1,000, the charges on account thereof need not be sub-divided under the sub-heads of estimate.

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

ACCOUNT OF MATERIALS.

No. 6.—(*concluded.*)

Particulars.	Description of Materials.						
Received to date as within							
Expended on work to end of last month.							
Expended during this month on.							
Total expended on work							
Remains at site -							

Remarks by the District Engineer.

Day Book for 188 .

DISTRICT.

NAME OF WORK

Authority

Estimate No.

SUMMARY OF CHARGES.

Cash payments by sub-divisional officer - - -

Cash payments by district officer

Total cash payments of month -

Value of stock issued to this work - - -

Total charges of this month -

Executive Engineer.

[Local Fund Account Form No. 7.]

Register of Works, District, 18 - .

(P. W. D. Form No. 25.)

Name of Work: Authority:

Note.—For works estimated to cost more than Rs. 200 and less than Rs. 500, three columns only will be necessary, for "Cash," "Stock," and "Total."	Quantity.	Amount.			Quantity.	Amount.			Quantity.	Amount.			Quantity.	Amount.			Quantity.	Amount.			Total of Monthly Charges.		
Estimate No. of 18 - - - -		Rs.	A.	P.		Rs.	A.	P.		Rs.	A.	P.		Rs.	A.	P.		Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
Expenditure of previous year brought forward (if any) - - - - - - -																							
April 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
May 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
June 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
July 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
August 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
September 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
October 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
November 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
December 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
January 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
February 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							
March 18 - - - - - -																							
Total - - -																							

REPLIES of District Officers N.-W. P. and Oudh as to Municipal Boards—*continued.*

[LOCAL FUND ACCOUNT FORM No. 8.]

Completion Report.

Name of work
sanctioned by for Rs. on the 18 .

Sub-head of Estimate.	Amount as per Estimate.	Amount as Executed.	Difference.		Remarks.
			More.	Less.	

Dated (Overseer or District Engineer.)

Remarks by Chairman of District Committee.

647

CORRESPONDENCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF

THE PROPOSED ALTERATION OF THE PROVISIONS

OF

The Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to Jurisdiction over European British Subjects.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1883.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE E. B. EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1883.

[C.—3512.] *Price* 3*d*.

CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

No. 33 of 1882.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.—HOME DEPARTMENT.

JUDICIAL.

To the Right Honourable the MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS, Simla, the 9th September 1882.

WE have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's consideration, the papers noted in the annexed list, on the subject of the position of native members of the Covenanted Civil Service under those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limit the jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects.

2. It will be seen that the Government of Bengal, on the 30th January 1882, while the revised Code of Criminal Procedure was under the consideration of the Legislature, had its attention drawn to this matter in a note by Mr. B. L. Gupta, a native member of the Bengal Civil Service, and that Sir Ashley Eden, while he was of opinion that discussion on this question could not with propriety be raised at the then advanced stage of the proceedings in connexion with the revised Code, and did not, therefore, submit Mr. Gupta's note, had himself no doubt that a change was called for in the existing law as reproduced in the Code. Accordingly in referring the point to the Government of India, on the 20th March, after the passing of Act X. of 1882, the Lieutenant-Governor remarked:—

"As a question of general policy it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor right that covenanted native civilians should be empowered to exercise jurisdiction over Europeans as well as over natives who are brought before them in their capacity as criminal judges. Now that native covenanted civilians may shortly be expected to hold the office of district magistrate or sessions judge, it is also, as a matter of administrative convenience, desirable that they should have the power to try all classes of persons brought before them. Moreover, if this power is not conferred upon native members of the Civil Service, the anomaly may be presented of a European joint magistrate, who is subordinate to a native district magistrate or sessions judge, being empowered to try cases which his immediate superior cannot try. Native presidency magistrates within the Presidency towns exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans that they do over natives, and there seems to be no sufficient reason why covenanted native civilians, with the position and training of district magistrate or sessions judge, should not exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans as is exercised by other members of the service.

"For these reasons Sir Ashley Eden is of opinion that the time has now arrived when all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed on them by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, or when at least native covenanted civilians who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge should have entrusted to them full powers over all classes, whether European or native, within their jurisdiction."

3. The new Code of Criminal Procedure does not come into force before the first day of January 1883, and it appeared to us desirable to obtain, without delay, in a confidential shape, the opinions of the different local governments upon the suggestion thrown out by Sir Ashley Eden, in order that if any amendment of the law was found to be necessary, it might be as far as possible synchronous with the commencement of the operation of the revised Code. It appears to us clear that the status in the Covenanted Service of those native gentlemen who have already obtained admission to its ranks is fast becoming so senior, and their numbers are yearly growing so rapidly, that we cannot any longer with justice decline to deal with the question; and if changes in the law are inevitable, as we

think they are, it seems to us desirable to make them at a time when the whole machinery of our criminal administration is being put on an improved footing. The anomalous nature of the present arrangements is forcibly brought out in Mr. Gupta's own case. While officiating as presidency magistrate he had under the law as it stands full powers over European British subjects, even in comparatively serious cases, and exercised these with satisfaction to the local government and the public. On his removal to a more responsible appointment in the interior he ceased to be qualified to deal with even the most trivial cases affecting Europeans.

4. The replies of all the local governments have now been received, and form the principal enclosures of this Despatch.

In Madras, his Excellency the Governor and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief can see no logical reason why a covenanted civilian of native birth should be put on a different footing in respect of criminal judicial powers from his European colleague. The civilian members of the local council on the other hand defend the existing state of things, mainly on the assumption that any interference with the privileges in the matter of jurisdiction now accorded to European British subjects would be unpopular with a certain class of Europeans.

In Bombay, the Governor in Council, after consulting the higher judicial and magisterial officers in the Presidency, finds that the preponderating opinion is to the effect that the disability of native judges and magistrates in respect to the jurisdiction in question should certainly be removed from those native members of the Covenanted Civil Service who attain to the position of district magistrates and sessions judges, and in this opinion his Excellency in Council concurs.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, having consulted several officers of experience serving under him, finds them generally agreed that jurisdiction over European British subjects cannot any longer be witheld from native members of the Covenanted Civil Service as a class. They are unanimous that native officers in the position of district magistrate or sessions judge ought to have the same powers as their European colleagues, but there is some difference of opinion as to the treatment of native officers in lower grades. In the view of the majority all native civilians who are deemed fit by the local government should have the powers, and the general statutory disability ought to be removed. Sir Alfred Lyall himself concurs in the view of the majority of his officers. On general principles of justice he would remove the existing class differences between European and native members of the same service. He thinks that both in the case of European and native officers some test of fitness and experience should be required before entrusting them with jurisdiction over European British subjects, and he considers that a native officer who has been adjudged fit to have charge of a district ought to receive these powers and to retain them even if he revert to a lower appointment afterwards. Sir A. Lyall would remove all invidious restrictions from the law, leaving local governments to confer powers on its officers in the manner above indicated.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab considers that native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved from all restrictions and disqualifications imposed upon them under the Code of Criminal Procedure by reason only of their not being European British subjects, and would provide that such of them as may be from time to time appointed justices of the peace and magistrates of the first-class or sessions judges should be authorised to exercise all the powers and jurisdiction which a European British subject similarly appointed can exercise. Sir Charles Aitchison would even go further than this, and would make the powers and jurisdiction of judicial officers entirely depend upon personal fitness. He proposes, therefore, that the same powers should be conferred upon all justices of the peace and 1st class magistrates, and upon all sessions judges, whether they are European or native, and whether they belong to the Covenanted Civil Service or not. (This proposal is to some extent based upon a doubtful construction of Act II. of 1869, in which the term "British inhabitant" probably does not mean, as supposed by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, any British subject, but only a European British subject.)

The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces would make no distinction between European and native members of the Covenanted Civil Service.

The Chief Commissioner of British Burma takes the same view.

The Chief Commissioner of Assam would place European civilians and natives appointed by competition in England on a precisely similar footing, but would only confer the powers in question on natives who may be appointed in this country by nomination on their attaining the rank of district magistrate or sessions judge.

The Resident at Hyderabad would confer the powers on all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service who attain the rank of district magistrate or sessions judge, and on such other native members as the local government deemed specially fit.

The officiating Chief Commissioner of Coorg, alone among the heads of administrations consulted, would leave matters as they are.

5. It will thus be seen that there is an overwhelming consensus of opinion that the time has come for modifying the existing law and removing the present absolute bar upon the investment of native magistrates in the interior with powers over European British subjects. There is some difference of view as to the actual extent to which the law should be modified, but it is generally admitted that a native civilian in the position of a district magistrate or sessions judge should have equal powers with his European colleague, and there is a very strong body of opinion that there should be no distinction made between native and European members of the Covenanted Service at any stage in respect of their judicial powers, provided that they are individually found qualified to exercise those powers.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab would go further than this, and would apply the test of fitness, irrespective of race distinction, to all classes of magistrates, native and European alike; and he assumes apparently that all first class magistrates are, as a matter of course, fit to be entrusted with the powers of a justice of the peace and with jurisdiction over European British subjects. Some of us concur in the views entertained by Sir Charles Aitchison, but the majority are not prepared at present to adopt them, as they doubt whether all magistrates of the first class are, as a matter of fact, competent to be entrusted with the powers which the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab proposes to confer upon them.

7. We are convinced that it is most desirable to settle this question of jurisdiction over European British subjects, if not permanently, yet in such a way as to prevent its early reopening; and we consider that no change of the law will be satisfactory or stable which fails to remove from the Statute Book, at once and completely, every judicial disqualication which is based merely on race distinctions and the supposed personal privileges of a dominant caste.

8. We propose therefore to confine the office of justice of the peace, and with it the power of trying European British subjects, to those persons, whether European or native, who have received a training that may be presumed to guarantee the possession of the qualities required for the proper disposal of such cases. In this view we think that all district magistrates and sessions judges should be vested with the powers in question in virtue of their office, and by a definite provision in the law; and we would empower the local governments, outside the Presidency towns, to confer these powers upon those members (*a*) of the Covenanted Civil Service, (*b*) of the Native Civil Service constituted under the Statutory Rules, and (*c*) of the Non-Regulation Commissions, who are already exercising first class magisterial powers, and are, in their opinion, fit to be intrusted with these further powers. We would make no distinction in the law between European and native officers. We consider that the care exercised in the selection of officers for the Covenanted Service, both in regulation and non-regulation Provinces, together with the subsequent training that they receive, warrants our amending the law in the manner proposed. As a fact, no officer would be eligible until he had passed all the departmental examinations, and been in training long enough to show the superior authorities whether he would be likely to use any powers conferred upon him with proper discretion. These proposals will completely remove from the law all distinctions based on the race of the judge. The limitations remaining on the jurisdiction of particular classes of magistrates will be based, not on any difference of race, but simply on differences of training and experience.

9. We ask your Lordship's sanction to the introduction of a Bill giving effect to these views, and we request that your decision may be communicated to us at as early a date as possible.

10. Our honourable colleagues his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Hope do not altogether concur in the recommendations above set out. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would not confer the powers of a justice of the peace upon any native member of the Civil Service until he had been selected for appointment, temporary or permanent, as a district magistrate or sessions judge. The Honourable Mr. Hope

has expressed his views in a separate Minute, a copy of which is enclosed. The Honourable Lieutenant-General Wilson would maintain the law as it now stands, objecting to any change affecting the position of European British subjects in this country.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

List of Enclosures.

Minute by the Hon. T. C. Hope, C.S.I., C.I.E., dated 8th September 1882.
Letter from Government of Bengal, No. 1411J., dated 20th March 1882, and enclosures.
Confidential Circular to Local Governments and Administrations, Nos. 7—586 to 594, dated 28th April 1882.
Letter from Government of Madras, No. 329, dated 8th June 1882, and enclosures.
Ditto ditto Bombay, No. 4622, dated 28th July 1882.
Ditto ditto North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 692, dated 27th May 1882, and enclosure.
Ditto ditto Punjab, No. 703, dated 5th August 1882.
Ditto Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, No. 1694—86, dated 15th May 1882.
Ditto ditto British Burma, No. 360, dated 11th May 1882.
Ditto ditto Assam, No. 764, dated 26th May 1882.
Ditto ditto Coorg, No. 315—17, dated 16th May 1882.
Ditto Resident at Hyderabad, No. 345, dated 24th August 1882, and enclosures.

Minute by the Hon. T. C. Hope, C.S.I., C.I.E., dated 8th September, 1882.

I concur in the expediency of conferring power over European British subjects upon Native civilians of any class when they have attained the rank of officiating district magistrate or sessions judge. But I do not consider that a mere training of a covenanted civilian by competition in England, and still less, a nomination to the service in India, is a guarantee that a native civilian will be fit to exercise jurisdiction over European British subjects when he has passed the usual departmental examinations. Between him and his European contemporary still lies the essential difference of race, which time has not yet sufficiently divested of the difficulties it creates. This difference, on the one hand, renders him ordinarily less possessed, at an early age, of the tact, judgment, and impartiality necessary for dealing satisfactorily with cases in which Europeans are concerned, and on the other, renders Europeans less disposed to submit to and confide in his jurisdiction. I consider that the grant of the powers in question to native civilians who have attained the post of officiating district magistrate or sessions judge is sufficient to meet all present necessities of the case; but that if a further advance is held to be indispensable the local governments might be authorised to confer, with the previous consent of the Governor General in Council, the powers upon any native civilian of proved fitness who had been seven years in the service of Government.

T. C. Hope.

No. 1411J., dated Calcatta, the 20th March 1882.

From HORACE A. COCKERELL, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial, Political, and Appointment Departments, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

I AM directed to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a note* by Mr. B. L. Gupta, of the Bengal Civil Service, representing the anomalous position in which the native members of the Covenanted Civil Service are placed under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which limit the jurisdiction to be exercised over European British subjects in the interior to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects. Chapter VII. of Act X. of 1872, which deals with the subject, has been reproduced in the new Code of Criminal Procedure (*vide* Chapter XXXIII. of Act X. of 1882).

2. The question raised in Mr. Gupta's note is one which requires full conideration, and on which the Government of India will probably deem it desirable to obtain the opinions of all the Local Governments and Administrations, inasmuch as it may not be expedient to apply to the Madras and Bombay Presidencies a rule which may be applicable to Bengal. Mr. Gupta desired that the question of the jurisdiction to be exercised by covenated civilians over Europeans in the mofussil might be considered in connexion with the Bill to amend Act X. of 1872; but the Lieutenant-Governor felt that a discussion on the subject could not with propriety be raised at the final reading of that Bill. Sir Ashley Eden is, however, of opinion that the matter should receive full and careful consideration, whenever, on any future occasion, a fitting opportunity occurs.

3. As a question of general policy, it seems to the Lieutenant-Governor right that covenanted native civilians should be empowered to exercise jurisdiction over Europeans as well as over natives who are brought before them in their capacity as criminal judges. Now that native covenanted civilians may shortly be expected to hold the office of district magistrate or sessions judge, it is also, as a matter of administrative convenience, desirable that they should have the power to try all classes of persons brought before them. Moreover, if this power is not conferred upon native members of the Civil Service, the anomaly may be presented of a European joint magistrate, who is subordinate to a native district magistrate or sessions judge, being empowered to try cases which his immediate superior cannot try. Native Presidency magistrates within the Presidency towns exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans that they do over natives, and there seems to be no sufficient reason why covenanted native civilians, with the position and training of district magistrate or sessions judge, should not exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans as is exercised by other members of the service.

4. For these reasons Sir Ashley Eden is of opinion that the time has now arrived when all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed on them by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, or when at least native covenanted civilians who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge should have entrusted to them full powers over all classes, whether European or native, within their jurisdictions.

NOTE by Mr. GUPTA.

Jurisdiction over European British Subjects.

As the law now stands (Chapter VII. of Act X. of 1872†) no magistrate or sessions judge has jurisdiction to inquire into a complaint or to try a charge against a European British subject unless he is a justice of the peace and himself a European British subject. An exception to this rule is allowed within the limits of Presidency towns where, under Act IV. of 1877, a Presidency magistrate, whether himself a European or not, has the same jurisdiction over Europeans as over natives of the country.

Previous to the passing of Act X. of 1872 (the present Criminal Procedure Code) no magistrate or justice of the peace, even though a European himself, had jurisdiction (outside the limits of the Presidency towns) to try a charge against any European British

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* Dated the 30th January 1882. † Section 72.

subject. But all magistrates who were also justices of the peace had jurisdiction to inquire into charges against Europeans and to commit them to the High Court for trial. (*See* sections 39, 40, and 41 of Act XXV. of 1861, the old Criminal Procedure Code.) And by section 3, Act II. of 1869, the Goverment was empowered to appoint any covenanted civil servant to be a justice of the peace. Under Act X. of 1872, however, a covenanted civil servant, even though a first-class magistrate and a justice of the peace, would have no jurisdiction over a European British subject unless he himself is a European British subject.

This provision of the law would give rise to an invidious distinction and to many practical inconveniences in the case of those natives of the country who in the course of time expect to attain to the position of a district magistrate or of a sessions judge. Hence, when the Bill for Act X. of 1872 was still before the Council, an amendment to section 72 in favour of the native members of the Covenanted Service was proposed by the Hon. Mr. Ellis. The* amendment was put to the vote and lost by a majority of seven against five. But it is remarkable that the minority in that instance comprised the highest officials of the State. The President and Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and his successor in office, all voted for the amendment, and I would humbly invite attention to the utterances of those dignitaries on that occasion. Nothing can be added to the eloquence or the sound reasoning of those speeches, and I shall content myself with appending a few extracts for ready reference.

The Bill of the new Criminal Procedure Code now before the Council† proposes to perpetuate the distinction noted above, and the disability under which myself and other Indian members of the service labour. The arguments which were uttered in 1872 for its removal present themselves with redoubled force after an interval of 10 years. They are too obvious to require mention, and they would lose all their grace and much of their force if repeated by one who is personally interested in the matter. My only sentiment on the subject is that if you do entrust us with the responsible office of a district magistrate or of a sessions judge, do not cripple us in our powers. The question affects seriously the efficiency of district administration; and I make bold to trust that the expediency of a change in the law cannot but be recognised if the matter be put before the Council in its present true light.

Since the passing of Act X. of 1872, however, the constitution of the Civil Service has undergone an important change, with reference to which a few words need be said. Under a recent measure of Government natives of India have been appointed to the Covenanted Civil Service under a system of nomination and without the test of any competitive examination or a compulsory journey to England. This fact somewhat alters the aspect of the question discussed in the Council in 1872, and under existing circumstances stronger objections would probably be raised against any proposal to extend generally the criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects to all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service. I would therefore venture to make a suggestion which would probably meet the urgent requirements of the case, at the same time that it would obviate all reasonable objections and command a general assent. I would propose that the extension of jurisdiction over European British subjects be limited to natives of the country holding the office of a magistrate of the district or of a sessions judge.

The 30th January 1882.

B. L. Gupta.

Extracts from Speeches of the Members of the Legislative Council upon an Amendment proposed by the Hon. Mr. Ellis to sections 72, 76, and 77 of the Bill for the present Criminal Procedure Code (Act X. of 1872) at a Meeting held on the 16th April 1872 (*see* Supplement to "India Gazette" of the 4th May 1872).

The Hon. Mr. Ellis.—In making the invidious distinction which was now proposed, if we excluded any justices of the peace from the exercise of certain powers, we were really casting a stigma on the whole educated native population of India. He might also urge that there would be considerable inconvenience in having such a distinction. But he preferred to put it on the broad ground that, if you had native covenanted civil servants, you ought not to bar them from exercising the powers of a civil servant, among

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* See proceedings of the Governor-General's Council on the Criminal Procedure Bill at a meeting held on the 16th April 1872, published in the supplement to the India "Gazette" of the 4th May 1872, page 572.

† Section 443.

which powers is the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace over European British subjects. By Act II. of 1869 natives might be appointed justices of the peace, and on what ground, he would ask, was it proposed to restrict their powers as justice of the peace ?

*His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.**—The Council should adhere to the decision which had been come to by the passing of Act II. of 1869, namely, that a justice of the peace must be either a European British subject or a covenanted civil servant. To re-open that question and to limit the powers that might be exercised by any justices who were covenanted civil servants, appeared to his Honour to be somewhat invidious, and would be, as it were, setting themselves against the policy hitherto pursued. Viewing the matter in that light he should be inclined to vote for the motion before the Council.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.†—Said that the native members of the Covenanted Civil Service having been to Europe, having become acquainted with the European feelings, ideas and customs, and having qualified themselves to take their places with the European members of the Civil Service, his Excellency would frankly accept them as real members of the Covenanted Civil Service, and allow them to exercise all the functions which the European members exercised.

His Excellency the President.‡—Said that his vote would be given in conformity with the opinion which had been expressed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency thought that the restriction would embody a stigma on the native community in general. It was equivalent to stating that under no circumstances, as far as the administration of the law was concerned, could the native attain to that degree of impartiality and courage which would justify the Government in reposing in his hands the powers of trying European British subjects.

He thought that by the restriction we in effect said to the European—" You are not " to be tried in the mofussil by the agency by which you are tried in the High Court " and in the courts of the magistrates in the Presidency towns, with the general approval " and sanction of the European and native communities." It was saying in effect that the native who had attained to the position of a sessions judge was not competent to try a European British subject, bnt that he might try him when he became a judge of the High Court and sat beside a European judge. His Excellency could not but help thinking that there was practically no greater disparity in permitting these native civil servants to try a European British subject, than in permitting native justices in the Presidency towns to try him. There appeared to his Excellency to be no such broad distinction whatever between the conditions of the society and of public opinion in this respect between the Presidency towns and the mofussil. There were now a great number of public spirited men and a great deal of public spirit all over the Provinces. Communications by rail, the dissemination of newspapers both in English and the vernacular, and a great variety of other circumstances had destroyed that distinction which formerly existed between the Presidency towns and the mofussil. His Excellency did not himself consider that there was the slightest possibility that in the rare case of a civil and sessions judge trying a European British subject in the mofussil there would be an abuse of justice.

The Hon. Mr. Ellis.—But he desired to add his testimony to the efficiency with which native magistrates had performed their duties in the Presidency towns, in the administration of justice to both Europeans and natives, and he had no hesitation in saying that they had performed their duties with as much credit and efficiency as the European magistrates. And if they had done that, he saw no reason why natives in the position of covenanted civil servants or sessions judges should not be equally competent to administer justice to the European in the mofussil. His hon. friend, Mr. Stephen, had remarked that in this matter we were not to consult the feelings of the judge, but of those who were to be subjected to the jurisdiction. In answer to that Mr. Ellis would say that he saw no reason why that which did not hurt the feelings of Europeans in the Presidency towns should hurt in the mofussil.

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.—After consideration, and having listened to the arguments, and given due weight to the weighty considerations which his Excellency the President had placed before the Council, his Honour was prepared to vote in favour of the very limited change which was proposed by the amendment.

The Hon. Sir Richard Temple.—He thought that the inference was undeniable that if the natives were eligible to all the great offices of the administration, it seemed improper and unreasonable to say that they should not sit as judges over Europeans in the mofussil for offences of the trivial nature over which it was proposed to give justices of the peace

* Sir George Campbell. † Lord Napier of Magdala. ‡ Lord Napier of Merchistoun.

cognizance. After what had fallen from hon. members, he felt that he ought not to give a silent vote on the subject. He would vote in favour of the amendment of his hon. colleague, Mr. Ellis.

The question being put, the Council divided—

Ayes.	*Noes.*
His Excellency the President.	Hon. Mr. Strachey.
His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.	Hon. Mr. Stephen.
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.	Major-General the Hon. H. W. Norman.
Hon. Sir R. Temple.	Hon. Mr. Inglis.
Hon. Mr. Ellis.	Hon. Mr. Robinson.
	Hon. Mr. Chapman.
	Hon. Mr. Stewart.

So the amendment was negatived.

(Confidential.) No. $\frac{7}{586\text{–}594}$.

From A. Mackenzie, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Local Governments and Administrations.

Home Department.
Judicial.

Sir, Simla, April 28, 1882.

I am directed to forward for consideration the accompanying copy of a letter* from the Government of Bengal, on the subject of the position of native members of the Covenanted Civil Service under those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limit the jurisdiction to be exercised over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects. It will be seen that, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 of that letter, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is of opinion that the time has arrived when all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code† of Criminal Procedure; or that at least native covenanted civilians, who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge, should be entrusted with full powers over all classes of persons, European or native, within their jurisdictions. It is certainly anomalous that a native member of the Civil Service, holding the position of a district officer, should be debarred from taking up cases which his European assistants may try, and of which he himself, if appointed Presidency magistrate, would have full power to dispose. Before, however, taking any action of the kind suggested, the Governor-General in Council would be glad to be favoured with $\frac{\text{the}}{\text{your}}$ opinion $\frac{\text{of his Excellency the Governor in Council}}{\text{of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor}}$ on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. Mackenzie,
Secretary to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Public Department.

Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

Sir, Ootacamund, June 8, 1882.

In acknowledging your letter, No. 7–586, dated 28th April 1882 (confidential), on the subject of the position of native members of the Covenanted Civil Service in respect of criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency

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* No. 1411J., dated 20th March 1882, and enclosure (see p. 7). † Act No. X. of 1882.

towns, I am to transmit the accompanying Minutes, which have been recorded by the members of Government on this important question.

2. It will be observed that while the Right Honourable the Governor and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief are in favour of the proposed extension of jurisdiction, the Honourable Messrs. Huddleston and Carmichael have recorded Minutes of dissent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. G. Master,
Acting Chief Secretary.

Minute by the Honourable D. F. Carmichael.

It is not true, as stated by Mr. Gupta*—whose error is not noticed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal—that, previous to the passing of Act X. of 1872 (the existing Code of Criminal Procedure), no magistrate, even though a British subject himself, had jurisdiction (outside the Presidency town) to try a charge against a British subject. From the earliest days of British settlements in India, the Governor and his Council of every plantation, factory, or fort had plenary criminal jurisdiction over British subjects. After this, as each supreme court was established, British subjects resident in India, even without the Presidency towns, became amenable to those courts only. This restriction proving very inconvenient was removed in the Company's Charter of 1813, which empowered district magistrates—extended afterwards to all persons exercising full magisterial powers—to adjudicate all complaints preferred against any British subject of assaults or other injuries, not being felonies. So that for nearly 60 years before the present Code of Criminal Procedure came into force, the British magistrate in the mofussil had pretty nearly the same authority which is given to him by that Code. The only considerable enlargement in the Code is the power given to a (British) mofussil session judge to deal with British subjects committed by the magistrate, provided that no severer sentence than one year's imprisonment shall be inflicted on conviction.

S. cv.—53 Geo. III. Cap. 155.

2. It is important to notice Mr. Gupta's mistake—because if we were going now for the first time to try British subjects in the mofussil, it would be difficult to defend the propriety of limiting the jurisdiction to British officials; but the case is different where it is proposed to legislate towards the forfeiture of an ancient privilege—dating perhaps—at any rate this is the common superstition—from Magna Charta, which declares that no Englishman shall be condemned except *per legale judicium parium?*

3. I observe, from Mr. Gupta's extracts, that Sir James Stephen's view of the matter was that this is eminently a case where we should consult the feelings of those who are to be subjected to the jurisdiction. I agree entirely to this. Before the Company's Charter of 1833, the Government of India had not acquired the power of legislating as Mr. Gupta would desire. That Statute gave them the power of investing the mofussil courts with full criminal jurisdiction (the sentence of death excepted) over any of Her Majesty's natural born subjects and the children of such subjects. Practically, however, except the petty jurisdiction given to a session court presided over by a British subject, in the present Code passed in 1872, nothing whatever has been done, and we know why it has not been done; the British lion, a vulgar brute, no doubt, has wagged his tail and roared; that he would do so again now is, I think, pretty certain. To refuse the jurisdiction to the covenanted native magistrate is, I own, less defensible. He has lived some years in England, graduated at Oxford or Cambridge, and won his position by honourable competition with young English gentlemen. The members of the Civil Service receive him cordially, but "Society" in India unfortunately does not; we propose him at the club, where "Society" blackballs him; and I fear the lower orders of the Briton in India are not prepared to accept him as one to be trusted with their personal liberty. If they accept the native magistrate in the Presidency town, it is because there they are surrounded by thousands of public-spirited compatriots, who, they are sure, would never allow them to be injured.

4. Lastly, I would observe that there is no little inconsistency about the treatment of this question at Calcutta. At one time it was enacted that at all events every British

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* Paragraph 2.

subject holding any of certain high judicial offices, ordinarily occupied by natives, in the mofussil, should be amenable to mofussil courts for corruption in the exercise of such office. After some years this Act was repealed; and when, during Lord Napier's government here, the courts of the Travancore State convicted and punished a British subject, its treasurer, for fraud, an immense stir was made at the Foreign Office; and a law was quickly passed that no Native State could so proceed by inherent right of sovereignty, though the contrary practice had prevailed in Travancore for 35 years under the formal approval of the British Government. So, at present, in Travancore, no Briton can be tried by a magistrate who is not a Briton, and such magistrate has no power at all, till invested with it by the Governor-General in Council. But if highly respectable natives are to try Britons in British India, how can we refuse to let natives of the same class do the same in Travancore territory, or in that of other civilised Native States?

5. After all, there is such a thing as privilege; this one is highly valued by those who possess it, and certainly does no harm to the native population; while its surrender would, in my opinion, cause great exasperation, perhaps accompanied with much political mischief, amongst Her Majesty's natural-born subjects, their children, and grandchildren, lawfully begotten, who now constitute the privileged class.

15th May 1882. (Signed) DAVID F. CARMICHAEL.

MINUTE by the Honourable W. HUDLESTON.

I CONCUR in opinion with my honourable colleague, Mr. Carmichael, that the proposed extension of jurisdiction would be impolitic, and is not expedient; and I would note that Section 3, Act II. of 1869, which empowers the Government of India and local governments to "appoint such and so many of the covenanted civil servants of the Crown in "India or other British inhabitants" to be justices of the peace in British India beyond the Presidency towns (in which any persons, not subjects of a foreign state, may be so appointed), distinctly contemplated that the covenanted civil servants would be British inhabitants. It was clearly not anticipated or perceived that the contrary might be the case.

2. The position in the Presidency towns, with their European population and Bar, is essentially different from that of a mofussil court, where, in this Presidency at least, the accused might very probably be the only European British subject within a circuit of 100 miles, and with all due recognition of the merits of the native members of the Covenanted Service I do not think the position would be a fair one. I am confident it would raise an outcry that would aggravate race friction far more than the removal of the already existing disability attaching to a small number of officials would allay it.

3. Mr. Gupta seems to me to wrongly assume that the nominated members of the Native Civil Service are members of the Covenanted Civil Service.

16th May 1882. W. HUDLESTON.

MINUTE by the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR.

I HAVE read with great care and much respect the opinions of my honourable colleagues Mr. Hudleston and Mr. Carmichael; but I cannot agree with them. It is perhaps a pity that a question was raised just now which affects so few people; but I see no answer to the claim made by Mr. Gupta, which is logically defensible. It may be that to admit that claim may wake up bad passions, which are now slumbering; but I trust this will not be so. We cannot stop where we are, if pressed to advance, without stultifying our past action. Very soon, if not immediately, the covenanted civilian of native birth, must be put on precisely the same footing as his European colleague. Mr. Gupta does not quite ask for this, in consequence of a misconception, which Mr. Hudleston has pointed out; but there is no safe standing-ground till we take up that position.

22nd May 1882. M. E. GRANT DUFF.

MINUTE by his Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

I AGREE with the remarks of his Excellency the Governor. I don't see how, in equity, any difference can be made in the position and power of British and native covenanted civilians.

23rd May 1882. FRED. ROBERTS.

(Confidential.)

No. 4622, dated Bombay Castle, 28th July 1882.

From H. F. ASTON, Esq., Acting Under Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Judicial Department, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

IN answer to your letter No. 7–587 of 28th April last, inquiring as to the opinion of this Government on the question whether native covenanted civilians, or at least those of them who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge should not be relieved of such restrictions as are imposed on their jurisdiction in relation to European British subjects by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, I am directed to state that after consulting the higher judicial and magisterial officers in the Presidency on the question, and finding much diversity of opinion thereon, the Governor in Council has no hesitation in concurring with the preponderating opinion, which is to the effect that the disability of native judges and magistrates in respect to the jurisdiction in question should certainly be removed from those native members of the Covenanted Civil Service who attain to the position of district magistrate and sessions judge.

No. 692 of 1882.

From the OFFICIATING SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, N.W. Provinces and Oudh, to the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Home Department.

Judicial Department.
(Criminal.)

SIR, Dated Naini Tal, May 27, 1882.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. $\frac{7}{588}$, dated 28th April, 1882, on the subject of the position of native members of the Covenanted Civil Service under those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limit the jurisdiction to be exercised over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects.

2. The opinions of several officers of experience have been received and considered, and copy of a note recorded by Mr. Duthoit, D.C.L., Officiating Judicial Commissioner o Oudh, is forwarded for information.

3. The officers consulted are generally agreed that jurisdiction over European British subjects cannot any longer be withheld from native members of the Covenanted Civil Service as a class. They are unanimous in thinking that when a native member of the Service has risen to the position of a magistrate of a district or of a sessions judge, it is imperative that he should exercise over European British subjects the same jurisdiction as is exercised by European members of the Service who are magistrates of districts or judges. There is, however, some difference of opinion as to the circumstances under which the jurisdiction in question should be given to native members of the Civil Service who hold other offices than those above named. In the opinion of the majority of those consulted, it should be conferred on all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service who are possessed of the requisite judicial experience, and who have shown by their ability, judgment, and strength of character, that they are fitted to exercise it. The local government would exercise its discretion as to the individual native members of the Service upon whom the powers of a justice of the peace might be conferred. But the general statutory disability under which the native magistrates and judges now labour ought, they think, to be removed.

4. Sir Alfred Lyall's views on the subject are briefly these. No European officer is appointed to be a justice of the peace, or magistrate of a district, or sessions judge, until he has been found to be, by experience and character, fitted to exercise the powers and perform the duties which are attached to these offices. During the period that ordinarily elapses before any officer can attain to the position of magistrate of a district or judge, or is appointed to be a justice of the peace, ample opportunities are afforded of forming an opinion as to his qualifications for the offices in question; and he is not appointed to them if he has shown himself to be unfit to perform the duties and exercise the powers belonging to them. The interests of the European British subject and of the administration would, in Sir Alfred Lyall's opinion, be sufficiently provided for, if the general restriction, under which no one who is not himself an European British subject has jurisdiction over an European British subject, being removed, power be left with the local government to appoint as justices of the peace those native members of the Covenanted Civil Service who have proved their fitness to exercise the jurisdiction. The local government would then apply the test of personal fitness to each particular case for native as well as for European members of the Covenanted Civil Service.

5. On general principles of justice it must, Sir Alfred Lyall thinks, be admitted that the existing class differences between European and native members of the same service should be as far as possible removed. But so long as the special jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and the special procedure for the trial of European British subjects, are retained in our laws (and the Lieutenant-Governor would not have them withdrawn hastily, or upon a side issue), it is reasonable and consistent to look specially to the qualifications of officers who are to use these exceptional powers. In these Provinces there has not yet been an opportunity to form any very decided opinion about the character and qualifications of the native members of the Service; and the time is still distant when it will be necessary to apply to the native civilians of these Provinces the test of personal fitness for the charge of a district, or for the post of sessions judge. On general grounds however Sir Alfred Lyall considers that the influences which are now brought to bear on natives in the position of members of the Civil Service—influences arising from education and professional training, and from the responsibility that must necessarily fall upon them when placed on a level, and brought into comparison, with European officers—are rapidly rendering them as a class capable of exercising impartially the jurisdiction and judicial powers which are ordinarily exercised by European members of the Service.

6. It must, Sir Alfred Lyall thinks, be admitted that an officer who is appointed to be a district magistrate, should have jurisdiction over European British subjects. Inconveniences of various kinds would result if this jurisdiction were not enjoyed by every district magistrate. A native covenanted civilian, therefore, who is appointed to the charge of a district, ought to exercise this jurisdiction; for a native civilian, who may not be entrusted with the powers of a justice of the peace, is hardly fit to hold charge of a district. And if he as magistrate of a district may be trusted to exercise the powers of a justice of the peace, he should retain them when, his charge of a district being temporary, he reverts to a subordinate post. For it would be unreasonable to let a restriction, in regard to the exercise of jurisdiction over European British subjects, operate so as to bring about the anomalous result that an officer, though considered fit to exercise certain powers when officiating as district magistrate, is considered unfit to exercise them when he reverts to his former appointment.

7. Sir Alfred Lyall would therefore recommend that the Code of Criminal Procedure be so amended as to allow effect to be given to the views above expressed. Act II. of 1869 has now been repealed, but section 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (X. of 1882) forbids the local government to appoint any persons except European British subjects to be justices of the peace beyond the Presidency towns. It would be necessary therefore to amend the section in such a manner as to allow local governments to appoint native members of the Covenanted Service to be justices of the peace. It would be necessary in section 443 of the same Code to omit the words "and an European British subject;" in section 444 to omit all reference to European British subjects; and to repeal section 450. These amendments would enable the local government to carry out the views above expressed, whenever occasion might arise. In short, although the Lieutenant-Governor would not, for the present, advise that a native covenanted civilian should be invested (save in very special cases) with the powers of a justice of the peace until he has been appointed, temporarily or permanently, to be magistrate of a district, he would confer the powers of justice of the peace on every native officer, whether a member of the Covenanted Civil Service or a commissioned

civil officer in a non-regulation Province, who may be appointed to be a magistrate of a district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. Reid,
Officiating Secretary to Government,
N.W. Provinces and Oudh.

Note by W. Duthoit, Esq., Officiating Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, dated Lucknow, the 19th May 1882.

There are, I suppose, two arguments in favour of restraining natives of India from the exercise of jurisdiction in criminal trials over Europeans:—

I. That, say what we may, the European is the dominant race in India, and as such is entitled to have its feelings considered and its prestige maintained.

II. That it is doubtful whether, in the exercise of jurisdiction over Europeans, the native judiciary would not be influenced by race prejudices.

There is, I think, much force in both these arguments.

As regards the former, I would remark that, go where we may in the East, we find that a claim to be judged by their peers is successfully asserted wherever Europeans are located in any numbers; and that there is much point in Mr. Fitzjames Stephens' remark (Supplement, "Gazette of India," 4th May, 1872, page 577)—"There is no country in "the world and no race of men in the world from whom a claim to absolute identity of "law for persons of all races and all habits comes with so bad a grace as from the natives "of this country, filled as it is with every distinction which race, caste, and religion can "create, and passionately tenacious as are its inhabitants of such distinctions." But the time has, I think, come when these considerations may wisely be disregarded; and I would not advocate the restriction of the powers of native covenanted civilians upon an argument based upon mere sentiment. We have taken the native into our most important governing body; let us treat him loyally, and, as far as may be, trust him.

In the latter of the two arguments, however, I find a valid reason for not placing our native brothers quite on the same platform with ourselves.

As Mr. Gupta has pointed out, we have now two classes of covenanted civilians, the men who have entered the service by competition in England, and the men who have been appointed to it by the Viceroy in India.

These two classes of men must, I think, be treated differently.

The men of the former class will, from the circumstances of the case, be men who have in their own persons overcome the caste and religious prejudices into which they were born, and who are more or less *au courant* with European feelings and customs. Those of the latter class, on the contrary, may often be men saturated with caste and religious prejudices, and ignorant of European modes of thought and feeling. In his own person a man of the former class is likely to be as impartial a judge as his European brother, and to influence from outside he would probably be almost equally inaccessible. But can we, for a long time at any rate, look for the same impartiality, the same inaccessibility to outside influences, in the latter class of men? I think not. We must not, I think, expect for some time to come to find in the latter class of men officers of higher intellectual capacity or greater strength of character than we have at present in our native uncovenanted and honorary magistrates of good family. I do not know what officers of the last mentioned classes may be like in other parts of India; but I am certain that in these Provinces they are not men who can be fully trusted to do even-handed justice as between their own countrymen of different religions, or between their own countrymen and Europeans. When I say this, I do not mean that they would be likely as a rule to press hardly upon the European; I think, on the contrary, that they would as a rule unduly favour the European; all that I mean is that from my experience of them I could not always trust them to hold the scales fairly. It is apt to be assumed that native civilians will make good judges. I take leave to doubt whether more than a small minority of the men appointed for some years to come by the Governor-General will ever be fit for judicial employment.

Things being so, I would make a distinction between the two classes of native civilians.

I would make it the rule, in default of special cause to the contrary, to appoint men of the former class (the men appointed in England by the Secretary of State) to be justices

of the peace under Act II. of 1869. I would only appoint men of the latter class (the men appointed in India by the Viceroy) to be justices of the peace after it had been fully ascertained that they are men fitted by strength of character and judicial ability to exercise high judicial functions.

Assuming the appointment of native civilians as justices of the peace to be restricted as above, I would meet the difficulty by omitting the words "and an European British subject" from between the words "first class" and the words "shall inquire" in section 443 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure; by substituting for the words "himself is an European British subject" in section 444 the words "is a justice of the peace;" and by substituting for the words "an European British subject" in section 450 the words "a justice of the peace."

It will perhaps be objected to this proposal that it interferes with the theory upon which the system of appointment of native covenanted civilians of the Viceroy, viz., that they should be treated in all respects as the civilians sent out from England, is based. The objection is valid; but I would reply that as a fact the men appointed in India do not all of them come up to the standard of excellence which was propounded for them, and that the adoption of the proposal will not require an invidious distinction to be publicly made, but merely the laying down of a rule of practice to be privately observed by the Government of India and the local governments.

No. 703, dated Lahore, 5th August 1882.

From W. M. Young, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

I am directed to acknowledge your letter No. 7—589, dated 28th April 1882, forwarding, for an expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, a copy of a letter from the Government of Bengal, recommending that all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved from such restrictions of their jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns, as are imposed by Chapter 33 of Act X. of 1882, or that at least native covenanted civilians, who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge, should be entrusted with full powers over all classes of persons, European or native, within their jurisdiction.

2. In reply I am to say that Sir Charles Aitchison entirely concurs in the arguments quoted in the enclosures of your letter, from the proceedings of the Legislative Council of 16th April 1872, and has little to add to them. His Honour considers that native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved from all restrictions and disqualifications imposed upon them under Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, Act X. of 1882, by reason only of their not being European British subjects; and that such of them as may be from time to time appointed justices of the peace and magistrates of the first class, or sessions judges, should be authorised by law to exercise all the powers and jurisdiction which a European British subject similarly appointed can exercise under that or any other Act.

3. Sir Charles Aitchison moreover is of opinion that the same powers ought to be conferred upon all justices of the peace, and first class magistrates, and upon all sessions judges, whether they are European or native, and whether they belong to the Covenanted Civil Service or not. The powers and jurisdiction to be exercised by judicial officers should, his Honour thinks, depend entirely upon personal fitness, and in no respect upon race or service distinctions. It may be assumed that no one of any class will be appointed a justice of the peace or magistrate of the first class or sessions judge, who is not considered to possess the requisite qualifications, and the appointment ought, therefore, to carry with it all the usual powers and jurisdiction without regard to race, service, or creed. Under Act II. of 1869, any British* subject, whether European or native, and whether belonging to the Covenanted Civil Service or not, may be made a justice of the peace, if he is considered properly qualified to act as such, and under section 5 of the Act every such justice of the peace has power to commit European British subjects for trial before a proper court, and to do all other acts which any justice of the peace may lawfully do, and this appears to Sir Charles Aitchison to be the broad and equitable principle which Government ought to follow. The restrictions introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure upon the powers of courts to inquire into and try charges against

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* No. British subject there means European British subject.

European British subjects, which rest exclusively on race distictions, are, in his Honour's opinion, invidious and unnecessary. They are indeed a mere residuum of the time when Europeans where to a great extent under English law, with which native judges were not supposed to be acquainted, and should now be entirely abolished, having ceased to be defensible with the revision of the Codes.

No. 1694–86, dated 15th May 1882.

From A. H. L. Fraser, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 7–590, dated 28th ultimo., regarding the position of native members of the Covenanted Civil Service under those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limit the jurisdiction to be exercised over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects. The Chief Commissioner is of opinion that native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be placed in this respect on the same footing as European members of the same Service, and should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure.

No. 360, dated Rangoon, 11th May 1882.

From E. S. Symes, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 7–59, dated the 28th April, concerning the investiture of native civil servants with power to try European British subjects within their jurisdictions.

I am to submit that, in the Chief Commissioner's opinion, it is desirable that native civil servants should possess the same jurisdiction over European British subjects as is exercised by European civil servants. Native civil servants are and will usually be quite fit to exercise such jurisdiction.

European British subjects are liable to the jurisdiction of Asiatics in Upper Burma; and the Chief Commissioner does not apprehend that there would be any prolonged feeling against the change advocated by the Bengal Government among the better classes of Europeans in India.

(Confidential.)

No. 764, dated Shillong, the 26th May 1882.

From C. J. Lyall, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential circular No. 539T., dated the 28th ultimo, in which you ask for the opinion of the Chief Commissioner on the proposals made by his Honour the late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, that all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, or that at least native covenanted civilians who have attained the position of district magistrate and sessions judge should be entrusted with full powers over all classes of persons, European or native, within their jurisdictions.

2. In reply, I am to say that if the proposal had been to do away altogether with the distinction between European and native magistrates in this respect, Mr. Elliott would not have supported it. The distinction is, no doubt, open to the charge of being invidious, and rests to a large extent rather upon sentiment and prejudice than upon reason. But that such prejudice did exist in great strength some years ago is notorious; and now

that the feeling has somewhat died out, the measures taken for introducing equality between the races should be gradual and tentative, in order to run no risk of reawakening the antagonism which is passing away. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that besides the strong disinclination which would undoubtedly be felt by European British subjects in India to being made subject generally to the jurisdiction of native judges and magistrates there are several practical reasons against that course which are not without great weight. An extensive conferment of these powers on native magistrates would involve the trial by them of Europeans in parts of the country where neither our police nor our jails are suited for dealing with such persons. The appearance of Europeans in court before a native magistrate, surrounded by native amla, and guarded by native police, accustomed only to deal with the generally tractable and (in the face of justice) submissive members of their own race, might easily lead to scandals in the administration of justice, which would be very regretable, and which would, Mr. Elliott fears, by the excitement and agitation which they would create, lead to exacerbation and strengthening of that popular prejudice and race antagonism, which it has taken a long course of years to soften and abate.

3. But while these considerations, in the Chief Commissioner's opinion, should forbid any extensive conferment of jurisdiction over Europeans upon native judicial officers at present, he is quite at one with Sir Ashley Eden in regard to the limited proposal now put forward. He thinks that there is room and reason for a distinction between native civilians appointed in England by competition, and those native members of the Covenanted Service who have been appointed by nomination in India. The former class should, in his opinion, be placed in every respect on an equality with their British-born brothers in the Service, and permitted, like them, if appointed justices of the peace, to deal with cases in which Europeans are accused. In the case of native civilians appointed in India, who have not had their experience enlarged and their education broadened by a visit to Europe, he would confine the extension of these powers to such of them as have attained the grade of district magistrate or sessions judge, and have also been appointed justices of the peace.

4. The Chief Commissioner does not think that this slight progress in the direction of equality is likely to excite any serious opposition on the part of the European community. The feeling which 10 years ago it would have encountered is, he believes, gradually dying out; and the experience which is being acquired of the efficiency with which native officers administer justice is by degrees undermining it. The extension of native agency in the public service, and the increase of the influence of the native voice in all political matters, are palpable facts, and the European settler is learning that he must reconcile himself to the march of events, and accept the inevitable.

No. 315–17, dated Bangalore, the 16th May 1882.

From Major H. Wylie, C.S.I., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Coorg, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

With reference to your letter No. 7–592, dated the 28th ultimo, inviting the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of Coorg, regarding native members of the Civil Service exercising jurisdiction over European British subjects, I am directed to state, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, that Mr. Sandford is of opinion that the provisions of the present law of Criminal Procedure, which limit jurisdiction to try for criminal offences European British subjects, to persons who are themselves European British subjects, are wise, and should, for political reasons, be maintained.

No. 345, dated Hyderabad Residency, 24th August 1882.

From W. B. Jones, Esq., B.C.S., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

Replying to your Circular No. 3–594 of 28th April last, I have the honour to submit, in original, a letter in which the Commissioner, Hyderabad assigned districts, discusses the matter there referred. The Judicial Commissioner, who was also consulted,

is of opinion that "the time may be considered to have arrived for extending to natives "who have qualified for the Civil Service, and who have attained the position of district "magistrate, or of sessions judge and justice of the peace, jurisdiction over European "British subjects."

2. My own opinion is that such jurisdiction should be exercised by—

(1.) All native members of the Civil Service who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge;

(2.) By such other native members of the Civil Service as the local government may specially empower in this behalf.

3. It is scarcely necessary for me to state in detail the reasons which induce me to give my opinion in favour of the small relaxation of the present law which his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal suggests. The principle that a European British subject shall only be tried by one of his own class has the sanction of a long history behind it. I certainly should not be disposed to rest a recommendation for a departure from it on consideration of mere administrative convenience. All that can be said is that the reasons by which the general principle might be defended have, from the days when it was first asserted, until now, been gradually getting weaker, and that the reasons for the particular departure from the principle now proposed are the novel results of the altered circumstances of the Civil Service and of India generally, and that, to use the Judicial Commissioner's expression "the time has come" when the change ought to be made. It will be a small change in itself, but it will be an act of justice to those natives of India whom we invite to take their places by our side as civil administrators, and will add on to the numerous measures which of late years have tended to bridge over the separation between Englishmen and their Indian fellow subjects, which began when, assuming the Dewani of Bengal, we constituted ourselves the sole civil administrators of the country.

4. I will only add that, while the proposed change appears to me to be demanded of us as a measure of justice to native members of the Civil Service, and of reasonable concession to general native opinion, I cannot believe that it can be regarded by intelligent Europeans with serious dislike. In days when the interior of India was reached with difficulty, when no press, railways, telegraphs, or bar existed, when native magistrates were untrained and unacquainted with European habits and feelings, an Englishman almost alone in an up-country district, might, with reason, apprehend that he would not always obtain an impartial trial before a native magistrate. All this is now changed, and a claim which was formerly grounded in a reasonable apprehension can, it seems to me, when concession is limited, as it is proposed to limit it, rest on little besides unreasonable class prejudice.

No. 32A, dated Chiculda, 1st June 1882.

From A. P. Howell, Esq., Commissioner, Hyderabad Assigned Districts, to the Secretary for Berar to the Resident at Hyderabad.

I have the honour to acknowledge your No. 319J of the 8th instant, forwarding, for opinion, a letter from the Government of Bengal, with enclosure, relative to the jurisdiction to be exercised by native members of the Covenanted Civil Service over European British subjects.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that the time has now arrived when all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed on them by Chapter XXXIII. of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, or when "at least native covenanted civilians, who have attained "the position of district magistrate or sessions judge, should have entrusted to them full "powers over all classes, whether European or native, within their jurisdictions." The grounds of this opinion are (1) that it is right, as a matter of general policy, that covenanted native civilians should be empowered to exercise jurisdiction over Europeans as well as natives; and (2) that it will be a matter of administrative convenience for natives to exercise such powers, otherwise the anomaly might occur of a European joint magistrate, who is subordinate to a native district magistrate or sessions judge, being empowered to try cases which his immediate superior cannot try. It is added that as native Presidency magistrates within the Presidency towns exercise the same jurisdiction

over Europeans that they do over natives, therefore there is no reason why covenanted native civilians, with the position and training of district magistrate or sessions judge, should not exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans as is exercised by other members of the Service. These views are expressed upon a note by Mr. Gupta, of the Bengal Civil Service, representing the anomalous position in which native members of the Covenanted Civil Service are placed by Chapter VII. of the old Code, which is reproduced in Chapter XXXIII. of the present Code.

3. The first point that occurs to me is, that the case is, unintentionally no doubt, very unfairly and incompletely stated by Mr. Gupta. He refers to the discussion of 1872, and says that nothing can be added to the eloquence or the sound reasoning of those who argued then in favour of the view which he advances now. He adds that the arguments of 1872 in favour of his view present themselves with redoubled force in 1882, and that "they are too obvious to require mention." Still he does mention them, and at length, in skilfully arranged "extracts for ready reference," and then he gives a reason, due to a recent but "important change" in the constitution of the Covenanted Civil Service, why there is admittedly less force in those arguments now than there was 10 years ago.

4. To this I reply that if the arguments in favour of Mr. Gupta's view are all that they are represented to be, how is it that they were in the minority in 1872? Mr. Gupta attempts to make a point in the composition of that minority, but when I find Sir J. Stephen and Sir John Strachey voting on the same side, and that side the majority, it is idle to say that the arguments against which they voted are "too obvious to require mention." Mr. Gupta cites the authority of the late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (Sir George Campbell), who voted with the minority, but Mr. Gupta fails to notice in his extract, or even allude to Sir George Campbell's admission, that he seldom had greater doubt and difficulty in making up his mind, and that when he did vote for the amendment, it was on the express ground that "it appeared to his Honour that what "was now proposed was a minimum of change. It was not proposed to impose upon "the European public the general liability to be tried by native magistrates, but only "the possibility of being placed under the jurisdiction of three or four natives who had "qualified themselves for admission into the ranks of the Covenanted Civil Service, and "who, under the existing law, might be 'justices of the peace.'" What then was Sir J. Stephen's argument? I give it, as Mr. Gupta gives the opposite views, in extracts: "In countries situated as most European countries are, it is no doubt desirable that "there should be no personal laws; but in India it is otherwise. Personal, as opposed "to territorial, laws, prevail here on all sorts of subjects, and their maintenance is claimed "with the utmost pertinacity by those who are subject to them. The Muhammadan has "his personal law. The Hindu has his personal law. Women, who according "to the custom of the country, ought not to appear in court, are excused from "appearing in court. Natives of rank and influence enjoy, in many cases, "privileges which stand on precisely the same principle; and are English people "to be told that, whilst it is their duty to respect all these laws scrupulously, they are to "claim nothing for themselves? that whilst English courts are to respect, and even to "enforce, a variety of laws which are thoroughly repugnant to all the strongest convictions "of Englishmen, Englishmen who settle in this country are to surrender privileges to "which, rightly or otherwise, they attach the highest possible importance? I can see no "ground or reason for such a contention. I think there is no country in the world, and "no race of men in the world, from whom a claim for absolute identity of law for persons "of all races and all habits comes with so bad a grace as from the natives of this country, "filled as it is with every distinction which race, caste, and religion can create, and "passionately tenacious as are its inhabitants of such distinctions.

"It may be replied that to use this argument is to desert the characteristic principles "of English Government, and to make a point against an antagonist by surrendering what "we ourselves believe. My answer is, that the general principle that all persons should "be subject to the same laws is subject to wide exceptions, one of which covers this case. "It is obvious enough; but possibly the best way of stating it will be to show how it "applies to the particular matter before us. The English people established by military "force a regular system of government, and, in particular, a regular system for the "administration of justice, in this country, in the place of downright anarchy. The "system for administering justice was, and is, beyond all question, infinitely better than "any system which the English people found here; but it neither is, nor can be, the "English system.

"It must of necessity differ from it in its characteristic features; and although I am "not one of those who blindly admire the English system of criminal justice, I say that, if "English people in India like it, which they notoriously do, they have a perfect right to "have it."

Again:—"The privilege as to jurisdiction is the privilege of the prisoner not the "privilege of the judge. The European had an objection to be tried by the native. "Considering the position in which he stood, the question was whether you would put him in "a position in which he did not at present stand. You placed no slight upon the native by "saying that he could only try a man of his own race. What was there against the feelings "of the native in saying that? Why should any one feel a slight, because he was told "that this particular man was to be tried in a particular way? On the other hand, it was "a feeling, and not an unnatural one, that a man should wish to be tried by his own "countrymen."

I think Mr. Gupta would have strengthened his case had he explained what is the answer now to Sir J. Stephen's arguments which commanded a majority ten years ago. Logically it would seem that as long as we have personal law in this country, as long as women and privileged natives are excused from appearing in our courts, as long as the European British subject has any rights and privileges under the law, so long should the present law, as to the judge before whom the European British subject must be tried, be maintained. I submit that when a European discusses the question he is exposed to the converse difficulty of that urged by Mr. Gupta, on the score of being personally interested, and that he is likely to be deceived by the false glamour of liberality attaching to his adoption of Mr. Gupta's view, which ought not, however, to obscure the real issue whether, under the circumstances of India, the European British subject should be deprived of the one privilege of personal law which he most values. The question is by no means so obvious as Mr. Gupta represents. I believe that the majority of non-official Europeans would answer it still as Sir H. Norman did. "He "had the highest regard for the natives of the country, and particularly for those who "had attained the very important position of a magistrate of the first class, but looking to "the peculiarities of our position here, and to the great differences of character between "natives and Europeans, he thought it was undesirable to allow the trial of European "British subjects by natives in the mofussil."

5. As to the arguments urged by the Government of Bengal, the first simply and admittedly begs the whole question on which Sir J. Stephen and Sir H. Norman took their stand. As for the second argument, based on administrative convenience, the question is how often would such cases be likely to arise, and whether, if they did, the inconvenience would be so frequent, or of such consequence as to supply an answer to the arguments of Sir J. Stephens and Sir H. Norman, which, I submit, are just as strong now as ever they were. In any case the plea of anomaly has far less force in India than elsewhere. Surely, too, it might be argued that natives and Europeans are not on the same footing in fact, in many ways, and that the law recognises this fact; that there must be some differences in the position of the European British subject from that of the native, and that the law recognises these differences; and that the nationality of the judge is no more invidious or special than the composition of the jury.

6. In conclusion then, if I am asked for an opinion about a clause in a Law which, although only just passed, and not yet actually in force, is considered by a high authority already to require to be amended in an important particular, I would admit that there is enough force in the plea urged by Mr. Gupta, and supported by the Bengal Government, to warrant a reconsideration of the question decided in the Legislative Council on the 4th May 1872. I go further and think that the point should be raised and discussed now, because in 1872 many of the speakers were hampered by pledges or *quasi* pledges which prevented the question being really decided on its merits. And as to the merits of the question, I would say that it is no doubt desirable that there should be no personal laws, but that, in my humble opinion, the whole question of personal law should be considered together, and not the single point raised by Mr. Gupta. And, if the question be raised, the decision should be final, for we cannot always expect the same serenity in the political horizon which we enjoy at present.

I append the replies of the Deputy Commissioners of Buldana and Amraoti, who were consulted on the subject.

In my opinion the time has certainly come when native members of the Civil Service who have been made district magistrates or sessions judges should be entrusted with full powers over all classes, European or native, within their jurisdiction.

B. Bulloch,
Deputy Commissioner.

Amraoti, 27th May 1882.

I am of opinion that the invidious distinction should be abolished, or that an understanding should be arrived at under which native members of the Covenanted Civil Service would be held to be disqualified for office as sessions judges or magistrates of the district. I quite agree with Mr. Gupta that if you entrust them with these responsible offices you ought not to cripple their powers.

There is, however, no force in so much of the argument as is based on the fact that native Presidency magistrates and High Court judges already have jurisdiction over Europeans. They are exposed to a publicity that renders their position exceptional. Mr. Gupta himself seems inclined to make distinction between native covenanted civilians who have been trained in England and those who have not, and I think he does so rightly. I am therefore inclined to believe that the latter class of civilians should not hold office as sessions judges or magistrates of districts. In other words, I would make the experiment under restricted conditions, and confine the exercise of jurisdiction over Europeans to native civilians who have been trained in England.

H. C. Menzies, Lieut.-Col.,
Deputy Commissioner.

Buldana, 29th May 1882.

To his Excellency the Most Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA in Council.

(Judicial, No. 33.)

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, December 7, 1882.

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Despatch, No. 33, dated the 9th of September last, on the subject of the position of native members of the Covenanted Civil Service under those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limit the jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects also.

2. Your Lordship in Council considers (for the reasons stated in your Despatch) that no change in the law will be satisfactory or stable which fails to remove from the statute book at once and completely every judicial disqualification which is based merely on race distinctions, and you propose to confine the office of justice of the peace, and with it the power of trying European British subjects, to those persons, whether European or native, who have received a training that may be presumed to guarantee the possession of the qualities required for the proper disposal of such cases. In that view you think that all district magistrates and sessions judges should be vested with the powers in question in virtue of their office, and by a definite provision in the law; and you would empower the local governments to confer these powers, outside the Presidency towns, upon those members (*a*) of the Covenanted Civil Service, (*b*) of the Native Civil Service constituted under the Statutory Rules, and (*c*) of the Non-Regulation Commissions, who are already exercising first-class magisterial powers, and are, in their opinion, fit to be entrusted with these further powers. These proposals, if carried out, would completely remove from the law all distinctions based merely on the race of the judge, and your Excellency in Council asks me to sanction the introduction of a Bill to give effect to them.

3. Your Lordship's Despatch, and the opinions recorded by the various local governments and authorities whom you have consulted, have been very carefully considered by me in Council, and I agree in the conclusion arrived at by your Excellency that the time has come when it is necessary to make the alterations in the law which you propose. I am therefore prepared to sanction the introduction of a Bill such as you suggest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

Copy Telegram from Viceroy, Calcutta. (Dated 14th February 1883.)

With reference to correspondence ending with Lord Hartington's Despatch, No. 33, judicial of 7th December last, we have introduced into the Governor-General's Council a Bill to amend the Criminal Code Procedure Bill.

Section 1 amends section 22 of the Code, and makes the following persons, being magistrates of the first class, eligible for the office of justice of the peace; viz., cove-

nanted civilians, members of the Native Civil Service constituted under statutory rules, assistant commissioners in non-regulation provinces, and cantonment magistrates.

Section 2 makes sessions judges and district magistrates *ex-officio* justices of the peace.

Section 3 repeals in section 443 of the Code, the words, "and in European British subjects."

Section 4 repeals the provision in section 444 of the Code barring jurisdiction over European British subjects, of a judge not being an European British subject.

Section 5 repeals section 450 of the Code, and the last sixteen words of section 459 of the Code.

(In) rest of the Bill formal right to mixed jury, and to summary application for release, and all other safeguards under Chapter 33 preserved.

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For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

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FURTHER

CORRESPONDENCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF

THE PROPOSED ALTERATION OF THE PROVISIONS

OF

The Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to Jurisdiction over European British Subjects.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1883.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE E. B. EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1883.

[C.—3545.] *Price* 1½*d.*

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

No. 6 of 1883.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.—LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

To the Right Honourable the EARL OF KIMBERLEY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD, Fort William, the 13th February 1883.

WE have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the Bill noted in the margin, which was introduced into the Council of the Governor-General on the 9th instant.

A Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, so far as it relates to the exercise of jurisdiction over European British subjects.

2. A copy of the statement of objects and reasons and of the abstracts of proceedings of the meetings of the Council on the 2nd and 9th instant also accompany.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RIPON.
D. M. STEWART.
J. GIBBS.
E. BARING.
T. F. WILSON.
C. P. ILBERT.
S. C. BAYLEY.
T. C. HOPE.

A BILL to AMEND the CODE of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1882, so far as it relates to the exercise of JURISDICTION over EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.

WHEREAS it is expedient to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, so far as it relates to the exercise of jurisdiction over European British subjects: It is hereby enacted as follows:— Preamble. X. of 1882.

1. For the last clause of section 22, the following shall be substituted:— Amendment of section 22.

"may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint such persons as he or it thinks fit, who, being

(*a*) members of the Covenanted Civil Service,
(*b*) members of the native Civil Service constituted under the Statute 33 Vict. cap. 3,
(*c*) assistant commissioners in non-regulation provinces, or
(*d*) cantonment magistrates,

are invested with the powers of a magistrate of the first class, to be justices of the peace within and for the territories mentioned in the notification."

2. In section 25, after the words "British India" the following shall be inserted:— Amendment of section 25.

"sessions judges and district magistrates are justices of the peace within and for the whole of the territories administered by the Local Government under which they are serving."

3. In section 443, the words "and an European British subject" shall be omitted. Amendment of section 443.

4. For section 444, the following shall be substituted:— New section substituted for section 444.

"444. An assistant sessions judge shall not exercise jurisdiction over an European British subject, unless he has held the office of assistant sessions judge for at least three years, and has been specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government." Assistant sessions judges who may try European British subjects.

5. Section 450 and the last sixteen words of section 459 are hereby repealed. Repeal of section 450 and of the last sixteen words of section 451.

6. (*1*) In this Act "section" means section of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. Construction of Act with Code of Criminal Procedure. X. of 1882.

(*2*) All references to that code made in enactments heretofore passed or hereafter to be passed shall be read as if made to that Code as amended by this Act.

7. Nothing in this Act shall affect the validity of any appointment made before the passing of this Act. Saving for existing appointments.

Statement of Objects and Reasons.

Shortly after the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act X. of 1882, was passed, the question was raised whether the provisions of that Code which limit the jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects should not be modified. It was thought anomalous that, while natives of India were admitted to the Covenanted Civil Service and held competent to discharge the highest judicial duties, they should be deemed incompetent to be justices of the peace and to exercise jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns.

2. After consulting the local Governments, the Government of India has arrived at the conclusion that the time has come for modifying the existing law and removing the present bar upon the investment of native magistrates in the interior with powers over European British subjects. The Government of India has accordingly decided to settle the question of jurisdiction over European British subjects in such a way as to remove from the Code, at once and completely, every judicial disqualification which is based merely on race distinctions.

3. With this object the present Bill has been prepared. In section one it amends section 22 of the Code, which provides that only European British subjects can be appointed justices of the peace, and gives the Government power to appoint to that office such persons as it thinks fit belonging to the following classes:—

(*a.*) Members of the Covenanted Civil Service;
(*b.*) Members of the Native Civil Service constituted by the rules made under the Statute 33 Vic., cap. 3;
(*c.*) Assistant Commissioners in Non-Regulation Provinces; or
(*d.*) Cantonment magistrates,

and being persons invested with the powers of a magistrate of the first class.

4. The Bill then in section two amends section 25 of the Code, and makes all sessions Judges and district magistrates *ex officio* justices of peace.

5. Section three repeals so much of section 443 of the Code as limits jurisdiction over European British subjects outside the Presidency towns to magistrates who are themselves European British subjects.

6. Section four repeals the similar provision of section 444 of the Code with regard to sessions judges.

7. Lastly, section five repeals section 450 of the Code, which provides for the case where the sessions judge of the division within which the offence is ordinarily triable is not an European British subject. The same section of the Bill also repeals so much of section 459 of the Code as provides that that section shall not be deemed to confer on magistrates and sessions judges outside the Presidency towns, not being European British subjects, jurisdiction over European British subjects.

The 30th January 1883. C. P. Ilbert.

Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India, assembled for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations under the provisions of the Act of Parliament 24 & 25 Vict., cap. 67.

The Council met at Government House on Friday, the 2nd February 1883.

Present:

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, K.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., presiding.
His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, C.S.I., C.I.E.
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, G.C.B., C.I.E.
The Honourable J. Gibbs, C.S.I., C.I.E.
Major the Honourable E. Baring, R.A., C.S.I., C.I.E.
Lieutenant-General the Honourable T. F. Wilson, C.B., C.I.E.
The Honourable C. P. Ilbert, C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir S. C. Bayley, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.

The Honourable T. C. Hope, C.S.I., C.I.E.
The Honourable Mahárájá Sir Jotíndra Mohan Tagore Bahádur, K.C.S.I.
The Honourable C. H. T. Crosthwaite.
The Honourable Rájá Siva Prasád, C.S.I.
The Honourable W. W. Hunter, LL.D., C.I.E.
The Honourable Durgá Charan Láhá.
The Honourable H. J. Reynolds.
The Honourable H. S. Thomas.
The Honourable G. H. P. Evans.
The Honourable R. Miller.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, Amendment Bill.

The Honourable Mr. Ilbert moved for leave to introduce a Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, so far as it relates to the exercise of jurisdiction over European British subjects. He said :—The effect of the existing law on this subject is summed up in a section of the new Criminal Procedure Code (443), which directs that—

"'No magistrate, unless he is a justice of the peace, and (except in the case of a Presidency magistrate) unless he is a magistrate of the first class and an European British subject, shall inquire into or try any charge against an European British subject.'

"Now, there is no restriction on the nationality of a Presidency magistrate; natives of India may hold, and have held, that office. The result of the law, therefore, is that, within the limits of the Presidency towns, jurisdiction over European British subjects may be exercised by any person who happens to be a Presidency magistrate, whether he is a European British subject or not; but that, outside these limits, in any part of the mufassal, that jurisdiction cannot be exercised by any of Her Majesty's magistrates, however complete may have been his training—however long may have been his judicial experience—however high may be his rank in the service—unless he happens to be a European British subject.

"Such is the existing law, and it was settled in this form in the year 1872, after a very remarkable debate, which resulted in a very remarkable division. The Select Committee on the Bill, which afterwards became law as the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872, had adopted a resolution in which they recorded their opinion 'that the jurisdiction of 'magistrates and sessions judges who are justices of the peace might with advantage be 'extended in the case of European British subjects.' It will be observed that there was nothing in the resolution which implied that the exercise of this jurisdiction in future was to be confined to persons who are themselves European British subjects. Such a limitation was, however, inserted in the Bill as finally settled by the Committee; but when it was brought before the Legislative Council, Sir Barrow Ellis (I shall take the liberty of referring to him and others by the titles which they now bear) moved an amendment which would have had the effect of striking out the limitation. It would appear that the limitation to which he objected had in fact been introduced in pursuance of some kind of bargain or compromise between members of the Committee holding different opinions on the subject. Repeated references were made in the course of the debate to the existence of this compromise. Thus, Mr. Chapman, whilst expressing his agreement with much that had fallen from Sir Barrow Ellis, said that he felt himself unable to support the amendment for the very plain and conclusive reason that he, as member of the Select Committee, considered himself bound to adhere to the pledge he had given to the European community, that under the altered law, an Englishman should retain his privilege of being tried by an Englishman. Again, Mr. Inglis said that he did not intend to go into the question on its merits, as he considered that he was bound by the terms of the recommendation which he had signed with other members of the Committee. My eminent predecessor, Sir James Stephen, who was in charge of the Bill, declared in the most emphatic terms that he could not undertake to justify on principle the terms of a compromise. And Sir J. Strachey, who also supported the proposals, admitted that the provisions of the Bill represented a compromise which was open to criticism of every kind. The amendment moved by Sir Barrow Ellis was put to the vote, and was lost on a division by a majority of seven to five. But the minority on the division included the majority of the Executive Council. It consisted of the then Viceroy, Lord Napier of Murchistoun, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir G. Campbell, his immediate successor, Sir R. Temple, the then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, and Sir Barrow Ellis. Each of these distinguished members of the Government of India not only voted but spoke in support of Sir Barrow Ellis's

amendment and against the proposals that are embodied in the existing law. And I shall make no apology for quoting to day some of the arguments which they used, and some of the opinions which they expressed.

"Sir Barrow Ellis said that, in making the invidious distinction which was now proposed, if we excluded any justices of the peace from the exercise of certain powers, we were really casting a stigma on the whole educated native population of India. He might also urge that there would be considerable inconvenience in having such a distinction. But he preferred to put it on the broad ground that, if you had native Covenanted Civil servants, you ought not to bar them from exercising the powers of a Civil servant, among which powers is the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace over European British subjects. By Act II. of 1869 natives might be appointed justices of the peace, and on what ground, he would ask, was it proposed to restrict their powers as justices of the peace?

"Sir George Campbell was of opinion that the Council should adhere to the decision which had been come to by the passing of Act II. of 1869, namely, that a justice of the peace must be either a European British subject or a Covenanted Civil servant. To reopen that question, and to limit the powers that might be exercised by any justices who were Covenanted Civil servants, appeared to his Honour to be somewhat invidious, and would be, as it were, setting themselves against the policy hitherto pursued. Viewing the matter in that light, he should be inclined to vote for the motion before the Council.

"The Commander-in-Chief said that the native members of the Covenanted Civil Service having been to Europe, having become acquainted with European feelings, ideas and customs, and having qualified themselves to take their places with European members of the Civil Service, his Excellency would frankly accept them as real members of the Covenanted Civil Service, and allow them to exercise all the functions which the European members exercised.

"Lord Napier of Murchistoun said that his vote would be given in conformity with the opinion which had been expressed by the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency thought that the restriction would embody a stigma on the native community in general. It was equivalent to stating that, under no circumstances, as far as the administration of the law was concerned, could the native attain to that degree of impartiality and courage which would justify the Government in reposing in his hands the power of trying European British subjects. He thought that by the restriction we, in effect, said to the European: 'You are not to be tried in the mufassal by the agency by which 'you are tried in the High Courts and in the courts of the magistrates in the Presidency 'towns, with the general approval and sanction of the European and native communities.' It was saying, in effect, that the native who had attained to the position of a sessions judge was not competent to try a European British subject, but that he might try him when he became a judge of the High Court and sat beside a European judge. His Excellency could not but help thinking that there was practically no greater disparity in permitting these native Civil servants to try a European British subject, than in permitting native justices in the Presidency towns to try him. There appeared to his Excellency to be no such broad distinction whatever between the conditions of society and of public opinion in this respect between the Presidency towns and the mufassal. There were now a great number of public-spirited men and a great deal of public spirit all over the provinces. Communications by rail, the dissemination of newspapers both in English and the vernacular, and a great variety of other circumstances, had destroyed that distinction which formerly existed between the Presidency towns and the mufassal. His Excellency did not himself consider that there was the slightest possibility that, in the rare case of a civil and sessions judge trying a European British subject in the mufassal, there would be an abuse of justice.

"Sir Barrow Ellis said that he desired to add his testimony to the efficiency with which native magistrates had performed their duties in the Presidency towns, in the administration of justice to both Europeans and natives, and he had no hesitation in saying that they had performed their duties with as much credit and efficiency as the European magistrates. And, if they had done that, he saw no reason why natives in the position of Covenanted Civil servants or sessions judges should not be equally competent to administer justice to the European in the mufassal. His honourable friend Mr. Stephen had remarked that in this matter we were not to consult the feelings of the judge, but of those who were to be subjected to the jurisdiction. In answer to that, Mr. Ellis would say that he saw no reason why that which did not hurt the feelings of Europeans in the Presidency towns should hurt them in the mufassal.

"And finally, Sir Richard Temple said he thought that the inference was undeniable that, if the natives were eligible to all the great offices of the administration, it seemed improper and unreasonable to say that they should not sit as judges over Europeans in the mufassal for offences of the trivial nature over which it was proposed to give justices of the peace cognisance.

"However, as I have said, these views, though they commended themselves to the majority of the Executive Council, did not commend themselves to the majority of the legislature, and the amendment proposed by Sir Barrow Ellis was lost.

"It was not to be expected that a decision which avowedly proceeded on the terms of a compromise, and against which such a formidable weight of official authority was arrayed, should be accepted as a permanent settlement of the question. It has not been so accepted. Whenever proposals have been made for amending the Criminal Procedure Code, the attention of the Government has been directed to the anomalous position in which native members of the Covenanted Civil Service have been left by the legislation of 1872. In the early part of last year, Mr. Gupta, a native member of the Bengal Civil Service, submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal a note in which he pointed out that the existing law, if maintained, would give rise to an invidious distinction, and to very practical inconveniences in the case of those natives of the country who might expect in course of time to attain to the position of a district magistrate or of a sessions judge. I may add that the anomalous nature of the present arrangements could not be better illustrated than by Mr. Gupta's own case. He officiated for some time as presidency magistrate here in Calcutta, and, while so officiating, he had, under the law as it stands, full powers over European British subjects even in comparatively serious cases, and exercised those powers to the satisfaction of the local Government and the public. On his removal to a more responsible appointment in the interior, he ceased to be qualified to deal with even the most trivial cases affecting Europeans. Mr. Gupta's proposal was that the law should be amended by extending the jurisdiction over European British subjects to natives of this country holding the office of a district magistrate or of a sessions judge, and he suggested that the amendment might be made in the Bill which has since become law as the Criminal Procedure Code of 1882. However, that Bill had then nearly reached its final stage, and it was obvious that a question which was of such importance and difficulty, and about which it would be impossible to take action without consulting both local Governments and the Secretary of State, could not with propriety be raised at so late a stage of the discussion on the Bill. In this, as in other matters, the Government had, as was pointed out last year by my friend Major Baring, to choose between, on the one hand, passing the new Code, with the amendments which had been generally accepted,—amendments which were of considerable importance,—or, on the other hand, postponing the Code, with all its improvements of form and substance, until all possible amendments of the law had been got together and considered.

"Of these two courses, the Government adopted—and, I think it will be generally agreed, wisely adopted,—the latter taking care, however, to make it clear that, whilst re-enacting, for the purpose of consolidation, certain provisions of the existing law, they were not to be considered as expressing an opinion that these provisions might not with advantage be amended.

"This was Sir Ashley Eden's own view, and accordingly he postponed the submission of Mr. Gupta's note to the Government of India until the new Criminal Procedure Code had become law. But, when he did submit it, he accompanied it with a strong expression of opinion as to the expediency of altering the law in the direction indicated by Mr. Gupta. He remarked that, as a question of general policy, it seemed to him right that covenanted native civilians should be empowered to exercise jurisdiction over Europeans as well as over natives who are brought before them in their capacity as criminal judges. Now that native covenanted civilians might shortly be expected to hold the office of district magistrate or sessions judge, it was also, as a matter of administrative convenience, desirable that they should have the power to try all classes of persons brought before them. Moreover, if this power was not conferred upon native members of the Civil Service, the anomaly might be presented of a European joint magistrate who is subordinate to a native district magistrate or sessions judge being empowered to try cases which his immediate superior cannot try. Native presidency magistrates within the Presidency towns exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans that they do over natives, and there seems to be no sufficient reason why covenanted native civilians, with the position and training of district magistrate or sessions judge, should not exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans as is exercised by other members of the service.

"For these reasons, Sir Ashley Eden was of opinion that the time had arrived when all native members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed on them by Chapter XXXIII of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, or when at least native covenanted civilians who have attained the position of district magistrate or sessions judge should have entrusted to them full powers over all classes, whether European or native, within their jurisdiction.

"Before taking any further action in the matter, the Government of India considered it desirable to ascertain the views of local governments and administrations as to the expediency of the amendments suggested by Sir Ashley Eden; and accordingly they addressed a circular letter to the several local governments, inviting a confidential expression of opinion on those suggestions. The result was remarkable. There was an overwhelming consensus of opinion that some change in the law was required, and that the time had come for removing the present absolute bar on the investment of native magistrates in the interior with powers over European British subjects. As to the precise extent to which the law should be modified, there was, as might naturally be expected, some difference of opinion; but it was generally admitted that a native civilian in the position of a district magistrate or sessions judge should have equal powers with his European colleagues, and there was a very strong body of opinion that there should be no distinction made between native and European members of the Covenanted Civil Service at any step in respect of their judicial powers, provided that they were individually found qualified to exercise those powers.

"Under these circumstances, it has become abundantly clear that the existing law cannot be maintained, and the only question which we have to consider is not whether the law should be altered, but how it should be altered. In approaching this question there is one consideration of which we must not lose sight, and of which it is not likely that we should lose sight, and that is, that this is a subject with respect to which it is eminently undesirable to avoid constant tinkering of the law. The settlement arrived at in 1872 may not have been satisfactory,—I do not myself think that it was satisfactory,—but, such as it was, we should not be justified in reopening this difficult question unless we saw our way to a solution which should be, I will not say final—for nothing in legislation is absolutely final—but which should contain in itself the elements of stability and durability. Can we find any such solution? If we look the question fairly in the face, and endeavour to realise distinctly the object at which we ought to aim and the facts with which we have to deal, I think that we can. As to the object at which we ought to aim, there will be no difference of opinion. It is simply the effectual and impartial administration of justice. And as to the facts with which we have to deal, no one who has studied the statistics and reports of the cases involving charges against European British subjects can fail to be struck with two things—first, that, as compared with the great mass of ordinary criminal business, they are exceptionally rare, and secondly, that they are exceptionally troublesome and difficult. To what conclusion do these two peculiarities point? They appear to me to show that, in the interests of the effectual and impartial administration of justice, it is not necessary, and that, in the same interests, it is not desirable, to clothe all magistrates indiscriminately with the power of dealing with these cases. As we are justified in excluding from the jurisdiction of inferior magistrates as such the cognizance of the graver classes of offences, so we should be justified in excluding from their jurisdiction the cognizance of a class of offences the trial of which, from the circumstances under which they are ordinarily committed, presents features of exceptional difficulty. It involves no disrespect to the magisterial or judicial office to say that an officer who may be fully competent to dispose of a common case of theft or assault may not be competent to dispose of a class of cases which, as will be admitted by all impartial persons, are apt to put an exceptionally severe strain on the judicial qualities of tact, judgment, patience, and impartiality. We are, therefore, I conceive, fully justified, on principles of general applicability, in confining the jurisdiction exerciseable in this particular class of cases to a specified class of magistrates; and the further question which we have to determine is, how this class is to be defined. My answer is, that the line ought to be drawn with reference to the presumable fitness of the magistrate, and with reference to that alone, and that we ought not to base any difference which we may think fit to make between particular classes of magistrates on race distinctions, which are as invidious as they are unnecessary.

"These are the principles by which we have been guided in framing the proposals which I am now asking leave to lay before the Council. We are of opinion that the time has come when the settlement which was arrived at in 1872 may with safety, and ought in justice, to be reconsidered; we are of opinion that, if this question is reopened, it ought to be settled on a permanent and stable foundation; and, finally, we are of opinion that

no change in the law can be satisfactory or stable which fails to remove at once and completely from the Code every judicial disqualification which is based merely on race distinctions.

"Accordingly, we propose to amend the law, first, by repealing the words which confine the exercise of jurisdiction over British subjects to persons who are European British subjects themselves; secondly, by declaring that every district magistrate and sessions judge shall be, by virtue of his office, a justice of the peace, and, as such, capable of exercising jurisdiction over European British subjects; and thirdly, by empowering local governments to invest with the office of justice of the peace, and consequently with jurisdiction over European British subjects, any person who, being either

(*a*) a member of the Covenanted Civil Service,
(*b*) a member of the Native Civil Service constituted under the statutory rules,
(*c*) an assistant commissioner in a non-regulation province, or
(*d*) a cantonment magistrate,

is for the time being invested with the powers of a magistrate of the first class, and is, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, fit to be entrusted with those further powers. We propose to make no distinction in the law between European and native officers. We consider that the care exercised in the selection of officers for the Covenanted Service, both in regulation and non-regulation provinces, together with the subsequent training that they receive, warrants our amending the law in the manner proposed. As a fact, no officer would be eligible until he had passed all the departmental examinations and been in training long enough to show the superior authorities whether he would be likely to use any powers conferred on him with proper discretion. These proposals will completely remove from the law all distinctions based on the race of the judge. The limitations remaining on the jurisdiction of particular classes of magistrates will be based, not on any difference of race, but simply on differences of training and experience.

"These, then, are our proposals. I repeat that, in making them, the only object which we have in view is to provide for the impartial and effectual administration of justice. It is by that test that we desire our proposals to be tried. If they are tried by that test, I am not without a confident hope that they will commend themselves both to the European and to the Asiatic subjects of Her Majesty as reasonable and just."

The Honourable Mr. Evans said that he was not well acquainted with the rules of debate in the Council, but wished to know whether the principle of this measure should be debated on this occasion, when leave was asked to introduce a Bill, or whether the measure should be debated at a later stage. Most of the non-official members of the Council were in the same position as himself, and had heard to day, for the first time, what the proposed measure was. It was, no doubt, one which had been often debated and was a vexed question. As had been pointed out, it was settled by a compromise in 1872, and Mr. Evans would also point out that there was nothing which was more dear to any man, and more especially to an Englishman, than his liberty, and nothing which he was more jealous of than any change in the tribunal which could deprive him of that liberty in a moment. He might also point out that, when an Englishman came into a tropical country, a sentence of imprisonment on him in certain seasons and places meant almost certain death. He did not propose now to discuss the principles of the settlement which it was now proposed to come to. He thought that the able speech in which it was introduced and the grave matters which were set forth in it deserved full consideration, and he did not think he would be justified in propounding any views of his own on the subject at once. But time should be given to the non-official community, considering that the question of the tribunal was one of the greatest importance, far greater than any question concerning the law of property and other such matters. Under these circumstances, he would ask his Lordship if he considered it was convenient to debate the principle of the Bill on the motion for leave to introduce it, then that the motion should be postponed so as to give time to the non-official English community in India, which was scattered far and wide in the various provinces, to make their voices heard, or, at any rate, that it should be postponed to-day, as he felt he could not give full consideration to it that day.

His Excellency the President said:—"Nobody is pledged in the smallest degree by the introduction of this or any other Bill, and it would obviously be very unfair that honourable members of Council should be called upon to express an opinion on the principle of a Bill which they have not seen. Nothing could be more lucid than the statement made by my honourable and learned friend who proposes to introduce the Bill, but,

until the Bill itself is in the hands of the public, it would be unfair, both to them and to the Government, that any opinion should be expressed upon it, or that any discussion should take place upon the measure in this Council.

"No one knows better than my honourable and learned friend Mr. Evans how difficult it is to understand a Bill, even with the clearest explanations of its provisions, until you have the Bill itself before you; and the public are sometimes perhaps a little too much inclined to criticise by anticipation measures of which they know nothing and have seen nothing; and I myself should not be in the smallest degree inclined to give any sort of encouragement to a procedure which, as I have said, is unfair both to the Government and to the public.

"I need not, I am sure, say that the Government has no desire to push this matter forward without giving full time for its consideration.

"The proper occasion, I think, for discussing the principle of the Bill will be on its reference to a Select Committee.

"I look upon that stage of the procedure as standing in the place of what is called 'the second reading' in Parliament at home. In the House of Lords, a Bill is often brought in and put on the table without saying a word; in the House of Commons, this is not the case, but the occasions on which discussions arise on the introduction of a Bill are rare, and debate on the principle of the measure takes place on the second reading.

"What I would, therefore, suggest would be that leave should now be given to bring in this Bill; that it should be brought in at the next meeting of the Council, and then published; and that due time should be given, before the motion is made for its reference to a Select Committee, in order to enable members of Council to consider it when they receive it in print, and to be prepared to discuss it fully after they have acquired a perfect knowledge of its provisions."

Mahárájá Sir Jotíndra Mohan Tagore having asked permission to address the Council on the subject of the Bill, his Excellency the President remarked :—

"Although, according to strict rule, the Mahárájá has lost his turn for speaking, I am sure that this Council would wish me to give him leave to address them. And, in doing so, I should like to take the opportunity of expressing the great regret I feel that this, I believe, is the last occasion on which we shall have the presence in the Council of our honourable colleague Mahárájá Sir Jotíndra Mohan Tagore. During the long period of his service in the Legislative Council, the Mahárájá has distinguished himself by his fairness, his enlightened views and his remarkable courtesy towards all the members of this Council.

"The Government of India have derived very great advantage from the presence of my honourable friend in the Council, and it is a source of deep regret to me that the fair rule of giving a chance to others to take their place in this Council, and, therefore, of not unduly prolonging the presence in it of any one particular member, added to the Mahárájá's own desire to be relieved of duties which clash with his other engagements, have necessitated his retirement, and occasioned the great loss to the Council which must result from his absence from it."

The Honourable Mahárájá Sir Jotíndra Mohan Tagore said :—"My Lord, I have listened with great interest to what has been said by my honourable and learned colleague opposite, and, as this may be the last occasion, as your Lordship has observed, on which I shall have the honour of addressing this Council, I beg leave to take this opportunity of offering, on behalf of my countrymen, their grateful thanks to your Excellency for redeeming the promise, which was held out to them during the last session of the Council, to amend that portion of the Criminal Procedure Code which relates to the trial of British-born subjects. Although it is impossible to say anything with regard to the details of the Bill before it is introduced, the very fact that something will be done now to remove the anomaly which has been a source of standing complaint with my countrymen for a very long time is in itself a matter for congratulation. Knowing the broad and statesman-like views which have characterised your Lordship's government, we have every reason to hope that legislation in this direction will be of a piece with those other great measures of reform,—among which I may name the repeal of the Vernacular Press Act, and the Act which, for the first time, has introduced the principle of self-government in this country,—which we feel sure will mark your Lordship's administration as an epoch in the annals of British India; and I am free to confess, my Lord, that, on this closing day of my humble career in this Council, I feel an honest pride that I have had the good fortune to occupy a seat here while these great measures

have been either passed or initiated under the auspices of your Excellency's liberal government.

" And I take this opportunity, my Lord, to tender my own most hearty and grateful thanks for the very kind manner in which your Excellency has been pleased to speak of my humble services in this Council."

The motion was put and agreed to.

ABSTRACT of the PROCEEDINGS of the COUNCIL of the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, assembled for the purpose of making LAWS and REGULATIONS under the provisions of the Act of Parliament 24 & 25 Vic., cap. 67.

The Council met at Government House on Friday, the 9th February 1883.

PRESENT :

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, K.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., presiding.
His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, C.S.I., C.I.E.
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, G.C.B., C.I.E.
The Honourable J. Gibbs, C.S.I., C.I.E.
Major the Honourable E. Baring, R.A., C.S.I., C.I.E.
Lieutenant-General the Honourable T. F. Wilson, C.B., C.I.E.
The Honourable C. P. Ilbert, C.I.E.
The Honourable Sir S. C. Bayley, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.
The Honourable C. H. T. Crosthwaite.
The Honourable Rájá Siva Prasád, C.S.I.
The Honourable W. W. Hunter, LL.D., C.I.E.
The Honourable Durgá Charan Láhá.
The Honourable H. J. Reynolds.
The Honourable H. S. Thomas.
The Honourable G. H. P. Evans.
The Honourable R. Miller.
The Honourable Kristo Dás Pál, Rai Bahádur, C.I.E.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, AMENDMENT BILL.

The Honourable Mr. Ilbert introduced the Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, so far as it relates to the exercise of jurisdiction over European British subjects. He said that the step which he was then taking was purely formal. He would not invite the Council to discuss the principle of the Bill until full time had been given for its consideration by the outside public.

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Further Papers on the Subject of the Proposed Alteration of the Provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to Jurisdiction over European British Subjects.

India Office,
28th May, 1883.

J. K. CROSS,
Under Secretary of State for India.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

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1883.

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ABSTRACT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT 24 & 25 VICT., CAP. 67.

The Council met at Government House on Friday, the 9th March 1883.

PRESENT:

His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, K.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., *presiding*.
His Honour the LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF BENGAL, C.S.I., C.I.E.
His Excellency the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, G.C.B., C.I.E.
The Hon. J. GIBBS, C.S.I., C.I.E.
Major the Hon. E. BARING, R.A., C.S.I., C.I.E.
Lieutenant-General the Hon. T. F. WILSON, C.B., C.I.E.
The Hon. C. P. ILBERT, C.I.E.
The Hon. Sir S. C. BAYLEY, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.
The Hon. T. C. HOPE, C.S.I., C.I.E.
The Hon. RÁJÁ SIVA PRASÁD, C.S.I.
The Hon. W. W. HUNTER, LL.D., C.I.E.
The Hon. SAYYAD AHMAD KHÁN BAHÁDUR, C.S.I.
The Hon. DURGÁ CHARAN LÁHÁ.
The Hon. H. J. REYNOLDS.
The Hon. H. S. THOMAS.
The Hon. G. H. P. EVANS.
The Hon. R. MILLER.
The Hon. KRISTODÁS PÁL, RAI BAHÁDUR, C.I.E.
The Hon. J. W. QUINTON.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, AMENDMENT BILL.

The Hon. Mr. ILBERT also moved that the Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, so far as it relates to the exercise of jurisdiction over European British subjects, and Statement of Objects and Reasons, be published in the *Gazette of India*, and in the local official Gazettes in English and in such other languages as the Local Governments might think fit. He said:—

"This publication is a necessary stage—and it clearly ought to be an early stage—in the progress of a Bill; but, under the Rules of Business as they stood before the recent alteration, the Council could not have ordered the publication of a Bill until a motion that it be referred to a Select Committee or some equivalent motion had been put and carried. However, under the new rule which was passed the other day, the Council may direct the publication of a Bill at any time after leave to introduce it has been granted. The effect of passing this motion, which I now make, will be that this Bill will be published in the usual manner, and that the various Local Governments will have the same opportunity of expressing their opinions on the provisions of this Bill as they have of expressing their opinions on the provisions of any other Bill.

"I give these explanations for the purpose of correcting some misstatements which have been made with respect to the course which the Government have adopted, and proposed to adopt, in dealing with this measure. It has been alleged that we are pushing the Bill through the Council with unusual and improper haste. There is no foundation for this statement. The Government never intended to pass the Bill into law during the course of the present Calcutta session. They have dealt, and they always intended to deal, with this measure in accordance with the ordinary rules of business; and, in dealing with it, they have not departed from the usual course of procedure, except in one particular, namely, that, in order to give the public the earliest possible notice of the nature of their proposals, they sent copies of the Bill and the accompanying papers to some of the leading Journals before any formal order for publication of the Bill had been made by this Council.

"To substantiate this statement let me recapitulate shortly the several stages through which this measure has passed, both before and since its introduction as a Bill into the Council. It originated with a proposal for legislation which was made by the Government of Bengal to the Government of India in the month of March 1882. That proposal was, in the month of April last, communicated in the ordinary way to other Local Governments for their opinions. On receipt of those opinions, the Government of India considered whether legislation should be undertaken, and, if so, what form it should take. Having come to a conclusion on these points, they submitted their proposals—the proposals which are embodied in the present Bill—to the Secretary of State in Council. The then Secretary of State, Lord Hartington, informed us that these proposals had been very carefully considered by him in Council, that he agreed in the conclusions at which we had arrived, and that he sanctioned the introduction of a Bill embodying the proposals which we had submitted. Accordingly, the Home Department issued instructions to the Legislative Department to frame a Bill, and the Bill, when framed, was placed in charge of the Legal Member of Council, who, I believe, always takes charge of Bills amending the Procedure Codes. I obtained leave to introduce the Bill on the 2nd of February, I introduced it in the following week, and the papers containing the opinions of Local Governments were, I believe, sent to the newspapers within three days after the introduction of the Bill. Since then the Bill has not been carried through any further stage.

"It has been also alleged that the Bill originated in the opinion of an adviser not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances of Indian life, the reference being obviously to myself. Now, I do not wish to disclaim or lessen in any way my share of responsibility for this measure, but to say that it originated in any opinion given by me is to say what is not in accordance with the facts. The letter of Sir Ashley Eden was received by the Government of India before I landed in this country. It was sent round to the various Local Governments before I took my seat as a Member of this Council, and I never heard anything about the subject at all until after the replies of the Local Governments had been received by the Government of India. My duty then was simply to form the best conclusion I could after seeing what had been written on the subject, and hearing what was said on the subject, by persons who had an acquaintance with the country which I never affected or claimed to possess. The conclusion to which I came on the materials before me was, that we ought to legislate, and that we ought to legislate on the lines on which this Bill has been framed. That opinion I still hold. But the Bill is the Bill, not of the Legal Member of Council, but of the Government of India, and, that being so, it will, I think, be more meet that I should, on the present occasion, leave to the Head of the Government the task of explaining the policy of what is a Government measure.

"Accordingly, I shall confine myself exclusively to the legal aspect of the measure. But I do not intend to waste your time by reference to any of the so-called legal arguments purporting to show that we have no power to alter the law in the mode in which we propose to alter it. I do not anticipate that my honourable friend Mr. Evans will venture to use any such argument. He is much too good a lawyer to do so. For he knows as well as I do that about the legal power of the Legislative Council to pass this Bill there is not, and cannot be, any question.

"What I propose to do is to give you a dry simple statement showing the jurisdiction which is, under the existing law, exerciseable by the Courts of this country in cases affecting European British subjects, and the mode in which it is proposed to alter that law by the present Bill. It is necessary that I should do this, because the scope and effect of the Bill have been much misunderstood or misrepresented, and I observe that an important London paper has alleged that we are running atilt against a rule which, as a matter of fact, we do not propose to touch, the rule, namely, which limits the extent

of the criminal jurisdiction exerciseable by Magistrates in the mufassal over European British subjects.

"Let me begin by explaining what is meant by a European British subject. The term 'European British subject' is defined by the Criminal Procedure Code (section 4) to mean—

'(1.) any subject of Her Majesty born, naturalized or domiciled in the United Kingdom of Great Britain or Ireland, or in any of the European, American, or Australian Colonies or Possessions of Her Majesty, or in the Colony of New Zealand, or in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope or Natal:

(2.) any child or grandchild of any such person by legitimate descent.'

"It will be seen that the definition is somewhat arbitrary and artificial. It includes persons who are neither European nor British. It excludes persons who may be in all essential characteristics Englishmen, but who are not of legitimate descent.

"Such being the European British subject, let us see what is the nature and extent of the jurisdiction exerciseable over him in this country in civil and criminal cases.

"First, then, as to the jurisdiction exerciseable over European British subjects in civil cases. That jurisdiction is precisely the same as that which is exerciseable in the case of persons not being European British subjects. Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that—

'no person shall, by reason of his descent or place of birth, be in any civil proceeding exempted from the jurisdiction of the Courts.'

"No person is exempted from that jurisdiction by reason of his being a European British subject; no person is disqualified for exercising that jurisdiction by reason of his not being a European British subject. A Native Judge has the same civil jurisdiction over a European British subject as any other Judge, and may exercise that jurisdiction in such a way as to affect not only his property, but his reputation and his person. He can give judgment against him in a suit for fraud or libel; he can send him to prison for debt; can punish him for contempt of Court; and can issue a warrant for his arrest in case of his non-attendance as a witness.

"So much as to jurisdiction in civil cases. Next, as to jurisdiction in criminal cases. I will deal first with the jurisdiction of the High Courts, including in that expression, not only the High Courts at the Presidency-towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, but the High Court at Allahabad and the Chief Court of the Panjáb at Lahore. The criminal jurisdiction of these Courts is unlimited. No person is exempted from it by reason of race or place of birth. No person is disqualified for exercising it by reason of race or place of birth. Any person may exercise the jurisdiction, whether he is a European British subject or a Native of India. And a Judge of the High Court, whether he is a European British subject or not, is by virtue of his office a Justice of the Peace within and for the whole of British India.

"Then, as to Presidency Magistrates. Here, again, there is no exemption, no disqualification, based on race or place of birth. Any Presidency Magistrate, whether a Native of India or not, can try or commit for trial any European British subject, and can pass any of the following sentences:—

(1.) Imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, including solitary imprisonment;

(2.) Fine not exceeding one thousand rupees;

(3.) Whipping.

"Lastly, as to the criminal jurisdiction of ordinary Magistrates and Judges in the mufassal. Here there are distinctions between cases affecting European British subjects and other cases, both as to the extent of the jurisdiction which may be exercised, as to the privileges of persons subject to that jurisdiction, and as to the persons qualified to exercise the jurisdiction.

"As to the extent of the jurisdiction. A Magistrate cannot sentence a European British subject to more than three months' imprisonment, or Rs. 1,000 fine, or both. A Court of Session cannot sentence a European British subject to more than a year's imprisonment, or fine, or both. And neither a Magistrate nor a Court of Session can sentence him to the punishment of whipping.

"Then, the European British subject has certain special privileges as to the mode of trial, the right of appeal, and the right to apply for release from custody.

"He may claim to be tried by a mixed jury or a mixed set of assessors, not less than half the number of jurors or assessors being either Europeans or Americans, or both Europeans and Americans.

"If he is convicted on a trial held by an Assistant Sessions Judge or a Magis rate he may appeal either to the High Court or to the Court of Session at his option. He can appeal against small sentences of fine or imprisonment from which there is no right of appeal in ordinary cases, and if he is unlawfully detained in custody he can appeal to the High Court for an order directing the person detaining him to bring him before the High Court.

"And lastly, he cannot be tried by any Magistrate unless the Magistrate is a Justice of the Peace, a Magistrate of the first class, and a European British subject; he cannot be tried by any Sessions Judge unless the Judge is a European British subject; and he cannot be tried by any Assistant Sessions Judge unless the Judge is a European British subject, has held the Office of Assistant Sessions Judge for at least three years, and has been specially empowered by the Local Government to try European British subjects.

"The privilege of being tried by a mixed jury, or mixed assessors, belongs to all Europeans and Americans; the privilege of being tried by a European British subject belongs to the European British subject alone. Now, of all these various rules, the only one which we propose to alter is that which relates to the race qualification of the Judge. We have left untouched the limitations on the sentences which may be inflicted by the Judge. We have left untouched the right to trial by a mixed jury or by mixed assessors; we have left untouched the right to apply for release from illegal custody. The single alteration which we propose to make is this. We propose to substitute, for the disqualification arising from race, a qualification depending on tried personal fitness. We propose to say that a very small number of specially selected Native Magistrates may exercise that limited and qualified jurisdiction which can at present be exercised only by persons who fall within the extremely arbitrary and technical definition of European British subjects."

The Hon. Mr. QUINTON said:—"It cannot be denied by the most earnest opponents of the present Bill that there is a strong array of official opinion in support of it. The measure which it embodies originated with the Government of Bengal. The Governments of Bombay, Madras, the North-Western Provinces and the Panjáb, the Chief Commissioners of the Central Provinces, of British Burma and of Assam, and the Resident at Haidarábád, who is *ex officio* Chief Commissioner of the Haidarábád Assigned Districts, have all written in no qualified terms expressing their approval of it on the grounds of public policy and administrative convenience.

"It is unquestionable that the Bill, if passed into law, will deprive the European British subject in the interior of being tried in certain cases by a Magistrate or Judge of his own race. I say 'in certain cases,' for as the law at present stands, there is nothing, should he be unfortunate enough to be committed to the High Court, to prevent his being tried by a Native Judge of that tribunal. Whether this partial deprivation of a peculiar privilege be one which State policy and the interests of good administration demand, is the question this Council has now to determine—a question which the heads of all the Local Governments have answered in the affirmative.

"The policy of the British Government in India for many years has been to throw open to Natives of the country, proved to possess the necessary qualifications, offices in the public service which were at first reserved exclusively for Englishmen. The progress of education, the gradual adoption among the better classes of Natives of India of European standards of honour, integrity, and truthfulness, the increase of intelligent interest in public affairs exhibited by the leaders of Native society, have all tended to break down the barriers which obstructed their advancement to the higher appointments of the administration. Successive opportunities of such employment have of late years been afforded to Native gentlemen, which have placed within their reach seats on the benches of the High Courts, and admission to the Covenanted and Native Civil Services. This last privilege will, except in cases of manifest incapacity, lead to the bench of the Sessions Court and to the magisterial and executive charge of districts.

"It is scarcely needful for me before this Council to dwell on the importance of this charge. District-officers have been rightly called the eyes and ears of Government. They are in their districts the outward and visible representation of British authority, —often but a dim and distant shadow,—and upon their efficiency, and on the respect and confidence they inspire, depend the reputation, the influence, and, perhaps in the last resort, the existence, of British rule in India. They are entrusted with weighty judicial and executive functions, and have in their hands powers which may affect the welfare and happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings; for they, and they only, can adequately represent and secure a hearing for the wants of their people. Similarly, Sessions Judges preside over the administration of criminal justice in areas coextensive

with, or larger than, those of districts, and have powers of trying all offences, even of a capital nature, committed by persons residing within their jurisdiction.

"To these high offices, for reasons of State policy which cannot now be questioned, Her Majesty's Government has thought it good that Natives of India should be admitted; and the Bill before the Council is only the natural outcome and complement of that policy. It simply invests the holders of them, when they happen to be other than Europeans, with powers hitherto inseparable from these offices.

"It is much to be regretted that this cannot be done without depriving Englishmen in India of a privilege, however small, which they have hitherto possessed, but that it must be done, sound policy and good administration alike seem to me to require.

"With what fairness can Government, which has held out to Natives prospects of reaching the highest posts in the public service, which induced and encouraged them to incur the labour and expense of qualifying for such appointments, turn round upon those persons now, who have satisfied all the requirements for high office, and say—'We make you Sessions Judges and Magistrates of districts, but we find you wanting, by reason of your descent, in the qualities essential to the discharge of a portion of the duties which devolve upon you in those capacities, and for the performance of those duties you must give place to others junior to you in the service'?

"Is such treatment likely to conciliate or win public esteem and confidence for Sessions Judges and Magistrates, to strengthen their hands in the execution of their offices, or to promote that good feeling and cordiality between European and Native Civilians which are indispensable to their working efficiently together? It is obvious that it must produce effects the direct opposites of these.

"No, My Lord. I believe it is now too late to stop short. We cannot retrace our steps, and, as the change now in contemplation must be made sooner or later, and, when it is made, appears fated to arouse passions which we all deplore, the sooner it is made the better.

"The warmth of feeling which has been called forth by the publication of the Bill, and the excitement to which it has given rise, seem to me very disproportionate to the results which may be reasonably expected to flow from it. The number of Native Civilians employed under each Local Government is very small; the localities where there are persons likely to be affected by the Bill are not numerous. Years must elapse before the few Native officers to whom the Bill refers can reach the qualifying offices or prove their fitness to be nominated as Justices of the Peace; and the Local Governments have, under these circumstances, full opportunity for giving effect to the proposals under the most favourable conditions. Notwithstanding all this, it has been assumed, in the vehement discussions which have taken place outside this Council chamber, that the present proposal is one to subject European residents in the interior of the country to the jurisdiction of all Native Magistrates—an assumption altogether unfounded. No Deputy Magistrate, no Honorary Magistrate, and no Extra Assistant Commissioner, which classes comprehend nearly the entire Native Magistracy, can be nominated under the Bill.

"Similarly, much of the heated declamation which has been resounding in our ears can only spring from the idea that all distinctions of law between Europeans and Natives of India are to be abolished; but what are the facts?

"The Bill leaves altogether unaltered the main provisions of the law, that for heinous offences European British subjects must be tried before the High Court, that for grave offences meriting a punishment of imprisonment of less than one year's duration they are to be tried before the Court of Session, and that the accused, if he pleases, can require that half the number of the jury or assessors at such trials shall be Europeans or Americans. The only change made is, that a Magistrate trying a European British subject for petty offences or inquiring into graver charges against him, and that a Sessions Judge presiding at his trial on such charges, shall not of necessity be a European, though such Magistrate, unless a Magistrate of the district, must have satisfied Government of his ability to discharge the duties of a Justice of the Peace.

"It is difficult to find any intelligible reason why an officer of sufficient judicial ability to be appointed a Presidency Magistrate should, when promoted or even transferred to a district beyond the Presidency, forfeit powers which he had been found to exercise in a satisfactory manner; or why a Native gentleman who has proved his fitness for the Bench of the Sessions Court should be declared disqualified from presiding at a trial of a European British subject, when the accused can have the advantage of a number of his countrymen on the jury or among the assessors.

"In several districts of the Lower Provinces of Bengal, where the cry of opposition has been loudest, and where the Bill, if it passes, is likely to have the most extensive operation, trials before Courts of Sessions are by jury.

"The arguments which might justly have been urged a quarter of a century ago, arising from the inaccessibility of Courts in the interior, and their seclusion from the fierce light of public opinion, were discussed and answered in the debate in this Council in 1872, in the speech of Lord Napier of Merchistoun, quoted on a previous occasion by the hon. and learned member who introduced this Bill; and, if anything further were wanted, I have but to point to the countless letters and telegrams in the columns of the newspapers arriving every day from different parts of the country, as evidence that, where Europeans in India are concerned, things cannot now be done in a corner."

The Hon. KRISTODÁS PÁL said:—"My Lord,—I think I would best consult the interests of the Bill if I should say as little as possible on the subject. I am convinced that I cannot do better than leave it to your Lordship, as the responsible head of the Government, to enunciate the reasons and policy of this measure. I cannot, however, allow this occasion to pass without saying that I look upon this Bill as a legitimate and logical development of the progressive policy which characterises British rule in this country, and that, its principal being sound, just, and righteous, my countrymen feel a deep interest in it.

"None, my Lord, can regret more than I do the ebullition of feeling which this Bill has caused. Considering the innocuous character of the Bill, I confess I did not expect it, nor did the Government, I believe, anticipate it. Had it not been for the great and important principal at stake, I would have been the first to counsel the withdrawal of the Bill, rather than oppose the wave of feeling which has risen against it. I have too strong a faith in the character of John Bull to believe for a moment that he will carry to the bitter end his opposition to a noble attempt to establish that equality in the eye of the law which the history of his own country, and the teachings of his own political system, so loudly proclaim. I was young when the hurricane of the Sepoy Revolt burst over the country in 1857, but I well recollect how feelings were torn asunder by the sad events of those days, how furious was the rage of denunciation, and how terrible the voice of vengeance. And yet, when the storm of the Mutiny subsided, the feeling also subsided, and not a few of those who had stood forth as uncompromising enemies of the Natives now stepped forward as zealous champions of their cause. It has been my good fortune to work with many of them, and to profit not a little by their advice, assistance, co-operation, and example. Who could for a moment say that the Anglo-Indian of the Mutiny days was the Anglo-Indian of the succeeding days of peace and progress? This is my experience of the character of honest John Bull.

"Pride of race—I use the phrase in no offensive sense—is a commendable feeling. It is an honest and honourable pride. It has been the mother of good deeds, valiant acts, patriotic exertions, and national glory. But there is a higher and nobler pride, that of fostering human happiness under beneficent law, raising the weak and lowly to the level of the strong and high, and making equal law and equal justice the basis of political paramountcy in the world. It is to that noble feeling I appeal. All Englishmen, whether in India or in England, I humbly think, should rejoice that, within the century and a quarter they have ruled India, they have effected such a complete revolution in the Indian mind, both intellectual and moral, that Indian Magistrates are found fit to be trusted with the administration of the laws of the land, not only over their own countrymen, but also over the members of the ruling race. This is a work of which England may justly feel proud—this is a consummation over which all Englishmen may well rejoice."

The Hon. Mr. MILLER said:—"My Lord, I can hardly imagine a subject likely to be brought up for discussion in this Council concerning which I should speak with greater unwillingness than this Bill. If there ever was a matter to which the proverb 'Least said soonest mended' applied, it is this one. To speak will lead to misunderstanding, and so also will the keeping silence. To the best of my judgment I choose the lesser evil, for there have been misunderstandings enough, for which, however, I cannot feel that I, or those for whom I speak, are in any way to be held responsible.

"No subject for many years has evoked in India so deep or such united feeling on the part of the European community as this Bill. In the presence of a feeling so strong, and I cannot help saying also so powerful for mischief, it is an infinite pity that a measure of this nature, which deeply affects the material interests, as well as the sentiments, of Europeans, should have been introduced without any attempt made beforehand to ascertain their views.

"The disappointment on our part would have been excited under any circumstances, but recent events intensify and attract attention to it; for we have of late been hopeful that the former policy on the part of Government, of relying solely on information derived through official channels, would be relaxed, and that the views of the non-official community would be sought for and weighed more than has been hitherto the custom, and we have been encouraged to form opinions, and at times even taunted with having none.

"The fact that a measure on which, if on no other, the European community in, and connected with, India think strongly and think together, should have been introduced without a word of warning, leads reasonably and properly to disappointment, and tends to throw discredit on the profession of Government when they say they wish to know our views.

"But, from what I and many others have seen of your Lordship and of your Lordship's Government, we are led to believe this must have arisen from some misapprehension; and that, when it is made plain that on this subject the interested class, whom alone the proposed alteration of the law would practically affect, not only have an opinion, but are practically unanimous in it, as regards this measure,—when this, the true state of affairs, is discovered,—the Government may see their way to withdraw their calamitous proposal.

"On this subject I can confidently say the European non-official community think together. I only wish there were less positive proof. I wish it were still a matter of opinion, and that the opinion alone could be accepted; for the very fact of asking the public in a public way to state their views is injurious to the best interests of India. There is hardly another subject which could call the widely scattered, in places solitary and isolated, Europeans in this country so unanimously together as a proposal to subject their personal liberty to Native tribunals in the Mufassal; for the proposal threatens them in all ways—their liberty, their reputation, and the stability of their property. The trade organisations in all parts of the country agree in this view: from Karáchi, from Bombay, although the planting interest is entirely absent in those parts of India; in Madras and Rangoon the same response is made; and in Bengal and in Southern India the Europeans in the Mufassal speak practically as one man.

"It seems to me to be altogether a fallacious argument to say that the proposal is at most a trifle. In the first place, it is not a trifle to deprive the European of his most cherished right. The first sign of an inclination on the part of Government to deprive him of his right to be tried by a fellow countryman excites him far beyond what actual immediate danger justifies; and it is not a trifle to stimulate feelings of distrust and indignation in the minds of Europeans in the country against the Government; for this indignation and distrust is not brought into effect directly against the Government, as would be the case in England, but affects rather the country itself and the Natives.

"If means were being sought to stir up and inflame those race antipathies which it is the noble ambition of your Lordship's administration to efface, a more effective one than this 'trifle' could not be found. It is not a trifle; for, if by mischance a Native Sessions Judge or a Native District Magistrate were to misjudge an European and condemn him to imprisonment on grounds which were afterwards proved to have been erroneous, it is perfectly certain that more positive, immediate, I may say instantaneous, harm would be done to this country than could be repaired in half a dozen years. It is not a trifle; for one of the most common crimes, I will not say one of the ingrained customs, of this country is the fabrication of false evidence in the Courts of law. Perhaps the hon. and learned member who introduces the Bill may think I am only uttering one of the common Anglo-Indian fossilised prejudices; but I would appeal to universal Indian experience to bear me out. False evidence is cheap. One single miscarriage of justice through the medium of false evidence sworn before a Native Magistrate will do more infinite mischief, by driving English workmen and English capital out of the country, than the united efforts of Government and of all the guarantees they can offer can repair in a quarter of a century.

"If a trifle, then, why in the name of common sense provoke all their animosity for the sake of it? It is difficult in a matter like this to appeal to experience that is purely English. This country is full of anomalies, and it is difficult for the English mind, unaccustomed to the facts of Indian life, to discover how it is that a practice which is submitted to without demur in a Presidency-town should be so bitterly resisted in the Mufassal. The answer is simple. A public opinion, a Press and legal assistance are at hand here. There, there is nothing but a Judge to condemn and a jail to confine. English enterprise—and on this side of India at least there is very little enterprise of

any kind except English—is largely concerned, and English capital largely invested in this country, especially in Bengal. The indigo factories, the tea gardens, and the consequent inducement to that migration of population which is so urgently needed in parts of India, mills and mines, are all supported by English capital, and the tendency has been to increase this. It has begun to be recognised by European capital that India most wants to buy what England most wants to sell, namely, material for increasing the trading power of the country; and a stimulus has lately, under the auspices of your Lordship's Government, been given to the inward flow of capital.

"But there is one thing that European capital will not do. It will not entrust itself to Native Indian management. It is hopeless and useless to say this is the result of prejudice. Possibly it is prejudice. But the result of the prejudice is a tangible factor, which cannot be denied, cannot be ignored, and which must in fact be acknowledged. Capitalists will not entrust their money to Native management, and they are satisfied the feeling is well founded. I will not give reasons for this, for I do not wish to give unnecessary offence, but I ask your Lordship to take note of it.

"Capital employed in the Province is invested on the faith of European agency, but such agency is expensive and is not employed in greater strength than the circumstances of the case render positively necessary. A practice exists in the Mufassal—I am not drawing on my imagination, I am not uttering an Anglo-Indian prejudice, I am stating a fact which is known to every zamíndár as well as to every raiyat, to every official European equally as to non-officials who ever engaged in litigation, that the practice of bringing false charges to injure rivals or to gratify a grudge is a common practice. This is a fact of which European capital has to take account before it allows itself to be locked up in India, and capital reflects that, if an European manager is removed from the charge of the enterprise on which he is employed in the Mufassal at a critical moment and imprisoned on a false accusation, the loss and damage may be overwhelming.

"No Native criminal tribunal in the Mufassal can, under these circumstances, command the confidence of our employés. Anything that touches the personal safety of our European employés in the Mufassal reflects back again on us, and, if it threatens their safety, it deters the inflow of capital. It is said this is all prejudice. We think it to be fact. Capital is sensitive, and, when you deprive the investor of one of the safeguards on which he mainly relies, namely, the right on the part of his employés to be tried by one who, whatever may be his knowledge of the criminal law, is at least a fellow-countryman and capable of understanding, as one of ourselves, our own feelings, it is of no sort of use to assure that capitalist that what he looks upon as a safeguard is only an 'anomaly.'

"It is only eleven years ago since Sir James Stephen addressed this Council on the same subject that is now before us; and, in allusion to the law which had then been decided upon, but which it is now proposed to alter, he used the following words:—

> 'I need not remind the Council of the extreme warmth of feeling which discussion upon a measure of the nature excited at no distant date, nor need I insist on the great importance to the Government of the country of the existence of harmony between the Government and the general European population.'

"These words still hold true. In what respect have circumstances changed since they were spoken? Is a compromise in itself more objectionable now than it was then; or are the facts which rendered the whole law a tissue of compromise in any manner or in any degree of manner different?

"The Europeans who have capital in this country do not think so, and they look in vain to anything that has been stated in advocacy of the Bill for reasons which justified a change in the law. A compromise the whole law is, and a compromise it must remain until the conditions of daily life in this country render a simpler law admissible.

"Is this compromise,—the least objectionable, the least actively offensive, of any that are to be found within the four corners of the statute-book—highly valued by the section to whom it applies? We have the traders' and planters' association from every part of India answering with one voice. I think it is a most regrettable thing, the idea of being called upon to answer the question had ever to be proposed to them; but of the fact of their reply there is no sort of doubt.

"My Lord, the exasperation of race that is now going on is terrible and deplorable. Enough harm has been done, and yet the exasperation is increasing every day. It has not done so yet, but it is leading to a sense of insecurity. If the Government depart from Calcutta to Simla, leaving the population of Bengal 'to stew in the juices of mutual animosity' engendered by this most unfortunate proposition, the mischief, which will not

be prejudice, but a fact, not imaginary but tangible, may become beyond repair; and I call upon those of your Lordship's Council who have served their years in the country, and who have more than a theoretical knowledge of the people, to tell your Lordship frankly that I have not overstated the case. And of yourself, I would earnestly beg, in the interest of that concord between the races which you have so much at heart, to withdraw this Bill, which satisfies no one, and which, with the smallest amount of good, does almost the largest possible amount of harm."

[The spectators present here applauded the last speaker by loud clapping of hands.]

His Excellency the PRESIDENT said:—"It is a rule of this Council, and of all legislative assemblies in the world, that those persons admitted as spectators should not applaud on either side any of the sentiments delivered, and it is my duty to enforce that rule. I am quite sure that those gentlemen who have applauded on this occasion did so from forgetfulness, but it is a rule which must be observed; and, although sentiments are felt on one side or the other, they must not be expressed."

The Hon. Mr. EVANS said that the motion for publication was purely formal. It was only a strong sense of public duty, and a strong conviction that the present deplorable state of things ought to be put an end to at once, that led him to speak at this stage of the Bill. The question raised by this Bill, as stated by the hon. mover, was whether they "could with safety, and ought in justice, to re-open the settlement or compromise of 1872." Mr. Ilbert had admitted, practically, that he was bound to show three things—

(1) necessity for disturbing the settlement of 1872;
(2) that the new settlement proposed was a durable and stable one; and
(3) that the new scheme was one conducive to the "effectual and impartial administration of justice."

He (Mr. EVANS) emphatically denied that any one of these propositions was made out. There was no administrative necessity; there was no element of finality or durability in the proposal made, and he challenged any one to say that justice would be "more effectually or impartially administered" under the scheme proposed by this Bill.

In order to explain the compromise of 1872, he was obliged to take the Council back to 1857, to show how the matter really stood; and how and why the settlement of 1872 was come to.

In 1857, European British-subjects in Bengal had the right to have their criminal cases (with a few small statutory exceptions) tried by the old Supreme Court. This led to grave inconvenience in bringing down prisoners and witnesses from very remote places on trifling charges.

All persons in India were now in civil cases subject to the ordinary Courts, and no person was exempt from the jurisdiction of any Civil Court, by reason of birth or descent. The Penal Code was then about to be passed, making one body of criminal law applicable to all Her Majesty's subjects in India. And it was proposed, as a complement to the Penal Code, to introduce a Criminal Procedure Code on the same broad principle, enacting that no person should, by reason of birth or descent, be exempted from the jurisdiction of any Criminal Court. This would have swept away at one stroke the right or privilege of European British subjects to have any special tribunals, or special privilege as to the constitution of the tribunals, by which their liberties and their lives could be declared forfeited. There was a great outcry against the proposal and violent public feeling. Meetings were held, and a petition, signed by 1,100 European British subjects in Bengal, was presented to the Legislative Council. They objected to all the proposed tribunals, as incompetent, and to those presided over by Natives, as utterly unsafe.

Debate of 1857.

Sir A. Buller, a Judge of the old Supreme Court, spoke in Council in March 1857, advocating a compromise. He admitted the grave inconvenience of bringing all charges against European British subjects to be tried by the Supreme Court. But urged that this practical difficulty could be met by the practical remedy of making them triable only by the Sessions Courts—not by the Magistrates' Courts or the Subordinate Courts presided over by Natives.

Sir A. Buller urged that they were practical men, living in a land full of anomalies, which they must deal with practically. He said the Magistrates' Courts, though they gave the Natives far better justice than they ever had before, would give the European British subjects far worse justice than they had been used to. He did not think it was right to give poorer justice to the European British subjects to avoid an anomaly, if they

could give them as good justice as before, without hardship to the Natives. As to the Native tribunals, he thought the European British subjects were right in objecting to them on the additional ground of race antagonism.

The Chief Justice, Sir James Colville, supported him, and drew attention to the well-known habit prevailing among Natives in the Mufassal, of endeavouring to get rid of rivals by deliberately framed false criminal charges, supported by false evidence, and said the combination of executive and judicial functions in the person of the Magistrates prejudiced and biased their minds, and rendered the Magistrates' Courts in India very unsatisfactory tribunals.

Sir B. Peacock, the Legal Member of Council, said that though he had introduced the Bill he would consider the arguments. No division was ever taken on this question.

The Mutiny broke out with all its horrors, and race feeling rose to a fearful pitch. The Court of Directors withdrew the question from the Council, and it was resolved to continue the former system of having European British subjects tried solely by the Supreme Court.

Debate of 1859.

In 1859, there was, however, another debate, which showed that Sir Barnes Peacock had been taught by the Mutiny the danger of carrying abstract principles to their logical conclusion in India, without regard to consequences. Sir Barnes Peacock inserted in the Code a provision disabling Natives in the Mufassal from even committing European British subjects for trial. Mr. Harington (a most able and experienced Civilian) thought this unnecessary. He said he had never advocated the *trial* of European British subjects by Natives, but he thought they might be allowed to commit; and he taunted Sir Barnes Peacock with having at first advocated the sweeping Bill of 1857, and having now gone to the opposite extreme. Sir Barnes Peacock replied that he had never committed himself to it, and that, even if he had done so, it was unfair of Mr. Harington to remind him of it. After the Mutiny he claimed the right to change his mind, and boldly avowed he had done so. Sir Charles Jackson, a Judge of the old Supreme Court, agreed with Sir Barnes, and pointed out the practical necessity of providing special tribunals for this particular class of persons, and showed the utter fallacy of arguing that because Natives were allowed to act as Justices in Calcutta, and to commit Europeans, therefore, it was practically safe to let them do so in the Mufassal. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 was eventually passed, leaving criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects practically as it was before.

Code of 1861.

Years rolled on, the echoes of the Mutiny grew fainter, and, in 1871, a revised Criminal Procedure Code was being prepared by Sir J. F. Stephen.

State of things in 1871.

He was in Calcutta at that time, and knew both Sir J. F. Stephen and Mr. Stewart, and, speaking from memory, without any notes of what passed, he would give the Council his impression of the state of things that led to the settlement of 1872. The influx of a poorer class of Europeans from England and Australia had rendered it an intolerable inconvenience to send them all for trial to the High Court in Calcutta for petty offences, and even gave practical immunity for petty crimes. The moderate and sensible men among the European British subjects fully recognised the necessity for giving some jurisdiction to some Mufassal Courts, and the Government pressed urgently for it.

The amount of jurisdiction proposed to be given to the Mufassal Courts over European British subjects was three months' imprisonment to be inflicted by a Magistrate's Court, and one year to be inflicted by a Sessions Court.

The European British subjects could not successfully object to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, provided he was a European, as his duties were purely judicial. But they could well object to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts, for the reason touched on by Sir James Colville in 1857, that is, the combination of executive and judicial functions in the same person. The Magistrate was head of his district, had to keep the peace, to see that crime and lawlessness was detected and put down, to hold secret inquiries, to act as practical head of the Police, to decide on ordering prosecutions to be instituted, and then, when his mind had been thoroughly saturated and biased by the result of secret inquiries and police reports, to try the accused.

Further, Sir J. F. Stephen was very anxious to introduce by his new Code summary trials, as in Petty Sessions in England, in which there should be no regular record of evidence, save such précis of it as the Magistrate might record in his judgment.

Sir J. F. Stephen justly feared a strong onslaught by the European British subjects on Magistrates' justice. He knew, and all knew, that the finances of India could not

afford the severance of the executive and judicial functions of Magistrates, which the interests of justice loudly called for.

The European British subjects were likewise entitled to object to summary trial without a proper record of the evidence, as tending to nullify in practice the much prized right of appeal to the High Court in all cases, which they possessed and still possess.

But there was further, the danger, nay the certainty, of a fierce agitation by the European British subjects against being subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of Natives in the Mufassal. Any proposal to do this would (it was well known) revive the fire of race hatred and the memories of the Mutiny, which had been waning and dying out slowly, and do much to interrupt cordial relations between Natives and Europeans, and between the European community and the Government of India.

Sir J. F. Stephen was quite willing to concede that European British subjects should not be tried by the ordinary Native Deputy Magistrates, and in this all responsible Government officials agreed with him, and still agree. But Natives had begun to enter the Covenanted Civil Service, and the European British subjects utterly objected to entrust their personal liberty to Natives, whether covenanted or uncovenanted.

This was the problem which Sir J. F. Stephen and Sir John Strachey, and the other experienced men who made the settlement of 1872, had to decide—"Was it worth while "for the sake of asserting the principle (if principle it be) that all Covenanted Civilians "should be empowered to try Europeans as soon as they become full-power Magistrates, "to risk the explosion which would inevitably have ensued, and which would have done "incalculable mischief." Bearing in mind that it was admittedly impossible, and politically dangerous, to carry out in its integrity, in the Mufassal, the broad principle that no man should be exempted from the jurisdiction of any Criminal Court by reason of birth or descent; and, further, bearing in mind that everyone connected with Government was agreed that it was necessary to sanction a similar anomaly in the case of Uncovenanted Magistrates, and to enact in effect that full-power Uncovenanted Magistrates, who were Europeans, might try the European British subjects, but that the Uncovenanted Magistrates who were not Europeans should not have that power. The strong practical intellects of Sir J. F. Stephen and Sir John Strachey perceived that, to risk such evils to avoid this petty anomaly, which caused no practical inconvenience, after sanctioning so many departures from the only broad principle which could be appealed to, would indeed be to strain at a gnat after swallowing many camels. They knew also the strong practical objections which exist to entrusting this jurisdiction to Natives.

Compromise of 1872.

Accordingly, they informally proposed to the European community, through the non-official members, that, if they would consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts and to the summary trials without opposition, they (Sir J. F. Stephen, Sir J. Strachey, and others) would agree that no Natives, not even Covenanted Civilians, should have power to try European British subjects. The European community, to whom the proposals were informally made, assented, and the arrangement was embodied in the report and resolution of the Select Committee.

This arrangement was come to, so far as he remembered, during the interregnum between the lamented death of Lord Mayo and the arrival of Lord Napier of Murchistoun, when Sir J. Strachey, as senior member of the Council, practically officiated as Viceroy, and it had Sir J. Strachey's fullest approbation, as appears by his remarks in the debate of 1872.

It was a wise, a statesmanlike compromise, and he felt well assured that the present Government of India, had they had the least idea of the lamentable results that would arise from endeavouring to upset it, would never have brought in this unfortunate Bill.

The debate of 1872 had been entirely misunderstood by Mr. Ilbert in his speech introducing the Bill, and Mr. Ilbert had unconsciously misrepresented the attitude of Sir J. F. Stephen and Sir J. Strachey in that debate.

All the opponents of the compromise in that debate admitted the principle, that only Natives who had become Europeanised in thought, and thoroughly acquainted with European manners and customs, could be permitted to try Europeans. So that a great portion of the proposals in the present Bill were directly opposed to the opinions of the eminent authorities who were appealed to, and relied on in support of it. In particular, so much of the present measure as provided that all Sessions Judges, whether Covenanted Civilians or not, should try European British subjects, was opposed to all authority.

Subordinate Judges from the Uncovenanted Service were now being promoted for their legal ability and aptitude in trying civil cases to be Sessions Judges. Many of them were men of high caste, saturated with caste prejudice, and had never been brought into social contact with Europeans, and were totally ignorant of their manners, customs, and habits of thought. This was also the case with the Natives now being admitted into the Covenanted Service under the new statutory rules, without competition and without going to England.

The Commander-in-Chief, in that debate in 1872, although he advocated the admission of Europeanised Native members of the Covenanted Service, yet was altogether opposed to the trial of Europeans by the Magistrates' Courts in the Mufassal, and had moved an amendment to confine the jurisdiction over European British subjects to the Sessions Courts, as suggested in 1857 by Sir A. Buller. The silence of Mr. Stewart, the non-official member, during the debate on the compromise, was due to a desire not to say things which are best left unsaid unless there is necessity, and to the assurance of Sir J. F. Stephen that a majority of the Council would stand by the compromise, and it was, he believed, the effect of the compromise which led Mr. Stewart to go against the Commander-in-Chief in the division on the subsequent amendment.

He made these observations as they were necessary to a correct understanding of the nature of the settlement of 1872 now sought to be re-opened. He did not put forward that compromise as anything legally or morally binding on the present Government; but he thought it was hard on the European British subjects to take away by a separate Act that concession by which their acquiescence in many of the provisions of the Code had been obtained, leaving in the Code provisions and powers which they were not prepared to entrust to any Native Magistrate in the Mufassal. He thought in fairness such a proposal should only be brought on when there was a general revision of the Code.

The power to direct prosecutions on suspicion and then try the case summarily, without record of evidence and without (in a large class of cases) any right in the accused to cross-examine after charge framed, unless the witnesses happened to be present in Court, were instances of powers which European British subjects were not prepared to entrust into the hands of Natives.

He hoped it was not likely that any Local Government would be so indiscreet as to appoint a Native Magistrate to any district where Europeans were strong and numerous, (a fact, if he was right, which went to show how useless the Bill was); but these powers in the hands of Natives would render the position of the lonely pioneers of European enterprise in remote places untenable and unsafe.

The next question was—

Necessity.

What was the necessity for reopening this burning question? None of the Local Governments consulted had complained of any administrative inconvenience. The reason there was no complaint was not far to seek. Only 11 Natives had entered the Covenanted Civil Service by competition in England, from 1864, when the first of them arrived in India, to the present day, and he had the authority of the *Statesman* for saying that the import had now ceased, owing to a change in the rules at home. Of these eleven one had left the service under circumstances which he need not advert to; one had gone to Madras and was dead. The remaining nine were thus distributed:—two were in Bombay; one, a young Parsee, a very junior officer, was in the North-Western Provinces; and the remaining six were in Bengal. There were none in the rest of India.

The Circular inviting confidential opinions from the Local Governments was sent out on the 28th April 1882, when Mr. Rivers Thompson was Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and it was singular that that circular was not sent to Bengal, and that no opportunities had been given to the Government of Bengal to consult its officers and the High Court on the subject.

He spoke subject to correction by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, who was present, but so far as he (as an outsider) had been able to gather, the opinion of the bulk of the Bengal officers and of the High Court was against the measure, and, so far as he could learn, no administrative necessity had arisen in Bengal or was likely to arise. It was impossible to allege the existence of administrative necessity in the rest of India arising from the presence of three men only, one of whom only would, so far as he could learn, be immediately affected by it and have the power conferred on him of trying European British subjects. The statutory Native Civil Service had very recently been created, and it would be years before the question of investing them with the power became a practical one.

As to stability and durability—

Stability and durability.

The settlement proposed had no single element of stability or durability. It proceeded on the principle (if it could be said to have any real principle in it) of allowing the Local Governments to determine the fitness of individuals to be Justices of the Peace, (Justices of the Peace alone being empowered to try European British subjects) while the area of selection was to be restricted and not left open as in the Presidency-towns, where any fit person might be selected.

Having enunciated this principle of personal fitness (to be judged by the Local Government), the hon. and learned mover found himself face to face with this difficulty. Everyone was agreed that it was not desirable to vest Uncovenanted Native Officers with this power. They, therefore, must remain disqualified.

But as the law now stood, Government was empowered to invest any Uncovenanted Europeans with the power, and had largely done so. There were now from 20 to 30 Uncovenanted European Deputy Magistrates, with first class powers in Bengal, who were Justices of the Peace, and had power to try European British subjects. The Uncovenanted Europeans were fit, and, so far as could be learnt, had exercised their powers impartially and efficiently, but it was an anomaly.

This difficulty was solved by disqualifying all Europeans who were not Covenanted Civilians from being Justices of the Peace in the Mufassal, and practically confining, with a few exceptions, the office of Justice of the Peace to ordinary Covenanted Civilians, whether Native or European, and to the Native Civilians admitted under the new statutory rules.

What principle was there in this? certainly not the principle of *fitness*, for no allegation was made against the fitness of the class it was proposed to exclude, that is, Uncovenanted Europeans. There was a difference of race and moral standard. The effect of it was to disqualify the Uncovenanted Natives. This was a fact. It could not be got rid of. This Bill attempted to hide or disguise the unpleasant fact by disqualifying the Uncovenanted Europeans against whose fitness there was no complaint. Thus, an apparent symmetry was produced at the expense of depriving Government of the services of a class of men who have been admitted as Justices of the Peace since the thirty-third year of His late Majesty, King George the Third, to the acknowledged advantage and convenience of the public service.

But his hon. and learned friend said there was a principle in this. His hon. and learned friend had apparently discovered that there was no privilege of European British subjects as to tribunals to be considered, but a "class of offences" which, from "the circumstances in which they were usually committed" by European British subjects, required to be dealt with by the higher class of Magistrates only. And it was to be presumed that it was this discovery which he considered justified him in disqualifying all Uncovenanted European British subjects from trying so "troublesome and difficult" a class of cases.

The only answer to be made to this was, that it had no basis of fact. There was no "class of offences," but there was a class of persons always liable to be accused of crimes, and who sometimes, but rarely, committed crimes.

Individuals of this class were, owing to the circumstances of the country, often "difficult and troublesome" to try. From the nature of things they must be far more "troublesome and difficult" for a Native to try than for an European to try. This class of persons was at present entitled to special tribunals, or to a special constitution of the tribunals by which they are to be tried.

This Bill attempted to disguise the fact—to allow this class to retain all its anomalous privileges as to tribunals (except the one now in question), and to justify such retention, not on the real ground, but on an imaginary ground, that is, that the offences this class commit are of such a character that Government is justified in enacting for the more "effectual and impartial administration of justice" that none but Covenanted Civilians shall try them, with a few exceptions based on no principle.

The Native Press utterly declines to accept this as final, and many of the Native papers, as the *Amrita Bazár Patrika* of March 1st, give it but very faint support, on the ground that the other anomalies are much more objectionable and inconvenient.

There can be no element of stability or durability in such an illusory settlement as this.

Effectual and impartial administration of justice.

The object of these proposals was said by his hon. and learned friend to be the effectual and impartial administration of justice. On this point it was enough to say that the proposal was to disqualify a class of men against whose effectual and impartial administration of justice no complaint had been made, and to substitute a class

(the Native Statutory Civil Service) whom Mr. Duthoit, Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, declared, in his confidential communication, to be utterly unfit to hold the scales of justice impartially, in cases where Europeans are concerned, and to be often saturated with caste and class prejudices, and who were not necessarily at all Europeanised. Even the *Statesman* (15th February) condemned this class as inferior to many of the Native Deputy Magistrates. Tried by this test, this measure fails on the face of it.

Many of the supporters of this measure were not prepared to go further than Sir Barrow Ellis' amendment in 1872, that is, in effect, to invest with these powers only the nine Covenanted Civilians elected by competition in England; but his hon. and learned friend had confessed, as he (Mr. Evans) understood him, that it would be mere tinkering to stop there, and that the Government would not be justified in re-opening the settlement of 1872, unless they could go further and propose a permanent and durable settlement of the broad question.

Satisfactory tribunal.

There was another test which he would suggest when any change in a tribunal was proposed,—that is, that the tribunal, as reconstituted, should, if possible, have the respect and reverence of the class from which the accused are drawn, and should (if possible) be regarded by the accused and his class as a satisfactory tribunal. This is a cardinal point in the administration of criminal justice. It would be waste of words to demonstrate that the proposed measure utterly fails to stand this test.

He failed to see any sufficient reason for proceeding with so unnecessary and useless a Bill on the face of so strong and intense a feeling as existed, a feeling in which the whole European community in India were practically unanimous.

He was not oppressed by the wonderful "unanimity" of the confidential answers of the Local Governments consulted. Bombay stood in a very peculiar position, with comparatively a small Mufassal, and a small European population in it. The voice of experience in Madras was against it. Even the Governor thought it was a pity to introduce it now. Sir A. Lyall said it would not for many years become a practical question in the North-Western Provinces. The others had nothing to do with it as a practical question, as a measure which would come into immediate operation.

A number of one-sided extracts from the debate of 1872 were sent with the letter of Sir A. Eden and Mr. Gupta's note, and these gentlemen had, he ventured to think, given opinions without sufficient consideration on points which to them must have seemed more abstract than practical. He excepted Mr. Elliott in Assam, who pointed out the need of caution, and Mr. Howell in the Birárs, who showed the grave nature of the issue raised. But it was sufficient to say that all who had given opinions in favour of the change were mistaken as to the feelings it would arouse, and had apparently made no inquiries among the class to be affected.

The voice of Bengal was absent. He could not accept Sir A. Eden's letter as a demand by the Government of Bengal for legislation. Considering the circumstances under which it was written—on the eve of departure, and without any consultation of officers or of the High Court—he looked on it as the individual opinion of Sir A. Eden, suggesting a consideration of the subject at a fitting time, and recording his own opinion. He knew there were in it the words "the time has come." But on the whole he thought it was more a record of individual opinion than a demand for immediate legislation.

Sir A. Eden's views on the subjection of Europeans to Mufassal Courts had never been in harmony with that of the bulk of Europeans in Bengal, official and non-official, as appears by what took place in 1857, when he came into collision with the Judges of the Supreme Court. But he had too great a respect for Sir A. Eden's tact and administrative ability to think that he would have initiated legislation on this subject without trying to ascertain the views of his officers and the High Court and the European community. So much for the "consensus" of opinion.

Then it was said, how can Europeans object to Native Magistrates in the Mufassal and yet suffer them in the Presidency-towns? The power and influence of the European community—the blaze of publicity—the Press—the Bar—the presence and powers of the High Court—are sufficient answers. Besides, the Presidency Magistrate's functions are strictly judicial, and the practice of deliberately attempting to ruin rivals or enemies by cunningly concocted false charges, which is still as common as ever in the Mufassal, is practically unknown in Calcutta.

Argument to show the difference between the Presidency-towns and the Mufassal was unnecessary. His hon. and learned friend had just explained to them that in the Presidency-towns no person was, by reason of birth or descent, exempted from the jurisdiction of any criminal tribunal, and he had just read a long list of the anomalous exemptions accorded to Europeans in the Mufassal. It was not proposed to abolish any of these exemptions, except the one dealt with by this Bill. No responsible adviser of His

Excellency, who had any knowledge of the country, could be found, who would propose the abolition of these exemptions or the extension to the Mufassal of the broad principle that Europeans should be subject to all the Criminal Courts in the Mufassal exactly the same as Natives are. So long as this was so, it was waste of time to combat any argument drawn from a fancied similarity between the Presidency-towns and the Mufassal.

Then there was the alleged slur on Natives; but he denied that any set of judges, any more than assessors or jurymen, were entitled to complain of the privilege of the accused as to his tribunal as a slur on them. If there was to be any question of slur, the large class of Uncovenanted Europeans who were disqualified by this Bill might well complain. He himself, though a Justice of the Peace in England, and now qualified to be a Justice of the Peace in Bengal, Bihár, and Orissa, would be disqualified by this Bill.

But the question before them that day was not a pure matter of argument. The reality and intensity of the feeling against the Bill was patent, and was one of the main points they had to consider as practical legislators.

He felt it his duty to offer some remarks on the reasons for this at the risk of giving pain.

First.—There was a reason, of which all would admit the weight. It was most desirable that a Criminal Judge should be able to put himself in the place of the accused, so as to judge of the probability or improbability of his having committed the alleged offence. This was desirable everywhere, but especially in India. Criminal trials here generally proceeded entirely on oral evidence. The lamentable untruthfulness and untrustworthiness of the bulk of Native oral evidence had been repeatedly commented on by the Privy Council, and was well known to all. It was, therefore, particularly necessary that the Judge should be in a position to try such evidence by the test of its probability or improbability. But, if he was alien in thought and moral standard, and ignorant of the manners, customs, and habits of the accused, how could he put himself in his place?

It was to this power in the Judge, of putting himself in the place of the accused, that the lonely planter in the Mufassal, confronted with a false charge and false witnesses, and far away from help, mainly trusted for protection.

He might be told that defect was exhibited by Europeans in trying Natives. It was so, but that was no reason for introducing the same defect into the trial of Europeans. We had given the Natives an administration of justice immeasurably superior to anything they ever had before. The unswerving uprightness, probity, and intense desire to do impartial justice shown by European Judges had been an education to the people of the country, and they constantly showed their appreciation of it by asking to have their cases transferred from Natives to Europeans.

The second factor was race antagonism. This feeling, which had been fanned into a fierce flame by the horrors of the Mutiny, was slowly dying out, but it was most unwise to stir the embers while so many of the generation who went through the Mutiny were still alive. The vitality of that feeling had been lamentably illustrated by the outbreak with which this Bill had been greeted.

The third and most serious consideration was that dwelt on by his hon. friend Mr. Miller. The Europeans did not trust the Natives as they trusted fellow Europeans. He knew many upright and honourable Natives. But the broad fact remained that the bulk of the Anglo-Saxon race in India looked upon the Natives as men bred in a degrading idolatry, and surrounded from their infancy by influences most adverse to truth, uprightness, honour, and every quality which Englishmen most revere, and which they demand especially in a Criminal Judge. They think that many centuries of Christianity, and of free political life, have given them a moral fibre not to be found among Natives, especially Natives of Bengal.

Can it be wondered at (unless Christianity is a sham, and the belief in national character a delusion) that they refuse to recognise as an Englishman a Native who has spent two or three years in England.

When passed, the effect of this Bill would be to establish tribunals for Europeans which they objected to and refused to respect. There was a vast difference between civil and criminal law. Broadly speaking, the one affects the purse, the other the person. We might be willing to have Natives educated at the expense of our purses; we were not willing to have them educated at the expense of our persons. Every conviction of a European in the Mufassal under these circumstances would be looked on as unjust, and would revive the bitter and violent animosities which they all knew were raging around them that day.

Some said the agitation was a mere flash, and referred to the Black Act of 1836 in Macaulay's time; but a reference to Trevelyan's life of Macaulay would satisfy anyone that the circumstances were widely different, and that no inference could be drawn from the one to the other. That was a Calcutta agitation; this was universal over India. That was about appeals being transferred from the Supreme Court to the Sadr; this was a far graver matter. Besides he thought any Government which proposed to deal with the present European community as "a mere handful of settlers," whose protests might be treated with contempt, would be forgetting the difference between 1836 and 1883.

Was this Bill likely, in any view of it, to remove any evils comparable in magnitude to those it was creating and would create?

This measure would have the effect of giving the power to Uncovenanted Subordinate Judges, when promoted to be District Judges, to try Europeans, though they might be utterly ignorant of their thoughts, ways, and customs.

It would give this power to nine Covenanted Civilians who had been to England, but whom the Europeans in India declined to accept as Englishmen.

It would give this power to the new Native Statutory Civil Service who are declared by Mr. Duthoit to be utterly unfit, and who also are, or may be, Uneuropeanised and ignorant of Europeans. These persons may or may not form a useful machinery for governing Natives, selected, as they often are, on account of the influence and social position of their families. But they are quite unfit to be Criminal Judges over Europeans.

It was a measure which had exasperated Europeans to the highest degree, and had interfered with their growing cordial relations with the Natives and destroyed the harmony between the European British subjects in India and the Government, and would do so to a much greater extent before it was passed. It was a measure which provided a machinery for producing periodical outbursts of race feeling whenever a European was convicted by a Native in the Mufassal—outbursts which would do immense harm and might lead to disastrous results.

It was a measure for which there was no necessity and one which touched almost the only point which was capable of uniting the whole of the Europeans in India as one man against the Government.

It was a measure which could, in any view of it, do little or no practical good, while it had already done and would do incalculable harm.

It was a measure which Government would never have introduced had they known the strength of the feeling against it.

He therefore implored the Government to show the truest form of courage by confessing an error of judgment and withdrawing the Bill at once.

The Hon. Mr. THOMAS said:—"My Lord, the hon. and learned member on whom, by force of his position, has devolved the duty of being the mover of this Bill, has stated emphatically, and re-asserted it on behalf of the Government, that the only object of its introduction is 'to provide for the impartial and effectual administration of justice.' It is a high claim,—a claim so high that every Briton is predisposed, without a thought, to bow to it instinctively, for a love of impartial and effectual justice is ingrained in him. Impartial and effectual justice is just what is in the very nature of every Briton to give to everyone within his power the wide world over. There is a danger, therefore,—a serious danger,—that, heralded with so high a claim, this Bill may be accepted without sufficient examination; and for that very reason it is the more desirable and necessary that it should be stripped of any adventitious advantage it may derive from such heraldry. For we all love justice, and an equal love of justice will surely be conceded to those who, like myself, may venture to traverse this Bill. Presuming that so much will be conceded, we shall commence our examination of the Bill on more even terms, and bearing in mind that the test by which we are invited to try this Bill is, that its object is 'to provide for the impartial and effectual administration of justice,' I will ask, first, what, in prosaic business detail, are the actual particulars in which the dispensation of justice to British subjects is to be improved, so that it shall be more effectual, more impartial, than it has been heretofore? and what the means by which it is to be effected? The answer is supposed to lie in the Bill: there we find that it is by the entrusting of it to Natives of Hindustan that it is to be better done than when it was entrusted to Englishmen. Natives of Hindustan, Foreigners and strangers,—strangers in great part, some more, some less, some altogether—strangers to the social customs, the nice ideas of chivalry and honour, the thousand and one Western strains of thought and surroundings which underlie the springs of action of the British subject; some only partially acquainted with the very language of the Englishman; men who, at best, and but limitedly, have

mixed only with one class of European, the educated and more refined class,—they are to be entrusted with the trial of Europeans, the majority of whom are likely to come from classes of which they know practically nothing, whose only English, too, is an English sufficiently different from anything they have seen in a book, or heard from the lips of any educated European; sufficiently different to throw them out completely, to utterly prevent their getting sight of the point which shall show them the animus which is its gist, the depth and tenor of the provocation which is its justification or its palliation; men who, from want of converse with them, are incapable of appreciating the weight to the individual of the punishment they are called on nicely to apportion; men who have never been on board a ship in their lives; men—Brahmins for instance—whose very religion makes it a sin for them to experience a sea voyage, a sin for which they will be excommunicated; men who are under every possible disadvantage in forming any adequate conception of the necessity, for crew and passengers and cargo, that the commander of a vessel, leagues at sea, without Police or Court within months of him, should be complete master; the necessity—the absolute necessity—that his word should be law; men without a conception of the hardships of the sea, of the numerous petty means of tyranny open to a captain,—how can such men weigh rightly the use and abuse of power at sea? How can such men judge rightly between rough men of few words—rough captain and rougher seamen, using, too, a nautical jargon that is worse than Greek to them? And yet we are invited to pass this Bill, in the expectation that the administration of justice to British subjects will, in the hands of such men, in the hands of Natives, be more effectual, more impartial, that if it is left, as heretofore, to Englishmen.

"All this, I may be told, applies equally to the trial of Natives of this country by Europeans, as it does to the trial of Europeans by Natives. But, I venture to say, it does not. Europeans in India are compelled to learn the languages of the country; they have to learn them before they are even appointed in England; they have to still further qualify in them in this country before they can be promoted: the Natives, who are to try Europeans, are not so compelled. It is specially provided by Statute that the great and increasing majority of them are to be appointed without such examination. Again, Europeans in this country pass their lives among the classes they have to try, the criminal classes of all shades, the labouring classes, the agricultural classes, as well as the better classes; learning their patois, their habits of thought, and their religion or their superstition; learning everything that underlies their springs of action; walking his fields with the farmer, the jungles with the junglemen; listening to their tales of joy and grief; sympathising with and labouring for them; present at their festivities; leading their combined action for any good; hunting, shooting, fishing with them; carried by them by day and night in travel; ever accessible to them in camp or Court; speaking direct as man to man with them; caring, aye, and exerting themselves to the sacrifice of health and even life, for them in famine; and walking daily amongst them, seeing to their village sanitation and the provision of medical treatment when they are dying around them of cholera; making it the one object of their lives to sympathise with and work for them. Such, my Lord, is the life of a district officer. By such means does he qualify himself to enter into the case of the Natives committed to his care. It is no fancy sketch. I have been through it myself, and it is being gone through every day in India by hundreds. Such are the means by which Englishmen have qualified, and continue to qualify, themselves to do justice to the people among whom they live. Will anyone assert the same, or anything approaching the same, of the Natives of this country that are to be entrusted with jurisdiction over British subjects? Have they lived among captains and seamen, soldiers and engine-drivers, mechanical engineers and surveyors, planters and merchants? What have they in common? They are absolutely a sealed book to them, and will be, for they shun them. Only the better class of Englishmen do they know anything about—only the educated official whom they have to meet in business. Of that class only, from whom will never come the subjects of trial, have they any knowledge at all; and even that knowledge is very superficial, and is only what the European chooses to give them, not what they search for for themselves, as we do among them. They do not court knowledge as a duty with a view to be in a position to do justice as the European does; they do not throw open their houses to us as we do to them. Their very religion forbids it; their very religion disqualifies them for ever having an intimate knowledge of the inner life of the European; and, if the fact is so, even with the better classes of Europeans in all but the Presidency-towns, and to a large extent even there, it is still more so in connexion with the classes of Europeans from whom criminal cases are likely to come. For that class of Europeans they studiously avoid, not only on religious grounds, but also because they are afraid of them. The courteous

Asiatic does not understand their rough ways, and there is no reason why they should ever understand them, for there is nothing to bring them into every-day contact with such men. They do not seek to know anything about them, and yet they wish to try them. It is surely irrational! And apart from not seeking, as a duty, to comprehend the habits of thought of the classes they may have to try, there is nothing accidental even to throw them together. They have no subjects of common interest.

"But I will withdraw the statement that, disqualified though they are, and, in accordance with all their preferences, will continue to be, they irrationally wish ignorantly to try Europeans.—I will withdraw it because it is not mine, but an imputation of their own countrymen, an imputation cast by a very few, who grasp at power, an imputation that I believe to be utterly without foundation among the masses. My belief is, and I speak from some little experience of Mufassal life, that the very great majority of Native officials in the Mufassal,—and it is only the Mufassal that the Bill deals with,—the very great, the almost unexceptional, majority would infinitely prefer not to have the white elephant that the Bill proposes to give them. It is only just to say that they are conscious of their disqualifications to try British subjects, and do not want to have to do what they cannot do to their own satisfaction; they are conscious that the Englishman is far more competent to try his fellow rightly, and they would infinitely prefer to leave the difficult task to him; they are content to be left to try only their own countrymen whom they do understand.

"But we have not yet got to the bottom of the incongruity; there is still a lower depth, and one that touches Englishmen, as indeed it touches all manly men, very home. I allude to the wives and daughters of our land. If the Native who is to try has but a very partial knowledge even of the better classes of Englishmen with whom his business compels him to mix outwardly, and a much less, if any, right knowledge of the lower class of Englishmen from whom he is free to keep away, still less has he any knowledge of the ladies, of the wives and daughters of their families. And yet he is to try them; for the term British subject, be it remembered, includes both sexes, and the English lady as well as the British sailor and the British soldier is to be subjected to the jurisdiction of Asiatics. A false complaint lodged by her ayah or Indian lady's maid, by her tailor that sits daily in her verandah, by any one of the household servants, grooms or coachmen, whom, as mistress of the house, she has to order on her husband's behalf,—a false complaint by any irrepressibly obtrusive hawker, who comes unbidden into the very verandah in which she is sitting and will not leave it,—a false complaint by any outside petty cobbler who has been paid his due, but thinks to get twice his due by means of vociferating clamour amounting even to menace, in a manner quite inconceivable to, and incredible by, those who do not know this country,—a false complaint by any of these may any day subject English ladies and English women to be tried by Foreigners. These are no ideal pictures. They are every-day circumstances of middle class Mufassal life, unexperienced, perhaps, by the well-to-do, but well known to their poorer unofficial brethren. Patience outlives the provocations, and nothing comes of them, because there is the certainty of a fair trial in the background, and the Court is the Court of a countryman. But when it comes to be known, as it will be known if this Bill passes, that anyone can summon an English lady before a Native, and that, right or wrong, she will, in 99 cases out of 100, pay any fine rather than appear, and it is borne in mind that, even if she does appear and answer to the charge, the complainant has more than satisfied himself with the sweets of the annoyance he has caused,—when this comes to be known, there is hardly room to doubt that complaints of this sort will become distressingly numerous. The position of English ladies and English women, left alone in their houses while their husbands are in Court, or camp, or office, or workshop, will be very distressing even in the bare contemplation. The security, and the feeling of assurance of security, which they now have, in trial by a British Magistrate, will be gone from them, and they will be subjected to the jurisdiction of Asiatics.

"I have cursorily alluded to the falsity of the complaints; but only most cursorily, both because I took it for granted that the proneness to false complaints in the Mufassal was well known, and also because I shrunk from dwelling on that side of the question—I shrunk from it, because unwilling to make unkindly imputations. But now that it has been stated by one hon. member that such is not his experience in the Mufassal, and the hon. and learned member to my right (Mr. Evans) has advanced opposite experience, I feel bound to say that my experience of the Mufassal, extending as it does over nearly a quarter of a century, is entirely in accord with that of Mr. Evans, that false complaints and false evidence are common in the Mufassal. I speak not of what may be called exaggerations and hard swearing; I speak of deliberate machinations,

that are perfectly staggering and appalling to the European; of rehearsals held in the presence of all the witnesses, that they may be thoroughly tutored in all details; of dress rehearsals, so to speak, held just before the trial, and in the very precincts of the Court to refresh memory. I could instance a case in which a poor man was hired to take a blow from a billhook, and all the witnesses were present to see and testify to the blow in all detail, only instructed to substitute an European for the Native striker of the blow. I could produce volumes of such evidence, but time will not allow. And I have no desire to do more than is absolutely necessary to bring that side of the question forward, and have only been constrained, as I have said, by the conflict of opinion.

"And why, let me ask for Britons, as they will ask,—why are they to be thus subjected to the jurisdiction of Asiatics? Not on account of any necessity of the case; not because it cannot be helped; not because the Natives wish it, but because—yes, that is what we are asked to expect—because the justice thus provided through the medium of the Asiatic will be more impartial, more effectual, than that dispensed by the Englishman himself; that is what the proposal comes to; that is what the Bill says in effect; and my business is with the Bill, the people to be tried by it, the people to be empowered by it. The only object of the Bill is 'to provide for the impartial and effectual administration of justice,' and that is the test by which I am invited to try it. If it be said that I rather overstrain the argument by applying the claim of impartial and effectual justice to the people to be tried by the Bill, and not, as was meant, to the magistrates and judges who are to administer it, then I plead in answer that such words should never surely be said with reference to any but the persons who are to experience in their proper persons whether the justice meted out is or is not impartial and effectual; that they have no applicability to anyone else, least of all to the mere machinery, the judges and magistrates, who only give life and existence to the Bill, and are merely the means by which the more impartial and effectual administration of justice is to be provided.

"Whatever may have been said elsewhere on the other phases of the Bill as it affects Natives, by removing an anomaly and a stigma, it cannot be that the claim by which we are invited to try the Bill, that of providing impartial and effectual justice, can have been put forward with reference to anything but the quality of the justice administered to the people who sought it, that is, to the complainant and accused. The question of anomaly and personal stigma is perfectly distinct. We shall come to that separately hereafter, but at present we have only to do with the claim that the Bill 'provides for the impartial and effectual administration of justice.'

"To the Englishman at home, who knows not this country, it may even seem that it does so provide; but when the Bill is examined in the light of the experience of those who have spent their lives in the study and the service of this country and its people, who can throw upon the Bill the light of actuals rather than of theories, it is then that it becomes apparent that the circumstances of the position afford no real foundation for the expectation that the administration of justice to British subjects will be either more effectual or more impartial for being entrusted to Foreigners and strangers rather than to fellow-countrymen—to Natives rather than to British subjects.

"But this, I may be told, is my idea—only my idea. Let the Native speak for himself. I shall quote, my Lord, from the *Madras Native Opinion*, a newspaper edited by a Brahman of considerable culture, a Native who has the interests of Natives, the interests of his country, very much at heart. He writes in a leading article of that paper, dated 14th February 1883:—

'Let us take, for instance, the case of a Deputy Magistrate of the first class who is called upon to try a case between two Europeans, one, say, a Covenanted Civil Servant, and the other a merchant or a planter. The case may be one of assault or defamation, and have arisen out of some episode at a ball, a club-room, or a dinner party. Now, if the Deputy Magistrate happens to be a Brahman (as almost all of those on the Madras establishment are) who has not been in Madras, and whose knowledge of English is but limited, what a predicament the poor man is sure to be in? He cannot possibly understand the allusions which will be made, and the conventional terms used in such a case, and he cannot very well engage an interpreter to explain what is meant. We leave our readers to imagine what the result will be, and what satisfaction the Magistrate's decision is likely to cause to the litigant parties.'

"And in a subsequent issue the same Native editor says—

'We must not lose sight of the fact that, while nothing is easier than for the European to obtain evidence or information on such matters in Native society as he might not know, the Native Magistrate is very differently placed. The *Munshi* and clerks of an Anglo-Indian Magistrate are Natives of the country, and if they are not able to supply it themselves they can easily obtain for their

master any information the latter may need in connexion with the disposal of cases. Now, to whom can the Native Magistrate turn when he has an Englishman brought before him?'

"And this Native editor is not alone in his opinion of the unfitness of his countrymen to try British subjects; but I must revert to the objection that, if it is right in theory for Europeans to try Natives, it is right also for Natives to try Europeans; and again I will say that, in my humble opinion, it is not so, because the case is not parallel. It is not as if Englishmen were asking to have authority to try Natives, as Natives are asking for jurisdiction over British subjects. The whole history of our Law Courts in India shows the fallacy of such an argument. Englishmen have no desire to try Natives because they are Natives. Indeed, they would never have tried them at all if they had been capable of trying themselves, and our whole aim ever since we came to this country has been steadily in the direction of fitting them to try their own countrymen; and as we have found them more and more qualified, so we have gone on extending their jurisdiction over their countrymen, or, in other words, resigning to them more and more of the judicial work in connexion with their own countrymen that we had in earlier years to do for them.

"Thus falls to the ground the argument that, if Englishmen try Natives, so, in fairness, ought Natives equally to try Englishmen; for, as we have seen, the Englishman does not want to try Natives, and is getting rid of the duty and consigning it to their countrymen as fast as he legitimately can. The Native also, with a few exceptions, does not want to try Englishmen, and is not qualified to try them even if he wished to.

"Once more, this same history of our legal dealing with India, if examined a little more closely, will fully explain the seeming anomaly of British subjects being exempted from Native jurisdiction, the seeming anomaly of which so much has been made. When we came to this country, did we find equitable law courts in which Englishmen and Natives could alike obtain equal justice? did we upset them and introduce this anomaly in favour of our countrymen? No. We found Surája Dowla, and the Black Hole, and the like of that. There was no such thing as law and justice. The land was a land of violence, of systematic and periodical marauding, of constant blackmail, of daily uncertainty of life and property, in short, of all the many forms of anarchy and misrule and lawlessness which I may not stay to dwell upon. It is matter of history, and it still lives in proverbs, customs, castes, tenures, structures, which point to the then every-day existence of a state of things for which there was no remedy but to sweep it clean away. It was for us, a mere handful of strangers, to introduce law and order, and to import into this country as much justice as was possible in the circumstances. We were too few in number to give to every Native with our own hands as good justice as we were accustomed to in the land from which we came; but we were enough to mete it out to our own countrymen, from whom there probably was not more than a case or two in a decade; and not only were they entitled to have no less a scale of justice than we were able to give them, but in the earlier days it was more, perhaps, to the interest of the Native than of any one else that Britons should be tried by Britons, who had both the courage and the mind to enforce law and order on their own countrymen, and to put down with a strong unwavering hand any disposition to take advantage of being members of the dominant race. Other than Britons there were none in the early days, because all other Europeans were deported. Thus it came about that Britons in India have till now been under the jurisdiction of Britons, and there was, and is still, *no necessity* for their being under any other jurisdiction.

"With the Natives, however, the necessities of the case were very different. It was impossible that the few and far between Englishmen should, in their own person, try all the teeming millions of Natives over such wide areas. The attempt would have been too extravagantly quixotic. They did the closest they practically could to it. In short, they aimed at the same thing for both; they aimed at giving the Native, as they gave their countrymen, the very best justice in their power to give; and while they gave the Briton the same as he had been accustomed to in the land of his nativity, they gave the Native of India a very great deal better than he had ever seen or heard or dreamt of before. And this they did by keeping the graver cases in their own hands, by deciding the intermediate cases on reports accompanied by the record, and leaving only minor cases to the decision of Natives. Then they fostered education, and they imposed examinations on candidates for public service, and subsequently they enhanced the scope of those examinations; and as they gradually qualified the Native for the right exercise of power, they entrusted him with more and more of it, till now we have Natives on the High Court Benches. I confess it puzzles me, my Lord, to see how anyone can say that the tendency of legal administration in India has not been uniformly

and without anomaly in the simple and single direction of giving the best form of justice possible in the circumstances to all classes, Briton and Native alike. With Britons we started at the top, because, from the paucity of their numbers, it was possible to do so. With the Natives this was impossible, because of their countless numbers, and their unmanageable areas, compared with the mere handful of Englishmen that have governed this vast Empire. So we started as near as we could to the same point, and keeping it ever in view, progressed steadily as circumstances allowed, always towards the same end. The progress has ever been upwards and the principle uniform. There has been no anomaly whatever, and there is no anomaly now in the sense urged in favour of this Bill. But to turn round now and progress downwards, by placing the British subject under a tribunal of less competency to do him justice than he already enjoys, and we have readily at command, and to do that for no better reason than to remove a fancied anomaly, that would be an anomaly indeed.

"'The anomalous nature of present arrangements' is one of the reasons put forward for the introduction of this Bill. Rightly examined, the anomaly lies, not in Natives having less jurisdiction out of Presidency-towns than they have in them, but in their having jurisdiction over British subjects anywhere. The anomaly lies in having made an exception of Presidency-towns. The anomaly lies in having, in Presidency-towns, departed from the simple principle on which we had uniformly proceeded, of ever giving to both races the best justice practicable in the circumstances, in proceeding downwards instead of upwards. Remove that anomaly, and the position is logical and clear. But to set up that anomaly, and to base on it the claim to surround it with so many more anomalies that it shall cease to stand out singly as a marked anomaly, is to lead us blindly into a maze of anomalies in which we can never see our place to stop.

"If we must needs turn aside to such trifles as anomalies, and legislate on what I will take leave to call such very secondary grounds, then, to be consistent, we ought rather to wipe out this first great anomaly, have done with the whole side issue, and revert to first principles—logical principles. But there is no need for this, and all I wish to say on this point is, do not let us bring the existence of one anomaly forward as a reason for justifying the creation of more.

"I submit, my Lord, that if we want to avoid anomalous positions and preserve logical action in the future, there is no point at which we can so safely call a halt as where we now are. The hon. and learned mover of the Bill, in summing up the principles which have guided the framers of the Bill, says—and I cordially agree with him in the principle—'that, if this question is reopened, it ought to be settled on a permanent and stable foundation.' I agree with him, because it is a corollary that, if it cannot be 'settled on a permanent and stable foundation,' it ought not to be re-opened. I submit, my Lord, that there is no landmark that can be called permanent about the position which the Bill takes up. It gives Natives the same jurisdiction over British subjects as Englishmen exercise over the same class of criminals, but that is not the same jurisdiction as is exercised over Natives; it is a modified quantity of jurisdiction amounting only to imprisonment for one year in the Mufassal; and, while the distinction in the quantity of punishment awardable to British subjects and Natives is maintained, it cannot be said that the Bill has brought us to the point to which it is claimed to have brought us, that of impartiality, of the removal of race distinctions, and specially of finality. Sir Ashley Eden—though I doubt whether he used the words advisedly—certainly does use the words 'full powers,' and that means the powers of life and death, of transportation for life, of imprisonment for 14 years. When the Native Judge in the Mufassal exercises such powers over the British subject, then we shall have removed 'race distinctions;' then we shall have arrived at impartiality and finality. But not till then. If the advocates of the Bill are not prepared to go as far as that, then admittedly they are not prepared to conduct us to what alone will justify the re-opening of this question, a settlement 'on a permanent and stable foundation.'

"Again, there is no element of finality that I can trace about the persons selected for the exercise of jurisdiction over British subjects.

"There is no such self-evident cause as can stand as a landmark why others should not equally be selected. Indeed, for my part, I think a Deputy Magistrate who has been for years associated with Europeans, who has had a long magisterial training as a Tahsíldár Magistrate, who has his judgment mellowed by years, who, at the very outset of his career, has to pass qualifying examinations, and who has eventually been promoted for tried efficiency, is eminently better qualified to exercise such powers than a young man under 25, appointed without like examination, without trial, and without magisterial training or converse with British subjects; and such are the Native Civil Servants con-

stituted under the statutory rules. If, then, the Native Deputy Magistrates, who are in hundreds all over the Presidencies, are obviously preferable to one of the classes named in the Bill, it follows that the settlement made by the Bill is not 'on a permanent and stable foundation.' I do not see how anyone, be he Native or European, can well think that this will be a final settlement. On the contrary, well nigh everyone outside these walls seems to look upon it as a mere beginning, as the opening of a door, as the introducing of a principle; and that is why there is so much agitation and anxiety about it—and that is why I, for one, my Lord, have indented so largely on your Lordship's patience. What I feel is, that this Bill will lead us into a hazy illogical position, with no distinct landmark to stop at; whereas, if we stand where we are, we have a defined line and a reason for it in Presidency-towns. If once we leave them and go half way down hill on the road to inferior justice for British subjects, we can never stop till we reach the bottom; and that bottom, where is it? It is deeper down even than our own Native Courts. It carries us into Native Courts in Foreign States. When once we have admitted that in our own Courts Natives are to try Britons, we can no longer insist that in Foreign Courts Britons shall not equally be tried by Natives; and so we shall have created another anomaly that will have to be wiped out. We shall not have arrived at finality; we shall have to go on and rescind the Act, not so long ago enacted, by which Britons were exempted from Native jurisdiction in Foreign States.

"Once more, the same hand that sweeps away anomalies and partialities so as to lead us to a settlement that shall be final, introduces, by the same stroke of the pen, an incongruity and a piece of race partiality that, to my thinking, is more glaring than any which it removes. The effect of the amendment of section 443, by the elision of the words 'and an European British subject,' is, not only to admit the Native to jurisdiction over British subjects, but by race distinction to bar the Briton, so that, if, for instance, the learned and hon. member to my right (Mr. Evans),—distinguished member though he is of the Calcutta Bar; if the Lord Chief Justice himself—were to elect to offer their services gratuitously for the trial of their countrymen in Calcutta or elsewhere in India, as they might do, and as so many do in England, they would find that, by the Bill we are asked to pass, they would be legally disqualified by reason of their race. In spite of their having the highest possible qualifications, in legal knowledge, in knowledge of the classes to be tried, to wit, their fellow countrymen, they would be legally barred by race distinction—barred solely because they are Britons, barred in the interests of the more effectual and impartial justice to be administered by Natives, stigmatised—if we are to use such a poor argument at all—stigmatised, in order that no stigma may be cast on Natives; and this, we are told, is an element of finality. The barring of the Briton is to be final.

"But casting to the winds such very secondary ideas as legislating for a stigma, neither is it convenient in practical every-day work that every Briton, simply by reason of his being a Briton, should be barred from jurisdiction over Britons. At certain ports, far distant from the seat of any Magistrate, it is convenient that the master attendant should have jurisdiction in trifling cases over the seamen frequenting the port. That will not be possible when all Britons are legally disqualified by the proposed amendment of section 443.

"As the word 'stigma' has been forced upon us, and we are called on to consider it in the course of this discussion, let me take the opportunity, before parting with the word, to say that, in considering their *circumstantial* disqualifications for trying Britons, I cast no manner of stigma on Natives—no more, in fact, than if the Commander-in-Chief, there, were to stigmatise me as unfit to command a brigade, or even a company. And even if it were a sort of fancied stigma not to be allowed to try a class of cases you were not calculated to be exactly the best man to understand; even if it were a hardship equal to being tried by a man who was not calculated to understand your case, and the hardships on both sides being equal—which, of course, they are not and never can be,—we were cast on the horns of a dilemma and had to choose between them, there still need not be a moment's hesitation about the choice, for the persons affected by the one hardship are in thousands, if not tens of thousands; whereas those affected by the other fancied hardship may be numbered on the fingers. On the principle, therefore, of the greatest good of the greatest number, there should not be a moment's hesitation about abandoning a Bill that legislates for the few against the many.

"To sum up the above objections and apply them to the Bill. Not only does this Bill not 'contain in itself,' as is claimed for it by the hon. and learned mover, 'the elements of stability and durability,' but it is pregnant with exactly the opposite elements,

and, therefore, by the corollary of that very proposition, this question ought not to be re-opened.

"Looking once again at the reasons given for the re-opening of the question, I find it is commended to us on the ground that 'the time has come.'

"It is a set phrase, 'the time has come;' but there may be two views about its applicability. The time when we are doing all we can to induce English capital to come to this country seems scarcely the time to scare it away with inferior justice to the Englishman. Tell the English capitalist, who is prepared to send his sons and his money out to this country to be large employers of labour in coffee, tea, or cinchona estates; in gold, iron, and other mines; in cotton or jute mills and so forth,—tell him that, if any one of the several hundred men, women, and children employed by his son lodges a complaint against him, 'the time has come' for his son to be tried by a Native,—I have a shrewd suspicion that he will have very different ideas about the time. He will not stay to ask what like the Native is, whether qualified or not. He will be apt, I think, to have strong opinions—some might call them prejudices—which we will have to put up with if we want him to bring his capital, for in that, at least, he is master of the situation. He will turn his back on us and send his sons and his capital elsewhere. And in the main he will be in the right; for, whether the planter gets justice or not at the hand of the Native Magistrate, is rather a secondary consideration; the mere fact of his having, on some trifling charge, had to appear before and be tried by a Native Magistrate, of the same caste and family, perhaps, as one of his own writers or contractors, will so lower him to their own level in the eyes of his two or three hundred coolies, that he will not be able to command their respect any more. It can answer no useful end to judge of these things by European ideas; we must take them as we find them in this country; and such, I am convinced, would be the effect on the mind of the Indian coolies and their maistries. I am convinced of this; because I have moved not a little amongst planters and their labourers, and made it my duty to acquaint myself with their position, as much as with that of any other farmers and their men; and now it is equally my duty to represent their interests here to the best of my poor ability; for their interests are the interests of the country, and it will be a dark day, indeed, for India if British energies, British intelligence, and British capital leave it in disgust. In a less degree, also, it will be an evil day for India if British energies, intelligence, and capital are discouraged from continuing to flow into it. It is a consideration of no small moment that the planters of Assam, of the Nilgiris, of the Wynaad, and other places, with the lákhs of rupees that they bring into this country, should not be discouraged, which, I am convinced, they will be if this Bill passes. I specially allude to planters, because, settling, as they do, in isolated positions, each a lone man among a hundred, they are specially trusting in, and specially entitled to, the best justice we can give them, a style of justice that shall give them a feeling of security.

"One word more about the time having come from another point of view. If any of the above reasons for not subjecting Britons to native jurisdiction have any weight, and had weight to sway the majority in 1872, surely they can only have *increasing* weight as the number of British subjects in the country increases; and in that sense the time, instead of having come, is, if anything, more remote than it was in 1872.

"When this matter was discussed in 1872, there were no Native gentlemen in this Council. Now there are four hon. members, and they are called upon to decide with us on the liberties of the British subject. The appeal to try the question by 'impartial justice' is addressed to them as well as to us; and there is a side of this case which specially addresses itself to them. They are better able, perhaps, than we are to appreciate the value to them of the special concessions made to them,—concessions made, some of them, in the very face of Western notions of justice,—concessions simultaneously denied to our own countrymen. I will touch with a word only, lest I should offend, such things as dancing girls, child marriage, child widowhood for life, plurality of wives, exemption on account of rank from appearance in Court, exemption on account of sex from appearance in Court—exemptions that we do not accord to our own Princes and our own ladies. Natives are the best judges of the value to them of these and like privileges, and, accordingly, they have been allowed, and rightly allowed, to be the judges: their voices have ever prevailed; their wishes have ever been scrupulously regarded, the only test applied being, will it do any positive injury to anyone else to concede these privileges? If it will not, then, by all means, let us liberally concede them. This has been the principle that has guided the concessions to Natives. Is it not fair to let the same equitable principle govern the grant of concessions to Europeans? Britons are

the best judges of the value to them of the privilege of being tried by Britons, a privilege of which they seem to think so much ; and if it will not do any positive injury to anyone else to let them have the privilege, then, by parity of treatment, by all means let them have the privilege. This view of the case will, probably, commend itself to the minds of Natives as an impartial one. Again, what would Natives think if, with the cry of justice to a class amounting to one half of India—the downtrodden females—in the interests of morality or any such like cry which an English philanthropist might raise, we ran atilt at their time-honoured institutions ? I imagine they would say at once that it was legislating for an idea, was uncalled for and provocative. By parity of reasoning, the great mass of Englishmen look upon this attack on their privileges as equally uncalled for. If the attack is not justifiable in the one case, neither is it, I submit, in the other. Far, far be it from us to disturb the mind of the Asiatic with even the breath of a suspicion of any interference with his time-honoured valued privileges that do no positive injury to anyone else. By parity of treatment, far be it from him to deal by us otherwise than as we have dealt by him.

"While I have contended above that trial of Briton by Briton is only a natural sequence of the impartial effort to give to Briton and Native alike the best justice in our power to give, here, I have called it, for argument's sake alone, a privilege, and even as a privilege have shown, I think, that it has a claim to be honoured ; a claim, too, based strictly on the very test by which we are invited to try the Bill, that of impartiality.

"But what I have said above has been simply comment on the reasons given for introducing the Bill. The reasons for not going on with it, though few and simple, are, to my mind, more forcible.

"The first reason is of itself enough to throw out any Bill. It is not wanted. With the exception of a fanciful few, fidgetting impatiently after an idea, nobody wants the Bill. Nobody, European or Native, wants the Bill for any practical good that it will do him.

"On the other hand, there are very large numbers who, whether rightly or wrongly is a secondary matter here, are nevertheless, as a matter of fact, vehemently, aye vehemently, opposed to the Bill, and they come of a class, too, on whom all the best interests of India are immeasurably more dependent than they are on any other class. It is an obvious fact of which we cannot but take count, and their vehement feeling in the matter has led to the rousing and bringing prominently forward of the very feeling which the Bill was meant to lay—race antagonism—feeling given expression to in the Native Press, and thus disseminated, in much more violent and provocative language than Britons have indulged in. Now that it has been unmistakeably seen that the Bill has roused and keeps on intensifying the very feelings it was meant to allay, the Bill, if it is to be consistent with its aim, ought, I submit, to be withdrawn.

"That it is wanted for administrative convenience, as has been alleged, is a mere loose statement, which five minutes reference to the criminal statistics of the country would conclusively falsify. Theoretical positions may be set up, but so absolutely is fact against theory in this matter that I will not waste time on it.

"Though I have urged above that, in effect, the Bill does not give what it professes to give, I never meant to imply that, in theory and in the minds of the framers, it was not honestly, generously intended and expected that it should and would give it. Who would doubt it ? Not doubting it, I venture to urge that the same soul of honourable, generous impartiality which lay behind the idea that prompted the Bill, should equally impel the advocates of this Bill to abandon it, now that it is unmistakeably clear that the Bill will not forward, but will positively thwart, their liberal intentions. I am not one of those who cannot admit honourable, high-minded intentions in those who think differently ; nay, rather, I venture to make an appeal to those very intentions to which I pay all honour. If it is manly in an individual to admit a well-intentioned error, and he only rises in our estimation for the generosity of the admission—and none but the mean-spirited will impute it to weakness—may not a Government also, conscious of its strength, do the same with advantage, advantage both to its own credit and, what is of much more importance, to the interests of the great country committed to its charge ? By the introduction of this Bill, the Government has made it abundantly plain that it entertains the most liberal intentions towards the Natives of India ; that it has placed beyond a doubt ; that surely will henceforth be accepted on all hands without a question ; and that having been demonstrated, surely the Government is in the best possible position for saying in effect, if not in word, to the peoples of India—'Though we entertain these unquestionable sympathies, yet, in the course of the ventilation which this Bill has undergone, we have come to know that the passing of the Bill will not compass for you the

advantages we had aimed at, but will, on the contrary, injure you seriously, by rousing a deep feeling of race antagonism in a class on which all your best interests are immeasurably dependent for justice, intelligence, capital, energy, progress in civilisation, commerce, agriculture, and all the material elements, of peace, plenty and health. Though in an infinitesimally minor degree, the Government itself also is not without indebtedness to the martial loyalty of the class that strengthens Her Majesty's forces in India by the supply of some ten thousand volunteers of all arms. We have accordingly resolved, in the best interests of the very people for whom this Bill was introduced, to abandon it.' If the Government can do this of its own motion, it will, I submit, take a high stand indeed in the calmer judgment of posterity; and it can well afford, in its conscious strength, to think cheaply of any such petty charge as having yielded to clamour; for, in the eyes of the wise and generous, it will be judged to have yielded, not to clamour itself, but to the light cast by the expression of feeling elicited by the ventilation of the Bill, or to speak more correctly, not to have yielded a jot, but adhered, under the new light thrown, to its own previously expressed intent of allaying race antagonisms.

" If the Government can do this, not in Council here, but of its own motion, then a thousand times *bis dat qui cito dat.* The sooner it does it, I submit, the better. If the Bill is understood to be only postponed till November, then the deplorable—the very deplorable—feelings that have been roused on both sides will only smoulder deeper and wider till the November discussion fans them again into flame; and then, if the Bill is carried by the Government, voting as a Cabinet, and not individually, as on the discussion of this point in 1872, the feeling will not pass away with the passing of the Bill, but will sullenly live for years to come and burst out afresh whenever a case in point arises. I hardly like to dwell on the depth and growing intensity and breadth of the feeling of race antagonism that has been raised. I only feel bound to touch the warning note, that it is a matter worthy of the gravest consideration of Government.

" The Government has only very recently taken additional steps for the better ventilation of Bills, with the avowed intention of availing themselves, in the interests of the country, of the better light shed by such increased ventilation. Here, then, in the deep and widespread agitation and vehement expression of strong feelings, is the very light they have courted. Will they cast aside the very light they have courted on the very first exhibition of it? Will they not rather recognise that it is the very light they courted, and, in consonance with their own previously expressed policy, rather use it in the best interests of the country? Surely they are in an advantageous position for doing so without risk of being misunderstood.

" Both in respect of having unmistakeably demonstrated their liberal intentions towards Natives, and in respect of having expressed a desire, for the public good, to obtain and be guided by the views of the people legislated for, and also in respect of both acts being quite recent, the Government are surely in the best possible position for promptly withdrawing this Bill of their own motion. Indeed, if they do not, they will even seem to stultify their own professions.

" Yet another course is open to the Government, a medium course that will probably satisfy the moderate minded on both sides, giving the Native the coveted brevet rank, and still practically retaining to the Briton his freedom,—a course also that will lead us into no illogical positions, and meet all fancied administrative difficulties—that of making the jurisdiction proposed to be given to Natives permissive only on the Briton positively waiving his right to be tried by a Briton. But in such case it would have to appear on the first summons that the Briton had the right, and he would have to endorse his election to appear or not to appear before a Native, and the jurisdiction should not be extended beyond the cases now contemplated. But this is only suggested as a compromise not without dangers; and the much more satisfactory and manly course would be to abandon the Bill.

" Having taken upon me to tender this my humble opinion of the best course to be pursued with this Bill, I wish to submit that it is in no spirit of factious opposition to the Government; indeed, I knew not till very recently that the Bill was to be regarded as a Cabinet measure, if indeed it is to be so regarded, as the hon. Law Member tells us to-day, and herein I must plead my newness to the rules of this Council. I thought it was put forward as an important measure on which the Government were anxious, as in 1872, to obtain the unfettered opinions of everyone present; and if I have erred in too candidly submitting mine, I trust it may be recognised that I have been influenced by no spirit of factious opposition; far from it. I have said what I have said only in true loyalty to the Government. Being called here, I felt bound, on a point of such vital interest to the country, to place my views, for whatever they might be worth, at the service of

Government. If they were worth nothing, the labour was mine only, and they could be cast aside. If they were worth anything, and served by a feather's weight even to influence the decision of Government, then I should rejoice indeed to have spoken freely, as I feel earnestly, in behalf of what I humbly believe to be the best interests of the country in which I have spent my life, and which I have as truly at heart as the liberal-minded framers of the Bill. In this light, and aiming in effect at the same final ends as do the framers of the Bill, I shall trust, though a seeming opponent, to be eventually recognised as a true coadjutor."

The Hon. Mr. Reynolds said:—"My Lord, I shall not detain the Council with more than a very few remarks, but I wish to take this opportunity of expressing my cordial approval of the principle of this Bill. That principle is clearly explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, and has been further explained to-day by the hon. member in charge of the Bill. It is simply this, to do away with all judicial disqualifications which are based upon mere distinctions of race. What we have to look at in a Judge or a Magistrate is, not his colour, but his character; not his pedigree, but his ability and his integrity. I was a member of the Select Committee last year on the Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question of the exceptional position of European British subjects under the criminal law was raised in the course of the discussion upon that Bill; but it was brought before the Council in a form, and at a stage of the proceedings, which precluded us from taking it into consideration, except at the risk of deferring the passing of the Bill to another session, and thus delaying the introduction of those useful reforms which have now become law in the amended Code of Criminal Procedure. But a promise was then given by the Government that the matter should not be lost sight of; and I presume that the Government had this promise in mind when it was determined to introduce the present Bill.

"I not only accept the principle of the Bill, but I entirely approve of the system on which it is proposed to carry that principle into effect. This is a Bill for levelling up, not for levelling down. It does not take away from Englishmen the cherished right of being tried by their peers, but it declares that a Magistrate shall not be precluded from being deemed the peer of an Englishman merely because he happens to be a Native. In the criticisms which have lately been poured out upon the Bill, it has been confidently asserted that this is a measure for removing a mere sentimental grievance; for dealing with a difficulty which may arise at some future time, but which has not yet assumed a practical shape. The authors of those criticisms must have been imperfectly acquainted with the facts of the case. In August last, Mr. Romesh Chunder Dutt, a Covenanted Civil Servant, was appointed to officiate as Magistrate and Collector of Balasore, and he has now been again appointed to officiate as Magistrate and Collector of Bákirganj. Mr. Dutt is an officer of some distinction in the service to which I have the honour to belong. He stood second in his year at the final examination in England; he is a barrister-at-law; he has filled subordinate appointments with credit; and he has written ably and successfully on economic questions in Bengal. It is something more than a sentimental grievance that such a man, who is thought competent to hold the chief executive charge of a district, should remain under a legal disqualification for exercising the powers of a Justice of the Peace. Such a disqualification hampers the Government in the selection of its officers, and weakens the hands of justice, and I should rejoice to see it removed from the Statute-book.

"If, therefore, the motion before us to-day, instead of being merely a motion for the publication of papers, had been a motion to refer the Bill to a Select Committee, I should have had no hesitation in voting in favour of it. I do not say that I am entirely satisfied with the provisions of the Bill. I feel considerable doubt whether the first section has not been too widely drawn, and whether it would not have been better to restrict the operation of the measure to officers, whether Covenanted Civilians or not, who might be actually appointed to be Sessions Judges or District Magistrates. But points of this kind do not touch the principle of the Bill, and the Select Committee would be the proper place for their consideration.

"It is, of course, a further question whether, in view of the determined opposition which this measure has encountered, it would be prudent in the Government to make any further attempt to pass it into law. It appears to me that this is primarily a question for the Executive, but I imagine it is quite within the competence of this Council, as a legislative body, to say that, though the abstract principles of a measure may be equitable and right, it would be impolitic and inopportune to make them part of the law of the land. That, however, is not a question which we are called upon to consider to-day. If the present ferment should subside; if the passions which have been aroused,

and the misrepresentations which have been made, should disappear before a calm consideration of what the Government really proposes to do, and what the effects of its legislation are likely to be, I should gladly give my vote, when the time comes, for passing into law a measure based upon the principle of this Bill. But if, on the other hand, postponement and reflection should intensify the feeling which undoubtedly exists to-day; if it should be made clear that the deliberate verdict of the European community in India is opposed to any such legislation as this; if the appeal to Philip sober, which is now to be made, should be dismissed on the merits of the case,—the Government would undoubtedly incur a serious responsibility by asking this Council to pass the Bill."

The Hon. DURGÁ CHARAN LÁHÁ said:—"My Lord, this Bill, in my humble opinion, is a move in the right direction, and I deeply regret the feeling which it has evoked.

"It seems to me absurd to suppose that the Native officers who were deemed qualified to hold the responsible post of Magistrate and Judge, and to sit in judgment upon millions without distinction of rank, were not competent to exercise jurisdiction over European British subjects in criminal matters.

"As to race prejudice, which has been already referred to, I for one think that it has little or no existence in fact. With the progress of English education and increased intercourse with Europeans, I am glad to say this feeling has no place in the minds of educated Natives, and that any apprehension as to failure of justice in their hands appears to me wholly groundless.

"What is this change, after all, that the Government propose to introduce? It is to give the same powers to a few selected Native Civilians that Englishmen holding the same position already possess. These Native gentlemen have had to pass the same examinations, and are considered by Government competent to perform the same executive duties, as their brother Civilians. If we refuse to put them on an equality as regards judicial powers, we shall, I maintain, be casting an unnecessary slur upon them, and lower them in the eyes of the people whom they have been deputed to rule. Much better, I say, not have introduced them into the service at all, than, once having done so, impugn their probity by saying 'You shall perform all the duties belonging to the 'office of an ordinary Civilian, except that of having judicial powers in criminal cases over 'any European.' We must remember that it is only proposed to invest those Native Civilians who have proved themselves to be of unexceptionable probity with the power in question, and, looking at the safeguards that are to be maintained against any possible failure of justice, can any Englishman honestly say that he is afraid that his countrymen will run any greater risk of being unfairly treated at the instance of a Native Judge than they will at that of a fellow-countryman? A Native Civilian would naturally be always most careful and anxious to see that no injustice should happen in the case of a European, as he would know that he would be accused of race hatred or incompetence should any fault be found with his judgment.

"It has been said that the passing of the amendment will prevent the introduction of British capital and enterprise into this country. I cannot bring myself to believe that anything of the kind will ever happen. The same argument was employed when Act XI of 1836, bringing our European fellow-subjects within the jurisdiction of the Mufassal Civil Courts of the East India Company, was passed, and we now see how the predictions then made have been wholly falsified.

"The Government of this country has, I am aware, my Lord, been of a most liberal and lenient description for many years past; and all educated Natives are, I am sure, deeply sensible of the great debt of gratitude they owe to the English nation for the conciliatory spirit which has been shown by the rulers of this country, when they might, with impunity, have acted in so very different a manner. The aim and object of the English Government has, I believe, been to make the people of this great Empire loyal and contented subjects of our Most Gracious Queen; and this object has hitherto been gained by the wise policy pursued by your Lordship and your predecessors, of treating all Her Majesty's subjects, whether Natives of this country or Europeans, as far as has been possible, with equality."

The Hon. SAYYAD AHMAD KHÁN said:—"My Lord, as this is probably the only opportunity which I shall have of expressing my views on this important measure, I am anxious to offer a few observations. I am aware, my Lord, that this Bill has been the subject of much discussion by the public Press, and has given rise to excited agitation among the non-official section of the European and Eurasian community, who feel that their liberties are imperilled by the proposed law. I have not the smallest wish to assign unworthy motives to the agitation; and far be it from me to say that the views which

that agitation represents should not be duly considered by the legislature. Never has the Indian legislature been more anxious to consult the views and feelings of the public regarding legislative measures than the present Government of India. With every wish that the views put forward by the European and Eurasian community should be duly considered, I confess, my Lord, I cannot help feeling deep and sincere regret at the attitude which the agitation against this Bill has adopted. Vehement and somewhat unmeasured language has been used by the agitators against my countrymen. I sincerely deplore this circumstance, as much for the sake of the leaders of the agitation themselves as for the sake of the feelings of my own countrymen. And here, my Lord, permit me to express a sincere hope that my countrymen will in no part of India follow the example of those who think that the vehemence of public demonstrations is the best way of submitting arguments and claims for the consideration of the legislature. The people of India, strongly as they feel in favour of the justice, the wisdom, and the expediency of this Bill, need no demonstration in favour of the measure; and, if I know the views of the leaders of Native society, I cannot be far wrong in prophesying that the people of India will not resort to any public demonstrations in support of this Bill. They are content to leave the measure to be decided upon its own merits. As a Native of India myself, with every wish for the success of this Bill, I hope my countrymen will adhere to their present determination to watch the progress of this Bill with calm and respectful silence.

"My Lord, it is not unintelligible to me that the non-official European and Eurasian community, separated as they are by the distance of time and space from those influences which secure the progress of political thought in England, should in the circumstances of India attach exaggerated importance to distinctions of race and creed; that they should upon such occasions emphasise the fact of their belonging to the ruling race; that they should claim for themselves especial provisions in the general law of the land. My Lord, all this is intelligible to me; but, at the same time, I cannot help feeling that a good deal of the opposition offered to the Bill arises from inadequate information in regard to the history of Indian legislation in matters of a similar nature, and from a misapprehension of the small change which this Bill proposes to make in the existing law. My Lord, I do not claim to be an authority on questions of constitutional law; but I may safely doubt the legal accuracy of the contention, which has been put forward elsewhere against this Bill, that the European and Eurasian subjects of the Queen Empress in India have any such constitutional rights as would place them above the jurisdiction of the Indian legislature. As an humble member of the Indian legislature myself, I would repudiate any such limitation. We derive our powers from the great Parliament of England; and, so long as we do not exceed those powers, it seems to me erroneous to doubt the legislative authority of this Council in all matters connected with India. History repeats itself, and we have in the present agitation against this Bill a repetition of the arguments and sentiments employed by the alarmists of many years ago, when Native Judges presiding in the Courts of the East India Company were empowered to try civil suits to which Europeans and Eurasians were parties. My Lord, I hope I may, without fear of contradiction, say that the exercise of civil jurisdiction by Native Judges in cases to which Europeans are parties has not given rise to any injustice, not even to complaint on the score of national differences. The truth is, that the fears of the alarmists of those days were unfounded, and their prophecies were bound to prove false. At this moment, throughout British India, Native Judges exercise civil jurisdiction over Europeans in a manner which certainly is not open to the charge of being influenced by race distinctions. But then, my Lord, it is sometimes urged that civil jurisdiction is vastly different to criminal jurisdiction; that the former affects property only, but the latter affects personal character and liberty; and that, whilst the European and Eurasian community may be willing to subject themselves to the civil jurisdiction of Native Judges, it does not follow that they should do the same in criminal matters. My Lord, I confess I am unable to see the reason upon which such distinction is based. The decrees of Civil Courts can reduce a man from opulence to poverty, and there are some branches of civil jurisdiction which not only relate to personal relations, but include the power of personal arrest, and, in the interests of justice, authorise a procedure similar to that provided for Criminal Courts. The process of arriving at conclusions as to the facts of civil cases is much the same as in criminal cases. The same law of evidence in India regulates the investigation of truth in Civil and Criminal Courts. The judgments of Civil Courts may stain the reputation and ruin the character of parties nearly as much as sentences passed by Criminal Courts; and it seems to me that there is no substantial foundation for drawing a distinction in principle between judicial powers

of the two classes of Courts, or for attaching greater importance to one class of jurisdiction than to the other. If probity, justice, and absence of race bias are found among Native Judges in civil matters, it is difficult to perceive why the same qualities should not mark their administration of criminal justice in cases in which Europeans and Eurasians are concerned. As I understand the existing law, all Native Magistrates already exercise jurisdiction in criminal matters in cases in which Europeans are complainants and seek redress from the Courts as injured parties. I have never yet heard that European British subjects have any objection to resort to Native Magistrates for redress; indeed, they do so without any hesitation. If this is so, there seems no reason why the same confidence should not be shown to those tribunals in cases in which complaints are brought against European British subjects. Counter-charges are not uncommon in criminal cases. Magistrates competent to give redress ought to be competent also to award punishment; and it seems unreasonable and unfair for any section of the community to say, 'We will go to Native Magistrates for redress, but we will not submit to be tried by them.' Indeed, my Lord, it is hardly necessary to say that, even under the existing law, Natives of India exercise a good deal of criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects. Even outside the Presidency-towns, I believe it is not a rare occurrence that European British subjects, appearing as defendants before Native Magistrates, waive the exceptional privilege accorded by the existing law. There is no judicial disqualification based on race distinction in the powers of the Native Judges of the High Courts and Magistrates in Presidency-towns; and I need have no fear of contradiction in saying that Native officers, when entrusted with criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects, have performed their duty with honesty and efficiency, and without any bias arising from distinctions of race or creed. Indeed, my Lord, in educated minds, employed in the solemn and sacred duty of administering justice, the claims of humanity at large to the protection of law, and the dictates of conscience, leave no room for any other considerations. In the neighbouring island of Ceylon, which forms a part of the vast Empire of Britain, I believe I am rightly informed, Native Magistrates and Judges exercise criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects. Judicial disqualifications based on race distinctions are unknown in that country. Yet British capital and British commercial enterprise, far from being driven from that island, have had considerable scope in that colony. The interest of coffee-planters in Ceylon is, so far as I know, in no sense inferior to the interest of indigo-planters in Bengal; and the people of Ceylon are in no sense less Asiatic than the people of India. Nor would their staunchest patriot in Ceylon claim for his countrymen a higher position in the scale of civilisation than he would concede to the people of India. Yet the existing law of British India in regard to criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects is behind the law of Ceylon, and, my Lord, I do not think it unreasonable for the people of India to feel that the time has arrived when the necessity of improving the law has become urgent.

" So far, my Lord, I have endeavoured to show that the proposed law is no innovation in principle, that the fears of the opponents of this measure are exaggerated and ill-founded, and that the example of Ceylon furnishes a practical illustration of the argument that the removal of judicial disqualifications, based entirely on race distinctions, will not be attended by any injury to the sacred cause of justice. And, my Lord, I may here repeat that the scope of the Bill seems to have been greatly misunderstood by the promoters of the agitation against it. As I understood the Bill, it does not propose to invest every Native Magistrate with power to try European British subjects. It is only in the case of those Natives of India whose recognised probity and ability have enabled them to achieve positions in the Judicial Service equal in rank to English officers of the higher order that the Bill proposes to remove judicial disqualifications based on race distinctions. The number of such Native officers is very limited; and the Bill cannot, therefore, in any reasonable sense, be regarded as precipitate or calculated to cause any serious practical change in the present machinery of the administration of justice.

" But, my Lord, putting aside these considerations, it seems to me that there is much fallacy in the argument which attaches so much significance to race distinctions. What the people obey in countries blessed with a civilised Government is, not the authority of individuals, but the mandates of the law. So long as the law is just, impartial, and humane; so long as the proper administration of that law can be secured, the nationality of those who carry out the law should be of no consequence even to sentimentalists. What requires respect, submission, and obedience is the authority of the law, and not that of individuals, and even those who regard the people of India as not entitled to

equality with themselves might, if they only consider the question calmly, feel that Native Magistrates are only the servants of the State, charged with the duty of carrying out the behests of the law. It is the duty of the State to provide for the proper administration of the law. To secure this object, the State has to choose the best available agency, and it seems a somewhat untenable and unjust proposition for any subjects of the State to insist that, in the choice of officers, Government shall confine itself to any particular race or section of the community. The whole question raised by the Bill, in my humble opinion, practically amounts to what I have just said. It is a matter the principle of which requires no new decision. The question was discussed and it was decided, and decided nobly, when the magnanimity and justice of England accorded to the people of India rights of employment in the service of the State on the same footing as Englishmen themselves. That noble decision has, in recent years, received practical effect, and administrative expediency requires the moderate change which this Bill proposes.

" But, my Lord, this Bill has in its favour considerations of a higher order than even administrative expediency. I allude to those noble principles of freedom, justice, and humanity which have their home nowhere as much as in the bosoms of the nation which first came forward to release the slave from his thraldom; which first announced to the people of India that, in matters of constitutional rights, distinctions of race and creed should have no place in the eye of the law. Never in the history of the world has a nation been called upon to act up to its principles more than the British in India. The removal of disabilities under which certain sections of the community laboured in England in regard to constitutional rights sinks almost into insignificance in comparison to what England has already done in India. The history of Indian legislation is the history of steady progress, of well-considered reforms, of a gradual and cautious development of the noble principle that between British subjects the distinctions of race, colour, or creed shall make no difference in legal rights; that whilst, on the one hand, British rule enforces submission, and expects loyalty and devotion from the people of India, on the other hand, it accords to them rights and privileges of equality with the dominant race. My Lord, I am convinced that it is on account of these noble principles, remarkable alike for their justice and for their wisdom, that the British rule has founded itself upon the hearts and affections of the people—a foundation far more firm than any which the military achievements of ancient conquerors could furnish for the domination of one race over another. History teaches the lesson that nothing is more destructive to the prosperity of a country than that race distinctions should be maintained between the rulers and the ruled. No one can be more anxious than myself that friendly feelings should grow even more than they have already done between the English nation and the Natives of India. Providence has thrown the two races together in a political and, I hope I may also say, social union, which will grow firmer and closer as time goes on. My Lord, if I believed that the legislative measure incorporated in the Bill will prove destructive to the growth of friendly feelings between the two races, I should have deprecated the introduction of the measure. But I can take no such view. I am strongly convinced that, so long as race distinctions find a place in the general law of the land, so long will there exist obstacles to the growth of true friendly feelings between two races. The social amenities of life arise from political equality, from living under the same laws, from being subject to the same tribunals. The caste system in India would, perhaps, never have held its ground so long, if the legislators of old had not framed one law for the Bráhman and another for the Súdra. Whatever the exigencies of former times may have been, I hope, my Lord, that a century and a half of British rule has brought us to that stage of civilisation when there is every reason for minimising race distinctions, at least in the general law of the land. My Lord, I, for one, am firmly convinced that the time has come when the entire population of India, be they Hindú or Muhammadan, European or Eurasian, must begin to feel that they are fellow-subjects; that between their political rights or constitutional status no difference exists in the eye of the law; that their claims to protection under the British rule in India lie, not in their nationalities or their creeds, but in the great privilege, common to all—the privilege of being loyal subjects of the august Sovereign whose reign has brought peace and prosperity to India, and made it a place suitable for commercial enterprise, and for the pursuit of the arts and sciences of civilisation. My Lord, as this is probably the last occasion on which I shall ever address the Legislative Council of India, I cannot conclude my observations without saying that your Lordship's administration is to be heartily congratulated upon having brought forward a measure which, I am convinced, will go a great way to remove

invidious race distinctions, and ultimately promote good feeling, mutual respect, and sympathy between the rulers and the ruled in this land of many races and many creeds.

The Hon. Mr. HUNTER said:—My Lord, after very careful consideration, I feel constrained to support this measure. In doing so, however, I hope that I shall not disregard either the expressions of disapproval which have reached us from without, or the arguments which have been so skilfully arrayed against the Bill in Council to-day. I agree with the opponents of the measure, that there is a body of personal law peculiar to European British subjects in this country—a law which accords to them highly-prized exemptions and privileges. I agree that there is likewise a personal law peculiar to certain classes of our Native subjects—a law which is equally valued by them. I agree that, as we have respected the exemptions and privileges secured to our Native subjects by their personal law, so we are bound to respect the exemptions and privileges enjoyed by European British subjects under their personal law. I am prepared to go further, and to maintain that, in the early days of English rule in India, the personal laws of the various classes formed the main body of law administered in our Courts. The history of Anglo-Indian legislation is the history of the absorption of these personal laws peculiar to classes into a common system of law applicable to all. By this process of absorption, the personal law of each class has been gradually but steadily curtailed. It is this process of absorption which supplied what the Marquis of Wellesley termed the "active principle of continual revision" that struck him as the salient feature of the Bengal Regulations in 1805. During the last 80 years the process has gone on at an accelerated pace, until the special privileges now left to the Natives of this country, and the peculiar exemptions still claimed by European British subjects residing within it, are a mere fragment of the privileges and exemptions which those classes severally enjoyed when Lord Wellesley delivered his Discourse. At each important stage in the process, there has been an outcry from the class whose personal law it has curtailed. Indeed, no class of men can be expected to part with their special privileges without opposition. It seems to me that a Government is bound to listen with great respect and sympathy to such an opposition, and that it ought to refrain from such changes, except when they are clearly demanded by the common weal. But when such a change becomes really necessary for the better administration of the country, then I hold that Government is bound to make it; however much it may regret that it has to purchase a benefit for the whole body of its subjects, at the cost of the natural resentment of a section of them.

The curtailment of class distinctions which this Bill will effect is no isolated act. It forms one of a long series of measures absolutely inevitable in moulding the laws of the various races, from which our administration of justice in India started, into a common body of law applicable to them all. Permit me for a moment to remind the Council how this process has affected our Hindú and Muhammadan subjects. The Charter of 1753 expressly exempted suits between Natives from the jurisdiction of the English tribunals, then styled the Mayor's Courts.* The Governor General guaranteed in 1772 their own laws to the Natives, and provided that Maulvís and Bráhmans should attend the Courts to expound those laws.† By the Statute‡ of 1781, the British Parliament secured the Hindús and Muhammadans, not only in their law of inheritance, succession, &c., but also in "all matters of contract and dealing between party and party." The same Statute guaranteed to them their domestic law of the *patria potestas*, and the punitive sanctions of caste. It provided that no act done, and therefore no penalty inflicted, in consequence of caste rules should "be held and adjudged a crime, although the same may not be justifiable by the laws of England."

I shall not detain the Council by a further enumeration of the guarantees granted to the Natives of this country, or of the legislative process by which those guarantees were one by one infringed. The Natives still retain a large portion of their domestic law and certain privileges, such as the exemption of women of position from appearing personally in Court. But in the ordinary affairs of business they have been brought under English-made law. The Maulví or Bráhman assessor has no longer a place in our Courts. For Native law an usage in dealings "between party and party," we have imposed the Code

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* Charter of George II. granted in 1753.

† Plan for the administration by Warren Hastings, 1772, Rule 23, afterwards incorporated in the first Bengal Regulation, dated 17th April 1780.

‡ 21 Geo. III., c. 70.

of Civil Procedure and the Contract Act. We have weakened the *patria potestas* by curtailing the punitive powers of the head of the family, especially in regard to the female members. We have undermined the sanctions of caste by treating as offences the graver penalties inflicted for breaches of its rules, notwithstanding our express pledge to the contrary. We accepted the system of the Muhammadan criminal law; we have substituted for it a system of criminal law of our own. Special classes have had their ancient privileges curtailed in a special degree. The Hindú law accorded to the Bráhmans a status which enabled them to exercise spiritual powers, yielding lucrative temporal results. We no longer permit the employment of the spiritual powers for compulsory purposes. If a Bráhman erected a *kurh*, and some credulous old woman killed herself thereon, our regulation law tried him for murder. If he enforces a debt, or extracts a charity, by fasting outside a man's door, the English Magistrate locks him up in jail. We have deprived the sanctity of Brahmanhood of much of its pecuniary value, and subjected its spiritual terrors to the Penal Code.

In all this the Government has done wisely and well. In doing so, however, it has had again and again to encounter a clamorous but quite natural opposition from those whose ancient privileges or personal law it curtailed. I shall not cite instances where the gain to the community at large was beyond question, but one in which the necessity for a change seemed doubtful to many. There are no branches of the Native law more solemnly guaranteed to the Hindús than those which deal with marriage and inheritance; and there is no principle more clearly established than the deprivation of rights to family property in the case of a Hindú becoming a convert to another religion. Yet a series of *Lex Loci* Acts, initiated in 1832, and ending within our own experience, have repeatedly interfered with the most cherished feelings of the Natives in these matters. In each case since 1842, the Natives have struggled against the change. With them, inheritance is not a mere question of gain or loss in this world, but involves the safety of the souls of their ancestors, and their own happiness or misery in the future life. They have pleaded Parliamentary guarantees, the solemn declarations of the Indian Legislature, the established usage of a century of British rule. With one temporary exception, they have pleaded in vain.

The personal law and exemptions peculiar to European British subjects in India have undergone scarcely less important curtailments. The legal status of the non-official Englishman in India commences, for practical purposes, with the Charter of 1813.* During the preceding half century, the English non-official in rural Bengal had passed through various stages, as an interloper, a licensed adventurer, a subordinate agent of the East India Company, and a partner, recognised or unrecognised, of its servants in their private trade. He might execute a bond making himself amenable to the Company's Civil Courts, and after 1787 he had to do so before he was permitted to reside in the interior. In criminal matters he was subject only to the Supreme Court and Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace in Calcutta. He practically, therefore, remained outside the Company's system of administration, as an unmalleable unit of sturdy independence and growing importance in whatever district he settled, disliked and often unfairly treated, but very difficult to reckon with. In matters of criminal jurisdiction he was under the surveillance of the rural police instead of being amenable to the rural Courts. As late as 1817 a Regulation was passed requiring the police to submit yearly to the Magistrate of the district a list of all Europeans residing within it. Indeed, until the Government passed to the Crown, each police-inspector had to report the arrival of every non-official European who came within his circle.

The Charter of 1813 threw open the Indian trade to private enterprise, and at the same time created a jurisdiction over the Europeans who might embark in the business. It provided that every British subject living at a distance of more than ten miles from the Presidencies should be amenable to the Civil Courts of the East India Company in like manner as Natives of India. It also empowered the Governor General to appoint Justices of the Peace from among its Covenanted Servants, or other British residents, with petty criminal jurisdiction over British subjects, not exceeding a fine of Rs. 500, or in default two months' imprisonment. As the number of Europeans increased in India, the powers of the Justices of the Peace were extended by a Statute of George IV.† All powers, whether civil or criminal, were exercised only by Europeans, because at that time the Natives of India had been excluded from the higher judicial offices which they

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* 53 Geo. III. c. 155.

† 9 Geo. IV. c. 74, sections 92, 97, 113, 121, 124.

held in the early days of the Company, and had not yet been incorporated as a branch of its Uncovenanted Civil Service. But when the Company withdrew from its trade after 1813, it set itself to the task of improving its rural government. By a series of measures between 1821 and 1836, it increased the powers of its Native Judges, and admitted the Natives of India to a large share of the civil judicial administration. It followed that, if Natives were to do the staple work of civil justice, they must exercise jurisdiction over the whole body of inhabitants within their district. By a series of laws in 1836, 1839, and 1843, their jurisdiction was therefore extended over European British subjects. It was enacted in comprehensive terms that, thenceforth, no person should by reason of place of birth, or by reason of descent, be in any civil proceeding exempted from the jurisdiction of any of the Company's Civil Courts.

The European community bitterly resented these laws, and opposed every effort to bring them under the jurisdiction of the country tribunals, as distinguished from the Supreme Court in Calcutta. The most important of them they stigmatised as the Black Act. "The Black Act," writes an eye-witness, Mr. William Tayler, an eye-witness not at all likely to favour Bengal officialism, "was the cause of an agitation which may fairly be said to have convulsed Indian society for a time. Several barristers took the lead; public meetings were called; scurrilous articles filled the columns of the daily journals. One impassioned orator hinted that Mr. Macaulay (the Legal Member of Council) ought to be lynched at the very least." My Lord, it marks the difference between Englishmen in India at that time and at the present day, that although their feelings on questions of class privilege remain equally strong, the articles in the public journals are no longer "scurrilous"; their public meetings cannot fairly be described, in Mr. Tayler's words, as "fierce and uproarious"; and their resistance is not now confined to Calcutta, but, with the extension of British enterprise, is diffused over many districts. The jurisdiction of the Company's Civil Courts and of the Native Civil Judges, which Englishmen so loudly opposed fifty years ago, has done more than any other series of administrative measures to protect British capital, and to render British enterprise possible in rural India.

During the same fifty years, the special privileges of European British subjects in matters of criminal jurisdiction have also been curtailed. Perhaps the most important attempt under the Company in this direction was that of Lord Dalhousie's Government. In 1849, it prepared a draft Act declaring that all British subjects, resident outside the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, should be thenceforth amenable to the Magistrates and Criminal Courts of the East India Company; save, only, that no such Magistrate or Court should have the power to sentence any of Her Majesty's natural-born subjects to death.* It made no proviso as to the Magistrate being a Justice of the Peace. On the contrary, it expressly stated that "the word Magistrate, as used in this Act, shall be understood to mean every officer, however styled, who has power to exercise any or all of the powers of a Magistrate."† I need hardly point out that the Bill now before the Council has a very much narrower scope. Lord Dalhousie approved of the proposed extension of the criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects, but thought that the measure should be postponed till the amending of the criminal law was effected by the Penal Code. His view prevailed. Shortly after the country passed to the Crown, the Penal Code became law, and the question of jurisdiction could be considered on its own merits. This was last done on the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1872. Before that year, the Natives of India had been admitted, by open competition in England, into the Covenanted Civil Service; and, in the natural course, would rise, as Magistrates and Judges, to the highest posts in the administration of criminal justice in their respective districts. The question which had to be decided in 1836, with regard to granting civil jurisdiction over European British subjects, came up for consideration in 1872 with regard to criminal jurisdiction. The Legislature, in 1872, determined to give a substantial jurisdiction over European British subjects to full-power Magistrates, being Justices of the Peace, and to Sessions Judges, provided that such Magistrates and Sessions Judges outside the Presidency-towns should themselves be European British subjects. By a narrow majority, the Legislature abstained from giving these powers to the Native members of the Covenanted Civil Service. How narrow the majority was, may be estimated from the circumstance that, if a single one of its members had voted the other way, the minority would by the President's casting vote have become the majority.

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* Draft Act read for the first time in Council on the 26th October 1849, section 1.

† *Idem*, section 6.

My Lord, I think that the Legislature decided wisely in 1872; but that we should decide wrongly if, in 1882, we supported its decision. The circumstances of the country at large, and of the special class of public servants to whom jurisdiction will be given, have altered during the ten years. The administrative necessity for the change, which was then remote, has now arrived, and will soon become urgent. Even before 1872, criminal jurisdiction over British subjects had been given to Native Magistrates in Calcutta, and both Hindú and Muhammadan gentlemen have exercised these powers in the Calcutta Courts. But it was not considered safe to entrust the same powers to Native Magistrates in the districts, because it was feared that public opinion, which would check any miscarriage of justice in Calcutta, might not act with equal force upon District Magistrates. I think that this was a good argument in 1872. But new enterprises have since then brought an influx of Englishmen into the interior, and created an amount of independent English opinion in the districts which could not have been anticipated in 1872. I, for one, read with pleasure the telegrams which have poured into *The Englishman* during the past month, from every part of Bengal where Englishmen reside. Those telegrams show that our non-official countrymen are strongly opposed to the measure which I advocate. But they also show that Englishmen in the interior have now the means of expressing the public opinion of their class with such promptitude and with such force as to constitute the strongest possible guarantee against the abuse of magisterial powers, whether vested in European or in Native hands. Not only is English public opinion in the districts stronger, but English public opinion in Calcutta acts much more directly upon the District Magistrates. Since 1872, the length of railways open in India has increased from a little over 5,000 to close on 10,000 miles. The number of private telegrams sent has increased from 600,000 to 1,337,526. The number of post-offices and letter-boxes has, during the same period, multiplied from under 5,000 to more than 11,000; and the number of letters, newspapers, &c., from 89 millions to 158 millions. Districts formerly isolated have now speedy and constant communication with the capital. Nor is it too much to say that English public opinion in the remote province of Assam can now be brought to bear as powerfully and as immediately upon the Central Government, as the English public opinion of Calcutta could twenty years ago.

The circumstances of the special class of public servants, to whom it is proposed to give jurisdiction, have also changed. In 1872, the Native Covenanted Civilians appointed by open competition in England were untried men, who had yet to prove their fitness for the offices entrusted to them. They have, during the past ten years, abundantly proved it. They have established their reputation as painstaking, impartial officers, and in a special manner they have shown their capacity for sound judicial work. Nevertheless, if a distinct administrative necessity had not arisen, I should decline to support a change which must be painful to an important section of the community. But such a necessity has now arisen. The Council has before it the reports from the various Local Governments in favour of this measure. I shall not, therefore, say more with regard to them, than that they present to my mind an overwhelming preponderance of opinion which it is difficult for the central Government to disregard. But I shall show, by one or two individual instances, the way in which the present anomalous state of things works in the rural districts. The Native Civilians have now reached a stage in their service when they must become, in the natural course, District Magistrates and Sessions Judges. We have guaranteed to them equal rights with their English brethren, yet they must be excluded from those offices in the more eligible districts where English private enterprise exists, and they must be turned out of those offices in any district into which English private enterprise comes. Let me illustrate this by two examples; one taken from Bengal, the other from Bombay. On the 17th January last, a Native Civilian was, in the ordinary course, appointed Joint Magistrate, with powers of a Magistrate of the first class, at the important station of Dháká. On the 23rd January, he received a letter from the Secretary to the Bengal Government, cancelling the appointment and transferring him to a less eligible district, on the ground that the opening out of the Dháká and Maimansingh railway was bringing a number of Europeans into the Dháká district. The gentleman thus disqualified had won the second place in his year, by open competition in England, from among several hundred candidates; he is an English barrister, and he had proved his fitness for the post from which he was turned out by twelve years of service. In the Bombay Presidency, a Native Civilian holds the important office of District and Sessions Judge of Kanára. His head-quarters are at Kárwár, the coast terminus of the railway which, some time ago, was proposed to be constructed from the Dhárwár cotton country. If this scheme should be revived and the railway sanctioned, the Sessions Judge of Kanára would, under the exigencies of the existing law, have to be

turned out of his district. Let us see what this practically means. The gentleman in question is Mr. Tagore. After a distinguished education, both here and in England, he has given about twenty years of unblemished service to the Government, and has established a high reputation as a Judge. He is a near relative of our late colleague, the Mahárájá Sir Jotíndra Mohan Tagore, who, during an unusually prolonged period, assisted this Council in making the laws of India. The well-earned encomiums in which your Excellency expressed your sense of the services thus rendered are still fresh in our memories. Yet we are told that we must not entrust to a member of the same noble house, notwithstanding his training in England and his twenty years of proved integrity as a Judge, the power of sentencing a European British subject to a short term of imprisonment. This, too, although the European British criminal has the right of immediate appeal from any sentence of imprisonment, however brief, and from any fine, however small. If it were necessary I could multiply examples. Unfortunately the time has come when such examples will year by year multiply themselves, unless the existing law is changed.

Since this Bill was introduced, I have taken occasion to consult several of the leading Native Civilians who were appointed by competition in England. They complain that under the present law they will be excluded, as Magistrates and Sessions Judges, from the advancing districts into which British enterprise comes; and that they will be condemned to backward or remote districts where they will have less opportunity of distinguishing themselves, or of proving their fitness for higher offices. They urge that in Bengal, for example, this means that they will be shut out, as Magistrates and Judges, from the healthy Province of Bihár, and condemned for the most part of their career to the miasmatic Delta. The pleasant regions of Tirhut and Patna will be denied to them; the swamps of Bákirganj and Noakháli will be permanently at their disposal. They contrast this state of things with the long series of declarations by Her Majesty's Government presented to Parliament, beginning with the Queen's Proclamation to the Chiefs and people of India in 1858, and ending with the Despatch of the Secretary of State, dated the 10th July 1879. They rebut the plea that it is not essential that the Magistrate of the district should have power over Europeans if his Joint-Magistrate has these powers, by bringing forward a long list of districts in which there is no Joint-Magistrate. They expose the fallacy of the argument that in cases where a Sessions Judge has not these powers a European criminal can easily be transferred to another district. In the Bombay case which I have cited, a European criminal, together with the prosecutor and witnesses, would either have to be sent several hundred miles by sea to the Presidency-town, or the whole party would have to be marched inland, under guard, nearly 100 miles, in part across a tract malarious during the rains, to the head-quarters of one of the adjoining districts. The present law not only acts as a disqualification to the Native Judge, but it operates as a hardship to English criminals, prosecutors, and their witnesses. The fact is, as shown by the Dháká case, that the Native Magistrate and Judge must either have jurisdiction over Europeans, or they must go elsewhere. They urge that Government will have to regulate its appointments, not by the merits of an officer, nor by his general fitness for a district, but by his power to deal with a small exceptional class of cases occurring within it. Yet by the orders of repeated Secretaries of State, orders formally placed before Parliament, the Native officers thus disqualified will in time form a substantial proportion of the whole Covenanted Civil Service. They point out that this is not only an injustice to themselves, but also a source of weakness to the Administration.

The admission of the Natives to the Covenanted Civil Service was one of the results of the Queen's Proclamation when Her Majesty assumed the Government of India. In that Proclamation she commanded that her subjects, "of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in (her) service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge." The Covenanted Native Civilians have now reached a point in Her Majesty's service when the Government must decide whether it will or will not grant them criminal jurisdiction over European British residents, as the Company had in 1836 to decide whether it would grant civil jurisdiction over such residents to the Uncovenanted Native Servants. The Government has in 1882 simply reached the same conclusion as that at which the Company arrived in 1836. But the present Bill provides the most ample safeguards against the abuse of the powers which it confers—safeguards so ample, stringent, and complete as to destroy any further analogy between the action of the Legislature in 1836 and in 1882. For the present, I shall only deal with the case of Covenanted Civilians who have entered the service by competition in England. They are the class to whom

the Bill is chiefly directed; they are the only class in regard to whom the Local Governments appear to have yet been consulted. So far as a scrutiny of the Civil List enables me to form an opinion, there are not above two or three Native officers, with the exception of those in the regular Covenanted Service, on whom any Local Government would confer the powers granted by this Bill for many years to come. At any rate the Council has no evidence before it with respect to the other classes mentioned in the Bill. And I, for one, am not prepared to support, by speech or vote, the curtailment of privileges on which my countrymen set a high value, without clear evidence that the sacrifice is demanded on behalf of good administration and the common weal. Such evidence may be forthcoming at the proper stage, when the Bill reaches the Select Committee. But, meanwhile, I speak only of the principal class of Native public servants whom the Bill will affect, namely, those who have won their positions by open competition in England.

I beg the opponents of this measure to consider the very limited powers which the Bill conveys, and the stringent safeguards which it provides against their abuse. The Native members of the competitive Covenanted Service are a select body of men, who have won their way into public employment by exceptional exertion, and by exceptional abilities. In youth they so far overcame the inertia of the climate, and the prejudices of their race, as to set forth to a country on the other side of the globe, on the chance of securing an honourable career by open competition. Most of them had already earned distinctions at Indian Colleges and Universities. In England they had to partially re-educate themselves on a Foreign model. They had to compete in an examination framed to suit an educational system different from that on which they had been trained, and they won their appointments from among a crowd of competitors. Many of the Native Civilians thus selected are more English in thought and feeling than Englismen themselves. After their arrival in India they have to pass through further tests, and to prove their fitness by years of faithful service, before they can receive the powers which the Bill confers. Even then, it is only if the Local Government is satisfied of the fitness of the individual officer that the powers are granted to him. And what, precisely, are these powers? The highest are those granted to Magistrates of districts and Sessions Judges, officers of about 13 to 25 years' standing. A District Magistrate can sentence a Native of India to two years' imprisonment, with fine, or, in cases of cumulative sentences, and on default of payment of the fine, to four years. This Bill would only empower him to sentence a European British subject to a term not exceeding three months. A Sessions Judge may sentence a Native of India to death or transportation for life. This Bill empowers him to sentence European British criminals to only one year. A Native criminal can appeal only to certain Courts, and only against sentences of a certain degree of severity. The European criminal by this Bill is allowed the right of appeal to either the District Court or the High Court at his own option; and he may exercise that right against a sentence of a Magistrate or Sessions Judge, however small—against a fine of one rupee, or a single day's imprisonment. The European British subject is further protected by his race privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and in any case important enough to come before the Sessions Judge, by trial by jury. Nothing can be further from the truth than the statement that this Bill disregards the different degrees in which the force of public opinion acts as a check upon miscarriages of justice in Calcutta and in the rural districts. A Native Magistrate sitting in Calcutta can at present sentence European British subjects to two years' imprisonment, and to a fine, with a right of appeal only from sentences of a certain gravity. This Bill confers on the same officer, if he is promoted to be Magistrate of a district, the power of sentencing a European British subject to only three months' imprisonment, with the privilege of appeal from every sentence, however small.

I would ask the opponents of the measure whether they seriously believe that these safeguards are not ample for the purposes of justice. If they can suggest further safeguards, I feel sure that this Council will impartially listen to their proposals. I know it is hard for any class of men to part with its special privileges. The hardship is sometimes a matter of fact, and sometimes a matter of feeling. The class affected always believes that the hardship is one of fact. Whether Europeans or Natives, they plead the same argument of the thin end of the wedge, and of the total abolition of their class privileges which the change, however small, foretells. This argument was never better set forth than by the Hindús on the passing of the *Lex Loci* Act. They then expressed their belief "that the security in person, property, and religion, hitherto ensured to them, thus undermined in one instance, would be eventually denied to them altogether." The 40 years which have passed since these words were uttered have abundantly falsified

the predictions which they conveyed. Nor have the apprehensions of the European community, on the passing of the Black Act in 1836, been more fully justified. The civil jurisdiction then granted to Native Judges seemed to our countrymen to destroy the sole securities which they possessed for their capital invested in the rural districts, and to threaten the extinction of British enterprise in Bengal. Europeans would be deterred thenceforth from settling in India, and it was vainly attempted to combat this statement by quoting Mr. Mill's evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons. The fifty years which have since passed, and the immense development of British enterprise under the protection of the rural Courts of Bengal, now supply an unanswerable refutation of such fears. Even the abolition of the Grand Jury in the Presidency-towns in 1865 sufficed to awaken serious apprehensions. "On the abolition of Grand Juries," said the circular issued by the Landholders' Association, "there would be no protection to gentlemen from being accused of crimes of which they were entirely innocent, whenever the local Magistrate was supposed to be inclined to believe in such charges, and of being put upon their trial whenever a credulous or prejudiced Magistrate would be found." A correspondent in the *Englishman* predicted that, now that the Grand Jury was doomed, the right of calling a public meeting through the Sheriff "would be the next old institution voted effete." Another begged his countrymen to "beware of the doctrinaire dissectors. Cry out in time," he said, "and that lustily, or we may expect the fate of the eviscerated cat, whose personal objections to the operation are disregarded in the promotion of experimental science." The Public Meeting in Calcutta condemned by a formal resolution "the proposed abolition of Grand Juries in the Presidency-towns; and on the contrary was of opinion that the institution should be extended to the Courts proposed to be established in the interior of India." One speaker regarded the abolition of the Grand Juries as "the thin end of the edge" * * * * "which threatens to bring down and destroy the whole fabric of our constitution." The *Englishman* newspaper, which has so ably brought to a focus the opposition to the Bill now before the Council, quoted with approval, in 1865, Sir Eardley Wilmot's protest against "any interference with this 'bulwark of the nation.'" My Lord, there have been individual miscarriages of justice since the abolition of the Grand Jury, as there were when it still flourished. But I feel sure that the English citizens of Calcutta, old enough to remember the state of things before 1865, will agree with me that the abolition of the Grand Jury has been a boon to the English community of the city, and a source of strength to the working of the whole jury system in the Presidency-towns.

I believe that the apprehensions now expressed with regard to the present measure will, ten years hence, be found to have been equally groundless. Meanwhile, we ought not to forget that those apprehensions spring from natural feelings of alarm in the minds of an important section of the community. If we can in any way allay those apprehensions, or conciliate those feelings, I think we are bound to do so. The honour of this Council, or the honour of the Government, is not involved in any hard-and-fast resistance on points of detail. Or, rather, the honour of the Government is involved in carrying out a measure which must necessarily be painful to an important class with the utmost consideration that it can show to their feelings. But with regard to the principle involved, I think the time has come when the Indian Legislature is bound to declare itself. At such a crisis, party spirit must run high. Several months will, however, elapse before the Bill can pass into law. During the interval the Council will have time to candidly listen to every argument, and to seriously consider every suggestion. If, in the heat of the discussion, fair arguments give place to ungenerous aspersions, our duty seems equally clear. We must meet obloquy with patience, and, assured of the justice of the measure, we must wait for time to dispel the apprehensions of our countrymen at present, as time has disproved their apprehensions in the past.

The Hon. RÁJÁ SIVA PRASÁD said:—"My Lord, this is the grandest concession to India. I would have called it the coping stone of the liberal policy of the Liberal Government of Her Most Gracious Majesty, whose worthy representative, the liberality incarnate, my Lord, you are; but no one can say to what a height the building is destined to reach during your Excellency's incumbency. So I content myself by simply saying that the measure will be a magnificent addition to the list already long. The distinction of race in the Indian Criminal Procedure was one of the remaining mementos of the narrow policy of an honourable body of monopolist traders, though it might have suited or become a necessity at the time; but now it will be simply incongruous with advanced liberal ideas and the progress of the age. The concession is most unexpected and little asked for, and so the most valuable. I cannot conceal from your

Excellency that the Indian branch of the Aryan race has been the most intolerant towards their conquered, and had no distinction between a conquered and a slave. Up to this time the Súdras, the remnants of the conquered aborigines, who form the mass of the population, are looked down upon by the military, and the then ruling class of Kshatryas, and the sacerdotal Bráhmans, as worse than slaves. The very name Dás, a corruption of Dasyu, means a slave or thief. Prohibition to wear the sacred thread has been for the poor Súdras a lasting mark of hnmility and subjection. Manu says, if any Súdra takes into his head to speak Sanskrit, or to teach that language, 'scalding oil' is to be poured into his mouth; nay, 'on killing a cat, a weasel, a peacock, a frog, a dog, a lizard, and an owl or a crow, a Bráhman should expiate himself by the same penance which he has to undergo for killing a Súdra'—chapter XII., stanza 132. Further, 'having slandered a Bráhman, a Kshatriya becomes liable to a fine of 8,000 *kauries* (shells) amounting to less than rupee one and a half, but a Súdra merits death'—chapter VIII., stanza 267. Let us see how the Muhammadans treated their conquered. They did not regard the Hindús even as men; hence to massacre them, to enslave their wives and daughters, to plunder their property, to demolish their temples, to deface the images, to force beef down their throats by violence, are the subjects which fill the so-called histories of the time. Even so good-natured a writer as Amír Khusro was, alludes to the Hindús in such contemptuous terms as 'raven-faced' and 'raven-like in nature' (*Zigh-rú va Zagh Manish*). The administration of the civil and criminal justice was completely in the hands of the kázís, and no Hindú could possibly aspire to be a kází. No matter whether either or both parties were Muhammadans or Hindús, the judgment was invariably pronounced according to the Muhammadan law or Shara. The same Amír Khusro relates in his Teríkhi Alai that Alá-ud-dín Khilji once sent for a kází and asked him what was written in the Code of Muhammadan law regarding the Hindús. The kází answered that the 'Hindús were Zimmis (condemned to pay the *Jizya* tax); if asked silver, they ought to pay gold with deep respect and humility; and if the collector of taxes were to fling dirt in their faces, they should gladly open their mouths wide. God's order is to keep them in subjection and the Prophet enjoins on the Faithful to kill, plunder, and imprison them, to make them Mussulmáns or to put them to the sword, to enslave them, and confiscate their property. Abu Hanífa alone permits the levying of the Jizya, but the remaining successors of the prophet have uniformly laid down that the Hindús ought to be made Mussulmáns, otherwise lose their heads.' The Emperor smiled, and remarked that he did not know what the Code might prescribe, but that he had issued an edict that only so much grain, milk, and other articles of consumption as would suffice for a year should be left to Hindús, and that they should in no case be allowed to lay by any money. Akbar was the only Emperor who raised the Hindús and kept down the race distinction as low as he could, but that was a matter of necessity. He had seen how his father was driven out from India. He could not reckon on receiving any succour from Central Asia. His only hope for his Empire was with the Hindús, and the Hindús well supported him. Now the days have come that a Hindú is appointed by your Excellency Chief Justice, or Kází-ul-Kuzáat, of the metropolis of the Indian Empire. We Hindús do not consider the British as our conquerors. We do not only acknowledge the divine right of our sovereigns, but find divinity in their person. I will never forget what the Pandits of Benares spoke to Sir William Macnaghten. I was then a boy reading in the Sanskrit College. Lord Auckland came with Sir William. His jamadár, being a Muhammadan, was stopped at the gate. Sir William asked the Pandits how it was that the English were allowed and the Muhammadans not. The Pandits quoted Bhagavat Gita that 'Rulers are divine.' Leaving aside the divinity for the present, is it not a fact that we sought the protection of the British? Jagat Seth Mahtábrai, one of the ancesters of the humble speaker, was one of those three who invited Clive to Murshidábád and helped him to establish the British supremacy in Bengal at the sacrifice of his own life. The idea of any restoration of a Kshatriyan Empire is as far from the bosom of a Hindú, as the idea of restoration of the Roman Empire in the family of Romulus, driving out all the 'barbarian' races across the Danube, is from the bosom of an Italian. Taimuri dynasty was gone; the choice lay between the Muhammadans from the North-West, like Nádir Sháh, who massacred Delhi, or Ahmad Shah Abdali, who massacred Mathura, and the freebooter Pindari Mahrattas. India threw herself under the protection of the British like a sheep running from a tiger and a wolf to her shepherd. We look to our Sovereign Kaisar-i-Hind, not only as Divine ruler, but as our own mother. We take her as our own, and I leave it to the generous Christian feelings of the British nation whether we are still to be treated as a

conquered and subjugated race. The *Indian Daily News* says very sensibly that 'we shall rise above class questions and race questions, and confess, even it be with some natural reluctance, that the change in the law which is now proposed is practically inevitable. Besides, we have to consider whether determined and narrow adhesion to exclusive privileges is not the most dangerous policy the European community could adopt. For the sake of England in India, and in order to further strengthen and cement the union between the two countries, is it not necessary that Englishmen should give the highest proof in their power of the thoroughness with which they adopt India, and take upon them the defence and advancement of her interests?' The *Statesman* takes the same just and impartial view of the question. Though there is no doubt that a very strong feeling, whether right or wrong, but almost universal, exists against the Bill in the European quarters, as a gentleman was just the other day saying, wherever he went he was asked 'Have you seen that infernal Bill.' They take it as certain that all their countrymen who have to appear before a Native Magistrate will be sent to jail, and the reason they assign for it is the 'widening,' as they are pleased to think, of the breach between the Natives and Europeans. Some say that there is neither newspaper nor High Court with astute barristers in the Mufassal; but I do not know if there is any place in India now beyond the pale of the newspaper influence, or where barristers cannot go; the wire has brought the High Court within an easy reach of everybody. As for a Native's sending a European or his wife to jail, there is no fear of that. If there is any fear, the fear is for his unjust acquittal. Mr. Duthoit, the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, who is no mean judge of Native character, truly says: 'I do not mean that they (Natives) would be likely, as a rule, to press hardly upon Europeans; I think, on the contrary, that they would, as a rule, unduly favour the Europeans.' Woe to the Native who has a European before him to judge! His position will be most unenviable, and fool he must be if ever he takes into his head not to ask for transfer of the case to some other tribunal or not to acquit the culprit totally. So, whatever the Europeans may have to say against the Bill, they cannot show any good cause for its condemnation, except the domineering race pride, or, as Mr. W. B. Jones says, the 'unreasonable class prejudice,' which cannot brook any idea of equality; but is such a pride to be encouraged? Does it not widen the gulf which we are trying to bridge over? Will it not keep the wound fresh which we want to heal up? The Government is bound to exonerate the integrity of Her Imperial Majesty's Proclamation of 1858. It is true that the Natives will not gain much by this concession. At the same time, it is also true that not the least harm will be done to the Europeans. It may do, I am afraid, some harm to the Natives. This new power may stand, to a certain extent, as a bar in the way of their promotion to a District Magistracy or a Sessions Judgeship; nay, some alarmists see a greater harm looming at a distance; they argue in this way, that, if the Government has broken the acknowledged privilege or personal law of their own countrymen, the Britons, like a straw, how can they be expected to maintain very long our own privileges and personal laws, which, though dear to us, but often approach absurdity in the eyes of the advanced civilisation. Simply an incongruity will be removed. Our European brethren ought to have a little faith upon their European Governors, and to be sure that these Governors will never appoint any one Justice of the Peace unless they know him to be the fittest man before whom, if occasion arises, a European can stand to be judged. Hear what Sir Alfred Lyall says:—

'No European officer is appointed to be a Justice of the Peace or Magistrate of a district or Sessions Judge, until he has been found to be, by experience and character, fitted to exercise the powers and perform the duties which are attached to these offices. During the period that ordinarily elapses before any officer can attain to the position of Magistrate of a district or Judge, or is appointed to be Justice of the Peace, ample opportunities are afforded of forming an opinion as to his qualifications for the offices in question; and he is not appointed to them if he has shown himself to be unfit to perform the duties and exercise the powers belonging to them. The interests of the European British subjects and of the administration would be sufficiently provided for, if the general restriction, under which no one who is not himself an European British subject has jurisdiction over an European British subject, being removed, power be left with the Local Government to appoint Justices of the Peace those Native members of the Covenanted Civil Service who have proved their fitness to exercise the jurisdiction. The Local Government would then apply the test of personal fitness to each particular case for Native as well as for European members of the Covenanted Civil Service.'

"The worth of the argument or analogy brought forward by my hon. colleague, the learned Dr. Hunter, that, if so many privileges of the Natives have been destroyed, why not this privilege of the Britons also is to follow suit, I leave to your Excellency to

judge. However, I do not know if the Britons also burnt their widows like the Hindús, or killed their infant daughters like them.

"Now, so far, whatever I have said, I have said as a representative of the Native community at large, and have echoed India's voice; but, if your Excellency allow me to express my own individual opinion, may I ask whether this feeling, right or wrong, is to be totally derided and set at nought? I would rather join with the Commissioner of Coorg in saying that 'the provisions of the present law on criminal procedure, which limit jurisdiction to try, for criminal offences, European British subjects to persons who are themselves European British subjects, are wise, and should, for political reasons, be maintained.' I would rather agree with the Hon. D. F. Carmichael in saying that 'after all, there is such a thing as *privilege;* this one is highly valued by those who possess it, and certainly does no harm to the Native population; while its surrender would, in my opinion, cause great exasperation.' I would rather coincide with the Hon. W. Hudleston in saying 'that the proposed extension of jurisdiction would be impolitic, and is not expedient; I am confident it would raise an outcry that would aggravate race friction far more than the removal of the already existing disability attaching to a small number of officials would allay it.' I would rather side with the Right Hon. the Governor of Madras, on whom, if my memory does not fail me, almost the whole brunt of all the Parliamentary debate fell when he was Under Secretary for India under His Grace the Duke of Argyll, when he says such weighty words as 'it is perhaps a pity that a question was raised just now which affects so few people.' There is much truth in Sir James Stephen's remark that 'in countries situated as most European countries are, it is no doubt desirable that there should be no personal laws; but in India it is otherwise. Personal, as opposed to territorial, laws prevail here on all sorts of subjects, and their maintenance is claimed with the utmost pertinacity by those who are subject to them. The Muhammadan has his personal law, the Hindu has his personal law. Women who, according to the custom of the country, ought not to appear in Court are excused from appearing in Court; Natives of rank and influence enjoy, in many cases, privileges which stand on precisely the same principle; and are English people to be told that, whilst it is their duty to respect all these laws scrupulously, they are to claim nothing for themselves? That whilst the English Courts are to respect, and even to enforce, a variety of laws which are thoroughly repugnant to all the strongest convictions of Englishmen, Englishmen who settle in this country are to surrender privileges to which, rightly or otherwise, they attach the highest possible importance? I can see no ground or reason for such a contention. I think there is no country in the world, and no race of men in the world, from whom a claim of absolute identity of law for persons of all races and all habits comes with so bad a grace as from the Natives of this country, filled as it is with every distinction which race, caste, and religion can create, and passionately tenacious as are its inhabitants of such distinction.' I would rather allow the incongruity to remain untouched, at least for the present, as greater incongruities remain. For instance, a rich Bábú's European coachman can keep as many arms as he likes unchallenged; but the Bábú Sahib, or, if he is so fortunate as being dubbed with some title, his son and brother, have to go every year to the Magistrate's Court for the renewal of the license with his menial servants, and suffer all the indignities and annoyances inseparable from such a procedure. My countrymen (advanced and anglicised) will call me a traitor to my country. The Native newspapers will vilify me; but if the Hon. the Law Member is not afraid of the British lion, wagging his tail and roaring, why am I to care for the bellowings of a few Indian sheep? However, for the present I only desire the Select Committee, when formed, to take both sides of the question into their serious consideration. It is possible that the Select Committee may add some more sugar to the pill. The Committee may think fit to strike off section 2 altogether, or go further, and, striking off clauses (*c*) and (*d*) in section 1, change 'invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the first class' for 'District Magistrates or Cantonment Magistrates or Sessions Judges or equal to them in rank as Deputy Commissioners in Non-Regulation Provinces.' I reserve my vote in favour or against the Bill till it comes to that stage. This moment my head, under the dictates of prudence, is in its favour; but my heart—a true heart of a true Native, labouring under a sense of deep obligation and sincere respect to the British nation for all the good it has done to my dear country—is against it.

"Ignorant people—I mean ignorant of facts, though otherwise well educated—may charge me with flattery; but a life's experience cannot be forgotten. How much I value the goodwill of the European British subjects; how much I appreciate their services to the country, and how far I look to them for the protection of our life and property and

the advancement of our welfare, the mention of one single incident, I think will amply suffice. It was, if my memory does not fail me, the evening of the 4th June 1857, when the alarm gun had been fired, all the non-combatant Europeans with their families had assembled in the mint at Benares. A few European gunners were blowing up on the parade some Native regiments of infantry and cavalry for refusing to lay down arms and mutinying. The time was critical. I was with the Governor General's Agent, Mr. Henry Carr Tucker, at the Mint. The runaway mutineers, many wounded and many with arms, were passing by the gate of the Mint towards the Burna Bridge. Not more than a dozen or two of the European soldiers were protecting the gate, pointing their guns towards the road. The hope of all of us was centred in them. Benares has a population of some two hundred thousand souls, but they all were utterly useless at the moment. The shops and houses were all closed, and the streets deserted. We were not so much afraid of the mutineers for our lives as of the city ruffians. The European soldiers were daily passing up the country by bullock-train, in batches to join General Havelock's army. These few soldiers were detained from the preceding day's batch. That day's batch had not arrived. With what anxiety we were expecting it I have no words to describe; every moment was precious. We would have offered each soldier's weight in silver had they been procurable. Mr. Tucker thought that they might have been waylaid by the mutineers and wished me to ride down to Rájghát to look after them. How happy I felt when I saw there the bullock-carts full of European soldiers just arriving, I have again no words to describe. This handful of Europeans saved Benares. Such incidents can be multiplied by scores and hundreds. But I do not feel myself justified in further encroaching on your Excellency' valuable time."

The Hon. Sir Steuart Bayley said:—"The motion before the Council is not one which, under ordinary circumstances, would require any expression of opinion from me; but, owing to the course the discussion has taken, and to the direct personal appeal that has been made to me, I feel bound to express my own views on the subject. And, first, I think it is due to our colleague, Mr. Ilbert, that it should not be supposed that he is the prime mover and originator of the Bill. Those who have read the papers of the case must be aware that the Bill had its origin in a suggestion made in March last by the Government of Bengal, when Sir A. Eden was at the head of the Local Government. That suggestion was circulated in the ordinary way for the opinion of other Local Governments, and on finding that there was a general agreement among them as to the expediency of legislation, and that in this opinion the Secretary of State concurred, the duty of framing and introducing the Bill devolved, as a matter of official routine, on my honourable friend. I make these remarks, because much of the odium with which he has been assailed seems to be based on the supposition that the Bill is in its main principle the outcome of his own reforming zeal, whereas, whatever be the merits or demerits of that principle, the responsibility should in justice be far more widely distributed.

"After the clear statement of the legal aspects of the case which we have heard from the member in charge of the Bill, I need not go over the same ground; but I may say that the aspect in which I have all along regarded the Bill is, that its main and important object, its substantive principle in fact, is to allow Native Civilians who may rise to be Sessions Judges or District Magistrates to exercise the powers which the law vests in District Judges and District Magistrates as such, and that they should not be disqualified from exercising those powers on the score of birth-place or nationality. The other or permissive provisions in regard to Assistant Commissioners and Magistrates of the first class I understand to be an adjunct to the main principle of the Bill, a fringe or margin as it were, and intended only to meet special cases, which the Local Government might otherwise be at a loss to provide for without serious inconvenience; and from this point of view the measure seems to me to be just and reasonable. Given the education which has enabled a Native to succeed in entering the Civil Service is not the fact of his having served with sufficient credit to be appointed to a District Magistracy or Sessions Judgeship,—a grade, be it remembered, that he cannot even temporarily reach till after an apprenticeship of some eleven or twelve years, and permanently not in less than eighteen years,—is not this as good a guarantee as can reasonably be desired of that man's fitness, honesty, and practical ability? and in that phrase I include, not merely natural ability, but the assimilation, by practice and study, of the full legal and judicial ideas which guide our Courts. I think we have here all the guarantee that can reasonably be expected that the principles of our law will be properly applied, and this is all we have a

right to demand. It seems to me that the exercise of these powers is the necessary corollary of the admission of Natives to the Civil Service. Practically, I hold that, when Government committed itself to the one step, it committed itself to the other; the question was only one of time, and the present Bill gives expression to that principle with as little alteration of existing arrangements, and with as careful a regard to the safety of the important interests concerned, as any Bill framed with this object could have attained. Before it can pass, however, the Bill will have to be criticised in ordinary course by the Local Governments (to whom only the preliminary principle of the Bill was referred in the first instance), and its working can be carefully examined and discussed, and the opinions of the Local Governments and their officers, as well as of others, will be fully weighed and considered before any action is taken. Now, there are two aspects from which the Bill is assailed. One is that Native gentlemen, no matter what their qualification, must be taught to remember that they are of a subject race, and, as such, unfit to try any members of the dominant race. On this argument I am unwilling to dwell. It has been developed into what our American cousins call 'spread-eagleism.' I have absolutely no sympathy with it, and the frequent recourse to such an argument is not creditable to our national character. But there is another aspect to the case of the opposition which I think deserves most attentive consideration; and this is the real danger in which the isolated European, living in the Mufassal, runs from having false cases trumped up against him. It is right that I should state publicly that this danger is a very real and very serious one; for, probably, no member of this Council has had the same experience as I have of the lives led by planters in the Mufassal. My own experience has given me a strong feeling on this matter, and anyone who knows the extreme bitterness with which disputes about land are fought out in the Mufassal, and the unscrupulous methods to which recourse is had in conducting these disputes before the Court,—methods to which a planter cannot have recourse,—will understand how precarious his position may become, and how essential to him it is that the law should be well and wisely administered. So far, then, as the argument against the Bill is based on a fear that these dangers are perceptibly increased, and that under the new Bill the law will be less well and less wisely administered than at present, I consider the objections deserve a most careful examination. As I have already said, my own opinion is that, in respect to Native Civilians who have reached the position of District Judge or District Magistrate, we have the best possible guarantee of their qualifications, and the other provisions of the Bill do not take effect *proprio vigore*, but merely give Local Governments the power of selection in special cases. But I imagine that what has really excited the feelings of the European population in this matter is, not so much the actual extension of power contemplated in this Bill, but the apprehension that it is only a stepping-stone to a larger measure which would really do what many speakers and writers seem to think this Bill will do, namely, place all Europeans quoad jurisdiction exactly in the same position as Natives of the country. The actual scope of this Bill has been clearly explained by Mr. Ilbert, and, so far from its being a stepping-stone to a larger measure, I can certainly say for myself, and, I believe, for the Government of India at large, not only that there is no such intention, but that the proposal itself would be regarded as dangerous and uncalled-for. No, so far as we are concerned, what Mr. Ilbert said on the score of the finality of this Bill, is, I know, strictly correct, and I hope that there may be no further misapprehension on this point.

"And now I have a few words to say in regard to the agitation which has sprung up in opposition to this measure. I confess that I failed to foresee either the extent or the depth of feeling which the measure has aroused among the European population; and it is only fair to add that I think the Viceroy had a clear right to expect from the Local Governments, or, in regard to Bengal, from myself, a more decided warning than he received of the spirit which the proposal would arouse. I cannot, looking at the evil effects which have ensued, and must ensue, from the agitation going on, but deeply regret that I failed to guage accurately the feelings of the great body of my countrymen, and of even my many personal friends among the planting community. I confess I had hoped that twenty-five years had really done something to obliterate the feeling of race antagonism, of bitterness and hatred, which was familiar to us a quarter of a century ago. It seems that I was in error, and I deplore, as we all must deplore, the palpable evidence that I was mistaken. Nor am I prepared to say, in response to the challenge of my hon. friend Mr. Evans, that he has in any way exaggerated the depth and earnestness of the feeling which this Bill has evoked, or the probability of its continued ill effects. It is one thing, however, to oppose this measure on the ground that it threatens rights dear to Europeans, and that it jeopardises the liberty and property of the Euro-

pean community in the Mufassal. I believe the fear to be ill-founded, but at least the objections on this score deserve to be anxiously considered and to be treated with all respect. But when the ground is changed, and rhetorical appeals are made to race hatred; when bitterness and vituperation directed against the whole body of Native officials take the place of calm reasoning, then I say that those who employ these weapons incur a very serious responsibility. It is by the use of these weapons that the old sore is re-opened and embittered, and that the healing influences of the past quarter of a century are nullified and destroyed in an hour. I have expressed my own regret that I did not foresee that this would take place, and I look forward with still deeper regret to the continuance of a state of things which by action and re-action must continue to keep the sore open. I wish it were in any way possible for the Government directly, and at once, to close the question one way or the other; but it is not easy to see how this can be done without incurring still more serious evils; and I can only hope that, so long as the question must remain open, it will be discussed candidly and fairly, without threats and without vituperation, with as little appeal as possible to the passions of race hatred and race contempt, and with the moderation which persons who really have reason on their side generally find to be the most successful weapon in their armoury. To such arguments the Government will give full and fair consideration."

Lieutenant-General the Hon. T. F. Wilson said:—My Lord, with regard to the measure which is now before this Council, I occupy a position totally different from that of every other member of your Excellency's Government, inasmuch as I have alone, from the commencement of its consideration, been compelled by my convictions to take the very unusual course of opposing those with whom I have the honour to be associated. It will be within the recollection of your Excellency that I availed myself of the first opportunity I could of recording my dissent from the views of the other members of the Government. And on a later occasion, when the matter came under the discussion of the Government, I entered at some length into an explanation of the views which I entertained, and, with your Excellency's permission, my dissent from the recommendations made to the Secretary of State was duly recorded.

"It is not necessary for my immediate purpose that I should enter upon this occasion into any detailed explanation as to why I hold the opinion I do; it will suffice for the object I have in view, that I should honestly and frankly declare that the opinion which I held more than six months ago I maintain as strongly to-day. I am opposed to the measure that has been brought forward by the Government. But whilst sympathising with those who are anxious that this measure should not become law, and thus bring about the changes which the Bill will produce,—whilst sympathising with them, still I must, in the strongest manner I can, condemn the violent language which has been used towards the Government. I desire further to condemn, in the strongest terms I can command, the malicious and scandalous personal attacks which have been made upon my hon. colleagues, and more especially upon your Excellency the Viceroy, in your great and high position as the representative of the Queen in India. Sympathising as I do with the opponents of the measure, and anxious as I am that the Bill should not become law, I must say that I hold in contempt many of the measures which have been resorted to in order to increase outside agitation. My Lord, there is no member of your Excellency's Government, there is not a person who is sitting round this table, who is more anxious and desirous than I am to receive outside criticism, for I think that, in these days of enlightenment and with the spread of education, the more the Government court publicity with regard to their intentions to alter the laws of the country, the better for the Government, and the better for those it governs; and when that criticism comes to us from a largely increasing population of Englishmen residing in the Presidency-towns, and others far away in remote districts of the country in pursuit of their several avocations, distinct, separate, and independent of the Government,—I say, when such criticism and advice is presented to us through the medium of a temperate and discriminating Press,—it is indeed valuable, as making known to those who are entrusted with the government of the country, the wishes, the hopes, the fears, and all the general requirements of those who are committed to our charge; and it does something even more than this, for it, in some small degree, relieves those who are entrusted with high office of some of the heavy responsibilities which are inseparable from such position.

"The Government has been urged to-day, by several hon. members who have spoken, to withdraw this Bill. Now, I have considerable experience of the Government of India, for it has been my privilege to serve under eleven Viceroys and Governors General, and I have seen other cases, during that long period, when the Government have stood very much in the same position towards the British public of India as they stand to-day; but

never have I seen such violence and unnecessary agitation as has been imported into the discussions on this measure; and I desire to say that, anxious as I am, in what I believe to be the interests of this vast country, that the proposed measure should not become law, still I am bound to add that, in my opinion, no Government ought to yield to the violence and hysterical excitement which now rages around us. In the presence of this it seems to me that there is but one course which Government can safely adopt, and that is to ascertain further the views and opinions of many more of the officials who are spread over the country. The time which this will occupy, will permit of passion cooling down, and we shall then be able to ascertain to a greater extent than we have already done the opinions of the various classes on the question now under consideration. These measures will enable those who like to change their opinions to do so, if further information should tend to that end.

"My Lord, there is another feature in connexion with this great controversy which has given me, individually, great pain; because, if I am anything at all, I am a soldier in every feeling and idea; and those feelings have been wounded by the miserable and pernicious advice which I have seen tendered by some irresponsible persons to the volunteers in India. It is known to your Lordship, and it is known to my hon. colleagues, that, as the head of the Military Department, I take a keen interest in the volunteers in India. But, apart from the official position I hold, it would be strange, indeed, if I were not a friend of the volunteers in this country. During by far the most eventful period of my life, I was closely associated with a body of volunteers, who took a prominent part in one of the most protracted and deadly struggles which has taken place during the past century, and they materially helped to write one of the most brilliant pages in our Indian military history. For these reasons I am, indeed, pained to read of the unpatriotic course which has been recommended to the volunteers. Can any volunteer in his senses suppose that his resignation, or that of any number of his comrades, will have any influence on this Council? No. This Council will do as it has ever done. It will act fearlessly; it will ascertain all the facts of the case; it will seek further information, and it will decide as it thinks best for the interests of those who are committed to its care. But it has been said that the recommendation has been made with a view, not so much to embarrass or intimidate this Government, as to show to the House of Parliament in England the necessity of reversing hereafter any decision in favour of the measure which may be arrived at by the Indian Government. Now, if there is one thing which would rivet fast the whole thing, it would be procedure such as this. I cannot conceive anything more wild. But, my Lord, I hope that time will bring reflection, and that calmer, wiser, and more patriotic counsels will prevail. I hope that the volunteers of India, mindful of those responsibilities which they have voluntarily taken upon themselves, will remain, as heretofore, faithful citizen soldiers of the Queen Empress of India.

"In conclusion, I will only say that, as regards the measure which is now under consideration, I maintain, as I have always maintained, distinct opposition to it; and, believing it to be impolitic, I hope it will not become law. To this extent I sympathise —I repeat, I sympathise—with those who hold similar views. Beyond this I cannot go, for I desire to separate myself from the unnecessary violence and agitation that has taken place outside this Council chamber."

The Hon. Mr. Gibb said:—"My Lord, it must be remembered that we are not now discussing or defending the principle of the Bill. That will form the subject of a future debate; but as member in charge of the Home Department, and, therefore, intimately connected with the general administration of justice in the Empire, it has been considered right for me to offer some explanation regarding the introduction of this measure, specially as it has, simple though it be, raised a perfect tempest among the European community.

"In so doing, I fear I may repeat some of the arguments used by those who have preceded me, but this I cannot help, nor do I think in such an important matter it is to be regretted.

"First, I think some explanation is required to show why the Government has remained silent up till now. The rules of this Council have been, as is well known to the members, recently amended with the object of giving greater publicity to measures. When leave for this Bill to be introduced was asked for, as the new rules were not in force, it could not be published, and, in consequence, the only way the Government could inform the public of its purport was by sending it by administrative order to the public newspapers. It has not yet been published in the *Gazette*, as my hon. and learned colleague's motion to-day shows; and, until this is done, no opinions of Local Governments and Adminis-

trations can be called for on it. Now, in accordance with the usual custom, such will be called for, and, when submitted, be laid before the Select Committee on the Bill. It is only, therefore, to-day that we have had the opportunity of saying anything about the matter. The opinions already published were invited, not on the Bill, but on a proposal submitted by the Government of Bengal, and which, as usual in such cases, was forwarded to the other Local Governments and Administrations for opinion, on receipt of which, as they were nearly unanimous in favour of the Bengal proposal, concurring as they did in the opinion so clearly given by Sir Ashley Eden in submitting his proposal to the Government of India (Bengal letter 1411 T. of 30th March 1882, paragraph 4), the Bill was drafted, and leave to introduce it applied for.

"We have been accused of not consulting the present Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The fact is, the measure, as it came from Sir Ashley Eden, was couched in the usual terms, and was taken as the opinion of the Government of Bengal, and, as such, was, according to custom, sent to the other Local Governments and Administrations for an expression of their views.

"The measure in itself is required for the furtherance of justice and the convenience of all parties. That sooner or later such a change would have to be made has long been foreseen, and I venture to think that the time has now come when, certainly as far as Sessions Judges and Magistrates of the district are concerned, the alteration is called for to meet the actual requirements of one part of the Empire, as well as the contemplated future requirements of other parts. I will explain how this is so. At Kárwár, in the Bombay Presidency, there is now a Sessions Judge, Mr. Tagore, who was the first successful Native candidate for the Covenanted Civil Service, of which he has now for eighteen years been a member, and for some eight or more years he has exercised, with credit to himself, the duties of District Judge and Sessions Judge.

"Then, in the Bengal Presidency, there are four gentlemen of the Covenanted Civil Service rapidly approaching their promotion to be District Magistrates or Sessions Judges, one of whom, Mr. Dutt, was gazetted in Wednesday's *Gazette* as promoted to the former grade.

"I have not obtained information as to the other divisions of the Empire, but I have, I consider, shown from the above that the time has come when a change should be made to render present and impending incumbents fitted for the full duties of their appointments; and the requirement is one of increasing importance, as year by year Native members of the Covenanted Civil Service will arrive at, or come nearer and nearer to, the appointments of Sessions Judge and District Magistrate. As regards the Natives themselves, it is a measure of simple justice, in so far that the policy which was laid down by the wisdom of Parliament a quarter of a century ago admitted Natives to the Covenanted Civil Service, and by so doing not only intended, but clearly made it manifest, that they should have therein the same powers as their European *confreres*, which they will not have unless the law is amended. Surely, then, we cannot now, in the year 1883, be said to be pushing on a new measure 'with indecent haste simply to please the Natives of the country.' The entire general question is not now before us, but it has been one of long standing, from the time of Lord Macaulay to the present. In 1872 the latest step was taken. It is called 'a compromise,' not, so far as I can learn, a compromise between Natives and Europeans, but between the members of the then Government or, perhaps, of the Select Committee on the Bill; but even this showed that some change in the present direction was then felt to be required; and I remember, with reference to this, when a Judge of Her Majesty's High Court at Bombay in 1870, I minuted in favour of such a change as is now proposed, basing my opinion mainly on the inconvenience of the law as it then stood. At that time there was no Native Civilian actually in a position to require such powers, whereas now the case is the reverse. Two officers actually require them, while others will do so very shortly; and surely any unbiassed person would admit that the time has arisen for going beyond the 'compromise' of 1872.

"Let me explain more fully what I mean by the 'inconvenience' argument. Take Kárwár, for example, where Mr. Tagore is Sessions Judge, in the neighbourhood of which large railway-works are about being commenced. If a European commits a crime which requires more punishment than the District Magistrate can award, and which is three months' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000, he must be committed to the Sessions Court, whose powers extend to one year's imprisonment and fine; but the Sessions Judge there could not try him, and an application would have to be made to the High Court to order his commitment elsewhere. He could thus be sent to Belgaum or Dhárwár, for example, each about 80 to 100 miles distant; this would be a troublesome journey at

any time; but, for some months of the year, one generally dangerous to the health of all parties, Europeans especially. Surely this would be a matter of great inconvenience, not to say danger, expense, and delay to all concerned.

"In the case of the District Magistracy, present arrangements also must cause great inconvenience. They are to some extent subversive of discipline by putting a junior officer by reason of his birth only, for one particular purpose, over the head of his superior in all other matters. No gentleman can arrive at the high position of Magistrate of the district under 10 to 12 years' service; and, considering that he would not even then be appointed to that post unless the Government thought him fitted for it (I have known European members of the Civil Service whom Government declined to place in such a position),—surely, I say, under these circumstances, the measure we propose is so far merely the natural and logical result of the policy which has been laid down for more than 25 years since Natives of India were first admitted into the Covenanted Civil Service of the State.

"From the extraordinary excitement which has been raised, a stranger would be led to suppose that the majority of the Europeans in India were constantly before the Criminal Courts in serious and intricate cases, whereas, so far as my own experience goes, there are very few cases in which Europeans come before them, and those of a simple nature—petty thefts or assaults.

"All cases in which one year's imprisonment does not suffice must now go to the High Court of the Province, and this Bill makes no alteration in this law. I fail, therefore, to find any reason why objection should be made, or why a 'European British subject' should not be tried by an officer who can now try any other European, be he French, German, Italian, or otherwise, not to mention those Englishmen who are not what is technically called 'European British subjects,' or an American, who might be placed before him.

"I do not now stop to consider separately the Native members of the Civil Service appointed under 33 Victoria, for, while I have some doubts whether they constitute a separate body, they are, when once admitted into the service at the end of their term of probation, for all administrative purposes, members of the Covenanted Civil Service of India, equally with those who are appointed from home. I will, therefore, now proceed to consider the three classes of first class Magistrates on whom it is proposed that Government should confer the powers of a Justice of the Peace when necessary. These are—

"(*a*) Members of the Covenanted Civil Service;
"(*b*) Assistant Commissioners in Non-Regulation Provinces; or
"(*c*) Cantonment Magistrates.

"The proposed measure being intended to contain the entire law regarding the trial of Europeans in the Mufassal, as regards the powers to be given to the local officers, the Bill makes no difference between Europeans and Natives, just as it makes no distinction when it confers, by the previous section, Justice of the Peace powers '*ex-officio*' on all Sessions Judges and District Magistrates. It, therefore, only differs from the present law by permitting Government to confer the powers of a Justice of the Peace on Native members of the classes I have named. As this power is only permissive, we are again thrown back on the questions of convenience and fitness to exercise the powers, and these must be left to the Local Governments to decide.

"Now, I will give an instance in point:—Take Calicut or any other large seaport on the coasts of India not being a Presidency-town. Unless Government have the power of appointing a Civilian of less standing than a Magistrate of the district to hear such cases, a captain who had a complaint to make against any of his crew might have to go some 60 miles for justice, leaving his ship lying in the roadstead in charge of a junior officer and a weakened crew, although there might be a Native Civilian on the spot as able and as capable of dealing with European crews and captains as is Mr. Dossabhoy Framjee in Bombay. Surely this is a case of inconvenience demanding a remedy.

"As regards Assistant Commissioners in Non-Regulation Provinces, the special provision is merely intended to be used to prevent inconvenience to the parties, and will probably be seldom resorted to; while, as regards Cantonment Magistrates, they are, as a rule, European Military officers, and are merely included here to complete the law as to Justices of the Peace in the Mufassal.

"Having thus, I trust, shown that there are causes of an administrative character which call for the change in the law, I may, my Lord, express my inability, perhaps

from being of a somewhat unsentimental disposition, and preferring as a rule to be guided by common sense, to understand why all this commotion should have arisen about this measure—a measure which, even if the Bill became law to-morrow, and if the Local Governments were at once to confer on every Native gentleman of the classes mentioned in it the power of a Justice of the Peace—a course not at all probable,—would add but a very small number to the list of those who could try Europeans for petty offences in the Mufassal. From a return I called for, I find the entire number in the whole of India would be about twenty, while in Bengal *alone* there would be but nine, and all these members of the Civil Service.

" Much less can I understand why your Lordship should be looked upon as the leader of 'an anomalous, unconstitutional and illegal confiscation of the chartered rights and priviliges of Englishmen,' or why my hon. and learned colleague, on whom the wrath of the European public seems to have fallen with redoubled violence, so much so that it was even suggested that he was not a worthy representative of the *alumni* of the two great English Universities, should be the victim of so much abuse, as if he alone, under your Lordship's guidance, were the sole author of the proposal, and his colleagues, including myself, were no parties to the discussion which led to it.

" Neither can I understand why the European gentry of the City of Calcutta, who have for years been subject to the Court of a Native Magistrate who can pass on them heavier sentenees than, should this Bill become law, could be passed by any Sessions Judge, much less a Magistrate, in the Mufassal, should now rise to prevent their neighbours on the opposite side of the Circular Road or other parts of the Mufassal from being placed, not on a par with them, but from being saved from some of the inconveniences and trouble and expense I have above alluded to.

" I am not sure that the great bulk of the European and Eurasian population of Bengal, who are most interested in this matter, know the meaning of the term ' European British subject.' It is a mere legal creation of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code; colour has nothing to do with it; a perfectly white person may not come within its definition, while a decidedly dark one may. It simply means that the person was either himself born in England, or that his father or grandfather, from whom he may be legitimately descended, was so born; but it goes no further. If the family has been settled for four generations in India, although father, grandfather and great-grandfather may have married European ladies, the representative of the fourth generation ceases to be a 'European British subject' within the meaning of the Procedure Code, and is amenable to all Criminal Courts presided over by Natives or Europeans, as the case may be, exactly as any one of his Native fellow-subjects, or any European of another nationality.

" And this, my Lord, brings me to the consideration of the articles in the Press, and the letters and speeches with which the daily newspapers have teemed during the last month or so. No one respects more than I do the right of any person or class of persons to bring forward their grievances and demand redress, and, therefore, I have read carefully this varied literature, to see what reasons it contained to lead me to the conclusion that the proposed measure was uncalled-for or could only be injurious; but, my Lord, though I found in those letters and speeches and articles warm eloquence, much invective, more assertions, and some insinuations, I could find no reason to show that the view I took from the first as to the advisability of this step was wrong. I venture to think that, while all must admit the meeting of the 28th to have been an extraordinay expression of strong feeling, it was, like the articles and letters in the Press, confined to feeling only; and when a cause appears supported mainly by invective instead of calm and dignified reasoning, its importance diminishes and its significance fades.

" But we are bound, my Lord, to respect the feelings of all the races under our Government, though we are equally bound to analyse those feelings and to judge calmly and dispassionately of them, and to bear in mind that the other races may also have feelings to be equally consulted and respected; and this we shall do most carefully when the reports and objections, which will doubtless be sent in during the next six months, come to be considered by the Governor General in Council.

" My learned colleague has explained the legal effects of the proposed measure, and I have endeavoured to show that, while it is the logical outcome of the policy of the last quarter of a century, there are also causes of an administrative nature requiring its introduction; and there I would leave it, merely adding that, although the Magna Charta has been freely alluded to, and the right which is supposed to belong to every British subject, of being tried by his peers, made the most of, I know not how he former can

affect the matter, or where the latter right will be found granted to Europeans in India. In Calcutta it has long ceased, if it ever existed, and those very gentlemen who spoke so energetically about it have never possessed it; so that I think the issue must be, as it ought to be, confined to the simple one of whether the measure is required for the due administration of justice or not? And on this I have already shown my reasons for holding that it is an alteration of the law which the circumstances of the time have rendered justifiable."

His Excellency THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF said:—"My Lord, I ask permission to say a few words on this occasion, because I have been challenged to give my free and unrestrained opinion on the policy of the Government, and because unworthy attempts have been made to intimidate me from doing my duty in regard to the matter before us.

"At the outset I beg to say that, in dealing with the question of the proposed amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code, I confined myself entirely to the practical bearings of the case. The sorrows of Native officials, the symmetry of the law and philosophic theories have no special attraction for me, for I do not believe that the world can be ruled by logic alone. What I had to consider was this. Did the Government service require any change, and, if so, to what extent was change needed?

"I will say frankly that I should have been very glad if matters could have been left as they are. I have been long enough in India to have a very vivid recollection of the storm created by the so-called Black Act, and, having this before my mind, I proceeded to examine the question.

"Well, having been satisfied by the representations of the Home Department that it was necessary to remove some of the disabilities of the Native Members of the Civil Service, who must sooner or later be appointed to the charge of districts or to be Sessions Judges, I made up my mind to support the proposals of the Government so far as they were applicable to these two offices, and to these only.

"My reasons for going so far are these:—

"Though the principle involved is, no doubt, a large one and of considerable importance, yet it must be patent to anyone who cares to look into the matter that its practical application must for a considerable time be small. I looked upon the change as a very tentative measure, which in its operation could be carefully watched, and which would, in a legitimate way, give us an opportunity of testing the merits and qualifications of this class of Civil Servants.

"If, unfortunately, it should turn out that officers of this class could not be trusted with extended powers, the Government of the day would be obliged to reconsider the whole position, and perhaps retrace their steps. It is obvious that a Native Magistrate or Judge who exercised his functions in a tyrannical or unjust manner would not hold his office very long. Again, the proposed change seemed to me to be in the nature of what is called a permissive Bill. The Supreme Government gives power to certain classes of its officers, but it cannot appoint these officers. It is only Local Governments that have the power of appointment, and we may rely on their not appointing to such offices any but men of the highest character and qualification; for the stronger sympathies of the Governors will naturally lie on the side of their own countrymen.

"In point of fact, I looked on the amendment of the law as a very safe experiment, and an experiment that might well be tried when its provisions would only apply to one or two individuals. I knew there would be opposition to any change, but I believed that, when my countrymen understood the case in all its bearings, they would see that it was a safe way of introducing a change which the bitterest of its opponents admit to be a question of time.

"That my expectations and forecast have been utterly wrong I freely admit, but I am not prepared to admit that the objections which have been put forward by those who oppose our proceedings are founded either on reason or common sense.

"I have hitherto attempted to restrict my observation to my own personal connexion with the measure under discussion, but there is one other point on which I have something to say. Very wicked and criminal attempts have, as you know, been made in some of the newspapers to excite animosity against the Government in the army. My Lord, I cannot trust myself to speak on proceedings of this nature. I am aware that the army may, and perhaps does, take a keen interest in a question that is engrossing the thoughts of the public; but I feel confident that the army knows its duty, and that it is thoroughly loyal to its Sovereign and to its salt.

"Soldiers have their feelings like other people—feelings that we all respect; but they also know that, if they have a grievance to redress, there is a legitimate way of putting

it forward through their officers and those placed in authority over them. But what are we to say of persons who make use of such tactics in support of their arguments? They must, indeed, be in a bad way when they resort to such a course.

"It is possible that the reference to Cantonment Magistrates in the Bill may have misled people into the belief that the Government proposes to appoint Native Civilians to such offices. This would be an entire misapprehension.

"The following extract from a note which I received two days ago from the Secretary in the Legislative Department explains more clearly than I can why reference has been made to this class of officials in the Bill.

'With regard to Cantonment Magistrates, they were put in because they would not ordinarily be Covenanted Civilians, Native Civilians or Assistant Commissioners, and it was thought necessary that power should be given to appoint a Cantonment Magistrate, who would be almost certain to have to deal with European British subjects, a Justice of the Peace. Military officers who are Cantonment Magistrates can, under the present law (Act X. of 1882, section 22), be appointed Justices of the Peace if they are, as I suppose they always are, European British subjects.'

"It will, then, be seen that the Government does not intend to make any real change in the system under which Cantonment Magistrates are usually military officers.

"If the reference to Cantonment Magistrates had not been made in the amendment, the effect would have been that any person, even a person who was not an European British subject, might have been made a Cantonment Magistrate, and it was to avoid this difficulty that the point was raised in this form."

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor said:—"My Lord, I must apologise to the Council for being obliged to trouble them with a few remarks at this late hour, but the desire which I share with the other members of Council to hear the address of your Excellency compels me to be very brief. I feel, however, that I could scarcely remain silent, even if I wished to do so, after the several appeals which have been made in the course of the debate to the Government of Bengal, and after recent events which have testified in so prominent a manner the strong expression of public opinion in this City and the Province. At the same time, I confess, I feel I am in a position not altogether satisfactory regarding this proposed legislation; and if I had not received so late as yesterday evening from your Excellency an assurance that the motion now before the Council was of a purely formal character which pledged no one to the principle of the Bill, but, what is of more importance to me, that it is the intention of the Government of India to refer the Bill as drafted for the renewed consideration of Local Governments, I would not have hesitated to take this opportunity to state at length, and with such ability as I possess, the conviction which I entertain that this measure is unnecessary in the present condition and constitution of the Native Judicial Covenanted Service in Bengal, and that it is inopportune, having regard to the many claims which demand the most cordial relations between the Government and the European community in India. In saying that, I am not in an altogether satisfactory position, I allude to the fact to which reference has been made, that I have had no opportunity personally of consulting the officers of Government or recording my own views upon this change in the law; though at the same time I am aware that the Government of India had received from Sir Ashley Eden a communication which favoured the view of withdrawing restrictions which now exist against Native Judges and Magistrates in the matter of the trial of European British subjects. Any defects or omissions in that respect will now be removed or remedied; and, as I shall have the opportunity of referring to the experienced officers of Government for their opinion, I think it the wiser and more appropriate course, and a course in which I am justified by the temper and excitement around us, if I reserve my own judgment till I have received those opinions. Whatever value may attach to my own views of the question—and those views I will say have not been formed or expressed only recently—they may be modified, or they may be removed, or they may be strengthened by the result of the inquiry. But whatever the result may be, they shall be communicated to your Excellency's Government with the utmost unreserve. Ample and exhaustive as was the speech of my hon. and learned friend Mr. Evans, with a great deal of which I sympathise, there are a great many facts which I could bring forward to support his contention that there is no administrative difficulty in connexion with the matter, and I should have been inclined to challenge more strongly than he did the competency of the Native to try European British subjects. But this is not the occasion on which I shall press those views. It is right, however, that, before I conclude my remarks, I should say a few words as regards the attidude of resentment which has characterised the public meetings and public utterances in connexion with this

Bill. No man could deprecate more strongly and earnestly than myself the wild, extravagant, and very dangerous sentiments to which the excitement round about us has given occasion. And I am sure no Englishman, Scotchman, or even Irishman, in his lucid moments, will think that the cause he advocates will be advanced or promoted by the threats levelled at the Government by certain writers and comments in the Press. If the Bill is not to be withdrawn—and this suggestion has come from a good many quarters—I sincerely trust the suspension of the measure for some months will induce a calmer judgment. No Government can deal with legislation, or with the withdrawal of legislation, in the presence of a popular phrenzy. Still I shall be wanting in my duty if I failed to press on the Government that I hope that, in their abscence from personal contact with the public feeling, they will not allow themselves to think that the calm which I hope will supervene is an indication of apathy or indifference. If it be the opinion of the Government of India that this is a case of temporary excitement, which will soon die out, I am sure they are mistaken; for I feel that, in the whole of my experience in India, this is unmistakeably the strongest and most united and unanimous expression of opinion of public discontent that I have ever known, and that the last state will be worse than the first. I could wish for myself that the Bill could be withdrawn, and I do so, not only for myself, but as expressing the opinion of a great many who have spoken to me on the subject, even though they support the principle of the Bill. I believe that such difficulties happen to all Governments, and that the oldest and most English course is the wisest and safest. It is in the knowledge of all of us that such a course has been adopted in many cases, in our home Parliamentary experience, and it has not unseldom been the case also in India; and, if I may venture to allude to the fact, I think your Lordship's reputation in this country as a Viceroy, who has endeavoured earnestly and honestly to promote the political and educational development of the people, will not be affected if you see your way to withdraw the Bill."

His Excellency THE PRESIDENT said:—"I am very sorry that I should feel it my duty to detain the members of this Council yet a while after the lengthened and able discussion to which we have listened for so many hours; but I feel bound to make some statement, before this discussion closes, of the grounds upon which the Government have proceeded in introducing this Bill, and to explain the reasons which led them to think that it was a right and a reasonable measure. The observations which I wish to make now will be, as far as possible, of a strictly practical character. I do not intend or desire to enter into needless controversy, for I wish to reserve to myself the freedom carefully to weigh and consider the arguments which have been adduced in the course of this debate on both sides of the question at issue. It has been to me a source of regret that I have not had an opportunity before to-day of explaining the course which the Government has pursued; but that I have not had an earlier opportunity of doing so has not been my fault. It was the intention of the Government to have taken a discussion upon this Bill upon the 23rd of February. We never had the least intention of hurrying this measure through the Council, or of proceeding with it further than the stage which I described when it was brought in as the second reading stage during the present Calcutta season; but we did propose, and it was necessary that we should propose, as the rules stood when this Bill was brought in, that it should have been referred to a Select Committee before we left here, with a view to its being afterwards circulated and published as the rules required. But when my honourable friends Mr. Evans and Mr. Miller became acquainted with the intention of the Government to take a further stage of this Bill on the 23rd of February, they represented that they were somewhat taken by surprise by that proposal. Not that I understood them to make any complaint of want of good faith on the part of the Government; but they urged that they did not expect any such discussion to come on on that date. In consequence of those representations, I had an interview with my hon. and learned friend Mr. Evans, on the 19th of February, and I then said to him that I was anxious that this discussion should take place, because I felt that it was only fair to the Government that they should have an early opportunity of explaining at greater length than had been explained by my hon. and learned friend Mr. Ilbert, when he brought in this Bill, the objects of this measure, and the reasons which had induced them to submit it to this Council. I said to my hon. and learned friend, Mr. Evans—'You may perhaps object to a discussion in the nature of a second reading, but it is possible for us, under the present rules, to take a formal discussion upon a reference of this Bill to Local Governments; that would afford a sufficient opportunity for the statement that I propose to make, and would not involve a discussion upon the principle of the Bill.' My hon. and learned friend took time to consider whether he

could agree to that proposal or whether he must adhere to the objection previously urged on his own behalf and on that of Mr. Miller to the discussion on the date proposed, and on the next day he informed me that he could not waive that objection. I then had to choose between putting my hon. and learned friend and Mr. Miller at some disadvantage, and putting myself and the Government at some disadvantage. I chose the latter alternative. It has been one of the many accusations made against the Government, that they delayed a farther explanation on this subject: those who have used that argument will now have an opportunity of judging of the justice of their charge. I may as well also say, as my hon. and learned friend is here, and will bear me out, that, when I saw him on the 19th of February, I explained to him that the Government had no intention of passing the Bill during the present session; to that my hon. and learned friend assented. I was, therefore, somewhat surprised when I saw next day a statement in Reuter's telegram, that something had been said in the House of Commons, which appeared to imply that this measure was going to be pressed forward now; and I immediately explained to the Secretary of State that that statement was not correct. It was founded on an entire misapprehension of the intentions of the Government. It would have been totally inconsistent with the declared policy of the present Government of India, if they had thought of unduly pressing forward this measure, and of not affording the fullest opportunity to the public and those interested in the matter to consider it. My hon. friend Mr. Miller touched upon that point, and he seemed, I thought, somewhat to complain that the public had not been consulted in this case in the manner in which we professed to consult them in respect to our legislative measures. Now, that charge —if it was meant as a charge—is founded on a mistake. The Government never professed that they would submit their Bills to the public before being brought in. No Government ever did or could do such a thing. All that we said was that, when our measures were brought in and published, the public should have the fullest opportunity of considering them; and that we ourselves desired to consider any representations which might be made to us upon any proposals for legislation which we might so submit. To that course we have strictly adhered in this case, and have acted in perfect and absolute accordance with all our professions in respect to giving the public full time to consider our legislative proposals.

"I thought it necessary to make these observations, in order to clear away some misapprehensions and misrepresentations which have surrounded this matter for some time.

"And now I will proceed to state very briefly the history of this transaction. Something was said upon the occasion of the introduction of this Bill by Sir Jotíndra Mohan Tagore about an undertaking which had been given him last year to the effect that this subject would be considered by the Government of India. What took place on that occasion was this. When the Criminal Procedure Code was before the Council last year, one of my hon. colleagues,—I cannot exactly remember which,—who was a member of the Select Committee on that Bill, came to me and said that Mahárájá Jotíndra Mohan Tagore had told the Select Committee that he intended to raise the question of the powers of Native Magistrates to exercise jurisdiction over European British subjects. That was at a time when the Bill had nearly reached its last stage, and my hon. colleague said, with perfect justice, that it would be entirely impossible to take up a question of such magnitude upon that stage of the Bill; and he said to me—'I think, if you were to speak to the Mahárájá and tell him that, if he did not bring this matter forward now, the question would be considered by the Government, he probably would not press his notice of amendment.' I replied 'I will consult my colleagues'; and I did consult the members of the Executive Government at that time, and it was with their full consent that I told Mahárájá Jotíndra Mohan Tagore that the subject in which he was interested should receive the full consideration of the Government. Of course, by so saying, I gave no pledge whatever to the Mahárájá as to what would be the decision at which the Government would ultimately arrive. All that I did say was—and that promise I and my colleagues intended to keep—that we would consider this question after the new Criminal Procedure Code had passed. But, before we had taken any steps whatever to fulfil that pledge, we received from Sir Ashley Eden a letter which is contained in these papers, and that letter winds up as the summary of the opinion of Sir Ashley Eden with these words:—

'For these reasons Sir Ashley Eden is of opinion that the time has now arrived when all Native members of the Covevanted Civil Service should be relieved of such restrictions of their powers as are imposed on them by Chapter XXXIII. of the New Code of Criminal Procedure, or when at least Native Covenanted Civilians who have attained the position of District Magistrate or Sessions Judge

should have entrusted to them full powers over all classes, whether European or Native, within their jurisdictions.'

"That opinion was expressed to us by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; it was a clear and distinct opinion. There is not one word in Mr. Cockerell's letter from which I have quoted which indicated any probability that a proposal of that kind would be received, I will not say with resentment, but even with disapproval by any portion of the community. Now, it is not necessary that I should recall to the recollection of this Council who was the person who made that recommendation. You all know that Sir Ashley Eden had been for five years Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; you all know that he was a man of large experience, and that he was intimately acquainted with the feelings of the European population; and certainly there was ample proof that he had their respect and confidence in the remarkable ovations which he received just before he left the country. Sir Ashley Eden did not accompany that letter by any other communications upon the subject, and, therefore, I had no doubt whatever that it contained his deliberate opinion and advice to the Government of India. My hon. and learned friend Mr. Evans says that Sir Ashley Eden only wanted to put his opinion on record; and he did not at all mean that anything should be done about it now. He only desired to say what he should like to see done at some future opportunity. But, in the first place, he says distinctly, in the summing-up of his letter,—'the time has now arrived for the change,' and, in the next place, it must be borne in mind that, if Sir Ashley Eden did not mean that the question should be taken up at an early date upon his proposal, he had a perfect opportunity of saying so; because, by a singular coincidence, marking the high respect entertained for that distinguished man by Her Majesty's Government, he went straight from the Government of Bengal to the Council of the Secretary of State at home; he was a member of that Council when our proposals were submitted to and sanctioned by the Secretary of State; and, therefore, if we had misinterpreted his views as my hon. and learned friend appears to think, or, if we had acted hastily on his opinion, he would undoubtedly have said so; and I cannot for a moment think that my noble friend Lord Hartington would not have communicated the fact to me: he did not do so. I should like to say one other word about Sir Ashley Eden. In the earlier stages of this controversy, before a large number of persons took to using strong language they used language of a milder kind, and they talked about this Bill as an ideal and sentimental measure. Now, I must say that, if ever I came across a man in my life who was not remarkable for the sentimental side to his character, that man was Sir Ashley Eden. I do not think that I ever knew a man less likely to be led away by vague sentiment or mere theory than Sir Ashley Eden. Then, what did Government do? If they had been so very keen to carry out this proposal; if they had been so very ready to proceed rashly in this matter, they would have had a very fair ground for acting at once, in the mere fact that a man so experienced as Sir Ashley Eden had recommended them to take that action. But they did nothing of the kind; they consulted the Local Governments on the subject, and the opinions of those Local Governments are before this Council. I have heard it said that those Local Governments felt themselves bound to give opinions which they thought would be agreeable to the Government of India. Well, really, it is needless on behalf of the Local Governments that we consulted—of men so eminent as those who fill the office of heads of those Governments—for me to reply to a charge of that description. The question was very carefully considered by those Governments, and their opinions are, with the single exception of the Local Government of Coorg, in favour of amending the present law. It is quite true that the Government of Madras were divided among themselves, and that the opinion given in favour of the Bill was only decided by the casting vote of the Governor of that Presidency. It is also true that another gentleman, Mr. Howell, has given an opinion which, if not absolutely clear, must on the whole be regarded as unfavourable to this proposal, but he reported as Commissioner of the Birárs to the Resident at Haidarábád, who advocated the principle of this Bill; and, therefore, I am strictly correct in saying that all Local Governments, with the exception of Coorg, were in favour of an alteration of the law. My hon. and learned friend, Mr. Evans, said that the only Local Government that is really concerned with this question at all is the Government of Bengal. But it was the Government of Bengal which started the question. I do not observe, however, that the European community in other parts of India appear inclined to admit that they have nothing to do with this subject; and I venture to think that all Local Governments have an interest in this matter, and are entitled to speak upon it. Can it be supposed that those distinguished men—many of them personal friends of my own—who are at the head of

Local Governments; if they had anticipated—I will not say danger, but—serious inconvenience, would not have advised me privately that this was a measure that ought not to be pressed forward? There are, doubtless, in these papers differences of opinion between different Local Governments, as to the extent to which this measure should go, just as there have been differences among members of the Executive Council on the same subject. My hon. and gallant friend the Commander-in-Chief says that, though he supports the measure, he would confine it to District Magistrates and Sessions Judges. Sir Charles Aitchison, on the other hand, went further than any other head of a Local Government; and the measure as produced and brought forward by the Government of India is one which has struck a mean between these different proposals and which, on the one hand, does not go so far as Sir Charles Aitchison recommended, and, on the other, goes somewhat further than the recommendations of some other Local Governments. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the measure was drawn up mainly in accordance with the amendments of the Code suggested in Sir Alfred Lyall's letter. Now, what was the next step taken with regard to this question? The next step taken was that the Government of India sent a despatch to the Secretary of State, Lord Hartington, last September, containing their proposals and forwarding the papers now before the Council. Lord Hartington must have received that letter late in September. It was upon the 7th of December that, in an answer to that letter, he stated that he had very carefully considered our proposals in Council, and that he gave them his sanction. My hon. and learned friend Mr. Evans alluded to the fact that this circular to Local Governments was not sent to the Government of Bengal. The course taken on the occasion was in accordance with the practice generally pursued; and it is a perfectly reasonable and intelligible practice, followed by all the departments of the Government of India, that, when one Local Government originates a proposal on which the Government desires to consult other Local Governments, the original proposal is sent round to those Governments, but not sent back to the Government from which it, in the first instance, emanated. The Bill was prepared and drafted in strict accordance with the proposals sanctioned by the Secretary of State. Leave was given to introduce it on the 2nd of February. It was brought in on the 9th of February; and the papers, containing the opinions of Local Governments, were circulated to members of Council and given to the public at the earliest possible opportunity. I believe I am right in saying that they were circulated to members of Council on the 12th February.

"That is the history of this transaction up to the introduction of the Bill. And I turn now to consider what was the state of things in respect to the position of Natives of India in the Civil Service of the Crown, with which we had to deal. I am dealing now solely with the case of the Covenanted Civil Servants. I leave aside the question of the non-regulation Provinces, which is not material to the present argument. I say nothing of Cantonment Magistrates, because my hon. and gallant friend the Commander-in-Chief has explained the Cantonment Magistrates are almost invariably military officers, and that no Native gentlemen are likely to be appointed to positions of that kind. The question, therefore, we have to consider here relates to the Native members of the Covenanted Civil Service, because it must be borne in mind that, although in departmental practice, it has been the custom to describe the members of the Covenanted Civil Service admitted under Lord Lytton's rules as members serving under the statutory rules, they are under those rules themselves—rules approved by the Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook, and laid before Parliament — admitted to employment in Her Majesty's Covenanted Civil Service. These are the words of the rule as sanctioned by the Secretary of State and by Parliament; and, therefore, the persons with whom we have to deal are the members of the Covenanted Civil Service. Our proposal, I would just point out, is a very much narrower one than that which was made in the year 1857, and to which Mr. Evans alluded. In that year there were no Native members of the Covenanted Civil Service. The proposal of 1857 would have subjected European British subjects to the jurisdiction of all the Mufassal Courts of every grade. The present Bill does not go nearly so far. Well, what is the state of things with which we have to deal now? I have said that in 1857 there were no Native members of the Civil Service at all. They have come in since;—first, by competition, having gone home and competed on equal terms with Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen, and won their way in that competition into the Civil Service; and recently under the new system inaugurated in the time of Lord Lytton. The time has now arrived when some of these gentleman have risen to high judicial positions. Mr. Tagore is one, and I have been informed that Mr. Dutt has also been raised to a similar office. Therefore, they are now

beginning to reach those positions, and the number of those who fill such appointments must gradually and steadily increase. Mr. Miller asks in what have the times changed since 1872? They have changed in this respect, that some of these Native gentlemen have acquired these important positions, and others will go on rising to them in increasing numbers in coming years. But the great change which has taken place in regard to this question from an administrative point of view has been that which was made by Lord Lytton's Government in 1879. That change was made by the express order of the Government at home: indeed, after the reiterated orders of successive Secretaries of State. I am not about to express any opinion as to the mode in which these gentlemen are now admitted into the Covenanted Civil Service under the rules of 1879. It may be that these rules can be improved. Nothing is more probable than that experience may show that they are capable of amendment. But what we have to consider is, what is the position in which these rules place the gentlemen admitted under them? and what will be the effect of them as time goes on? These gentlemen will rise in the Covenanted Service year by year, and they will be entitled to hold higher and higher offices as they advance, until ultimately they will attain to the highest judicial offices below the High Court. Now, it has been contended that the Local Governments, when they spoke of Covenanted Civilians, only meant those who had got in by competition. I have no reason to suppose that that is the case with any of the opinions which have been expressed, because the words 'Covenanted Civil Service' cover all the members of that Service. The Hon. Mr. Evans quoted Mr. Elliott, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and he said that Mr. Elliott only proposed that these powers should be conferred upon persons who had got into the Covenanted Service by competition. Mr. Elliott no doubt drew a distinction between the two classes; but he said that he would extend the powers to the second class when they became District Magistrates or Sessions Judges. Now, it seems clear to me that, as these gentlemen in the Civil Service rise to the higher appointments, especially to the appointments of District Magistrates and Sessions Judges, increasing administrative inconvenience must ensue unless these additional powers are conferred on them. If they are to hold these offices, it appears to me that inconvenience of a serious kind must arise as time goes on; indeed, I shall have to show that it has arisen already. The Hon. Mr. Evans has said that what we ought to do is to give the best justice we can to everyone in the country without giving rise to administrative inconvenience. I entirely concur in that opinion, and I say administrative inconvenience has already begun to be felt, and it will increase. That being the state of things with which we had to deal, some of these gentlemen being already in high administrative positions, and a still larger number coming on from below, we felt it our duty to see in what way we could best remove this administrative inconvenience, and, I must also say, the injustice to suitors which would be caused by dragging them long distances over the country.

"I turn to consider what is the scope of the Bill. I have shown you that the extent of our Bill is very much less than that of the Bill of 1857. It is very much less than that of the Bill brought in by Lord Dalhousie's Government in 1849. We have confined it to the strict necessities of the case, and the result of it would be that, if it were passed to-day, it would at once confer jurisdiction over European British subjects upon only two persons in India; and the number who would rise to that position during the next few years might not exceed four or five. That statement supplies, as it seems to me, the strongest argument against the proposal of the Government. It is said, why do this now when it will only affect Mr. Tagore and Mr. Dutt? Why do this now, when, if there is administrative inconvenience, it is only in one or two places? and I admit that I am bound to meet that objection, and to explain why the Government think that this is a convenient opportunity for making the change.

"But, before I do so, I must point out that, of course, that argument cuts both ways. If the scope of the Bill is so very small, then it seems not altogether reasonable that it should have been encountered by such violent opposition. In stating the reasons why it appears to me to be desirable to make this change now, rather than to postpone it until the appointment of a much larger number of these gentlemen to high judicial positions, I desire to deal with this question strictly from a practical point of view. I am not going upon this occasion to enter into any examination whatever of any claims which these Native gentlemen may have to exercise this jurisdiction; but, at the same time, I cannot but ask members of this Council to consider whether—I do not speak now of justice or generosity—it is politic, if there be not an overwhelming necessity, for us to impose on these gentlemen restrictions which sensitive men would naturally feel? These men, it must be admitted, are the pick and cream of our Native Civil

Service; those who are now in this position, or are about to enter into it, have won their way through a keen competition at home, and secured their position through their own ability. Under Lord Lytton's system, by which, for the future, at least one-sixth of the whole Covenanted Service will in course of time consist of Natives, we shall have to rely more and more, year by year, on the devotion and loyalty of these gentlemen. I think the question of policy is not undeserving of the consideration of this Council; but I pass from it to the practical question. My hon. friend Mr. Gibbs has shown you to-night that the idea that administrative inconvenience may arise is not an imagination or a theory; he has pointed out to you what are the circumstances in regard to Mr. Tagore, the Sessions Judge of Kárwár; and he has explained that, if certain railway works which, he says, are likely to commence there are opened, they will bring European British subjects in considerable numbers into that district. If these persons are not tried by the Sessions Judge, they will either have to be sent by sea to Bombay, or have to march 80 or a 100 miles through a district which at many times of the year is very injurious to health. This constitutes a real administrative inconvenience, and it implies, not only an inconvenience to the administration of justice, but also a considerable hardship to the suitors and witnesses concerned. And it is surely clear that, though there is not at the present moment an irresistible necessity for introducing this measure, as Lord Lytton's system develops an irresistible necessity will arise. When you have one-sixth of the Civil Service composed of Natives, it will be impossible to maintain the present restriction. Therefore, what we had to consider was—is it better to wait until this necessity becomes overwhelming and irresistible, or is it better to introduce the system now? I confess it appears to me that it is far wiser, and far more in the true and substantial interests of those over whom this jurisdiction is exercised, that it should be introduced now, when the persons who would obtain the powers are very limited in number; when the circumstances under which they enter the Civil Service insure their ability and character; and when all their proceedings can be carefully watched. Being few in number, it will be easier now than afterwards for the attention of the Local Governments and the public to be directed to their proceedings; and, being the men they are, it seems to me that they would be likely to set a good example and give a good tone to those who come after them. I hold it therefore, to be wiser to introduce the measure now gradually, cautiously, and tentatively, than to wait till the change is forced upon us by necessity, and the powers which are now to be given only to a few men have to be given suddenly to a very much larger number of Native Civil Servants. This is the ground upon which I thought that the time had come when this change could best be made. The truth is, that the opposition to this Bill is in reality, not so much an opposition to this particular measure, as an opposition to the declared policy of Parliament about the admission of Natives to the Covenanted Civil Service. That policy has been a deliberate policy; it commenced many years ago, and has been enforced steadily from time to time. It is not a policy of my invention or of the invention of the present Government at home or here; it is the policy of Parliament. What does Lord Cranbrook say upon that subject, writing to Lord Lytton's Government on the 7th of November 1878? He says—

'The broad policy was laid down by Parliament so long ago as 1833, that no Native shall, by reason of his religion, place of birth or colour, be disabled from holding any office; and Her Majesty's gracious proclamation in 1858 announced her will that, as far as may be 'our subjects of whatever race or creed be impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge'.'

"And he goes on to say—

'Since that period several of my predecessors in office, and especially Lord Halifax, Sir Stafford Northcote, the Duke of Argyll, and Lord Salisbury, have pressed upon the attention of the Government of India that the policy of Parliament, enforced as it was by the Royal proclamation, was not to remain a dead-letter, and two Acts of Parliament were passed to give further effect to it. But, as your Excellency justly observes, all endeavours hitherto to deal with this question on a satisfactory basis have proved unsuccessful. It is gratifying to observe that your Lordship's elaborate treatment of the subject will enable a practical course to be taken, that will prove, it may be hoped, both beneficial to the State and satisfactory to the natural aspirations of the educated Natives of India.'

"That is said, not by me, but by Lord Cranbrook; and I cannot doubt that, if that policy is now applied under the rules laid down by Lord Lytton's Government in 1879, and is carried out as he proposed, an alteration of the law in the direction in which this Bill

goes is inevitable at no distant time. The Government of India have not the power, if they had the inclination, which certainly I have not, to withdraw from that policy; and Lord Cranbrook very distinctly tells us that, in his judgment, Parliament will not withdraw from it. Lord Lytton's original proposal was that, when he established a separate Native Service, permission to Natives to compete for the Civil Service in England should be withdrawn. What Lord Cranbrook says on that subject is this—

'But your proposal of a close Native Service, with a limited class of high appointments attached to it, and your suggestions that the Covenanted Civil Service should no longer be open to Natives, involve an application to Parliament which would have no prospect of success, and which I certainly would not undertake. Your Lordship has yourself observed that no scheme could have a chance of sanction which included legislation for the purpose of repealing the clause in the Act of 1833 above quoted; and the obstacles which would be presented against any attempt to exclude Natives from public competition for the Civil Service would be little less formidable.'

"Therefore it appears to me to be evident that the intention of Parliament has been to admit Natives more and more largely into the Covenanted Service; that steps were taken in 1879, after a considerable delay and frequent injunctions from the Secretary of State, to carry out that intention more fully; and that the result has been, as I have stated, that we have now to deal with a state of things in which, before many years have elapsed, it will be, as I have said, simply impossible, on account of administrative inconvenience, to withhold powers of this description from the higher ranks of the Covenanted Native Service. The Hon. Mr. Evans has said that he could not admit the force of the argument that because Presidency Magistrates had power to try Europeans, therefore, similar powers should be given to Native Magistrates in the Mufassal. I admit a considerable portion of the argument of my hon. friend, but he must allow me to say that the fact that Natives of India have been trying Europeans for a considerable number of years in Calcutta and Bombay is a conclusive argument against the theory that Englishmen have a constitutional right to be tried by Englishmen only. No one is more convinced than I am of the advantage of having a case argued before a Magistrate by trained lawyers; and I would not for a moment think of underrating its importance. Nevertheless, I was rather struck with what I saw in a Bombay newspaper this morning. It certainly did seem rather curious, after all that has been said on this subject, to find that certain European gentlemen, composing what is called the Salvation Army, are being tried at this moment in Bombay by Mr. Dossabhoy Framjee. Their religious feelings are very intimately involved in the case which is being tried by that Native Magistrate. I did not intend to have said anything about the past history of this question, because, as I have mentioned before, my main object has been to explain the reasons which have induced the Government to bring in this Bill. But Mr. Evans has spoken with personal knowledge of what was called the compromise of 1872. On that point I would say this. There may have been a compromise between the members of the European community and the members of the Select Committee. Of that I know nothing, although I have not the least doubt that the Hon. Mr. Evans has stated exactly what occurred; but it is perfectly obvious that that compromise cannot have been a compromise with the Government; because, if it had been, then Lord Napier of Merchistoun, Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir Richard Temple, Sir George Campbell, and Mr. Barrow Ellis could never for a moment have given their support to an amendment inconsistent with it. My hon. friend Mr. Ilbert, in the speech with which he commenced this discussion, pointed out that all the safeguards now possessed by Europeans, and all the special privileges now enjoyed by them, were left standing by this Bill, except the single one of being exempted from the jurisdiction of Magistrates who are not European British subjects. This Bill does not touch the rest of these safeguards; and the Government has not the least intention of submitting any proposals now or hereafter, certainly not as long as I am here, with the view of interfering with those privileges. But there is another matter which I look upon as in some respects a more important safeguard, and that is the power of supervision exercised by the High Court over all the Courts below. What would be the result if a Native Magistrate trying an European acted towards him in an unjust manner? If the case came before the High Court, or if they even heard of it, they would be able to call for the proceedings, and the consequence would be to deprive that gentleman of the position which he might have so abused. That is the history of this measure, and of the grounds upon which it was introduced, and of the extent to which it goes. I know very well that a great deal has been said, as is always said when changes are introduced, about this being the thin end of the wedge. I can only say that, so far as this question is con-

cerned, it is not the thin end of the wedge, and that this measure represents the final views of the present Government in respect to changes regarding this portion of the Criminal Procedure Code. Passing from the history of the course we have taken and the motives which have actuated us, I may now state that we are perfectly ready to listen to reasonable remonstrances, to statements of fact and to legitimate arguments. But neither this nor any other Government that will ever exist in India will, I hope, listen to violence, to exaggeration, to misrepresentation, and, least of all, to menace. It is perfectly natural that those whose interests are affected by this Bill, that those who would lose under it a privilege to which they evidently attach a great value, should bring their views on the subject before the Government, and should press them earnestly upon their attention. I should be the last man to complain of that being done, and I should be the last man not to give to such representations the fullest and most careful consideration; and those who are animated by the dread, which has been expressed in many quarters, of the results of this measure, may rely upon it that a fair representation of their opinions, supported by good arguments, will be listened to with the greatest attention. It is, of course, true that in this, as in every other, question with which the Government of India has to deal, it is obliged to take a wider view than that confined exclusively to the interest of any single class of the community; but it is also true that any special class of the community, which is specially affected by any particular measure, has a right to bring its views before the Government, and to expect that those views will be fully and carefully examined. I will not allude on this occasion to the character of a great deal of the opposition which has sprung up to this Bill, or to the means by which that opposition has been to a great extent conducted; I will say nothing of the charges which have been made against myself, or of the systematic misrepresentation of my feelings and objects in regard to this and other measures. I pass that by; but I can truly say that it is a source of deep regret to me and all my colleagues to observe the difference which has in this matter sprung up between the Government and, I admit, a very large portion of the European community, especially on this side of India. I do not know whether anything that I can say will tend to mitigate the bitterness of the controversy or to induce calmness; but if the vehemence of feeling is due in any degree to a misapprehension as to the scope of the Bill or the course which the Government intended to pursue in regard to it, or to a fear that we have ulterior designs which we never have entertained, then it is possible that this discussion may have done good. It is only right that it should be remembered that the Government never had the smallest idea of hurrying this Bill through the Council. They proposed to deal with it deliberately, and to afford the amplest opportunity for the representation of opinion in regard to it. It will be observed that it was before any such representations had reached the Government, and, therefore, before it had been in their power to consider them, that the proceedings which have been adverted to were adopted. This Bill will now, in accordance with the usual practice, be sent to the various Local Governments, and they will have an opportunity of recording their views upon it. These views will be sent up in due course, after careful examination by the Local Governments into all the circumstances of the case, for the consideration of the Government of India; and we shall then give to the observations of the Local Governments and of the public which may have reached us in the meantime, the fullest weight and the most deliberate consideration. I frankly say that with those who desire, if any such there be, to retain the distinction which this Bill proposes to remove, merely because it is a race distinction, I have no sympathy whatever. To arguments which are inconsistent with the declared policy of the Crown and of Parliament it would be contrary to my duty to listen; but to fair reasons, urged in a manner to which the Government can give heed, the ears of myself and my colleagues will always be open on this and every other question. I observe that the opponents of this Bill speak of appealing to the House of Commons. I am the last man in the world to object to such a course being taken. To the decision of the House of Commons both parties to this controversy must bow. I do not think I have anything more to add now by way of explanation of the views of the Government. I have kept myself clear of controversy, because I wish to hold myself perfectly open to consider the arguments adduced on both sides in this debate. If I had thrown myself into this controversy, it might fairly be objected that I had not reserved to myself real freedom to consider those arguments. I have shown that this measure was recommended to the Government by Sir Ashley Eden, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; that its principle has been approved by all the other Local Governments in India, with the exception of that of Coorg; and that it

has been very carefully considered by the late Secretary of State for India, Lord Hartington, in Council and sanctioned by him. I have recalled to the recollection of the Council the circumstances in which we stand at this moment, and those in which we shall stand in no distant future, with respect to the position of the Native members of the Covenanted Civil Service. I have pointed out how very limited the immediate effect of the Bill will be, and have stated the reasons which induce me to think that it is wiser to make the proposed change now, when it can be brought into operation gradually and cautiously, than to wait until administrative necessities and justice to suitors compel the Government to introduce it suddenly and extensively. Lastly, I have expressed the perfect readiness of the Government to consider and to weigh any remonstrances which may be made against this Bill, provided they are supported by arguments which are consistent with the policy of Parliament. The Government do not propose to take any further steps in this matter now, and ample time will thus be afforded for the deliberate examination by Local Governments, by the Government of India and by the Government at home of any representations which may be made to them in connexion with this measure."

The Motion was put and agreed to.

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India Office,
8th June 1883.

J. K. CROSS,
Under Secretary of State for India.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

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1883.

[C.—3655.] *Price* ½*d.*

THE INDIAN NATIVE JURISDICTION BILL.

(Reuter's Telegram.)

Calcutta, March 9.

The Bill relating to the jurisdiction of native magistrates over European British subjects in India came before the Council to-day, on the motion of Mr. Ilbert for its publication. It was explained that it did not originate with Mr. Ilbert, but was suggested by a letter from Sir Ashley Eden, and introduced after the whole Council had taken into consideration the opinion of the local governments. It was further pointed out that it left untouched the limitations on sentences which might be passed on European subjects of the British Crown by the Mofussil Courts, the right to trial by mixed jury, and the right to apply for release from illegal custody. It merely substituted for the disqualification arising from race, a qualification depending on tried personal fitness. Speeches were made in support of the Bill by various members of the Executive Council and by the following independent members, viz., Mr. Quinton, Rai Bahadur Kristodas Pal, Durga Charan Laha, Sayyad Ahmed Khan Bahadur, and Messrs. Reynolds and Hunter. The following spoke in opposition :—Messrs. Miller and Evans, Rajah Siva Prasad, Mr. Thomas, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The last named, though opposing the Bill, suspended his final opinion until after consultation with his officers. Messrs. Hunter and Gibbs cited instances showing that grave administrative inconvenience would arise unless the Bill was carried, as the native civil servants, not being competent to try European British subjects, would be excluded from all the more desirable districts. Sir Donald Stewart, the commander-in-chief, and others pointed out that the Bill was merely a permissive measure, which would be put in force tentatively by degrees. Moreover, the powers under it would be conferred only on natives of approved fitness. As regarded the apprehension that it might be merely the thin edge of the wedge, Sir Stewart Bayley stated it was meant to be final, and no further steps in the same direction were contemplated. Lieutenant-General Wilson stated that he was the one member of the Government who had throughout opposed the amendment. He still considered it unnecessary and impolitic, but he strongly condemned the violent language used regarding it, and the personal attacks made on his colleagues in connexion with the Bill. Both he and Sir Donald Stewart expressed warm disapproval of the efforts made to excite the volunteers and British troops. The opposition to the Bill was based chiefly on the ground that it would tend to create hostility between the natives and Europeans, that it would expose isolated Europeans up-country to the risk of having false charges brought against them and tried by native judges ignorant of European ways; and that it would thus keep European capital away from India. It was explained that the Government would be ready to consider fully any arguments brought against the Bill before the next cold weather, and that all the local governments would be consulted on all its details before anything was done. The Marquis of Ripon explained the circumstances under which the Bill had been brought in, and stated that during March of last year Sir Ashley Eden, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, sent a letter to the Indian Government, in which he gave it as his opinion that the time had arrived when all natives, being covenanted civil servants, should be released from the restrictions placed upon their powers by Chapter 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On receipt of this letter, the Government consulted all the local governments in India, and their replies showed them, with the single exception of Coorg, to be in favour of a change in the existing law in the direction indicated by Sir Ashley Eden. There was a division of opinion on the subject within the Madras Government itself, but the Bombay Government was unanimous. The question was then referred, in September last, by the Indian Government to Lord Hartington, who very carefully considered it in Council and sanctioned the alteration of the law embodied in the present Bill. The Viceroy then pointed out that, with the exception of a special provision for non-regulation provinces, the Bill only proposed to confer jurisdiction over British subjects on native members of the covenanted service. Of these a certain number were now beginning to rise to the high judicial positions of sessions judges and district magistrates, while under the new system introduced by Lord Lytton's Government in 1879, in a certain number of years *the whole covenanted service** would consist of natives. When

* The words used by Lord Ripon were "one-sixth of the whole covenanted service." The omission was due to a clerical error.

R 7735. Wt. P 463.

this occurred it would be obviously impossible on the simple ground of administrative convenience to continue the existing restrictions. In the first instance, the Bill would have very limited scope. Indeed, if it passed now, only two gentlemen would obtain powers under it, and not more than four or five in the course of the next few years. The most plausible argument against making a change in the law now was that the effect would be so small; but the Viceroy argued that as a change must inevitably be made on the grounds of administrative convenience and justice to suitors before many years had passed, it was wiser and more prudent to introduce it now when it could be brought into operation gradually and cautiously, when its working could be easily watched, and when the persons on whom it would confer jurisdiction were men of ability who had got into the service by competition at home, and who would set a good example to their successors rather than wait till administrative necessities forced the Government to make the change much more suddenly and extensively. The opposition to the Bill was really more an opposition to the declared policy of Parliament, as to the admission of natives to the covenanted civil service than to this particular measure. Lord Lytton's new rules made the change inevitable at no distant time. The Bill touched none of the special privileges of British subjects which were numerous, except the single one of not being tried for a criminal offence by any native judicial officer in the Mofussil, however high his position. The supervision of the high courts over all courts below was by itself sufficient to ensure that if any native judge misconducted himself he would be immediately called to account. The Indian Government were perfectly ready to consider and weigh any reasonable objections or legitimate arguments against the Bill, but they could not listen to violence or misrepresentation. The Government were bound to take a wider view of every question than the single interest of any class, but the objections of any class specially affected by any particular measure were always entitled to special consideration. Arguments inconsistent with the declared policy of Parliament about the admission of natives to the civil service the Government could not accept, but all fair reasons against the Bill would be thoroughly considered by himself and his colleagues. The opponents of the Bill spoke of appealing to the Government at home and the House of Commons. It was their constitutional right to do so, and to the decision of those authorities both parties to this controversy would be forced to bow. Plenty of time would be afforded between now and next November for a full examination of any representations which might be made in connexion with the Bill.

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